Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses

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Summary

A priority of Obama Administration policy has been to address the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests, in particular the potential threat posed by the advance of Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. These advances have caused the government of Israel to assert that it might take unilateral military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities unless the United States provides assurances that it will act, militarily if necessary, to prevent Iran from taking the final steps toward developing a nuclear weapon. Aside from the nuclear issue, the United States has long seen a threat to U.S. interests posed by Iran’s support for militant groups in the Middle East and in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. officials accuse Iran of helping Syria’s leadership try to defeat a growing popular opposition movement and of taking advantage of Shiite majority unrest against the Sunni-led, pro-U.S. government of Bahrain.

The Obama Administration has orchestrated broad international pressure on Iran through economic sanctions, while also offering Iran sustained engagement if it verifiably demonstrates to the international community that its nuclear program is peaceful. Iran’s leaders returned to nuclear talks with six powers in April 2012 after a one year hiatus. Three rounds of talks held in April, in May, and in June yielded no breakthroughs, but did explore a potential compromise under which Iran might end uranium enrichment to 20% purity (a level not technically far from weapons grade) in exchange for substantial sanctions relief. Technical talks were held on July 3, 2012, with further conversations between Iranian and EU negotiators during July—September 2012. These conversations produced no announcement of another round of high level talks. The Administration expresses frustration that no settlement has been reached, but it asserts that there is time and space for the accumulated sanctions to compel Iran’s leaders to compromise before U.S. military action be considered. Since the beginning of 2012, as significant multilateral sanctions have been added on Iran’s oil exports—including an oil purchase embargo by the European Union that went into full effect on July 1, 2012—the regime has begun to acknowledge significant economic pressure. Those pressure led to a virtual collapse in the market value of Iran’s currency, the rial, in early October 2012. Since late 2011, both Britain and Canada, have closed their embassies in Iran.

The Administration and many outside experts also perceive that the legitimacy and popularity of Iran’s regime is in decline, although not to the point where the regime’s grip on power is threatened. There are few outward signs that the opposition in Iran or in exile have gained traction against the regime, even though international sanctions are causing clear public frustration over deteriorating economic conditions. The reformist boycott of the March 2, 2012, parliamentary elections rendered the election a contest between factions supporting either President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i. Khamene’i’s supporters were elected overwhelmingly, helping him solidify his control over day-to-day governance. It is likely that only hardliners will be significant candidates in the next presidential election to be held on June 14, 2013.

The 112th Congress has supported additional economic sanctions against Iran, most recently with enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (H.R. 1905, P.L. 112-158), which expands sanctions against companies that conduct energy and financial transactions with Iran. Additional sanctions are reportedly under consideration by the European Union and by some Members of Congress. For further information, including pending Iran sanctions legislation, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, and CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr.
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses

Political History

Iran is a country of about 75 million people, located in the heart of the Persian Gulf region. The United States was an ally of the late Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (“the Shah”), who ruled from 1941 until his ouster in February 1979. The Shah assumed the throne when Britain and Russia forced his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi (Reza Shah), from power because of his perceived alignment with Germany in World War II. Reza Shah had assumed power in 1921 when, as an officer in Iran’s only military force, the Cossack Brigade (reflecting Russian influence in Iran in the early 20th century), he launched a coup against the government of the Qajar Dynasty. Reza Shah was proclaimed Shah in 1925, founding the Pahlavi dynasty. The Qajars had been in decline for many years before Reza Shah’s takeover. That dynasty’s perceived manipulation by Britain and Russia had been one of the causes of the 1906 constitutionalist movement, which forced the Qajars to form Iran’s first Majles (parliament) in August 1906 and promulgate a constitution in December 1906. Prior to the Qajars, what is now Iran was the center of several Persian empires and dynasties whose reach shrunk steadily over time. Since the 16th century, Iranian empires lost control of Bahrain (1521), Baghdad (1638), the Caucasus (1828), western Afghanistan (1857), Baluchistan (1872), and what is now Turkmenistan (1894). Iran adopted Shiite Islam under the Safavid Dynasty (1500-1722), which ended a series of Turkic and Mongol conquests.

The Shah was anti-Communist, and the United States viewed his government as a bulwark against the expansion of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf and a counterweight to pro-Soviet Arab regimes and movements. Israel maintained a representative office in Iran during the Shah’s time and the Shah supported a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In 1951, under pressure from nationalists in the Majles (parliament) who gained strength in the 1949 Majles elections, he appointed a popular nationalist parliamentarian, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, as prime minister. Mossadeq was widely considered left-leaning, and the United States was wary of his policies, which included his drive for nationalization of the oil industry. Mossadeq’s followers began an uprising in August 1953 when the Shah tried to dismiss Mossadeq, and the Shah fled. The Shah was restored in a CIA-supported uprising that toppled Mossadeq (“Operation Ajax”).

The Shah tried to modernize Iran and orient it toward the West, but in so doing he also sought to marginalize Iran’s Shiite clergy. He exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1964 because of Khomeini’s active opposition, which was based on the Shah’s anti-clerical policies and what Khomeini alleged was the Shah’s forfeiture of Iran’s sovereignty to the United States. Khomeini fled to and taught in Najaf, Iraq, a major Shiite theological center that contains the Shrine of Imam Ali, Shiism’s foremost figure. There, he was a peer of senior Iraqi Shiite clerics and, with them, advocated direct clerical rule or velayat-e-faqih (rule by a supreme Islamic jurisprudent). In 1978, three years after the March 6, 1975, Algiers Accords between the Shah and Iraq’s Baathist leaders, which settled territorial disputes and required each party to stop assisting each other’s oppositionists, Iraq expelled Khomeini to France, from which he stoked the Islamic revolution. Mass demonstrations and guerrilla activity by pro-Khomeini forces, allied with a broad array of anti-Shah activists, caused the Shah’s government to collapse in February 1979. Khomeini returned from France on February 1, 1979 and, on February 11, 1979, he declared an Islamic Republic of Iran. His political system of velayat-e-faqih was enshrined in the constitution that was adopted in a public referendum in December 1979 (and amended in 1989); it provided for the post of Supreme Leader. The regime based itself on strong opposition to foreign, particularly Western, influence, and relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic turned openly hostile after the November 4, 1979, seizure of the U.S. Embassy by pro-Khomeini.
radicals. Ayatollah Khomeini died on June 3, 1989, and was succeeded as Supreme Leader by Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i.

The regime faced serious unrest in its first few years, including a June 1981 bombing at the headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and the prime minister’s office that killed several senior leaders, including Khomeini confidant Mohammad Hossein Beheshti. These events, along with the hostage crisis with the United States, provided cover for the regime to purge many of the secular, liberal, and left-wing personalities and parties in the anti-Shah coalition. Examples included the Tudeh Party (Communist), the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI, see below), the first elected President Abolhassan Bani Sadr, and the Iran Freedom Movement of the regime’s first Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and, later, Ibrahim Yazdi. The regime was under economic and military threat during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, which resulted at times in nearly halting Iran’s oil exports. Still, during these years, there was diversity of opinion in ruling circles.

Despite these struggles, during 1982 until 2009, the regime had faced only episodic, relatively low-level unrest from minorities, intellectuals, students, labor groups, and women. Since the June 2009 presidential election, the regime has struggled to contain popular dissatisfaction. In late 2009, several Iran experts believed this opposition movement—calling itself “The Green Path of Hope” or “Green Movement” (Rah-e-Sabz)—posed a serious challenge to the current regime. The regime subsequently pushed the Green Movement underground through imprisonment or house arrests of its leaders or main activists.

Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition

Iran’s Islamic regime, established in a constitution adopted in a popular referendum, is widely considered authoritarian but not “one-man rule.” The system provides for a degree of popular input and checks and balances provided by elected institutions. The Supreme Leader is not directly elected by the population; the president and the Majles (parliament) are. There are also direct elections for municipal councils, which in turn select mayors. Even within the unelected institutions, factional disputes between those who insist on ideological purity and those considered more pragmatic have been frequent and highly consequential.

Unelected Governing Institutions: The Supreme Leader, His Powers, and Other Ruling Councils

At the apex of the Islamic Republic’s power structure is a “Supreme Leader” who has vast formal powers and no term limits. He is chosen by an elected body—the Assembly of Experts—which also has the constitutional power to remove him. Upon Ayatollah Khomeini’s death, the Assembly selected one of his disciples, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, as Supreme Leader. Although he has never had Khomeini’s undisputed political or religious authority, the powers of the office have enabled Khamene’i to ensure that he is Iran’s paramount leader. Formally, the Supreme Leader is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, giving him the power to appoint commanders and to be represented on the highest national security body, the Supreme National Security Council.

1 At the time of his selection as Supreme Leader, Khamene’i was generally referred to at the rank of Hojjat ol-Islam, one rank below Ayatollah, suggesting his religious elevation was political rather than through traditional mechanisms.
composed of top military and civilian security officials. The Supreme Leader also has the power, under the constitution, to remove the elected president if either the judiciary or the elected Majles (parliament) decide that the president should be removed, with cause.

Still, the growing dependence of the regime on internal security forces caused Secretary of State Clinton to assert in February 2010 that the Supreme Leader’s authority is being progressively usurped by regime security forces, most notably the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This assessment is disputed by several outside experts who continue to see the Supreme Leader and his allies in the clerical establishment in firm control of regime decision making.

Table 1. Supreme Leader: Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i

| Born in July 1939 to an Azeri (Turkic) family from Mashhad. Was jailed by the Shah of Iran for supporting Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution. After the regime took power in 1979, helped organize Revolutionary Guard and other security organs. Lost use of right arm in assassination attempt in June 1981. Was elected president during 1981-1989 and was selected Khomeini’s successor in June 1989 upon his death. Upon that selection, Khamene’i religious ranking was advanced in official organs to “Grand Ayatollah” from the lower ranking “Hojjat ol-Islam.” But, still lacks the undisputed authority and public adoration Khomeini had. Like Khomeini, Khamene’i has tended to intervene primarily to resolve factional disputes, or to quiet popular criticism, but has taken more day-to-day role since 2009 uprising. Has sided decisively with hardline opponents of Ahmadinejad since mid-2011. Has taken consistently hard-line stances on foreign policy and particularly toward Israel, often calling it a cancerous tumor that needs to be excised from the region. Reputedly issued religious proclamation (2003) against Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, and has publicly called doing so a “sin,” but has consistently opposed bowing to any U.S. pressure on the nuclear issue. Yet, he is widely believed to fear direct military confrontation with United States on Iranian soil. Generally does not meet with Western officials and is suspicious of relations with the West as opening Iran to undue Western cultural influence and spying. Opposes opening comprehensive direct talks with the United States, but has made public reference to letters to him from President Obama asking for renewed U.S.-Iran relations. On economic issues, he has tended to support the business community (bazaaris), and opposed state control of the economy, making him attentive to the effects of international sanctions on Iran’s economy. His office is run by Mohammad Mohammadi Gopayegani, with significant input from Khamene’i’s second son, Mojtaba, who is said to be acquiring increasing influence. Also advised by Keyhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari and former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, who reportedly may run for President in June 2013 with Khamene’i’s backing. Potential successors include Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Council of Guardians head Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, and Judiciary head Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani. |

Source: CRS.

Council of Guardians and Expediency Council

The Supreme Leader appoints half of the 12-member Council of Guardians; and the head of Iran’s judiciary (currently Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani). Headed by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the conservative-controlled Council of Guardians reviews legislation to ensure it conforms to Islamic law, and it screens election candidates and certifies election results. The Supreme Leader appoints members of the 42-member “Expediency Council,” set up in 1988 to resolve legislative disagreements between the Majles and the Council of Guardians. The Expediency Council’s powers were expanded in 2006 to include oversight of the executive branch (cabinet) performance. Its members serve five-year terms; its chairman, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, was re-appointed in February 2007 and again in March 2012. The March 2012 reappointment defied predictions of many experts that he would be removed because of perceived disloyalty to

2 The Council of Guardians consists of six Islamic jurists and six secular lawyers. The six Islamic jurists are appointed by the Supreme Leader. The six lawyers on the Council are selected by the judiciary but confirmed by the Majles.
the Supreme Leader, and was widely interpreted as a Khamene’i effort to keep Rafsanjani from supporting reformist leaders. Earlier, Rafsanjani was removed in March 2011 as head of the Assembly of Experts (see below). The Expediency Council’s executive officer is former Revolutionary Guard commander-in-chief Mohsen Reza’i.

Table 2. Major Factions, Personalities, and Interest Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conservatives</th>
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<tr>
<td>Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i</td>
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<td>Expediency Council Chair</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad</td>
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<td>Senior Shiite Clerics</td>
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March 2, 2012, Majles elections. Yazdi, an assertive defender of the powers of the Supreme Leader and a proponent of an “Islamic state” rather than the current “Islamic republic,” fared poorly in December 2006 elections for Assembly of Experts. Another hardline cleric is Ayatollah Kazem Haeri, mentor of Iraqi cleric Moqtada Al Sadr.

Judiciary Chief/Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani
Judiciary head since August 2009. Brother of Ali Larijani; both are close to the Supreme Leader and opponents of Ahmadinejad. Both support hard line against dissidents.

Militant Clergy Association

Bazaar Merchants (“Bazaaris”)
The urban bazaar merchants fear jeopardizing the economy by participating in political opposition activity; have conducted only a few strikes or other organized action since the 1979 revolution. The bazaaris are not a monolithic group; each city’s bazaars are organized by industry (e.g., carpets, gold, jewelry, clothing) and bazaar positions tend to be reached by consensus among elders representing each industry represented at the bazaar.

Opposition/“Green Movement” (Rah-e-Sabz)
All of the blocs and personalities below can be considered, to varying degrees, as part of the Green Movement. However, overall leadership of the movement and decision-making on protest activities is unclear, with several components competing for preeminence. Some Green supporters have left for Europe, Asia, or the United States.

