UNLEASHED POTENTIAL: THE POTENTIAL OF CIVIL MILITARY SUPPORT ELEMENTS IN THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

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General Studies

by

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**UNLEASHED POTENTIAL: THE POTENTIAL OF A CIVIL MILITARY SUPPORT ELEMENT IN THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION**

**MAJ Clayton D. Curtis**

The problem is how to employ a limited amount of CMSEs in a theater of operations in order to develop and maintain a partner nation’s military CMO capacity. The purpose of this research is to identify best practices in developing partner nation capacity to conduct CMO to a level where little or no U.S. military involvement is needed. The thesis question that this research attempts to answer is whether a CMSE can develop the capacity of partner nation military to conduct civil military operations through unified action to level where little or no U.S. military involvement is needed. The conclusion of this thesis is that the CMSE in the Paraguay case study not only did this but also helped the partner nation develop, plan, execute, and orchestrate their own Civil Military Engagement Plan to achieve unity of effort in conducting CMO and to train other military branches and units to do so as well. This action met the Combatant Commander’s (CCDR) and Theater Special Operations Command’s (TSOC) objectives and allowed the TSOC the flexibility to reassign the CMSE from Paraguay to another region/country.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

UNLEASHED POTENTIAL: THE POTENTIAL OF A CIVIL MILITARY SUPPORT ELEMENT IN THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION, by MAJ Clayton D. Curtis, 151 pages.

The problem is how to employ a limited amount of CMSEs in a theater of operations in order to develop and maintain a partner nation’s military CMO capacity. The purpose of this research is to identify best practices in developing partner nation capacity to conduct CMO to a level where little or no U.S. military involvement is needed. The thesis question that this research attempts to answer is whether a CMSE can develop the capacity of partner nation military to conduct civil military operations through unified action to level where little or no U.S. military involvement is needed. The conclusion of this thesis is that the CMSE in the Paraguay case study not only did this but also helped the partner nation develop, plan, execute, and orchestrate their own Civil Military Engagement Plan to achieve unity of effort in conducting CMO and to train other military branches and units to do so as well. This action met the Combatant Commander’s (CCDR) and Theater Special Operations Command’s (TSOC) objectives and allowed the TSOC the flexibility to reassign the CMSE from Paraguay to another region/country.
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Thanks to Colonel Preda and Colonel Nunez from which I learned so about Paraguayan culture, history, military customs, and generally how to do business there. We spent our time together helping people to help themselves. Our work was more than work, it was passion and I truly learned from them how to continuously engage the population in conflicted areas. We were able to draw up a military and governmental training plan together in order to keep the fire and spirit of CMO going to defend their great nation, Paraguay.

Thanks to the MAJ Joseph Martinez and LTC Rivera, my US Special Operation Command South (Forward) bosses who allowed my team to operate with the Paraguay Military and Government without interruption. Their leadership provided me the motivation to, one, not disappoint them, and, two, to strive to accomplish the mission above reproach. When I asked for support or backing, both were there. Moreover, they personally participated in our operations on several occasions, which showed me that they truly cared.
Thanks to both LTC Roberto Martinez and MAJ Blanton, my company commanders during the CMSE mission in Paraguay. Your unwavering support and continued discussion and assistance during my research were essential. Both were of them articulated our achievements to the USOCSOUTH command cell and our parent battalion, brigade back at Fort Bragg, NC. Moreover, our achievements would have never materialized if both had not ensured that US Southern Command financed our Humanitarian Civic Action Events (HCA).

Both LTC Roberto Martinez and LTC Rivera were our early spokesmen to relay the frustration in the first half of our tour regarding how the CMSE was not permitted to conduct the original mission that it was sent to Paraguay for. They laid the groundwork for his successor to work with USOCSOUTH to rectify the issue. Moreover, when CMSE Paraguay found a relevant mission within the confines of GWOT CONPLAN 7500 for COIN operations in Concepcion, they were strong backers to ensure we participated. They started a path for MAJ Joseph Martinez and MAJ Winn Blanton to improve on to get USOCSOUTH and US Embassy in Paraguay to permit CMSE conduct operations by, with, and through the Paraguayan Government and Military in the north.

MAJ Blanton is the example of how a commander assists his subordinate team leaders to be good at all areas of civil affairs activities. He ensured that are civil information management products were substantial to assist future operations and articulated our progress to accomplish the building partner nation capacity mission with the Paraguayan mission. Because of his communication to USOCSOUTH, we were able
to close the Paraguayan mission down and transfer the next team to another critical area in USSOCOM’s AOR, Guatemala.

Thanks to COL Timothy Hodge, MAJ Robert Armstrong, and MAJ Michelle Artolachipe for their continued support and participation in our CMO events in northern Paraguay. Their leadership and ability to help us solve difficult issues were unequivocal. Without their support, CMSE Paraguay would not have operated in northern Paraguay nor have the funds to operation with at all. MAJ Armstrong’s continued assistance with HA Program planning and funding as well as pulling in Paraguay’s Peace Keeping Multi-Role Engineering Unit was above all the best compliment to our unity of effort and partner capacity building mission.

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<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>Contingency Plan</td>
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<td>CT</td>
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<td>DIME</td>
<td>A summarized term for the instruments of national power: Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
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<td>MEC</td>
<td>Ministerio de Educacion y Cultura (Minister of Education and Culture)</td>
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<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>Mission, Enemy, Time, Troops Available, &amp; Civil Considerations</td>
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<td>PMESII-PT</td>
<td>Political, Military, Economy, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical, and Time</td>
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<td>Partner Nation Military</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Background

This paper is a case study of how a Special Operations Forces (SOF) Civil Affairs (CA) Team, doctrinally named a Civil Military Support Element (CMSE) when conducting Theater Security Cooperation activities, developed the capacity of the Paraguay Military Civil Affairs Directorate and Detachment to conduct civil-military operations (CMO) from 2008 to 2010. Specifically, this research analyzes the CMSE’s and Paraguay Military Joint Civil Affairs Detachment’s performance in three areas including developing partner nation capacity, Civil-Military Operations, and unified action to accomplish its mission within the backdrop of irregular warfare and peacetime military engagement (including stability operations) operational themes.

This chapter will provide the purpose of this paper and the problem of limited CMSEs; and a brief overview of decision that must be made to execute a game plan on employing CMSE. Next, research questions, assumptions taken in the research, key definitions, limitations of the research, delimitations, significance of the research, and a brief summary will follow in this chapter.

The purpose of this research paper is to identify best practices in developing partner nation capacity to conduct CMO through unified action in order for it to meet its mission requirements to a level where little or no U.S. military involvement is needed. This will give the TSOC the flexibility to move CMSEs within a theater of operations. Moreover, the TSOC can rotate CMSE planning elements to ensure the trained partner nation CA element maintains its capacity. The TSOC’s flexibility to move CMSEs will
depend on three factors. First, the GCC, Embassy and Country Team, and partner nation leader’s understanding of what a CMSE’s capability is. Second, the level of importance given to develop the partner nation’s capacity to conduct CMO with little or no U.S. military involvement. Third, a viable game plan that includes level of capacity that they want to achieve. Thus, the TSOC will have the flexibility of reassigning a CMSE to another ‘Hot Spot’ because, the TSOC, Embassy Country Team, State Partnership Program, CMSE, and partner nation focused on the right objective first, capacity development and they can later continue improving the partner nation’s military capacity to conduct CMO without a CMSE present.

The problem is there are a limited amount of CMSEs (20) to support the USSOCOUTH in the USSOUTHCOM Theater of Operations. Therefore, the challenge is how to employ a limited amount of CMSEs in a theater of operations such as SOUTHCOM in order to develop and maintain a partner nation’ capacity. There are three decisions that must be made. First, what is the level of capacity that the TSOC is willing to accept in order to transition CMSE operations to the US Embassy Country Team? The TSOC may elect to keep the CMSE there regardless of partner nation capacity to conduct CMO because, of the mission importance to U.S. interests. Also, the Country Team, State Partnership Program, and partner nation must have the capacity and interest to conduct unified action in CMO to make it a good transition from the CMSE. Second, what is the time line for the CMSE to establish partner nation capacity? Last, what is the plan to maintain partner nation capacity to conduct CMO? Again, the partner nation, Country Team, Private Organizations, Intergovernmental Organizations must have the capacity and interest to keep the CMO capacity going. The TSOC may elect to conduct periodic
engagements with the partner nation with a full six-man, or four-man, or two-man CMSE in order for the partner nation to maintain the capacity to conduct CMO.

Another problem to consider is that CMSE develop the capacity of partner nation’s military or police civil affairs elements. A TSOC’s and CMSE’s plan must include to what level of capacity that these elements need have and what is the acceptable risk to take if the partner nation military/police civil affairs element does not exactly want or follow the same doctrine, structure, mission, and/or purpose of the U.S. idea of what a civil affairs detachment is. For example, the Paraguay Military Joint Civil Affairs Directorate/Detachment’s mission is to support the Paraguay government and military in Civil Defense Operations during emergencies and disasters. Therefore, the detachment is not focused on mitigating any long-term internal (in-country) Irregular Warfare operations such as U.S. Special Operation Force Civil Affairs units are.

The recommendation provided in this paper in Chapter Five is that the TSOC defines the level of which CMSEs develop the partner nation’s military to conduct CMO (with little or no U.S. involvement for two reasons). First, is to ensure that the partner nation’s military can assist the U.S. in GWOT and TSCP objectives. Second, to allow the TSOC flexibility to employ CMSEs to ‘Hot Spots’ within a GCC’s AO, which in turn, will not negatively impact a partner nation’s lack of CMO capacity with no U.S. involvement or CMSE presence.

Research Question

This research attempts to answer the following questions. The primary question is: Can a CMSE develop a partner nation’s military capacity to conduct CMO through unified action to a level where little or no U.S. military involvement is needed? The first
secondary question is; can a CMSE develop a partner nation civil affairs element’s capacity to conduct its mission to a level where little or no U.S. military involvement is needed? These questions will be answered using a case study of the CMSE’s mission in Paraguay from 2008 to 2010 with a heavy emphasis on in 2010 and the post-CMSE mission in Paraguay today.

Assumptions

There are five assumptions taken in this research. First, the case study used in this research demonstrates a typical CMSE mission in the USSOUTHCOM Theater of Operations. Second, developing partner nation capacity to conduct CMO and its civil affairs element’s mission readiness can be measured. Third, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational partners (e.g. partner nation) lack a degree of understanding of a CMSE’s potential to develop a partner nation capacity to a level that requires little or no involvement. Fourth, currently there is not a specific plan to achieve a partner nation CMO capacity to a specific level. Last, there is not a plan for the TSOC to rotate CMSEs throughout the Theater of Operations to monitor and maintain that capacity of civil affairs elements in the SOUTHCOM Theater of Operations.

Definition of Terms

The definitions of terms will follow the terms included in the thesis questions. Terms such as, civil affairs, special operations forces civil affairs, CMSE, capacity, civil-military operations, and unified action will be examined in order for the reader to understand each on in the research questions. For example in the primary research question, ‘Can a CMSE develop a partner nation’s military capacity to conduct CMO
through unified action to a level where little or no U.S. military involvement is necessary, civil affairs definition, components, and mission will be defined in order to explain what a CMSE is. Also, the setting (e.g. spectrum of conflict and operational themes) in which the capacity was developed will be defined in order to provide a backdrop of what occurred in the Paraguayan case study. Last, the doctrinal task (e.g. Nation Assistance and Civil Information Management) in which the CMSE used to develop the partner nation’s capacity will be defined as well for the reader to understand how the CMSE did it in the Paraguayan case study.

Civil Affairs. To understand what a CMSE is one must understand what civil affairs forces is and what they do since a CMSE is a civil affairs element. In the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report 2010 makes a series of recommendations to rebalance the force in order to achieve success in protection and advancing our nation’s interests. Moreover, the QDR calls for an expansion of civil affairs capacity especially in the face of Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism operations. The QDR explains the following as to why.

Ineffective governance can create areas that terrorist and insurgents can exploit. Circumstances are ripe for violent ideologies to spread among a population when governments struggle to provide basic services, justice and security, or the conditions for economic opportunity. Civil affairs address these threats by serving as the vanguard of DoD’s support to US government efforts to assist partner governments in the fields of rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information. Because of their linguistic and culture skills, civil affairs personnel often serve as liaison to reduce friction between our military forces and the civilian population.¹

Civil Affairs mission. According to the recently published FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, the mission of CA forces is “to support commanders by engaging the civil component of the operational environment to achieve CMO or other stated US objectives and ensure the sustained legitimacy of the mission and the transparency and credibility of the military force before, during, or after war.” Moreover, CA forces plan through the operational process for all levels of war to conduct Civil Affairs Operations and to support Civil-Military Operations.

Civil Affairs components. In October 2006, Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoolmaker directed that all Army active civil affairs be administratively assigned to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and all reserve component civil affairs units be administratively assigned to the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), which would report to the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC). Moreover, in September 2011, the Army also created an Active Duty Civil Affairs Brigade to support General Purpose Force, which is a Direct Reporting Unit (DRU) to US Forces Command (USFORCOM). This paper will focus on Special Operations Forces (SOF) Civil Affairs (CA).

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3Ibid.


**Special Operation Force (SOF) Civil Affairs (CA).** These units are Title 10 units that conduct Civil Affairs Operations in support of Special Operation Forces. There is one brigade, the 95th CA Brigade (Airborne), which is administratively assigned to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), which reports to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The brigade consists of five regionally oriented battalions, which include the 98th CA Battalion (Airborne). Each battalion supports a Geographic Combatant Command and Theater Special Operations and the 98th CA Battalion (Airborne) supports USSOUTHCOM and USSOCSOUTH. More will be discussed in chapter four about SOF CA organization.

**Civil Military Support Element.** A CMSE is a SOF CA organization. A task organized Civil Affairs force that conducts civil-military engagement in a specified country or region. A civil-military support element is composed of a persistent presence element of Civil Affairs leaders/planners, and a presence for purpose element composed of a Civil Affairs Team(s) that may include enablers (i.e. health service support, engineer, etc.) who are task organized for a specific time to execute a coordinated mission. CMSE is also mentioned by Admiral Olsen, former USSOCOM Commander, during his March 5, 2008 Posture of Special Operations Forces before the U.S. Congress House Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities as, “Civil Military Support Elements which are scalable, modular SOF teams that plan, coordinate, facilitate, manage and lead programs and projects that support U.S.

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6Department of the Army, FM 3-57, 2-4 to 2-5.

7Hicks and Wormuth, 32-33.

8Department of the Army, FM 3-57, 1-1.
and host nation objectives.” Per US Africa Command (USAFRICOM), “A CMSE assesses partner nation capacities to develop and sustain government and local institutions, including infrastructure development, that address the population’s basic humanitarian needs.”9 The only thing that should be added to the to the USAFRICOM description of the CMSE is what MAJ John Wishart described, “CMSE conducts operations using a variety of mechanisms to legitimize the partner-nation government, building the capacity of military forces and determine civil vulnerabilities that can be exploited by Violent Extremist Organization (VEO).”10

Civil Military Support Element (CMSE) Functions and Capabilities. The primary function is to support the commander by engaging the civil component of the operational environment.11 The functional capability requirement reaches from the strategic to tactical level of war (see the table below). The CMSE has provides support at all levels of war. For example, at the strategic level, the CMSE enables the partner nation military to conduct CMO through unified action (e.g. JIIM) by training advising the Paraguay Military CA Detachment. The CMSE works at the operational level with the partner nation through the Paraguay Military CA Detachment to stabilize and develop with the various agencies and organization of unified action. The CMSE executes the defense, diplomacy, and development strategies through partner nation’s agencies (with the

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11Ibid., 1-6.
Paraguay Military CA Detachment) while conducting CMO at the departmental (provincial) and municipal level.

**Developing Partner Nation Capacity.** Next, the terms of capacity and capability will detailed since the central theme of the research paper is how much did the CMSE develop the Paraguay Military Joint Civil Affairs Detachment’s capacity. Emphasis on this task has been evident through national strategic documents from the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, Theater Security Cooperation, and various DoD Directives, Instructions, Joint Publications, and Field Manuals.

The National Security Strategy of 2010 lists “Security” as one of the four enduring national interests to achieve the “world we seek.” Under the interest of Security, one of the “Ways” to achieve it is Invest in the Capacity of Strong and Capable Partners. In order to do this, the Strategy is for the US to improve its capability to strengthen the security of states at risk of conflict and violence and to build the capacity to strengthen the foundations of common security to prevent the emergence of conflict.\(^{12}\)

In the National Defense Strategy 2008, the Security of Defense laid out five objectives that support the National Strategic Strategy 2006. These objectives included (1) Defend the Homeland, (2) Win the Long War, (3) Promote Security, (4) Deter Conflict, and (5) Win our Nation’s War.\(^{13}\) Under the objective of “Promote Security,” the


Secretary of Defense states that the US Defense strategy is to emphasize building capacities of broad spectrum of partners as the basis for long-term security.\textsuperscript{14}

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report of February 2010 covers building partner-nation capacity for one main purpose. That is to prevent and deter conflicts with the integrated use of diplomacy, development, and defense along with intelligence, law enforcement, and economic tools to maintain and promote stability.\textsuperscript{15} Therefore, in order to protect our national interest and defend ourselves, we must build the security capacity of partner states and “build the security capacity of allied and partner states and to ensure that the Armed Forces of the US have ample opportunities to train with and learn from counterpart forces.”\textsuperscript{16}

As currently conceived, BPC is a multi-agency, multinational initiative that draws on the elements of security cooperation to achieve US strategic objectives that include defeating terrorist networks; preventing hostile states and nonstate actors from acquiring or using WMD; conducting irregular warfare and stability operations; and enabling host countries to provide good governance.\textsuperscript{17}

Last, US Army Field Manuals on Stability Operations and Counterinsurgency defines capacity building as, “The process of creating an environment that fosters host-

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., 9.

\textsuperscript{15}Department of Defense, \textit{Quadrennial Defense Review}, v.

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., viii.

nation institutional development, community participation, human resources
development, and strengthening managerial systems.”

**Capability and Capacity.** Both terms are neither JP 1-02 nor FM 1-02. However, Jennifer D. P. Moroney et al. in their monograph *Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations*, give the simplest definition, “capability is the ability to perform a function, and capacity is the extent of a capability present.” The Joint Capability Area (JCA) lexicon defines Building Military Partner Capability as, “the ability to improve the military capabilities of our allies and partners to help them transform and optimize their forces to provide regional security, disaster preparedness and niche capabilities in a coalition.” Building Military Partner Capacity refers to “the ability to encourage and empower the military capacities of our allies and partners through training, education, assistance, diplomacy and other activities so they are prepared to protect homelands, defeat terrorists, and protect common interests while strengthening relations with friendly global and regional powers.” In the case study presented in Chapter Four of this thesis, the 98th CA Battalion (Airborne) worked, by, with and through the Paraguay Joint Military Civil Affairs Detachment to develop their capability and capacity to conduct CMO and CAO.

