RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION: HOW DOES THE ARMY MAINTAIN READINESS IN A DECLINING STATE OF WAR?

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USAWC CLASS OF 2011

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The Army Reserve Component over the past decade deployed multiple units and personnel as part of the conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, units were mobilized as part of domestic and world crisis involving natural disaster relief and homeland security operations. This operational tempo (OPTEMPO) is unprecedented in our history and our reliance with using citizen Soldiers has become part of our overall strategy with incorporating Reserve Component (RC) forces as part of the Total Forces Policy, but have we ensured that these forces are trained and ready for tomorrow’s crisis? Due to this high OPTEMPO and changes in the geostrategic environment the time is now to implement long range plans that clearly define roles and responsibilities that take into consideration the experience that RC forces have gained over this time period. The longer the Department of Defense waits to implement programs that ensure the training and readiness of RC forces the longer the Army jeopardizes the momentum that RC forces maintain. The central theme of this article is defining how the Army will maintain readiness during a time of declining state of war while transforming to an operational force.
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"We as a military have come to the realization that we can't fight an extended conflict without the reserve. We've built an Army that is dependent on having access to the reserve when it needs them and with the expectation that it is going to be trained and ready. That it's not going to be in a strategic posture. What we're saying is, an operational reserve makes sense "It's the right thing for the military, it's the right thing for the nation, and it's the right thing for the Soldier."

Interview with LTG Jack C. Stultz on 20 October 2010 (American Press Service)

The Army Reserve Component (Army National Guard and United States Army Reserve) over the past decade deployed multiple units and personnel as part of the conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, units were mobilized as part of domestic and world crisis involving natural disaster relief and homeland security operations. This operational tempo (OPTEMPO) is unprecedented in our history and our reliance with using citizen Soldiers has become part of our overall strategy with incorporating reserve component (RC) forces as part of the Army’s Total Forces Policy,\(^1\) but have we ensured that these forces are trained and ready for tomorrow’s crisis? The United States Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ANG) activated more than 538,000 personnel in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and as of this writing, 67,595 are currently mobilized.\(^2\) Based on this high OPTEMPO and changes in the geostrategic environment the time is now to implement long range plans that clearly define roles and responsibilities that take into consideration the experience that reserve component forces have gained over this time period. The longer the Department of Defense (DOD) waits to implement programs that account for the training and readiness of reserve forces the longer DOD jeopardizes the momentum that the Army currently maintains. Reverting back to how business was conducted prior to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq would cast a demoralizing effect
within the reserve component community. The military would squander the efforts and operational experience gained over the past decade by these civilian Soldiers.

History has shown that after major conflicts in particularly after WWI and WWII when large amounts of reserve component forces were mobilized to support these conflicts, the Department of Defense failed to implement readiness programs that would sustain our forces between major conflicts. During WWII it took an average of twenty-eight months for National Guard units to reach a point of readiness prior to deploying overseas. Another example, involves National Guard divisions that were activated in response to the Korean War were rated at only 40-45% ready after seven months of mobilization. They were shipped to Japan where they received another eight months of training before entering combat in December 1951. The challenge we face as a nation is not to repeat history, but implement programs that ensure that our reserve component forces are ready for tomorrow’s conflicts.

Background

Throughout this high OPTEMPO period, the reserve component finds itself in the mist of transforming from a strategic force into an operational force that is ready to respond to any crisis when called upon. A great example of a unit that responded and deployed in support of humanitarian relief operations involves last year’s response to the earthquake in Haiti. Army logistic forces were mobilized, trained and equipped to support this humanitarian effort in the middle of two on-going wars. The result was the deployment of the 377th Theater Sustainment Command (TSC), the largest command in the Army Reserves headquartered in Belle Chasse, Louisiana in March 2010. Although the unit deployed and provided outstanding logistic support to the citizens in Haiti, one of the concerns was that the unit deployed two months after the earthquake. The 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC), an active component unit
from Fort Knox, Kentucky was the first major logistic unit on the ground.\textsuperscript{4} The 3d ESC experienced their own set of issues while deploying to Haiti partially due from their recent return from Iraq in late 2009. The unit’s equipment was in the reset phase of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model and compounding this problem was that their personnel strength was at 50 percent of required joint manning document positions.\textsuperscript{5} This scenario has become the norm when involving relief operations between active component and reserve component units in a strategic operations environment, but this is not the concept that the Army is striving to accomplish under the operational reserve concept. The goal for an operational reserve force is to have units identified, trained and ready to respond without having to undergo a prolonged mobilization and validation process. The mechanism that the Army implemented to ensure that forces are trained and ready is called Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). Does ARFORGEN fully account for reserve component forces? Until the Army reaches this readiness goal the reserves will continue to revert back to their strategic ways of conducting operations. The brunt of the deployment burden will continue to fall on active component forces whose forces are already stretched thin, compounding this problem are future force reductions and pending Department of Defense fiscal constraints.\textsuperscript{6}