Titular Green Movement
Leaders: Mir Hossein Musavi/ Mohammad Khatemi/Mehdi Karrubi
Khatemi—reformist president during 1997-2005 and declared he would run again for president in June 2009 elections, but withdrew when allied reformist Mir Hossein Musavi entered the race. Khatemi was elected president in May 1997, with 69% of the vote; reelected June 2001 with 77%. Rode wave of sentiment for easing social and political restrictions, but these groups became disillusioned with Khatemi’s failure, as president, to stand up to hardliners on reform issues. Has hewed to staunch anti-Israel line of most Iranian officials, but perceived as open to accepting a Palestinian-Israeli compromise. Perceived as open to a political compromise that stops short of replacement of the regime, and voted in March 2, 2012, election, ignoring reformist boycott of that election. Now heads International Center for Dialogue Among Civilizations. Visited United States in September 2006 to speak at Harvard and the Washington National Cathedral on “dialogue of civilizations.”

Titular leader of the Green movement, Musavi is a non-cleric. About 68. An architect by training, and a disciple of Ayatollah Khomeini, he served as foreign minister (1980), then prime minister (1981-1989), at which time he successfully managed the state rationing program during the privations of the Iran-Iraq War but often feuded with Khamene’i, who was then president. At that time, he was an advocate of state control of the economy. His post was abolished in the 1989 revision of the constitution.

Musavi later adopted views similar to Khatemi on political and social freedoms and on reducing Iran’s international isolation, but supports strong state intervention in the economy to benefit workers, lower classes. Appeared at some 2009 protests, sometimes intercepted or constrained by regime security agents. However, not necessarily respected by harder line opposition leaders who criticize his statements indicating reconciliation with the regime is possible. He and wife (prominent activist Zahra Rahnevard) repeatedly harassed by regime during 2009 protests. He and Mehdi Karrubi, below, placed under strict house arrest after Green demonstrations resumed on February 14, 2011. With Karrubi, supported reformist boycott of March 2, 2012, Majles elections.

A founder of the leftwing Association of Combatant Clerics (different organization but with similar name from that above), Mehdi Karrubi was Speaker of the Majles during, 1989-1992 and 2000-2004. Formed a separate pro-reform
“National Trust” faction after losing 2005 election. Ran again in 2009, but received few votes and subsequently emerged, along with Musavi, as a leader of the Green Movement. Was physically blocked by regime from attending Green demonstrations during 2010 and, with Musavi, was put under house arrest as of February 14, 2011. Taken away to complete isolation (except for regime agents) at a two room office on July 16, 2011. Reportedly was allowed some access to his family in December 2011.

Student Opposition Leaders/Office of Consolidation of Unity (Daftar Tahkim-e-Vahdat) and Other Groups

Groups composed of well-educated, Westernized urban youth are the backbone of the Green Movement. They are attempting, with mixed success, to gain support of older generation, labor, clerics, village-dwellers, and other segments. Many in the Office of Consolidation of Unity, the student group that led the 1999 riots but which has since become controlled by regime loyalists, believes that major reform of the current regime might be acceptable. An offshoot of the Office—the Confederation of Iranian Students (CIS)—believes in regime replacement and consists of pro-American, pro-free market activists. Overall CIS leader, Arzhang Davoodi, convicted in August 2012 of “war against God” which carries life sentence. CIS co-founder Amir Abbas Fakhravar is based in Washington, D.C. Another dissident figure who emerged from the 1999 student-riots is Ahmad Batebi.

Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF)

The most prominent and best organized pro-reform grouping, but has lost political ground to Green Movement groups advocating outright overthrow of the regime. Its leaders include Khatemi’s brother, Mohammad Reza Khatemi (a deputy speaker in the 2000-2004 Majles) and Mohsen Mirdamadi. Backed Musavi in June 2009 election; several IIPF leaders, including Mirdamadi, detained and prosecuted in postelection dispute. The party was outlawed by the regime in September 2010.

Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization (MIR)

Composed mainly of left-leaning Iranian figures who support state control of the economy, but want greater political pluralism and relaxation of rules on social behavior. A major constituency of the reformist camp. Its leader is former Heavy Industries Minister Behzad Nabavi, who supported Musavi in 2009 election and has been incarcerated for most of the time since June 2009. The organization was outlawed by the regime simultaneously with the outlawing of the IIPF, above.

Combatant Clerics Association

Very similar name to organization above, but politically very different. Formed in 1988, it is run by reformist, not hardline, clerics and officials. Leading figures include Mohammad Khatami, former Interior Minister Ali Akbar Mohtashemi-Pur, and former Prosecutor General Ali Asgar Musavi-Koiniha.

Labor Unions

Organized labor has suffered from official repression for many years. Organized labor is not a core constituency of the Green Movement, but laborers viewed as increasingly sympathetic to political change. Some labor protests took place in Tehran on “May Day” 2010, and selected small strikes (truckers, some factories) during 2010 led some experts to believe that labor might be gravitating toward Green Movement. However, younger Green Movement activists are suspicious of labor as a leftwing bastion. Others say union members fear income disruption if they openly defy the regime. A bus drivers’ union leader, Mansur Osanloo, has been in jail since July 2007.

Other Prominent Dissidents

Other leading dissidents, some in Iran, others in exile, have been challenging the regime since well before the Green Movement formed and are now significant opposition figures. Journalist Akbar Ganji conducted hunger strikes to protest regime oppression; he was released on schedule on March 18, 2006, after sentencing in 2001 to six years in prison for alleging high-level involvement in 1999 murders of Iranian dissident intellectuals. Abdol Karim Soroush, now exiled, has challenged the doctrine of clerical rule. Former Revolutionary Guard organizer Mohsen Sazegara is based in the United States, but his role in the IRGC likely discredits him in the eyes of dissidents who want regime replacement. Other significant dissidents include former Culture Minister Ataollah Mohajerani, Mohsen Kadivar, and Fatemah Haghighatgoo. Some well known dissidents who
remained in Iran and were arrested in 2010 include filmmaker Jafar Panahi and journalist Abdolreza Tajik. In November 2008, before the 2009 unrest, famed Iranian blogger Hossein Derakshan was jailed; he is serving a 20-year prison sentence. 80-year-old Iran Freedom Movement leader Ibrahim Yazdi was released from prison in April 2011 after resigning as the Freedom Movement’s leader.

One major dissident figure is Nobel Peace Prize laureate (2003) and Iran human rights activist lawyer Shirin Abadi. She has often represented clients persecuted or prosecuted by the regime but she left Iran for Europe, fearing arrest in connection with the 2009 postelection dispute. In December 2009, the regime confiscated her Nobel Prize. In April 2012, she publicly opposed U.S. and allied sanctions against Iran. In January 2011, a colleague, Nasrin Sotoudeh, was sentenced to 11 years in prison.

Elected Institutions: The Presidency, the Majles (Parliament), the Assembly of Experts, and Recent Elections

Elections in Iran have always lacked some credibility for international observers because hardliners are able to use their control over key election administration bodies such as the Interior Ministry and the Council of Guardians to limit the number and ideological diversity of candidates. The Council of Guardians has the power to approve or deny candidates based on its application of constitutional requirements about a candidate’s knowledge of Islam and loyalty to the Islamic system of government.

Another criticism of the political process in Iran is the relative absence of political parties; establishing a party requires the permission of the Interior Ministry under Article 10 of Iran’s constitution. The standards to obtain approval are high: to date, numerous parties have filed for permission since the regime was founded, but only those considered loyal to the regime have been granted (or allowed to retain) license to operate. Some of those authorized include Ahmadinejad’s “Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran” party and the “Executives of Construction” party. Some have been licensed and then banned, such as the two reformist parties, Islamic Iran Participation Front and the Organization of Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution, which were formally outlawed in September 2010.

The Presidency

The main directly elected institution is the presidency, which is clearly subordinate to the Supreme Leader. Most presidents during the Islamic republic have sought, generally unsuccessfully, to expand presidential authority relative to that of the Supreme Leader. Still, the presidency is a coveted position which provides vast opportunities for the holder of the post to empower his political base and to affect day-to-day policy, particularly on economic issues. The president appoints and supervises the work of the cabinet, but the Supreme Leader is believed to have significant input into security-related cabinet appointments, including ministers of defense, interior, and intelligence (Ministry of Information and Security, MOIS). Prior to 1989, Iran had both an elected president as well as a prime minister selected by the elected Majles (parliament). However, the officials who held these posts during 1981-89 (Ali Khamene’i, who is now Supreme Leader, and Mir Hossein Musavi, who is now the main opposition leader, respectively) were in constant institutional conflict and the constitution was revised in 1989 to eliminate the post of prime minister.
As the top governing official, the presidency is also responsible for oversight bodies, including the Anticorruption Headquarters and the General Inspection Organization. The presidency develops the budgets of cabinet departments and imposes and collects taxes on corporations and other bodies. However, implementation of all these functions is said to be uneven, and presidential authority is often undermined by key clerics and allies of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other powerful institutions. Religious foundations, called “bonyads,” for example are tax exempt and their import-export operations often unregulated. All government officials are required to submit annual financial statements to state auditors, but there is no confirmation that such procedures are followed. Through profits earned from its affiliate companies, the IRGC is widely known to spend funds, outside its approved government budget, on arms, technology, support to pro-Iranian movements, and other functions. Such expenditures are conducted with almost no official oversight.

In a speech on October 16, 2011, Supreme Leader Khamene’i raised the possibility of eliminating the post of president and restoring the post of prime minister. The comments were viewed in the context of a rift between him and President Ahmadinejad, discussed below. Khamene’i indicated the change would not be difficult to orchestrate—although it would require a change to the constitution. In late July 2012, a parliamentary committee was established to assess the possibility of such a change, although observers say it will not be implemented before the June 2013 election and the election will go forward.

**The Majles**

Iran’s Majles, or parliament, consists of 290 seats, all elected. However, there are reserved seats (one each) for members of Iran’s religious minorities, including Jews and Christians. There is no “quota” for the number of women to be elected, but women regularly run and win election, although not in proportion to their percentage of the population. Majles elections occur one year prior to the presidential elections; the elections for the ninth Majles were held on March 2, 2012, and the dynamics and outcome of the upcoming contest are discussed below.

Cabinet appointments are subject to confirmation by the Majles (parliament), which also drafts and acts on legislation. The unicameral Majles in Iran is highly factionalized but, as an institution, it is far from the “rubber stamp” that characterizes many elected national assemblies in the region, but it generally has lost institutional disputes to the president. Among its main duties is to consider and enact a proposed national budget; that review typically takes place each February and March in advance of the Persian New Year (Nowruz) on March 21.

**The Assembly of Experts**

Another elected institution, mentioned above, is the *Assembly of Experts*. It is akin to an electoral college: it is empowered to choose a new Supreme Leader upon the death of the incumbent, and it oversees the work of the Supreme Leader. The Assembly can replace him if necessary, although invoking that impeachment power would, in most circumstances, be highly controversial. It is also the body empowered to amend the constitution. The Assembly has 86 seats, elected to an eight-year term, with elections conducted on a provincial basis. It generally meets two times a year, for a few days each. The fourth election for the Assembly was held on December 15, 2006; after that election, Rafsanjani, still a major figure having served two terms as president (1989-1997), was named deputy leader of the Assembly. After the death of the leader of the Assembly (Ayatollah Meshkini), Rafsanjani was selected its head in September 2007. However, as part of
the broader power struggles within the regime that have raged since the post-2009 election uprising, Rafsanjani was not reelected as Assembly of Experts chair in March 2011. He was replaced by aging and infirm compromise candidate Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani. See Figure 1 for a chart of the Iranian regime.

**Recent Elections: First Ahmadinejad Election in 2005**

After suffering several presidential election defeats at the hands of President Mohammad Khatemi and the reformists in the 1997 and 2001 presidential elections, hardliners successfully moved to regain the sway they held when Khomenei was alive. Conservatives won a majority (155 out of the 290 Majles seats) in the February 20, 2004, Majles elections (which are always held one year prior to each presidential election), in large part because of the Council of Guardians’ disqualification of 3,600 reformist candidates, including 87 Majles incumbents. The George W. Bush Administration and the Senate (S.Res. 304, adopted by unanimous consent on February 12, 2004) criticized the elections as unfair because of the disqualifications.

As the reformist faction suffered setbacks, the Council of Guardians narrowed the field of candidates for the June 2005 presidential elections to 8 out of the 1,014 persons who filed. Rafsanjani was considered the favorite against several opponents more hardline than he is—three had ties to the Revolutionary Guard: Ali Larijani; Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf; and Tehran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In the June 17, 2005, first round, turnout was about 63% (29.4 million votes out of 46.7 million eligible voters). With 21% and 19.5%, respectively, Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad, who did unexpectedly well because of tacit backing from Khamene’i, moved to a runoff. Reformist candidates (Mehdi Karrubi and Mostafa Moin) fared worse than expected. Ahmadinejad won in the June 24 runoff, receiving 61.8% to Rafsanjani’s 35.7%. He took office on August 6, 2005.

During his first term, splits widened between Ahmadinejad and other conservative members of his “Principalist” (usulgaran) faction. That rift was evident in the March 2008 Majles elections in which his base of support fractured and some conservatives ran as an anti-Ahmadinejad bloc. These splits foreshadowed the broader rift with the Supreme Leaders, discussed below.

**Ahmadinejad (Disputed) Reelection on June 12, 2009: Protests Erupt and Second Term is Riven by Schisms**

With splits in Ahmadinejad’s base, prospects for reformists to unseat Ahmadinejad through the established election process seemed to brighten. In February 2009, when Khatemi indicated a willingness to run, but he ultimately yielded to and endorsed a fellow reformist, Mir Hossein Musavi. Musavi was viewed as somewhat less divisive (and therefore more acceptable to the Supreme Leader) than Khatemi because of Musavi’s service as prime minister during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.

