



U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Inspector General
Office of Audits and Inspections

Inspection Report

Tactical Response Force Pursuit Operations at Idaho National Laboratory

INS-O-13-02

November 2012



Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

November 30, 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MANAGER, IDAHO OPERATIONS OFFICE

Sandra D. Bruce

FROM: Sandra D. Bruce
Assistant Inspector General
for Inspections
Office of Inspector General

SUBJECT: INFORMATION: Inspection Report on "Tactical Response Force Pursuit Operations at Idaho National Laboratory"

BACKGROUND

In support of the Department of Energy's mission, several national laboratories, to include Idaho National Laboratory (Idaho), work with Special Nuclear Material. Idaho protects such materials with an armed protective force comprised of specially trained and equipped contractor personnel. Idaho is managed and operated by Battelle Energy Alliance (Battelle). The Department's Idaho Operations Office oversees the activities of Idaho and Battelle.

Because of the presence of nuclear materials, Federal regulations require Idaho's contractor to maintain a highly trained Tactical Response Force to protect nuclear weapons, weapon components and Special Nuclear Material. As part of Idaho's protection strategy, the Tactical Response Force is equipped with vehicles to respond to attacks and pursue adversaries. It is possible for adversaries to cross jurisdictional lines and enter into a jurisdiction where several different Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies reside.

Because such activities have the potential to endanger members of the public, we initiated this inspection to determine whether Idaho's Tactical Response Force was properly prepared, trained and equipped to execute its mission related to pursuit of suspects across jurisdictional lines.

RESULTS OF INSPECTION

Our inspection revealed several weaknesses with Idaho's approach to pursuits that could cross jurisdictional lines. In particular, we identified problems with coordination, communication and equipment that could, if not addressed, result in confusion and lead to injury of members of the public. Specifically, we found that:

- Idaho had not coordinated with and established Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with other law enforcement bodies regarding specific roles and responsibilities during pursuits across jurisdictional lines;

- Emergency notification procedures necessary to communicate with Federal, state or local law enforcement agencies during pursuit operations across jurisdictional lines were not formalized and documented; and,
- Tactical Response Force vehicles were not properly equipped to adequately alert the public during pursuit operations.

With regard to pursuits, we were told that the *Site Safeguards and Security Plan* (SSSP) does not require the Tactical Response Force to obtain assistance from law enforcement agencies in the jurisdiction affected by the pursuit, and as such, formal agreements such as MOUs were not required. We noted, however, that other Department sites with Tactical Response Force personnel had MOUs with law enforcement agencies to avoid confusion regarding roles and responsibilities when crossing jurisdictional lines. Agreements in this area are particularly important because Department Order 473.3, *Protection Program Operations*, specifically requires that primary responsibility must be ceded to law enforcement officials from other jurisdictions if they choose to become involved with the pursuit.

We were also told that Idaho had not formalized and documented its emergency notification procedures because the Tactical Response Force knew what to do when communicating with law enforcement officials from other jurisdictions during a pursuit. However, we found that Idaho's position was not consistent with the requirements of the Tactical Response Force's internal policy and requirements established by the Department. Specifically, the Department requires each site to prepare site-specific guidelines that address procedures used to provide emergency notification to jurisdictions that may be crossed during a pursuit situation. Local directives also require that tactical responders adhere to emergency notification procedures when crossing or entering other jurisdictions. This direction could be difficult to follow because Idaho had not formalized and documented its emergency notification procedures.

Finally, Idaho officials indicated that due to budget considerations and Idaho's commitment to cost effective implementation of Department policy, Idaho officials chose to equip their vehicles as opposed to purchasing fully equipped vehicles. While acknowledging that not all of their Tactical Response Force pursuit vehicles had the equipment listed in Department Order 473.3 and Idaho State Statutes, Idaho Operations Office officials stated that due to tactical considerations, it was "not practical" to equip all of their vehicles with the required lights and sirens. However, Department policy does not specifically allow sites to deviate from equipment requirements on their own authority.

Without the proper mechanisms in place there is potential for confusion between law enforcement agencies from other jurisdictions that could compromise a successful pursuit operation, as well as increase the risk to public safety. To help reduce the risk in this area, we made recommendations designed to enhance coordination with Federal, state or local law enforcement agencies and reduce the risk to public safety during pursuit operations that may cross jurisdictional lines.