The Army has a history with reverting back to the old ways of doing business when dealing with reserve forces partially due to budget constraints and a lack of a clear readiness strategy that provides trained, equipped and ready forces. The trend over the past four decades is to quickly mobilize units during a time of crisis, but only to find that readiness rates are not within the Army’s deployment standards. In past eras of fiscal restraint, Pentagon officials reduced the U.S. military’s operational reliance on the Guard and Reserves and cut their budgets, in part due to the inherent tension between full-time active duty and reserve personnel.\textsuperscript{7} Such
reflexive underutilization and downsizing today would squander the immense experience gained recently by the Guard and Reserve during their missions in Afghanistan, Iraq and the U.S. homeland. With the drawdown in Iraq scheduled for completion at the end 2011 and the Afghanistan mission scheduled for drawdown in 2014, the time is now for revising policies in regards to missioning, training and resourcing RC units in anticipation for tomorrow’s crisis. The Army has an opportunity to reverse this trend and set in motion training programs that will provide direction and predictability. The goal is to affect the Fiscal Year (FY) 2013-2018 Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The following quote by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates summarizes this trend over the past four decades in regards to how the Department of Defense has handled reserve component forces after the end of major operations:

As a country, historically, we have a troubling, predictable pattern of coming to the end of a conflict, concluding that the nature of man and the world has changed for the better, and turning inward, unilaterally disarming and dismantling institutions important to our national security. And when we are invariably – and inevitably – proved wrong, when war comes again, we have had to rearm and rebuild, at huge cost in blood and treasure, most recently after September 11th. It is critically important moving forward that we not repeat that mistake again.

The central theme of this article is defining how the Army will maintain readiness during a time of declining state of war so that tomorrow’s reserve component forces are ready to respond when called upon. How does the Army capitalize on the experience gained by our civilian Soldiers and what programs are required to ensure reserve forces are ready for tomorrow’s fight? The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review stated that significant reductions in use of the reserve component following the drawdown in Iraq and efforts to reset the force will necessitate a thorough assessment of reserve component readiness and future roles. Existing literature related to reserve component transformation clearly outline areas that must be addressed as well as informational and implementation concepts such as the January 2008 report
on the “Commission of the National Guard and Reserves”, a commission charted by Congress to assess the reserve component of the U.S. military and to recommend changes to ensure that reserve forces are organized, trained, equipped, and supported to best meet the needs of U.S. national security. This report contained six major conclusions and 95 recommendations, supported by 163 findings. The Commission concludes that there is no reasonable alternative to the nation’s continued increased reliance on reserve components as part of its operational force for missions at home and abroad.  

The most recent study published by General (Retired) Dennis J. Reimer in November 2010 titled, “Review of Reserve Component Employment in an Era of Persistent Conflict”, recommends the development of Total Army policies and programs for the institutionalization of the reserve component as part of the Army’s operational force and for employment of the reserve component over the next decade.  

This research project will address three transformation points that will provide recommendations for tomorrow’s operational reserve based on specific conclusions from the above mentioned studies that pertain to reserve component readiness, integration of forces and reserve component policy reforms. The ARFORGEN model mentioned earlier will be used as the venue and framework with incorporating the proposed recommendations. The first point highlights the requirement for a viable ARFORGEN model for reserve component units. Does the current ARFORGEN process fully take into account reserve component capabilities and is the model suited for reserve forces? The second point involves revisiting previous training programs that attempted to integrate training of active and reserve component forces under the Total Force Policy (TFP). The goal with integrating both active and reserve component training during the ARFORGEN process will help strengthen training and operational relationships of the teamed units. There are valuable lessons we can learn from past Army
programs that are relevant with implementing tomorrow’s structure. The third point involves redefining policies as they relate to missioning and training of reserve component units under Title 10 and 32 guidelines. Much of the current guidelines were written under a different geostrategic environment, an environment that has seen many changes over the past four decades. The current policies were established during the Cold War era and must be refined to coincide with tomorrow’s operating environment. Although these three points do not take into consideration the full spectrum of issues associated with the transformation of reserve component forces from a strategic to operational force, they do address issues with maintaining the current state of readiness that has been achieved over the past decade while ensuring that the Army remains postured for tomorrow’s conflicts.

Point 1: Reserve Component Army Force Generation Model

The definition of an operational force is a force that is manned, trained and equipped for recurrent mobilization and for employment as cohesive units. This is in accordance with the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, the all-volunteer force and the Citizen-Soldier ethos. The current force that is engaged with fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan by definition can be classified as achieving an operational state of readiness, but if the Department of Defense does not put into place the programs and adjusts current outdated policies then the Army cannot continue to refer to the reserve component as being an operational force.

