

Thinking Beyond Counterinsurgency: The Utility of a Balanced Approach to Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration

**A Monograph
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Abstract

THINKING BEYOND COUNTER INSURGENCY: THE UTILITY OF A BALANCED APPROACH TO AMNESTY, RECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION by MAJ John L Clark, British Army, 38 pages.

This paper explores the military's role in the processes of amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration (AR2). Its premise is that while the US and UK have devoted considerable intellectual energy and treasure to dealing with the current counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, little thought appears to have gone in to what happens once stability and a legitimate government have been restored. In fact, it is clear that in the long term, counter insurgency (COIN) operations are usually just the first step toward conflict resolution which is concluded with the culmination of the amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration processes.

This study examines the relationship between COIN operations and AR2 processes and assesses the military's role in both. The primary vehicle it uses to do this is a case study of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland since 1969. While the circumstances and events in Northern Ireland are distinct, if not unique from those in other contemporary instances of conflict resolution (not least as they took place in the context of a western liberal democracy), they point to some generic principles. In the first instance, conflict resolution in Northern Ireland was ultimately aided by an approach that balanced political, economic and military developments in the context of a society. While the UK government's initial overreliance on a security solution served mainly to further divide and impoverish Northern Irish society, resolution of the 'troubles' ultimately came about by political developments encouraged by economic incentives. Within this framework, the role of the military (as a subordinate element of the security forces) was, through a COIN operation, to lay the foundations for the AR2 that followed. In particular, the military needed to become cognizant of the possible negative impacts of some aspects of COIN operations on the AR2 processes.

In addition to the evolving use of military power, the UK government also came to realize the effectiveness of outside mediation in conflict resolution. In the initial stages, the internalizing of the problem and the characterization of its resolution as a zero-sum game were not helpful. In doing so the government precluded meaningful political dialogue with many of the main protagonists, not least as the government was seen by many as part of the problem rather than its solution. It was only with the involvement of the United States and the European Union, as impartial mediators, and the government of the Republic of Ireland (to lend weight to the republican/nationalist cause), that real progress was possible.

The study concludes that it is vital that the governments and militaries of the US and the UK look beyond the current fight when conducting COIN operations. In doing so, they need to utilize an inclusive, balanced and responsive approach that advances political, economic and security processes in a way that avoids one area having an adverse affect on the others. Critically, wherever possible, COIN operations should be conducted in a way that sets the conditions for AR2. In particular, military operations should not be seen as an end in themselves, or even purely as a way to support a legitimate government, but rather, in terms of their contribution to the vital processes of AR2.

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Introduction¹

As a result of the situations faced by coalition forces on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States (US) military has invested considerable intellectual energy in developing counterinsurgency (COIN) theories and doctrines in recent years, culminating in the production of Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency Operations. Theorists have stressed the need to follow multiple lines of operation and to identify and develop political, economic and social systems that provide for long term stability in addition to pursuing military operations. At the same time there has been considerable debate in the corridors of power over the roles of the military and other government agencies and non-governmental organizations in nation-building. It has become clear that in the initial stages of a post conflict situation, non-military organizations are generally ill-resourced or unprepared to engage in the development of fractured societies as long as the atmosphere remains semi-permissive. In this event, the military increasingly has to assume the roles of these agencies and therefore has been called upon to deal with nation building and the shoring up of fractured polities with very little assistance in the initial stages at the same time it has been involved with significant counterinsurgency operations. Even with the arrival of other agencies (both national and international) to conduct many vital areas of nation building, the military has taken centre-stage in the redevelopment of the societies in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

The prominence of the military in these theatres bears considerable responsibility; not only has the military borne the lion's share of societal reconstruction, but it also has had to take the lead in striving to provide a unity of effort in order to ensure progress across the many lines of operation. Providing this level of leadership should involve a deep understanding of the wider

¹ An abbreviated form of this monograph was published in the US Army's *Military Review*, Vol LXXXVIII, Jan-Feb 2008, No. 1: 37-49.

non-military aspects of the long term development of a fractured society. Chief among these aspects are the functions of amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration (AR2) which collectively seek to decrease alienation in society and to enable those who have been excluded (of their own volition or otherwise) to have the option of playing a constructive role in their new society. It is therefore interesting that neither FM 3-24 nor the latest British doctrine (Army Field Manual 1, Vol 1 Pt 10: Counterinsurgency Operations) mention AR2 in this sense. Despite the exhortation to follow non-military lines of operation, it appears that the military has neglected to look beyond its own counterinsurgency fight to see the longer term fixes in society.

This paper aims to explore the relationship between COIN operations and AR2 to establish a military best practice. This best practice will ensure that the military commanders are at least aware of the impact of their military operations on the longer term regeneration of societies and, at best, capable of incorporating AR2 mechanisms in their operational design and later planning. This paper will begin by exploring the theoretical relationship between COIN and AR2 to establish the substance of the relationship. It will then highlight the way in which COIN operations can be used to prepare the ground for AR2 in practice by considering the UK government's role in resolving the 'troubles' in Northern Ireland since 1969. Finally it will assess the role of the military in both COIN and AR2 and provide some generalized guidance for military commanders.

This study concludes that the relationship between COIN and AR2 is that, if conducted with a view to the future, COIN operations can effectively set the conditions within which AR2 can be conducted. This is achieved by an approach that achieves a balance between security operations and progressive political dialogue encouraged by economic growth. If the security aspect of the COIN campaign is balanced with political, economic and societal developments then the stage will be set for successful AR2.

A Theoretical Relationship Between COIN and AR2

In his article “The Armed Reconciler: Understanding the Role of the Military in the Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration (AR2) Process”, Dr. Michael Mosser presents a model of the AR2 process (Figure 1)² in which he considers the “dynamic relationship of the political, security and economic dimensions”³ in the context of a society. This model, drawn up as a result of a variety of case studies (including this one), is helpful in understanding both the AR2 process and the military’s contribution to it. It highlights the relationship between the security forces (including the military) and the political and economic spheres. Mosser argues that the ‘sweet spot’ at the




Figure 1: Dimensions of the AR2 Process

meeting of the spheres is the place in which AR2 occurs. Furthermore he concludes that the size of that ‘sweet spot’ indicates the receptiveness of the society for AR2 and that for each dimension there is a key actor whose role it should be to balance their dimension with the others and also to expand the ‘sweet spot’ in the centre. In the context of a COIN operation where, in the initial stages, the indigenous police forces are either non-existent or ineffective due to partisanship, we can see the military as the key actor in the security sphere, charged with balancing security operations with political and economic development. This important function is recognized in FM 3-24: “Durable policy success requires balancing the measured use of force with an emphasis on non-military programs. Political, social and economic programs are most commonly and appropriately associated with civilian organizations and expertise; however, effective implementation of these programs is more important than who performs the task. If adequate

² Michael W. Mosser. “The Armed Reconciler: The Military Role in the Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration Process”, *Military Review*, Vol VXXXIX (Nov-Dec 2007): 14.

³ *Ibid.*, 15.

civilian capacity is not available, military forces fill the gap. COIN programs for political, social and economic well-being are essential to developing the local capacity that commands support when accurately perceived.”⁴

So it would appear that the US military’s conception of COIN operations fits into Mosser’s AR2 dimensional model as it stands. However, in this paper I propose an extension of the model that considers the role of the military not only as the custodian of its own sphere, but also to be the principle agent in enabling the expansion of the ‘sweet spot’. In short, the aim of a COIN operation should be to set the conditions for AR2.

