

Integrating Language and Culture

A Monograph

by

MAJ Deborah M. Ellis

United States Army



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

AY 04-05

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 074-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 052605	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Monograph	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Integrating Language and Culture			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Deborah M. Ellis				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) US Army Command and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies 250 Gibbon Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words) Foreign language proficiency and cultural understanding are and will remain critical skills for United States Army personnel. The Department of Defense (DoD) has recognized the importance of foreign language skills to national security. Future conflicts will be asymmetrical with more ethnic and religious issues as the source of conflict. An understanding of language and culture is just as important as understanding the enemy order of battle. However, accurately anticipating future linguist requirements is a formidable task. This monograph determines whether or not the United States Army has sufficient foreign language and culture skills to meet its requirements. If not, this paper will offer possible solutions to the problem and recommendations as to what changes can be made to ensure that the Army continues to produce personnel capable of responding to the threats facing the nation. The thesis is that an understanding of language and culture are an integral part of military operations. Because language is a subset of culture, acquiring a foreign language means that a knowledge of culture is acquired at the same time. The Army must sustain an adequate corps of language trained and regionally oriented personnel in order to remain prepared to face the threats of the COE (Contemporary Operating Environment).				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Language, foreign language, linguist, culture, translators, military			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 60	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT U	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE U	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT U	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT none	

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

MAJ Deborah M. Ellis

Title of Monograph: Integrating Language and Culture

Approved by:

Donald Lisenbee, LTC, AV

Monograph Director

Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR

Director,
School of Advanced
Military Studies

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

Director,
Graduate Degree
Programs

ABSTRACT

INTEGRATING LANGUAGE AND CULTURE by MAJ Deborah M. Ellis, USA, 55 pages.

Foreign language proficiency and cultural understanding are and will remain critical skills for United States Army personnel. The Department of Defense (DoD) has recognized the importance of foreign language skills to national security. Future conflicts will be asymmetrical with more ethnic and religious issues as the source of conflict. An understanding of language and culture is just as important as understanding the enemy order of battle. However, accurately anticipating future linguist requirements is a formidable task.

This monograph determines whether or not the United States Army has sufficient foreign language and culture skills to meet its requirements. If not, this paper will offer possible solutions to the problem and recommendations as to what changes can be made to ensure that the Army continues to produce personnel capable of responding to the threats facing the nation. The thesis is that an understanding of language and culture are an integral part of military operations. Because language is a subset of culture, acquiring a foreign language means that a knowledge of culture is acquired at the same time. The Army must sustain an adequate corps of language trained and regionally oriented personnel in order to remain prepared to face the threats of the COE (Contemporary Operating Environment).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL.....	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iv
ILLUSTRATIONS	v
INTRODUCTION	1
IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE SKILLS.....	3
THE ENVIRONMENT	9
LANGUAGE SHORTFALLS	17
THE IPB PROCESS	29
LANGUAGE SHORTFALLS	32
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	37
APPENDIX A.....	45
APPENDIX B	46
GLOSSARY	47
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	50

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. OPM's Workforce Planning Model.....	33

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Foreign language proficiency and cultural understanding are critical skills that the United States Army must possess for continued success in future conflicts. Globalization has served to increase United States interaction with many other nations and transnational actors. There is a wider range of threats to national security. The Global War on Terrorism is illustrative of the increased ability of non-nation states to directly affect national security. If the United States wants to understand her enemies, anticipate threats, and respond appropriately to those threats, it is imperative that the ability of United States citizens to understand foreign languages and cultures be increased.

The wide spectrum of military operations that the United States Army must be prepared to face requires a wide spectrum of skills to meet the challenge. The past fifteen years attest to the diversity in missions facing the military. There have been major combat operations such as Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, peace operations in Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia, counter-drug operations in Latin America, humanitarian assistance in Somalia, Bangladesh, and Rwanda, humanitarian de-mining operations in Laos and Cambodia, and natural disaster assistance worldwide.¹ The number of “small wars” and “operations other than war” is greater than the number of conventional wars. Over the last one hundred years, the United States has taken part in only four major wars but over sixty small wars and operations other than war.² In addition to the conventional tactical skills, there is a need to understand local culture when fighting operations other than war.³

The national defense of the United States depends on the ability of members of its armed forces to read and understand foreign languages and to understand culture. Foreign newscasts,

¹ Headquarters, Department of the Navy, *Small Wars* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 3.

² *Ibid.*, 6-7.

³ *Ibid.*, 3.

newspapers, radio broadcasts, and magazines all provide intelligence. They also provide insight into the culture and sources of knowledge upon which the people in other countries base their opinions and form their actions.

During the Cold War, there were just a few threats that the intelligence community knew and understood very well. Analytical efforts could be focused. As evidenced by the training during MREs (Mission Rehearsal Exercises), BCTP (Battle Command Training Program), and the CTCs (Combat Training Centers), today's threats have focused the training of military forces more towards stability and support operations and less on full conventional warfare. United States Army forces are becoming more expeditionary and can expect to deploy more rapidly with little notice. Unit training and the ongoing Transformation do not allow United States Army forces to prepare for conflict over an extended period of time before entering the theater of operations. The combination of the ongoing Transformation and more rapid deployments will limit the time available to intelligence personnel to study and learn about their adversary. Intelligence personnel will be expected to already have a working knowledge of the threat.

The purpose of this research is to determine whether or not the United States Army has sufficient foreign language and culture skills to meet its requirements. If not, this monograph will offer possible solutions to the problem and recommendations as to what changes can be made to ensure that the Army continues to produce quality soldiers and officers who are capable of responding to the threats facing the nation. The thesis is that an understanding of language and culture are an integral part of military operations. Because language is a subset of culture, acquiring a foreign language means that a knowledge of culture is acquired at the same time. The Army must sustain an adequate corps of language trained and regionally oriented personnel in order to remain prepared to face the threats of the COE (Contemporary Operating Environment). The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) framework already incorporates language and culture in the analytical process but language and culture must be incorporated Army wide into planning and operations.

CHAPTER TWO

IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE SKILLS

In March 2002, Arie Amit, a retired Israeli general officer, said that the United States would not prevail against terrorists unless they understand “their language, their literature, and their poetry.”⁴ Language and culture are entwined. In fact their relationship can be considered symbiotic. The Oxford American College Dictionary defines language as a system of communication used by a particular community or country.⁵ It defines culture as the customs, arts, social institutions and achievements of a particular nation, people, or other social group.⁶ Culture defines how people view the world. It is impossible to effectively communicate without some common understanding of language and culture. Even historians use language as a way to understand culture. Word origins and usage as well as the construct and use of language all provide insights into a culture and can help one to understand what a person is saying and why.⁷ Missionaries have long understood the value of learning the language and culture of others. They know that in order to achieve the best educational results and to gain the cooperation and willingness of the people with whom they are working, they must understand the language and culture of the people. During the 19th century, British army officers were routinely stationed abroad in their Middle Eastern and Asian colonies. Studying language and absorbing culture from their colonial holdings was normal during the reign of the British Empire.⁸ It was also common for the upper class to travel and spend time in their colonial holdings; often “going

⁴ Clifford F. Porter, *Asymmetrical Warfare, Transformation, and Foreign Language Capability* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2003), 4.

⁵ Oxford University Press, *The Oxford American College Dictionary* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2002), 753.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 333.

⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Navy, 31.

⁸ David Pryce-Jones, “Golden Days of the Black Arts: Human Intelligence the Right Way - at War,” *National Review*, 26 January 2004. Available from <http://nationalreview.com/pryce-jones/pryce-jones.asp>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

native.” The British were able to rule their empire successfully in part because of the knowledge gained by those who knew and understood the foreign languages and culture of their empire.

In contrast, American history shows that the United States has taken an opposite approach. During the expansion years, Americans relied on native speakers to translate for them. Later, immigrants were and still are encouraged to assimilate by speaking only English and forsaking certain cultural traditions. Many parents refuse to teach their first generation American children the language and culture of their heritage for fear that they will not be “Americans.” Correspondingly, the United States military has never had an adequate number of linguists in time of need. During World War II, the United States government turned to Japanese-Americans to translate and interpret despite the fact that many other Japanese-Americans were detained in internment camps. More recently, intelligence documents and taped phone conversations in Arabic were not translated until after the World Trade Center was bombed in 1993.⁹

The COE is an asymmetrical environment and these operations other than war usually involve “winning the hearts and minds” of the people. This task cannot be accomplished without an understanding of the culture of the indigenous people because cultural traditions and previous experiences shape the way that people observe, decide, and act.¹⁰ Military operations, particularly operations other than war, inherently rely on the ability to communicate with and understand people of different cultures who speak different languages. The demand for linguists (interrogators, interpreters, voice interceptors, and document exploiters) far exceeds the supply. Augmentation from National Guard and Reserve forces is required at all echelons in order to maintain intelligence operations. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, Brigade Combat Team (BCT) commanders estimated that the relative value of human intelligence (HUMINT) comprised

⁹ Katherine McIntire Peters, “Lost in Translation,” *Government Executive Magazine*, 1 May 2002. Available from <http://govexec.com/features/0502/0502s4.htm>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

¹⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Navy, 28-29.

seventy to ninety percent of total intelligence.¹¹ The Tactical Questioning Handbook dated November 2003 is not doctrine but was developed by United States Army Intelligence Command (USAIC) specifically for soldiers deployed to the Middle East for use as a tool. Page eleven of the handbook lists key considerations for talking with the local population and includes knowing as much about the culture and local customs as possible and knowing a few phrases of the local language. Although the handbook says that soldiers should learn a few phrases of the local language, it then instructs soldiers to ask “open” questions rather than interrogatives, gives tips for maintaining the conversation and encourages soldiers to be subtle and social. The guide implies that soldiers will likely not be proficient enough in the local language to follow these tips because it provides guidance on how to use an interpreter.

During the Cold War era, signals intelligence (SIGINT), a category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted; reigned supreme.¹² Satellites and electronic technology gave the United States a distinct advantage over its adversaries. The United States Army placed less focus on human intelligence, a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources; obtained from interrogating, debriefing, and the eliciting of information from human sources and the exploitation of documents. Human sources are enemy prisoners of war, detainees, refugees, local inhabitants, friendly forces, and members of foreign governmental and nongovernmental organizations.¹³ Counterintelligence (CI), information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities, and HUMINT are two different functions although

¹¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Iraqi Freedom CAAT Intelligence Assessment*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Government Printing Office.

¹² Headquarters, Department of the Army, Student Text 2-19.402 (FM 34-80-2), (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002).

¹³ Ibid.

they are generally viewed as the same.¹⁴ This is a dangerous assumption because the soldiers are not cross trained to perform both functions. The standard intelligence MTOE reflects one CI team and one HUMINT team assigned to a direct support company.