A total of about 500 candidates for the June 12, 2009, presidential elections registered their names during May 5-10, 2009. The Council of Guardians decided on four final candidates on May 20: Ahmadinejad, Musavi, Mehdi Karrubi, and former Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary

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3 Rafsanjani was constitutionally permitted to run because a third term would not have been consecutive with his previous two terms. In the 2001 presidential election, the Council permitted 10 out of the 814 registered candidates.
Guard Mohsen Reza’i. The Interior Ministry, which runs the election, also instituted an unprecedented series of one-on-one debates, which including Ahmadinejad’s acrimonious accusations of corruption against Rafsanjani and against Musavi’s wife. If no candidate received more than 50% of the vote on June 12, there would have been a runoff one week later.

The challengers and their backgrounds and platforms were as follows.

- **Mir Hosein Musavi.** The main reformist candidate. See Table 2.
- **Mehdi Karrubi.** See Table 2.
- **Mohsen Reza’i.** As noted, commander in chief of the Revolutionary Guard through the Iran-Iraq War. About 58 years old, he was considered an anti-Ahmadinejad conservative. Reza’i dropped out just prior to the 2005 presidential election. He alleged fraud in the 2009 election but later dropped his challenge.

The outcome of the election was always difficult to foresee; polling was inconsistent. Musavi supporters using social media such as Facebook and Twitter organized large rallies in Tehran, but pro-Ahmadinejad rallies were large as well. Turnout was high at about 85%; 39.1 million valid (and invalid) votes were cast. The Interior Ministry announced two hours after the polls closed that Ahmadinejad had won, although in the past results have been announced the day after. The totals were announced on Saturday, June 13, 2009, as follows.

- **Ahmadinejad:** 24.5 million votes—62.6%
- **Musavi:** 13.2 million votes—33.75%
- **Reza’i:** 678,000 votes—1.73%
- **Invalid:** 409,000 votes—1%
- **Karrubi:** 333,600 votes—0.85%

Almost immediately after the results of the election were announced on June 13, 2009, Musavi supporters began protesting the results, citing: the infeasibility of counting 40 million votes so quickly and the barring of candidate observers at many polling stations. Khamene’i declared the results a “divine assessment,” appearing to certify the results even though formal procedures require a three-day complaint period. Some outside analysts said the results tracked pre-election polls, which showed strong support for Ahmadinejad in rural areas and among the urban poor.4

**“Green Movement” Protest Movement Forms**

Continuing to use Facebook and Twitter, and fueled by outrage over regime use of force as depicted on YouTube, the demonstrations built throughout June 13-19, 2009, largely in Tehran but also in other cities. Security forces used varying amounts of force to control them, causing 27 protest deaths (official tally) during that period, with opposition groups reporting over 100 killed, including a 19 year-old woman Neda Soltani, who subsequently became an emblem of the opposition movement. The protesters’ hopes of having Khamene’i annul the election were dashed by his major Friday prayer sermon on June 19, 2009 in which he refuted allegations of vast fraud

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4 A paper published by Chatham House and the University of St. Andrews strongly questions how Ahmadinejad’s vote could have been as large as reported by official results, in light of past voting patterns throughout Iran. “Preliminary Analysis of the Voting Figures in Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election.” http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk.
and threatened a crackdown on further protests. Protesters continued despite Khamene’I’s warning. On June 29, 2009, the Council of Guardians tried to address the complaints by performing a televised recount of 10% of the votes of Tehran’s districts and some provincial ballots and, finding no irregularities, certified the results. As 2009 progressed, the opposition congealed into the “Green Movement of Hope and Change,” which later moved well beyond the election issue into a challenge to the regime, as discussed below.

Ahmadinejad’s Second Term: Divisions Within the Regime Increase

As the Green Movement gathered strength in 2009, splits within the regime widened, although most of the core regime leaders tried to remain outwardly unified. Since 2010, as unrest faded from the streets, Ahmadinejad has sought to promote the interests of his loyalists and promote what his critics say is a nationalist version of Islam that limits the authority of Iran’s clerics. Ahmadinejad’s perceived favorite has been his former chief-of-staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashai, to whom he is related through their children’s marriage. This caused anti-Ahmadinejad hardliners to rally around the Supreme Leader Khamene’i—who himself is believed suspicious of Ahmadinejad’s allies’ ambitions and ideology—to try to weaken Ahmadinejad. Many in the regime want to see antagonists of his, particularly moderate-conservatives such as Ali Larijani or Mohammad Baqr Qalibaf, as the next president in 2013.

The infighting evolved into a rift between Ahmadinejad and Khamene’i, breaking out into the open in April 2011 when Ahmadinejad dismissed the intelligence minister Heydar Moslehi and attempted to replace him with a Mashai loyalist. The Supreme Leader reinstated Moslehi, and Ahmadinejad protested by refusing to attend cabinet meetings from April 24 to May 4, 2011. The political establishment rallied around the Supreme Leader, and Ahmadinejad accepted Moslehi’s reinstatement. Later, 25 Mashai loyalists were charged with witchcraft or sorcery.

In September 2011, the split continued with allegations that a $2.6 billion embezzlement scheme involving fraudulent letters of credit were facilitated by Mashai—an implied link of the scam to Ahmadinejad himself. On February 7, 2012, the rift escalated further when the Majles, still mostly populated by those loyal to the Supreme Leader, voted to summon Ahmadinejad for formal questioning—the first time this has happened since the Islamic revolution. He made the appearance on March 14, 2012, after the March 2 Majles elections, but the session reportedly was not contentious. On July 30, 2012, four people were sentenced to death in the alleged embezzlement scheme, the first sentences of a total of 39 persons convicted in the case—the death sentences were considered a further rebuke to Ahmadinejad. On September 27, 2012, Ahmadinejad’s press adviser, Ali Akbar Javanfekr, was sentenced to six months in jail for publishing materials critical of the Supreme Leader.

March 2, 2012, Majles Elections Marginalize Ahmadinejad

The 2012 Majles elections were held in the context of the schisms discussed above, and between the regime and reformist factions seeking major change. Reflecting reduced faith in the fairness of the elections, during the candidate registration period, December 24-December 30, 2011, 5,400 Iranians put their names forward to compete—33% fewer than those who filed candidacies four years ago. Only 10% were women. The leading reformist factions boycotted the elections, perceiving that the Council of Guardians was likely to limit voter choice to only hardline candidates. Perhaps justifying those fears, the Interior Ministry, the first body to screen candidates, disqualified 17% of the candidates as of January 24. The Council of Guardians, the
ultimate arbiter, reinstated some of those candidates and issued the final candidate list of 3,400 (for the 290 seats) on February 21, 2012. Amid reported worries that the Green Movement might become active during the campaign season, the regime tried unsuccessfully to recruit some reformists into the contest.

After the final candidate list was established, the regime used exhortations of nationalist obligations to try to encourage a large turnout. The reformist boycott left pro and anti-Ahmadinejad hardline factions to compete against each other. Ahmadinejad and his allies reportedly concentrated their efforts on rural areas where Ahmadinejad is relatively popular. The two pro-Khamene’i blocs that competed against his bloc—one centered around Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi (the Front of Stability of the Islamic Revolution) and another centered around Assembly of Experts chair Mahdavi-Kani (United Front of Conservatives, and included likely 2013 presidential candidates Qalibaf and Ali Larijani)—concentrated their efforts mainly in urban and suburban areas.

The regime announced a turnout of about 65%, which it asserted was a retort to international pressure and a sign of regime popularity. Khamene’i loyalists won a clear majority in it—and in a May 4, 2012, runoff for seats not determined—and control about 75% of the seats in the ninth Majles. Gholam Haddad Adel was nominated to return to the speaker role; his prominence is in part because of his relationship to Khamene’i. His daughter is married to Khamene’i’s son, Mojtaba, who is one of his top aides. However, reflecting its confidence in Larijani, the Majles voted to retain Larijani as speaker in late May 2012.

Next Presidential Election

Following the Majles elections, many experts concluded that the Supreme Leader had consolidated his authority and rendered Ahmadinejad virtually irrelevant in his final year in office. The date for the next presidential election has been set for June 14, 2012.

The widely mentioned candidates have been Ali Larijani and Mohammad Baqr Qalibaf, both well-known Khamene’i supporters. Of those two, Larijani has been considered favored. In August 2012, the Supreme Leader’s foreign policy advisor, former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, expressed interest in running. He is somewhat more moderate on most policies than either Larijani or Qalibaf, but Velayati has a long and close association with Khamene’i and would likely have his backing if he runs. Some speculate that Velayati would be able to garner Khamene’i’s backing for a nuclear compromise with the international community were he to become president. It is likely that Ahmadinejad’s ally Masha’i, discussed above, will not run—or be allowed to run—in the election. There has been some speculation that Rafsanjani, who has been rehabilitated politically by Khamene’i since mid-2012, might run again. Another potential candidate mentioned is Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi.

A question under debate is whether any reformist figure might run. Some experts believe that the regime seeks additional legitimacy and will try to induce a reformist, such as former Interior Minister Abdollah Nuri, to run. A reformist is unlikely to win the election because many reformists are certain to boycott the vote. Others believe that the Supreme Leader and his supporters want only pliable allies to run and do not want to risk another uprising if a reformist leader runs and is declared the loser.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

First non-cleric to be president of the Islamic republic since the assassination of then-president Mohammad Ali Rajai in August 1981. About 58, he asserts he is a “man of the people,” the son of a blacksmith who lives in modest circumstances, who would promote the interests of the poor and return government to the original principles of the Islamic revolution. Has burnished that image as president through regular visits to poor areas and through subsidies directed at the lower classes. His official biography says he served with the “special forces” of the Revolutionary Guard, and he served subsequently (late 1980s) as a deputy provincial governor. Although he is a member of the Builders of Islamic Iran party, he more closely identifies with a “Principalist” faction composed of former Guard and Basij (volunteer popular forces) leaders and other hardliners. U.S. intelligence reportedly determined he was not one of the holders of the 52 American hostages during November 1979-January 1981. Other accounts say Ahmadinejad believes his mission is to prepare for the return of the 12th Imam—Imam Mahdi—whose return from occultation would, according to Twelver Shiite doctrine, be accompanied by the establishment of Islam as the global religion. Earned clerical criticism in May 2008 for again invoking intervention by Imam Mahdi in present day state affairs. Following limited recount, declared winner of June 12, 2009, election. Well earlier, had been a controversial figure for inflammatory statements. He attracted significant world criticism for an October 26, 2005, Tehran conference entitled “A World Without Zionism” by stating that “Israel should be wiped off the map.” In an October 2006 address, Ahmadinejad said, “I have a connection with God.” He insisted on holding a December 2006 conference in Tehran questioning the Holocaust, a theme he has returned to several times since, including at a September 2007 speech at Columbia University. A U.N. Security Council statement and Senate and House resolutions (H.Res. 523 and S.Res. 292), passed by their respective chambers, condemned the statement. On June 21, 2007, the House passed H.Con.Res. 21, calling on the U.N. Security Council to charge Ahmadinejad with violating the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the Convention includes “direct and public incitement” of genocide as a punishable offense. On March 6, 2010, Ahmadinejad called the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States a “big lie” used to justify intervention in Afghanistan. During his September 24, 2012, speech to the U.N. General Assembly in New York, he repeated past assertions that Israel must be eliminated. In interviews connected to that visit, he continued to criticize homosexuality and those who oppose any further research on or questioning of the Holocaust. Was apparent target of an unsuccessful grenade attack on his motorcade in the city of Hamedan on August 4, 2010. As noted, has steadily lost influence as a result of a power struggle with the Supreme Leader since early 2011.

The Opposition

The popular uprising of 2009 constituted the most significant unrest faced by the regime since its inception in 1979. Many experts on Iran believe that the still seething opposition remains a key concern of the regime, particularly in the context of successful uprisings in the Arab world in 2011-2012 and the collapse of Iran’s currency, the rial, in October 2012. That latter event sparked major street demonstrations on October 3, 2012, the first demonstrations since early 2012. Still, the regime’s willingness to use force against unrest and the lack of clear leadership of the protest movement clouds the opposition’s prospects to mount a sustained return to the streets. Not all the opposition operates under the Green Movement banner; some opposition groups in exile or in Iran operate separately, and others act to further ethnic or other interests.

The Green Movement and Its Uprising

The Green Movement, the genesis of which was the post-presidential election protests as discussed above, is centered around educated, urban youth, intellectuals, and former regime officials. Perhaps accounting for its failure to challenge the regime over the past two years, it has been unable to incorporated many traditionally conservative groups such as older Iranians and Iranians who live in rural areas. It remains divided between those who believe the regime can be reformed and moderated, and those who believe it must be replaced outright by a more secular system of government.
The year 2009 was clearly “the high water mark” of the Green Movement to date. After the initial post-election daily protests, Green Movement members organized protests around major holidays and called openly for the downfall of the regime, rather than its reform. Some of the protests in late 2009 nearly overwhelmed regime security forces. Large protests were held on the July 9 anniversary of the suppression of the 1999 student riots; the August 5, 2009, inauguration of Ahmadinejad; September 18, 2009 (“Jerusalem Day”); November 4, 2009, (30th anniversary of the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran); and the Ashura holy day (December 27, 2009). The latter protest was marked by the seizure and burning of some police vehicles, and the refusal by some police to beat protesters; it spread to smaller cities and some clerics participated.

**Quiescence in 2010-2012 Despite Arab Spring**

The momentum of the Green Movement in late 2009 led some experts to predict the downfall of the regime, but the movement’s outward activity declined after its demonstration planned for the February 11, 2010, anniversary of the founding of the Islamic Republic (in 1979) was suppressed. With weeks to prepare, the regime limited opposition communication, made several hundred preemptive arrests, and executed some oppositionists in January 2010. Minor protests were held on March 16, 2010, a Zoroastrian holiday (Fire Festival), and there were scattered protests in major cities on May 1, 2010 (May Day). Musavi and Karrubi called for a huge demonstration on the June 12, 2010, anniversary of the election, but, sensing regime preparations for repression, the two publicly “called off” the protest in order to avoid harm to protesters.