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21Ibid.
Unity of Effort and Unified Action. The term unity of effort is essential to the research question as it is something that CMSE Paraguay and the Paraguay Military CA Detachment worked toward during the case study. The Department of Defense’s Joint Publication 3-08, Intergovernmental Coordination During Joint Operations, defines that unity of effort is, “Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action.” Moreover, the same publication also defines what produces unity of effort, unified action, as “The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Unified action is the DoD doctrinal term that represents a comprehensive approach. Unified action is promoted through close, continuous coordination and cooperation, which are necessary to overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure of procedures, and bureaucratic and personnel limitation.

In order to achieve unity of effort at different levels whether it be within the US Government or with other elements of unified action (e.g. Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational) one must know the difference between comprehensive


24 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-08, I-5.

25 Ibid.
and whole of government approach. A comprehensive approach is external to U.S. entities, which is an approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.\(^{26}\) In contrast a whole of government approach is internal to the U.S., which is an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the US Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.\(^{27}\)

The first element of Unified Action is, interagency is “of or pertaining to US Government agencies and departments, including the Department of State.”\(^{28}\) Second, intergovernmental organization is, “an organization created by a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more governments.”\(^{29}\) Third, nongovernmental organization is “a private, self-governing, non-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution.”\(^{30}\) Last, private sector is “an umbrella term that may be applied in the United States and in foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specific nonprofit organization, most academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected

\(^{26}\)Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 1-7.

\(^{27}\)Ibid., 1-6.

\(^{28}\)Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-08, I-2.

\(^{29}\)Ibid.

\(^{30}\)Ibid.
nongovernmental organizations.”31 See figure 1 for an illustration of the different elements in unified action.

![Unified Action Diagram]

Figure 1. Unified Action


**Unified Action, Civil-Military Operations, and Civil Affairs Operations Relations**

After discussing what Unified Action, the reader may see how Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs Operations relate to each other within Unified Action in the figure below. Civil-Military Operations per JP 3-57 is “the activities of a command that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organization and authorities, and the civilian populace in a

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31Ibid.
friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives.”\textsuperscript{32} This means operations that is conducted between non-military and military authorities in which civil affairs forces may plan for the commander which is called CMO. These operations include civil affairs core tasks in which civil affairs officers plan and non-civil affairs officer execute.

The JP 3-57 defines Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) as “military operations conducted by civil affairs forces the (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations.”\textsuperscript{33} Civil Affairs Operations are nested under Civil-Military Operations.

Figure 2, Civil-Military Operations Relationships, illustrates how Unified Action, CMO and CAO are conducted or planned by Civil Affairs Forces in current field manuals like FM 3-57, these tasks are conducted in support of Unified Land Operations as well. Unified Land Operations is “a simultaneous and continuous combination of offense, defense, stability, and civil support operations.”\textsuperscript{34}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32}Department of the Army, FM 3-57, 1-2.
\item \textsuperscript{33}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{34}Ibid., 1-3.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Next, the following definitions of terms are presented to provide the setting in which the CMSE in this case study developed the capacity of the Paraguay Military Joint Civil Affairs Detachment. The setting will be defined in relation operational themes in the spectrum of conflict. Spectrum of conflict is the backdrop of Army operations. The spectrum of conflict spans from stable peace to general war (e.g. graduated steps of violence from left to right of the spectrum) and includes: Stable Peace, Unstable Peace, Insurgency, and General War.

Operational themes are groups of military operations with common characteristics that allow doctrine to be developed for each theme rather than for a multitude of joint operations. These themes emphasize the differences among various types of joint operations. The themes occur among the spectrum of conflict and there are five of themes and examples will be given to each from left to right of the spectrum of conflict (i.e. from...
Stable Peace to Unstable Peace to Insurgency to General War). For the purpose of this research the operational themes of Peacetime Military Engagement and Irregular Warfare (IW) will be examined. See figure 3, Range of Military Operations. One can see that Peacetime Military Engagement occurs between peace and small level troop commitment. Irregular Warfare, which is not depicted very well on this figure would be near towards war on the Conflict Continuum and in the middle of Range of Military Operations.

It is important to note that operational themes are too broad to be assigned as missions. These themes provide a major operation’s characteristics not details. These themes may change during a major operations for the following reasons: (1) Planned

Figure 3. Range of Military Operations


phases, (2) Changes caused by friendly, enemy, or neutral activity, (3) Revised political
guidance, and (4) unexpected opportunities.\(^{36}\)

In the Paraguay case study The Spectrum of Conflict in Paraguay ranged from
unstable peace to Insurgency in northern Paraguay and Stable Peace in the rest of
Paraguay. These themes/activities in the case study in chapter 4 in northern Paraguay
case study is Peacetime Military Engagement and Irregular Warfare. The Irregular
Warfare theme serves as only a backdrop of how the CMSE developed the capacity of the
Paraguayan Joint Military CA Detachment to conduct CMO.

**Peacetime Military Engagement (Theater Security Cooperation and Phase 0)**

Peacetime military engagement includes Theater Security Cooperation. Theater Security
Cooperation is engagement activities designed to support the combatant commander’s
objectives with the theater security cooperation plan that occurs from Stable Peace to
Unstable Peace on the spectrum of conflict. Operations or activities include:
(1) Multinational training events and exercises, (2) Security Assistance Operations
(SAO), (3) Joint combined exchange training (JCET), etc. These operations and activities
are designed to improve interoperability; improve military-to-military ties with another
nation; promote regional stability; and increase partner nation military capabilities, thus
reducing unilateral U.S. military requirements.\(^{37}\)

In this paper, the CMSE supported the GCC’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan
(TSCP), which was integrated with the US Embassy’s Mission Strategic Plan (MSP) and
the TSOC’s GWOT objectives. The CMSE was the vehicle, in which defense, diplomacy

\(^{36}\)Ibid., 2-4.

\(^{37}\)Ibid., 2-5.
and development entities (i.e. through a comprehensive approach) reached their objectives and one objective together (i.e. unity of effort). For example, the CMSE assisted with the planning of New Horizons 2010; however, the Paraguayan President Lugo canceled the event in September 2009 due to political reasons. Second, the CMSE assisted the Country Team and partner nation to identify qualified Paraguay Military Officers (esp. Civil Affairs) to send to the U.S. Western Hemisphere Institute of Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) for CMO and Human Rights Courses or participate in major military exercises such as Continuing Promise 2010.

**Irregular Warfare (IW).** “Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over a population.” Irregular warfare differs from conventional warfare in two aspects including (1) it is a war among the people and (2) its emphasis on an indirect approach. Special operations forces conduct most irregular warfare operations. The joint operations under IW that this paper covers include (1) foreign internal defense and (2) counterinsurgency (COIN). Per DoDD 3000.07, “Geographic Combatant Commanders must identify IW-related requirements for steady-state and surge campaigns and incorporate irregular warfare-related concepts into military training, exercises, and planning.” Therefore, the SOUTHCOM Commander’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) has IW-related objectives in support GWOT.

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39Department of the Army, FM 3-0, 2-9.

In this paper, CMSE developed the partner nation’s capacity to conduct CMO through unified action during irregular warfare and stability operations. The following terms and relation to the spectrum of conflict will touch on in this paper: Insurgency, Foreign Internal Defense (as one of the Nation Assistance subtask), and COIN operations.

Counterinsurgency (COIN). CMSE Paraguay was conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID) indirectly supporting the Paraguayan Government and Military effort. The Department of Defense’s Joint Publication 1-02, Counterinsurgency Operations, defines COIN as, a “Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.” The general COIN operations conducted by the Paraguay Government and Military in this case study was one of massing military and police presence, in which had a negative effect on the population. Thus, no insurgents have been caught in three states of exceptions declared by President Lugo.41 Moreover, some have called Lugo’s response an ineffective one and that he is militarized his approach to handling the situation.42

Stability Operations. JP 3-0 (August 11, 2011) describes Stability Operations as, “An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential


42Irala, 24-25.
government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”

Stability operations have two goals. One is immediate goal that provides local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goals are transformation and foster sustainability of effort include developing partner nation capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, legitimate and effective institutions, and a robust civil society.

The U.S. President, President George W. Bush, signed the National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44 in which designated the Department of State (Secretary of State) the lead agency for all Stability and Reconstruction Effort. The Department of State is responsible for coordinating such efforts with the Department of Defense (Secretary of Defense) to ensure ‘harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.”

Therefore, CMSE in this case study received approval to develop the partner nation capacity in all CMO/CAO in northern Paraguay by the U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay not only because the she was the U.S. Chief of Mission for Paraguay but also, because the CMSE was conducting stability operations in which had to be nested with the Department of State’s U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reconstruction and stabilization efforts as well.

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43 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-02, 320.


**Nation Assistance (NA).** The CMSE in the case study conducted Nation Assistance in order to develop the capacity of the partner nation’s joint civil affairs detachment. Nation Assistance is defined as, “NA is civil or military assistance (other than Foreign Humanitarian Assistance) rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and the nation.”\(^46\) The Nation Assistance programs that the CMSE in the Paraguay case study used to develop their capacity was foreign internal defense (FID) and Title United States Code (Department of Defense) programs such as 10 USC 401, Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA).

**Foreign Internal Defense (FID).** The DoD Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, defines FID as, “Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”\(^47\) U.S. Army FM 3-57 as states, “...FID is an umbrella concept that covers a broad range of activities. Its primary intent is always to help the legitimate host government address internal threats and their underlying causes. Commensurate with U.S. policy goals, the focus of all U.S. FID efforts is to support the HN program of internal defense and development (IDAD). FID is not restricted to times of conflict. It also can take place in the form of training exercises and other activities that show U.S. resolve to and for the region.

Therefore, CMSEs conducted FID through unified action while developing the partner nation’s capacity to conduct CMO in support of COIN, theater security

\(^{46}\)Department of the Army, FM 3-57, 3-13.

\(^{47}\)Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-08, ix.
cooperation activities, and stability operations. The CMSE provided indirect support to COIN, which “emphasized the Paraguayan Military and Government self-sufficiency.”

Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA). HCA authorizes the U.S. military such as the CMSE and the State Partnership Program (e.g. Massachusetts National Guard) that support Paraguay to use 10 USC 401 funds to conduct HCA operations such Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAP) in order to ‘promote specific operational readiness skills of the individual (US) Soldier’ involved with the event. The secondary intent of the use of HCA funds in regarding to an HCA event (e.g. MEDCAP) is that the local population should benefit from the event and desired Measures of Effects (MOE) should be achieved from it as well. HCA activities include (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural or underserved areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. More important, the military or paramilitary organizations, groups, and/or individuals may benefit from HCA activities. However, the CMSE in the case study used HCA activities such as MEDCAPs to train the Paraguay Military Joint Civil Affairs Detachment to conduct CMO through unified action and prepare it to meet its mission while training the CMSE and the Massachusetts National Guard.

The CMSE in the case study also developed the capacity of the partner nation to conduct Civil Information Management (CIM), which is an important task for any civil affairs unit. These terms are defined below.

48Department of the Army, FM 3-0, 2-10.

49Department of the Army, FM 3-57, 3-15.
Civil Information Management (CIM). CIM includes the managing of information collected in order to develop the civil component of the operational environment. This information includes areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events, political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical, and events regarding a focused area, country, and/or region. The subtask under CIM is civil reconnaissance (CR) which is used to collect civil information.

Limitations

The research is limited by lack of face-to-face interviews and current site visits in Paraguay since the topic is being written in the Continental U.S. Also, current capabilities and assessments of the Paraguay Military Civil Affairs Battalion and its CMO impacts in Paraguay are limited due to physical distance and financial limitations of the researcher to travel there. Therefore, interviews, emails, and current situations gathered from Paraguayan newspapers and websites are used to bridge the gap. Last, no classified documents are referenced or used in order to keep this research unclassified.

Delimitations

I am choosing to delimit this paper and the case study within a specific period of time, March 2010 to June 2010 in the Paraguay case study. However, the whole 98th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) CMSE mission, January 2008 to September 2010, will be covered in order to provide profound answers to the research questions. The reason is two-fold, one that is when I personally participated in CMSE operations, as I was the CMSE Team Leader and Planner. Second, the CMSE and Paraguay Military Civil Affairs

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50 Ibid., 3-11.
Battalion’s capacity development work prior to March 2010 really started paying off during the Paraguay’s government’s conduct of Irregular War and COIN Operations in March to June 2010. Moreover, the last operations conducted by the Paraguay Military Civil Affairs Battalion proved that they had the capacity to conduct CMO in support of COIN operations with only U.S. financial assistance.

Also, I will not focus the U.S. Forces Command (USFORSCOM) civil affair organizations such as the U.S. Army Reserves’ (USAR) US Civil Affairs and Psychological Command (USCAPOC) and activity duty’s 85th Civil Affairs Brigade that support conventional forces.

**Significance of the Study**

It is my intent that the findings in this paper will provide to 95th Civil Affairs Brigade and the TSOC a better or another way to employ CMSEs in a given theater of operations in order to achieve TSCP and GWOT objectives in Phase 0. Second, it is my intent that the findings and facts in this paper will contribute to the knowledge and understanding of the Special Operations Forces community regarding civil affairs organizations, training, tasks, and employment techniques and procedures. Third, the findings will hopefully provide our interagency partners and partner nations a method of considering how the U.S. Special Operations Forces can be to develop partner nation’s military capacity to conduct CMO to a level where little or no U.S. military involvement is needed. The results of this research will be shared with the U.S. Southern Command J-7, U.S. Special Operations Command South J-9, 98th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) S-3, the 7th Special Forces Group S-9 the Country Team in Paraguay, and the Paraguay Military Civil Affairs Detachment.
Summary

It almost goes without saying that the variables to operational environment within the spectrum of conflict and operational themes and other factors will have a significant impact on the military purpose, objectives, tasks, and end state within unified action to developing capacity of a partner nation military. Moreover, our nation’s defense strategy and facilitation to a comprehensive approach for developing, maintaining partner capacity will also have a profound impact on how best to employ a CMSE. This will provide literature and doctrinal sources in which the facts were gathered and analyzed to the reader in Chapter 2, “Literature Review.” Chapter 3, “Research Methodology” will provide the reader an understanding of how the facts were analyzed in order to answer the research questions. Chapter 4, “Analysis” will prove from document sources and through a case study example of how a CMSE can develop the capacity of a partner nation military to conduct CMO through unified action. Moreover, new practices will be covered in this central research question/answer. Last, Chapter 5 “Conclusions and Recommendation” will provide a clear interpretation of the findings in the research and cast study to assist the reader to act upon it or continue further research over the topic.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter is organized per the elements of the primary research question, “Can a Civil Affairs Team develop the capacity of a partner nation military conduct civil-military operations through unified action to a level of little or no U.S. military involvement is needed.” Therefore, orders, doctrine and literature will include:
(1) Paraguay’s Operational Environment; (2) Civil Affairs; (3) Partnership Capacity, (4) Unified Action, Civil-Military Operations, and Civil Affairs Operations; and (5) Operational Themes and Operations (e.g. Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations).

However, in order to maintain a manageable scope of research for this paper, the focus will be how the CMSE developed the Paraguay Military’s capacity NOT regarding if the insurgency was defeated, marginalized, or disrupted. The focus of this thesis is not IW; however, it did exist in the operational environment in Paraguay during this case study. The IW piece will be touched on as a backdrop of how the CMSE developed the Paraguay Military CA Detachment’s capacity to conduct CMO through unified action.

National strategic documents provide objectives in all seven parts of the primary research question. These include the National Strategic Strategy 2010, the National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, the National Defense Strategy 2008, Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010, National Military Strategy 2011, DoDD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare, DoDI 3000.05, Stability Operations, and USSOUTHCOM Command Strategy 2020. However, these documents will be included in each of the seven areas along with other literary sources.
Operational Environment in Paraguay

There are five primary sources that assisted in understanding the operational environment in Paraguay. The first source used is the three major newspapers in Paraguay including ABC Digital, La Nacion, and Ultima Hora. Each of these papers has historical news that covered the operations of the CMSE and Paraguay Military/Government during January 2008 to September 2010. Moreover, operations after the CMSEs presence in Paraguay are still listed historically in the web sites of these papers. These sites were used to prove that the Paraguay Military Civil Affairs Detachment was alive and well conducting CMO.

The second source of information regarding Paraguay’s operational environment was from interviews and emails with past colleagues from the Paraguay Military CA Detachment, U.S. Embassy Office of Defense Cooperation in Paraguay, U.S. Embassy Paraguay Country Team members, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) members, Massachusetts National Guard (State Partnership Program) members, and 98th CA Battalion members. These colleagues were able to provide current Paraguay laws, organizational charts, and operations.

The third source comes from David Spencer’s article, “Paraguayan People’s Army: Challenging a Populist Regime” is one of the most important articles that details the history and current insurgency issues in northern Paraguay. The information collected and defined in chapter one and four in this research paper mostly comes from his article regarding the insurgency in Paraguay.

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The fourth source comes from Abel Irala’s investigated report, *The New Faces of Militarization*, for the Paraguay Government’s Peace and Justice in 2009-2010, provides a good piece of information used in my research. His report is shows a somewhat negative stance on U.S. involvement in Paraguay’s actions during Paraguay’s State of Exception in 2010. However, he provides a unique viewpoint of when the military instrument of national power dominates the other ones during internal operations. He recommends that the counterinsurgency effort should have a non-military lead with the police and local/department governing officials.

The fifth source is the Department of State’s US Embassy Paraguay (http://paraguay.usembassy.gov/). This website was of particular importance to define the threat in Paraguay in chapter 1. Moreover, this site still has historical announcements of civic assistance activities between the Paraguay Military and Government and the CMSE. I also used to this source to contact former colleagues to assist with this research.

The last source to stay current and document historical events was the Paraguay Government website: http://www.presidencia.gov.py/v1/?cat=66. The Military homepage, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Justice and Labor, and Secretary of National Emergency websites were used to generate research findings and support conclusions to the thesis questions.

**Civil Affairs (CMSE and Tasks)**

One of the strategic documents, The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report 2010, details the importance to expand Civil Affairs to expand in meet the defense

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52 Irala.
objective of Succeeding in COIN, Stability and Counterterrorism Operations.\(^53\) However, the majority this literature comes from U.S. Field Manuals (FM) FM 3-57 (October 2011), and Graphic Training Aid (GTA) 41-01-004 (September 2007), Joint Civil Affairs Operations and Joint Civil-Military Operations. FM 3-57 was used to explain the organization, mission, functions/capabilities, civil affairs tasks, and relationships between Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) to Unified Land Operations, Civil-Military Operations, and Army Special Operations Forces. GTA 41-01-004 Joint CAO and Joint CMO was used to detail CAO/CMO support to Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Peacetime Military Engagement/Theater Security Cooperation.

Articles from the U.S. John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s Special Warfare Magazine such as “Out of Africa,”\(^54\) by Major John P. Wisehart from the 95th CA Brigade (Airborne) and “Persistent Engagement,” by Major Ross Lightsey, Sr.\(^55\) from 1st Special Warfare Training Group, are very insightful as to what CMSE do in two different theaters. Both articles give a non-doctrinal definition to a CMSE, CMSE’s strategy and approaches to COIN (interagency coordination, non-lethal, indirect, persistent engagement) and how CMSEs build partner capacity and for long-term stability. Last, both articles help start my research in the right direction in order to tie in other tasks and concepts that CMSE can do.

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\(^{54}\) Wishart, 10-15.