During the Cold War, high tech sensors and collectors became the premier intelligence assets and as a result, the majority of HUMINT assets were moved to the National Guard and Reserve forces. Adversaries were no match for the dominance of the United States in technology and warfare. With such superior technology, adversaries learned that the only way to win a war with the United States was to employ asymmetric methods that neutralized the effects of that superior technology. They adapted their techniques to take advantage of capabilities that are not susceptible to technology. The subsequent counteraction for the United States is an increased need for HUMINT. High tech sensors collect electronic signatures but they cannot track intent, ideology, and motivation.¹⁵ Oftentimes, non-state actors such as terrorists, organize into small cells making it even more difficult to intercept their communications.¹⁶ Insurgent groups mingle freely with and blend into civilian populations making it difficult to identify and target them.

“I knew where every enemy tank was dug in on the outskirts of Tallil. Only problem was, my soldiers had to fight fanatics charging on foot or in pickups and firing AK-47s and [rocket propelled grenades]. I had perfect situational awareness. What I lacked was cultural awareness. Great technical intelligence . . . wrong enemy.” Returning commander from 3ID when asked how well situational awareness (aerial and ground intel technology) worked during the march to Baghdad.¹⁷ HUMINT operations are just one reason that Army personnel must understand other cultures and be conversant in foreign languages. Another important and less

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ John A.Gentry, “Doomed to Fail: America’s Blind Faith in Military Technology,” *Parameters* xxxii, no. 4 (Winter 2002-03). Available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02winter/gentry.htm>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005..

¹⁶ Pryce-Jones.

¹⁷ Robert H. Scales, “Culture-Centric Warfare,” *Proceedings*, October 2004. Available from http://www.military.com/New_Content/0,13190,NI_1004_culture-P1,00.htm, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

obvious reason is participation in coalition operations. HUMINT operations are generally conducted by trained intelligence personnel but all specialties will participate in multi-national operations. Alliances have been a part of warfare since the time of Athens and Sparta in the Peloponnesian Wars. There are instances in the past where the United States has acted unilaterally, but there are far more instances of the United States working in conjunction with one or more foreign coalition partners. The United States Army personnel have even fallen under the command of foreign coalition commanders and will continue to do so in the future. It is absolutely critical that United States Army personnel have an appreciation for other cultures and some knowledge of a language other than English.

The Department of Defense (DoD) has recognized the importance of foreign language skills to national security. Two bills, S.1799 the Homeland Security Education Act and S. 1800, the Homeland Security Federal Workforce Act, were passed to assist national security agencies in recruiting skilled linguists.¹⁸ In March 2002, the Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services held a hearing on “Critical Skills for National Security and the Homeland Security Federal Workforce Act (S.1800).” In addition to the Department of Defense, representatives from the National Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and Department of State (DOS) testified on specific personnel needs as a result of 11 September 2001. The role of foreign language in national security and how to build a 21st century workforce that can meet the new demands was highlighted.¹⁹ The Honorable Lee Hamilton, Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars and Former Members of the House of Representatives, commented on and offered his strong support of S.1799, the Homeland Security Education Act, which strengthens and promotes the study of science, math, and foreign languages in elementary and secondary

¹⁸ Daniel Akaka, Senator, “Promoting Foreign Language Proficiency in the Federal Workforce,” 24 June 2002. Available from <http://akaka.senate.gov/-akaka/speeches/2002625A28.htm>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

¹⁹ Cynthia Wierzbcki, “Hearing Held on the Critical Skills Needed By the Federal Government,” Press Release: 13 March 2002.

schools.²⁰ Recently, the House of Representatives proposed legislation that was opposed by senior Pentagon officials, because of its stance on military education that mandated items such as course length and joint requirements. However, buried within the legislation was specific evidence of the House's interest in military officers possessing greater cultural understanding.²¹

“Wars are won as much by creating alliances, leveraging nonmilitary advantages, reading intentions, building trust, converting opinions, and managing perceptions - all tasks that demand an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and their motivation.”²² In Operation Iraqi Freedom, conventional warfare was easily and quickly conducted. The following phases of the war have proven to be more problematic. Middle Eastern language and culture is strange and unfamiliar to most United States forces but the outcome of OIF will depend on the ability of United States and coalition forces to understand it. High tech sensors and collectors are not able to discern the enemy from the population. Technology cannot predict the motives and intentions of the Iraqi people. Technology alone will not be enough to defeat adversaries. Additionally, much of the advanced technology available to the United States Army is also available to her adversaries. Continuing to use the same methods to train and assign officers, may prevent the Army from providing the level of support required.

Army Transformation has focused primarily on technology but technology cannot replace human interaction. In future conflicts that do not involve major conventional operations, the majority of tactical intelligence will derive from HUMINT sources. The commander will always have a need to understand language and culture in order to fully appreciate intelligence collection. Rather than replacing intelligence collection, technology should be used to facilitate it.²³ Equal

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Inside the Pentagon, “Pentagon Opposes House-Backed Requirements for Military Education,” 02 September 2004. Available from <http://www.insidedefense.com>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

²² Scales.

²³ Headquarters, Department of the Navy, 55-56.

attention needs to be paid to education and providing personnel with the skill sets to understand the adversary and his intentions.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ENVIRONMENT

Americans have an international reputation for being ethnocentric and arrogant when it comes to learning other cultures and foreign languages. It is a reputation that is based in some degree on fact. “Linguistic arrogance” assumes that everyone else in the world will be able to speak English.²⁴ English is the second most widely spoken language in the world after Mandarin Chinese.²⁵ There are approximately 6,800 languages in the world that are spoken across 200 countries.²⁶ The breakdown of world languages is as follows: Americas – 15 percent, Africa – 30 percent, Europe – 3 percent, Asia – 32 percent, and the Pacific – 19 percent.²⁷ The United States has only one official language, English, and wherever Americans travel in the world, there are always people who are also able to speak English.

Not only is the acquisition of a second language a necessity in the United States, but it is not stressed as a valuable skill. Only New York, Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia require students to study a foreign language in order to earn a standard high school diploma. In order to graduate with honors or from the college preparatory track, an additional eleven states require some study of a foreign language. Twenty-six states, over half the country, make no specific mention of foreign language as a necessary requirement to earn a diploma. Three states have recently recognized the need for foreign language education and have new standards

²⁴ Dennis Wagner, “Linguists Are Needed for the War on Terror,” *Arizona Republic*, 7 November 2003. Available from <http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

²⁵ Ethnologue, “Most Widely Spoken Languages in the World,” 2001. Available from <http://www.ethnologue.com/info.asp>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

²⁶ *Language Dictionaries*, Available from <http://www.yourdictionary.com/languages.html>. Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

²⁷ Ethnologue, “Geographic Distribution of Living Languages,” 2000. Available from http://www.ethnologue.com/ethno_docs/distribution.asp, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

pending that incorporate foreign language into the graduation requirement. Another seven have vaguely addressed the problem by adding requirements for students to “develop an understanding of cultures and become competent in at least one language in addition to English.”²⁸

The problem continues once a student advances to the secondary education level. Many universities have no foreign language requirement for undergraduate students. It is only at the doctorate level where foreign language proficiency is a common requirement. Students who earn degrees in foreign languages at the undergraduate and graduate level can usually expect to use their skills in academia, federal service, social services, or other service oriented industries unless that language degree is coupled with another degree in business, law, or some other more valued profession. Translators and interpreters can also expect sporadic employment. Despite studies that show the study of foreign language and culture enhances cognitive skills and fosters adaptability in new situations, Americans have not made foreign language study an important part of any academic curriculum.²⁹

In comparison to other nations that start the language acquisition process at the elementary school level, the United States is far behind. The problem of foreign language literacy in the United States and the United States Army is not one that will be easily or quickly solved. It requires a long term approach and an investment of time and money now to pay dividends in the future. Past conflicts in places like Bosnia-Herzegovina and ongoing operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq consistently demonstrate that the military has an abiding need for linguists and culturally literate soldiers and officers.

²⁸ Jennifer Dounay, “Foreign Language Requirements for High School Graduation,” Education Commission of the States, 2002. Available from <http://www.ecs.org>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

²⁹ K. Foster, and C. Reeves, “FLES Improves Cognitive Skills,” *FLES News* 2, no. 3 (Spring 1989). Available from <http://www.wrightgroup.com/index.php/home/worldlanguages/espanolparati/teacherslounge/infoandsupport/selectedfiles/190>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

The lack of emphasis on foreign language in primary and secondary education in the United States makes it difficult to learn and converse in foreign languages as an adult. Language acquisition is optimized in children rather than adults. In fact, second language acquisition is the only complex learning system that is more easily mastered as a young child than as an adult because children acquire language differently. The world is full of people who are not considered literate, able to read and write, yet they have mastered a language. This is because primary language acquisition is not a skill that is taught. There are multiple theories about how children acquire language, but the common theme is that humans are genetically programmed to learn any language to which exposed. Therefore, a child who is born in Germany to German speaking parents but raised in India where Hindi is spoken will learn to speak Hindi. Similarly, a child who is exposed to more than one language during the early years while he is still learning his native tongue, will easily acquire those additional languages with the same level of fluency.³⁰

Adult language acquisition is very different. It must be taught. There are three methods of teaching a foreign language; grammar-translation, direct method, and audio-lingual. The first method, grammar-translation, relies primarily on memorization where a student memorize words, inflection, and grammar rules which are translated back forth. The direct method is a type of immersion in which a student is placed in an environment where he hears nothing but the foreign language he is trying to learn. This method purposefully does not teach language structure or make any comparisons between the native tongue and the target language. The third method of language instruction is the audio-lingual method which relies on imitation, repetition, and reinforcement.³¹ The Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California has successfully used a combination of the audio-lingual and direct methods.

The American bias towards learning foreign languages and cultures is not new. In 1923, twenty-two states had laws that restricted the teaching of foreign languages as a result of paranoia

³⁰ Victoria Fromkin, and Robert Rodman, *An Introduction to Language* (Chicago: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1988), 388-391.

³¹ *Ibid.*

and prejudicial fears from World War I. That same year, the Supreme Court overturned these laws so that foreign languages could be taught. Even the military had a negative attitude towards learning foreign languages during this time. Brigadier General W. K. Naylor, the Army G-2 in 1923, stated that it was “open to question” whether or not attachés should be able to speak the language of their host countries. He was speaking to the Army War College class and his statement represented the fear of losing objectivity by being fluent in another country’s language.³² The negative trend continued when in 1940 a national report was issued that stated “overly academic” programs were causing too many high school students to fail. The report then went on to recommend that foreign language classes be eliminated to fix the problem.³³ More recent statistics indicate that foreign language instruction is still not an educational priority. The Center for Applied Linguistics shows that most American elementary schools do not teach any foreign language at all. High schools are better in that eighty-six percent offer foreign language classes but primarily in Spanish or French only.³⁴ A survey conducted by the American Council on Education in 2002 showed that only eight percent of American college students take classes in foreign languages; a decrease from sixteen percent in 1960.³⁵ This is coupled with the general lack of foreign language requirements for American high school graduates.

Over ninety percent of communication is nonverbal; so despite American reputation for linguistic and cultural arrogance, United States soldiers have the advantage of a natural proclivity towards loquaciousness and geniality.³⁶ Those Americans who serve in the military or other federal agencies may have increased opportunities for exposure to foreign languages and cultures.