The sense in refocusing the aim of a COIN operation can also be seen from a comparison of COIN operations and AR2, both temporally and in terms of what they achieve. In the first instance, the principle aim of a COIN operation is to establish a legitimate government with authority.⁵ Yet it is clear that unless the root causes of an insurgency are eradicated, there is the potential for continued division in society and the possibility of a resumption of violence. While many of these root causes, such as political and economic disparity, are addressed in COIN operations, as discussed above, the processes of amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration, so vital to long term societal stability, are rarely considered. If we accept that, as a minimum, COIN forces enable the legitimate government to achieve amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration, then it makes sense that consideration is given to this in conducting COIN operations. This is particularly relevant when we consider the possible negative impacts of COIN operations on society. For example, providing security can often necessitate the separation or isolation of belligerents yet such steps, reinforcing divisions, run counter to the goal of an integrated society. The focus of COIN operations should not stop at the establishment of a legitimate government

⁴ *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency*, (Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 15 December 2006), 2-5.

⁵ FM 3-24 states that: “The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster the development of effective governance by a legitimate government.” *Ibid.*, 1-21.

but rather should look toward the reconciliation and reintegration of a society. Only by making this consideration will the security forces be able to fulfill their role not only as the custodian of the security sphere, but also as the guarantor of the conditions in which AR2 can take place.

Northern Ireland as a Case Study

In order to test the validity of this hypothesis, this paper will now set it against a case study of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland, focusing on the United Kingdom (UK) government's attempts to resolve the 'troubles' since 1969. In particular it examines the way in which the conditions were set for the processes of AR2. While this case offers a rare example of such processes in the context of a western liberal democracy, it is of general value both as it highlights the linkage between a very successful COIN operation and AR2, and also as it offers a wealth of approaches and literature pertaining not only to the military but also to the political, economic and societal dimensions.

Terms

The Oxford English Dictionary defines amnesty as: "a general pardon, esp. for political offenses",⁶ but in this paper I widen this definition to include a weapons amnesty or, as referred to in Northern Ireland, decommissioning, for this was a critical part of the peace process as a whole. While reconciliation⁷ is often held to focus on the breaking down of social barriers within communities (which undoubtedly remains a very important aspect), for the purposes of this study I also consider reconciliation as the way in which opposing groups' political agendas were

⁶ Sara Tulloch, ed., *The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997), s.v. "amnesty."

⁷ *The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus* defines reconcile variously as 1. make friendly after an estrangement, 2. make acquiescent or contentedly submissive to, 3. settle (a quarrel etc.), 4. a. harmonise; make compatible, b. show the compatibility of by an argument or in practice. Sara Tulloch, ed., *The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus*, s.v. "reconcile."

managed to the extent that meaningful and progressive dialogue became possible.⁸ Finally, in the context of Northern Ireland I consider reintegration to mean the coming together of opposing sides to form a viable polity and society, in addition to describing the process by which those granted amnesty were able to play a part in this process. Even though the political process appears to have been concluded with the reconvening of the Northern Ireland Assembly on Tuesday May 08, 2007 and the ending of the British military's security operations after 38 years in July of the same year, the AR2 processes are ongoing and it will be difficult to ascertain accurate measures of success for some time.

While the role of the British military in COIN operations in Northern Ireland has had the lion's share of military attention and analysis over recent years, COIN operations were but a contributing factor to the wider AR2 processes. This study examines the military's role in setting the conditions for AR2 in Northern Ireland. By suggesting ways in which the British military positively contributed to the process, as well as sounding cautionary notes where it arguably had an adverse impact, the study hopes to provide lessons to inform military planning for future involvement in conflict resolution.

Historical Background in Northern Ireland

Following the devolution of power from the UK government in 1920, the Northern Ireland Assembly was dominated by unionists⁹ (mainly Protestants) who were resolved to maintain political union, in one form or another, with the UK. Set against them were

⁸ This accords with the understanding of Lesley McEvoy, Kieran McEvoy and Kirsten McConnachie who write "the successful negotiation of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 has seen the Irish peace process widely lauded as an example of successful reconciliation between sworn enemies." Lesley McEvoy, Kieran McEvoy and Kirsten McConnachie, "Reconciliation as a Dirty Word: Conflict, Community Relations and Education in Northern Ireland," *Journal of International Affairs* 60, no.1 (Fall 2006): 81.

nationalists¹⁰ (mainly Catholics) who desired political union with the Republic of Ireland, from whom they devolved much of their political, moral and economic support. Not only was there considerable animosity between the two communities, but such was the domination of the unionists that both on the political and social levels there was evidence of discrimination against the nationalist community, in particular over voting rights and housing issues.¹¹ As the political and social divides grew, the Catholic community began to protest and appeal to the UK government for protection. Finally in 1969 matters came to a head with a particularly hostile response by the unionist-dominated authorities to Catholic civil rights campaigners. The British military was deployed to the province in 1969 to restore order and protect the Catholic community. In the wake of the failure to bring about initial political reconciliation, the UK government assumed direct responsibility for all aspects of government in Northern Ireland in 1972. These actions signaled the beginning of over 25 years of paramilitary violence and the deaths of over 3,600 people (of a population of just over 1.5 million) with countless more injured or bereaved.

⁹ There are many different political parties and paramilitaries with diverse agendas who are loosely bound together by a common desire to preserve the union with Great Britain. Most of them are labeled as either “unionist” or “loyalist”. In the interest of clarity in this article, I will use the term “unionist” to refer to all of these groups.

¹⁰ Again there are many different political parties and paramilitaries with diverse agendas who are loosely bound together by a common desire to unite Ireland under one government and so for Northern Ireland to cede from its current union with Great Britain. Most of them are labeled as either “nationalist” or “republican”. In the interest of clarity in this article, I will use the term “nationalist” to refer to all of these groups.

¹¹ Bertie Ahern, “In Search of Peace: The Fate and Legacy of the Good Friday Agreement,” *Harvard International Review* 24 (Winter 2003): 26.

COIN Operations in Northern Ireland: Setting the Conditions for AR2

The roots of the conflict in Northern Ireland were chiefly political and economic¹² and resolution of the ‘troubles’ has therefore, for the most part, come by way of political agreements encouraged by economic incentives. But AR2 has not taken place in a vacuum of politics and economics; rather it has transpired in an atmosphere of fear, intimidation and violence with far-reaching consequences. As David Bloomfield writes: “the protracted nature of the violence has, through a process of institutionalization that has spanned a generation, produced profound effects in structural and societal aspects that are less amenable to quantification; for example, the spread and normalization of paramilitarism, the growth of intimidation as a constraint on social behavior, [and] the growth of the ‘security industry’.”¹³ Indeed a case study of Northern Ireland reveals the importance of the balance of these four dimensions: political, economic, security and societal. This paper will consider each dimension in turn to determine the necessary progress towards setting the conditions for AR2 (as a generic whole) and the impact of the other dimensions on it. As Michael Cunningham writes: “Political progress, aspects of social reform, the defeat of terrorism and economic progress are mutually reinforcing and advances (or regressions) in one area can have a knock-on effect in others.”¹⁴ The study highlights the occasions when one dimension had an adverse impact on another and the attendant consequences, in order to illustrate that the UK government was unable to make real progress with regard to AR2 in Northern Ireland

¹² David Bloomfield, *Peacemaking Strategies in Northern Ireland: Building Complementarity in Conflict Management Theory* (New York: St Martin’s Press Inc., 1997), 22.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁴ Michael Cunningham, *British Government Policy in Northern Ireland 1969-2000* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2001), 161.

until it achieved a balance between security operations and progressive political dialogue encouraged by economic growth.