Kathleen H. Hicks, Christine E. Wormuth, and Eric Ridge in their report of *The Future of US CA Forces*, in CSIS International Security Program details the Historical uses of CA, US CA Missions Today, and US Military Capabilities for CMO. This report was essential to my research in order to explain some of the factors affecting Civil Affairs today and throughout the history of its existence.

Develop Partner Nation Capacity

There are many governmental and general literary sources regarding building partner nation capacity. However, a few sources from each will be used in order to keep the scope of the research to a manageable level. The sources that will be detailed will be governmental first and then general literature.

Governmental Sources regarding Building Capacity

The National Security Strategy (NSS) 2010 explains the US must support its interests through investing in the capacity of strong and capable partners. Under this objective the NSS states that the U.S. must strengthen the security of states at risk of conflict and violence. Next, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) of 2008 lists five strategic objectives that include (1) Defend the homeland, (2) Win the Long War, (3) Promote Security, (4) Deter Conflict, and (5) Win our Nations War. Building partner nation capacity is listed mainly under the second and third objectives. To win the long war, “We (U.S.) will

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56 Hicks and Wormuth.

help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves.” The sub-objective under ‘Promote Security’ has the following regarding capacity building, “The best way to achieve security is to prevent war when possible and to encourage peaceful change within the international system. Our (U.S.) strategy emphasizes building the capacities of a broad spectrum of partners as the basis for long-term security.” The NDS also explains that in order for the US to achieve its objectives that it has to ‘Strengthen and Expand Alliances and Partnerships.’ The NDS goes on further to explain that the alliance system is key to the U.S. in successfully achieving all objectives. “The U.S. will support, train, advise, and equip partner security forces to counter insurgencies, terrorism, proliferation, and other threats.”

The QDR 2010 gives several references to building partner nation capacity and reason why. The first under the Defense Strategy is to ‘Prevent and Deter Conflict.’ The U.S. must integrate the instruments of national power to help build the capacity of partners to maintain and promote stability.

Building partner nation capacity focus has trickled down to the DoD Directives and Instructions regarding Stability Operations (DoDD 3000.05) and Irregular Warfare (DoDD 3000.07) to Joint and Army publications within COIN Operations (JP/FM 3-24), Foreign Internal Defense (JP 3-22/FM 3-05.2), and Stability Operations (JP 3-07/FM 3-

58Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, 8.

59Ibid., 9.

60Ibid., 15.

61Ibid.

07). All references explain the U.S. needs to build its own capabilities to conduct operations and also, the U.S.’s need to build its partner nation’s capacity as well.


General Literature regarding Capacity Building

The following four books and one research paper were extremely helpful in designing a strategy to assess the level of partner nation capacity to conduct CMO. First, Jenifer D.P. Moroney’s et al., *Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations* is a good source to give approaches with metrics regarding building partner nation capacity. The study focuses on the theory of collective action and the challenge of developing metrics to evaluate Army security cooperation activities. Some of these metrics will be used in this study to evaluate building partner nation capacities.63 Second, Derek S. Reveron’s book, *Exporting Security: International Engagement Security Cooperation and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military*, also gives helpful metrics that will be used in this case study. Third, Jefferson P. Marquis’ et al., *Developing an Army Strategy for Building Partner Capacity for Stability Operations* is another source used in

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63Moroney, et al.
this research paper to develop a metrics for TSOCs and CMSEs to use.\textsuperscript{64} Fourth, David C. Gompert, Terrence K. Kelly, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Michelle Parker, and Kimberly Colloton’s the \textit{Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency} is a great book linking civil and military efforts that are needed to fight any insurgency.\textsuperscript{65} This book links what military efforts should be and when the Department of State should step and continue the success that military was able to provide. Last, the research paper by MAJ Jason B. Terry (USAF) “Principles of Building Partnership Capacity” was extremely helpful and was the cornerstone paper that identified other references to measure capacity development.\textsuperscript{66}

\begin{quote}
\textbf{Unified Action, Civil-Military Operations, and Civil Affairs Operations}
\end{quote}

Virtually all Department of Defense Joint Publications and writers regarding Civil-Military Operations in Theater Security Cooperation, Stability Operations, and Counterinsurgency operations conclude that unified action under a political strategy is needed to defeat an insurgency. Almost all national strategic documents highlight the need for joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational coordination. The references are cited in chapters one, four and five regarding unified action. However, the Department of Defenses Joint Publication 3-08 Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations is one of the key references used throughout this research paper since it

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{64}Jefferson P. Marquis, et al., \textit{Developing an Army Strategy for Building Partner Capacity for Stability Operations} (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010).
\item \textsuperscript{65}David Gompert, et al., \textit{Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency} (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009).
\item \textsuperscript{66}Jason B Terry, “Principles of Building Partnership Capacity” (Master’s Thesis, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010).
\end{itemize}
has everything to do with the research question, “Can a CA Team develop the capacity of
the partner nation military conduct CMO through unified action to level where little or no
US involvement is needed?” It is all too uncommon for intergovernmental coordination
to just happen. Equally so, it is uncommon for an insurgency to be marginalized without
it -unit of effort by counterinsurgency forces. Specifically stated in Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations is that, “unity of effort and unified action is essential
for successful COIN operations. In Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, it
states that, “The FID effort is a multinational and interagency effort, requiring integration
and synchronization of all instruments of national power. Moreover, the same publication
states that internal defense and development (IDAD) program (which focuses on building
viable political, economic, military, and social institutions that respond to the needs of the
host nation’s society) first principle is unity of effort among others (maximum use of
intelligence, maximum use of CMO and Military Information Support Operations
(MISO), minimum use of force, a responsive government, and use of strategic
communication).

Last, one of the most influential writers and practioner of COIN, David Galula
wrote regarding the primacy of political over the military power. The summation of this
quote is that all instrument of national power for both the nation and host nation have to
be involved.

That the political power is the undisputed boss is a matter of both principle and
practicality. What is at stake is the country’s political regime, and to defend it is a
political affair. Even if this requires military action, the action is constantly
directed toward a political goal. Essential though it is, the military action is
secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political
power enough freedom to work safely with the population. The armed forces are
but one of the many instruments of the counterinsurgent, and what is better than
the political power to harness the non-military instruments, to see that appropriations come at the right time to consolidate the military work, that political and social reforms follow through?67

Irregular Warfare (IW)

The following books and articles are appropriate to understand historical aspects and today’s experience what an insurgency is, what they do, and what happens when they achieve their objectives. In contrast, best practices and general rules based on experiences of what works and does not work against an insurgency, Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations, are covered adequately as well. The reader will see how principles, theories, and best/worst practices in COIN is applied and written from these authors/theorist into today’s military and civilian doctrine.

Dr. David Kilcullen’s book *Accidental Guerilla* 68 is a great book that is used in this research to explain how CMSE Paraguay used a population-centric, bottom-up, disaggregate approach by, with, and through the Paraguayan Government and Military to address civil vulnerabilities during COIN operations in Paraguay. Kilcullen explains how insurgents gain sympathy of the population they thrive and use against their government and military. Moreover, Kilcullen describes the insurgency and accidental guerrilla syndrome in a way that it easy to understand. This research paper uses Kilcullen’s principles of insurgencies that the EPP exhibit and COIN best practices that CMSE Paraguay and the Paraguayan Military and Government used or did not use.


The following DoD/Army Manuals detail the characteristics of VEO threat, which help develop this paper immensely in order to apply SOF capabilities and tasks: JP/FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency Operations*, JP/FM 3-07 *Stability Operations*, JP 3-26 *Counterterrorism*, and JP/FM 3-05 *Special Operations*.

Kilcullen’s book *Counterinsurgency*\(^{69}\) is used throughout this research paper quite often. Mainly, because he articulates Twenty-eight Articles: Fundamentals to Company-level Counterinsurgency that help tie theory into application at the small unit level where Civil Affair Teams such as CMSEs thrive. He also explains the difference from terrorism and insurgency and pre-existing/updated theories of COIN approaches. He goes into depth of the organization of insurgency and explains it in a way that is consistent to Joint and Army Doctrine. Last he explains finite (e.g. six finite number of ways) attack methods in counterinsurgency while using historical examples of the British in Malaya, Indonesia, Vietnam, Palestine, and Northern Ireland. Moreover, Kilcullen details the cycle of abuse between the insurgency and the government of Afghanistan, which has a lot of similarities with the Government of Paraguay and the EPP. The historical examples shed light on which ones work for PRY CMSE during the case study.

Galula in his book *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*,\(^{70}\) details the nature and characteristics; The Prerequisites for a Successful Insurgency; Insurgency Doctrine; Counterinsurgency in the Cold Revolutionary War; and counteractions to

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\(^{70}\)Galula.
defeat the insurgency. This book will be very useful in understand VEO characteristics that endure time and in which the EPP do or lack in doing.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN

The research methodology used to answer the research questions in this paper is a case study of CMSE Paraguay conducting CMO with, through, and by the Paraguay government and military in northern Paraguay from January 2008 to September 2010 with an emphasis on March 2010 to June 2010. Both primary and secondary research questions are regarding a CMSE developing the capacity of the Paraguay Military Joint Civil Affairs Detachment (e.g. civil-military operations, unified action, and mission). Therefore, developing capacity metrics will be used to determine the level of capacity was developed. Since the thesis is based on the performance of a task conducted by a CMSE, the examination of the facts and assumptions gathered and analyzed in this paper will be in a chronological format (e.g. before, during, and after the CMSE mission in Paraguay). The following is the design of how the reader will be guided through the research paper as findings and conclusions are made regarding the research questions.

The reader will understand operational environment in which CMSE Paraguay and the Paraguay Military Civil Affairs Detachment operated. Then, the reader will understand the endstate and military conditions in which CMSE Paraguay had to meet to solve the problem. Next, the reader will understand relevant factors in which affected CMSE Paraguay’s approach to solve the problem (i.e. the research questions).

Second, the reader will understand the problem (i.e. research questions) presented to CMSE Paraguay in the case study. The reader will see how CMSE Paraguay framed the problem, identified the problem, and tendencies and risks between the relationships of actors and potential factors affecting them.
Third, the reader will understand how the research problems were solved in the case study. CMSE Paraguay and the Paraguay Military CA Detachment’s operational approach, initiative, and resources and risks will demonstrate how the solutions of the research questions were achieved. The solution lies in how CMSE Paraguay orchestrated unity of effort through unified action by, through, and with the Paraguay Military CA Detachment in order to develop a Civil Military Engagement Plan that focused on disrupting the insurgency (i.e. the Paraguayan People’s Army-EPP) through certain CA tasks and partner nation capacity building.

Research instruments (i.e. products) for the case study include (1) interviews from people and organizations that participated in the events of the case study; (2) products newspapers articles and journals describing events and actions of the case study (e.g. international, U.S, and Paraguayan); and (3) products from the Paraguayan Military and CMSE Paraguay such as operations orders, trip and event itineraries, and after action reports from events; (4) current doctrine, theories, and practices will be examined that relate to the case study; and (5) U.S. and Paraguay laws governing defense activities. The research instruments will move the reader from a general situational understanding to a detailed one regarding how the solution to the research questions are solved or not solved. This brings us to how each step will be taken in order to solve the research questions using the products and history of the Paraguayan Civil-Military Operation case study.

First, the interviews from actors in the case study will be structured for the reader to understand the environmental, problem, and solution. The interviews questions are not all the same for each actor. The interview questions will be based on the actor’s relation
to the case study. The interviews will guide the reader to how the interviewee’s perceptions and analysis develops defines the environment, problem and solution of the research questions. Interviews were taken from Paraguayans and U.S. civilians, government workers, and military members involved in the case study. Some interviewee’s will remain anonymous due to the sensitive nature for some in relation to this research.

Second, Paraguayan, U.S., and international newspaper and journal articles will be used throughout the research to help the reader from the operational environment, problem, and solution of the research questions. Although there is a possibility that some articles can lead a reader to misinterpret facts, these articles will be clarified as to what angle/position they present to the problem or solution. Interviews were conducted to some of the article’s authors in order to clarify their viewpoint to the problem and/or solution of the research questions.

Third, certain relevant products from case study actors will be used to guide the reader from situational understanding to understanding the solution of the research questions. These products include Paraguayan Military and CMSE Paraguay operations orders, trip and event itineraries, and after action reports from events. The main events used will be four CMO events including Civil Reconnaissance trips in March 2010, Operation Onondivepa, Operation Nepytivo, and Operation Nepohano #10. Tables detailing plans, execution, and assessments of these operations provide the reader an insight how these operations contributed to the solution of the research questions.

Fourth, current doctrine, theories, and practices will be examined that relate to the case study in order to guide help the reader understand how and why certain solution
frames were applied to solve the research questions. These include civil affairs, developing partner nation capacity, COIN Operations, Stability Operations, FID, and CMO doctrine. Also, illustrations from appropriate doctrine and theories will help the reader understand how and why certain actions or coordination took place in the case study in order to solve the research question. Moreover, the reader will appreciate how certain theories were applied/practiced to solve the research questions during the case study.

Last, the most important aspect of my research methodology is to avoid violating operational security (OPSEC) and individual anonymity (when it was requested) while, at the same time, ‘telling the story’ (case study) to answer the primary and secondary research questions. The purpose of the research methodology taken is to guide the reader from problem to solution while noting that some there maybe some weaknesses and strengths regarding how CMSE Paraguay operated. Moreover, the research will offer the reader better ways to attack similar problems in the features that were presented in this case study.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter is organized into five parts which includes examining (1) the operational environment in Paraguay which led to the CMSE mission; (2) the metrics used in this research to determine developing capacity and CMSE best practices used in the case study; (3) the CMSE security cooperation mission and tasks used to develop partner nation capacity; (4) the case study during and after the CMSE’s presence in Paraguay will detail the progress made for capacity development; (5) and a summary of the research questions will be given. The order of the chapter and the case study will facilitate the process in answering the research questions. One must know the operational environment and conditions of the partner nation’s force before, during, and after the case study to measure if capacity development was achieved. Moreover, the reader will be given details of the unit (i.e. CMSE) that conducting and assessing capacity development. Last, the reader will need to know what level on the spectrum of conflict operational themes served as a backdrop during the case study. Given this, the reader will be able to logically follow how the research questions are treated and answered through the reading.

The Operational Environment in Paraguay

Paraguay’s president, President Fernando Lugo and the Vice President Luis Franco were elected in August 2008 to a five year term which ends in 2013. The

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President served as the Bishop of San Pedro Department in Paraguay in 1990s.\textsuperscript{72} Paraguay has two major political parties including the Colorado Party (conservative) and the Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA). The Colorado Party dominates the south and the PLRA is influential in the north. During the time of the case study, Paraguay was conducting departmental and municipal elections in Paraguay.

The Paraguay Armed Forces includes the Army, National Navy (includes Marine Corps and Naval Aviation), Paraguayan Air Force, Logistics Command, and the War Material Directorate. Paraguay spends less than 1 percent of its GDP on the military and it has a budget of $221,031,865.80 USD (2011).\textsuperscript{73} The budget increased between the years of 2010 and 2011 at $61,499,192.00 USD.\textsuperscript{74} See the figure 4 of the Paraguay Armed Forces.

\textsuperscript{72}Spencer, 106.

\textsuperscript{73}Irala, 43.

\textsuperscript{74}Ibid.
The following is a brief summary of economic, social and infrastructure conditions in Paraguay. First, the economy in Paraguay has been growing in the last two years, 2010 and 2011. The GDP (real growth rate) grew in 2011 at 6.4 percent and at 15 percent in 2010, which was the highest in South America. However, 18.8 percent of Paraguayans still live below the poverty line. Paraguay has two hydroelectric dams that provide another means of income into Paraguay, which includes the Yacyreta in Encarnacion on the Parana River shared with Argentina and the Itaipu, which is near Ciudad de Este on the Parana River shared with Brazil as well. Second, Paraguay’s national language is Spanish and Guarani. Paraguay is the only country in Latin America that has an indigenous language as its official language and the people of Paraguay are
proud of it. Paraguay has a population of 6.5 million (July 2012 etc.) and the literacy rate is 94 percent. Third, Paraguay’s paved road networks are mostly in the south and in the major population centers; therefore, many roads in Paraguay are dirt roads. Fourth, Paraguay is 94th in the world with 1.105 million Internet users and the country has 6 privately owned TV stations; about 75 commercial and community radio stations; and 1 state-owned radio network.75

Paraguay is a land-locked country in Central South America and it shares borders with Brazil (north and east), Bolivia (west), and Argentina (South). Paraguay has four major rivers, the Paraguay River, that runs north to south and splits Paraguay in half; the Parana Rivers which forms the south and east border with Argentina and Brazil; the Pilcomayo River which runs to create a border with Argentina in the southwest; and the Apa River which is in the north, forming a border with Brazil. The population is denser on the west side of the Paraguay River than it is on the other. The land in the west is known as the Chaco in which it is of a dry climate much like southwest Texas. The major population centers in Paraguay are the capital in Asuncion, Ciudad de Este, and Encarnacion. See figure 5 to see the location of Paraguay with in South American and Paraguay itself.

75 CIA World Factbook.
Figure 5. South America and Paraguay Maps


Paraguay has basically four threats and two threat activity areas (i.e. Hot Spots) in which the first two threats are in northern Paraguay and the last one on the tri-border area. The first threat is a small-armed anti-government militant group (i.e. insurgency group), the Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP abbreviation in Spanish), that is operating in the northern Paraguay which is responsible for killing police and conducting high-profile kidnappings. The second threat is Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) that operates on the border of Paraguay and Brazil in the northern Paraguay. The third threat area includes individuals and groups providing financial support to extremist groups operating in Ciudad del Este along the area known as the tri-border area or TBA between Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina. The last threat is natural disasters. Flooding is a threat along the four rivers in Paraguay and in the Chaco region (i.e. northwest region of Paraguay). Fires
are the other grave threat to Paraguay, which typically occurs in the Chaco region throughout the year.\textsuperscript{76}

Insurgency and The Paraguayan People’s Army

The insurgency during the case study was the Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP in Spanish). The EPP had all the characteristics of what the Department of Defense’s Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations, describes as, "The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself."\textsuperscript{77} The insurgency confronted in northern Paraguay was a local insurgent group called the Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP) who has a history of support from the Colombian FARC (Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces). Insurgencies can support or be supported by transnational or regional criminal or terrorist organizations. Both the EPP and the FARC are considered regional terrorist organizations or insurgents with sporadic transnational criminal connections. These organizations call themselves revolutionaries in which they conduct a violent struggle with the state, Colombia and Paraguay, in order to gain political control.

During its existence since the early 1990s, the EPP had tried to influence and draw the population of Northern Paraguay nearer to them and farther from the government.\textsuperscript{78} Their cause calls for classist social change for the peasants. They initially


\textsuperscript{77}Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-08, 1-02.

\textsuperscript{78}Spencer, 107.
started as an armed organization under the leftist and populist Free Country (Partia Libre) Party in the 1990s using communist and the Theology Liberation Theory as their cause. They gained strength and capacity in the early 2000s by training and organizing with the Colombian FARC. Their tactics included robbing and ransoming family members of political figures and wealthy landowners. They have conducting coercion and persuasion actions such as burning down a police station, killing and wounding police officers, and releasing press statements and photos. Their populist and classist ideological cause had been reduced with the Ex-Bishop of San Pedro Fernando Lugo was elected as President of Paraguay under a coalition of parties. This ended 54 years of Colorado Party rule and promised a new era of populism that the EPP was waiting for. However, they soon seemed betrayed, as President Lugo has failed to change the status quo since 2006. Moreover, they felt betrayed because; President Lugo had also taught and conducted Theology Liberation in San Pedro where the founding members of EPP attended in the 1980s. Therefore, they continued their coercion and harassment tactics soon after 2007 after a year silence. The EPP problem, however, did not go away as President Lugo called for three States of Exceptions in Northern Paraguay.