A major question was whether the opposition uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, which toppled leaders there in January and February 2011, would reinvigorate the Green Movement, which has used similar social media techniques and has similar grievances. The regime, seeking to parry such parallels, praised the Tunisian and Egyptian events as inspired by Iran’s 1979 revolution, while Green Movement leaders compared those uprisings to their uprising in 2009. Musavi and Karrubi called for protests on February 14, 2011, and there were numerous clashes with tear-gas-wielding riot police in Tehran and other cities but, in advance of that demonstration, Karrubi and Musavi were placed under house arrest. Further weekly protests, which reportedly drew large numbers of protesters, were held from February 20, 2011 until Nowruz (March 21, 2011). But, no major demonstrations materialized at the 2011 second anniversary of the disputed election.

Despite these setbacks, observers in Iran say the Green Movement remains highly active underground. It conducted some significant protests on the February 14, 2012, anniversary of the February 14, 2011, protests. This occurred despite the January 2012 regime arrests of numerous journalists and bloggers. However, no additional protests erupted in the run-up to the March 2, 2012, Majles elections, in part because the Green Movement leaders boycotted the vote and their supporters did not have candidates to champion.

**Exiled Opposition Groups: Supporters of the Son of the Late Shah of Iran**

Some Iranian outside Iran, including in the United States, want to replace the regime with a constitutional monarchy led by Reza Pahlavi, the U.S.-based son of the late former Shah and a U.S.-trained combat pilot. The Shah’s son, who is about 57 years old, has delivered statements condemning the regime for the post-2009 election crackdown and he has called for international
governments to withdraw their representation from Tehran. He is supported by Iranian exile-run stations in California. A younger brother, Ali Reza Pahlavi, committed suicide in January 2011.

Pahlavi has always had some support particularly in the older generation in Iran, but he reportedly is trying to broaden his following as perceptions of regime vulnerability have increased since 2009. Since March 2011, he has been increasingly cooperating with—and possibly attempting to co-opt—younger Green Movement figures. In a meeting with the author in June 2011, Pahlavi indicated that an internationally provided “strike fund” would help Iranian labor rise up against the regime by protecting their incomes from regime retaliation. He also advocated establishing a large scale opposition radio station, funded presumably by wealthy Persian Gulf states. As of late 2012, he is said to be trying to assemble a “National Iranian Council” modeled on similar bodies representing the revolutions in Libya and Syria since early 2011.

Exiled Opposition Groups: People’s Mojahedin

Some groups have been committed to the replacement of the regime virtually since its inception, and have used violence to achieve their objectives. Their current linkages to the Green Movement are tenuous, if existing at all, and some indications suggest these movements want to dominate any coalition that might topple the regime.

One of the best-known exiled opposition groups is the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI). Secular and left-leaning, it was formed in the 1960s to try to overthrow the Shah of Iran and has been characterized by U.S. reports as attempting to blend several ideologies, including Marxism, feminism, and Islamism, although the organization denies that it ever advocated Marxism. It allied with pro-Khomeini forces during the Islamic revolution and, according to State Department reports, supported the November 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, although the group claims that it is the regime that alleged this support in order to discredit the group with the West. The group was driven into exile when it rose up against the Khomeini regime in September 1981. Even though it is an opponent of Tehran, since the late 1980s the State Department has refused contact with the PMOI and its umbrella organization, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). It is led by spouses Maryam and Masud Rajavi; Maryam, based in France, is the “President-elect” of the PMOI-led opposition. Masud is the longtime Secretary-General of the PMOI; his whereabouts are unknown.

The “De-Listing” the PMOI

The State Department designated the PMOI as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in October 1997 and the NCR was named as an alias of the PMOI in the October 1999 re-designation. In August 14, 2003, the State Department designated the NCR offices in the United States an alias of the PMOI, and NCR and the Justice Department closed down those offices.

6 Other names by which this group is known is the Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO) and the National Council of Resistance (NCR).
7 The designation was made under the authority of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132).
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses

The PMOI’s FTO designation has been widely debated for many years. The State Department’s annual reports on international terrorism, including the report for 2011 issued July 31, 2012, asserts that the organization—and not just a radical element of the organization as the group asserts—was responsible for the alleged killing of seven American military personnel and contract advisers to the former Shah during 1973-1976—including the deputy chief of the U.S. Military Mission in Tehran. The report also repeats allegations that the group was responsible for bombings at U.S. government facilities in Tehran in 1972 as a protest of the visit to Iran of then-President Richard Nixon, and bombings of U.S. corporate offices in Iran to protest the visit of Secretary of State Kissinger. The State Department report lists as terrorist acts numerous attacks by the group against regime targets, including major 1981 bombings that killed high ranking officials, and attacks on government facilities in Iran and abroad, and attacks on security officials in Iran. However, the report does not list any attacks by the group that purposely targets civilians—a key distinction that leads several experts to argue that the group should not be considered “terrorist.” And, the report does not state that the group has, as of mid-2001, fulfilled pledges to end all use of violence inside Iran. There are no reports that the group has—or is planning to—resume those activities. The group’s alliance with Saddam Hussein’s regime in the 1980s and 1990s has contributed to the U.S. criticism of the organization.

In challenging its FTO decision, the PMOI also asserted that, by retaining the group on the FTO list, the United States was unfairly preventing the PMOI from participating in the opposition movement. The regime accuses the group of involvement in the post-June 2009 presidential election violence, and some of those tried for mohareb since February 2010 are members of the organization, according to statements by human rights groups such as Amnesty International. It also pointed to legal successes in Europe. On January 27, 2009, the European Union (EU) removed the group from its terrorist group list; the group had been so designated by the EU in 2002. In May 2008, a British appeals court determined that the group should no longer be considered a terrorist organization on the grounds that the British government did not provide “any reliable evidence” that the PMOI would “resort to terrorist activities in the future.” In June 2003, France arrested about 170 opposition activists, including Maryam Rajavi. She was released and remains based in France, and is frequently received by European parliamentarians and other politicians in Europe. On May 12, 2011, France dropped charges against Mrs. Rajavi and 23 other PMOI activists who remained under investigation, saying there was no evidence the PMOI conducted or backed violence against civilians. Such action, in the view of the judges, constituted resistance, not terrorism.

In July 2008, the PMOI petitioned to the State Department that its designation be revoked on the grounds that it renounced any use of terrorism in 2001. The Department reaffirmed the listing in January 2009 and after a January 2010 review. On July 16, 2010, the Court of Appeals required the State Department to review the listing, ruling that the group had not been given proper opportunity to rebut allegations against it. On February 29, 2012, Secretary Clinton, at a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, stated that a “key factor” in the de-listing decision will be the group’s compliance with an agreement that its members leave Camp Ashraf, discussed below. That suggests that the department has determined that the group qualifies for removal on the technical issues of involvement in terrorism. However, the group continued to press in court for a decision to require the department to de-list it, and, in early June 2012, the Appeals Court gave the State Department until October 1, 2012, to decide on the FTO designation, although without prescribing how the Department should decide. On July 6, 2012, two State Department officials reiterated that the relocation from Ashraf (see below) is a key consideration in the FTO decision, and that the group must complete the move, which had stalled.
On September 28, 2012, maintaining there had not been confirmed acts of PMOI terrorism for more than a decade and that it had cooperated with the Ashraf move, the Secretary of State removed the group from the FTO list as well as from the designation as a terrorism supporter under Executive Order 13224. However, State Department officials, in a background briefing that day, said “We do not see the [PMOI] as a viable or democratic opposition movement…They are not part of our picture in terms of the future of Iran.” That appeared to counter those who advocate that the United States not only remove the group from the FTO list but also enter an alliance with it.

In an effort to obtain a favorable de-listing decision, supporters of the organization have reportedly been paying several former U.S. officials for panel appearances in which they supported de-listing the group. H.Res. 60, introduced January 26, 2011, “urges” the Secretary of State to remove the PMOI from the FTO list. It has nearly 100 co-sponsors.

**Camp Ashraf Issue**

The issue of group members in Iraq has long been a factor in U.S. policy toward the PMOI. U.S. forces attacked PMOI military installations in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom (March 2003) and negotiated a ceasefire with PMOI military elements in Iraq, requiring the approximately 3,400 PMOI fighters to remain confined to their Ashraf camp near the border with Iran. Its weaponry was placed in storage, guarded first by U.S. and now by Iraqi personnel. Another 200 Ashraf residents took advantage of an arrangement between Iran and the ICRC for them to return to Iran if they disavow further PMOI activities; none is known to have been persecuted since returning.

In July 2004, the United States granted the Ashraf detainees “protected persons” status under the 4th Geneva Convention. However, that designation ended in June 2004 when Iraq formally reassumed full sovereignty from a U.S.-led occupation authority. The U.S.-led, U.N. supported security mandate in Iraq was replaced on January 1, 2009, by a bilateral U.S.-Iraq agreement that limits U.S. flexibility in Iraq. The group long feared that Iraqi control of the camp would lead to the expulsion of the group to Iran. The Iraqi government tried to calm those fears in January 2009 by saying that it would adhere to all international obligations not to do so, but that trust was reduced on July 28, 2009, when Iraq used force to overcome resident resistance to setting up a police post in the camp. Eleven residents of the camp were killed.

The PMOI’s fears for Ashraf residents heightened on July 1, 2010, when the Iraqi Security Forces assumed full physical control over Ashraf and the U.S. military post near the camp closed, although U.S. forces in Iraq continued to periodically visit the camp to monitor conditions. On April 2, 2011, with a U.S. military unit overseeing the rotation, the Iraqi government changed the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) brigade that guards Ashraf, triggering PMOI warnings. The U.S. unit departed on April 7, 2011 and clashes between the Iraqi force and camp residents took place on April 8; U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Navanethem Pillay largely confirmed PMOI claims that 35 Ashraf residents were killed and that Iraqi forces were at fault. The State Department issued a statement attributing the deaths to the actions of Iraq and its military.8

After the clash, Iraqi officials reiterated their commitment to close Ashraf at the end of 2011 (following a full U.S. withdrawal from Iraq), but said such closing would be done in co-operation

with the United Nations and other international organizations. On May 16, 2011, the United States offered to help relocate camp residents before Iraq closes it and, in early July 2011, then U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Jim Jeffrey called on the Ashraf residents to disband and seek refugee status elsewhere in Iraq. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) declared the residents “asylum seekers” and offered to assess each resident in an effort to resettle them elsewhere. The top U.N. envoy in Iraq, Martin Kobler, offered to mediate between the Ashraf residents and the Iraqi government and called on the Iraqi government to postpone its end of 2011 deadline to close the camp. Ambassador Daniel Fried was appointed in November 2011 as the Obama Administration’s coordinator on the Ashraf issue.

In late December 2011, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki extended the deadline for relocation to late as April 2012, and the Iraqi government and the United Nations announced agreement to relocate the residents to former U.S. military base Camp Liberty, near Baghdad International Airport. The PMOI, which had demanded safeguards for their transfer, subsequently announced acceptance of the deal and the move to Camp Liberty (renamed Camp Hurriya). About 2,000 Ashraf residents had relocated as of mid-May 2012, and about 1,200 remained at Ashraf, at which time the PMOI stopped further relocations claiming that conditions at Camp Liberty can’t accommodate more residents. In mid-June, and again at the July 6, 2012, briefing by Fried and Coordinator for Counterterrorism Daniel Benjamin (mentioned above), the State Department reiterated that the Secretary of State has linked the PMOI’s cooperation with the relocation to a decision to take the PMOI from the FTO list, and implied it would not come off the FTO list unless it completes the move. In mid-August 2012, the PMOI resumed the relocation process and largely completed it by September 17, 2012, leaving only a residual group of about 280 PMOI persons at Ashraf to dispose of its property.

The U.N. High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) is conducting refugee status determinations for all the residents after they relocate. As of early October 2012, several hundred have been interviewed. Two have left Camp Liberty through their links to European countries, not through the resettlement process.

In the aftermath of the April 8, 2011, clashes, H.Res. 231 was introduced, calling on the President to undertake “all necessary and appropriate steps” to ensure the safety and protection of the Ashraf residents. Another bill, H.Res. 332, introduced June 24, 2011, called for a congressional investigation of the incident.

**Armed Groups: Pro-Monarchy Radicals**

One issue that has arisen in 2010 is that a pro-monarchist armed group in Iran, called *Tondar* (Thunder)/Kingdom Assembly of Iran is accused of conducting attacks inside Iran. One attack, a bombing of a mosque in Shiraz that took place in April 2008, killed 14 Iranian worshippers, including some children. There are some allegations that Iranians living in California are directing the group’s activities in Iran.

**Ethnic or Religiously Based Armed Groups**

Some armed groups are operating in Iran’s border areas, and are generally composed of ethnic or religious minorities. These groups are not known to be cooperating with the mostly Persian members of the Green Movement. One such group is *Jundullah*, composed of Sunni Muslims primarily from the Baluchistan region bordering Pakistan. The region is inhabited by members of
the Baluch minority and is far less developed than other parts of Iran. On the grounds that Jundullah has attacked civilians in the course of violent attacks in Iran, it was formally placed on the U.S. of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on November 4, 2010. Some saw the designation as an overture toward the Iranian government, while others saw it as a sign that the United States does not support ethnic or sectarian opposition groups that use violence, but only groups that are committed to peaceful protest.