³² Scott A. Koch, “The Role of US Army Military Attaches Between the World Wars,” *Studies in Intelligence* 38, no. 5 (1995). Available from <http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/95unclass/Koch.html>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

³³ Katherine McIntire Peters.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Natalie Troyer, “Campaign Urges America to Learn Foreign Languages,” *Washington Times*, 8 December 2004.

³⁶ Patrick Jonsson, “Say It In Pashto: US Troops Learn New Tongues,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, 5 February 2002. Available from http://www.csmonitor.com/csmonitor/display.jhtml;jsessionid=UI2BBJLLPAM3ZKGL4L2SFEQ?_requestid=92846, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

While there is no requirement for enlisted personnel to acquire a language unless they are in a language dependent military occupation specialty (MOS), most officers must fulfill a language requirement in order to earn a commission. The requirement is less than stringent and not every officer must meet the language requirement. “All scholarship cadets are required to successfully complete one semester or quarter of college instruction in a major Indo-European or Asian language, other than the language which they normally speak.”³⁷ This requirement applies only to scholarship cadets seeking commission through the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) program. Those seeking a commission through the United States Military Academy (USMA) are encouraged to take two years of a foreign language in high school in order to prepare for the curriculum at USMA. Once enrolled at USMA, cadets “. . . will take at least two semesters of one of the seven foreign languages offered. Course work will present perspectives from another culture, develop the ability to learn another language, provide an introductory level of proficiency in the language selected, and provide a firm foundation for further language study.”³⁸ At USMA, the dean has listed *Cultural Perspective* as one of the academic program goals that provides “an essential base of knowledge necessary for all career Army leaders.”³⁹ Despite the requirements of these two programs, there is no commissioning requirement for non-scholarship ROTC cadets and Officer Candidate School (OCS) graduates to study foreign languages at the undergraduate level. Once young officers are commissioned, there is no DoD or Army requirement to maintain any level of language proficiency. With no required proficiency requirements, commissioned officers who enter the service with some foreign language capability are at risk of losing any skills acquired up to that point.

³⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 145-1, *Senior Reserve Officer’s Training Corps Program: Organization, Administration, and Training* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996).

³⁸ United States Military Academy, *Curriculum Overview*, 2004. Available from <http://www.dean.usma.edu/Curriculum/shortcurriculumoverview.cfm>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

Education continues to be a critical aspect of professional development. Forces need to be educated in order to understand and interact with the different actors involved. In the first part of the 20th century, the Army did not have to compete for legitimacy when fighting operations other than war. Most of the time, the Army was the only functional organization. Today there are a variety of actors that the Army must compete with for attention and resources; non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private volunteer organizations (PVOs), international organizations, private military corporations, and the media.⁴⁰ All of these organizations contain personnel with a broad range of skills necessary for operations. However, it is incumbent on the military to have an organic personnel capability to understand foreign languages and cultures rather than depending on other organizations that may have their own shortages.

Learning and understanding a foreign language and culture is not something that happens quickly. It requires a significant investment of time and education. Army officers are not required to be educated beyond the undergraduate level, and military intelligence officers are not required to specialize in a particular area such as signals intelligence, human intelligence, or imagery intelligence or maintain any special skills such as regional expertise or foreign language proficiency. In the United States Army, it takes more than a year to train a beginning speaker to a 2/2 level of proficiency in a Category IV language such as Arabic.⁴¹ Despite the significant investment of time and money spent on training, career professional development does not support language maintenance. Language skills are perishable. Without a dedicated effort to maintain these skills, they will quickly evaporate. It is critical that professional development programs and timelines stress the importance of language maintenance and make reasonable provisions for personnel to maintain or increase their skills.

The requirement for trained linguists in the Army has increased significantly over recent years. Advances in technology have increased the amount of information that must be analyzed.

⁴⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Navy, 67-68.

⁴¹ Government Administration Office, *Foreign Languages: Human Capital Approach Needed to Correct Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), 5.

Intelligence collection has expanded to include not just the cold war era line-of-sight communications but also the cell phones, the internet and fiber optic cables.⁴² The changing contemporary operating environment has presented the Army with a wider range of potential adversaries, many of which come from countries or regions unfamiliar to the military or Americans in general. Some of the language shortages are caused by systemic problems in recruiting and training policies in the Department of Defense as well as other governmental agencies. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) does not track the number of jobs that require foreign language skills nor does it have a comprehensive database on federal employees with foreign language capability.⁴³ In none of the federal agencies responsible for the national security, foreign interests, and foreign intelligence needs of the United States is there a screening requirement to understand other cultures or have a foreign language capability.

Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) advocate American foreign policy, protect American citizens, and promote American business interests throughout the world. They serve in United States embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic missions tasked to strengthen peace, stability, and prosperity.⁴⁴ FSOs receive overseas assignments once they complete their initial orientation and training. They are required to serve at least one year in an overseas consular job, and they are normally also assigned duty at a hardship location. Hardship duty is usually in those locations outside of Western Europe, Canada, and Australia.⁴⁵ Despite the overseas assignments and mission to advocate American foreign policy and interest abroad, applicants to the FSO program are not required to have any foreign language capability. Instead, the Department of State “. . . welcomes applicants who are proficient in one or more foreign languages. Those who pass the Oral Assessment can raise their ranking on the List of Eligible Hires by passing a language test in

⁴² Ibid., 12.

⁴³ Katherine McIntire Peters.

⁴⁴ Department of State, *Careers*, 2004. Available from <http://www.careers.state.gov/officer/apply.html#5>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

any foreign language used by the Department of State. Additional credit is given to candidates who pass a test in “critical needs languages.”⁴⁶

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has a mission to provide intelligence analysis of events around the globe by deducing the military capabilities and intentions of foreign governments and non-governmental organizations around the world.⁴⁷ Those who apply for a position with the DIA should possess “Intelligence related experience or a bachelor’s or advanced degree from an accredited college or university in an appropriate job related field, such as political science, regional studies, international affairs (foreign language skill in conjunction with these majors is highly desired), geography, economics, engineering, or physical or life sciences.”⁴⁸ Language capability is something that is only “highly desired” when coupled with education in another field.

The mission of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is to support the President, National Security Council, and all officials who make and execute the United States national security policy by: 1) providing accurate, comprehensive and timely foreign intelligence on national security topics and 2) and conducting counterintelligence activities, special activities and other functions related to foreign intelligence and national security, as directed by the President.⁴⁹ For students applying for internships, “Foreign language skills, previous international residency, and military experiences are pluses.” For employee applicants, “Fluency in a foreign language is a good addition.”⁵⁰ The CIA, DIA, and DOS present language skills and regional expertise as a nice addition to a new applicant or as a way to move ahead in the applicant pool, but they do not stress language as a critical skill. If it were presented as a requirement for those working overseas, focused on foreign intelligence, or other diplomatic missions, potential new hires would

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Defense Intelligence Agency, Homepage. Available from <http://www.dia.mil>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, Homepage. Available from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/information/info.html>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

work towards gaining those skills during their education and subsequently enter government service with a greater ability to perform their responsibilities.

In the Cold War era, the Army could rely on formal schools and training programs to sufficiently teach the threat. Today's world with many non-specific threats makes that task extremely difficult. Current United States involvement in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (OEF and OIF) has stretched both Army and Marine forces thin. In addition to the strain caused by current operations, the Army is also undergoing transformation. Along with units and equipment, the education system is being transformed too. Many schools are becoming shorter in duration, making use of distance learning technology, and transferring the responsibility of teaching certain tasks and skills to other schools or even to individual units. It is not feasible to focus on every potential threat or adversary because there are simply too many. However, an officer corps that has a broad foundation in the language, culture, and history of other nations is well equipped and capable of understanding the historical and cultural context from which the threat emerged, anticipating threat behavior and reacting appropriately.⁵¹

CHAPTER FOUR

LANGUAGE SHORTFALLS

Ambassador Jean-David Levitte stated "Language is the United States' last barrier and it comes from ignorance. We have to make sure that language differences do not impede our efforts towards globalization."⁵² The importance of learning foreign languages and cultures has become an issue that is receiving national attention. Recently, the Senate passed a resolution that proclaimed 2005 to be "The Year of Languages in the United States."⁵³ Concerns about the future role of the United States in a global economy and national security have called attention to the lack of focus on foreign language education.

⁵¹ Headquarters, Department of the Navy, 68.

⁵² Troyer.

⁵³ Ibid.

There is a documented shortage of language, qualified personnel in the United States Army. The shortage of linguists and regional experts is not just a result of the failure to prepare for certain types of operations in the spectrum of war. Advances in technology mean that massive amounts of data and intelligence are able to be collected and more sources are available for collection. There is an increased need for personnel who are proficient in foreign languages to interpret the collected information. It is also difficult to predict with accuracy the exact location and nature of future conflicts far enough in advance to have just the right number of trained linguists at the right moment in time. As missions become increasingly more complex and technology dependent, the level of proficiency required from linguists also increases.⁵⁴ This is a problem that will not disappear.

In 2002, the Army stated that it “did not have the linguistic capacity to support two concurrent major theaters of war, as planners require.”⁵⁵ This means that the Army does not have the linguists required by its mission to face two major regional conflicts simultaneously. Shortages are based on positions designated as language dependent and do not address the needs created by the changing threat of the COE. Other federal agencies such as the Department of State, the Foreign Commercial Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have also reported similar shortages. Amongst the agencies, the Army shortage was most severe in its critical languages.⁵⁶ There are approximately 15,000 positions requiring over sixty-two different languages in the active force, Reserve, and National Guard.⁵⁷ The languages considered most critical by the Army are Arabic, Korean, Mandarin Chinese, Persian-Farsi, Russian, and Spanish.⁵⁸ In 2002, the Army reported that it needed additional translators, interpreters, cryptologic linguists, and human intelligence collectors.⁵⁹ In two of the six most critical

⁵⁴ Government Administration Office.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 14-15.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 6-7.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 8.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 7.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 6.

languages, Korean and Mandarin Chinese, there was a twenty-five percent shortage of cryptologic linguists.⁶⁰ These specialists, who hold the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), 98G, are responsible for detecting and identifying foreign communications through the use of signals intelligence. They are also trained in translation and interrogation techniques. In five of the six most critical languages, Arabic, Russian, Spanish, Korean, and Mandarin Chinese there was a thirteen percent shortage of human intelligence collectors.⁶¹ These specialists, who hold the 97E MOS, are responsible for collecting and providing information about the enemy by observing and monitoring enemy forces. They are also trained in interrogation and debriefing.

In February 2004, the Department of Defense testified before the House Intelligence Committee that it had tripled the number of Arabic and Persian linguists in response to current operations in the Global War on Terror.⁶² Despite the increase, there is still a shortage in linguists. Letitia Long, a deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, testified that there were still approximately 2,000 positions unfilled and that 6,000 additional contract positions had been created. According to a report released by the Joint Congressional Committee in 2003, only thirty percent of the linguist requirements in languages such as Arabic, Pashto, Persian, and Urdu were filled.⁶³

Both enlisted and officer personnel in the United States Army who hold language dependent military occupation specialties maintain language proficiency to a measured standard. There are only five enlisted MOSs that are language dependent: 97B Counterintelligence (CI) agent, 97E Interrogator, 97L Interpreter/Translator, 98C Signals Intelligence Analyst, 98G Voice Intercept Operator, and 71LL Defense Attaché Intelligence Analysts. The 97L MOS is specific to

⁶⁰ Ibid., 8.