Having highlighted the way in which the ground was prepared for AR2, the paper then examines the actual processes of amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration in Northern Ireland to assess their results and wider contribution to conflict resolution. This section also illustrates the importance of the existing conditions at the commencement of the process. The key conclusion of the study is that in planning for and conducting conflict resolution operations, governments and in particular militaries must consider every action in light of its impact on the longer-term, but vitally important processes of amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration. For militaries, COIN operations should not be considered as an end to themselves but rather as a key factor in laying the foundations for AR2.

The Societal Dimension

While a narrative of the roots, causes and development of the conflict and its resolution can inform our analysis, it is also important to remember that AR2 is a very human activity and that political, economic and security progress all take place in the context of society. If seeking balance between the political, economic and security dimensions is an effective way of framing our approach to set the conditions for AR2, then the context for this study is set by assessing the impact of these dimensions on the wider society and conversely the impact of society on the dimensions.

In the first instance, a study of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland reveals that political developments give society goals to aim for by way of AR2: this is what Bloomfield refers to as the “structural approach”, and in his lexicon this should be complemented by a “cultural approach”, working from grass roots up to the political level as a part of which “community relations work operates to develop more inclusive communal relationships, that will

facilitate politics in working out more inclusive political settlements.”¹⁵ In addition to contributing to the political process, economic developments give incentive to society that AR2 is worth more than continued inter-factional strife. Security operations, when effectively executed, provide an environment in which communities can mix and act as a disincentive for a resumption of hostilities. On the other hand, heavy-handed tactics and allegations of impartiality can also create problems in terms of the military’s interaction with local communities. As Mari Fitzduff writes: “In achieving such a long-term solution the security forces increasingly realized that their own occasionally hostile interface with the communities...and the tactics that they sometimes employed, became a problematic of the conflict itself.”¹⁶ Using this understanding of society as a context, this paper will now explore the constituent dimensions in turn.

The Political Dimension

In considering setting the political conditions for AR2 I will focus on four key areas: the political process itself, the involvement of regional powers, the interaction of the key political parties, and the role of outsiders as brokers. The political process has been critical to setting the conditions for AR2 in Northern Ireland. Initially hopes of long-term conflict resolution were hampered by a focus on security and the perception of the conflict, on all sides, as a zero-sum game in which a party would either win or lose. Security, or certainly a commitment from the warring factions to cease fire, renounce violence and decommission weapons, became a precondition for political dialogue. It was not until the early 1980s with the establishment of the Anglo-Irish Council in 1983 that the UK government began to make any sort of tangible progress towards achieving a political settlement. The first main framework accord was the Anglo-Irish

¹⁵ Bloomfield, 185.

¹⁶ Mari Fitzduff, *Beyond Violence: Conflict Resolution Process in Northern Ireland* (New York: United Nations Press: Incore, 2002), 79.

Agreement of 1985, which established an inter-governmental conference to discuss affairs of mutual interest in Northern Ireland. It took a further eight years to reach a joint declaration which, in December 1993, laid out the basis of a peace process. This joint declaration worked towards “A New Framework for Agreement”, published in February 1995, which proposed a method for arriving at a solution that would not prejudice the aspirations of any of the sides in Northern Ireland for a future settlement. The framework agreement also paved the way for the political dialogue that resulted in the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) of 10 April 1998 of which the Irish prime minister, Bertie Ahern, writes: “for the first time, a precise mechanism for achieving a united Ireland, which is possible only with the consent of Irish people, has been defined and accepted by all sides.”¹⁷ The political process was concluded with the reestablishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly in May 2007 (the previous attempt collapsed in 2002).

Once initiated, the political process was undoubtedly aided by the timetables laid down. As each agreement was reached it was considered in light of previous achievements and the goals for future progress with attendant deadlines were drawn up. Even if these deadlines were often not met, the existence of agreed timetables gave the political process hope and direction. It is not clear why the use of timetables was successful in Northern Ireland when in other cases they proved to be ineffective and appeared to give incentive to stall. It is possible that the intense media pressure surrounding negotiations played a part.

If the use of timetables helped the process, the vehement opposition of the main political parties to each other, fuelled by their positions as representatives of increasingly militant and divided communities, certainly inhibited political development. Indeed, such was the strength of vitriol, that rather than the reconciliation of the UK government and the main political parties in Northern Ireland, many have seen the eventual meeting of Ian Paisley (leader of the Democratic Unionist Party) and Gerry Adams (president of Sinn Fein) in 2007 as the most evident sign of

¹⁷ Ibid., 28.

progress.¹⁸ This was literally the first physical meeting between two of the main protagonists in the political arena after three decades of fervent opposition and marked a watershed in demonstrating the commitment of such bitter rivals to work together. The close association of political parties and paramilitary organizations (particularly Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) on the nationalist side, and the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) with the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) with the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) on the unionist side) was also a considerable obstacle to political progress since the UK government consistently refused to deal with political parties that were closely associated with terrorist and criminal groups. As Fitzduff wrote as late as 2002: “The objectives of the politicians do not differ significantly from the objectives of many of the paramilitaries, and during the conflict, the constitutional political parties frequently accused each other of colluding secretly with the different paramilitaries.”¹⁹ Arguably the move that finally broke the deadlock was the decision of the British prime minister, Tony Blair, to drop the precondition of arms decommissioning prior to dialogue and his subsequent invitation to Gerry Adams to meet with him at 10 Downing Street. It was a bold move by Tony Blair to bring Sinn Fein into the political process when it was still tainted by association with the IRA and arguably only made possible by Blair’s landslide victory in the general election of 1997;²⁰ yet it was only by doing so that real progress was made towards resolving the conflict by AR2.

The changing attitudes and roles of the main states with a stake in Northern Ireland have also been fundamental to setting the conditions for AR2. For the UK government the conflict was initially an internal issue to be resolved by imposing the will of the central government over a

¹⁸ “Peace in Northern Ireland,” *America: The National Catholic Weekly*, April 30, 2007.

¹⁹ Fitzduff, 9.

²⁰ The other key event that in many ways enabled and arguably forced Prime Minister Blair towards this measure was President Clinton’s move to legitimize Gerry Adams and by association to give the IRA an official platform, by inviting him to the White House in 1994.

recalcitrant people. It was not until this policy had failed to make headway that the UK government looked to restore the hand of local politicians and to deal with other regional stakeholders such as the Republic of Ireland and the European Union on the issue. Similarly the government of the Republic of Ireland transitioned from a relatively isolated position,²¹ to dealing with the UK government as the stakeholder representing the interests of the nationalist elements of Northern Ireland. As Bloomfield writes: “the partnership between Dublin and London exemplified by the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 represented the single most important change in the parameters of British structural policy.”²²

The internationalization of the problem was the catalyst for real progress towards AR2. As Seamus Dunn writes: “Although it is difficult to find a measure of the influence of external actors, such as the United States and the European Union, there can be little doubt that interventions by the international community have contributed to the process toward peace.”²³ The involvement of the United States, both as a nation and in the person of Senator George Mitchell, paved the way for political dialogue by opening lines of communication between the nationalist political parties and the UK government. Despite the vocal opposition of the British government, President Bill Clinton invited Gerry Adams to the White House in 1994, and he remained a fundamental part of the AR2 process throughout his tenure.²⁴ These actions raised the issue to the international level and in essence forced the UK government to be more widely

²¹ *An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland* actually argues that the Irish Government was actively hostile to the UK: “The Government of Ireland, which had cooperated with Stormont [the seat of government of Northern Ireland] during the IRA campaign of 1957-1962, was deeply anti-British in the late 1960s and 1970s. Initially, therefore, there was virtually no cross-border cooperation.” *Operation BANNER: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland*, Army Code 71842, July 2006, 3-6.