Questions and Metrics Used to Determine Capacity Development and Best Practices

The following questions and metrics will be used to determine if the CMSE developed the capacity of the Paraguay Military Civil Affairs Directorate/Detachment to conduct CMO through unified action. The second set of questions is regarding their

79 Ibid., 106.
capacity to conduct their mission stated by Paraguayan law. These questions are designed to answer the primary and secondary research questions.

Primary Research Question

Can a CMSE develop a partner nation’s military capacity to conduct CMO through unified action to a level where little or no US military involvement is necessary?

Does the Paraguay Military Joint CA Detachment/Directorate:

1. Have a Civil Military Engagement Plan?
2. Execute Civil Military Engagement Plan?
3. Execute the plan without U.S. Assistance? If so, how much of it?
4. Use the Civil Military Engagement Plan to focus on ‘Hot Spots’ conflicted, ungoverned, and/or undergoverned areas? Or does it address civil vulnerabilities?
5. Use the Civil Military Engagement Plan to prepare the detachment for their mission?
6. (Joint) Plan and execute CMO with the Army, Navy, Air Force, Logistics Command, and the War Material Department? How often?
7. (Interagency) Plan and execute CMO with Paraguayan Government Agencies, especially the ones that are involved in its mission tasks?
8. (Interagency) Plan and execute CMO with local, departmental, and national Paraguayan government agencies?
9. (Intergovernmental) Plan and execute CMO with local, departmental, national, and/or International Governmental Organizations, Nongovernmental Organizations, Private Volunteer Organizations?
10. (Multinational) Plan and execute CMO with other countries such as the U.S, Brazil, Japan, Spain, Taiwan, and/or Argentina?

Secondary Research Question

Can a CMSE develop a partner nation civil affairs element’s capacity to conduct its mission to a level where little or no U.S. involvement is necessary? Does the Paraguay Military Joint CA Detachment/Directorate:

1. Conduct training, exercises, and events to prepare it and partner institutions to conduct civil defense operations (i.e. prevention, response, and rehabilitations activities regarding emergencies and disasters)?

2. Assist in projects that are useful to the civilian population?

3. Assist in the national defense; coordinate the use of military resources to aid the civilian population in national emergency and disaster situations?

U.S. involvement in Paraguay Military Joint CA Detachment activities

The metrics used to measure the level of U.S. military or government involvement in Paraguay’s CMO and mission activities are the following. It is important to note that the Paraguay Military Joint CA Detachment needed the U.S.’s assistance full participation in all of its CMO activities, financial and advisory-wise, from 2007 until 2010.

1. U.S. participates in less a quarter (< 25 percent) of the CMO activities conducted by the Paraguay Military Joint CA Detachment.

2. U.S. does not pay (0 percent payment) for the CMO activities in which it does not participate.
Best Practices in developing partner nation CA capacity

Developing partner nation civil affairs capacity best practices developed in the case study with the assumption that the partner nation has a joint civil affairs directorate or detachment. In Theater Security Cooperation activities (Phase 0 Shaping Operations), a CMSE should under its CIM and Nation Assistance:

1. Know the partner nation military’s civil affairs mission. Understand that unit’s purpose and mission given by law or general orders (read it).

2. Identify objectives and end state for capacity development. Plan with the US Country Team (ODC/Military Group, USAID) and Special Operations Command Forward (i.e. Operational Support Team) regarding to the level of capacity development desired. These folks will help maintain the capacity of the partner nation’s civil affairs unit when the TSOC rotates the CMSE to other countries or regions. The end state was achieved in Paraguay in the case study as the Paraguay Military requested support from the ODC (e.g. personnel) rather than vice versa like it used to be.

3. Develop a Civil Military Engagement Plan that focuses on partner nation capacity development and track their progress. Create an assisting and advising plan and metrics through the CMEP to track the capacity of the partner nation military’s progress toward capacity development. The CMEP should:
   A. Focus on ‘Hot Spots’ which include ungoverned, undergoverned, and/or insurgency areas.
   B. Focus on small target areas. Start small (a district or three-town cluster).
C. Develop a training method for the joint civil affairs detachment in a logical way.

(1) Conduct civil reconnaissance and key leader engagements in order to develop the civil component of the operational environment for the partner nation military and government. These activities should be done in the same small geographic area at least two to three times (trips) with the local government in order to identify the civil vulnerabilities in the area. Also, the government and military contacts should be made in order to assist with the partner nation’s civil defense operations mission. The assessment sheets need to be in the partner nation’s language to allow the partner nation to conduct them as the CMSE observes and advises.

(2) Once the facts, analysis, and findings have been done and the civil vulnerabilities are identified, prioritize them and plan to conduct an HCA event (i.e. MEDCAP or projects) according to the short-term plan and long-term desired objectives for the area.

4. The CMEP should be used by the partner nation’s joint military CA directorate to train the service branches and large units. These entities include the Air Force, Navy, and/or Marine civil affairs components at each one of the Civil Military Engagement (CME) events. Moreover, large units such as division and
corps that own the battle space in the region should be identified and trained at
each one of the CME events as well. The Defense Attaché Officer at the
embassy and joint military civil affairs directorate should assist in doing this.

5. The CMEP should identify funds and programs to conduct each event. Identify
funds and programs from the GCC, DoS Country Team (USAID), Private
Volunteer Organizations (PVOs), and host nation’s government in order to
execute the partner nation’s CMEP. The key is finding PVOs and the host
nation’s government to fund the CMO events for the partner nation. Moreover,
having the local government supporting them as well in order to alleviate the
costs from the military.

The Paraguay Military Civil Affairs Directorate and Detachment

The Paraguay Armed Forces enacted General Order 21 organized and created the
Civil Affairs Directorate on February 2, 2007 (See figure 6 to visually understand where
the CA Directorate is located within the Armed Forces Staff). The purpose for the
Paraguay Military Civil Affairs Directorate is, to “Facilitate the armed forces relationship
with civil authorities of the population.” Paraguayan Code 12, states that the Armed
Forces in Chapter VI, Civil Affairs, will assume a role that will support civil authorities
in Civil Defense Operations responding to disasters and emergency.

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The Civil Affairs Directorate’s roles and responsibilities are primarily to coordinate with civil authorities and provide disaster/humanitarian assistance during disasters and emergencies (Civil Defense Operations). The Paraguay Military Civil Defense Department is under the authority of the Paraguay Military Civil Affairs Director. The Paraguay Military Civil Affairs Director also serves as the President of the Paraguay Military Emergency Council in which he serves as the coordinator between the military and the Secretary of National Emergency. This council serves to coordinate before, during and after disasters and emergencies (See figure 7 regarding the organizational chart of the Emergency Council). Consequently, the Director of the Paraguay Military Civil Affairs Directorate has the responsibility to ensure that each branch civil affairs directorate of the armed forces is prepared to conduct their duties. In the levels below the service component such as large commands and units, with zones...
and areas of responsibilities, detachments, air and naval bases, in their area of influence, should have a representative or liaison officer with the Municipal and Departmental (Provincial) Emergency Committees in order to provide appropriate support when the situation warrants it.\textsuperscript{82}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Paraguay_Armed_Forces_Institutional_Emergency_Council.png}
\caption{Paraguay Armed Forces Institutional Emergency Council}
\end{figure}

Source: Created by author.

The Civil Affairs Directorate is comprised of general staff (J-1 thru J-4), a special staff of civil affairs four functional areas (e.g. Government, Economy, Public Services, and Special), four directorates (e.g. Administrative, Civil Defense, Environmental Defense, Human Rights). The Civil Affairs Directorate is projected to include a civil affairs battalion, Civil Defense Group, and Environmental Defense Group. The missions of the Civil Affairs Directorate included the following.\textsuperscript{83} See figure 8 for the Paraguay Military Civil Affairs Directorate.

\textsuperscript{82}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{83}Ibid.
1. Plan, coordinate, and direct military support, responsible institutions by the law of civil defense operations and humanitarian assistance.

2. Advise, coordinate and regulate the civil military activities for the armed forces.

3. Optimize the planning and execution civil affairs functions (e.g. government, economic, public services, and special services).

4. Assist in projects that are useful to civilian population.

5. Assist in the national defense; coordinate the use of military resources to aid the civilian population in national emergency and disaster situations.

6. Facilitate force entry in civil defense operations capable of reacting before, during, and after emergency situations in threatened locations and zones in the national territory.

7. Instill in the public mindset of prevention, preservation, conservation, and recuperation of the environment.

8. Execute environmental prevention and conservation, through projects and programs, streamlining the use of environmental resources available and including the protection and preservation of the environment with critical aspects in planning and execution in military activities.
In 2007, the Chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation and US Embassy Paraguay offered to provide a U.S. civil affair team to conduct a subject matter exchange with the Paraguay Military Chief of Defense. The Paraguay Military Chief of Defense wanted to conduct humanitarian civic action events such as Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) in order to train the recently created planning staff and detachment.

The CMSE Mission

In January 2008, the U.S. Theater Special Operations Command South (USSOC SOUTH) sent a six-man Civil Military Support Element (CMSE) from the 98th

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84 Office of Defense Cooperation is another name for Military Group, which belongs to USSOUTHCOM and is a member of the U.S. Embassy Country Team.
Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) to develop the capacity of the Paraguay Military to conduct civil-military operations (CMO) and work towards JCS CONPLAN 7500 Global War on Terror and USSOUTHCOM Intermediate Objectives in the Theater Security Cooperation Plan.

A total four CMSEs were employed in Paraguay from January 2008 to September 2010, in which a total of 13 humanitarian civic action events and projects, countless key leader engagements, civil reconnaissance, humanitarian donations were conducted. However, less than half were conducted in threat areas of Paraguay. This was due to heighten security and safety risks in the TBA and northern Paraguay. Therefore, the CMSE assisted the Paraguay Military Civil Affairs Detachment in civil-military operations in safer parts. It was not until August 2009 and March 2010 to September 2010 until the CMSE and Paraguay Military Civil Affairs Detachment could operate in a threat area, northern Paraguay’s Concepcion Department.

Northern Paraguay provided the conditions to assess the Paraguay Military CA Detachment’s level of capacity in conducting CMO through unified action. Their actions on the last civic action event on June 2010 demonstrated that they were competent to conduct CMO through unified action on their own to a level of little U.S. support. This led to the TSOC Commander deciding on June 2010 to reassign the CMSE to another country in October 2010.

**SOF CA and the CMSE Organization, Tasks, and Employment**

CMSEs are organized from Civil Affairs Teams from the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) which the Special Operations Forces Civil Affairs component to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command (USASOC). The 95th CA Brigade has the four battalions assigned to it as of 2009 that were aligned to four different Theater Special Operations Commands under their respective Geographic Combatant Command (GCC). These CA battalions included the 91st CA Battalion, 96th CA Battalion, 97th CA Battalion, and the 98th CA Battalion.

![Diagram of SOF CA, TSOC, and GCC Organizational Chart]

Figure 9. SOF CA, TSOC, and GCC Organizational Chart

*Source:* Created by author.

As figure 9 illustrates above, the 98th CA Battalion is aligned to support the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) and US Southern Command (USOUTHCOM) Geographic Combatant Command (GCC). Therefore, each company in the 98th CA Battalion serves a Theater Security Cooperation mission in the US Southern Command Area of Operations, Latin America. There are five companies per CA
Battalion to do this, which include a Headquarters Company and four line companies, Alpha through Delta Company.

![Organizational Chart](image)

Figure 10. The 98th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) Organizational Chart

*Source:* Created by author.

A Civil Affairs company has five CA Teams, a Company Civil-Military Operations Center, and a Company Headquarters Section (as seen in figure 10).

Normally, a Civil Affairs Team can be a CMSE; however, for bigger countries or for those CA Teams that have multiple countries, a CA Team and part of the CMOC will make up the CMSE. Therefore, a CMSE may have four to six men, depending on the mission or country size. The Company headquarters and part of the CMOC become the Theater CMSE (TCMSE) and work in the J39 Operations–Civil Affairs Section of the TSOC.

The basic modular structure of a Civil Affairs Team is composed of four personnel, which include a Captain (38A), Sergeant First Class (38B40), Staff Sergeant
(38B30), and Civil Affairs Medic (68W20). All members are normally Sergeant and above and have graduated from the Civil Affairs Qualification Course (CAQC) or the Special Operations Medical Course. These teams convert in name only to a Civil Military Support Element as seen on figure 11.

Figure 11. Civil Affairs Team Organizational Chart

*NTCE: The Medical Sergeant is a graduate of the Special Operations Combat Medic and Civil Affairs Medical Sergeant Courses

Legend:
O-3 Captain
E-7 Sergeant: First: Class
E-3 Staff Sergeant


CMSE Organization

A Civil Military Support Element (CMSE) conducts phase 0 Theater Security Cooperation activities for the GCC and TSOC Commander. The draft Civil Affairs Operations manual, FM 3-57, defines the CMSE as a task-organized Civil Affairs force that conducts civil-military engagement in a specified country or region. A civil-military support element is composed of a persistent-presence element of Civil Affairs leaders/planners, and a presence-for-purpose element composed of a Civil Affairs
Team(s) that may include enables (for example, health service support, engineer, etc.) who are task organized for a specific time to execute a coordinated mission.”

See figure 12 for an example of a CMSE.

![CMSE Organizational Chart](image)

*NOTE: Some CMSE missions do not have this element; therefore, a CA Team will conduct both elements’ tasks like CA Team 814 in the Paraguayan Case Study.

**Figure 12. CMSE Organizational Chart**

*Source: Created by author.*

A CMSE is made up of Civil Affairs generalists, which are members of a Civil Affairs Team. Depending on the size or responsibility of a CMSE mission, the Civil Affairs Team may keep, loose, or gain more members of its organic team. Usually when a CMSE deploys it is operationally controlled (OPCON) by the TSOC, tactically controlled (TACON) by the Military Group at the US Embassy, and administratively controlled (ADCOM) by its parent unit, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) at Fort

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85Department of the Army, FM 3-57, 3-27.
Bragg, North Carolina. The following are other definitions that reflect with some accuracy what CMSEs are and do.

First, Admiral Eric T. Olson, the commander of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in his Posture of Special Operations Forces Statement before the House Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities on March 5, 2008, defined that a, “CMSE as a scalable, modular SOF teams that plan, coordinate, facilitate, manage and lead programs and projects that support US and host nation objectives.”86

Second, US African Command (USAFRICOM) on its webpage, defines that a “CMSE as an element that assess partner nation capacities to develop and sustain government and local institutions, including infrastructure development, that address the population’s basic humanitarian need.”87

Last, Major John P. Wishart details in his article regarding CMSEs engagements in West Africa that CMSEs influence lower-level terrorist networks with direct links to VEOs and uses the indirect approach by engaging vulnerable populations to counter VEOs. Moreover, he states that CMSEs build Partner Nation capacity to determine civil vulnerabilities.88

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86 Admiral Eric T. Olson, Posture of Special Operations Forces Before the House Armed Service Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities (March 5, 2008), 8.


88 Wishart.
CMSE primary core tasks used to develop capacity

CMSEs conduct mainly two of the five basic core tasks (see figure 13) and sometime a third one. The primary core tasks that a CMSE conduct is Nation Assistance (NA), Civil Information Management (CIM) and sometimes Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA). CMSE conducts NA and CIM the most to develop partner nation military capacity to conduct CMO through unified action. NA includes subtasks such as Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Civil Military Engagement (CME), Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA), and Military Civic Assistance (MCA). Out of these NA subtasks, CMSEs develop partner nation military civil affairs capacity with FID, and HCA the most in Paraguay during the case study. CMSE applied subtasks of CIM such as Key Leader Engagements (KLE) and Civil Reconnaissance (CR) for three main reasons. First, these tasks help develop the civil component of Combatant Commander’s (CCDR) operational environment and support US Country Team goals. Second, these task help develop the capacity of the Paraguay Military CA Detachment. Third, CMSE worked with, through, and by the Paraguay Military and Government to inform/influence the relevant population to turn away from the insurgency (i.e. EPP). Therefore, CMSE assisted the Paraguay Government and Military in conducting COIN operations to disrupt/defeat the insurgency. CMSE worked with, through, and by the Paraguay Military and Government to achieve its Internal Development and Defense (IDAD) objectives. See figure 13 for the examples of the five core tasks that CMSEs conduct.
CMSE worked with, through, and by the Paraguay Military Joint Civil Affairs Detachment to develop a Civil Military Engagement Plan (CMEP) in which the CMSE used CIM tasks and Nation Assistance tasks to develop their capacity. See figure 14 regarding Paraguay’s Civil Military Engagement Plan. The CMSE used FID to train and advise the Paraguay Military Joint Civil Affairs Detachment to train service components and large units. The second column is where the event was completed or not. The third column is the type of CMO activity such as civil reconnaissance (CR) or a Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA) event. The fourth column is the primary and alternate dates to conduct the activities. The fifth column is the primary and secondary locations to conduct the activities. The last column is the purpose of the activity. The green rows indicate the U.S. Massachusetts Army-Air National Guard (USMAANG) involvement in HCA.
events. The green rows indicate a special staff visit and donation event, which included the USMAANG State Adjutant General.

Figure 14. Paraguay Military Civil Military Engagement Plan


The Paraguayan Military CA Detachment plan according to the Civil Military Engagement Plan was to supervise each branch of the Paraguayan Military (e.g. Air Force, Navy, and Army) to conduct at least two Civil Reconnaissance trips and one Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA) Event a quarter. The Civil Reconnaissance trips
included a series of Key Leader Engagements with national, departmental, and local government officials and organizations, NGOs, and private organizations in order to assess the needs and issues. These needs and issues normally identified gaps between government services and resources that were being applied to the relevant population. The information found through these trips was to be recorded in a central database in which the Paraguay Military could share with their military, government and U.S. Country Team and the U.S. Massachusetts Army Air Force National Guard (i.e. the U.S. State Partnership Program).

Then, the Paraguay Military CA Detachment would coordinate with the U.S. Embassy for U.S. military involvement and funds to use in Humanitarian Civic Assistance, Humanitarian Assistance, and/or Military Civic Action events. The U.S. military component, the Office of the Defense Cooperation (i.e. representative of USOUTHCOM) of the U.S. Embassy’s Country Team would coordinate with the U.S. Massachusetts Army Air Force National Guard (USMAANG) in order to get manpower assistance and meet the letter of the law to use certain funds. Under certain U.S. Code statutes, funds for such events as Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA) that require U.S. military participating with the partner nation’s in order to use the funds. U.S. Military involvement during the case study normally included the USMAANG and Special Forces Command (Forward) Paraguay (e.g. CMSE, MIST Paraguay, and the OIC).