⁶¹ Ibid., 9.

⁶² "US Intelligence Agencies Triple Number of Arab Linguists," *World Tribune*, 8 March 2004. Available from http://216.26/163/62/2004/ss_intelligence_03_05.html, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

⁶³ Ibid.

the Reserve Component.⁶⁴ These MOSs are all in the intelligence field although language skills are a much needed combat multiplier across all the branches. Warrant officers have language dependent MOSs that parallel those of enlisted personnel with the exception of the interpreter/translator skill: 351B Counterintelligence Technician, 351E Interrogation Technician, 352C Traffic Analysis Technician, 352G Voice Intercept Technician and 350L Attaché Technician. Commissioned officers that serve in Functional Area 48 as Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) are the only commissioned officers required to maintain language proficiency.⁶⁵

General John Abizaid, Commander, United States Central Command stated, “We must invest in greater culturally-literate HUMINT capabilities across the services and build networks that not only provide discrete target information but also help us anticipate enemy actions.”⁶⁶ The Department of Defense trains its linguists at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) at the Presidio of Monterey, California. DLI was first established as the Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS) in November 1941 as a covert training institution. At that time, there were only four instructors and sixty students, mostly Nisei (second generation Japanese Americans), who served the American World War II effort.⁶⁷ Over time, the mission and size of the school grew and the DLIFLC is now the primary location for resident foreign language acquisition training and for a variety of nonresident programs such as Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) and Video Tele-Training (VTT).⁶⁸ In 1973, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) assumed administrative control and a joint service General Officer Steering Committee established in 1981 advises the language program.⁶⁹

⁶⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 350-16, *Total Army Language Program* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), 4-5.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 4-5.

⁶⁶ “US Intelligence Agencies Triple Number of Arab Linguists.”

⁶⁷ Defense Language Institute, Homepage, Available from <http://www.dliflc.edu>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

⁶⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 350-16.

⁶⁹ Defense Language Institute.

Eighty percent of all United States government foreign language classes are taught at DLI.⁷⁰ Its mission is to “educate, sustain, evaluate, and support foreign language specialists under the guidelines of the Defense Foreign Language Program, which provides the Department of Defense and other federal agencies with linguists fully capable of supporting United States interests worldwide.”⁷¹ The school, which has resident instruction in twenty-three languages and multiple dialects, can instruct approximately 3,500 students at any given time. DLIFLC also provides instruction in more than sixty-five languages and dialects through supervised contracts in Washington DC.⁷²

In October 2001, the DLIFLC was granted federal degree-granting authority by the House of Representatives.⁷³ This is an acknowledgement of the quality of instruction and rigor of the program. As an aid in determining who is selected to attend language training, the Army uses the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB). The DLAB tests aptitude for learning a language and is scored on a scale of 1 to 175.⁷⁴ Every language is different and some language families are more difficult to master than others for native English speakers. DoD has classified world languages into four categories with category I being the easiest group of languages to learn and Category IV being the most difficult. In order to receive training in a Category I language, the minimum required DLAB score is an 85 or higher. Category II requires a score of 90 or higher. Category III requires a score of 95 or higher and Category IV requires a score of 100 or higher.⁷⁵ Once selected and enrolled, students go to class six hours a day, five days a week where they are taught listening, reading, writing and speaking skills, geopolitical issues, economic issues, and social attributes of foreign cultures. The DLI has recognized that language cannot be

⁷⁰ Ann Scott Tyson, “Uzbek or Dari? Military Learns New Tongues,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, 2 January 2004. Available from <http://www.cs.monitorservices.com>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

⁷¹ Defense Language Institute.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 350-16, 4.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

learned in a cultural vacuum so it is important that the language programs incorporate an understanding of culture.⁷⁶

Since 11 September 2001, DLI has instituted a number of measures to cope with the increasing demand for qualified linguists. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Task Force was established as an additional branch specifically to respond to demands from commanders in the field. The GWOT Task Force has undertaken such missions as translating letters written by detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and translating the Ranger Handbook into Dari for use with the Afghan Army.⁷⁷ Ten languages have also been added to the curriculum. There has been a dramatic increase in the number of students learning languages from the three countries; Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, that President George W. Bush labeled the “Axis of Evil” during his 2003 State of the Union address. Enrollment in Persian classes is up seventy percent, forty percent in Arabic and fifty percent in Korean.⁷⁸ Trends have shown that interest in learning specific foreign languages tends to correlate with current events or the latest demand and not with predicted future needs. Given the length of time it takes to train to a given level of proficiency, language training should not only address current needs but a percentage should be dedicated to future requirements so that there is an adequate pool of linguists available at the right time.

DLI is experimenting with new teaching methods and leveraging technology to provide more realistic and pertinent training and speed the process of learning some of the more difficult languages. Classrooms at DLI now have “smartboards” which have replaced overhead projectors, blackboards, and the language lab. Instructors are using computers and servers to design and publish their lesson plans, and students are able to watch streaming video broadcasts from Al Jazeera, BBC in Arabic, and other Middle Eastern newspapers.⁷⁹ Since over 90 percent of the students at DLI serve in military intelligence, the integration of news broadcasts into

⁷⁶ Defense Language Institute.

⁷⁷ Tyson.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

classroom instruction provides a needed background in current events. Classroom instruction is typically over six hours a day with two to three hours of homework in the evenings.⁸⁰

There are two different Army standards for language proficiency. One is just memorization that is used by the Special Forces and the other is based on the linguist skills required to fill language coded positions in the Army.⁸¹ The DoD and Army ascertain linguist proficiency with the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) which measures ability in listening, reading, and speaking. The test is scored in accordance with the Federal Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) scale.⁸² Language proficiency is ranked on the ILR scale from 0 to 5 with 0 being the lowest and 5 the highest level of proficiency. Individuals are tested on their ability to read, write, speak, and listen. A rank of 0 indicates “no practical capability in the language.” A score of 1 is labeled “elementary” and indicates “sufficient capability to satisfy basic survival needs and minimum courtesy and travel requirements.” A score of 2 is labeled “limited working” and indicates “sufficient capability to meet routine social demands and limited job requirements. Can deal with concrete topics in past, present and future tense.” A score of 3 is labeled “general professional” and indicates “Able to use the language with sufficient ability to participate in most formal and informal discussions on practical, social, and professional topics. Can conceptualize and hypothesize.” A score of 4 is labeled “advanced professional” and indicates “Able to use the language fluently and accurately on all levels normally pertinent to professional needs. Has range of language skills necessary for persuasion, negotiation, and counseling.” A score of 5 is labeled “functionally native” and indicates “Able to use the language at a functional level equivalent to a highly articulate, well educated native speaker.”⁸³ ILR scores can have a plus or minus added to the numerical value if a person meets the requirements for a

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Government Administration Office, 8.

⁸² Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 350-16, 4.

⁸³ Government Administration Office, 5.

lower score but has not met all the requirements to achieve the next higher rank.⁸⁴ Currently, the DLPT is on its fourth version, which differs from previous forms by its use of only authentic, adult language materials. The test makes extensive use of newspapers, television, and radio excerpts. Only the most recently developed DLPT is valid; if a DLPT IV is available to the field, an earlier test cannot be used.⁸⁵

The ILR scale is used by all governmental agencies but the language proficiency required varies by agency. The minimum standard for Army linguists is a score of 2/2. After training a linguist to a 2/2 level of proficiency, the cost of training is significantly increased to achieve 3/3 or higher. However, there is a corresponding positive benefit in the skill that the linguist possesses. A linguist with a 3/3 capability is potentially four times as productive as a 2/2 level linguist.⁸⁶ Language training is expensive. It costs approximately 27 thousand dollars and a years time to train one Army cryptologic linguist to the 2/2 standard. In fiscal year 2001, the Army spent over 27.3 million dollars on language training through the DLI.⁸⁷

The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School is another source of foreign language capability. The school trains approximately 3,300 personnel each year.⁸⁸ However, personnel trained at this school are part of the United States Special Operations Command and are not considered part of the available pool of linguists that the remainder of the Army uses. Currently, the Special Warfare School teaches six-month courses in Arabic, Russian, Persian, Serbo-Croatian, Czech, Korean, Polish, Thai, and Tagalog. It offers four-month courses in French, Portuguese, and Spanish.⁸⁹ The only languages that were added to the school post 11 September are Pashto, Dari, and Uzbek.⁹⁰ The school does not try to train linguists to a 2/2 level of proficiency. Instead, graduates achieve a 1/1 proficiency level, which is memorization of the

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 350-16.

⁸⁶ Government Administration Office AO, 5.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 16.

⁸⁸ Jonsson.

⁸⁹ Department of the Army, *Language Training*.

⁹⁰ Jonsson.

target language. Even this basic level of foreign language proficiency is enough to significantly enhance the conduct of special operations missions. Graduates are very enthusiastic about their ability to converse and their general understanding of culture. Jim, a student at JFK Special Warfare School, stated “This isn’t exactly what I signed up for, but I’m glad I’m getting it. At the end of the day, knowing this stuff gives you a strategic advantage. . . . It can also save your life.”⁹¹

The Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program provides commissioned officers from all services who have regional expertise, language competency, and political-military awareness. FAOs serve as Attaches or Security Assistance Officers at United States embassies, to implement United States national security strategy, often as the sole DoD representative in country. FAOs may also serve on joint staffs to provide a regional and cultural perspective for planning and execution of military operations, and to advise senior leaders.⁹² Because each service maintains its own program, the benefit of regional expertise provided by FAOs varies. A document released by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in January 2004 identified five issues with the service FAO programs and made recommendations. Lack of regional expertise in the unified commands was the first issue cited. DoD Directive 1315.17 does not require the services to take into consideration the FAO requirements of their sister services. As a result, personnel managers in the unified commands do not code assignment billets with FAO in an effort to ensure that all their positions are filled. Billets that are coded branch immaterial have an even lesser chance of being filled by a FAO.⁹³

The second issue cited was the lack of oversight at the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS)/Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level of FAO programs. A program that is not monitored is likely to lose its focus. The services have a tendency to focus on traditional MOSs, which are

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Mark Bergeson, Lieutenant Colonel, *Information Paper (FAO)*, Office of Secretary of Defense, 20 February 2004), 1. Available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/prhome/docs/ltpofficers.doc>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

⁹³ Ibid., 2.

more in line with their warfighting mission. The third issue was the failure to recognize regional expertise and language proficiency as critical skills. FAOs have traditionally served in diplomatic rather than operational assignments and they have a very Eurocentric focus. Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom have highlighted the importance of the very same skills that FAOs possess and the need to increase their presence in the combatant commands and other defense agencies. The fourth issue was personnel tracking. The Marine Corps is the only service that effectively tracks its reserve component FAOs making them available for use during surge periods. The fifth and final issue was the negative perception of FAO as a career track. Because some of the services require FAOs to continue to serve in their primary MOS, any time spent working FAO assignments places those officers at risk of falling behind their peers who remain on a single track. The Navy routinely fills FAO billets with officers serving their final assignment.⁹⁴