The recent release of the “Contingency Expeditionary Force White Paper” by U.S Army Forces Command on January 20, 2011 outlines a strategy for implementing Contingency Expeditionary Forces (CEF) units based on a supply based ARFORGEN model. The white paper clearly outlines start dates for active component units, but fails to mention implementation timelines for reserve component forces. The paper states that active component units entering
the reset force pool in the 2nd quarter, Fiscal Year 2012 will then become available in Fiscal Year 2014 for deployment. What about the reserve component timeline? The longer the Army waits to fully implement reserve component ARFORGEN timelines the further out in the future we push this readiness issue. This is the same flawed mindset that occurs after each major conflict that involves use of reserve forces. If the Army is committed to transitioning to an operational reserve force, then we must start the process now or we lose the momentum and experience that our civilian Soldiers have worked so hard to achieve.

An issue with the current ARFORGEN model in regards to the reserve community is that the model has never been tested in a steady state and this causes the Army to react to the combatant commanders requirements that in turn excludes a significant segment of reserve component forces. What this creates within the reserve component community is a state of haves and have-nots. Units in high demand have been deployed multiple times and are equipped and trained to execute their war time mission. Cross leveling of equipment among the forces, in particularly in the reserve component, is required due to the shortfalls that exist in both the National Guard and Army Reserves. In fiscal year 2010, the National Guard had a total equipment shortage of 28% across their entire force structure and Army Reserve units had a 38% shortage within their force structure.

Predicting what type of forces are required to support future force requirements can be a daunting experience, especially in light of the unpredictable geostrategic environment that we live in. Developing a template that identifies units based on either the deployment expeditionary force or contingency expeditionary force model is not an exact science, but the Army does have a template to use. The continued rotation and simultaneous engagement of forces in two major theaters (Iraq and Afghanistan) to include supporting two major domestic and international
natural disasters during the past decade (Hurricane Katrina and the earthquake in Haiti) is the starting point for a framework. Although we may never experience this type of OPTEMPO again, the Army would be wise to use this as the starting point for future ARFORGEN training requirements.

**ARFORGEN Background**

The Army program of record that defines and sets in motion how a unit is trained and resourced is referred to as ARFORGEN. The purpose of ARFORGEN is to generate a pool of rapidly deployable Army forces continuously, from all three of the Army’s components—Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve—to meet the worldwide requirements of civil authorities and combatant commanders via a managed, cyclic process.\(^\text{18}\)

The Army refers to ARFORGEN as a model, but it could be better thought of as a process and forum to plan, manage, prioritize, and allocate limited resources to meet all worldwide Army force requirements. In June 2005, the Army leadership approved the use of ARFORGEN and designated U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) as the executive agent.\(^\text{19}\)

Since the start of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) over a decade ago, the Army’s worldwide force requirements consistently have been out of balance with its current force capabilities. In other words, total annual force requirements have exceeded the supply and capability to generate the numbers and types of trained and readily available forces needed under ideal ARFORGEN conditions.\(^\text{20}\) As General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army told a Senate committee, “Our readiness is being consumed as fast as we can build it.”\(^\text{21}\) This in-balance is not anticipated to change in the near future. The result has been that many units, both active and reserve component, have been called upon multiple times in a short period of time to support the war effort. What has occurred is that units that have seen limited deployments over the past decade
have not been afforded the opportunity to improve their readiness while those units that have been either deployed or mobilized have undergone extensive reset and training opportunities based on this supply and demand factor.

As shown in figure 1, the Army further defines ARFORGEN as “the structured progression of increased unit readiness overtime, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of civil authorities and combatant commander requirements.” All units progress through a series of three successive force pools: Reset/Train, Ready, and Available. Units move through the Reset/Train and Ready force Pools based only on an event, not time. The Available Force Pool is the only time-based pool, where a unit will remain available for up to 1 year for deployment, if not deployed sooner. As early in the process as possible, ARFORGEN assigns units in both the active and reserve component on future missions and then task organizes them into one of two Expeditionary Force Packages: the Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF) and Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF). Deployment Expeditionary Force units are task organized to execute planned operational requirements are part of the Deployment Expeditionary Force.
Operational requirements include contingency operations, homeland defense, and homeland security. Alerted or already mobilized reserve component units fall into the Deployment Expeditionary Force.\textsuperscript{24} The Contingency Expeditionary Force consists of units that are in the available force pool, but have not been task organized for an operational requirement. These units are capable of rapid deployment, but have not been alerted for deployment (for active component forces) or alerted for mobilization (for reserve component forces). Once Contingency Expeditionary Force units are alerted, or alerted for mobilization for reserve units, they become part of the Deployment Expeditionary Force pool.\textsuperscript{25}

After deployment, or 1 year in the available force pool, all units are returned to the Reset/Train pool where this cyclic process begins again. The event versus time factor for a unit moving through a force pool works well for an active component unit, but time is an issue for reserve units based on policies that mandate the maximum number of days units are allowed to conduct training.