The Civil Military Engagement Plan (CMEP) also helped CMSE and the Paraguay CA Military orchestrate unity of action through unified action. The unified action concept was implemented by ensuring that the Civil Reconnaissance (CR) and Key Leader Engagement (KLE) trips had scheduled local and departmental level government
officials and local military and police officials’ visits. Moreover, national level Paraguay Government agencies and Military elements, NGOs, and U.S. agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) were visited prior to or after the trips. This helped the Paraguay Military CA Detachment not only know what operations and objectives these entities were pursuing but also, how to find a common thread among them to pull into the activities planned in the Civil Military Engagement Plan. CMSE ensured that the Paraguay Military CA Detachment took the lead in conducting the visits and also in assessing capabilities and infrastructure.

CMSE enabled the Paraguay Military CA Detachment to increase unity of effort through the Civil Military Engagement through five main ways. First, CMSE changed their Civil Military Engagement Plan into the Paraguay Military CA Detachment’s. Second, CMSE translated assessment worksheets into Spanish to allow the Paraguay Military CA Detachment to do this. Third, CMSE assisted in creating a CIM database to story assessments and government ANB (Analyst Notebook) charts. Fourth, CMSE also tied in the ODC and MAANG operations and activities such as Security Assistance and State Partnership to ensure the U.S. Military complement and funding could assist in the Civil Military Engagement Plan. Fourth, CMSE secured the funding through the ODC to USSOUTHCOM for Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA) events. Fifth, CMSE coordinated meetings for Paraguay Military CA Detachment with USAID, ODC, and MAANG officials. Last, CMSE created a CMSE SOP and shared it with the MAANG, ODC, USAID, and Paraguay Military CA Detachment to continue to conduct FID in support of Paraguay’s Internal Development and Defense (IDAD) objectives.
CMSE and Paraguay Military Joint Civil Affairs Detachment
with Unified Action

CMSE helped the Paraguay Military Joint Civil Military Detachment achieved unity of action during the deployment in Paraguay by coordinate the Joint Operations (e.g. SOCSOUTH, SOUTHCOM/ODC, Massachusetts National Guard); Multinational Operations (e.g. Paraguay Military which were joint, too); Operations with Other Organizations (e.g. the Paraguay Government and Association of Rural Paraguay (ARP)); Operations with Intergovernmental Organizations (e.g. Paraguay Military’s United Nation Multi-Role Engineer Company); Operations with Nongovernmental Organizations (e.g. the SERVIMEX storage company, World Vision, Project for the People of Paraguay, and the National Cancer Coalition); and Operations with US Government Agencies (e.g. U.S. Embassy and the Country Team). The CMSE took every operation it conducted using unified action or the comprehensive approach in order to achieve unity of effort.

CMSE Employment

A CMSE normally is employed with a Special Operations Command (Forward) element that may consist of a Special Forces Company or Operational Support Team Officer in-Charge (OST OIC). These elements normally also have a Military Information Support Team (MIST) and Special Forces Teams (SF Teams) as well. The OST OIC ensures that the CMSE, MIST, and SF Teams accomplish Theater Special Operations Command, Geographic Combatant Commander, and US Country Team tasks.

The ODC Army-Navy Section Chief was the Humanitarian Assistance Program Manager and pushed all funding requests through USSOUTHCOM channels for
approval. Moreover, the ODC Army-Navy Section chief ensured that all funding requests were legal and were also targeted for certain programs and requests from the U.S. Embassy’s Humanitarian Assistance Working Group which was made up of members from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Country Team (Political-Military Advisor, Public Diplomacy Office, etc.). The ODC Commander and staff served as the coordinating link between CMSE and the U.S. Ambassador. In order to gain a better understanding of how the Country Team and Office of the Defense Cooperation is organized, and how the Ambassador manages them.

See figure 15 below that depicts the Country Team structure in most embassies.

![Country Team Structure Diagram]

Figure 15. US Embassy Country Team Structure

CMSE regularly coordinated Civil-Military Operations with the SOCFWD Commander, ODC Commander, ODC Army-Navy Section Chief, USAID Civil-Military Liaison Coordinator, and the Paraguayan Military Civil Affairs Detachment Commander. CMSE organized itself to meet coordinating demands by first working in the Political Section of the Embassy where SOCFWD had an office that was shared with the SOCFWD Commander, MIST, and SF Teams (when in country). However, later CMSE spent most of its time on the Paraguay Military Civil Affairs Detachment Compound, a few blocks from the U.S. Embassy.

Developing Partner Nation Capacity: FID in IW and Stability Operations

Capacity development is inherent with Theater Security Cooperation, Foreign Internal Defense, Stability and COIN Operations. These principles will be defined and examined in context of these operations prior to recommending ones to assessing the case study and answering the research questions. FID is a Nation Assistance task along with HCA. They were the two most used subtasks along with civil reconnaissance (under CIM) to develop partner nation military capacity in the case study.

Developing partner nation capacity is a “Targeted effort to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the Department of Defense and its partners,” according to the DoD 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) Execution Roadmap. The BPC Execution Roadmap also explains who partners are, “include allies, coalition members, host nations, and other nations among others defined

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Moreover, the BPC Execution Road explains what partnership capacity includes which is, “the capability to defeat terrorist networks, conduct irregular warfare (IW) and stabilization, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations, and enable host countries provide good governance.” The following Department of Defense Directives regarding Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare also mandate that DoD forces not only give importance, train, and conduct exercises in both operational environments but also mandate to develop partner nation capacities in stability operations and in Irregular Warfare.

For example, DoD Directive 3000.05 Military Support for SSTR (dated: November 28, 2005) gives the tasks for the military to support the long-term goal of helping develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services and other tasks. Both DoDD 3000.05 and DoD Directive 3000.07 Irregular Warfare (dated December 1, 2008) states that DoD forces will, “train, advise, and assist foreign security forces and partners at the ministerial, service, and tactical levels to ensure security in their sovereign territory or to contribute forces to operations elsewhere.” Therefore, in other words, DoD forces will develop partner nation capacity of foreign security forces. These Department of Defense Directives also assigns responsibilities for DoD forces to train for both IW and Stability Operations and gives the Combatant Commanders responsibility to,

\[90\text{Ibid.}\]
\[91\text{Ibid.}\]
\[93\text{Department of Defense, DoDD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare, 2.}\]
first, “identify stability operations and IW-related requirements,” and to “incorporate stability operations/irregular warfare into military training, exercises, and planning, including intelligence campaign plans and intelligence support plans.” DoD 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review BPC Execution Roadmap, DoD Directives for Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare were used as examples because, all DoD Joint Publications and Military Service Departments’ Field Manuals derive their doctrine from these directives. These directives, in essence, govern military forces’ activities in partner nation capacity building missions, roles, and responsibilities in stability operations and irregular warfare environments (e.g. COIN).

US military goals in stability operations according to the DoDD 3000.05 are to, “Rebuild indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment; Revive or build the private sector, including encouraging citizen, bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure; and develop representative governmental institutions.” To state it more bluntly, the ultimate goal of US military forces in stability operations is to conduct these tasks, mainly establish a safe and secure environment, and transition the mission to the Host Nation once they have the capacity according to the

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94 Department of Defense, DoDD 3000.05, Stability Operations; Department of Defense, DoDD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (IW), 9.

95 Department of Defense, DoDD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (IW), 9.

following figure. This makes unified action and unity effort much more essential in stability operations from the start. The quicker that joint, intergovernmental, interagency, and multinational forces are involved in building partner capacity in stability operations, the easier it will be to arrive at a US military end state. This also goes for COIN operations.

The common goal and thread in both stability operations and counterinsurgency operations is unity of effort through unified action and capacity building as stated earlier. Unity of effort is essential as the US national strategic objectives is better achieved and sustained through the means of joint, intergovernmental, interagency, and multinational commitment. In areas of the world where preemptive actions are taken to avoid major combat operations (i.e. Phase 0 operations), the US military and agencies assist weaker or failed states through the Host Nation’s Internal Development and Defense Strategy (IDAD) through the US’s Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission. The FID mission is truly requires unity of effort where all US’s instruments of national power can be applied in order to coordinate IDAD (See figure 16 regarding IDAD coordination).

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Moreover, the US will involve intergovernmental and multinational military organizations to assist the US’s FID mission.98 This mission is largely a capacity building mission that the US military helps develop the capacity of the Host Nation to meet its IDAD Strategy whether it is to defeat an insurgency or stabilize (develop and defend) itself (see figure 17 for the IDAD Strategy Model for better clarification).

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98Ibid., IV-5.
In counterinsurgency operations, the HN government mobilizes the population to participate in IDAD efforts with the ultimate goal of preventing an insurgency or other forms of lawlessness or subversion by forestalling and defeating the threat. The US’s FID mission supports the Host Nation’s counterinsurgency operations in order to keep it from become a weaker or failed state (See figure 18). In stability operations, the Host

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Nation does the same, however, the ultimate goal is, “to achieve conditions that ensure a stable and lasting peace,” and “prevent and/or eliminate lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency.”

Figure 18. Counterinsurgency and Foreign Internal Defense


Civil-Military Operations at the operational and tactical level support the Host Nation’s overall IDAD strategy, which is overarching. As JP 3-24 states, “The HN’s government below the national level needs to build the capability and capacity to support


\[101\] Ibid., IV-6.
IDAD, which may necessitate civil-military support. Civil-military support may come in the form of organizations like national-level governmental assistance teams (GATs) or provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs).102 In Phase 0 operations, Civil-military support will most likely come in the form of Civil Affairs Teams (i.e. Civil Military Support Elements) or via US Country Team (i.e. US Agency for International Development, Department of Justice, etc.). The following paragraphs will explain how Civil-Military Operations support Host Nation’s IDAD during COIN and Stability Operations.

US military forces conduct civil-military operations through, by, and with Host Nation, joint forces, interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and multinational forces throughout the range of full spectrum operations including offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support operations. These operations occur through the six distinct phases of military operations (see figure 19). The case study in this research paper will focus on phase zero. It is important note that phase zero “Shaping Operations” does not necessarily mean that phases one thru six will follow.103 However, it is up to the military commander whether campaigns include all six phases. Because of political sensitivity of the word ‘shape,’ that US partners may not like (of what they think that US


is doing to them), the term is yielding to “cooperative security,” which is meant to emphasize partnership in improving security.104

Figure 19. Phasing Model of Military Operations


Civil-military operations according to DoD, “are a primary military instrument to synchronize military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats.”105

CMSE and the Paraguay Military CA Detachment practiced, inadvertently COIN operations using principles and best practices for better or worse. CMSE trained, advised,


105 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-57, vii.
assisted, and procured funding/materials by, through, and with the Paraguay Military CA Detachment to conduct Civil-Military Operations in direct support (not involving combat operations) to the Host Nation. These programs, tasks, and events that CMSE used to conduct Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and persistent Civil Military Engagement (CME) included Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA). All of these tasks from FID, CME, and HCA are Nation Assistance Tasks. Moreover, CMSE not only did these tasks by, through, and with the Paraguay Military CA Detachment but also with the rest of Paraguay Military and Government. The following figure (figure 20) shows how a CMSE and Country Team may conduct Nation Tasks in CMO while providing direct in FID support during non-combat operations.

![Diagram](image.png)

**Figure 20.** Direct Support (Not involving Combat Operations)

CMSE used the HCA tasks to conduct Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) events to train, advise, and assist the Paraguay Military CA Detachment to work through, by, and with the Paraguay Government and other branches of the Paraguay Military. Prior to conducting each MEDCAP or Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) event, CMSE and the Paraguay Military CA Detachment conducted a series of Civil Military Engagements that included Civil Information Management Tasks such as Civil Reconnaissance (CR) and Key Leader Engagements (KLE) in order to determine where each event would take place in order to assist the Paraguay’s Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) Program and conduct the COIN fight.

While conducting FID and these other tasks, CMSE included the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) from the US Embassy so that they may participate and conduct their Security Assistance Tasks at these also called Security Cooperation activities, events or programs. The ODC saw CMSE’s operations with the Paraguay Military and Government as Joint and Multinational Exercises and Direct Support CMO. ODC’s role in conducting Security Assistance in conjunction with these Security Cooperation Activities that CMSE and the Paraguay Military CA Detachment as a way to mesh their activities and goals within Paraguay’s Internal Defense and Development Program. Therefore, CMSE, Special Operations Command South, US Southern Command (ODC), and the Department of State Goals were synchronized and met during these operations. The Department of State, US Embassy, Paraguay was especially satisfied, as they are the lead agency in Foreign Internal Defense.

CMSE conducted Nation Assistance and Civil Information Management tasks by, through, and with the Paraguay Military and Government during their short time in
Paraguay. However, the point of this case study is to show how they were able to orchestrate unity of effort through unified action in order to defeat the EPP, the terrorist/insurgent organization in Paraguay. Later in this chapter, the reader will see detail tasks and methods used that CMSE and the Paraguay Military CA Detachment used to tie in unity of effort and develop the capacity of the Paraguay Military and Government.

CMSE did not defeat the insurgency of the EPP. However, CMSE did train, advise, and assist the Paraguay Military CA Detachment to conduct Civil-Military Operations in the right place, time, and with the Paraguay Military and Government to defeat the EPP. In other words, CMSE helped to build the capacity of the Paraguay Military CA Detachment to focus their tasks and programs to assist the government and military in addressing civil vulnerabilities. Therefore, CMSE and the Paraguay Military CA Detachment used indirect operational approach to conduct and support COIN operations.

CMSE and the Paraguay Military CA Detachment conducted several Key Leader Engagements and Civil Reconnaissance tasks while focusing on a few areas in Paraguay, the Concepcion Department. CMSE and the CA Detachment met with government, military, and police officials in these areas to identify civil vulnerabilities. The civil vulnerabilities found were mainly lack of civil registration, health care (above routine care), adequate education and supplies, and infrastructure (e.g. improved roads, schools, clinics, water, etc.). The lack of infrastructure, especially improved roads, seemed to affect the economy outside of agriculture. These vulnerabilities were also coupled with the lack of the population’s confidence in the police.
CMSE and the Paraguay Military CA Detachment attempted to address these vulnerabilities by including the Paraguay’s local political representatives, police, civil registry, health medical professionals, education teachers and officials, engineers, and equipment in all Nation Assistance tasks and events. Unfortunately, all MEDCAPs, projects, and engagement trips did not address the civil vulnerabilities in a long-lasting way, however, some did. Projects such as school improvement, water-well reconstruction, and educational donations such as books were tools to address civil vulnerabilities with long-term effects. Most of all, the psychological impact of the relevant population seeing their military, government, and military coming together and conducting an event for them. This could be argued as a long-term answer, as long as it is persistent, to a well-known civil vulnerability of lack of positive assistance and attention between the population and the government. As Kilcullen writes in his theory of competitive control in irregular warfare, “the local armed actor that a given population perceives as most able to establish a normative system for resilient, full-spectrum control over violence, economic activity, and human security is most likely to prevail within that population’s residential area.”106

The COIN strategy that CMSE and the Paraguay Military CA Detachment embarked on was one that followed some of Kilcullen’s best practices in COIN which included helping the Paraguay Government’s political strategy to improve its legitimacy while marginalizing insurgents; using a comprehensive approach to integrate civil and military efforts based on a common diagnosis of the situation; population-centric security founded on presence; and close and genuine partnerships at the departmental and town

106Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 152.
level. Although, Paraguay’s national government had a COIN strategy above the influence of CMSE, CMSE and the Paraguay Military CA Detachment were able to improve on it at the operational and tactical level. The EPP was only marginalized temporarily during CMSE’s and Paraguay Military CA Detachment’s promoted events, however, the diagnosis seems to have been found how to not marginalize them. The President of Paraguay had conducted three States of Exception in which he deployed over 3,000 Soldiers and Police to stamp out the EPP. Unfortunately, no EPP members were caught, the government of Paraguay was embarrassed, and the affected population became more volatile to the disruption of their lives with police and military overwhelming intervention. The only marginalization period that occurred was during and shortly after a Nation Assistance event such as a MEDCAP, HA Donation, and/or project completion. The short-term EPP marginalization period follows David Galula’s COIN principles of establishing contact with the population; selecting the right area; and using a small force. However, the Paraguay Government did not deploy a small static military unit afterwards to sustain and build upon the population’s support while further isolating the EPP.

CMSE assisted the Paraguay Military and Government in attacking the insurgency, the EPP, using attack methods in COIN defined by Kilcullen. But before, CMSE’s assistance is talked about; it will help to define the insurgency in Paraguay.

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107 Kilcullen, Accidental Guerilla, 265.
109 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 208-209.
Once the type of insurgency in Paraguay is addressed, CMSE’s tactics, techniques, and procedures will be addressed.

The EPP is the insurgency in the Paraguay. Some call it a terrorist group and others, mainly the Government of Paraguay, call it a band of criminals. The reader should be aware that Kilcullen talks briefly about the difference of both. In his discussion between the competing paradigms of terrorism and insurgency, he explains that, “terrorist are seen as unrepresentative, aberrant individual, misfits within society.”110 On the other hand, he explains that an insurgency is a group representing deep issues and grievances within society (directed at the government). He further explains that their grievances maybe legitimate but, their action as it not (i.e. violent action directed against the government).111 Moreover, he explains the action that must be taken against both terrorist and insurgency in that there is no negotiation with terrorists as opposed to winning the hearts and minds of the population against an insurgency is critical.112 Therefore, CMSE viewed the EPP as an insurgency group whose grievances were against the Government of Paraguay’s lack of distributed wealth and programs for the poor peasants. The view that the government of Paraguay routinely noted that they were a band of criminals who prayed on rich cattle owners and who kidnapped, robbed, and killed government institutions and officials. Perhaps, their view steered toward the EPPs as a terrorist group in which they would not negotiate and they saw as a law enforcement problem or at least until the President was pressured to use military force to solve. Last, the Paraguay

110 Ibid., 186.

111 Ibid., 187.

112 Ibid., 188.
Government also saw the methods and objectives of the EPP both unacceptable. This means that the Government did not see any legitimate grievances that the EPP had especially after a Liberal, Populist President such as Lugo gained power in 2006.

CMSE saw the EPP as an insurgency as the EPP did bring up some legitimate grievances in the northern Paraguayan society. The EPP gained sympathizers through police abuses, bad economic conditions, lack of security, lack of governmental essential services, and through fear. The EPP methods of killing, robbing, and kidnapping government institutions and officials are unacceptable through the eyes of the government, however, it may seem reasonable through the eyes of the relevant population as this is what they see being done to them. Therefore, CMSE’s plan was to train, advise, and assist the Paraguay Military CA Detachment to win the trust of the relevant population in order to win them back on the side of the government.

**Case Study**

The CMSE working itself out of a Job

The CMSE had developed the capability and capacity of the Paraguay Military CA Detachment to a certain point. What was lacking to ‘seal the deal’ was translated assessment forms for the Paraguayan to do during civil reconnaissance, a database created to put those assessments in (CIM), a civil military engagement plan, and an operational environment to test them –one like northern Paraguay.