As noted in the State Department terrorism report for 2010, released August 18, 2011, since mid-2006, it has conducted several successful attacks on Iranian security and civilian officials. One of its most widely noted terrorist attacks was a May 2009 bombing of a mosque in Zahedan, which it claimed constituted revenge for the poor treatment of Sunnis in Iran. On October 18, 2009, it claimed responsibility for killing five Revolutionary Guard commanders during a meeting they were holding with local groups in Sistan va Baluchistan Province. The regime claimed a major victory against the group in late February 2010 by announcing the capture of Jundullah’s top leader, Abdolmalek Rigi. The regime executed him in June 2010, and the group retaliated in July 2010 with another major bombing in Zahedan, which killed 28 persons, including some Revolutionary Guards. Secretary of State Clinton publicly condemned this bombing. The group is believed responsible for a December 15, 2010, bombing at a mosque in Chahbahar, also in the Baluchistan region, that killed 38 persons.

An armed Kurdish group operating out of Iraq is the Free Life Party, known by its acronym PJAK. Its leader is believed to be Abdul Rahman Hajji Ahmadi, born in 1941, who is a citizen of Germany and lives in that country. Many PJAK members are said to be women, who support the organization’s dedication to women’s rights. PJAK was designated by the Treasury Department in early February 2009 as a terrorism supporting entity under Executive Order 13224, although the designation statement indicated the decision was based mainly on PJAK’s association with the Turkish Kurdish opposition group Kongra Gel, also known as the PKK. The five Kurds executed by Iran’s regime in May 2010 were alleged members of PJAK.

In June 2010, Iran conducted some shelling of reputed PJAK bases inside Iraq, reportedly killing some Kurdish civilians. It repeated that activity in July 2011. On September 26, 2011, Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan said that Iran and Turkey are planning joint operations against the Iraq-based hideouts of these Kurdish opposition groups. Some reports in March 2012 said that PJAK may have reached a ceasefire agreement with the Iranian regime.

Another militant group, the Ahwazi Arabs, operates in the largely Arab-inhabited areas of southwest Iran, bordering Iraq. Its activity level appears to have been scant over the past few years.

**Iranian-American Interest Groups**

Of the more than 1 million Iranian Americans of differing ideologies, a vast majority want to see a change of regime in Tehran. By all accounts, a large number support the Green Movement, although many Iranian Americans are not politically active and focus on their businesses and personal issues. As many as half of all Iranian Americans are based in the Los Angeles area, and they run at least two dozen small-scale radio or television stations that broadcast into Iran. Many of them protest Ahmadinejad’s visits to the United Nations General Assembly every September, and many others sport green bracelets showing support for the Green Movement.
National Iranian-American Council, Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans (PAAIA) and Others

Some U.S.-based organizations, such as The National Iranian-American Council (NIAC) and the Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans (PAAIA), are not necessarily seeking change within Iran. The stated mission of NIAC, composed largely of Iranian Americans, is to promote discussion of U.S. policy. The group advocates engagement with Iran, supports easing some U.S. sanctions against Iran, opposes removing the People’s Mojahedin (see below) from the U.S. list of terrorist organizations, and has warned that some U.S. experts are seeking to convince the Administration to take military action against Iran. These positions have led some experts and commentators to allege, although without providing supporting evidence, that it is a front for the Iranian regime. On the other hand, NIAC has criticized the regime’s human rights abuses.

PAAIA’s mission is to discuss issues affecting Iranian Americans, such as discrimination caused by public perceptions of association with terrorism or radical Islam. Some observers believe it has been less active in 2011-2012 than it was in the two previous years, perhaps because of desertions by some who wanted PAAIA to take a stronger stand against the regime in Tehran.

Another U.S.-based group, the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, appears supportive of the Green Movement. Believed close to Karrubi and Musavi, it is headed by Hadi Ghaemi. Former CNN anchor Rudi Bahktiar, a relative of the Shah’s last prime minister, Shahpour Bakhtiar, has been part of the group. She is an adviser at the Voice of America’s Persian News Network (PNN), discussed further below.

Other Human Rights Practices

International criticism of Iran’s human rights practices predates and transcends the crackdown against the Green Movement. Table 3, which discusses the regime’s record on a number of human rights issues, is based largely on the latest State Department human rights report (for 2011: May 24, 2012)9 and the State Department International Religious Freedom report (for July-December 2010: September 13, 2011). These reports cite Iran for a wide range of serious abuses—aside from its suppression of political opponents—including unjust executions, politically motivated abductions by security forces, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and arrests of women’s rights activists. Some human rights groups, including Human Rights Watch, believe that a revised Iranian penal code under consideration in Iran’s governing bodies leaves in place much of the legal framework that the regime uses to prosecute dissidents, although the draft revisions might limit child executions.10

Criticism of Iran’s Record in U.N. Bodies

The post-election crackdown on the Green Movement was a focus of the U.N. four-year review of Iran’s human rights record that took place in mid-February 2010 in Geneva. Despite the criticism, on April 29, 2010, Iran acceded to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, after earlier dropping its attempt to win a seat on the higher-profile U.N. General Assembly Human Rights

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Council. Still, on June 10, 2010, Iran was formally questioned by the U.N. Human Rights Council about its record. On November 19, 2010, by a vote of 74-48, with 59 countries abstaining, the General Assembly’s “Third Committee” expressed “deep concern” about Iran’s forms of punishments and other abuses.

Iran has an official body, the High Council for Human Rights, headed by former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Larijani (brother of the Majles speaker and the judiciary head). However, as noted in the State Department human rights report, the Council largely acts to defend the government’s actions against dissidents to outside bodies and the Iranian public, and does not act as an oversight body urging that Iran meet international standards of human rights practices.

Special U.N. Rapporteur Reestablished

On February 28, 2011, in remarks at the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva, Secretary Clinton said the United States is working with Sweden and other countries to reconstitute a Special Rapporteur to report on Iranian human rights abuses. Such a mission existed during the from 1988-2002, but Iran tended to offer little, if any, cooperation with the various Rapporteurs who investigated the issue during that time. On March 24, 2011, the U.N. Human Rights Council voted, 22 to 7, to reestablish a Special Rapporteur for Iran’s human rights situation. On June 17, 2011, former Maldives Foreign Minister Ahmad Shaheed was appointed to this role, but he has said Iran has not, to date, provided him the requested cooperation such as permitting him to conduct fact-finding visits to Iran. The Rapporteur issued his first report on September 23, 2011 (U.N. Document Number A/66/374: “The Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran”), and a subsequent report on March 6, 2012 (A/HRC/19/66). Both reports cite many of the same abuses as do the State Department reports mentioned above.

On November 21, 2011, the U.N. General Assembly’s Third Committee, by a vote of 86-32, with 59 abstentions, approved a resolution asserting that Iran must cooperate with the efforts of the Special Rapporteur to assess the human rights situation in Iran. The full Assembly approved the resolution on December 19, 2011, by a vote of 89-30 with 64 abstentions.

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<th>Table 3. Human Rights Practices: General Categories</th>
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<td>Group/Issue</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic and Religious Breakdown</td>
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<td>Media Freedoms</td>
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<td>Labor Restrictions</td>
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<td>Women</td>
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<th>Group/Issue</th>
<th>Regime Practice/Recent Developments</th>
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<tr>
<td>Religious Freedom</td>
<td>chador, but enforcement has reportedly relaxed in 2011-2012. Women do not have inheritance or divorce rights equal to that of men, and their court testimony carries half the weight of a male’s.</td>
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<td>Each year since 1999, the State Department religious freedom report has named Iran as a “Country of Particular Concern” under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). No sanctions have been added under IRFA, on the grounds that Iran is already subject to extensive U.S. sanctions. Continued deterioration in religious freedom noted in the International Religious Freedom report for the second half of 2010, which stated that “Government rhetoric and actions created a threatening atmosphere for nearly all non-Shia religious groups, most notably for Bahais, as well as Sufi Muslims, evangelical Christians, Jews, and Shia groups that do not share the government’s official religious views.”</td>
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<td>Baha’is</td>
<td>Iran is repeatedly cited for virtually unrelenting repression of the Baha’i community, which Iran’s Shiite Muslim clergy views as a heretical sect, which numbers about 300,000-350,000. At least 30 Baha’is remain imprisoned. Several were sentenced to death in February 2010. Seven Baha’i leaders were sentenced to 20 years in August 2010; their sentences were reduced in September 2010 to 10 years but the full sentence was restored on appeal. In the 1990s, several Baha’is were executed for apostasy (Bahman Samandari in 1992; Musa Talibi in 1996; and Ruhollah Ruhan in 1998). Another, Dhabihullah Mahrami, was in custody since 1995 and died of unknown causes in prison in December 2005. Virtually every year, congressional resolutions have condemned Iran’s treatment of the Baha’is.</td>
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<td>Jews</td>
<td>Along with Christians, a “recognized minority,” with one seat in the Majles, the 30,000-member Jewish community (the largest in the Middle East aside from Israel) enjoys somewhat more freedoms than Jewish communities in several other Muslim states. However, in practice the freedom of Iranian Jews to practice their religion is limited, and Iranian Jews remain reluctant to speak out for fear of reprisals. During 1993-1998, Iran executed five Jews allegedly spying for Israel. In June 1999, Iran arrested 13 Jews (mostly teachers, shopkeepers, and butchers) from the Shiraz area that it said were part of an “espionage ring” for Israel. After a 2000 trial, 10 of the Jews and 2 Muslim accomplices were convicted and given sentences ranging from 4 to 13 years. An appeals panel reduced the sentences, and all were released by April 2003. On November 17, 2008, Iran hanged businessman Ali Ashtari (a Muslim), who was arrested in 2006, for allegedly providing information on Iran’s nuclear program to Israel.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Azeris</td>
<td>Azeris are one-quarter of the population and are mostly well integrated into government and society, but many Azeris complain of ethnic and linguistic discrimination. Each year, there are arrests of Azeri students and cultural activists who press for their right to celebrate their culture and history. The government generally accuses these activists of promoting revolution or separatism.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>There are about 5 million-11 million Kurds in Iran. The Kurdish language is not banned, but schools do not teach it and Kurdish political organizations, activists, and media outlets are routinely scrutinized, harassed, and closed down for supporting greater Kurdish autonomy. Several Kurdish oppositionists have been executed since 2010.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>Ethnic Arabs are prominent in southwestern Iran, particularly Khuzestan Province. The 2 million to 4 million Arabs in Iran encounter oppression and discrimination, including torture and a prohibition on speaking or studying Arabic.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Trafficking</td>
<td>The June 19, 2012 (latest), State Department “Trafficking in Persons” report, for the seventh consecutive year, places Iran in Tier 3 (worst level) for failing to take significant action to prevent trafficking in persons. Iranian women, boys, and girls are trafficked for sexual exploitation in Iran as well to Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, and Europe, possibly with the involvement of religious leaders and immigration officials.</td>
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses

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<td>Executions Policy</td>
<td>Human rights groups say executions have increased sharply since the dispute over the June 2009 election. The State Department human rights report for 2011 said there were between 275 and 700 executions during 2011—disparate figures cited by various human rights organizations. The numbers included several persons for crimes committed when they were minors. Iran is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and is obligated to cease the executions of minors. As noted above, a revised penal code under consideration would prevent child executions in many, but not all, circumstances.</td>
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<td>Stonings</td>
<td>In 2002, the head of Iran’s judiciary issued a ban on stoning. However, Iranian officials later called that directive “advisory” and could be ignored by individual judges. On December 2, 2008, Iran confirmed the stoning deaths of two men in Mashhad who were convicted of adultery. A sentence of stoning against a 45-year-old woman (Sakineh Ashtiani) convicted of adultery and assisting in the murder of her husband was set aside for further review in July 2010. An Iranian parliamentarian said on January 17, 2011, the stoning sentence was dropped but she would serve 10 years in prison.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arrests of Dual Nationals and Foreign Nationals/Robert Levinson/ the American Hikers</td>
<td>An Iranian American journalist, Roxanna Saberi, was arrested in January 2009 allegedly because her press credentials had expired; was charged on April 9, 2009, with espionage for possessing an Iranian military document. Sentenced to eight years in jail, she was released on appeal on May 12, 2009, and left Iran.</td>
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**Iran’s Strategic Capabilities and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs**

The Obama Administration views Iran as one of the key national security challenges facing the United States. This assessment, made clear repeatedly by senior U.S. officials, is based largely on suspicions about Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and its perceived intent and ability to counter U.S. objectives in the region. A nuclear armed Iran, in the view of U.S. and Persian Gulf state officials, would be more assertive than it now is in trying to influence the foreign and energy policies of the Persian Gulf states and in supporting countries and movements that oppose U.S. interests and allies. Iran would likely conclude that the United States would hesitate to take military action against—or undertake any action to try to change the regime of—a nuclear armed Iran. A nuclear-armed Iran would also likely cause other countries in the region to try to acquire a countervailing nuclear capability—stimulating a nuclear arms race in one of the world’s most volatile regions. Israel views an Iranian nuclear weapon as a threat to its existence.

Others see Iran’s foreign policy as primarily defensive. Some believe Iran’s core national security goals are to protect itself from foreign, primarily U.S., interference or attack; to prevent any
efforts to cut off its ability to export oil; and to exert regional influence that Iran believes is commensurate with its size and concept of nationhood.

Conventional Military/Revolutionary Guard/Qods Force

Iran’s armed forces are extensive but they are widely considered relatively combat ineffective in a head-on confrontation against a well-trained, sophisticated military such as that of the United States or even a major regional power such as Turkey. Iran is believed to largely lack the logistical ability to deploy ground forces much beyond its borders. However, a 2012 Defense Department report, required by P.L. 111-84, reported growing lethality and survivability of Iran’s ballistic and cruise missiles, suggesting the Defense Department assesses a higher level of conventional threat from Iran as compared to a similar DOD report in 2010.\textsuperscript{11} The 2012 assessment raises the question of whether Iran possesses the capability to close the strategic Strait of Hormuz, where about one-third of all seaborne traded oil flows—an issue that has gained greater urgency in 2012 as Iranian leaders and commanders talked openly of trying to do so as a retaliation for international sanctions against Iran’s oil exports. The Iranian armed forces are sufficiently effective to deter or fend off any threats, should they emerge, from Iran’s weaker neighbors such as post-war Iraq, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Afghanistan.