The goal for how fast a particular unit moves through this ARFORGEN cyclic rotation is different for the active and reserve component. For an active component unit, it is one deployment in every 3 years. For reserve component units, it is one deployment in every 6 years.\textsuperscript{26} However, in many instances this cycle also depends on the type and availability of forces in demand from combatant commanders or civil authorities. For example, a heavy equipment transportation company is considered a high demand/low density (HD/LD) unit, so high worldwide demands for these relatively few type units may require them to move through this ARFORGEN cyclic rotation at a much faster rate. Ongoing changes to the Army’s force structure will address these problems to an extent. Nevertheless, Army force requirements are
expected to remain high for several years, so these HD/LD force gaps are still several years away from being resolved.  

Proposed Reserve ARFORGEN Template

The active component Army Force Generation model was fully implemented in 2006, but Army Force Generation models for reserve component units are still being planned to support operational combatant commanders and other Army requirements. The active component ARFORGEN model takes into consideration requirements worldwide for deployment expeditionary force units and in particularly matters involving anticipated future threats, but fails to fully incorporate domestic and regional requirements unique to the reserve component when assigning units in the contingency expeditionary force category. Domestic and regional matters include natural disaster relief operations and homeland defense operations involving border security. These domestic and regional categories are unique to the reserve component because they are regional in nature and many states are already programmed to react to these types of contingencies. By incorporating these types of missions into a national program based on a unit’s regional focus would further enhance the current program and provide for an increase readiness across the reserve component community.

Development of Regional ARFORGEN programs across the Continental United States Army that incorporates both active and reserve component units and aligning units under a major active component senior level command will increase readiness and training oversight. This type of program would entail breaking down current stove piped planning organizations and would require joint coordination among the active and reserve component commands. This concept would also require the merger of the operations and maintenance, Army (OMA) funds within one Army command. This merger would lead to joint planning and coordination among the

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forces. Aligning reserve component units in the continental United States under one of the three Army Corps headquarters for training and readiness oversight based on regions will increase training and unit readiness while in time of war and during steady-state time periods. An example of this concept involves reserve component units located in Texas aligning with III Corps and First Army Division West at Fort Hood, Texas for ARFORGEN training oversight. This model would incorporate both active and reserve component units to plan and coordinate readiness issues under a joint forum. The Army already has organizations that plan the mobilization, training and validating of reserve component forces for specified deployments, this process would add another layer of oversight for this organization. The Army agency whose mission is to coordinate the mobilization, training, validation, and deployment of reserve component units in accordance with Combatant Commanders, Department of the Army, and FORSCOM directives is First Army, currently based out of Fort McPherson, Georgia. Coordination between First Army units in conjunction with the three active component Corps located in CONUS would provide a forum to train and provide ARFORGEN oversight for reserve forces. Reserve units would be aligned under one of the three Corps Headquarters based on the region units are located in.
The proposed regional concept model shown in figure 2 would streamline planning and incorporate a Total Army focus by region in the Continental United States. Reserve Component units depending on whether they are Army Reserve or National Guard would take part in this regional concept and would have responsibility with coordinating future missions under one ARFORGEN model. Reserve Component forces will make a proportional contribution in that they will be given operational missions similar to active component forces that would include full spectrum operations, counterinsurgency operations, homeland defense missions, and requirements to prepare for natural disaster relief operations for both the homeland and abroad.

The 2011 Forces Command Campaign Plan mentions that it is imperative that we codify and gain the resources necessary to operationalize our reserve component as well as fully integrate them into the execution of all phases of ARFORGEN. This regional concept model would also incorporate non-DEF/CEF units and assign every reserve component unit with a specified mission focus in the event a unit is required to mobilize in support of either a homeland defense requirement or natural disaster relief operations. All units would continue to train on their core competence based on their mission essential task list (METL). Incorporating this type
of program would add another focus to unit training and improve readiness in the event of mobilization. This program would help to reduce the “haves” and “haves-not” mentality that is prevalent in today’s force.\textsuperscript{31}

Implementing the Army Force Generation model will help reservists, their families and employers better prepare for deployments. LTG Jack Stultz, Chief, Army Reserve and Commanding General, U.S. Army Reserve Command, called the model "critical to the future," particularly in light of the Army Reserve's shift from a strategic to an operational force during the global war on terror. Reservists can return from a deployment and get the individual training they need, escalating the pace and intensity of the training as they move toward the fifth year of the cycle. Reservists can better plan their lives. ARFORGEN "tells the Soldier, you can expect to ... have four years of inactive service, and then be deployed for up to a year, and then come back for another four years," Stultz said. "You can build your life around it."\textsuperscript{32} After that, they're assessed as "available" for deployments, as needed. About 67,000 Army Reservists are currently mobilized, mostly to Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait for a total of 538,265 over the past decade as of March 1, 2011.\textsuperscript{33} Incorporating regional ARFORGEN programs and aligning them with senior level commands gives the active Army a better grip on what capabilities within the Army Reserve are immediately deployment-ready.