From March to June 2010, the CMSE and the Paraguay Military CA Detachment began to conduct CMO in support of COIN in northern Paraguay. CMSE took the lead in the beginning; however, Paraguay Military CA Detachment took the lead in April to June with their own Civil Military Engagement Plan. Their ability and maturity to conduct
CMO and population-centric COIN increased. So much so, that the final HCA event in Kurusu de Hierro was ran entirely by them with only a portion of financial and logistic support from the CMSE. The Paraguay Military had already planned and executed OPERATION NEPYTYVO with minimal US support from January 2010 to April 2010; however, they did not have the capacity to cover a large area. CMSE now was trying to tie in USAID’s 1207 program in Concepcion to the Military’s CMO. This was achieved by the sharing of CIM information and HA Donations complementing opening project ceremonies. CMSE continued to help achieve unity effort by tying the operations and objectives of the U.S. Embassy Country Team, the Paraguay Government, the Paraguay Military, and later nongovernmental organizations like the Paraguayan Rural Association (ARP abbreviation in Spanish), National Cancer Coalition (NCC), and the Project for the People of Paraguay (PPP) to conduct CMO to marginalize the EPP from the population in Concepcion as well. CMSE had already been training, advising, and assisting the Paraguay Military CA Detachment for approximately two years at this point; therefore, it was time to set the conditions to enable them to conduct operations without CMSE. The best test to ensure that Paraguay Military CA Detachment could do this was in an area where COIN Operations were conducted, the Concepcion Department. CMSE wanted to ensure that the Paraguay Government and Military focused in a specific geographic area, conducted persistent civil military engagement, and focused on the population in ungoverned and/or undergoverned areas instead attacking the enemy directly in order to gain support. When the press had asked the US Ambassador, Liliana Ayalde, if the US was focusing on these conflictive areas, She responded that the U.S. would provide support through training and planning (i.e. developing capacity) to the Paraguayan
Government in any undergoverned zone on the government’s request.\textsuperscript{113} As Kilcullen states in his book, \textit{COIN}, the support of the population will follow strength whether government or insurgency not vice versa.\textsuperscript{114} Therefore, the plan was to ensure that the government and security forces showed a continuing presence among the population. Last, the government and security force would do this through CMO in order to improve the image of both and gain more support from the population.

**CMSE and Paraguay Military CA Detachment**

getting a foothold in the COIN fight

In March 2010, The US Embassy Regional Security Officer (RSO) and ODC Force Protection (FP) Officer wanted to conduct a trip to Concepcion in order to that the Peace Corps Volunteers were protected from the EPP threat in the areas. CMSE and the Paraguay Military accompanied both officers and made two additional stops in San Pedro and Amambay to conduct CR. At this point CMSE continued to observe the Paraguay Military CA Detachment as they conducted the CR.

The ODC Force Protection officer assisted with the CRs as to ensure there was sufficient force protection in the area to conduct future CMO. This was the beginning for CMSE and the Paraguay Military CA Detachment to get a foothold in the Northern Area where the EPP was operating and where the population was largely undergoverned.

Operation Jaguarete was still going strong, in which the President of Paraguay ordered

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{ABC Color}, “The (U.S.) Ambassador Ayalde Speaks of the Undergoverned Area in the North, Tuesday,” June 29, 2010.

\textsuperscript{114} Stathis Kalyvas, \textit{The Logic of Violence in Civil War} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
350 military and 230 police to capture the EPP.\textsuperscript{115} The operation started immediately after the EPP set Fidel Zavala free from being held hostage on 21 January and continued until 24 April 2010.

CMSE returned to Concepcion after the initial CR trip to coordinate the Ambassador’s donation ceremony at two Concepcion public schools. This donation ceremony included two schools, School No. 294 Doctor Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia and School No. 5939 San Antonio. The main purpose of these donations was to give the Ambassador a public speaking platform to show the US Embassy’s willingness to work in the Concepcion area once again. CMSE met with the Governor, Mayor, Health Director, and Education Director of Concepcion in order to coordinate for the event and also to discover the needs of the population in the area.

On 23 March 2010, CMSE conducted the donation ceremony, which included donating $5,000 worth of educational books and school supplies with the USAMB, Governor, Mayor, and Peace Corps. The US Embassy’s Public Diplomacy Department donated $1500 worth of literature and history books from American authors. The USAMB spoke of US DoS education and scholarship programs given to Paraguayan people over the year and, moreover, she spoke of how much money the US has donated to the Paraguayan people over the last year (e.g. $238,200) in humanitarian assistance. On the day before and on same day of the event, the USAMB was conducting a series of CRs that include meetings with the Concepcion Governor, Concepcion Mayor, Horqueta Mayor, and Loreto Mayor.

\textsuperscript{115}Irala, 23.
The USAMB wanted to reestablish contact with this northern department after the much-publicized issues regarding the EPP sequestering of a wealthy ranch owner named Fidel Zavala. The Ambassador’s trip and the HA Education Donation, allowed CMSE to gain access once again in an area that had once been off-limits to them. CMSE and the Paraguay Military CA Detachment shortly thereafter developed a civil military engagement plan in order to (1) assist the Paraguay Government in gaining access to the population, (2) marginalize the EPP, (3) improve the public perception of the Paraguay Military, and (4) train the Paraguay MILITARY Army and Air Force to conduct CMO while the Paraguay Military CA Detachment assisted and advised. Civic action events such as MEDCAPs and projects were planned and coordinated with the Paraguay Government and CMSE would solicit financial or food assistance from the Paraguay Government for each one. This was not hard to do as it was election year and the Paraguay Government was eager to assist. CMSE had to ensure that no political banners were at the events and that the events were sterile from political campaigns.

The Paraguay Government recommended areas to conduct these events, which were in the ungoverned and undergoverned areas. These areas recommended included Roberto L. Petit, Jhugua Poi, and Kurusu de Hierro. There were other areas that CMSE were interested in but, the plan was to gain access into the area and help the Paraguay Government and Military begin to win over the population and for both to gain confidence.

U.S. National Guard State Partnership Program, Operation Onondivepa

The CMSE, ODC, Paraguay Military CA Detachment, and the Massachusetts National Guard’s State Partnership Program J-5, COL Tyminski, and the Director, then
COL Smith (now BG Smith), conducted a civil reconnaissance trip in the Northern Area (e.g. the municipalities of Concepcion, Horqueta, Roberto L. Pettit, and Kurusu de Hierro). COL Smith wanted to reconnoiter locations to conduct the next civic action event in May 2010, which to send Massachusetts National Guard health professionals to participate. The team conducted a civil reconnaissance and site survey in Kurusu de Hierro and discovered that the town and surrounding area had a population of over 2,000. Moreover, Kurusu de Hierro was literally an ungoverned and undergoverned area since the Horqueta District let it go because the Azote’y District (a newly created one) would take the town in October 2010.

On the same day, 29 March, the team conducted a CR with the Horqueta Mayor, Jorge Centurion; regarding the Paraguay Government wishes to maybe conduct a civic action event in Kurusu de Hierro. The mayor expressed his support for this event and agreed that Kurusu de Hierro and its surrounding area needed attention. However, he expressed that he wanted to have the civic action event nearer to his municipality. The team suspected this as he was in an election year and he wanted to show his voters that he was a man of action.

The team left Horqueta to meet with the Governor, Mayor, the local Paraguay Military Air Force Base Commander, Education Director, and the Health Director of the Concepcion Department the next day. All of the Concepcion Department officials were on the same page in which they requested the next civic action event in one of the three areas they told CMSE and the Paraguay Military CA Detachment the week prior. Therefore, after a series of CRs, the team went 30km to the north of the capital of Concepcion, Concepcion, to conduct a site assessment and CRs in Roberto L. Petit and
then later Jhungua Poi. Both towns were in conflicted area however; it was not ungoverned but undergoverned like some many other areas in Concepcion.

Roberto L. Petit and Jhungua Poi had many advantages to conduct CMO but mainly because, both were accessible to and from Concepcion which would allow transport of Paraguay Military, Paraguay Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and the US EMBASSY country team. Both towns were also close enough to lodge the Massachusetts National Guard health professionals and US Embassy country team at night for force protection during the civic action event. Kurusu de Hierro did not offer any of these advantages as it was 60 km away from Horqueta, the nearest city, force protection would be difficult, and the town did not have enough standing infrastructure to support a civic action event such as a MEDCAP.

Therefore, CMSE and Paraguay Military CA Detachment began planning to conduct the first MEDCAP in Roberto L. Petit since it is larger than Jhungua Poi and more accessible and has more adequate infrastructure than Kurusu de Hierro. This would be the first test for the Paraguay Military and Paraguay Government to conduct a civic action event in a rural area and in a conflicted undergoverned area in COIN operations. Moreover, the Paraguay Military CA Detachment recommended to the CHOD for the Paraguay Military Air Force to run the event which would be the first time that another Paraguay Military branch would do so.

Paraguay Military CA Detachment told CHOD that they would train, advise, and assist each Paraguay Military branch once a quarter with a civic action event in a conflicted area. Although, the President ordered the military and police to focus on capturing EPP members, Paraguay Military started their focus on a “population centric”
focus using CMO in COIN from this point on. Months later, CMSE and Paraguay Military CA Detachment continued to conduct CR in Concepcion. The need to get Paraguay Military CA Detachment and the Paraguay Government and Paraguay Military involved in a CMO event became more evident.

The President declared state of exception, from 24 April to 24 May 2010, named Operation Py’a Guapy. The state of exception was declared due to four assassinations by the EPP in Concepcion and the Paraguay Government ordered 3,300 military and police to capture the EPP. Moreover, the Paraguay Government continued to request help from the US EMBASSY to assist with humanitarian and civic action operations (CMO). CMSE saw this as a sign to use these CMOs not only to get the Paraguay Government closer to its population in Concepcion and isolate the insurgency but also, to test Paraguay Military CA Detachment’s civil military engagement plan and train the Paraguay Military Air force to conduct CMO. Moreover, CMSE saw the upcoming civic action event in Robert L. Petit as a way to improve the populace’s perception of the military.

During the later days of the state of exception, the population seemed to grow weary of Paraguay Military and police involvement as both registered (booked) 96,330 people and detained 232 people. Moreover, the military and police relations were tense after the firefight incident between them in Concepcion on 15 May 2010. Therefore, one of the goals of the next civic action events was to demonstrate to the population that there was no breakdown in efforts between the military and police.

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116 Ibid., 34.
CMSE assists Paraguay Military to establish own CMO Plan  
Operation Onondivepa  

CMSE supported the Paraguay Military CA Detachment and Paraguay  
Government’s decision to select Roberto L. Petit as the area to conduct a civic action  
event. The state of exception was still going and was to end until 24 May. The Paraguay  
Government wanted one of the three towns to conduct the Military Civic Action event,  
which included Jhugua Poi, Kurusu de Hierro, or Roberto L. Petit. The Paraguay Military  
CA Detachment selected Roberto L. Petit since Jhugua Poi was within the vicinity of  
Robert L. Petit and Kurusu de Hierro did not have supporting infrastructure to conduct  
the event. The date of the civic action event was scheduled to take place from 22-23 May  
10.  

The event would be the first one conducted with the National Policy and Joint  
Paraguay Military, which was noteworthy since it occurred one with after the shooting  
between Police and Military in Concepcion. Second, it was the first civic action event  
that another branch of the military, the Air Force was in charge of the event. Third, it was  
the second CMO event conducted by the Paraguay Military and Government since the  
state of exception began; Operation Nepytyvo was conducted three weeks earlier. Fourth,  
this was the first Military Civic Action event that took place in a rural area in  
Concepcion, the heart of the insurgency, since the Paraguay CA Detachment and the  
CMSE started conducting CMO together. Robert L. Petit was in an under-governed area  
that is 35 km away from the capital of Concepcion that had a sizeable population that  
included adjacent towns. Fifth, this was the first Military Civic Action event that the  
Paraguay Government’s Ministry of Health (MPyBS abbreviations in Spanish) officially  
approved the US Massachusetts National Guard health professionals to participate in the
Military Civic Action event. Sixth, this was the first event that the Paraguay Government (Governor, Mayor, and Health Director) identified and area to conduct a Military Civic Action event, which the Paraguay Military and Government conducted. Last, the was the first event that the Paraguay Military CA Detachment and Paraguay Military Air Force used the services of the Paraguay Government’s Department of Justice and Labor’s civil registry and arms registry.

Paraguay Government and Military and U.S. Massachusetts National Guard health professionals attended to 1,481 people and provided over 7,000 consults. The Military Civic Action (MCA) event occurred at two schools that were less than a 400 meters in distance to each other. The following figures show the type of human resources, services provided, and costs for Operation Onedivepa in Roberto L. Petit. Prior to the MCA event, the Paraguay Military CA Detachment took the lead as CMSE served in advisory capacity coordinated with the national, departmental, and local government and police forces. This was to ensure that the event included registry of arms and civil registration of birth certificates and personal identification cards issue. The Ultima Hora newspaper (one of the major newspaper) reported, “that it is important for the government to provide social services in undergoverned and conflicted areas where the armed insurgents, the EPP, want sanctuary.”

The Paraguay Military CA Detachment along with the Paraguay Military Air Force Task Force Command, Colonel Baez, conducted two Civil Reconnaissance (CR) 117Paraguay Military Civil Affairs Directorate HCA-MEDCAP Brief, June 2010.

trips to Concepcion to coordinate with the Paraguay Government’s piece of the MCA event. The Paraguay Military CA Detachment, with some support from CMSE, began to show its maturity in conducting the CRs, Key Leader Engagements (KLE), and orchestrating unified action. Moreover, the Paraguay Military CA Detachment took on a ‘population-centric’ and military public relations focus during COIN operations.

The Paraguay Military CA Detachment conducted KLEs to coordinate and create unity of effort with the Concepcion Department’s Secretary of Emergency (SENAD abbreviation in Spanish), Volunteer Fire Department, Pest Control & Preventative Medicine Secretariat (SENEPA abbreviation in Spanish), War Material Directorate responsible for Arms Registry (DIMABEL abbreviation in Spanish), Civil Registry, the Concepcion Department Ministry of Health, Concepcion Medical University, Ministry of Education and Culture, Departmental and municipal Police Commission, Rotary Club, and other services. The Paraguay Military CA Detachment and Task Force Commander, Air Force Colonel Baez, also negotiated for the Governor of Concepcion to provide class I subsistence support (8 meals for 84-man task force) for the HCA event and the Mayor of Concepcion to provide class III 1200 liters of fuel to transport the task force to and from Asuncion.

At the national level, the Paraguay Military CA Detachment and Task Force Commander coordinated with both the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labor and Justice to tie in Paraguay Government objectives and goals with U.S. CMO efforts. First, the Paraguay Government’s Ministry of Health vetted and approved the health professionals from the U.S. Massachusetts National Guard to practice in Paraguay. This was the first time that this had ever been coordinated, and the purpose for doing this was
to link the Paraguayan Government more closely with U.S. CMO operations. Moreover, this coordination also allowed the Paraguay Government and the U.S. Massachusetts National Guard to begin to work together for current and future operations.

Second, the Paraguay Military CA Detachment and CMSE coordinated with the national level of Paraguay Government’s Ministry of Justice and Labor Department to assist them in their goal of getting the national population documented. One of the largest citizen complaints in the Concepcion Department was the lack of the Paraguay Government’s ability to provide vital records services to its population. The Ministry of Labor and Justice’s objective was and still to document the population and also to convert records electronically onto a nation-wide database. However, the program had failed to reach rural populations and records were often lost or misplaced. This was a common theme in all Civil-Military Operations (CMO) to come in Concepcion by Paraguay rural populations.

Third, the Paraguay Military CA Detachment coordinated with the Ministry of Defense’s Directorate of War Material (DIMABEL abbreviation in Spanish) to assist them in their objective of documenting all firearms in Paraguay. Under Act No. 1910/02 on Firearms, Ammunitions and Explosives, DIMABEL, “administers National Arms Registration, arms testing facilities, issues arms licenses for civilian use, and monitors the manufacture, import, export, marketing, transit, transport, storage, and where appropriate, warehousing and safekeeping of firearms and their components, spare parts, ammunition,
DIMABEL maintains a national database with the above information in order to fight illicit trafficking of arms and to better investigate domestic and international crimes. This was a very important coordinating step that was taken during COIN operations in order to trace weapons to either sympathizers of the EPP and/or the EPP themselves.

Fourth, the Paraguay Military CA Detachment coordinated and negotiated support from the Secretary of National Emergency, Anti-Drug to give anti-drug classes during the MCA event.

SENAD’s Anti-Drug section had been helping the Paraguay Military CA Detachment since the early days of U.S. assistance in Humanitarian and Military Civic Assistance/Action programs. However, never had there been a time than the operations conducted in Concepcion during March to June 2010 to do conduct an Anti-Drug campaign. The porous borders in Concepcion between Brazil and Paraguay add to addition problem of combating drugs in this area. Anti-Drug talks were and still are today the first line of defense against Narco-Traffickers prevalent in the border state of Concepcion.

Last, the Paraguay Military CA Detachment also coordinated national support from the Secretary of Emergency to ensure to ensure national representative came to the MCA event and assisted the Secretary of Emergency for the Department of Concepcion. This was especially important, as the Secretary of Emergency was a principle Paraguay Government agency that the Paraguayan Military partners with during national

emergency such natural disasters. The Humanitarian/Military Civic Assistance/Action events also were a venue to allow both working and training together to be prepared for future crises.

Above all, the Paraguay Military CA Detachment coordinated at the national, departmental, and local level of the Paraguayan Government in order to gain their support. This was the first that his happened without CMSE taking the lead role. Moreover, the Paraguay Military CA Detachment included other Paraguay Government services entities that never before had participated in CMO events, which included the Secretary of Emergency for the Eradication of Malaria (SENPE abbreviation in Spanish) along with DIMABEL and the Civil Registry from the Ministry of Justice and Labor.

The Paraguay Military CA Detachment and Task Force Commander were passing the test for their ability to coordinate unified action and achieve unity of effort with Paraguay’s Joint Military Force, their governmental agencies, nongovernmental agencies, and multinational military, diplomatic, and development agencies. First, the Paraguay Military CA Detachment coordinated Operation Onondivepa with joint military forces included the Navy, Army, and Air Force of the Paraguay Military, especially since the Task Force Commander was Air Force. Second, the Paraguay Military CA Detachment coordinated with Paraguay Government Agencies (as stated in the preceding paragraphs). Third, the Paraguay Military CA Detachment coordinated with Multinational entities such as with CMSE and the Massachusetts National Guard. Last, the Paraguay Military Chief of Defense, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Special Operations Command South, and the US Ambassador complemented the Paraguay Military on their ability to
coordinate unified action and training for another armed force branch to conduct CMO. This was especially true as the Paraguay Military CA Detachment conducted Operation Onondivepa in during COIN operations in an undergoverned area.

Shortly after the Civil Reconnaissance (CR) trips and the Military Civic Action (MCA) event itself, the Paraguay Military Chief of Defense (CHOD) approved of the Civil Military Engagement Plan developed by the Paraguay Military CA Detachment Command, CMSE, ODC, and U.S. Massachusetts National Guard. This became the first time ever that the Paraguay Military was requesting force according to its Civil Military Engagement Program rather than vice versa (i.e. the U.S. Embassy Office of the Defense Cooperation requesting Paraguay Military Troops to assist with a Nation Assistance tasks or event). This was an important step for getting the Host Nation to take true ownership over its Internal Defense and Development Program (IDAD) and the U.S. assisting with it.