²² Bloomfield, 38.

²³ Seamus Dunn, “Northern Ireland: A Promising or Partisan Peace?” *Journal of International Affairs* 52, no.2 (Spring 1999): 729.

²⁴ Dominic Casciani, “Clinton: His Role in Northern Ireland,” British Broadcasting Corporation, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/1065913.stm (accessed September 05, 2007).

accountable and more inclusive in its approach. This ultimately led to the decision to allow Sinn Fein to the negotiating table as a stakeholder which, as discussed above, was a critical step towards beginning the AR2 process.

The European Union (EU) also had a key role to play in preparing the ground for AR2 in Northern Ireland. Once the UK government's efforts had effectively come to a standstill and the US had internationalized the issue, the EU became increasingly involved in setting the conditions for AR2. The EU aided conflict resolution in Northern Ireland on two inter-related levels, economic (to be discussed below) and political. Ultimately the EU, with its experience in creating federal institutions became one of the most influential brokers and was able to guide the peace process through the GFA and to deliver tangible economic and political development.

The role of the EU in Northern Ireland highlights the overlap between the political and economic dimensions of conflict resolution. In essence, the EU tied political progress to economic incentives. Not only did this encourage the political parties to keep the process moving, but it also gave the people they represented the impression that political progress was worthwhile. Similarly, political development and the cooperation it implies also assisted in the opening of borders and encouragement of trade. If the political dimension laid the groundwork for economic development then it should also be noted that economic development, and the hope it represented for a better future, provided the incentive for developments in the political dimension. This cycle proved to be a powerful motivator in Northern Ireland and we can therefore see the importance of the relationship between politics and economics in setting the conditions for AR2.

If military action is seen as a "continuation of political intercourse"²⁵ then it could be argued that ten years without meaningful political dialogue does not mean ten years without political progress. On the other hand we have already seen that real political progress was not

²⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 87.

achieved in Northern Ireland until the resumption of meaningful political dialogue in the mid 1980s. An overbearing security operation, seeking to divide communities in order to keep the peace, is not conducive to political dialogue. Furthermore, the close association of political parties and paramilitary organizations, as discussed above, meant that military actions in Northern Ireland had the potential to disproportionately influence the political process. In the initial stages of conflict resolution, the emphasis was on security to the detriment of many of the other aspects of the process. It was not until this imbalance was corrected by placing equal emphasis on the political process in addition to the security operation that real progress was made towards AR2. Once the conflict was viewed in military terms by the main protagonists, it became much harder for the political arms of the paramilitaries to control militant behavior, and also to commit themselves to a political process with sworn enemies over whom they were determined to triumph through violent means. The longer the military struggle continued, the more entrenched the positions became, and further the hope of the UK government to re-engage the political parties in the process receded.

The Economic Dimension

Economic development was a key condition for effective AR2 in Northern Ireland. Relative poverty can be held to account for many of the root causes of the conflict, for example in economic discrimination against the Catholic community particularly in terms of employment, and certainly contributed to the growing animosity of the Catholic community towards the UK government.²⁶ It was only with progress in the political process tied to economic incentives, and the internationalization of the problem that markets were opened both within Northern Ireland

²⁶ The Portland Trust, *Economics in Peacemaking: Lessons from Northern Ireland*, May 2007: 7. <http://www.portlandtrust.org/Economics%20in%20Peacemaking%20-%20Lessons%20from%20Northern%20Ireland.pdf> (accessed September 18, 2007).

and across the world. As mentioned above economic development then fed back into the political process to provide added incentives for further progress.

The involvement of the international community, in particular the EU, was particularly important to economic development in Northern Ireland. Funding for the EU's PEACE program has reached over €1000 million²⁷ and its aims—social inclusion, economic development and employment, urban and rural regeneration and cross-border cooperation—are directly related to AR2. Economic development in Northern Ireland had political impact beyond the geographical boundaries of the region. Aid packages tied donor countries' interests to Northern Ireland, and Northern Ireland was reintegrated into the world economic system.

The economic dimension was also related to the security dimension. Specifically the poor economic situation in Northern Ireland in the 1970s and its attendant unemployment provided a good recruiting ground for the paramilitary groups²⁸ and also drove many of the militant groups into criminal activity in order to fund their campaigns of terror. Fuel smuggling, drug running and bank robberies placed greater demands on the security services. However, the occasionally draconian security measures implemented in response often had an adverse effect on legitimate trade. The segregation of communities and overly restrictive border controls were not conducive to economic development. This is another area in which careful balance is required between the dimensions; that is, providing security yet maintaining a growing economy. It is possible to argue that economic growth in Northern Ireland was stunted by a military campaign that focused on the ending of terrorist and criminal activity without much thought to the economic consequences. Where security reigned and political progress was made there were usually underlying economic incentives.

²⁷ European Commission, "EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland (2000-2004) - PEACE II." http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/country/prordn/details.cfm?gv_PAY=UK&gv_reg=ALL&gv_PGM=2000RG161PO001&LAN=5 (accessed August 22, 2007).

The UK government and others realized the powerful motivational factor of economic incentives and used them to good effect in building commercial ties between sides in the conflict in order to stabilize the security situation and achieve political progress. Over time, a fractured society was encouraged to put aside political differences in pursuit of economic prosperity. Again the move of the UK government to recognize the interests of the Republic of Ireland in Northern Ireland reaped dividends in the economic dimension. The Republic of Ireland achieved unprecedented economic growth in the late 1980s and early 1990s with its GDP rising by 53% between 1988 and 1994 – the fastest growth in the European Union over the period.²⁹ Northern Ireland was able to piggyback on this success and over the ten-year period 1987-1997 the nominal value of Northern Ireland's exports to the Republic of Ireland increased by some 93.3%, whilst imports from the Republic of Ireland increased by 68.3%.³⁰ This in turn contributed to a sharp upturn in the Northern Irish economy with “2.4% growth per annum for the six years ending 31 December 1996 compared to 0.9% for Great Britain as a whole for the same period.”³¹

This economic growth had a significant impact on conflict resolution in Northern Ireland. By 1997 unemployment was running at 7.6% in November of that year, its lowest level in around 17 years, falling from a peak of 17.2% in October 1986. This had two major consequences, first, that one of the main causes of disaffection and disenfranchisement and hence the appeal of the criminal activities of many of the paramilitary organizations was removed, and second that those finding themselves in employment became stakeholders in society and therefore had an increased interest in a peaceful and politically progressive environment in which to work and prosper economically. As Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk write: “some terrorist groups also offer recruits

²⁸ Fitzduff, 99.