The Army and Marine Corps programs are the most functional. The Air Force selects officer volunteers for its program. However, the volunteers must already possess an elementary skill level (DLPT 1/1 plus education and experience).⁹⁵ Once accepted into the program, FAOs have access to Air Force training in order to maintain their skills but usually only after duty hours during their personal time. Air Force language and regional training programs are short and rarely do FAOs have the opportunity to study at the Naval Post-graduate School or compete for fellowships. FAO assignments are special duty and valid FAO duty positions take a lower priority.⁹⁶ The Navy convenes an annual board to select officers with regional expertise for their FAO program. All officers in the grade of Captain (O-3) to Colonel (O-6) are eligible, and only those who have already demonstrated an aptitude for languages, served in regional experience tours, and have post-graduate education are competitive. After being selected for the program,

⁹⁴ Ibid., 2-3.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 1.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

the FAOs continue to serve in their primary specialty and fill FAO billets when assigned to non-essential duty.⁹⁷

The International Affairs Officer Program (IAOP) is the Marine Corps program for both FAOs and Regional Affairs Officers (RAOs). It consists of study and experience tracks. Eighteen officers in their fourth year of service are selected annually for attendance at the Naval Post-graduate school where they study National Security Affairs. FAOs then receive language training, which is not a requirement for RAOs, at the Defense Language Institute. Both FAOs and RAOs are dual tracked and alternate duty between their primary MOS and FAO/RAO assignments. An additional fifty officers who have preexisting qualifications can enter the FAO and RAO program annually through the Experience track.⁹⁸

The Army's FAO program selects officers for FAO training upon completion of company command, usually between five and eight years of service. Training consists of language training at the Defense Language Institute, a graduate degree in a regionally focused area and in-country training. At the tenth year of service, a Department of the Army central selection board selects officers who will be permanently tracked as FAOs.⁹⁹

In spite of the recognized shortage of formally trained linguists who hold language dependent MOSs, the Army has a wealth of organic language ability that is potentially not harnessed. AR 350-16, which governs the Army Language Program, places the responsibility of identifying, tracking, and reporting latent language ability on units at the brigade, group, and battalion level. Commanders at this level use the Command Language Program (CLP), language training programs directed, managed, funded, and controlled by a MACOM chain-of-command. A CLP is designed to satisfy individual linguist proficiency requirements.¹⁰⁰ The regulation requires units to encourage individuals with language skill to maintain their proficiency and be

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 350-16, 5.

evaluated via the DLPT and cadets graduating from USMA have a requirement to take the DLPT in their senior year.¹⁰¹ DA Form 7383-R (Individual Linguist Record (ILR)) is used by the Army to track foreign language capability. On the surface, this may seem an easy enough task but other than interviews during the in-processing period, there is no accurate way to capture all those who have latent foreign language skills. In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that some personnel are reluctant to report any language skill in those areas deemed critical or shortages by DoD for fear of being deployed repeatedly or being assigned to a less than desirable location. Individuals who personally evaluate their language skills as sub-standard and unable to serve any measure of usefulness do not report their skills or get tested.

Trained linguists are a low density, high demand specialty. As such, their retention is critical to military readiness. However, a competitive job market in the civilian sector makes it difficult to attract, recruit, train, and retain sufficient personnel. Statistics show that less than 50 percent of trained Army cryptologic linguists, serve beyond their initial enlistment of four to six years.¹⁰² In fiscal year 2001, over 45 percent of trained Army cryptologic linguists served only their initial enlistment service obligation after spending approximately two of those years in basic training, foreign language training, and intelligence training.¹⁰³ Language training is too time intensive and too costly for personnel trained at DoD expense to depart the service so quickly. Linguists need years of training and practice to hone the skills that will enable them to understand the nuances of spoken language and culture. These are skills that military commanders and their units can benefit most from.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Government Administration Office, 13.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 17.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE IPB PROCESS

The military intelligence community bears the responsibility for providing the analysis that commanders, leaders, and staff personnel need to plan and conduct operations. Increasingly, that responsibility has become more difficult as the number of threats expands and the demand for intelligence increases. Current events, the changes in the contemporary operating environment (COE), and Army transformation have all contributed to the need for a change in the provision of support to the warfighter. Intelligence officers must now provide analysis and support in an age where there is an overload of information and it must still be timely and relevant. In addition, continued rapid advances in technology mean that tactical commanders now expect and have come to rely on intelligence that was once available only to operational and strategic level commanders.

One of the foundations of military intelligence is Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB); a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. It is designed to support staff estimates and military decision-making. Applying the IPB process helps the commander selectively apply and maximize his combat power at critical points in time and space on the battlefield.¹⁰⁴ There are four steps in the IPB process: define the battlefield environment, describe the battlefields effects, evaluate the threat, and determine threat COAs.¹⁰⁵ A key factor in the IPB process is to remember that it is continuous. It is not simply a step of mission analysis during the military decision making process (MDMP). The steps of IPB do not change when they are performed at the tactical, operational or strategic echelons nor do they change if performed in a conventional operation or an operation other than war. The differences in application are apparent in the level of detail and

¹⁰⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), 1-1.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

analysis required. Even a conventional operation will emphasize different techniques for offensive and defensive actions and for heavy divisions and light divisions.¹⁰⁶ A conventional operation may have a threat model that conventional enemy forces typically employ. In a counterinsurgency operation, the threat may be the indigenous population many of whom are noncombatants. Although FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, does not explicitly address the understanding of language and culture as a critical feature, it does discuss those features. The manual emphasizes that IPB is a process and must be applied differently to every situation. Chapter three provides examples of IPB in a conventional setting and chapter six is devoted to providing examples of IPB in operations other than war. Chapter six addresses the need to focus on demographics to include ethnic divisions, religious beliefs, language divisions, tribal, clan and sub-clan loyalties, and political sympathies.¹⁰⁷ The IPB field manual is not all inclusive, it is simply a guide that can be used in applying the fundamentals of the process. The process can then be used to drive intelligence efforts. Although the Chief of Staff of Intelligence (G2)/Intelligence Staff Officer (S2) is responsible for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), it is something that the entire staff must contribute to. Every staff element and member of a command has a responsibility to consider the environment and the effect it will have on all types of operations across the spectrum.¹⁰⁸

In the past, intelligence was focused on nation states. Analysts focused on specific countries and when units deployed, country studies, and country books were produced to describe the threat. The contemporary operational environment is one in which non-state actors can pose a serious threat to national security or national interests. As a result, the intelligence community must place increased emphasis on cultural, ethnic, religious, societal, and economic factors when analyzing the threat.¹⁰⁹ “By 2015 more than half of the world’s population will be urban. The

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 6-1.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 6-2.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 1-4.

¹⁰⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Navy, 12.

number of people living in mega-cities - those containing more than 10 million inhabitants - will double to more than 400 million. . . . Ninety-five percent of the increase [in world population] will be in developing countries, nearly all in rapidly expanding urban areas. Where political systems are brittle, the combination of population growth and urbanization will foster instability.”¹¹⁰ With increasingly urban populations, operations other than war are frequently taking place in urban rather than rural areas. The large civilian populations in urban areas present complex terrain in which to conduct military operations. This urban terrain negates the technological advantage of the United States military. HUMINT derived from an ability to understand foreign languages and culture will provide the intelligence that commanders need to defeat their adversaries.

Without the attendant language and cultural knowledge of the threat, it is very easy to become overwhelmed by the enormous amount of data provided to the commander and analyst by United States sensors. It is the understanding of the adversary’s mindset that enables commanders and analysts to arrive at combat intelligence rather than reams of meaningless information.¹¹¹ Understanding the language and culture of an adversary can give the commander the tools he needs to determine courses of action that are culturally acceptable.¹¹²

Although not stated explicitly, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) incorporates the importance of language and culture. A need to modify the process of IPB does not exist. Many Army field manuals have recently been or are currently being revised. However, FM 34-130 continues to serve its purpose as a guide to the systematic and continuous process of analyzing the threat and the environment. The Cold War era allowed the military intelligence community to minimize the cultural aspect of the process but current events have made it perhaps

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 20-21.

¹¹¹ John A. Gentry, “Doomed to Fail: America’s Blind Faith in Military Technology,” *Parameters*, xxxii, no. 4. (Winter 2002-03) 88-103. Available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02winter/gentry.htm>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

¹¹² Lawrence A. Yates, “Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns, and Recurring Themes.” Available from <http://usm.edu/armyrotc/militaryhistory/Reading%20for%20Lsn%2027.doc>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

one of the most critical features in estimating the threat. Understanding intentions has become more important than understanding capabilities. Knowledge and appreciation of culture is particularly important during counterinsurgency operations.¹¹³ Cultural ignorance can result in the adoption of courses of action that are better adapted to a nation's own culture and society rather than the environment that operations are taking place in.

CHAPTER SIX

LANGUAGE SHORTFALLS


The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is the human resource agency of the federal government. It provides support to agencies by offering policy leadership, labor management guidance, and programs to improve work force performance.¹¹⁴ In 1999, OPM developed a workforce planning model that provides a framework for understanding workforce planning. The OPM model has been recognized by the executive branch as an important tool in managing human capital resources and meeting the President's capital management initiatives.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Headquarters, Department of the Navy, 61.

¹¹⁴ Office of Personnel Management, Senate Report No, 107-69. Available from <http://www.opm.gov>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

¹¹⁵ Government Administration Office, 31.

Figure 2: OPM Workforce Planning Model



Source: OPM's Workforce Planning Model (<http://www.opm.gov/workforceplanning/wfpmodel.htm>).

¹⁴Senate Report No. 107-68, at 11.

Figure 1. OPM's Workforce Planning Model.