Organizationally, Iran’s armed forces are divided to perform functions appropriate to their roles in Iran. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, known in Persian as the Sepah-e-Pasdaran Enghelab Islami)\textsuperscript{12} controls the Basij (Mobilization of the Oppressed) volunteer militia that has been the main instrument to repress Green Movement protests in Iran. The IRGC and the regular military (Artesh) report to a joint headquarters, headed by Dr. Hassan Firuzabadi. The Artesh has no role in internal security and is deployed mainly at bases outside major cities.

The IRGC Navy and regular Navy (Islamic Republic of Iran Navy, IRIN) are distinct forces; the IRIN has responsibility for the Gulf of Oman, whereas the IRGC Navy has responsibility for the closer-in Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. The regular Air Force controls most of Iran’s combat aircraft, whereas the IRGC Air Force has come to focus primarily on developing Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities.

Iran’s armed forces have few formal relationships with foreign militaries, but Iran and India have a “strategic dialogue” and some Iranian naval officers reportedly have undergone some training in India. Most of Iran’s other military-to-military relationships, such as with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, North Korea, and a few others, generally center on Iranian arms purchases or upgrades, although such activity is now banned by U.N. Resolution 1929 of June 2010. In early September 2012, Iran and North Korea signed a new agreement to cooperate on science and technology, raising concerns about potential additional North Korean support to Iran’s nuclear program.


Table 4. Iran’s Conventional Military Arsenal

| Military Personnel: | 460,000+. Regular ground force is about 220,000, Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) ground force is about 130,000. Remainder are regular and IRGC navy (18,000 and 20,000 personnel respectively) and Air Forces (52,000 regular Air Force personnel and 5,000 Guard Air Force personnel.) About 12,000 air defense. |
| Security Forces: | About 40,000-60,000 law enforcement forces on duty, with another 600,000 Basij security/paramilitary forces available for combat or internal security missions. |
| Tanks: | 1,800+ Includes 480 Russian-made T-72 |
| Ships: | 100+ (IRGC and regular Navy) Includes 4 Corvette; 18 IRGC-controlled Chinese-made patrol boats, several hundred small boats.) Also has 3 Kilo subs (reg. Navy controlled). 2012 DOD report says Iran may have acquired additional ships and submarines over the past two years, but does not stipulate a supplier, if any. |
| Midget Subs: | Iran has been long said to possess several small subs, possibly purchased assembled or in kit form from North Korea. Iran claimed on November 29, 2007, to have produced a new small sub equipped with sonar-evading technology, and it claimed to deploy four Iranian-made “Ghadir class” subs to the Red Sea in June 2011. |
| Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs): | 150+ I-Hawk plus possibly some Stinger |
| Anti-aircraft Missile Systems: | Russia delivered to Iran (January 2007) 30 anti-aircraft missile systems (Tor M1), worth over $1 billion. In September 2006, Ukraine agreed to sell Iran the Kolchuga radar system that can improve Iran’s detection of combat aircraft. In December 2007, Russia agreed to sell the highly capable S-300 (also known as SA-20 “Gargoyle”) air defense system, which would greatly enhance Iran’s air defense capability. The value of the deal is estimated at $800 million. The system is a ground-to-air missile whose sale to Iran would, according to most experts, not technically violate the provisions of U.N. Resolution 1929, because the system is not covered in the “U.N. Registry on Conventional Arms. However, on September 22, 2010, Russian President Medvedev signed a decree banning the supply of the system to Iran is banned by Resolution 1929. In November, Iran claimed to have deployed its own version (Mersad) of the Russian S-200 air defense system and said in September 2012 that it has completed 30% of a missile defense network similar to the S-300. In August 2011, Iran sued Russia at the International Court of Justice for non-delivery of the system. |
| Defense Budget: | About 3% of GDP |

Sources: IISS Military Balance—Section on Middle East and North Africa, and various press reports; April 2010 and April 2012 DOD reports on military power of Iran,” cited earlier.
Table 5. The Revolutionary Guard

The IRGC is generally loyal to Iran’s hardliners politically and is clearly more politically influential than is Iran’s regular military, which is numerically larger, but was held over from the Shah’s era. IRGC influence has grown sharply as the regime has relied on it to suppress dissent to the point where Secretary of State Clinton sees it as wielding preponderant influence. As described in a 2009 Rand Corporation study, “Founded by a decree from Ayatollah Khomeini shortly after the victory of the 1978-1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has evolved well beyond its original foundations as an ideological guard for the nascent revolutionary regime. Today the IRGC functions as an expansive socio-political-economic conglomerate whose influence extends into virtually every corner of Iranian political life and society. Bound together by the shared experience of war and the socialization of military service, the Pasdaran have articulated a populist, authoritarian, and assertive vision for the Islamic Republic of Iran that they maintain is a more faithful reflection of the revolution’s early ideals. The IRGC’s presence is particularly powerful in Iran’s highly factionalized political system, in which [many senior figures] hail from the ranks of the IRGC. Outside the political realm, the IRGC oversees a robust apparatus of media resources, training activities, education programs designed to bolster loyalty to the regime, prepare the citizenry for homeland defense, and burnish its own institutional credibility vis-à-vis other factional actors.”

Through its Qods (Jerusalem) Force, the IRGC has a foreign policy role in exerting influence throughout the region by supporting pro-Iranian movements, as discussed further below. The Qods Force numbers approximately 10,000-15,000 personnel who provide advice, support, and arrange weapons deliveries to pro-Iranian factions in Lebanon, Iraq, Persian Gulf states, Gaza/West Bank, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. IRGC leaders have confirmed it is operating in Syria to assist the regime of Bashar al-Assad against an armed uprising. It also operates a worldwide intelligence network to give Iran possible terrorist option and to assist in procurement of WMD-related technology. The Qods Force commander, Brigadier General Qassem Soleimani, is said to have his own independent channel to Supreme Leader Khamenei’s, bypassing the IRGC and Joint Staff command structure. The Qods Force commander during 1988-1995 was Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, confirmed as defense minister on September 3, 2009. He led the Qods Force when it allegedly assisted two bombings of Israeli and Jewish targets in Buenos Aires (he is wanted by Interpol for a role in the 1994 bombing there); recruited Saudi Hezbollah activists later accused of the June 1996 Khobar Towers bombing; and assassinated Iranian dissident leaders in Europe in the early 1990s. IRGC leadership developments are significant because of the political influence of the IRGC. On September 2, 2007, Khamenei named Mohammad Ali Jafari as commander in chief of the Guard; Jafari is considered a hardliner against political dissent and increasingly at odds with Ahmadinejad in the context of Ahmadinejad-Khamenei’s political power struggle. The Basij reports to the IRGC commander in chief; its leader is Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi. It operates from thousands of positions in Iran’s institutions. Command reshuffles in July 2008 integrated the Basij more closely with provincially based IRGC units and increased the Basij role in internal security. In November 2009, the regime gave the IRGC’s intelligence units greater authority, perhaps surpassing those of the Ministry of Intelligence, in monitoring dissent. The IRGC Navy has responsibility to patrol the Strait of Hormuz and the regular Navy has responsibility for the broader Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman (deeper waters further off the coast).

As noted, the IRGC is also increasingly involved in Iran’s economy, acting through a network of contracting businesses it has set up, most notably Ghorb (also called Khatem ol-Anbiya, Persian for “Seal of the Prophet”). Active duty IRGC senior commanders reportedly serve on Ghorb’s board of directors and its commander, Rostam Ghasemi, became oil minister in August 2011. In September 2009, the Guard bought a 50% stake in Iran Telecommunication Company at a cost of $7.8 billion. In the past five years, Guard affiliated firms have won 750 oil and gas and construction contracts, and the Guard has its own civilian port facilities. However, Ghorb pulled out of a contract to develop part of the large South Pars gas field in July 2010, citing the impact of expanded U.S. and international sanctions, which might have caused foreign partner firms to refuse to cooperate with Ghorb.

On October 21, 2007, the Treasury Department designated several IRGC companies as proliferation entities under Executive Order 13382. Also that day, the IRGC as a whole, the Ministry of Defense, several IRGC commanders, and several Iranian banks were sanctioned under that same executive order. Simultaneously, the Qods Force was named as a terrorism supporting entity under Executive Order 13224. These orders freeze the U.S.-based assets and prevent U.S. transactions with the named entities, but these entities are believed to have virtually no U.S.-based assets. On June 9, 2011, the IRGC and Basij were named as human rights abusers under Executive Order 13553, with the same penalties as the above Executive Orders.

Nuclear Program and Related International Diplomacy

International attention to Iran’s nuclear program intensified in late 2002, when Iran confirmed PMOI allegations that Iran was building two facilities that could potentially be used to produce fissile material useful for a nuclear weapon: a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant at Arak, considered ideal for the production of plutonium.

The United States and its partners state that they accept Iran’s right to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but that Iran must verifiably demonstrate that its nuclear program is for only those purposes. Iran has been producing low-enriched uranium (3.5%-5%, suitable only for electricity production) since 2002 and more recently has been enriching to 20% (which Iran says is being used to produce medical isotopes), as discussed below. To construct an actual nuclear weapon, Iran would have to produce highly enriched uranium (90%+) and master the complicated capability to trigger a nuclear detonation.

Iran’s Nuclear Intentions

U.S. officials have stated on several occasions in 2012 that the United States believes Iran has not, to date, made a decision to construct a nuclear weapon. However, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports indicate that Iran has not satisfactorily addressed IAEA information that Iran might have a nuclear weapons program. Several pre-2011 IAEA reports describe Iranian documents that show a possible involvement of Iran’s military in the program. This issue garnered heightened attention after the IAEA released its November 8, 2011, report that contained an extensive annex laying out the IAEA’s information on Iran’s apparent efforts to acquire the knowledge required to weaponize highly enriched uranium, and on some possible facilities Iran had constructed that could be used for that effort. The annex discussed the IAEA’s sources, purported foreign scientific assistance to the experimentation, and Iran’s management structure for a weapons program. Based on the report, on November 18, 2011, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution expressing “deep and increasing concern” about Iran’s nuclear program. The vote was 32 in favor, 2 against (Cuba, Ecuador), and 1 abstention (Indonesia).

After repeatedly refusing to discuss the IAEA information, in January 2012 Iran agreed to host an IAEA team to discuss the allegations during January 29-31, 2012. That visit, as well as a subsequent IAEA visit during February 20-21, 2012, did not satisfy the IAEA on the question of Iran’s nuclear weapons research. In particular, Iran did not allow the IAEA team, in either trip, to visit the Parchin military base where the IAEA suspects some research on nuclear explosive technology may have taken place. The site was inspected twice in 2005. IAEA Director Yukiya Amano, following an unexpected visit to Iran on May 21, 2012, announced an agreement in principle under which Iran would allow inspections of Parchin and clear up outstanding questions about its suspected nuclear weapons design work. However, amid IAEA accusations that Iran may have cleaned up parts of the Parchin facility, no pact was finalized and IAEA-Iran talks to make the agreement final broke down in late August 2012. That breakdown formed the basis of another IAEA Board of Governors resolution criticizing Iran for non-cooperation; it was adopted

13 In November 2006, the IAEA, at U.S. urging, declined to provide technical assistance to the Arak facility on the grounds that it was likely for proliferation purposes.
on September 13, 2012, with 31 countries in favor, Cuba against, and Ecuador, Tunisia, and Egypt abstaining.

Iran’s Position and Counter-Arguments

Iranian leaders continue to deny they are trying to achieve a nuclear weapons capability and that that IAEA information demonstrates little more than that some of its scientists may have performed nuclear weapons calculations on computers. They assert that Iran’s nuclear program is for medical uses and electricity generation, given finite oil and gas resources, and that enrichment is its “right” as a party to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They cite studies, including an analysis by the National Academy of Sciences, that Iran might have negligible exports of oil by 2015. U.S. officials have said that Iran’s gas resources make nuclear energy unnecessary.

Iran professes that WMD is inconsistent with its ideology. In 2003, the Supreme Leader Khamene’i issued a formal pronouncement (fatwas) that nuclear weapons are un-Islamic. On February 22, 2012, he expanded on that concept in a speech saying that the production of and use of a nuclear weapon is prohibited as a “great sin,” and that stockpiling such weapons is “futile, expensive, and harmful.” He repeated this formulation in an August 30, 2012, speech to the Non-Aligned Movement summit meeting in Tehran.

Iran’s assertions of a purely peaceful program have been met with widespread skepticism, not only because of the activities discussed above but also because Iran’s governing factions appear to perceive a nuclear weapons capability as a means of ending Iran’s perceived historic vulnerability to invasion and domination by great powers, and as a symbol of Iran as a major nation. Others believe a nuclear weapon represents the instrument with which Iran intends to intimidate its neighbors and dominate the Persian Gulf region. Still others believe regime leaders see a nuclear weapon as insurance that domestic or international opponents will end perceived attempts to displace the regime. There are also fears Iran might transfer WMD to extremist groups or countries.

Some Iranian strategists appear to agree with U.S. assertions that a nuclear weapon will not deliver Iran absolute security, but will instead make Iran less secure. According to this view, moving toward a nuclear weapons capability will bring Iran further sanctions, military containment, U.S. attempted interference in Iran, and efforts by neighbors to develop countervailing capabilities. Some Green Movement leaders have positions on the nuclear issue similar to those of regime leaders, but many Green Movement factions see the nuclear program as an impediment to eventual reintegration with the West.