²⁹ Newry and Mourne District Council, “Economic Development: Statistics: Northern Ireland’s Economic Statistics,” http://www.newryandmourne.gov.uk/economic_development/stats/economic.asp (accessed September 12, 2007).

³⁰ Ibid.

financial incentives and additional family support...social and economic development policies can help to reduce the pool of potential recruits by reducing their perceived grievances and providing the members of these communities with viable alternatives to terrorism.”³² They also highlight the wider impact of economic development on society, and in particular on social reconciliation, as they point to the emergence of a new middle class in Northern Ireland as a result of economic development and remark that: “members of this particular demographic sector have formed important mediation networks to reduce violence between supporters of militant Protestant groups and those sympathetic to the cause of the Real Irish Republican Army.”³³

The Security Dimension

These economic developments were enabled by the security forces in Northern Ireland, whose role was initially to enforce peace and protect the citizens, and eventually to persuade the opposing sides that the benefits to be gained (political, social and economic) by going through AR2 outweighed the potential benefits of continuing the struggle. The results eventually created a relatively secure environment in which to facilitate AR2. However, it was not until the police had primacy (over the military) and that the security forces in general were seen as impartial, that real political progress was possible.

On the positive side the security forces in Northern Ireland remained as a threat to keep the parties involved in the political process and a de-escalation of military activity could be used as a bargaining tool to achieve political progress. However, on the negative side, the failure to maintain the perception of impartiality prolonged the process, and the predominant use of the British Army in the early years both politicized the military and undermined the authority of the

³¹ Ibid.

³² Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, *Terrorism and Development: Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism* (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 2003), x.

³³ Ibid.

police (although this was done in part to counter accusations of the partiality of the Royal Ulster Constabulary).³⁴ It was not until the creation of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) in November 2001 as a result of the GFA and subsequent Patton Commission³⁵ that police forces were able to play an effective role in setting the conditions for AR2. Overall though, as mentioned above, the resort to a security solution in the early years (with its negative impacts on political and economic efforts) was detrimental to AR2. In short, the security operation became an end in itself rather than an enabler of economic, political and social development.

The issue of security also had impacts on the economic dimension. On the positive side, border controls and increased internal security measures led to greater state control of customs revenue, greater regulation of trade and also undermined the opposing paramilitary efforts by cutting sources of funding through smuggling and black marketeering. However, the segregation and border controls implemented also stifled trade between areas and communities in Northern Ireland and beyond. Also, perhaps ironically, in lieu of substantial economic and social development, in particular addressing issues of unemployment, the illegal trade engaged in by wings of the paramilitary organizations was the source of livelihood of many of the citizens of Northern Ireland; the government that cut off this earning potential without providing alternative livelihoods was not popular.

In terms of the impact of the military on the society, Sneddon writes of the early years: “Mistakes were made; the heavy-handed colonial approach of the 1970s that utilized internment, hard interrogation, curfews and area searches was massively counter-productive and generated

³⁴ The Royal Ulster Constabulary was the police force in Northern Ireland between 1922 and 2001 and was considered by many in the Catholic community to be dominated by and loyal to the Protestants, and protective of unionist paramilitaries.

³⁵ The Patton Commission conducted an independent review of policing in Northern Ireland and made 175 recommendations on subjects as wide as: the composition, size and structure of the police service, the creation of new accountability structures, and stressed that human rights and community policing should underline all of the work carried out by the police service. http://www.psni.police.uk/index/about_psni.htm (accessed September 4, 2007).

deep sympathy for the IRA.”³⁶ It was difficult for the UK government to maintain the impression of impartiality when its military was viewed by all, as being partial to the other sides. The government was able to begin to counter these allegations through the development of new police forces as discussed above. However, the British military also had a role in this and it is worth concluding this section by agreeing with Sneddon that: “perhaps one of the greatest achievements of the armed forces was the ability to evolve and fall more closely into step with political progress, becoming a vital, but always subordinate part in the overall campaign.”³⁷

³⁶ S.E. Sneddon, *Northern Ireland: A British Military Success or a Purely Political Outcome?* (Defence Research Paper, Joint Services Command and General Staff College, Watchfield, UK, 2007), 3.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

AR2 in Northern Ireland

Having identified the utility of an approach that ultimately balanced political, economic, military and societal developments to lay the foundations for AR2, I will now turn to examine the individual processes of amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration in Northern Ireland and the relationships between them. In doing so it is worth remembering that certain conditions have to have been met in order to proceed with effective AR2. Specifically there has to be political agreement, although, as described below, amnesty can often form part of this initial agreement. As Brian Gormally writes: “Politics have to come first. Only...on the basis of a real political solution, will demobilization and reintegration support be fundamental...components of post-war rehabilitation and development.”³⁸ In the case of Northern Ireland this political development was embodied in the Good Friday Agreement, reached on 10 April 1998.

Amnesty

Before discussing the amnesty process in depth, it is important to understand the role and the place of amnesty in the AR2 process. In the first instance, amnesty is a very important part of conflict resolution. As Gormally and McEvoy discovered in their 1995 survey of the release and reintegration of politically motivated prisoners across the world: “...the issue of the early release of politically motivated prisoners was critical to any peace process which follows a political conflict. Whatever the particular positions taken up by negotiating parties at any given time, we would argue that, until the question of prisoners is agreed then nothing, that will create a final

³⁸ Brian Gormally, *Conversion from War to Peace: Reintegration of Ex-Prisoners in Northern Ireland* (Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Bonn: 2001), 2.

solution, is agreed.”³⁹ The importance of the prisoner amnesty in Northern Ireland lay in two key areas: first, and in common with many other cases of amnesty, it was an important trust building measure on the part of the UK government, and second, that the disproportionate influence of the political prisoner population meant that many of the key players needed to lead the reconciliation and reintegration processes were behind bars and would otherwise have been excluded. To that end, it is evident that amnesty was, in many aspects, a precursor to reconciliation and reintegration in Northern Ireland.

A further point to note is that amnesty is often seen as a concession of one side to another, in this case of the UK government to insurgents and terrorists. To many this concession is unnecessary on the part of a government that has been able to reestablish its authority or subdue a recalcitrant population. However, it is important to realize that the UK government had not won the COIN fight nor defeated the IRA, as the authors of *An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland* conclude: “It should be recognized that the Army did not ‘win’ in any recognizable way; rather it achieved its desired end-state, which allowed a political process to be established without unacceptable levels of intimidation.”⁴⁰ It had however, as mentioned above, brought the various belligerents to the point where a negotiated solution was more attractive than continued resistance. By the same token, it is clear that the UK government had also reached the point where a negotiated solution was in its best interests (even though it had been there for some time), and to that end, in entering the process, it had to be prepared to concede ground in the same way as the other parties.