While we recognize that pursuits across jurisdictional lines are not everyday occurrences, site security forces must adhere to established Department protocols that might impact its ability to successfully pursue adversaries. The circumstances we observed during our Special Inquiry, [*Inquiry into the Security Breach at the National Nuclear Security Administration's Y-12 National Security Complex*](#), (OIG-0868, August 2012), readily demonstrate the impact of failure to ensure that established security protocols are adhered to.

MANAGEMENT REACTION

Management concurred with the report's recommendations and indicated it was in the process of implementing improvements to address our recommendations. Management's formal comments are included in Appendix 3.

Attachment

cc: Deputy Secretary
Associate Deputy Secretary
Acting Under Secretary of Energy
Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy
Chief of Staff

REPORT ON TACTICAL RESPONSE FORCE PURSUIT OPERATIONS AT IDAHO NATIONAL LABORATORY

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TACTICAL RESPONSE FORCE PURSUIT OPERATIONS AT IDAHO NATIONAL LABORATORY

TACTICAL RESPONSE FORCE PURSUIT OPERATIONS

Idaho National Laboratory's (Idaho) Tactical Response Force did not have appropriate mechanisms in place to effectively coordinate and communicate with law enforcement agencies to engage in pursuit operations across jurisdictional lines. Further, the Tactical Response Force did not have proper visual and audible equipment on its vehicles to assure public safety during pursuit operations. Department Order 473.3, *Protection Program Operations*, Idaho State Statutes, and Idaho's Tactical Response Force policy provides requirements for the Tactical Response Force to follow during a pursuit of an adversary that leaves the site and enters another law enforcement agency's jurisdiction.

Coordination with Law Enforcement Agencies

We found that Idaho had not coordinated with and established Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with other local law enforcement bodies regarding specific roles and responsibilities during pursuits across jurisdictional lines. Department Order 473.3 addresses coordination with other law enforcement agencies, and stipulates that when other Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction in the pursuit area join the pursuit, they *must be* primarily responsible for the continued pursuit. In such a circumstance, it is imperative for all parties involved in the pursuit to have a clear understanding and agreement of their respective roles and responsibilities. However, the Idaho Operations Office had not established agreements with law enforcement agencies delineating the authorities of participating organizations when crossing jurisdictional lines.

Because Idaho had not entered into MOUs with other law enforcement agencies, it had not invited law enforcement agencies to participate in training exercises with the Tactical Response Force regarding pursuit operations across jurisdictional lines. Department Order 473.3 requires that the Federal Security Authority at the site request that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies that would assist during a site security incident participate in training exercises at least every 12 months.

Idaho Operations Office officials stated that the Tactical Response Force would pursue adversaries across jurisdictional lines to recover stolen nuclear materials. One official told us that the *Site Safeguards and Security Plan* (SSSP) does not require the Tactical Response Force to obtain assistance from law enforcement agencies in the jurisdiction affected by the pursuit. The same official also noted that if those agencies offered to assist the

Tactical Response Force by setting up road blocks or conducting traffic control, it would coordinate with those agencies. An official with the Department's Office of Health, Safety and Security said that typically the Department has MOUs with law enforcement agencies establishing methods to control traffic and set up road blocks during a pursuit, but that if the site was not expecting support from local law enforcement, then it did not need an MOU even though it "made good sense." However, we did note that other national laboratories have MOUs with law enforcement agencies that establish procedures for pursuit situations that cross jurisdictional lines, to include conducting traffic enforcement and control when requested. Further, the Idaho Operations Office had MOUs with state and local law enforcement agencies to enhance public safety during environmental hazards such as fires and hazardous material leaks, but not for potentially dangerous pursuit operations.

The Idaho Operations Office took the position that Idaho did not need MOUs with other local law enforcement bodies regarding specific roles and responsibilities during pursuits across jurisdictional lines. This position was based on the SSSP which stated that "outside law enforcement response is not planned for, or relied upon for the protection of SNM [Special Nuclear Material]." For situations other than the recapture and recovery of Special Nuclear Material, the Idaho Operations Office took the position that a fresh pursuit across jurisdictional boundaries was highly unlikely. The Idaho Operations Office stated that the SSSP, which incorporated detailed vulnerability assessments and performance testing, did not indicate a need for support from local law enforcement agencies to successfully resolve a security incident; therefore, there was no Department requirement for an MOU or annual training.