\textbf{Point 2: AC/RC Integration}

The second research point analyzes why the operational reserve must be readily available for emergencies at home and abroad, and more fully integrated with the active component. One of the recommendations in the “Commission of the National Guard and Reserves” states that the Secretary of Defense should recognize the cultural divide that exists between the reserve and active component, and should develop a new Total Force Integration Policy to achieve the next
level of integration among all components. In addition, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review acknowledged the need to examine issues associated with employing the reserves on a routine, rotational basis as part of the total operational force, changing the active component/reserve component mix, and/or changing the role of the reserves.

To further illustrate this divide one of the conclusions in the “Commission on the National Guard and Reserves Report in 2008” stated that to successfully execute the national military strategy in the 21st century, the active and reserve components must increase their military effectiveness by becoming a more integrated total force. It has taken the U.S. Armed Forces two decades to approach the level of jointness envisioned by the authors of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which did not address the reserve component. Achieving total force integration of the active and reserve components will require changes to the defense establishment of a magnitude comparable to those required by Goldwater-Nichols for the active component. The goal with achieving a total force concept is ideally suited for inclusion within the first two phases of the ARFORGEN model, during the reset and trained/ready phase. These two phases allow for active and reserve component units to plan and conduct training based on DEF/CEF missions. After both Iraq and Afghanistan missions have drawdown, an area that must be synchronized during times of non-persistent conflict is the training program among the active and reserve component forces. How does the Army ensure that both active and reserve component forces continue to train together?

Previous Integration Programs

The first modern effort to improve active–reserve relations began in 1970 when, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird directed the department to consider “the Total Force, Active and Reserve, in planning, programming, manning, equipping, and execution processes,”
recognizing that the reserves’ lower costs in peacetime would make possible a larger total force for a given budget. In August 1973, then Secretary James Schlesinger directed each service secretary to provide the manning, equipping, training, facilities, construction and maintenance necessary to assure that the Selected Reserve units meet deployment times and readiness required by contingency plans.\textsuperscript{38}

The Army previously attempted to integrate both active and reserve component training between 1973 and 2001 through two programs called CAPSTONE and WARTRACE by incorporating national contingency planning between the forces and maximizing their peacetime preparation for future wartime service.\textsuperscript{39} Under the WARTRACE program, the National Command Authority (NCA) apportioned capabilities—including generic units by type—to the combatant commanders (CCDRs), who developed operation plans (OPLANs) for specific contingencies in their respective areas of operation based on this allocation. These plans included a detailed deployment timeline for apportioned forces known as the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD), which specified the sequence of movement to theater for all apportioned forces.\textsuperscript{40} FORSCOM would then identify specific units (including reserve units) for inclusion in the OPLAN in place of the generic capabilities apportioned to the CCDRs. Under WARTRACE, units so designated would be assigned a wartime chain of command.\textsuperscript{41}

Under CAPSTONE, the Army was to designate for “each unit a wartime chain of command, probable wartime mission, and probable area of employment.”\textsuperscript{42} The core of CAPSTONE was the Directed Training Associations (DTAs) between specific active and reserve component units. A DTA was intended to be a “dedicated year-round training assistance relationship between an active and reserve component unit . . . under which the active component units provide training assistance and Annual Training (AT) evaluation to reserve units.” Under
WARTRACE, the focus shifted from training assistance to integrating reserve component units into wartime planning by “aligning Army units under wartime gaining commands and providing units with detailed information concerning their wartime mission.

What has prevented the Army from fully integrating based on all of these attempts by previous administrations? Both listed programs intended to incorporate training of the forces while in peace time to an area of possible deployment. WARTRACE and its predecessor CAPSTONE proved ineffective as a methodology for improving reserve component unit readiness for wartime missions. As early as 1982, a General Accounting Office (GAO) report found that “many units had not been contacted by their gaining commands, and some units had not received the required training and planning guidance.”

The report leaves an overall impression, however, of a concept implemented haphazardly and dependent for success on idiosyncratic and inconsistent relationships between wartime higher and subordinate commands.

Proposed Solution

One possible reason for the failure to integrate both forces is due to the operating environment that existed prior to 9/11. The need for an operational reserve component force was not in high demand and therefore the need to fully integrate forces was not pursued. Reserve Component forces were mobilized as strategic forces to mostly sustain military humanitarian operations as was the case in the 1990s with deployments in support of Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, and Haiti. The landscape as we know today has changed and integration plans must fully take into account how the Army trains and mobilizes reserve forces as part of the operational force. The mechanism that we have now that may have been missing previously is ARFORGEN; ARFORGEN has the capability with directly linking active and reserve
component forces for training and readiness purposes. Once units are notified of a pending deployment they are also provided with the higher command that they will be assigned too while deployed. This process works very well for units that are part of a deployment expeditionary force, but the real issue is that Army Force Generation only impacts a small portion of the reserve component forces. What about the remainder of the reserve component community that is not designated as a deployment expeditionary force or contingency expeditionary force? How are they integrated into the active component Army?