A final general observation is that it is possible to argue that in ending violent armed struggle, the UK government had a moral obligation for the future of those they had ‘put out of

³⁹ Brian Gormally, Kieran McEvoy, *Release and Reintegration of Politically Motivated Prisoners in Northern Ireland: A Comparative Study of South Africa, Israel/Palestine, Italy, Spain, The Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland* (Belfast: The Northern Ireland Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (NIACRO), 1995), 43.

work'. For two generations of those whose main purpose of existence was to unite Ireland and get the British out through fair means or foul, there had to be at least a partial recognition of a duty to reintegrate former combatants into the new society. This view is supported by Jonathon Moore as he writes: "A random sweep through the thousands of individual cases that have led to conviction reveals a complex picture in which the individual offender is caught in a cycle of violence. It is one of the most common remarks to be heard in both unionist and republican circles, that most of the young people who ended up in prison would not have been there but for "The Troubles." Statistically at least, this is a tenable view."⁴¹

Amnesty was not a novel concept to the British in Northern Ireland. As Moore again writes: "Britain has often found it expedient to release Irish political offenders before they have served their full or even a significant proportion of their sentences. Political realism suggested to British politicians that continued incarceration of "patriots" was an impediment to and not an aid to achieving political stability."⁴² Indeed there were several amnesties throughout the 'troubles' in response to ceasefires, for example, 36 prisoners following the first ceasefire in 1994, and a further 25 between July 1997 and April 1998.⁴³ However, the already politically sensitive issue of amnesty was raised to another level when at the 1994 Sinn Fein Ard Fheis, nationalist prisoners tabled a motion asserting that: "The release of all political prisoners is a republican demand based on the merits of justice—there would be no prisoners but for the conflict caused by Britain's usurpation of Irish sovereignty."⁴⁴ In effect, this put huge pressure on the UK government by

⁴⁰ Operation BANNER: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland, 8-15 para 855.

⁴¹ Jonathon Moore, "Paramilitary Prisoners and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland", in *Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Conflict and Conflict Resolution*, ed. Alan O'Day (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997).

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Mary Baber quoting John O'Donoghue, in a speech in the Dail (Irish Parliament). *Northern Ireland: The Release of Prisoners under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Bill*, Research Paper 98/65 (London: House of Commons Library, 15 June 1998), 24.

⁴⁴ Moore, Chapter 6.

suggesting that any future general amnesty would be recognition that Britain admitted usurping Irish sovereignty. Fortunately the UK government was able to rise above the rhetoric and see fit to agree to a rapid general amnesty in the GFA. It is difficult to assess tangibly, but the granting of a general amnesty in the face of such provocative talk probably served to enhance the trust placed by the nationalist parties in the UK government.

In the GFA, the UK and Irish governments committed to establishing “mechanisms to provide for an accelerated programme for the release of prisoners”⁴⁵ noting that those included in the provisions of the agreement should, subject to individual review, be released within two years of the signing of the agreement.⁴⁶ While, as asserted above, a general amnesty of this nature is necessary to begin the processes of reconciliation and reintegration, it proved to be very divisive in Northern Irish society. Given that a considerable majority of those to be released under the terms of the agreement were nationalist, it is understandable that the major concern over the release of such a large number of prisoners (approximately 150) was felt by the unionist community; as Prime Minister Blair said: “the early release of paramilitary prisoners...reached deep into people’s emotions.”⁴⁷ Ian Paisley, head of the Democratic Unionist Party and current first minister of Northern Ireland, has been particularly vehement in his opposition.⁴⁸ On the other hand it also had two key effects on the political process. In the first instance, the influence

⁴⁵ The Agreement, <http://www.nio.gov.uk/agreement.pdf> (accessed December 02, 2007), 30.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ “Blair Jets in to woo Unionists.” BBC News, 14 May 1998. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/events/northern_ireland/latest_news/93397.stm (accessed December 2, 2007).

⁴⁸ James F. Clarity, “As First Step in Peace Accord, Ireland Frees 9 IRA Prisoners,” New York Times, April 15, 1998. <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0CE4D9163CF936A25757C0A96E958260> (accessed December 2, 2007).

of paramilitary prisoners which had hitherto been considerable,⁴⁹ was significantly reduced and former militants have been led to work through legal political parties in order to achieve their desired ends. Fitzduff points to the emergence of several new political parties in the late 1990s that recruited significant numbers of former paramilitaries, for examples the Progressive Unionist Party and the Ulster Democratic Party;⁵⁰ and second, that many of them have been directly involved in furthering the peace process,⁵¹ either through being politically active or by taking leading roles in the processes of reconciliation and reintegration. Probably the best example of this is Martin McGuinness, a convicted senior IRA terrorist, who became the chief Sinn Fein negotiator of the GFA, and who currently holds office as the deputy first minister of Northern Ireland.

Weapons Decommissioning

The UK government recognized that the surrender of the huge quantities of weapons held by paramilitaries during the conflict would be a vital part of the peace process in general, and to that end forced decommissioning as a major precondition for negotiation, particularly with the IRA and Sinn Fein. There was however, especially in the eyes of the nationalist community, a disparity between the preconditions leveled on the nationalist paramilitaries when set against those demanded of the unionist groups. The IRA steadfastly refused to surrender its weapons without evidence of reciprocal action on the part of unionist groups and in the end, as mentioned

⁴⁹ George Mitchell writes: "Prisoners play an important part in the peace politics of Northern Ireland. They are seen by some in their communities as heroes who fought to defend a way of life and an oppressed people. Their views are of special significance to the political parties associated with paramilitary organisations." George Mitchell, *Making Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 131.

⁵⁰ Fitzduff, 10.

⁵¹ The role of the Political Education Group was critical in preparing many former political prisoners for roles in public life. *Ibid.*, 102.

above, the precondition was dropped under the ‘Mitchell Principles’⁵² and decommissioning instead became a part of the GFA amnesty. It has however remained a contentious issue, and while the IRA claims to have decommissioned much of its arsenal, its refusal to provide photographic evidence of the destruction remains a significantly contentious point for the unionists.

There are however two positive lessons to emerge from the handling of decommissioning in Northern Ireland. The first is that, as alluded to above, decommissioning did not get in the way of a final settlement in that the flexibility of the other actors ultimately allowed for a drop in the initial demand. Secondly, as with the political process in general, decommissioning was aided by the involvement of international players. As The Honorable Mitchell B. Reiss, Special Envoy of the President and Secretary of State for the Northern Ireland Peace Process, has written: “The GFA established a process for paramilitary weapons decommissioning that is verified by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD). This process allowed the paramilitary groups to avoid the perception that they were surrendering weapons to the British government by interposing an international body to handle the weapons issue.”⁵³

While it is still early days in the process, it appears that a general amnesty was an essential precondition for the processes of reconciliation and reintegration in Northern Ireland and also that it has had a positive impact on those processes. On the other hand, weapons

⁵² The ‘Mitchell Principles’, were six ground rules agreed on by the British and Irish governments in February 1996 as a basis for participation in peace talks. Parties entering the negotiations had to affirm their total and absolute commitment: to democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues; to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations; to agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission; to renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or outcome of all-party negotiations; to agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and, to urge that “punishment killings and beatings stop and take effective steps to prevent such actions. Mitchell, 35-36.

⁵³ House Committee on International Relations, Northern Ireland: Prospects for the Peace Process: Hearing before the subcommittee on Europe and emerging threats, 109th Cong., 1st sess., May 25, 2005.

decommissioning, while undoubtedly aided by the offices of an independent and external agency, remains a contentious issue with the potential to conflagrate in the future.

Reconciliation

Above I considered reconciliation as the coming together of opposing groups' political agendas to the point where progressive and meaningful dialogue became possible. This form of reconciliation, resulting in a peace agreement should be considered as a precondition for the rest of the AR2 process in general and reintegration in particular.