However, this position did not address the realities of Department Order 473.3 with regard to other law enforcement agencies being primarily responsible for pursuits in their jurisdictions. Because there were no MOUs with other local law enforcement agencies stipulating that those agencies would not join the pursuit, it must be assumed that local law enforcement would get involved. In fact, an Idaho Tactical Response Force management official said that other law enforcement agencies would definitely be involved in pursuits that enter their jurisdiction. Therefore, we believe an MOU in conjunction with appropriate training exercises is imperative to avoid confusion and ensure there is a clear understanding and agreement on the respective roles and responsibilities of all parties involved.

Communication with Law Enforcement Agencies

We determined that emergency notification procedures necessary to communicate with Federal, state or local law enforcement agencies during pursuit operations across jurisdictional lines were not formalized and documented. Department Order 473.3 requires each site to prepare site-specific guidelines that address procedures used to provide emergency notification to jurisdictions that may be crossed during a pursuit situation. Specifically, when it becomes apparent to Tactical Response Force officers that they are crossing jurisdictional lines, this information must be transmitted immediately to the law enforcement authorities of the jurisdiction to be crossed in accordance with the site-specific emergency notification procedures. To the extent possible, such notifications must include a description of the fleeing suspect, the vehicle, the alleged criminal violation for which the suspect is being pursued, and the location and direction of travel of the suspect. We noted that Idaho's internal policy, *Conducting Patrol Operations and Arrest Authority*, included the requirement to adhere to its own emergency notification procedures when crossing jurisdictional lines. However, Idaho had not formalized and documented its emergency notification procedures consistent with the requirements of its internal policy and as required by Department Order 473.3.

Site-specific emergency notification procedures are necessary for enhancing the ability of the Tactical Response Force to effectively execute pursuit operations in the safest manner when crossing jurisdictional lines. We believe such procedures: (1) allow for the uniform training of Idaho's Tactical Response Force on proper procedures; (2) give trainers and supervisors the ability to uniformly measure officers' proficiency levels; and, (3) inform new and auxiliary officers of the proper procedures to use during pursuit operations. By not having formal emergency notification procedures in place, confusion may occur between the Tactical Response Force officers and other law enforcement agencies when crossing jurisdictional lines.

The Idaho Operations Office stated that Idaho has historically and successfully coordinated and communicated with local law enforcement agencies on a regular basis for a variety of activities including traffic accidents, natural disasters, transportation events, and/or trespassers. The Idaho Operations Office cited a site-specific procedure requiring protective force personnel to be in contact with the assigned supervisor, the Warning Communication

Center, and Central Alarm Station by radio during any pursuit, and to provide appropriate descriptions of a suspect being pursued.

However, the Idaho Tactical Response Force management officials in charge of daily operations and communication said they did not have written emergency notification procedures in place to communicate with law enforcement agencies. In addition, one management official said that Idaho's requirement to have the emergency notification procedures with law enforcement was an error, and should be removed from the policy. This position, however, is inconsistent with Department Order 473.3, which requires that sites formalize and document emergency notification procedures to communicate with local law enforcement agencies.

Pursuit Vehicle Equipment

We found that Tactical Response Force vehicles were not properly equipped to adequately alert the public during pursuit operations. Department Order 473.3 requires pursuit vehicles to be equipped with visual and audible emergency equipment when practicable (e.g. when the site is capable of doing so). In addition, the vehicles must be marked as security vehicles. Additionally, State Statutes require emergency vehicles to display a flashing light visible in a 360-degree arc and to sound an audible siren, when reasonably necessary, to warn pedestrians and other drivers when engaged in a pursuit.