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Nuclear Weapons Time Frame Estimates

If Iran were to pursue a nuclear weapon, estimates differ as to when Iran might achieve that capability. Secretary of Defense Panetta said on January 29, 2012, that Iran could produce a nuclear weapon within about one year of a decision to do so, and a delivery vehicle for that weapon one to two years after that. Some outside groups, such as the Institute for Science and International Security, in a study released in early October 2012, have similar assessments. These estimates take into account technical difficulties, possibly caused by Western activities and international sanctions, as well as reported covert action (discussed further below), that might have delayed a nuclear-armed Iran. National Security Adviser Donilon stated in his Brookings Institution speech on November 22, 2011, that sanctions and other difficulties “have succeeded in slowing [Iran’s] nuclear program.” Among these difficulties is the effect of a deliberate computer virus (Stuxnet) in September-October 2010 that appeared to target Iranian nuclear facility computers by altering their spin rate,19 although IAEA reports since 2011 indicate that Iran overcame these effects.

A separate but related issue is the ability of the United States and IAEA to detect an all-out effort by Iran to develop an actual nuclear weapon. Defense Secretary Panetta said on September 11, 2012, that the United States has “pretty good intelligence” on Iran’s nuclear program. The crucial role of the IAEA in helping determine whether Iran is trying to construct a weapon explains why many experts are concerned that Iran might reduce cooperation with the IAEA. Those concerns have been raised since September 18, 2012, when its nuclear chief, Abbas Davani, accused unspecified attackers of trying to sabotage the electricity supply to Iran’s nuclear facilities—an accusation that came at the time of an IAEA visit to the country. In addition, some Iranian parliamentarians and officials have openly threatened to reduce cooperation with the IAEA.20

Status of Enrichment

Sparking further concerns among several governments is the steady progress of Iran’s enrichment program, and the August 30, 2012, IAEA report indicates that enrichment has continued. Thus far, according to that report, Iran has a stockpile of enough low-enriched (3.5%—5% uranium (15,100 lbs+) to produce as many as five nuclear weapons, if it were to enrich that stockpile to weapons grade. It has a stockpile of about 417 lbs of 20% enriched uranium—up about 60% from the amounts reported in the previously quarterly IAEA report—but still not enough to produce a nuclear weapon if it were using only that stockpile.21 Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in his U.N. General Assembly speech on September 27, 2012, indicated that Iran’s accumulation of enough 20% enriched uranium for one weapon might constitute a “red line” that should be stipulated as likely to trigger military action to prevent any further progress. However, according to the August 30, 2012, IAEA report, some of the 20% enriched uranium has been used to fabricate fuel rods that could not be used to produce weapons-grade uranium. To some extent, this has undercut the Israeli and other arguments that Iran is accumulating 20% enriched uranium for the purpose of developing a nuclear weapon.

19 For information on Stuxnet and its origins and effects, see Broad William, John Markoff and David Sanger. “Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay.” New York Times, January 15, 2011.
Some of the enrichment to 20% is taking place at the heavily fortified Fordow site that Iran admitted in September 2009 (after discovery by Western intelligence) that it had developed. The August 30, 2012, IAEA report said Iran had added about 1,000 centrifuges at that site, although they are not yet operational. The IAEA report added that Iran has had difficulty with its newer generation centrifuges (IR-2M and IR-4) at Fordow and at the main Natanz enrichment site. In late August 2011, the head of Iran’s atomic energy agency said Iran would produce more 20% enriched uranium than it needs for the medical reactor, causing further concern among experts about Iran’s intentions.

The IAEA reports maintain that there is no evidence that Iran has diverted any nuclear material (for a nuclear weapons program). The February 25, 2011, IAEA report has annexes listing Iran’s declared nuclear sites as well as a summary of all the NPT obligations Iran is not meeting.22

**Bushehr Reactor**

U.S. officials have generally been less concerned with Russia’s work, under a January 1995 contract, on an $800 million nuclear power plant at Bushehr. Russia insisted that Iran sign an agreement under which Russia would reprocess the plant’s spent nuclear material; that agreement was signed on February 28, 2005. The plant was expected to become operational in 2007, but Russia appeared to delay opening it to pressure Iran on the broader nuclear issue. The plant was inaugurated on August 21, 2010, and fueling was completed by October 25, 2010. It began limited operations on May 8, 2011, and was linked to Iran’s power grid in September 2011. It was reported by Iran as fully operational as of September 3, 2012. As part of this work, Russia trained 1,500 Iranian nuclear engineers.

**International Efforts to Address Iran’s Nuclear Program**

The international response to Iran’s nuclear program has evolved into a growing global consensus to apply substantial pressure on Iran—coupled with diplomacy and selected incentives—to limit its program.

**Diplomatic Efforts in 2003 and 2004/Paris Agreement**

In 2003, France, Britain, and Germany (the “EU-3”) opened a separate diplomatic track to curb Iran’s program. On October 21, 2003, Iran pledged, in return for peaceful nuclear technology, to (1) fully disclose its past nuclear activities, (2) sign and ratify the “Additional Protocol” to the NPT (allowing for enhanced inspections), and (3) suspend uranium enrichment activities. Iran signed the Additional Protocol on December 18, 2003, although the Majles has not ratified it. Iran discontinued abiding by the Protocol after the IAEA reports of November 10, 2003, and February 24, 2004, stated that Iran had violated its NPT reporting obligations over an 18-year period.

In the face of the U.S. threat to push for Security Council action, the EU-3 and Iran reached a more specific November 14, 2004, “Paris Agreement,” committing Iran to suspend uranium enrichment (which it did as of November 22, 2004) in exchange for renewed trade talks and other aid.23 The Bush Administration did not openly support the track until March 11, 2005, when it

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23 For text of the agreement, see http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/eu_iran14112004.shtml. EU-3-Iran (continued...)
announced it would drop U.S. objections to Iran applying to join the World Trade Organization (it applied in May 2005) and to selling civilian aircraft parts to Iran. The Bush Administration did not participate directly in the talks.

**Reference to the Security Council**

The Paris Agreement broke down just after Ahmadinejad’s election; Iran rejected as insufficient an EU-3 offer to assist Iran with peaceful uses of nuclear energy and provide limited security guarantees in exchange for Iran’s (1) permanently ending uranium enrichment; (2) dismantling the Arak heavy-water reactor;24 (3) no-notice nuclear inspections; and (4) a pledge not to leave the NPT (it has a legal exit clause). On August 8, 2005, Iran broke the IAEA seals and began uranium “conversion” (one step before enrichment) at its Esfahan facility. On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board declared Iran in non-compliance with the NPT and decided to refer the issue to the Security Council,25 but no time frame was set for the referral. After Iran resumed enrichment activities, on February 4, 2006, the IAEA board voted 27-326 to refer the case to the Security Council. On March 29, 2006, the Council agreed on a presidency “statement” setting a 30-day time limit (April 28, 2006) for ceasing enrichment.27

**Establishment of “P5+1” Contact Group/ Incentive Package**

Taking a multilateral approach, the George W. Bush Administration offered on May 31, 2006, to join the nuclear talks with Iran if Iran first suspends its uranium enrichment. Such talks would center on a package of incentives and possible sanctions—formally agreed on June 1, 2006—by a newly formed group of nations, the so-called “Permanent Five Plus 1” (P5+1: United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany). EU representative Javier Solana formally presented the P5+1 offer to Iran on June 6, 2006. The incentive package—which includes accepting Iran into the World Trade Organization and Persian Gulf security frameworks, easing sanctions, and guarantees of nuclear fuel and light-water reactor technology, and is Annex I to Resolution 1747, and the offer remains on the table, according to U.S. and EU diplomats. Sanctions threatened28—such as a ban on technology and arms sales to Iran, have mostly been imposed subsequently, as discussed in CRS Report RS20871, *Iran Sanctions*:

(...continued)

negotiations on a permanent nuclear pact began on December 13, 2004, and related talks on a trade and cooperation accord (TCA) began in January 2005.

24 In November 2006, the IAEA, at U.S. urging, declined to provide technical assistance to the Arak facility.

25 Voting in favor: United States, Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Argentina, Belgium, Ghana, Ecuador, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovakia, Japan, Peru, Singapore, South Korea, India. Against: Venezuela. Abstaining: Pakistan, Algeria, Yemen, Brazil, China, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, and Vietnam.

26 Voting no: Cuba, Syria, Venezuela. Abstaining: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya, South Africa.


28 One source purports to have obtained the contents of the package from ABC News: http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN060609.htm.
Iran did not immediately respond to the offer. In response, the U.N. Security Council began its efforts, still ongoing, to impose sanctions on Iran in an effort to shift Iran’s calculations toward compromise.

- **Resolution 1696.** On July 31, 2006, the Security Council voted 14-1 (Qatar voting no) for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696, giving Iran until August 31, 2006, to fulfill the long-standing IAEA nuclear demands (enrichment suspension, etc.). Purportedly in deference to Russia and China, it was passed under Article 40 of the U.N. Charter, which makes compliance mandatory, but not under Article 41, which refers to economic sanctions, or Article 42, which would authorize military action. It called on U.N. member states not to sell Iran WMD-useful technology.

- **Resolution 1737.** After Iran refused a proposal to temporarily suspend enrichment, the Security Council adopted U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737 unanimously on December 23, 2006, under Chapter 7, Article 41 of the U.N. Charter. It prohibits sale to Iran—or financing of such sale—of technology that could contribute to Iran’s uranium enrichment or heavy-water reprocessing activities. It also required U.N. member states to freeze the financial assets of 10 named Iranian nuclear and missile firms and 12 persons related to those programs. In deference to Russia, the Resolution exempted the Bushehr reactor.

- **Resolution 1747.** Resolution 1737 demanded enrichment suspension by February 21, 2007. With no Iranian compliance, on March 24, 2007, after only three weeks of P5+1 negotiations, Resolution 1747 was adopted unanimously. It demanded Iran suspend enrichment by May 24, 2007, added entities to those sanctioned by Resolution 1737, and:
  - banned arms transfers by Iran, a provision targeted at Iran’s alleged arms supplies to Lebanese Hezbollah and to Shiite militias in Iraq;
  - required all countries to report to the United Nations when sanctioned Iranian persons travel to their territories; and
  - called for (but did not require) countries to avoid selling arms or dual use items to Iran and for countries and international financial institutions to avoid any new lending or grants to Iran. The Resolution specifically exempted loans for humanitarian purposes, thereby not applying to World Bank loans.

Iran did not comply with Resolution 1747, but, in August 2007, it agreed to sign with the IAEA an agreement to clear up outstanding questions on past nuclear activities by the end of 2007.

- **Resolution 1803 and Additional Incentives for Iran.** After several months of negotiations, Resolution 1803 was adopted by a vote of 14-0 (Indonesia abstaining) on March 3, 2008. It added 12 more entities to those sanctioned, and:
  - banned virtually all sales of dual use items to Iran, citing equipment listed as dual use in various proliferation conventions and documents;
  - authorized, but did not require, inspections of shipments by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, if such shipments are suspected of containing banned WMD-related goods;
• imposed a firm travel ban on five Iranians named in Annex II to the Resolution and requires reports on travel by 13 other named individuals; and

• stated the willingness of the P5+1 to consider additional incentives to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiation “beyond those of June 2006.”

The Bush Administration agreed to expand the June 2006 incentive package at a meeting in London on May 2, 2008, offering political and enhanced energy cooperation with Iran. EU envoy Solana presented the package (which included a signature by Secretary of State Rice) on June 14, 2008, but Iran was non-committal. (The text of the enhanced incentive offer to Iran is contained in an Annex to Resolution 1929.) Iran did not accept the enhanced package of incentives as a basis of further discussion but, in July 2008, Iran indicated it might be ready to first accept a six week “freeze for freeze:” the P5+1 would freeze further sanctions efforts and Iran would freeze any expansion of uranium enrichment (though not suspend outright). To try to take advantage of this opening, the Bush Administration sent Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns to join Solana and the other P5+1 representatives at a meeting in Geneva on July 19, 2008. Iran did not accept the “freeze for freeze” by an extended deadline of August 2, 2008.

• Resolution 1835. The August 2008 crisis between Russia and Georgia contributed to Russia’s opposing new U.N. sanctions on Iran. In an effort to demonstrate to Iran continued unity, the Council adopted Resolution 1835 (September 27, 2008), demanding compliance with previous resolutions but not adding new sanctions.

The P5+1 met again in October and in November of 2008, but no consensus on additional sanctions was reached.

The International Response Under the Obama Administration

After President Obama was inaugurated, the P5+1 met in Germany (February 4, 2009), reportedly focusing on the new Administration’s approach on Iran. The other members of the P5+1 sought to incorporate the Administration’s commitment to direct U.S. engagement with Iran into the U.N. sanctions and negotiating framework. On April 8, 2009, then Under Secretary Burns told the other members of the P5+1 that a U.S. diplomat would attend all of the group’s meetings with Iran. The P5+1 did not materially alter its approach because of the unrest in Iran that erupted after that election, and a July 9, 2009, G-8 summit statement, which included Russian concurrence, mentioned late September 2009 (G-20 summit on September 24) as a time by which the P5+1 would expect Iran to offer constructive proposals, lest the P5+1 consider “crippling sanctions” on Iran. On September 9, 2009, Iran distributed its proposals to settle the nuclear issue to P5+1 representatives in Iran (the Swiss ambassador represented the United States). The P5+1 considered the proposals vague but still a sufficient basis to meet with Iran on October 1, 2009.

October 1, 2009, Agreement on Reprocessing Iran’s Enriched Uranium

In light of September 25, 2009, revelations about the previously unreported Iranian nuclear site, little progress was expected at the October 1, 2009 meeting in Geneva. However, the meeting

resulted in an apparent breakthrough in the form of a tentative agreement to allow Russia and France, subject to technical talks to begin by mid-October, to reprocess 2,600 pounds (about 75% of Iran’s low-enriched uranium) for medical use. There was also agreement for the Fordow facility to be inspected, which happened during October 25-29, 2009. At the session, U.S. Under Secretary of State William Burns, representing the United States, also met privately with Iranian negotiator Sayed Jallili.