Social reconciliation is probably the most difficult of the AR2 processes to achieve yet it remains vital to complete conflict resolution; as Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma Bennink write: "We suggest that it is the process of reconciliation itself that builds stable and lasting peace."⁵⁴ It is also arguably the most difficult to achieve calling as it does for genuine societal change. Bar-Tal and Bennink continue: "Reconciliation goes beyond the agenda of formal conflict resolution to changing the motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes, and emotions of the great majority of the society members regarding the conflict."⁵⁵ Such reconciliation is particularly difficult to achieve in societies in which separate identities have evolved. In Northern Ireland these identities have coalesced around ritual and symbology. Throughout the 'troubles' murals and landmarks gained added significance and came to mark the territory of rival groups, and parades, in particular the Unionist ones in Portadown and South Belfast, have served to divide the society.⁵⁶ The importance of subordinating group concerns, over marching rights for example, to the interests of the wider community is a key part of the reconciliation process. While the main parties in

⁵⁴ Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma H. Bennink, "The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process," in *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, ed. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 13.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ A full description of these phenomena is described by Marc Howard Ross in his article "Ritual and the Politics of Reconciliation," in *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*. ed. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

Northern Ireland were not prepared to forgo what they saw as 'rights', the security forces played a valuable role by attempting to deescalate the frictions caused by the marches through negotiation or the use of barricades and crowd control obstacles. This, besides keeping public order, can also be seen to have aided the process of reconciliation by limiting confrontation between the sides and also by focusing opposition on the security forces, who attempted to deny them their 'rights', and not each other.

If the ultimate aim of reconciliation is to build the basis of a common narrative and to develop a shared identity then it can be seen that the process is far from complete in Northern Ireland. Indeed, the main sides see the GFA and its resulting dialogue as an opportunity to continue to seek either continued union with or separation from Great Britain. There appears to be little interest in developing a common identity and so it could be concluded that, as long as this remains the case, the prospects for peace in the long-term are slim.

Interestingly, in their article "Reconciliation as a Dirty Word: Conflict, Community Relations and Education in Northern Ireland", Lesley McEvoy, Kieran McEvoy and Kirsten McConnachie argue that the term 'reconciliation' is inappropriate for the process it describes. For many of those involved in the process, 'reconciliation' is too closely associated with community relations and the notion that their own identities are impediments to progress; furthermore, particularly for nationalists, it has connotations of programmes instituted by the British government which, in their view should have been involved in the process rather than dictating it.⁵⁷ The article also highlights the vital role played by ex-combatants in the reconciliation process: "some of these men and women have been at the forefront of taking forward the most difficult issues of the peace process including working on interface violence at flashpoint areas; negotiations concerning contentious parades; the decommissioning of paramilitaries' weapons; engagement with the victims of political violence and other ex-combatants; and promoting and

encouraging the emerging debate on truth recovery in the jurisdiction.”⁵⁸ From this a clear link can be seen between the amnesty granted these ex-prisoners, their reintegration in society and their subsequent work in the field of reconciliation.

Finally, as mentioned above, the security forces can contribute to reconciliation by providing an environment in which it can take place. In generally keeping the peace, and specifically by preventing the conflagration of symbolic marches, the military set the conditions for the early stages of reconciliation in Northern Ireland.

Reintegration

Reintegration has also taken place on several different levels in Northern Ireland. In this section I will consider the reintegration of the region itself, the reintegration of the Catholic and Protestant communities and finally the reintegration of ex-prisoners in society at large. In examining reintegration as a concept, we must also remember that it is a two way process taking decision and effort both on the side of the party being reintegrated and on that of the accepting society. This is an important distinction to bear in mind as the ground has to be prepared on both sides.

Regional Reintegration

While alluding to this aspect above, it is important to recognize the significance of Northern Ireland’s regional reintegration both politically and economically. Not only was the region reintegrated with the rest of the UK and Ireland it was at the same time drawn in more widely with the rest of the European Union and the rest of the world. This type of reintegration was stimulated by economic ties and bound together by political negotiations and agreements and was arguably instrumental in raising the horizons of many of the groups in Northern Ireland

⁵⁷ McEvoy, McEvoy and McConnachie, 109.

beyond what can be seen, without trivializing them, as parochial issues. While difficult to substantiate it is possible to conclude that rather than feeling locked in a mortal battle with the UK or each other, many of the political parties and paramilitaries on all sides were able to realize that the eyes of the world were on them and therefore that they could use that to their advantage to pursue their goals through peaceful means, in particular by leveraging the support of other nations to influence the UK and Irish governments to recognize their positions.

Community Reintegration

As considered above, one of the most effective methods for the security forces in deescalating violence can be the construction of physical barriers to keep warring factions apart. In Northern Ireland, the division these ‘peace’ walls created was enhanced by the marking of territory by the use of painting murals, kerbstones or the hoisting of flags by groups. As the conflict progressed communities became increasingly isolated and entrenched, not only physically but also psychologically. The reintegration of communities therefore needed to overcome both physical and mental barriers. In Northern Ireland it is possible to see that, over time, effective policing was able to offset the necessity of the physical barriers. The obstacles to mental reintegration were more significant. The efforts of most of the community relations work in Northern Ireland was predicated on the assumption that “while such physical and mental separation exists between communities, fears and misunderstandings about each other’s ultimate intentions will continue, and will thus make the achievement of any agreed political solutions between the communities even more difficult, and more difficult to sustain.”⁵⁹

Over the course of the ‘troubles’, many community relations initiatives were launched by the government (at national, regional and local levels) and on local initiative. Perhaps chief

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Fitzduff, 32-33.

among them was the Community Relations Council (CRC), established in 1990 and intended as “an independent agency dedicated to improving relationships between communities and fostering conflict resolution in Northern Ireland.”⁶⁰ In her book *Beyond Violence: Conflict Resolution Process in Northern Ireland*, Mari Fitzduff, the first director of the CRC, points to two significant elements that enabled such programmes to begin to achieve a level of social reintegration. The first of which was an emphasis on education; that is, giving participants the necessary knowledge and skills with which to begin or continue dialogue. The second was the use of “partials” as facilitators. Having concluded, by experiment, that it was virtually impossible to have a facilitator seen as completely neutral by both sides, work began to develop a cadre of “partials” or “insider-partials”, people whose loyalties were known to both sides, but who were trusted to lay these aside for the duration of community dialogue. These were individuals who were able to “model openness about their own upbringings, their fears and their political convictions, while at the same time ensuring a productive process for discussion.”⁶¹ This mechanism has proved to be very successful and has often involved ex-prisoners, thereby aiding their reintegration in the community.

The Reintegration of Political Prisoners

This aspect of reintegration follows directly on from amnesty and is another vital step in the AR2 process, as Gormally writes: “prisoner release and reintegration are an indispensable prerequisite for the building of an inclusive society.”⁶² It is also important to note, as mentioned above, that the ground has been prepared. This preparation happens on both sides of the process; on the one hand the ex-combatants need to be prepared to play their part as responsible citizens

⁶⁰ Ibid., xiv.

⁶¹ Ibid. 142.

⁶² Gormally, *Conversion from War to Peace: Reintegration of Ex-Prisoners in Northern Ireland*, 35.

within a democracy, and on the other hand the society receiving them needs to be prepared to recognize that this change has occurred and to accept them as such.