An Idaho official stated that they had the option to order vehicles with a police package that would have included emergency equipment required by Department policy and State Statutes. The Idaho Operations Office stated that due to budget considerations and its commitment to cost effective implementation of Department policy, Idaho officials chose to equip their vehicles as opposed to purchasing fully equipped vehicles from a vendor because it could do so at a reduced cost. We were told by an Idaho official and several Tactical Response Force personnel who use pursuit vehicles as a regular part of their daily activities that their vehicles were only equipped with a red flashing visor light. Upon inspection, we noted that these lights did not meet visibility requirements. Specifically, the red flashing visor light could only be seen in front of the vehicle and not from the required 360-degree arc. Further, there was no audible emergency equipment such as sirens or public address systems, and no markings to identify the vehicles as property of a security force.

Because the Idaho site is located near a public highway, it is possible for the Tactical Response Force to engage in a pursuit of an adversary that may require Tactical Response Force officers to travel onto that highway and cross jurisdictional lines. We recognize that Idaho, in part, was attempting to reduce the cost; however, by not having marked vehicles with the proper emergency notification equipment, drivers on public roads may be unnecessarily put at risk if they are unaware of the pursuit area. Further, audible and visual emergency notification equipment could give drivers an opportunity to move away from the pursuit and into a safer area. In addition to public safety concerns, absent clear markings identifying the vehicles as property of a security force, the vehicles could possibly be mistaken for adversaries and cause confusion among the Tactical Response Force and any Federal, state or local law enforcement agencies involved in a pursuit. Because recapture and recovery of Special Nuclear Material is a high national security priority, the risk to public safety during a pursuit could be significant. We believe this risk is increased when emergency vehicles lack appropriate emergency equipment such as markings, lights and sirens.

The Idaho Operations Office acknowledged that not all of the Tactical Response Force pursuit vehicles had the equipment listed in Department Order 473.3 and Idaho State Statutes. The Operations Office stated that some vehicles inspected only have flip down lights that may not be visible in a 360-degree arc; however, it is "not practical" for these specific vehicles to have additional lights and sirens based on the function they provide. The Idaho Operations Office stated that unique tactical considerations are necessary for Special Nuclear Material recapture/recovery operations.

However, Department Order 473.3 does not allow sites to waive equipment requirements because it is "not practical," and as such, a formal exemption would be required to deviate from these requirements. As noted in Department Order 473.3, such an exemption must include sufficient analysis to determine that Idaho was not capable of equipping all pursuit vehicles as required by Department Order 473.3, and describe alternative measures that would be used to adequately alert the public during pursuit operations.

Contributing Factors and Impact

The conditions discussed in this report occurred, in part, because the SSSP did not require the Tactical Response Force to obtain assistance from law enforcement agencies in the jurisdiction affected by the pursuit. As such, formal agreements such as MOUs were not obtained. We noted, however, that other Department sites with Tactical Response Force personnel had MOUs with law enforcement agencies to avoid confusion regarding roles and responsibilities when crossing jurisdictional lines. Agreements in this area are particularly important given the fact that Department Order 473.3 specifically requires that primary responsibility must be ceded to law enforcement officials from other jurisdictions if they choose to become involved with the pursuit.

We were also told that Idaho had not formalized and documented its emergency notification procedures because the Tactical Response Force knew what to do when communicating with law enforcement officials from other jurisdictions during a pursuit. We found, however, that Idaho's position was not consistent with the requirements of the Tactical Response Force's internal policy and requirements established by the Department. Specifically, the Department requires each site to prepare site-specific guidelines that address procedures used to provide emergency notification to jurisdictions that may be crossed during a pursuit situation. Local directives also require that tactical responders adhere to emergency notification procedures when crossing or entering other jurisdictions. This direction could be difficult to follow because Idaho had not formalized and documented its emergency notification procedures.

Finally, the Idaho Operations Office stated that due to budget considerations and Idaho's commitment to cost effective implementation of Department policy, Idaho officials chose to equip their vehicles as opposed to purchasing fully equipped vehicles. While acknowledging that not all of their Tactical Response Force pursuit vehicles had the equipment listed in Department Order 473.3 and Idaho State Statutes, Idaho Operations Office officials stated that due to tactical considerations, it was "not practical" to equip all vehicles with required lights and sirens. However, without the proper mechanisms in place, there is potential for confusion with other law enforcement agencies that could compromise a successful pursuit operation, as well as increase the risk to public safety.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Considering the potential for confusion during pursuits that may cross jurisdictional lines and the risk to public safety, we recommend that the Manager, Idaho Operations Office:

1. Initiate efforts to establish formal agreements with Federal, state or local law enforcement agencies regarding roles and responsibilities during pursuit operations to enhance coordination and public safety if a pursuit crosses jurisdictional lines;
2. Invite Federal, state or local law enforcement agencies that could assist during a site security incident to participate in training exercises with the Tactical Response Force regarding pursuit operations that may enter other jurisdictions;
3. Ensure the Tactical Response Force establishes documented, mission-specific emergency notification procedures that include an approved, effective communication method for informing Federal, state or local law enforcement agencies that Tactical Response Force officers are entering another jurisdiction during a pursuit; and,
4. Ensure that all Idaho Protective Force vehicles that may engage in a pursuit across jurisdictional lines are marked and equipped in accordance with Federal regulations and State Statutes for emergency vehicle equipment, or seek the appropriate exemption to deviate from Department Order 473.3 requirements.

**MANAGEMENT
COMMENTS**

Management concurred with the report recommendations. The Idaho Operations Office will update Memorandums of Understanding with Local Law Enforcement Agencies to address roles and responsibilities during pursuit operations to enhance coordination and public safety if a pursuit crosses jurisdictional lines. Also, the Idaho Operations Office has directed Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA), the Management and Operating Contractor, by Contracting Officer Representative (COR) letter to address the recommendations. As a result, BEA plans to change performance testing procedures and invite Federal, State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies to participate in training exercises annually. BEA also plans to change notification procedures to inform adjoining Local Law Enforcement Agencies when entering their jurisdiction. Finally, BEA plans to change their fresh pursuit procedures to only allow appropriately equipped vehicles to

engage in off-site pursuits, and to emphasize that fresh pursuit is only authorized for situations involving the theft of Special Nuclear Material.

Management comments have been provided in their entirety in Appendix 3.

**INSPECTOR
COMMENTS**

Management's comments and planned corrective actions are responsive to our report findings and recommendations.

OBJECTIVE

We initiated this review to determine if Idaho National Laboratory's (Idaho) Tactical Response Force was properly prepared, trained and equipped to execute its mission related to pursuit of suspects across jurisdictional lines.

SCOPE

This inspection was performed from October 2011 to September 2012, and was focused on the ability of Idaho to implement its Tactical Response Force mission. The inspection was conducted at the Idaho site, and inquiries were made at other Department of Energy (Department or DOE) sites to ascertain other methods regarding public safety during pursuit operations.

METHODOLOGY

To accomplish the inspection objective, we reviewed and evaluated Idaho's internal policies, Department policies, and State Statutes relevant to emergency vehicles operating in the State's jurisdiction. We interviewed Federal Operations Office and Contractor personnel. We reviewed Tactical Response Force training and equipment records, as well as Tactical Response Force site-specific operational policies. The documentation we reviewed for this inspection also included:

- DOE Manual 470.4-3A, *Contractor Protective Force*;
- DOE Manual 470.4-1, *Safeguards and Security Program Planning and Management*; and,
- DOE Order 473.3, *Protection Program Operations*.

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, issued January 2011. Those standards require that we plan and perform the inspection to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our conclusions and observations based on our inspection objective. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our conclusions and observations based on our inspection objective. The inspection included tests of controls and compliance with laws and regulations to the extent necessary to satisfy the inspection objective. Because our review was limited, it would not necessarily have disclosed all internal control deficiencies that may have existed at the time of our inspection. Also, we assessed the Department's compliance with the *Government Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010* and determined that the Department had not established performance measures specifically related to public safety during pursuit operations and the use of

pursuit vehicle emergency equipment. Finally, we relied on computer-processed data, to some extent, to satisfy our objective. We confirmed the validity of such data, when appropriate, by reviewing source documents and performing physical observations.

The exit conference was waived by the Idaho Operations Office.