Source Available from <http://www.opm.gov/worldforceplanning/wfpmodel.htm>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

The OPM model should be used by the Army to establish a plan to address previously identified foreign language shortfalls. The Army has pursued three methods to address its language shortfall. The first strategy provides pay incentives to language-qualified individuals. Foreign language proficiency pay (FLPP) can range anywhere from 50 dollars to 300 dollars per month. In fiscal year 2001, the Army spent approximately 6.5 million dollars on foreign language incentives.¹¹⁶ The second strategy is the use of external sources such as contracting native linguists or using the skills of reservists, retirees, or personnel from other governmental agencies. The Army Reserve and National Guard are part of the Army's foreign language program and can provide trained linguists for short duration missions. The 300th Military Intelligence Brigade from the Utah National Guard is a vital source of over several hundred

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 16.

linguists.¹¹⁷ Ten Army recruiters have been specially designated to recruit native speakers of foreign languages. This effort is significant because of the costs savings incurred by recruiting a native speaker versus recruiting and training a new soldier for twenty-three to sixty-three weeks. These newly recruited native speakers may also receive enlistment bonuses.¹¹⁸ To assist in the Global War on Terrorism, the National Virtual Translation Center announced in November 2003 that it planned to hire over three hundred civilian linguists. The center focused recruiting efforts on language qualified personnel willing to work out of their homes or offices to translate both classified and unclassified information into English from thirty to forty foreign languages. Only United States citizens able to pass national security screening and meet certain language proficiency skills were eligible for hire by the center.¹¹⁹

The 2000 Army Language Master Plan listed the use of contractors as a key strategy in fulfilling foreign language requirements in future small, scale conflicts. This strategy was chosen because it is too difficult and resources are too constrained to adequately predict the wide variety of possible future conflicts and train linguists for them all. Instead the Army has chosen to focus its preparation on major theaters of war and a select group of smaller scale conflicts. Irrespective of the inherent security risk, contractors will be used to fill the gap.¹²⁰ “Until the first American trained especially for Indonesian duty was assigned to the embassy in 1949, all translating was done by natives. To please their employers, they interpreted everything to sound rosy, pro-American. But when American area and language experts began to read Indonesian newspapers and attend sessions of the National Legislature, the Embassy learned that strong communist inspired anti-American feeling was sweeping the country.¹²¹ Reliance on contractors poses risk to the mission and national security. Military personnel must trust that the interpreters and

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 19.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 18.

¹¹⁹ Wagner.

¹²⁰ Government Administration Office, 17.

¹²¹ Kurt E. Muller, *Language Competence: Implications for National Security* (New York: Praeger, 1986), 5.

translators are doing their jobs without subjective interpretation. In order to hire linguists with the required level of proficiency, many contractors are native speakers whose primary allegiance may not be to the United States or its interests.

The third strategy is to leverage technology. Databases of contract linguists are being built, language translation software is being designed, and computers are being used to pre-screen collected information.¹²² One of the systems being designed sends collected signal intercepts from the battlefield to a central location in sanctuary where they can be translated, interpreted, and analyzed. Using this system, the Army would decrease the number of trained cryptologic linguists required to be on location during combat. Networked computer systems are another way to send work to linguists no matter where they are located.¹²³ Computers are used by both the Army and the FBI to reduce the workload of linguists and focus their efforts on information that needs more attention. In a process called “gisting,” computers are used to screen the enormous amounts of intelligence collected daily. By searching documents and transmissions for keywords and phrases, items needing to be translated can be prioritized or even reduced.¹²⁴ Certainly there is no machine or computer that can ever replace a thinking soldier but there are machines that can assist.

At Fort Huachuca, Arizona, which is the home and proponent for United States Army Military Intelligence, the Futures Development Integration Center has started a broadband intelligence training system which includes foreign language training.¹²⁵ The DLIFLC has developed a language maintenance program for linguists called LANGNET. LANGNET is internet based and interactive in order to maximize flexibility.¹²⁶ Language translation software

¹²² Government Administration Office, 15.

¹²³ Ibid., 19-20.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 20.

¹²⁵ Military Intelligence Corps Association, Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, *Broadband Intelligence Training System - Distance Learning to Provide Internet-based Training to Soldiers and Civilians in the Home*, January-March 2002. Available at <http://www.micorps.org>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

¹²⁶ Porter, 7-8.

is being developed specifically to meet military needs. DLI developed and produced language survival kits (LSKs) specifically in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The LSKs are compact disc (CD) and MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3 (MP3) players that use common military and medical terms.¹²⁷ This is far from a perfect solution. No language can ever be translated word for word and computers are unable to understand slang, idioms, and other subtle nuances that are a part of culture. An added complication to computer translations is the constant morphing of any language because languages are not static.

Career Field Designation (CFD) has made it possible for an Army officer to seek a career path not oriented on command and still be successful. The DA Pam 600-3 is under revision to stay in line with Army Transformation. It is entirely possible to transform the way that the Army train and educate officers on language and culture. To date, the bulk of efforts addressing the issue of language and culture have been focused on identifying gaps in language needs. Using the OPM model, the DoD and the Army need to go a step further and establish implementation and monitoring plans that address shortcomings in language trained personnel.¹²⁸

There is no coordinated, long-term strategy between the Department of Defense and other governmental agencies such as the State Department and the Department of Education. Without a conscientious effort to develop programs, training, and incentives that will recruit, train, and retain language proficient and regionally oriented personnel the problem cannot be solved. In order for these programs to succeed there must be a commitment that involves the entire nation. The United States cannot risk future generations of culturally ignorant and linguistically deficient citizens if it wants to survive as a world superpower. Global economies dictate that people from every corner of the globe will interact with each other more and more in the future.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 11.

¹²⁸ Government Administration Office, 21-22.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Recent operations have highlighted the change in the contemporary operating environment. Not only must doctrine and structure transform, but training and utilization must also transform in order to produce officers with skill in the required competencies. An understanding of language and culture is just as important as understanding the enemy order of battle. This issue cannot be addressed on a superficial level. Officers must have a depth of knowledge that will provide the basis for predictive analysis. Foreign language proficiency, cultural awareness and regional expertise will provide that depth.

Accurately anticipating future linguist requirements is a formidable task. It is unlikely that DoD or any other federal agency will always be able to predict future language requirements. Language training is time intensive and in many instances, the occasion to surge on language training will not be predicted far enough in advance to furnish an adequate amount of linguists at the right time. This is a problem that cannot be solved but it can be mitigated.

Army officers must be branch qualified in order to be promoted to the next grade. The requirements for branch qualification by grade are listed in DA Pamphlet 600-3 and officer assignments and career management are geared to ensure that officers are branch qualified before their files appear before a promotion board. The time that an officer has to meet the branch qualifying requirements at each grade leaves very little, if any room, at all to seek additional educational and professional opportunities. Even if officers are trained in a foreign language and culture, they must be provided reasonable opportunities to maintain their skills. The DLPT tests linguists skills but cannot test the ability of a linguist to perform in the target country. Ultimately, the best HUMINT collection will result from “subjective evaluations of intentions, aspirations,

and tendencies.”¹²⁹ The best preparation for Army personnel is study and practice, training and education.¹³⁰ DLI trains standard language skills but to have an in-depth knowledge of slang, colloquialisms and jargon, cultural immersion is necessary. Limited language skills can hinder the ability of an analyst to accurately understand a situation and provide predictive intelligence. Lessons learned cannot be applied accurately without knowledge of the foreign language and culture that they are being applied to.

The United States must develop a comprehensive and integrated strategy to meet its foreign language needs. The Department of Defense and other federal intelligence and security agencies cannot act alone in solving the problem. Promoting language skills at all levels of education should be a common goal of all governmental agencies such as the Departments of State, Education, and Commerce. Foreign language education must be an important part of every American school curriculum beginning at the elementary school level and continuing through the doctorate level. All state high school graduation requirements need to have language that specifically requires students to take classes in and demonstrate a minimal level of proficiency in foreign languages and culture. Vague and obtuse language regarding such requirements needs to be eliminated. Students who have been consistently been exposed to a foreign language and culture since the beginning of the formal education process will be able to meet high school graduation requirements. This will provide the nation a base of more culturally sensitive and adaptive people with an interest in other nations and an increased capacity to learn secondary languages.

The Department of Defense must develop a comprehensive and integrated joint plan amongst the services. The number of languages spoken in regions of potential conflict combined with the inability to precisely predict the next area of need means that each service cannot independently manage its pool of linguists and regional experts. The services must be able to

¹²⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Navy, 54.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 70.

cross level and conduct surge operations as national security and intelligence requirements dictate. A Department of Defense revision of guidelines such as DoD Directive 1315.17 is one way to ensure that the services can pool limited, high value resources during times of crisis.

DoD should continue to identify and update its list of critical languages on an annual basis. Languages targeted as critical should be based on an integrated and long-term national security strategy. All federal agencies would use the same list of critical languages to train their linguists. Focusing the training of linguists across the federal government will allow cross leveling during surge periods. Linguists should be drawn from all agencies and services in time of need. Personnel security requirements may need revision too. In order to cross level linguists to perform functions for the federal government, they all should hold the same top secret sensitive compartmentalized information (TS-SCI) level security clearance that the United States Army requires.

The Total Army Language Program (TALP) must be more closely managed. Army Regulation 611-6, *Army Linguist Management*, delineates responsibilities for the Secretary of the Army, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (G3), Intelligence (G2) and Personnel (G1), the Chiefs of the Army Reserve (OCAR) and the National Guard Bureau (NGB), MACOM commanders, the Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) commander, the Military Enlistment Processing (MEPCOM) commander, and Army Reception (USAREC) battalion commanders. The responsibilities form the parameters of a viable command language program. However, the absence of centralized program accountability prevents the program from meeting Army needs. Language skills are too valuable to national defense to entrust supervision solely to the interpretation of multiple commanders at the tactical echelon. Responsibilities are distributed through the chain of command down to the battalion level but oversight is limited with the primary burden of language maintenance falling to those in the intelligence field. There is no training, and commanders outside the intelligence field must rely on the good fortune of having a reliable warrant officer or NCO in the unit to manage the program for them. With such limited

resources, it is imperative that leaders and staff personnel at all echelons understand their language requirements, how to forecast and plan for linguist support needs in operations, and how to best utilize limited linguist resources during operations. Just as other skill sets that are deemed critical, language skills need to be managed at the highest levels. All commanders at the battalion level and higher should receive mandatory training on the TALP and its management. The training could be conducted at the Pre-Command Course (PCC) or consolidated at the installation level. In addition, all officers could receive introductory training at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC).

More linguists should be trained to the 3/3 level. There is an increase in training time but the resulting increase in productivity is exponentially greater. Language and regional skills need to be considered in the assignment process. Officers who enter the service with already existing language and culture skills should be assigned to locations where their skills can be utilized and further honed. Further language training should also be considered to bring some of these personnel up to the 3/3 level of proficiency. The productivity of these individuals will be greater than that of an officer with no resident skills who spends an equivalent amount of time in training to reach a 2/2 level of proficiency.

As part of transformation, the Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Education Systems (OES and NCOES) must take specific steps to incorporate cultural awareness and foreign language proficiency as integral parts of the education process. Giving officers the option of taking a twelve to twenty-four month sabbatical would increase the number of regionally focused and educated officers in the personnel inventory. Time spent on a sabbatical would possibly not count towards retirement but officers would still be serving on active duty. Officers would be required to use the time to earn an advanced degree in a foreign language, a regionally focused area or some other subject such as anthropology that increases the understanding of culture. Another part of the OES Transformation is that all officers will attend the Command and General Staff College. Training should include mandatory instruction dedicated to directed self-

study or classroom instruction in foreign languages and culture. Officers already take five electives as part of the curriculum, but it should be expanded to include language and cultural training. At a minimum, the CGSC would offer classroom instruction in the top tier of languages designated most critical by DoD. Graduation requirements would stipulate that officers continue to maintain an ILR score of 1/1.