An example of an initiative that is mentioned in the U.S. Army Forces Command 2011 Campaign Plan highlights a program designed to integrate sustainment organizations across both the active and reserve component. The Leveraging Sustainment Organizations within the continental United States (CONUS), known as the LSOC initiative, is designed to better influence leadership, mentorship, and training oversight relationships among all active component sustainment organizations, from the Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) down to the most junior logistician. Due to Army transformation, organizational structures within the logistic community were rearranged as part of modularity. This reorganization created a void within logistic units in the area of training and mentorship among units and leaders. The LSOC concept attempts to bridge the gap in regards to training oversight and also brings together logistic units and leaders for the purpose of improving readiness. This type of concept can be expanded to the reserve component community by aligning active component units with reserve component units in a mentorship and training role while outside the ARFORGEN window. Training and Readiness Authority (TRA) and Command and Control (C2) would not change, but senior active component commanders would serve as advisors by assisting, advocating and mentoring echelon above brigade (EAB) units in order to improve
efficiency and prepare units for deployment. The same arrangement as previously discussed in the ARFORGEN model can be used to align both active and reserve component units to include implementing remnants of the CAPSTONE/ WARTRACE concept. Currently units are notified of a pending mobilization and then inserted into the ARFORGEN process. When this alert occurs, the unit’s war time chain of command contacts and synchronize training plans during the reset and trained/ready phase of ARFORGEN. This concept must then expand to those units that are not scheduled for mobilization, but that require routine annual training. This concept sets a pattern with synchronizing the development of readiness and training that is the core of the Total Army Concept. In addition, this concept would provide a forum for commanders at both the active and reserve component level to interact and synchronize training requirements in anticipation for future missions.

Point 3: Policy Revisions

Since the establishment of the National Security Act in 1947 there has been one major policy change in DOD that impacted the roles and responsibilities of the Army. The Goldwater-Nichols Act was enacted in 1986 and has been the cornerstone with establishing roles and responsibilities for the past 25 years between the joint armed forces. Not addressed within the Goldwater-Nichols Act were the roles and responsibilities of reserve component forces. DOD much like any other organization must consistently evolve and review policies to ensure that they are relevant with dealing with tomorrow’s operating environment. The 2008 Commission of the Army National Guard and Reserves report concluded that an operational reserve requires a higher standard of readiness than does today’s Ready Reserve, for a greater duration, with less time to achieve readiness goals between deployments. If the reserve components are to sustain this standard of readiness, the services must change their policies, budgets, and planning.
Current mobilization policies were enacted for Cold War-era scenarios in which the National Guard and Army Reserves were a force to augment and backfill the active forces (after long post-mobilization training periods) and only in the event of a major conflict. These statutes address neither the needs of the current prolonged conflict, in which portions of the reserve component are at an extremely high operational tempo, nor the permanent use of that force in a sustainable system of rotation. Coinciding with the transformation of reserve component forces, the Department of Defense must periodically review policies that mandate how the reserve component is to be used as part of an operational force.

The vast majority of issues written and addressed by commissions, reports and studies concerning the reserve component conclude that the amount of time allocated for training and mobilization time lengths are not sufficient to maintain an operational force. The numbers of days reserve personnel are authorized to spend on active duty over a given year based on Title 32 guidelines are 39 days of active federal service. It is no small secret that readiness within the reserve component will continue to be an issue based on the amount of time allocated for training. If the Army leadership is pursuing an operational force concept for the reserve component then one of the first areas that must be addressed concerns the number of active duty days allocated for training each year and in particularly the number of days required for training while a unit is slated in an ARFORGEN cycle. The second issue in regards to reserve component policies, involves the amount of days reserve component units once called upon for mobilization are allowed to spend on active duty. Current policies mandate that National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers will mobilize and deploy for only 12-months, despite a new policy that active component Soldiers will deploy for 15-month tours. Mr. Thomas F. Hall, assistant defense secretary for reserve affairs, reaffirmed that reserve component Soldiers are not affected
by the 15-month tour policy that Defense Secretary Mr. Robert M. Gates announced on April 11 2007.\(^5\) This policy will not continue to work while the reserve component transforms to an operational reserve. Issues associated with this policy range from a lack of readiness, training shortfalls, and misalignment concerning boots on the ground and dwell-time once units are mobilized. The Army is dependent on the resources provided by their reserve component counterparts. By continuing to implement mobilization timelines that restrict the capabilities that reserve component forces bring to the fight will continue to hinder the progress achieved over the past decade.