RELATED REPORTS

- The Department of Energy's Office of Health, Safety and Security issued a report on the (U) *Idaho National Laboratory Protective Force Response Capabilities*, dated September 30, 2011. The results of this report are classified "Secret."
- Audit Report on [*Inquiry into the Security Breach at the National Nuclear Security Administration's Y-12 National Security Complex*](#) (DOE/IG-0868, August 2012). This inquiry was initiated to identify the circumstances surrounding the Y-12 National Security Complex breach because of the importance of ensuring the safe and secure storage of nuclear materials. Our review found that the Y-12 security incident represented multiple system failures on several levels. We identified troubling displays of ineptitude in responding to alarms, failures to maintain critical security equipment, over reliance on compensatory measures, misunderstanding of security protocols, poor communications, and weaknesses in contract and resource management. Contractor governance and Federal oversight failed to identify and correct early indicators of these multiple system breakdowns. When combined, these issues directly contributed to an atmosphere in which the trespassers could gain access to the protected security area directly adjacent to one of the Nation's most critically important and highly secured weapons-related facilities. We noted that following the incident, Y-12 and the National Nuclear Security Administration took a number of actions designed to improve security at the site. However, the successful intrusion at Y-12 raised serious questions about the overall security approach at the facility.

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

United States Government

Department of Energy

memorandum

Idaho Operations Office

Date: November 14, 2012

Subject: Department of Energy, Idaho Operations Office's Comments on the Office of Inspector General Draft Report on "Tactical Response Force Pursuit Operations at the Idaho National Laboratory" (AS-IR&A-13-008)

Reference: Memorandum, Rickey R. Hass to Richard B. Provencher, Subject: Draft Report on "Tactical Response Force Pursuit Operations at the Idaho National Laboratory," dated October 23, 2012.

To: Rickey R. Hass
Deputy Inspector General for Audits and Inspections
Office of Inspector General
IG-30

The Idaho Operations Office appreciates the opportunity to review the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) draft report, "Tactical Response Force Pursuit Operations at the Idaho National Laboratory." This report identified four recommendations for management action. Idaho Operations Office agrees with the importance of coordination and communication with law enforcement agencies in order to ensure protection of public safety. Idaho Operations Office concurs with the recommendations and provides the following responses:

Recommendation 1: Initiate efforts to establish formal agreements with Federal, state or local law enforcement agencies regarding roles and responsibilities during pursuit operations to enhance coordination and public safety if a pursuit crosses jurisdictional line.

Management concurs with the recommendation. The Idaho Operations Office will update Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with Local Law Enforcement Agencies to address roles and responsibilities during pursuit operations to enhance coordination and public safety if a pursuit crosses jurisdictional lines. This will be completed as each of the current MOUs come due for renewal, starting with the Idaho State Police MOU in February 2013.

Recommendation 2: Invite Federal, state or local law enforcement agencies that could assist during a site security incident to participate in training exercises with the Tactical Response Force regarding pursuit operations that may enter other jurisdictions.

Management concurs with the recommendation. The Idaho Operations Office has directed Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA) by Contracting Officer Representative (COR) letter to address the recommendation. BEA plans to change performance testing procedures by June 30, 2013, and invite Federal, State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies to participate in training exercises annually.

Mr. Rickey R. Hass

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November 14, 2012


Recommendation 3: Ensure the Tactical Response Force establishes documented, mission-specific emergency notification procedures that include an approved, effective communication method for informing Federal, state or local law enforcement agencies that Tactical Response Force officers are entering another jurisdiction during a pursuit.

Management concurs with the recommendation. The Idaho Operations Office has directed BEA by COR letter to address the recommendation. BEA plans to change notification procedures by June 30, 2013, to inform adjoining agencies when entering their jurisdiction.

Recommendation 4: Ensure that all Idaho Protective Force vehicles that may engage in a pursuit across jurisdictional lines are marked and equipped in accordance with Federal regulations and State Statutes for emergency vehicle equipment, or seek the appropriate exemption to deviate from Department Order 473.3 requirements.

Management concurs with the recommendation. The Idaho Operations Office has directed BEA by COR letter to address the recommendation. BEA plans to change their fresh pursuit procedures by June 30, 2013, to only allow appropriately equipped vehicles to engage in off-site fresh pursuit. Also, that fresh pursuit is only engaged in for situations involving the theft of Special Nuclear Material.

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Mr. Robert Green, Director, Security Division, at (208) 526-2216.



Richard B. Provencher
Manager

cc: Glenn S. Podonsky, DOE-HQ
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