The Paraguay Military CA Detachment CME Program included one civic action (HCA/MCA) event per quarter. Each event would be commanded by one of the Paraguay Military armed forces branches and supervised by the Paraguay Military CA Detachment. The engagement program also included at least two Civil Reconnaissance (CR) and Key Leader Engagement (KLE) Missions to be conducted prior to each Humanitarian/Military Civic Assistance/Action (HCA/MCA) event. Moreover, the U.S. Massachusetts National Guard agreed to support the civic action events throughout the year.

Last, the Civil Military Engagement Plan included areas of focus including Concepcion, San Pedro, and Amambay Departments where the EPP was targeting the population. This also ensured coordination and collaboration with USAID’s 1207
program in the north to provide a whole of government approach. The press prior, during and after the Operation Onondevipa was favorable. Headlines such as the one that ran in one of the major papers of Paraguay, ABC Digital, read, “Lugo ask for help from the United States to review the absence of the northern state [Concepcion].”\textsuperscript{120} Moreover, other articles read similar pronouncements and it was general perceived that the US was to provide technical assistance to the Paraguay Government in order to respond to the absence of the state in the north, Concepcion. The press also expressed discontent with President Lugo for not allowing the US conduct a Military Civic Action event call “New Horizons” in 2009. President Lugo had called off the event on September 2009 because of the US building bases in Colombia.\textsuperscript{121} CMSE and the Paraguay Military CA Detachment avoided exploiting this issue because it was a politically one. However, the population overall wanted the U.S. to conduct the New Horizons event with the Paraguay Government and Military as the press constantly brought it up for every Humanitarian Civic Action that the CMSE did. Overall, the press covered, in the big three newspapers of Paraguay, that the Paraguay Government considered it very important to provide social work to the population that live in these remote areas where the EPP liked to seek support for their delinquent activities. The impact on the EPP only can be measured by the EPP not conducting any operations in the area after the HCA event in May 2010. The below

\textsuperscript{120}La Nacion, “Lugo asks for help from the US to reverse the absence of the state in the North,” 5 May 2010.

tables (tables 1-3) are evidence of unified action and the humanitarian civic action work that went into Operation Onondivepa.

Table 1. Participating Personnel and Organizations in Operation Onondivepa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Participating Personnel and Organizations in Operation Onondivepa</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>After Action Review for Operation Onondivepa, May 2010, Paraguayan Military Civil Affairs Detachment.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAGUAY MILITARY CA Det.</th>
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<th>PARAGUAY MILITARY Secty Det.</th>
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<th>PARAGUAY MILITARY Med Det.</th>
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<td>PARAGUAY MILITARY ServDet</td>
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<td>CMSE</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>MISO PRY</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Sect. of Emer Anti-Drug</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>PARAGUAY MILITARY Arms Registration</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Concepcion Medical School</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Min/Health Dept Concepcion</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Civil Registry</td>
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<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Sect. of Emer Prev Medicine (Vaccinations &amp; Bug Spraying)</td>
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<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Police</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Sect. of Emergency (Firefighters &amp; Paramedics)</td>
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<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Governor</td>
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<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Mayor of Concepcion</td>
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<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Mayor of Roberto L. Petit</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Health Minister of Concepcion</td>
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<td>NGO Rotary Club</td>
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<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Total</td>
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<td>US DoD Total</td>
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Source: After Action Review for Operation Onondivepa, May 2010, Paraguayan Military Civil Affairs Detachment.

Table 2. HCA Services Documented in Roberto L. Petit, Concepcion from 22-23 May 2010 during Operation Onondivepa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patient Seen</th>
<th>Consults</th>
<th>De-parasitic Meds Distributed</th>
<th>Dental</th>
<th>Gynecology</th>
<th>General Medical</th>
<th>Pediatrics</th>
<th>Ophthalmology</th>
<th>Family Planning</th>
<th>Vaccinations</th>
<th>Anti-Drug Talks</th>
<th>Identification Cards Issued</th>
<th>Arms Registered</th>
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<tr>
<td>1481</td>
<td>7712</td>
<td>1481</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>7</td>
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Source: Humanitarian Civic Action Assistance-Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP), June 2010, Produced by the Paraguayan Military Civil Affairs Detachment.
Table 3. Costs of services and logistics for Roberto L. Petit, Concepcion HCA Event, Operation Onondivepa from 22-24 May 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HA – Educational Books and Supplies</th>
<th>HA – Medical Supplies</th>
<th>HCA</th>
<th>Developing Country Combined Exercise Program (DCCEP)</th>
<th>National Cancer Coalition (NGO)</th>
<th>Project for the People of Paraguay</th>
<th>Subsistence Costs Provided by PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT (Governor of)</th>
<th>Fuel Costs Provided by PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT (Municipality of Concepcion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>$3,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>$3,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>$20,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>$3,000</strong></td>
<td>$1500</td>
<td>Clothing for 96 personnel</td>
<td><strong>8 meals for 84 workers</strong></td>
<td><strong>500 Liters of fuel</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Paraguay Civil Military Detachment and Army conduct Operation Nepytyvo II during COIN Operations

CMSE, the Paraguay Military CA Detachment, the Paraguay Army, and Paraguay Government conducted CAO ISO Paraguay Military and Government’s CMO, Operation Nepytyvo phase four, which was ISO the President of Paraguay’s declared state of exception. The state of exception was declared immediately after four people were killed by the EPP in northern Concepcion.122 The state of exception, named “Py’a Guapy,” allowed the President to use the Paraguay Military to assist the PRYPOL in tracking down EPP members, supports, and sympathizers. The Paraguay Military Chief of Defense requested the ODC to assist and fund the UN Multi-Role Engineering Company to assist in the renovation of the six schools and assist with improving the roads. The

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ODC and CMSE coordinated this effort, funded Paraguay Military UN multi-role engineering company with GPOI funding, and the company conducted these operations in preparation for their upcoming deployment to Haiti to assist with Disaster Relief Operations after the Earthquake there in January 2010. The school donations, MEDCAP assistance and school and road renovations in both towns showed Paraguay Government and Paraguay Military’s resolve to support the population. Much more, this event helped transform Paraguay Military’s image and character to the population. This action was in the heart of the insurgent area in which is largely ungoverned and under governed.

The Paraguay Military Army had been conducting Operation Nepytyvo II, which included four phases since January 2010 in order to provide much needed assistance to the population of Paraguay. The focus narrowed on the third and the fourth phases in the area where the EPP was operating. The third phase was conducted in Jhugua Nandu and Puertosino in which CMSE provided medical supplies while the Paraguay Army repaired schools. The Paraguay Military had renovated various schools in order to gain access and support from the population in that conflicted ungoverned area. Unfortunately, CMSE and the Paraguay Military CA Detachment could not support the third phase, as CMSE was restricted from operating in Concepcion. However, the Paraguay Military

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124 ABC Color, “More Police and Military were in the North to Capture the Kidnappers (EPP),” February 14, 2010.

125 Ultima Hora, “Military culminate assistance in two Northern Communities,” March 2, 2010.
Army requested CMSE and Paraguay Military CA Detachment’s assistance again for the fourth phase of the operation. In this phase, Paraguay Military’s the 4th Infantry Division was planning to conduct CMO in Paso Bareto and Belen, which were both in undergoverned, ungoverned, and insurgency areas. Paraguay Military had sought and received approval from the Paraguay Government to renovated six schools, three in Paso Bareto and three in Belen. The Paraguay Military Army needed Paraguay’s UN (US paid for) chartered Multi-Role Engineering Company (CIM abbreviation in Spanish) to do the job since they were really the only unit with the capability and financial backing (i.e. from the US) to do so. The Paraguay Military Army’s staff requested that the CMSE coordinate to the funding for the UN CIM and also, to support the operation with book donations and medical supplies for its two planned MEDCAPs. CMSE coordinated with the ODC to get funding approval for the all. Therefore, on 23 April 2010, CMSE and Paraguay Military CA Detachment traveled to Concepcion and stayed until 30 April 2010 in order to ensure the educational donations were given with official ceremonies; the medical supplies were used during the two MEDCAPs in Belen and Paso Bareto (See figure 5 for the consults given); and to ensure that the UN CIM were in the condition to support the operation successfully. The overall operation was successful, however, there was no EPP members were caught during the state of exception.126 The population seemed were more aligned to the Paraguay Government because of the Paraguay Military. This was the first operation in which the UN CIM Battalion was deployed. Paraguayans along the highways in San Pedro and Concepcion were honking with joy to

126 *ABC Color*, “Lugo recognizes that the State of Exception was a Failure,” May 25, 2010.
see their country, with the appearance of UN backing, traveling into the conflicted,
undergoverned are to help. Operations Nepytyvo phase IV demonstrated that CMSE can
develop the capacity of the partner nation military to conduct Civil-Military Operations
through unified action to reaching include operational objectives of the United Nations
Civil Multi-Role Engineer Company that is Haiti-bound and operations of the Paraguay
Military and Paraguay Government in COIN operations to defeat the EPP, an insurgency.
Although no member of the EPP was captured during this time, their operations were
quieted. Tables 4 and 5 below show the unity of effort and services that went into
Operation Nepytyvo.

Table 4. HCA services documented in Paso Bareto and Belen, Concepcion from 24-25
April 2010 during Operation Nepytyvo II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Consults</th>
<th>Dental</th>
<th>Gynecology</th>
<th>General Medical</th>
<th>Pediatrics</th>
<th>Ophthalmology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paso Bareto</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belen</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5. U.S. and Paraguay Government Costs during Operation Nepytyvo II, 23-30
April 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Materials to Repair the Schools (PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Financed)</th>
<th>Medical and Dental Supplies (US Financed)</th>
<th>Books and School Supplies (US Financed)</th>
<th>Fuel and Subsistence for the Multi-Role Engineering Company (US Financed)</th>
<th>Cost of 9,239 Man-Hours</th>
<th>Cost of 648 Machine Hours</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$20,000</td>
<td>$3,000</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
<td>$23,000</td>
<td>$21,740</td>
<td>$45,740</td>
<td>$125,480</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Paraguay Military Civil Affairs Detachment Demonstrates Capacity

Shortly after the Paraguay Military CA Team announced that it was to conduct CMO in Roberto L. Petit, the Governor of Concepcion expressed that another operation must be conducted soon in Kurusu de Hierro. The situation in Kurusu de Hierro grew intensely as police operations were searching for EPP members suspected to be located there. The Paraguay Government strongly recommended that the CMSE/Paraguay Military conduct a civic action event in Kurusu de Hierro immediately after the Roberto L. Petit HCA event. The main purpose for the Governor of Concepcion recommending this was because Kurusu de Hierro was again in the heart of the insurgency. Therefore, Paraguay Military CA Detachment and CMSE conducted a series of CRs and KLEs in Concepcion (the departmental seat), Horqueta (the district seat), and Kurusu de Hierro in order to plan the civic action event. CMSE and the Paraguay Military CA Detachment conducted two CR trips in order to coordinate the support aspects of the event.

Kurusu de Hierro was 60 km from its district seat, Horqueta, in which the road in between took an hour to get to. Moreover, the school and clinic did have neither enough rooms nor electricity to support a MEDCAP. Therefore, the Paraguay Military CA Detachment had to coordinate with ANDE for electrical support and with the 4th Infantry Division for tent support. In addition, the roads leading into Kurusu de Hierro were almost inaccessible to buses and other large transport vehicles that they Army and firefighting vehicles could get to. The 5th Engineer Battalion, which was located 10 km away agreed to support road improvements. CMSE and the Paraguay Military CA Detachment negotiated with the Concepcion Department Governor and Mayor to provide subsistence and fuel support. Second, they requested support from the Concepcion
Department Health Ministry and the Horqueta hospital, firefighters, civil registry, and police for assistance. All rendered services and assisted in the civic action event. Moreover, the ODC financed the support of the UN CIM to construct fourth sets of bathrooms, a town well, and 15 km of road improvements. CMSE and Paraguay Military CA Detachment secured agreements for Horqueta and Concepcion Paraguay Government entities to assist in the operation. However, on the last CR trip on 16-18 June 2010, two Special Forces Police (21st Police Force) were shot and killed (June 17, 2010) on patrol 300 meters from the school where the planned event was to take place.\textsuperscript{127} The police later found out that same day that the heads of the EPP were the culprits and had fled the area and that the town was a safe haven for the EPP.\textsuperscript{128} Later that week, CMSE and Paraguay Military’s civic action event plans were in the press as the school’s president and his wife were found to be logistic supporters of the EPP.\textsuperscript{129} Therefore, the USAMB and SOUTHCOM planned to cancel the event. However, after reassurance of the Paraguay Government’s Minister of Interior and the President and Fidel Zavala’s personal request to the Ambassador, the event was back on again.\textsuperscript{130} Moreover, the Minister of Interior publicized that the EPP did not have the capacity to kidnap and hold American Military

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{127} Ultima Hora, “Two Policemen died in an Ambush in Kurusu de Hierro,” June 18, 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{128} ABC Color, “EPP has Logistical Support (in Kurusu de Hierro),” June 20, 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{129} ABC Color, “Armed Group planned to kidnap or assassinate U.S. Soldiers,” June 18, 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{130} ABC Color, “The Armed Group’s (EPP) threats do not impede U.S. military action,” June 21, 2010.
\end{itemize}
members. However, CMSE, the ODC, Paraguay Military, and Ambassador agreed for the CMSE and country team to support the event 60 km away from the civic action site, Horqueta. The Paraguay Government was well represented at the local and national level at the event, as the Paraguay National Electric Company (ANDE), Ministry of Health (MPBS), Secretary of National Emergency SEN, Secretary of National Emergency for Anti-Drug (SENAD), Directorate of War Material (DIMABEL), local and national Police, and the Minister of Justice and Labor’s Civil Registry were present to provide services. The Paraguay Military’s Joint Special Forces Battalion that had been trained and equipped by the US’s 1208 funds provided security. The Paraguay Military and Paraguay Government proved to the population that they had to capacity to conduct an event such as this. The Paraguay’s UN Multi-Role Engineer company repaired and built bathrooms for the school, a town well, and improved the roads. The Medical Civic Action Event attended to over 2000 people and the education books and donations benefited the population’s schools for time to come. Immediately after the event, community leaders, the governor, and district leader, and the local bishop declared that there are sympathizers, supporters of the EPP among them in several town hall meetings.

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131 Ibid.
133 La Nacion, “(Ambassador) Ayalde highlighted the maturity of the military,” June 30, 2010.
They denounced the EPP and the problems that they had caused in the population. The population agreed to force the EPP out of their area. Moreover, they praised the government’s and local military’s response to the needs of the population. Civil vulnerabilities such as lack of improved roads that bring governmental services and improve the economic situation, poor medical care, poor education due lack of infrastructure and books were alleviated somewhat by the civic action event. However, they denounced the local police’s behavior, which included harassment, attacks, and robbery of the population. Also, they denounced the way the Horqueta District Attorney had detained some individuals unnecessarily during the EPP search in Kurusu de Hierro. However, the population did not mention the two town’s citizens for backing the EPP financially. The governor and other officials promised to continue to support the population and focus on their needs, especially better policing methods. On a positive note, the 21st Police Commissary Director, Abilio Lezcano, had stepped into office the week of the shooting. Therefore, there were hopes from the community that policing practices would improve, especially since Chief Lezcano was present ready to address any community complaints. Since the civic action event in Kurusu de Hierro, there had not been any more population support to EPP allegations. The EPP seemed to have moved their operation north in central Concepcion. The tables below (Tables 6-9) show the unity effort and cost that went into Operation Nepohano #10.


136 ABC Color, “The population of Kurusu de Hierro admits that the Kidnappers live among them,” June 29, 2010.

137 Vargas Quiroz.
Table 6. Participating Personnel and Organizations to Operation Nepohano #10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PARAGUAY MILITARY CA Det.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>PARAGUAY MILITARY SF Bn</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>PARAGUAY MILITARY Med Det</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARAGUAY MILITARY Service Det</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>UN Multi-Role Eng</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>PARAGUAY MILITARY Arms Registration</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US EMBASSY Country Team &amp; CMSE</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Secretariat of Anti-Drugs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Min/Health</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT National Police</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Civil Registry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Volunteers from Kurusu De Hierro</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Horqueta Firefighters</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Horqueta Hospital</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Health Clinic of Kurusu de Hierro</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Min/Education School of Kurusu de Hierro</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Governor of Concepcion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Acting Mayor of Horqueta</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT ANDE Electricity Unit</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT Total</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>PARAGUAY MILITARY Total</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>US EMBASSY</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>Civilian Vol.</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 7. HCA services documented in Kurusu de Hierro, Concepcion from 26-27 June 2010 during Operation Nepohano #10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Consults</th>
<th>De-parasitic Meds Distributed</th>
<th>Dental</th>
<th>Gynecology</th>
<th>General Medical</th>
<th>Pediatrics</th>
<th>Ophthalmology</th>
<th>Family Planning</th>
<th>Vaccinations</th>
<th>Anti-Drug Talks</th>
<th>Identification Cards Issued</th>
<th>Civil Registry</th>
<th>Arms Registered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patient Seen</td>
<td>2052</td>
<td>7973</td>
<td>1567</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>1436</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Humanitarian Civic Action Assistance-Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP), June 2010, Produced by the Paraguayan Military Civil Affairs Detachment.
Table 8. Engineering Work Completed during Operation Nepohano #10 in Kurusu de Hierro, Concepcion from 25-30 June 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boys Bathroom Construction</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>School No. 3225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UN Multi-Role Engineers)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls Bathroom Construction</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>School No. 3225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UN Multi-Role Engineers)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Well Construction</td>
<td>8m³</td>
<td>School No. 3225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UN Multi-Role Engineers)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Improvements</td>
<td>15 km</td>
<td>Area in vicinity of Kurusu de Hierro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5th Engineer Battalion – Kurusu de Hierro)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Humanitarian Civic Action Assistance-Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP), June 2010, Produced by the Paraguayan Military Civil Affairs Detachment.

Table 9. US Costs of services and logistics Kurusu de Hierro, Concepcion HCA Event during Operation Nepohano #10 from 25-30 June 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HA – Educational Books and Supplies</th>
<th>HA – Medical Supplies</th>
<th>HCA – Developing Country Combined Exercise Program (DCCEP) -Firetruck, Ambulance, Police Escort</th>
<th>Subsistence Costs Provided by PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT (Governor of Concepcion)</th>
<th>Fuel Costs Provided by PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT (Municipality of Horqueta)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$3,000</td>
<td>$3,000</td>
<td>$20,000</td>
<td>$3,000</td>
<td>400L Fuel, 3K Generator, 2 Police Escorts cars, &amp; 1 Fire Truck w/Water</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Humanitarian Civic Action Assistance-Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP), June 2010, Produced by the Paraguayan Military Civil Affairs Detachment.

Paraguay Military CA Detachment after CMSE mission

The Paraguay Military CA Detachment has continued to execute its mission in support of the Paraguay military, government, and local populations. They have a Civil
Military Engagement Plan, in which they orchestrate unified action while conducting civil-military operations and civil affairs operations to prevent, respond, and rehabilitate ‘hot spots’ identified by declared national emergencies and disasters. The Paraguay Military Civil Affairs and the Paraguay Air Force conduct its last event with the CMSE in Yby Yau, Concepcion, Paraguay. This event was a successful one in which the Rural Association of Paraguay and USAID participated and tied the event’s objectives with the USAID 1207 ones (e.g. economic and security development in northern Paraguay).