**Current Training and Mobilization Policies**

The National Guard is unique to the other two military components, the active component (AC) and Army Reserve, in that when not federalized under Title 10, the National Guard has a state role under Title 32 to respond as directed by their respective state governors to contingencies within their state. This dual-role responsibility of the National Guard is rooted in the Constitution and draws from the National Guard’s militia heritage.\(^5\)

When serving under Title 10, “active duty” means full-time duty in the active military service of the United States. Title 10 allows the President to “federalize” National Guard forces by ordering them to active duty in their reserve component status or by calling them into federal service in their militia status. When Army National Guard units are not under federal control, the governor is the commander-in-chief of his or her respective state, territory (Guam, Virgin Islands), or commonwealth (Puerto Rico). Each of the 54 National Guard organizations is supervised by the Adjutant General of the state or territory who also serves as the Director or Commanding General of the state military forces (in DC, only the Commanding General title is used). When serving under Title 32 Active Duty, Title 32 service is primarily state active duty.\(^5\)
Every National Guard Soldier is enlisted under both Title’s 32 and 10; this is called a dual enlistment. As a National Guard Soldier, Soldiers serve in their state's militia (e.g., Georgia Army National Guard). At the same time, they are in a Federal Reserve status of the Army (i.e., Army National Guard of the United States). Once Soldiers are activated under State Active Duty, then they are solely under state command and paid by the state. Soldiers are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, do not receive federal protection, and cannot exercise command over federal Soldiers.

United States Army Reserve Soldiers on the other hand serve under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, the United States Army Reserve mission is to “provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in time of war or national emergency.” Since the September 2001 attacks on America, the Army Reserve continues to deliver on its Title 10 obligation by serving in a prolonged operational capacity for which it was originally neither designed nor equipped, but for which it is currently being transformed.\textsuperscript{53}

Proposed Mobilization Policies

Transforming into an operational force will require an increase in training to ensure that, once called upon, forces are ready to respond and deploy. Once in the reset and trained/ready phase of ARFORGEN the number of days for reserve forces must be increased based on any future and pending deployments. Those units that are not designated as either a deployable expeditionary force or contingency expeditionary force can continue operating under the current policies. This gradual increase in training days allows for predictability for the Soldier, family, unit and civilian employer, but more importantly these forces are trained to respond when called upon. If a Soldier is able to predict that in any given 6-year cycle at least two of those years will require an increase in training and mobilization days followed by a prolonged stabilization
period, then the Soldier has some certainty about their future. More importantly this increase in training days provides the Army with an improved readiness posture within the reserve component community.

The second policy that must be reviewed and modified involves the 12-month mobilization policy. The 12-month mobilization policy would be sufficient only if the training days of a unit while in the ARFORGEN window is increased. The current policy hinders units’ readiness, training requirements, and limits the units’ boots on the ground timeline. Expanding mobilization timelines from 12 to 15 months would allow units to train as a unit and build cohesion prior to deploying. This would also allow units to train as a cohesive unit 3 months prior to deploying. Another key aspect for this increase pertains to the boots on the ground (BOG) issues that the Army must consistently adjust based on mobilized unit readiness postures. The Army relies heavily on the reserve component to provide a majority of the enabling capabilities required for a rotational, balanced force. To achieve a 1:3 (AC) and 1:5 (RC) BOG:dwell ratio, the Army must continue to rely on the reserve component to meet operational requirements.54

While serving as the Division West, First Army assistant Chief of Staff, G4 from 2009-2010, one of my responsibilities was to coordinate and oversee sustainment training for logistic units mobilizing on Fort Hood. The majority of the issues I witnessed dealt with the lack of unit cohesiveness among the staff that in turn impacted subordinate unit planning and preparation. Recommendations discussed during after action reviews centered on incorporating pre-mobilization training to include adding additional training requirements during the post-mobilization time frame. Both of these recommendations are flawed in concept and do not get to the root of the problem. Commanders at all levels must have sufficient time to train at the
individual and collective level and then tested during simulation exercises as a whole unit; this training flow cannot be rushed. The current policy also hinders the amount of deployment or boots on the ground timelines when additional training days are added while mobilized. An issue associated with this, but that will not be addressed in this research paper concerns personnel issues. Unit manning for reserve component units is an issue, in some cases personnel are cross leveled or assigned to units while a unit is already mobilized and in-processing at the mobilization center.\textsuperscript{55}

Conclusion

The Department of Defense is on the verge of jeopardizing the experience gained by reserve forces over the past decade especially the transformation that occurred as the force transformed from a strategic to operational force. If policies are not updated then our reserve forces will remain a strategic force and the Army will continue to mobilize forces only after the initial combat phase has commenced. The trend after the conclusion of past wars will again be repeated and the nation’s reserve force will again revert to a strategic follow-on force. The Army runs the risk with not having properly trained and equipped units to support our nation’s conflicts. For those reasons, it is imperative that we relook and make changes to our policies that will affect tomorrow’s fighting force.

In summary, the first recommendation point highlighted the importance with incorporating a reserve component ARFORGEN model. The proposed regional ARFORGEN model provides the reserve component the predictability while ensuring readiness remains at the forefront prior to mobilizing and deploying forces. A program based on a regional concept ensures units are receiving training as deployment expeditionary forces, contingency expeditionary forces, and in response to homeland security and natural disaster relief operations.
The Army has the right format in place, but we must expand reserve ARFORGEN models across the entire reserve component so that all units are trained according to the needs of the nation.