The Army and Department of Defense must further explore methods of institutionalizing foreign language proficiency and cultural appreciation. There must be a command emphasis on education and learning. The burden of linguist support cannot lie on the military intelligence community. A requirement to maintain a minimal level of proficiency in a foreign language is a method of fielding a force that is culturally aware, better able to communicate and more prepared to meet future linguistic needs. Commissioning requirements for foreign languages need to be more rigorous and inclusive. Officers who enroll in a commissioning program should know what the requirements are up front to ensure that they can meet the standard. Every officer needs to study a minimum of two years of a foreign language at the undergraduate level and be required to take the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) upon commissioning. Once commissioned, officers must score a 1/1 level of proficiency. Promotions would be contingent upon officers maintaining a 1/1 level of proficiency while those in language dependent MOSs must meet a higher standard. Everyone does not have the same aptitude for learning languages but the 1/1 level can be considered achievable by an officer corps that is already required to be educated at the undergraduate level as a minimum. The JFK Special Warfare School is able to train its personnel to the 1/1 level with a six-week course. An officer who dedicates a portion of his four-year education to studying language and culture should be able to achieve the same results. The requirement should not be so rigorous that all officers must study Category IV languages or “critical” languages. The goal is to have an officer corps with an appreciation for and some demonstrated ability in foreign languages and culture. Commissioning sources such as ROTC and the service academies already have language requirements built into their programs. The

degree completion program that many OCS graduates use to complete their education program does not specify language training but it should be added.

Over time, as the Army becomes more culturally attuned and proficient in foreign languages, requirements to maintain an ILR score of 1/1 should be raised to and maintained at 2/2 for promotion to the field grade or senior NCO level. The requirement would remain at 1/1 for commissioning and all junior level officers. In order to meet the new requirements, officers would have several years to study, work with others who have a similar focus and even be immersed in the language and culture of their focus area through routine assignments, special training, and sabbaticals.

The Marine Corps and the Army both have sound FAO programs. The programs should be continued with some revisions. The Army should consider selecting officers for training at an earlier point during their careers as the Marines do. Officers who are commissioned with a degree in foreign languages or regional studies or already have native linguist skills could be targeted for recruitment to the FAO program. Creating a FAO branch that accesses officers upon commissioning rather than waiting until Career Field Designation at the ten year mark would develop a FAO branch with more depth and increased time in service. It would also yield the necessitous training time without a decrease in the service. Officers who were accessed as FAOs would receive progressive professional training and education like officers in the basic branches which would broaden the corps, build esprit de corps, and lay the foundation for networking, coaching, and mentoring.

In addition to increasing the pool of FAOs who possess both language and regional expertise, FAOs should be assigned at lower unit levels. As the Army transforms and modularizes units, consideration should be given to assigning a FAO to every Unit of Execution (UEX) and every Unit of Action (UA). FAOs should certainly serve as attachès, in embassies, in combatant commands and other higher-level staffs. However, tactical level units will also benefit

greatly from having organic language and regional expertise; both during planning and operations.

The Information Operations career field, FA 30, should become a regionally focused and perhaps even a language dependent MOS. With a mission to support the commander by gaining information superiority in all phases of Army operations, FA 30 officers must understand the culture in the environment that forces are operating in. An ability to perceive the way that information is processed by different cultures without mirror imaging American beliefs and ideologies is a skill that every FA 30 should have in order to be effective. Foreign language fluency would only further enhance that ability. After selection to the FA 30 career field, those officers should pursue an advanced degree in an area that promotes cultural understanding as part of the branch training.

Retention continues to be an issue. Lengthening the active duty service obligation of trained linguists may actually hinder recruitment. Instead, the service obligation should be increased with continued service in another designated federal agency. During times of crisis, the ranks of civilian translator pools that operate from sanctuary locations could be filled with these personnel. Consideration should be given to using retirees as well as civilians to fill translator pools. Language and regional expertise from sanctuary do not demand personnel that can meet certain physical requirements or be under a certain age. In fact, retired personnel who already have a working knowledge of military terminology and a basic understanding of operations may better be able to recognize information with military value or even provide some level of analysis.

The United States Army is charged with the ability to fight across the spectrum of operations. Despite this charge, resource constraints limit the ability of the Army to train equally on all skills across the spectrum. Although United States military forces have consistently been involved in operations other than war throughout the nation's history, United States Army forces have typically focused training on only one end of the spectrum; full scale conventional war. There seems to be a general consensus that future conflicts will be asymmetrical with more ethnic

and religious issues as the source of conflict. Foreign language proficiency and cultural understanding are and will remain critical skills for United States Army personnel in current and future operations. Present shortages of those skills must be addressed in an aggressive manner. Although there is no easy solution, a long-term strategy that integrates other governmental agencies will provide the United States Army, Department of Defense and the nation with the language and cultural skills needed to remain relevant in a global world.

APPENDIX A

US Military Operations*	
Traditional Warfare	Nontraditional Military Operations
<p><i>Total War</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> American Revolution Civil War World War I World War II <p><i>Limited War</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> War of 1812 Mexican War Spanish-American War Korean War Vietnam War Gulf War <p><i>Expeditions/Contingency Operations</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Undeclared Naval War with France Barbary Pirates Mormon War Second Seminole War Indian Wars Boxer Rebellion Intervention in Cuba, 1906 Intervention in Mexico, 1914, 1916 Intervention in Russia, 1918-20 Operation <i>Blue Bat</i> (Lebanon, 1958) Operation <i>Power Pack</i> (Dominican Republic, 1965) Operation <i>Urgent Fury</i> (Grenada, 1983) Operation <i>Just Cause</i> (Panama, 1989) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Whiskey Rebellion Lewis and Clark Exploration Reconstruction in South Pullman Strike Nation Building in the Philippines, 1899-1904 Nation Building in Cuba, 1899-1902, 1906-1909 San Francisco Earthquake Relief Occupation of Haiti, 1915-34 Occupation of Dominican Republic, 1916-24 The Sandino Affair in Nicaragua, 1927-33 Civilian Conservation Corps Greek Civil War, 1947-49 Huk Insurrection in the Philippines, 1946-54 Peace Operations in Lebanon, 1958 Nation Building in Vietnam Stability Operations in Dominican Republic, 1965-66 US Civil Disturbances, 1960s Counterinsurgency in Latin America, 1960s Mayaguez Incident Peacekeeping in Beirut, 1982-84 Peacekeeping in the Sinai Counterinsurgency in El Salvador Hurricane Andrew Relief Noncombatant Evacuation Operations in Somalia

* This chart is by no means a comprehensive rendering of nontraditional operations.

Source: JP 3-07

APPENDIX B

Table 2: Shortfalls of Army Translators and Interpreters, by Language, Fiscal Year 2001

	Authorized positions	Filled positions	Unfilled positions	Percent shortfall
Arabic	84	42	42	50%
Korean	62	39	23	37
Mandarin Chinese	52	32	20	38
Persian-Farsi	40	13	27	68
Russian	91	57	34	37
Total	328	188	146	44

Source: Army response to GAO data collection instrument.

Table 3: Shortfalls of Army Cryptologic Linguists, by Language, Fiscal Year 2001

Language	Authorized positions	Filled positions	Unfilled positions	Percent shortfall
Korean	484	331	108	24%
Mandarin Chinese	144	105	39	27
Total	578	436	142	25

Source: U.S. Army response to GAO data collection instrument.

Table 4: Shortfalls of Army Human Intelligence Collectors, by Language, Fiscal Year 2001

Language	Authorized positions	Filled positions	Unfilled positions	Percent shortfall
Arabic	209	170	39	19%
Russian	205	197	8	4
Spanish	181	163	18	10
Korean	174	149	25	14
Mandarin Chinese	58	40	18	31
Total	827	719	108	13

Source: U.S. Army response to GAO data collection instrument.

Source: Government Accounting Office

GLOSSARY

- Analysis - in intelligence usage, the procedure for determining facts, patterns, and relationships from information about the threat and environment. (ST 2-19.402)
- Certification - This is a measure of individual technical proficiency. It may also be used to confirm a unit's collective training proficiency to perform a specific mission or task. Certification requirements are normally specified in Army or MACOM regulations. (FM 7-1)
- COE - Contemporary Operational Environment - A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. The COE that exists in the world today is expected to exist until a peer competitor to the United States arises. There are eleven critical variables of the COE: physical environment, nature and stability of the state, sociological demographics, regional and global relationships, military capabilities, technology, information, external organizations, national will, time and economics. (ST 2-19.402)
- Collection - The obtaining of information in any manner, including direct observation, liaison with official agencies, or solicitation from official, unofficial, or public sources. In addition to collection activities, collection includes reconnaissance and surveillance tasks. (ST 2-19.402)
- Command Language Program (CLP) - Language training programs directed, managed, funded and controlled by a MACOM chain-of-command. A CLP is designed to satisfy individual linguist proficiency requirements. (AR 350-16)
- Combat Intelligence - Information on the enemy's capabilities, intentions, vulnerabilities, and the environment. (ST 2-19.402)
- Competency - A set of knowledge, skills and abilities that impacts leader behavior and performance. (FM 7-1)
- Counterintelligence - (CI) - Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (ST 2-19.402)
- DLAB - Defense Language Aptitude Battery
- DLIFLC - Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center - The primary location for resident foreign language acquisition training and for a variety of nonresident programs such as MTTs and VTT. (AR 350-16)

DLPT IV - Defense Language Proficiency Test - The latest DLPT test, which differs from previous forms by its use of only authentic, adult language materials. The test makes extensive use of newspapers, television, and radio excerpts. Only the most recently developed DLPT is valid; if a DLPT IV is available to the field, an earlier test cannot be used. (AR 350-16)

Education - Instruction with increased knowledge, skill, and/or experience as the desired outcome for the student. This is in contrast to Training, where a task or performance basis is used and specific conditions and standards are used to assess individual and unit proficiency. (FM 7-1)

FAO - Foreign Area Officer - Commissioned officers from all services who have regional expertise, language competency, and political-military awareness. FAOs serve as Attaches or Security Assistance Officers at US embassies, to implement US national security strategy, often as the sole DoD representative in country. FAOs may also serve on joint staffs to provide a regional and cultural perspective for planning and execution of military operations, and to advise senior leaders. (OSD Fact Paper)

FLPP - Foreign Language Proficiency Pay

FSO - Foreign Service Officer - Advocate American foreign policy, protect American citizens and promote American business interests throughout the world. They serve in US embassies, consulates and other diplomatic missions tasked to strengthen peace, stability and prosperity. Their perceptiveness, dedication and creativity drive the formulation and achievement of American foreign policy objectives. (Department of State)

Gisting - reviewing intelligence documents to determine if they contain target key words or phrases. (General Accounting Office)

HUMINT - Human Intelligence - A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Intelligence derived from the analysis of information obtained from interrogating, debriefing, and the eliciting of information from human sources and the exploitation of documents. Human sources are enemy prisoners of war, detainees, refugees, local inhabitants, friendly forces, and members of foreign governmental and nongovernmental organizations. (ST 2-19.402)

IMINT - Imagery Intelligence - Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors, such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film electronic display devices, or other media. (ST 2-19.402)

Intelligence - The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign

countries or areas; Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (ST 2-19.402)