Since the CMSE mission ended in September 2010, the U.S. Government has been involved only once with the Paraguay Military CA Detachment’s Civil Military Engagement Plan. The Massachusetts Army Air National Guard (USMAANG) through the State Partnership Program participated in a civic action event on November 13-14, 2010, in the northern Paraguay. Therefore, US involvement has been once out six major joint civic action events, which is under 17 percent. The major bill payer for these civic action events is continuing to be either the Yacyreta or Itaipu Bi-National Entities, which are intergovernmental organizations between Paraguay and Argentina and Brazil respectively. These intergovernmental organizations finance these events in order to support training (prevention), response, and rehabilitation of areas that could be, are, and were affected by a national emergency or natural disaster. These events are continuing and address the nation of Paraguay’s Internal Development and Defense (IDAD) Program. See Table 10 regarding some of the civic action events conducted by the

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Paraguay Military and Secretary of National Emergency after the CMSE mission ended in Paraguay.

Table 10. Civic Action Events after CMSE Mission (September 2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic Action Event (# Treated)</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Military Branch In-Charge</th>
<th>US Involved</th>
<th>Bill Payer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEDCAP #13 (300)</td>
<td>San Isidro, Itaquera Dept.</td>
<td>18-19 Dec 2010</td>
<td>Respond to Disaster Flooding</td>
<td>Army &amp; II Corps (Joint Operations)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yacyretá</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing Donation &amp; Sales to benefit the poor</td>
<td>Asuncion, Paraguay</td>
<td>26-30 Dec 2010</td>
<td>Respond to those affected by floods</td>
<td>Dept. Logistics</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NGO / PRY Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDCAP #14 (2,638)</td>
<td>Mariscal Estigarribia, Boqueron Dept.</td>
<td>11-12 Jun 2011</td>
<td>Prevent (training), Provide Government Presence (Pres. Lugo was present).</td>
<td>National Reserves &amp; 1st DIV III Corps (Joint Operations)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Itaipu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDCAP #15 (3,000)</td>
<td>Fernandez, Hayes Dept.</td>
<td>10-11 Sep 2011</td>
<td>Prevent (training)</td>
<td>National Reserves (Joint Operations)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yacyretá</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDCAP #16 &amp; Evacuation</td>
<td>Pres. Hayes Dept.</td>
<td>25-UTC Apr 2012</td>
<td>Respond to Disaster Flooding</td>
<td>Army (Joint Operations)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yacyretá</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDCAP #17</td>
<td>Checo (Boqueron o Hayes Dept.)</td>
<td>Jun-12</td>
<td>Rehabilitate those affected by flooding</td>
<td>Air Force (Joint Operations)</td>
<td>Yes - USMAANG</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** There are three purposes including Prevent, Respond, and Rehabilitate. Prevent is conducted by training for the mission and showing presence. Respond is to an emergency or disaster. Rehabilitate is to assist in disaster recovery.

*Source:* Created by author, based on a compilation of newspaper articles and from the Paraguay Military Civil Affairs

The Paraguay Military CA Detachment has continued to reach out to a myriad of other unified action for financial and mission support for as well for each civic action event such as those listed in Table 11 Unified Action below. The Paraguay government provides health support, biometrics support, vaccinations, medical statistics, vital records certificate, identification cards, infrastructure (school space), and helps plan the HCA events with the Paraguay Military CA Detachment and participates in all areas with firefighters (water), emergency medical technicians, and provides shelters for population during the events. The intergovernmental organizations fund the HCA event and provide
meals and fuel for the workers and sometimes for the population. The Multinational organizations such as the U.S. pay for the HCA events as well when participating. However, the mayors and governors are always solicited to provide meals and gas to support each HCA event.

Table 11. Unified Action entities included in Paraguay Military Civil Affairs’ Civil Military Engagement Plan (CMEP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Forces</th>
<th>Interagency</th>
<th>Intergovernmental</th>
<th>Multinational</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay Army</td>
<td>Min/Health</td>
<td>National Cancer Coalition</td>
<td>US Embassy Country Team</td>
<td>The Paraguay CA Detachment continues to train each Armed Forces &amp; large units to conduct civic action events. USMAANG participates in at least one civic action event per year. SEN and Paraguay Civil Affairs continue to train and execute their mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay Navy</td>
<td>Min/Justice &amp; Labor</td>
<td>World Vision</td>
<td>US SOCSOUTH &amp; 96th CAB CMSE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay Air Force</td>
<td>Min/Interior</td>
<td>Association of Rural Paraguay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay Logistics</td>
<td>Min/Education and Culture</td>
<td>Yacyreta Bi-National Entity (Governments of Paraguay &amp; Argentina)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay War Material</td>
<td>Secretary of National Emergency (SEN)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Corps (Chaco)</td>
<td>Secretary of Anti-Drugs</td>
<td>Itapa Bi-National Entity (Governments of Paraguay &amp; Brazil)</td>
<td>US Massachusetts Army Air National Guard (State Partnership Program)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Corps (S. Paraguay)</td>
<td>Dept Governors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Corps (N. Paraguay)</td>
<td>Mayor of Municipalities / Districts</td>
<td>Paraguayan Mother’s Foundation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay National Reserves</td>
<td>Min/Paraguayan Indigenous Institute</td>
<td>People’s Project for Paraguay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author, based on articles written about HCA events from November 2010 to June 2012.

Summary

The case study in this chapter has covered before, during, and after capacity developing operations conducted by the CMSE to the Paraguay Military CA Detachment. The CMSE developed the capacity of the Paraguay Military CA Detachment to orchestrate unified action and conduct CMO to a level with little or no US involvement. Moreover, the CMSE has also developed the Paraguay Military CA Detachment and the
Secretary of National Emergency to train and prepare themselves for their mission in response to national emergencies and disasters. See the figure 21 below regarding civic action events before, during, after the CMSE mission in the case study in order to see all events conducted in Paraguay by the Paraguay Military CA Detachment.

Figure 21. Civic Action Events before, during, and after the CMSE in the case study

Source: Created by author; Map is created by Geology.com, http://geology.com/world/paraguay-satellite-image.shtml (accessed April 29, 2012) (without before, during, and after events legend and plots.)
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction
The purpose of this research was to identify best practices for CMSE to use when developing the capacity of a partner nation’s military to conduct CMO through unified action by showing it through a case study. In this chapter, the research questions will be answer in accordance to the findings in chapter four. Then, the significance of this study to the SOF CA community will be discussed. Last, recommendations for further application and inquiry will be stated.

Interpretation of Findings
The case study answered the questions below rather thoroughly. The CMSE did develop the capacity of the Paraguay Military Civil Affairs Directorate/Detachment to conduct CMO through unified action to a level where little or no U.S. military involvement is necessary (17 percent since the CMSE left Paraguay and the US does not pay for the events when not involved). Moreover, CMSE Paraguay developed the capacity of the Paraguay Military CA Detachment to conduct its mission to a level where little or no U.S. military involvement necessary. Below are the answers to the research questions and metrics provided through analysis of the case study.

Capacity to Conduct CMO
Does the Paraguay Military CA Detachment/Directorate:

Have a Civil Military Engagement Plan? Yes, they have a plan as detailed in chapter 4.
Execute Civil Military Engagement Plan? Yes, they continue to execute even to this day per chapter 4.

Execute the plan without U.S. Assistance? If so, how much of it? Yes, they execute the plan with little or no help; however, they do involve the Massachusetts Army-Air National Guard (USMAANG) at least twice a year, which is less than 50 percent of the time.

Use the Civil Military Engagement Plan to focus on ‘Hot Spots’ conflicted, ungoverned, and/or undergoverned areas? Does it address civil vulnerabilities? Yes, they use the plan to focus on areas where disasters have occurred such as flooding areas in the Chaco and in the southern Paraguay. They are somewhat restricted, as the government may want the Paraguay Military CA Detachment to go to areas based on political reasons. This includes the government hydroelectric organization in the south, Yacyreta, wanting them to conduct a civic action event close their headquarters.

Use the Civil Military Engagement Plan to prepare the detachment for their mission? Yes, they plan and conduct the plan to maintain readiness and also to respond to disasters and emergency which is one of their most important mission tasks.

Capacity to orchestrate unified action to achieve unity of effort

Does the Paraguay Military CA Detachment/Directorate:

(Joint) Plan and execute CMO with the Army, Navy, Air Force, Logistics Command, and the War Material Department? How often? Yes, they still involve all forces because, their plan rotates among them in order to train branch services and local large units in the area where the plan is being executed. This is part of the overall mission for disaster and emergency preparedness by law.
(Interagency) Plan and execute CMO with Paraguayan Government Agencies, especially the ones that are involved in its mission tasks? Yes, they plan with, through, and by the Secretary of National Emergency (SEN), SEN-Anti-Drugs (SENAD), Civil Registry, Ministry of Health, etc. The humanitarian civic assistance events depend on these government entities to provide services. Moreover, the Paraguay Military CA Detachment plans and executes these events with local, departmental, and national level governmental officials.

(Intergovernmental) Plan and execute CMO International Governmental Organizations, Nongovernmental Organizations, and Private Volunteer Organizations? Yes, the Minister of Defense received a sizeable donation from an NGO, the National Cancer Coalition (NCC) on March 2011, in which the military has and will continue to use for humanitarian civic assistance events.\textsuperscript{139} The NCC and World Vision has been the biggest supporter in humanitarian civic assistance events in the past and it appears that they will continue to be.

(Multinational) Plan and execute CMO with other countries such as the U.S, Brazil, Japan, Spain, Taiwan, and/or Argentina? Yes, they have been working with the U.S. Embassy Country Team (the ODC) and the Massachusetts National Guard frequently.

Secondary Research Question

Can a CMSE develop a partner nation civil affairs element’s capacity to conduct its mission to a level where little or no U.S. involvement is necessary? Does the Paraguay Military Joint CA Detachment/Directorate:

Conduct training, exercises, and events to prepare it and partner institutions to conduct civil defense operations (i.e. prevention, response, and rehabilitations activities regarding emergencies and disasters)? The Paraguay Military Joint Civil Affairs Detachment conduct training through its CMEP. Every HCA event is either a preventative, responsive, or rehabilitative exercises in which entities involved in the HCA event receive training (per Chapter 4). Moreover, the Paraguay CA Detachment trains large units such as the 4th Infantry Division in Concepcion and the service components such as the Air Force CA unit to conduct HCA events such as the one in Operation Onindivepa in May 2010.

Assist in projects that are useful to the civilian population? The projects conducted in Operation Nepyttyvo and Nepohano 10 (Kurusu de Hierro) benefited the local population through basic services, education, and economics/transportation infrastructure.

Assist in the national defense; coordinate the use of military resources to aid the civilian population in national emergency and disaster situations? The HCA events conducted in the Chaco (Nepohano #15) and in Encarnacion (Nepohano #8) aided in the population under a natural disaster which was flooding.
Best Practices

As revealed through the detailed case study, the CMSE developed the capacity of the Paraguay Military Joint Civil Affairs Detachment/Directorate through the following ‘best practices.’

Know the partner nation military’s civil affairs mission. CMSE built the capacity of the Paraguay Civil Affairs Detachment to prepare for its mission established by Paraguayan Code of Law Chapter 12 as they developed rapport with local governing bodies including their disaster and emergency teams. Moreover, the civil affairs detachment also trained the other military service components and local large units in each of the CIM and HCA activities per their CMEP.

Identify objectives and end state for capacity development. The objective and end state for developing capacity was given by the TSOC Deputy Commander, CAPT Thompson, on/about January 2010 when he wanted the CMSE to prove that the Paraguay Civil Affairs Detachment could conduct their own CMO through unified action in accordance with their CMEP as per the case study. They did this by conducting the HCA event with only U.S. financial support in Kurusu de Hierro (Operation Nepohano #10) in June 2010.

Develop a Civil Military Engagement Plan that focuses on partner nation capacity development and track their progress. The CMEP focused and still focuses on insurgency areas in northern Paraguay, and other areas requiring stability operations as per the case study. The CMEP focused and still focuses on small areas at a time such as the areas in the Chaco and Concepcion to conduct repetitive CMO. The Paraguay Civil Affairs Detachment still conducts at least two to three CR and KLE trips in order to identify civil
vulnerabilities prior to conducting an HCA event in the area. The Paraguay Civil Affairs Detachment is preventing, responding or rehabilitating an area such as the Chaco and southern Paraguay because of flooding as per the case study. The CMSE developed a training method through the CMEP for developing the capacity of the Paraguay Civil Affairs Detachment to conduct CIM, FHA, and HCA activities in support of its mission tasks, irregular warfare, and stability operations as per the case study. Moreover, the Paraguay CA Detachment through its CMEP has been able to train each service component including the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force to conduct CMO through unified action and prepare them for their mission as stated by law. The Paraguay Civil Affairs Detachment and military is continuing to obtain funding from the military, Private Volunteer Organizations, local government entities, and sometimes the U.S. (under 50 percent of the operations) to conduct activities in its CMEP.

Recommendation for Action and Further Study

The recommendation is for the TSOC to use the engagement technique that the CMSE did in Paraguay in order to ensure partner nation military can support themselves and a future coalition, disaster response, and U.S./partner nation interests through CMO and unified action. The engagement and capacity development technique that CMSE in this case study used allowed the CMSE to achieve defense, diplomacy, and development objectives and provided the TSOC the flexibility to reassign the CMSE to another country/region. The CMSE has to get all organizations of unified action involved in order shorten the duration and increase the sustainability of capacity development. The CMSE can train not only the partner nation’s military and government but also the Country
Team, PVOs, and NGOs. These organizations can sustain capacity development and provide legitimacy in these operations.

Last, the following plan should be studied and implemented. First, the CMSE should know the laws and missions of the civil affairs or civil affairs-like entities. Second, the CMSE should assess a country first hand with a TSOC planning representative. Second, the TSOC establish goals and end states regarding the capacity building of the partner nation military and government. These goals and end states should be directed a the partner nation’s IDAD Program and developed with the US Embassy Country Team, partner nation, TSOC (incl. CMSE and other SOF elements), State Partnership Program unit/TCA Coordinator, and Military Group Commander. The plan should address current conditions, development plan, and desired conditions/end state of the CMSE mission in relation to capacity development. All IDAD program partners should agree as to what task each has the lead or support on. Moreover, the TSOC and IDAD program partners need have a sustainability plan to keep the partner nation’s capacity up to acceptable level (i.e. defined by the IDAD program partners). This may be the only way that the partner nation can sustain itself to be a reliable coalition partner when it is called upon in the future to accomplish an important mission such as GWOT, etc.

Currently, the sustainment plan to keep the Paraguay Military CA Detachment’s capacity is not synchronized currently. The CMSE developed the Paraguay Military CA Detachment’s capacity; however, it did not train the US Embassy’s Country Team to sustain it after the CMSE left Paraguay. Currently, the US Embassy works through the State Partnership Program Coordinator in order to do MEDCAPs instead of how to
support it in its CMEP. Moreover, the US Embassy and USSOC SOUTH are not focused on the Paraguay National Police in order to build its capacity to conduct CMO. Therefore, periodic assessments should be made by the TSOC (i.e. can send someone or a CMSE planning team) to assist in maintain the partner nation’s capacity and the TSOC should have an overarching plan with the US Embassy Country team and partner nation to develop capacities of its government and military to accomplish its IDAD program goals.

Conclusion

CMSEs can develop partner nation capacity as long as the CMSE does not lose sight of the objective by conduct irrelevant tasks during persistent engagement. Also, a CMSE must ensure that all influencers on their operations know the game plan. For example, the Military Group Commander, the Partner Nation Military Commander, Special Operation Command Forward OIC, SF Company Commander, the TSOC, etc. The more they are involved, the more unity of effort in reaching the goal of capacity development will be reach. They will be there longer than the CMSE and they will be key factor in maintain capacity that the CMSE developed with the partner nation. The TSOC needs the flexibility to move CMSEs to high interest areas without high risks.
GLOSSARY

Civil Affairs Operations. Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. Also called CAO. (JP 3-57)

Civil Information. Information developed from data with relation to civil areas, structures, capabilities, organization, people, and events within the civil component of the commander’s operational environment that can be fused or processed to increase Department of Defense/Interagency/intergovernmental organizations/nongovernmental organizations/indigenous populations and institutions situational awareness, situational understanding, or situational dominance.

Civil Information Management. Process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, other United States Government and Department of Defense agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the area of operations. Also known as CIM.

Civil-Military Operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02; JP 3-57)

Civil Reconnaissance. A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of those specific civil aspects of the environment. Civil reconnaissance focuses specifically on the civil component, the elements of which are best represented by the mnemonic ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and
events. Civil reconnaissance can be conducted by Civil Affairs or by other forces, as required. Also known as CR.

Counterinsurgency. Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. Also called COIN. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

Country Team. The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02: JP 3-07.4).

Foreign Internal Defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02: JP 3-22)

Governance. The state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society, including the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional authority. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

Host Nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02: JP 3-57).

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401 and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. Also called HCA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Information Operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and
automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. See also psychological operations. (JP 1-02: JP 3-13)

Instruments of National Power. All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military. (JP 1-02: JP 1)

Insurgency. The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

Insurgent. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Internal Defense and Development. The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD. See also foreign internal defense. (JP 1-02.: JP 3-22)

Interagency. United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. See also interagency coordination. (JP 3-08)

Intergovernmental organization. An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called IGO. (JP 3-08)

Irregular Warfare. A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Also called IW. (JP 1-02: JP 1)

Joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 1)

Military Civic Action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JP 1-02: JP 3-57)
Multinational Operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-16)

Nation Assistance. Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other Title 10, US Code programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or intergovernmental organizations. (JP 1-02: JP 3-0)

Nongovernmental Organization. A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (JP 1-02: JP 3-08)

PRC. Populace Control. Populace control provides security for the populace, mobilize human resources, deny personnel to the enemy, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and relocation of the population. DC operations and NEO are two special categories of populace control that require extensive planning and coordination among various military and nonmilitary organizations.

Resources Control. Resources control regulates the movement or consumption of materiel resources, mobilize materiel resources, and deny materiel to the enemy. Resources control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints (for example, roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities.

Special Operations Forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02: JP 3-05.1). These forces include Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Military Information Support.

Strategic Communication. Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 1-02: JP 5-0)
Strategy. A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 1-02: JP 3-0)

Subversion. Actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02).

Support to Civil Administration (SCA). Helps continue to stabilize management by a governing body of a HN’s civil structure by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. SCA occurs most often during stability operations. Some SCA is manifested in PRC, FHA, and NA.

Terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. See also terrorist; terrorist group. (JP 1-02: JP 3-07.2)

Terrorist. An individual who commits an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives. See also terrorism. (JP 1-02: JP 3-07.2)

Terrorist Group. Any number of terrorists who assemble together, have a unifying relationship, or are organized for the purpose of committing an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of their political, religious, or ideological objectives. See also terrorism. (JP 1-02: JP 3-07.2)

Unified Action. The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1-02: JP 1). Unified Action includes “whole-of-government” or comprehensive approach” that employs all instruments of national power.

Unity of Effort. The coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization – the product of successful unified action (JP 1).
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