The second recommendation point discussed integrating training among the active and reserve component as one of the essential requirements for the future of the reserve component. This allows units to share new tactics, techniques and procedures when not in an ARFORGEN cycle. Using the regional concept template and having senior level commands provide coordination and oversight is essential with ensuring that integration training programs are not put on the backburner as was the case in previous administrations.

The third recommendation point discussed deployment timelines and active duty training day policies, these policies were established during a much different era and do not reflect today’s force requirements nor the geostrategic landscape that we currently find ourselves in. Title 10 and 32 policies must reflect what we expect the reserve force to accomplish if they are to remain an operational force. DOD is attempting to change the reserve component culture and this will require revision of policies to reflect the current and tomorrow’s operating environment.

An area that is difficult to measure is the moral and ethical impact thrust upon reserve component forces if not resourced and trained at the same level as their active component counterparts. Reservists are “Citizen Soldiers” and they provide a strong bond between the military and civil society. Any large-scale mobilization of reserves would affect communities throughout the country and affect America’s communities. The Department of Defense has a duty to ensure that civilian Soldiers are trained and ready to respond to the nations call when required. There are indications that those that serve our military only represent a fraction of today’s society. Reenlistment data for the reserve component indicates that urban areas represent the lowest percentage of the total enlistment population. Approximately nine percent of the total
enlistments for 2008 were from large urban areas, and the region of the country that continues to produce the vast majority of enlistments in concentrated in the South. This figure cuts across demographics and indicates that a much different social class of Soldier is serving then those that served during WWII or during the Vietnam era. In a lecture at Duke University, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates remarked upon the ever present divide that exists between the nation and those who serve in uniform, noting that only “a tiny sliver of America” continues to volunteer for military service, and that many parts of the country are woefully underrepresented, particularly urban areas like Chicago and Los Angeles. The risk associated with not properly resourcing our civilian Soldiers is that we send the wrong message to the men and women who currently serve. America cannot afford to ignore the slow divide we are currently experiencing based on the disparity that is resulting with those that volunteer to serve our nation.

Today’s world and geostrategic environment is filled with uncertainty from failed/fragile states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, globalization, shifting demographics, and uncertain natural resource availability. All these factors will require a force that is trained, equipped and ready to deploy to combat these problems. The active component forces cannot continue to sustain the current pace and this is why the reserve component must resemble their active component counterparts. This transformation will require changes in the Army culture and policies that enable the reserve component to fully transform into an operational force while in a state of declining war.

Endnotes

1 U.S. Department of the Army, Army Total Force Policy, http://www.army.mil/standto/archive/2010/07/27/ (accessed February 3, 2011) The Army's Total Force Policy is an ongoing effort by the service to transition its reserve component forces, both the Army Reserve and the National Guard, into an operational force. The intent is to create a seamless and holistic "total force" governed by the same interchangeable policies and procedures.


While serving as the First Army, Division West Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, I was responsible for ensuring that the 377th TSC was prepared logistically to deploy to Haiti. The unit was mobilized at Fort Bliss, TX and validated to deploy after undergoing training and readiness validation.

Paul R. Hayes, “Deploying an Expeditionary Sustainment Command to Support Disaster Relief,” *Army Sustainment* 42, no. 6 (November-December 2010), 4-5.

Lawrence J. Korb and Sean E. Duggan, *Caught Off Guard: The Link Between our National Security and our National Guard* (Center for American Progress, May 2007), 5-6.


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, CJCSI 85001.01A, CJSC, *Combatant Commanders, Joint Staff Participating in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System* (Washington, DC, current February 12, 2008), the POM is part of the PPBE process to establish requirements in the President’s Budget and the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). The FY 13-18 POM begins in early 2011.


Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force* (Arlington, VA, January 31, 2008), Final Report Executive Summary, 2. The report contained six major findings: creating a sustainable operational reserve; enhancing DOD’s role in the homeland; creating a continuum service; developing a ready, capable and available operational reserve; supporting service members, families and employers; and reforming the organizations and institutions that support an operational reserve. Departments role in the homeland; creating a continuum service; developing a ready, capable and available operational reserve; supporting service members, families and employers; and reforming the organizations and institutions that support an operational reserve.


19 Ibid.


25 Ibid.

26 U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 memo, pp. 2 and 5.

27 Ibid, pp. 2, 5-6.

28 U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, memo, p. 2.


31 While serving in the Texas National Guard from 1986-1990, I experienced the equipment disparity among units while assigned to the 386th Engineer Battalion, 49th Armored Division in Houston, Texas. Later, in 2009 while serving as the Division West, First Army G4 one of my responsibilities was to track Equipment On-Hand and Readiness Rates for mobilized units and in a majority of the cases most units were short of the required and authorized equipment required to execute their mission.


34 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force*, 331.


37 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force*, 4.


43 Ibid, 1.

44 Ibid, 5.


47 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force*, 3.

48 Ibid, 27.


55 I personally experienced this while serving as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4 for Division West, First Army from 2009-2010. Units and individual fills were arriving at the mobilization station without ever having trained together as a unit.