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield - IPB - The systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and battlespace environment in a specific geographic area. IPB is designed to support the staff estimate and MDMP. Most intelligence requirements are generated as a result of the IPB process and its interrelation with the decision-making process. (FM 2-0)

Linguist - Anyone who has been rewarded the special qualification indicator "L" in accordance with AR 611-6, Army Linguist Management. (AR 350-16)

Officer Education System (OES) - Produces a corps of broadly-based officer leaders who are fully competent in technical, tactical, and leader skills, knowledge, and behaviors; are knowledgeable of "how the Army runs"; demonstrate confidence, integrity, critical judgment, and responsibility; can operate in an environment of complexity, ambiguity, and rapid change; can build effective teams amid continuous organizational and technological change; and can adapt and solve problems creatively. Officer leader development is a continuous process beginning with pre-commission training and education. (FM 7-1)

Operational Training - Training conducted at home station, combat training centers, joint training exercises, or operational deployments that satisfy national objectives. (FM 7-1)

REDTRAIN - Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training - An Army-wide program conducted by national level intelligence agencies and activities designed to maintain and improve the technical foreign language skills of tactical intelligence personnel. (AR 350-16)

SIGINT - Signals Intelligence - A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted; Intelligence derived from communications, electronics, and foreign instrumentation signals. (ST 2-19.402)

Standard - The minimum acceptable proficiency required in the performance of a particular training task under a specified set of conditions. (FM 7-1)

TALP - Total Army Language Program

Threat - Any specific foreign nation, organization, (or individual) with intentions and military capabilities that suggest that it could become an adversary or challenge the national security interests of the United States or its allies. A threat is a potential enemy. (ST 2-19.402)

Training - The instruction of personnel to increase their capacity to perform specific military functions and associated individual and collective tasks. (FM 7-1)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Akaka, Daniel, Senator. *Promoting Foreign Language Proficiency in the Federal Workforce*. 24 June 2002. Available from <http://akaka.senate.gov/~akaka/speeches/2002625A28.htm>. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.
- Bergeson, Mark, Lieutenant Colonel. *Information Paper (FAO)*. Office of Secretary of Defense, 20 February 2004. Available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/prhome/docs/ltpofficers.doc>. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.
- Binnendijk, Hans. *Transforming America's Military*. Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2003.
- Boasso, Herbert J., Lieutenant Colonel. *Intelligence Support to Operations: The Role of Professional Military Education*. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1988.
- Central Intelligence Agency. Homepage. Available from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/information/info.html>. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.
- Darilek, Richard, and Walter Perry, and Jerome Bracken, and John Gordon, and Brian Nichiporuk. *Measures of Effectiveness for the Information-Age Army*. Arlington, VA: Rand-Arroyo Center, 2001.
- Defense Intelligence Agency. Homepage. Available from <http://www.dia.mil>. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.
- JMIC. *Transforming Reserve Component Intelligence: Conference Proceedings*. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 5 June 2003.
- Defense Language Institute. Homepage. Available from <http://www.dliflc.edu>. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.
- Department of Defense. *Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002.
- Department of State. *Careers*. Available from <http://www.careers.state.gov/officer/apply.html#5>. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.
- Deputy Chief of Staff. Intelligence, US Army Training and Doctrine Command. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-2-60, *The Operational Environment and Threat - A View of the World to 2020 and Beyond*. Fort Monroe, VA: Government Printing Office.
- Desch, Michael C. *Soldiers in Cities: Military Operations on Urban Terrain*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001.

- Dounay, Jennifer. *Foreign Language Requirements for High School Graduation*. Education Commission of the States, 2002. Available from <http://www.ecs.org>. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.
- Enduring Freedom Combat Assessment Team. *United States Marine Corps Initial Observations on Operation Iraqi Freedom*. Component Commander's Conference, 2003.
- Ethnologue. *Geographic Distribution of Living Languages*, 2000. Available from http://www.ethnologue.com/ethno_docs/distribution.asp. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.
- Ethnologue. *Most Widely Spoken Languages in the World*, 2001. Available from <http://www.ethnologue.com/info.asp>. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.
- Foster, K and C.Reeves. "FLES Improves Cognitive Skills." *FLES News* 2, no. 3 (Spring 1989). Available from <http://www.wrightgroup.com/index.php/home/worldlanguages/espanolparati/teacherslounge/infoandsupport/selectedfiles/190>. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.
- Fromkin, Victoria, and Robert Rodman. *An Introduction to Language*. Chicago: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1988.
- Gentry, John A. "Doomed to Fail: America's Blind Faith in Military Technology." *Parameters*, xxxii, no. 4. (Winter 2002-03) 88-103. Available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02winter/gentry.htm>. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.
- Government Administration Office. *Foreign Languages: Human Capital Approach Needed to Correct Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army. Army Regulation 145-1, *Senior Reserve Officer's Training Corps Program: Organization, Administration, and Training*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army. Army Regulation 350-16, *Total Army Language Program*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998.
- Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command. *Capability Development Document for the Objective Force Battle Command (C4ISR) System, (DRAFT)*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Battle Command Lab, 2003.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army. *Critical Task List: 35D All Source Intelligence Officer*. Fort Huachuca, AZ: US Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca, 2003.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army. Fifth Corps, C4ISR Integration AAR. A Paper

- on the Information Systems Integration and Information Management Challenges and Successes training for, and achieving “Victory” in Operation Iraqi Freedom. 2003.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army. Field Manual 2-0, *Intelligence*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army. Field Manual 7-1, *Battle Focused Training*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army. Field Manual 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army. *Intelligence Officer’s Battlebook; Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned*. Fort Huachuca, AZ: US Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army. *MI Huddle*. Fort Huachuca, AZ: US Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca, 2003.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army. *Objective Force Intelligence Glossary*. Fort Huachuca, AZ: US Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca, 2003.
- Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command. *Operation Iraqi Freedom CAAT Intelligence Assessment*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL.
- Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command. Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group, *Intelligence Battlefield Operating System Initial Observations*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: 19 June 2003.
- Headquarters, Special Forces Command. *Language Training*. Available from http://www.training.sfahq.com/anguage_training.htm. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army. *Stryker Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations*. Fort Huachuca, AZ: US Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca, 2003.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army. Student Text 2-19.402 (FM 34-80-2). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army. Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report, *Operation Iraqi Freedom*. Baghdad, Iraq: Third Infantry Division, 12 May 2003.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-90 O & O, *The US Army Objective Force Operational and Organizational Plan Maneuver Unit of Action*. Change 2, Final. Fort Knox, KY: Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab,

2003.

Headquarters, Department of the Navy. *Small Wars*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004.

Hopple, Gerald W., and Bruce W. Watson. *The Military Intelligence Community*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986.

Inside the Pentagon. *Pentagon Opposes House-Backed Requirements for Military Education*. 02 September 2004. Available from <http://www.insidedefense.com>, Internet, Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

Joint Readiness Training Center and Fort Polk Operations Group, *Observations from Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (31 May-13 June 2003)*. Fort Polk, LA: US Army Joint Readiness Training Center, 2003.

Jonsson, Patrik. "Say It In Pashto: US Troops Learn New Tongues." *The Christian Science Monitor*, 5 February 2002. Available from http://www.csmonitor.com/csmonitor/display.jhtml;jsessionid=UI2BBJLLPAM3ZKGL4L2SFEQ?_requestid=92846. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

Koch, Scott A. "The Role of US Army Military Attaches Between the World Wars." *Studies in Intelligence* 38, no. 5 (1995). Available from <http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/95unclass/Koch.html>. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

Language Dictionaries. Available from <http://www.yourdictionary.com/languages.html>. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

Medby, Jamison Jo and Russell W. Glenn. *Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations*. Arlington, VA: RAND- Arroyo Center, 2002.

Military Intelligence Corps Association. Integrated Concept Team. *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*. Transforming Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence. Available from http://findarticles.com/0/articles/mi_m01BS/is_4_29/ai_112129346. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin. *Broadband Intelligence Training System - Distance Learning to Provide Internet-based Training to Soldiers and Civilians in the Home*, January-March 2002. Available at <http://www.micorps.org>. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

Müller, Kurt E. *Language Competence: Implications for National Security*. New York: Praeger, 1986.

Office of Personnel Management. Homepage. Available from <http://www.opm.gov>. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Operational and Organizational (O & O) Plan for*

- Army Objective Force Counterintelligence (CI)*. Washington DC: Government Printing Office.
- Ornstein, Jacob, and William W. Gage. *The ABCs of Language and Linguistics*. New York: Chilton Books, 1964.
- Oxford University Press. *The Oxford American College Dictionary*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2002.
- Peters, John E., and Eric V. Larson, and James A. Dewar. *Futures Intelligence: Assessing Intelligence Support to Three Army Long-Range Planning Communities*. Washington, DC: Rand-Arroyo Center, 1998.
- Peters, Katherine McIntire. "Lost in Translation." *Government Executive Magazine*, 1 May 2002. Available from <http://govexec.com/features/0502/0502s4.htm>. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.
- Porter, Clifford F. *Asymmetrical Warfare, Transformation, and Foreign Language Capability*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2003.
- Pryce-Jones, David. "Golden Days of the Black Arts: Human Intelligence the Right Way - at War." *National Review*, 26 January 2004. Available from <http://nationalreview.com/pryce-jones/pryce-jones.asp>. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.
- Scales, Robert H., Major General, USA (Retired). "Culture-Centric Warfare." *Proceedings*, October 2004. Available from http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_1004_culture-P1,00.htm. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.
- Seelye, H. N. *Teaching Culture: Strategies for Intercultural Communication*. Lincolnwood, IL: National Textbook Company, 1993.
- TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC). *Future Combat Systems Mission Needs Analysis (FCS MNA)*, Final Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Government Printing Office, 2002.
- TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC). *Initial Insights Memorandum (IIM) for the Army Transformation Experiment 2002 (ATEX02)*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Government Printing Office, 2002.
- Troyer, Natalie. "Campaign Urges America to Learn Foreign Languages." *Washington Times*, 8 December 2004.
- Tyson, Ann Scott. "Uzbek or Dari? Military Learns New Tongues." *The Christian Science Monitor*: 2 January 2004. Available from <http://www.cs.monitorservices.com>. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

US Intelligence Agencies Triple Number of Arab Linguists. *World Tribune*, 8 March 2004. Available from http://216.26.163.62/2004/ss_intelligence_03_05.html. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

US Military Academy at West Point. *Curriculum Overview*. Available from <http://www.dean.usma.edu/Curriculum/shortcurriculumoverview.cfm>. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

Wagner, Dennis. "Linguists Are Needed for the War on Terror." *Arizona Republic*, 7 November 2003. Available from <http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/>. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.

Wierzbcki, Cynthia. Hearing Held on the Critical Skills Needed by the Federal Government. Press Release: 13 March 2002.

Yates, Lawrence A. *Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns, and Recurring Themes*. Available from <http://usm.edu/armyrotc/militaryhistory/Reading%20for%20Lsn%2027.doc>. Internet. Last accessed on 10 March 2005.