The significant role that political prisoners played throughout the peace process in Northern Ireland helped with their reintegration. As Gormally writes: “the active role of prisoners and ex-prisoners in the peace process opened their way to political reintegration... Virtually all of the negotiators representing paramilitary-aligned parties during the peace talks were ex-prisoners.”⁶³ In essence, having conceded that further violence would not bring them closer to their goals, many of the insurgents sought to pursue their cause in political fora, and were given the opportunity to do so by the UK government. The attitude of the UK government in this regard helped both to further the political process, by ensuring that many of the people most closely associated with the paramilitary organizations were able to influence their supporters to also play an active role in the process, and also by doing so to enable the same people to reintegrate into democratic society by playing an active non-violent political role.

At the same time, it must be noted that a study of the reintegration of political prisoners into society has not been without its problems in Northern Ireland. Most of the issues stem from the economic conditions facing ex-prisoners as they begin the reintegration process. Many have found employment hard to come by through a combination of a lack of skill training in prison, employer reluctance to employ anyone with a ‘bad reputation’ who could be a disruptive influence, and for various legal reasons.⁶⁴ This point also highlights the importance of the preparedness of society to receive ex-prisoners for as Gormally writes: “Long-term peace is hardly to be consolidated by excluding former combatants from mainstream employment.”⁶⁵ Interestingly one of the main ways in which this issue was addressed was through the EU Special

⁶³ Ibid.,13.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 19-20.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 22.

Programme for Support and Reconciliation which, by providing funding to communities to sponsor 'prisoner projects', was able to assist with both reconciliation and reintegration. This highlights the important role played by outside mediators and agencies in not only setting the conditions for, but also directly facilitating the processes of AR2.

The Results of COIN and AR2 in Northern Ireland

A brief study of the actions of the UK government in resolving the ‘troubles’ in Northern Ireland reveals some of the difficulties inherent in attempting to appropriately balance the political, economic, security, and societal dimensions to set the conditions for AR2. In the first instance, the UK government’s internalizing of the problem and the characterization of the situation as a zero-sum game, in the early years of the conflict, can be seen to have ended the hope of meaningful political dialogue. In lieu of the latter, it is possible to argue that security operations became an end in themselves and so detrimental to overall efforts at AR2; as *An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland* states “The British Government’s main military objective in the 1980s was the destruction of the PIRA⁶⁶ rather than resolving the conflict.”⁶⁷ If it was not until Sinn Fein was brought into the political process along with international brokers and with them significant economic incentives, then it can also be argued that these measures should have been taken in the intervening 25 years of military struggle. While the UK government can assert that it used this time to set the conditions for what followed, it is also possible to conclude that the military struggle continued for such a long time precisely because these steps had not been taken earlier. In the meantime the conflict served only to increasingly divide and impoverish the society in Northern Ireland.

Similarly, the effectiveness of an outside mediator for political and economic reasons might have been deduced earlier in the process. Notwithstanding issues of sovereignty, the

⁶⁶ The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA) were the two wings of the Irish Republican Army (referred to generically elsewhere in this paper). In very general terms they were divided over political leanings with the PIRA tending towards socialism with the OIRA focusing on the movement’s republican and nationalist beginnings; the split coming in 1969-1970. Of the two wings, the PIRA became by far the most prominent and effective. While the OIRA declared an official ceasefire in 1972 PIRA did not do so until 1994.

⁶⁷ Operation BANNER: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland, 2-15.

impartiality of an outside broker clearly has its benefits, particularly when the government has such a close association with and perceived interest in one side.

Yet it is clear that the COIN operation undertaken by the British military was highly successful; indeed, Martin van Creveld has credited the British military with a unique achievement in its “success against an irregular force.”⁶⁸ The success of the COIN operation can be attributed to: a sensitive approach to the application of military force, robust intelligence structures, the effectiveness of a theatre headquarters and a comprehensive and effective training system,⁶⁹ and can be recognized in the form of a secure environment and a functioning government at Stormont. Yet the same level of success can not yet be ascribed to the AR2 process. While the general amnesty of the GFA has been vital in kick-starting AR2, it still remains a contentious issue and efforts at reconciliation and reintegration have achieved limited results. Politically while there is a functioning government, reconciliation has not truly been achieved. As Stephen Farry writes: “the relatively extreme Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein have overtaken their more moderate unionist and nationalist rivals in the Ulster Unionist Party and the Social Democratic and Labour Party respectively.”⁷⁰ This is of particular concern as the more radical parties have a more radical following which they will most likely seek to maintain through the avocation of relatively extreme and intransigent positions. While this remains the case, the likelihood of a united government pushing through legislative measures and programs designed to improve social reconciliation and reintegration appear slim.

This gloomy outlook is added to by Stephen Farry who puts many of the current issues down to the GFA. While I argued above that the agreement formed the cornerstone of the AR2 process, Farry contends that: “For many, the dominant view underlying the agreement was that

⁶⁸ Ibid., 8-15.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 8-15.

⁷⁰ Stephen Farry, *Northern Ireland: Prospects for Progress in 2006? A Special Report for the United States Institute for Peace* (Washington DC: USIP, 2006), 1.

Northern Ireland was divided into two distinct and irreconcilable communities: one Protestant/unionist/British and the other Catholic/nationalist/Irish. Essentially, society would be managed through separate but equal provisions for separate communities.”⁷¹ While he also points out that the British government has now “set the goal of creating a shared and integrated society in Northern Ireland”⁷² articulated in particular through a shift in community relations emphasis, if Farry is correct then the normally lengthy AR2 processes will have to continue for many years to come.

⁷¹ Ibid., 4.

⁷² Ibid.

The Relationship between COIN and AR2 in Northern Ireland

While, as described above, the COIN operations of the British government, once they achieved balance between the political, economic and security dimensions, helped to set the conditions for the AR2 that followed, it is also possible to contend that the current issues with AR2 in Northern Ireland in part have their roots precisely in the successful COIN operation. That is to say that the impacts of the COIN operation on AR2 were mixed. Arguably the considerable success of the British military in creating a peaceful environment, in the main by separating the belligerents, served also to emphasize divisions within the society and put significant obstacles in the way of the AR2 processes. While there were other factors at play: divisions already existed in society and political progress and agreements did little to integrate rival groups, it is clear that COIN operations, while generally setting the conditions for, also had a negative impact on AR2. While it is not possible to conclude that an approach to COIN that had setting the conditions for AR2 as its end state would have produced an environment more conducive to AR2 than that in existence in Northern Ireland today, this study leads to an appreciation that such an approach is at least worth of consideration by military commanders undertaking COIN operations in the future.

Conclusion

In conclusion, any approach to setting the conditions for AR2 needs to be inclusive, balanced and responsive in nature. It must seek to advance political, economic and security processes in the context of a society in a way that avoids one area having an adverse effect on the others. Only by achieving results in all four dimensions simultaneously will the ground be prepared for successful AR2. The military, as part of the security forces, has a key role to play in laying the foundations for AR2 by persuading the opposing sides that the benefits to be gained (political, social and economic) by going through AR2 outweigh the potential benefits of continuing the struggle, and to act as a threat to the paramilitary organizations to keep their political representatives in negotiations. In doing so, it must be mindful of the potential of security operations (particularly those dominated by the military) to negatively impact on political, economic and societal developments. Military operations, in particular COIN, should not be seen as an end to themselves, or even purely as a means to support a legitimate government,⁷³ but rather in terms of their contribution to setting the conditions for the vital processes of AR2.

⁷³ FM 3-24 states that: “The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster the development of effective governance by a legitimate government.” *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency*, 1-21.

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