The technical talks were held October 19-21, 2009, at IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, and chaired on the U.S. side by Deputy Energy Secretary Daniel Poneman. A draft agreement was approved by the P5+1 countries and the IAEA. Despite Ahmadinejad’s comments in early February 2010 that he “did not have a problem” with the arrangement, political opposition from hardliners inside Iran—purportedly including the Supreme Leader himself—caused Iran to refuse to finalize the agreement. Instead, Iran floated counter-proposals to ship its enriched uranium to France and Russia in increments, to ship the uranium to Turkey, or to reprocess the uranium in Iran itself. All of Iran’s counter-proposals were deemed insufficiently specific or responsive. Iran also rebuffed a specific U.S. proposal in January 2010 to allow it to buy on the open market isotopes for its medical reactor, although this proposal remains active.

May 2010 Iran-Brazil-Turkey Uranium Exchange Deal (“Tehran Declaration”)

As international discussions of new sanctions accelerated in April 2010, Brazil and Turkey negotiated with Iran to revive the October 1, 2009, arrangement. On May 17, 2010, with the president of Brazil and prime minister of Turkey in Tehran, the three signed an arrangement for Iran to send 2,600 pounds of uranium to Turkey, which would be exchanged for medically useful reprocessed uranium along the lines discussed in October 2009.31 As required by the agreement, Iran forwarded to the IAEA a formal letter accepting the agreement terms. Even though some assert that the Obama Administration quietly supported the Brazil-Turkey initiative, the Obama Administration did not accept the Tehran Declaration, asserting, primarily, that the arrangement did not address Iran’s enrichment to the 20% level.

Resolution 1929 and EU Follow-Up

On May 18, 2010, one day after the signing of the Tehran Declaration, Secretary of State Clinton announced that the P5+1 had reached agreement on a new sanctions resolution. The resolution was designed to attract support from Russia and China, which believe sanctions might threaten their own interests in Iran, while also giving U.S. allies authority to take substantial new measures against Iran. Simultaneous with Russian agreement on the draft, several Russian entities, including the main state arms export agency Rosoboronexport, were removed from U.S. lists of sanctioned entities. (See CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, for a table of entities under sanction.)

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31 Text of the pact is at http://www.cfr.org/publication/22140/.
Adopted on June 9, 2010, Resolution 1929: are the following:

- It added 15 Iranian firms affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard firms, and 22 other Iranian entities, to the list of U.N.-sanctioned entities. Some of the IRGC firms are alternate names for the \textit{Khatem ol-Anbiya} (Seal of the Prophet) engineering firm under IRGC control.

- It made mandatory a ban on travel for Iranian persons named in it and in which a non-binding travel restriction was instituted in previous resolutions.

- It gave countries the authorization to inspect any shipments—and to dispose of their cargo—if the shipments are suspected to carry contraband items. However, inspections on the high seas are subject to concurrence by the country that owns that ship.

- It prohibited countries from allowing Iran to invest in uranium mining and related nuclear technologies, or in nuclear-capable ballistic missile technology.

- It banned sales to Iran of most categories of heavy arms and requests restraint in sales of light arms, but did not bar sales of missiles not on the “U.N. Registry of Conventional Arms” (meaning that the delivery of the S-300 system, discussed above, would not be legally banned).

- It required countries to insist that their companies refrain from doing business with Iran \textit{if} such business could further Iran’s WMD programs.

- It requested, but does not mandate, that countries prohibit Iranian banks to open in their countries, or for their banks to open in Iran, \textit{if} doing so could contribute to Iran’s WMD activities.

- It authorized the establishment of an eight person “panel of experts,” with a mandate to assist the U.N. Sanctions Committee in implementing the Resolution and previous Resolutions, and to suggest ways of more effective implementation. The Panel’s coordinator is French; current membership includes the P-5 countries plus Japan, Germany, and Nigeria. The panel’s reports are not officially published by the Sanctions Committee but are usually carried by various websites.

2011-2012 Diplomatic Developments

President Obama and other senior officials noted that the intent of Resolution 1929 was to bring Iran back to negotiations, and an annex presented a modified offer of incentives for Iran to rejoin the international community. After its passage, EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton issued a letter to Iran inviting it to attend new talks. After several months of discussions over venue, agenda, talks were held during December 6-7, 2010, with the P5+1, in Geneva, but by all accounts made little progress on core issues. The United States and Iran did not, as they did in the October 2009 talks, hold direct bilateral talks during the two days of meetings. Still, there was agreement to hold additional Iran-P5+1 talks in Istanbul which some thought might lead Iran to show more flexibility because of Turkey’s willingness to take Iran’s viewpoints into account.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{It was adopted by a vote of 12-2 (Turkey and Brazil voting no) with one abstention (Lebanon)}

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Text of the resolution is at http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Draft_resolution_on_Iran_annexes.pdf}
The Istanbul (January 21-22, 2011) talks, by all accounts, made no progress because Iran demanded lifting of international sanctions as a precondition to substantive discussions. No date for new talks was then announced. A P5+1 statement of March 9, 2011, affirmed the lack of progress at Istanbul, but also said “the door remains open.”\(^{34}\) Indications that talks might revive followed Iran-Russia talks during August 15-16, 2011, when Iran praised as a “basis to start negotiations” Russia’s proposals for a stepwise exchange of the lifting of international sanctions for Iran’s giving up some nuclear activities. A State Department spokeswoman, Victoria Nuland, confirmed that U.S. diplomats had worked with Russian counterparts to develop the proposal.

The prospect for new talks appeared to recede after the release of the November 8, 2011, IAEA report, which cast doubt on Iran’s assertions of its purely peaceful nuclear program. In late November 2011, in response to a move by the United States, Britain, and Canada to shut Iran out of the international banking system, a mob supported by the Basij militia ransacked the British Embassy in Tehran on November 29, 2011. This led to the closure of the Iranian and British embassies in London and Tehran, respectively, and caused the EU to impose on January 23, 2012, an embargo on purchases of Iranian oil, to be fully in effect by July 1, 2012. Iran perceived such a move (along with an amendment to the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act [P.L. 112-81] sanctioning banks that do business with Iran’s Central Bank) as a potential vital threat to its survival. These sanctions have caused Iran’s vital oil exports to fall from 2.5 million barrels per day in 2011 to about 1 million barrels per day as of October 2012. Canada closed its embassy in Iran in September 2012, citing security concerns. The effect of sanctions on Iran’s economy, political system, and nuclear decision making is analyzed in CRS Report RS20871, *Iran Sanctions*, by Kenneth Katzman.

As sanctions started to harm Iran’s economy severely, Iran—along with threats to the Strait of Hormuz—began to publicly propose a new round of nuclear talks. A letter of acceptance was sent by chief negotiator Jalilli to EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton on February 15, 2012. The United States and its partners announced on March 6, 2012, that they accept new talks. April 13-14, 2012, Istanbul Talks

Talks were set for April 13-14, 2012, in Istanbul. Pressured by sanctions, Iran went into the talks suggesting it might accept P5+1 demands to halt 20% enrichment. The talks were held and, by all accounts, including a statement by EU foreign policy chief Ashton, did not focus on substantive details. However, Iran agreed to enter a negotiating process on its nuclear program—a pledge considered sufficient to announce a follow-up round in Iraq on May 23-24, 2012, to be held in Baghdad—a venue intended to accommodate Iran’s earlier proposal. In preparation for the Baghdad talks, technical teams from the Iranian and P5+1 sides worked on substantive proposals.

May 23-24, 2012, Baghdad Talks

There was a sense of optimism going into the Baghdad talks, because Iranian leadership statements appeared to prepare the Iranian public for compromise by emphasizing that a prospective agreement preserves Iran’s right to enrich uranium under the NPT. Tempering the optimism was the view among many experts that the Supreme Leader remains suspicions of U.S. and international intent and might, in the end, not accept an agreement. The following outlines

\(^{34}\) [http://vienna.usmission.gov/110309p51.html](http://vienna.usmission.gov/110309p51.html).
what both sides, by numerous accounts, offered in Baghdad. The positions of both sides appear based on the principle of “reciprocity”—a term used by Secretary Clinton, EU foreign policy chief Ashton, and others—referring to a stepwise easing of sanctions in exchange for verifiable Iranian compliance.

The P5+1 reportedly proposed in Baghdad:

- That Iran halt enrichment to the 20% level and allow removal from Iran of the existing stockpile of 20% enriched uranium.
- That Iran eventually close the Fordow facility.
- That Iran accept a comprehensive verification regime to ensure that Iran fulfills any commitments made.
- That Iran clear up reputed past efforts to design a nuclear explosive device, including allowing inspections of Parchin and other facilities.

As “reciprocity” for Iran accepting such steps, the P5+1:

- Apparently would allow, at least in the interim, Iran to enrich uranium, although only to the 3.5%-5% level. This represents a dropping or de-emphasis of the demands of U.N. resolutions that Iran suspend all uranium enrichment.
- Offered Iran a guaranteed supply of medical isotopes that it says it needs, and technical assistance to ensure the safety of its civilian nuclear facilities.
- Offered Iran spare parts for its civilian passenger aircraft.

Baghdad Outcome? The P5+1 did not offer to defer or lift entirely the EU oil embargo that goes into full effect July 1, leading to criticism in the Iranian media that the P5+1 offer was “unbalanced.” This issue reportedly threatened the talks, but U.S. and other officials told journalists that the talks were substantive. According to EU foreign policy representative Ashton’s statement at the conclusion of the talks, “it is clear that we both want to make progress, and that there is some common ground. However, significant differences remain. Nonetheless, we do agree on the need for further discussion to expand that common ground.” According to the statement, Iran declared its readiness to address the 20% enrichment issue and presented a five part counter-proposal that focused on the nuclear issue but also raised the issue of U.S. and European involvement in Syria. There was enough progress to yield agreement that further Iran-P5+1 talks would be held June 18-19, 2012, in Moscow.

June 18-19 Moscow Talks and Follow-Up Discussions

Expectations were relatively low going into the Moscow talks, in that the P5+1 refused Iran’s proposal to have technical talks immediately before the negotiations. However, Iran and EU chief negotiator Ashton reached agreement on an agenda for the talks, and Iran dropped threats to call the talks off. By all accounts, the talks were highly substantive, and Iran engaged specifically on the P5+1 demands, discussed above, to “stop, shut, and ship” (stop enriching to 20%, shut Fordow, and ship out the existing 20% enriched stockpile).

However, no breakthrough was achieved, and the parties were able to agree to hold lower level technical talks on July 3, 2012, in Istanbul. According to the Ashton statement concluding the meeting, the technical talks will further clarify the P5+1 proposal, increase P5+1 understanding of
Iran’s response, and study other issues raised in the talks. Subsequently, there would be contact between the deputies to Ashton and to Iranian chief negotiator Jalili, followed by Ashton-Jalili contact to discuss a possible further round of high level talks.

This roadmap has been followed to date, with technical talks on July 3 and then talks between Ms. Ashton’s deputy, Helga Schmid, and Seyyed Jallili’s deputy, Ali Baqeri, on July 24, 2012. Ms. Ashton and Seyyed Jallili spoke by telephone on August 2, 2012, agreeing to assess their positions during the Ramadan and European holiday periods and to subsequently speak by telephone at the end of August 2012. That latter conversation was delayed but Ashton and Jallili met in Istanbul on September 18, 2012, to assess the status of the technical discussions. However, no new P5+1 talks were announced as an outcome, and none is scheduled.

On the other hand, suggesting that sanctions are beginning to affect Iran’s assessments, Iranian officials accompanying Ahmadinejad to the U.N. General Assembly meetings in late September 2012 reportedly floated to counterpart diplomats proposals along the lines of those discussed at the 2012 rounds of talks discussed above, although with emphasis on an early lifting of the EU oil embargo. The P5+1 countries met on September 27, 2012, on the sidelines of the U.N. meetings, indicating a willingness to enter further negotiations but rejecting an early easing of sanctions and Iran’s demand that the international community formally recognize Iran’s “right” to enrich uranium. On October 9, 2012, Iran’s Foreign Minister reformulated Iran’s proposals as offering to limit Iran’s enrichment (presumably to the 3.5—5% level) if the international community guaranteed a supply of 20% enriched uranium for its medical reactor, a supply the international community has said repeatedly they would guarantee.

Some experts remain skeptical that any new high level talks, if held, will yield a breakthrough. Others believe the negotiations should be viewed over a long time period, to allow for only minor, incremental progress at each set of talks. Others argue that Iran will not agree to the P5+1 demands unless and until the P5+1 offers to lift the EU embargo on purchases of Iranian oil, which took full effect on July 1, 2012. This has not been offered by the P5+1 to date.

Israel has called on the United States and its partners to declare the 2012 rounds of talks a failure and to set a clear “red line” which, if crossed, would trigger U.S. military action. As noted above, that red line is defined, according to press accounts quoting Israeli officials, as Iran stockpiling enough 20% enriched uranium to produce at least one nuclear weapon. The Obama Administration position is that any unilateral Israeli military action at this time is unwise and President Obama stated in late August 2012, and in his September 26, 2012, U.N. speech, that there is still “time and space” for diplomacy with Iran on the nuclear issue. In an effort to put pressure on Iran, he and his aides have stated that the “window” for diplomacy is closing. More information on the Administration position and policies on Iran is discussed later in this report.
### Table 6. Summary of Provisions of U.N. Resolutions on Iran Nuclear Program (1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requires Iran to suspend uranium enrichment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prohibits transfer to Iran of nuclear, missile, and dual use items, except for use in light-water reactors.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prohibits Iran from exporting arms or WMD-useful technology.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prohibits Iran from investing abroad in uranium mining, related nuclear technologies or nuclear capable ballistic missile technology.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freezes the assets of over 80 named Iranian persons and entities, including Bank Sepah, and several corporate affiliates of the Revolutionary Guard.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Requires that countries ban the travel of over 40 named Iranians.</td>
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<td>Mandates that countries not export major combat systems to Iran.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Calls for “vigilance” (a nonbinding call to cut off business) with respect to all Iranian banks, particularly Bank Melli and Bank Saderat.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Calls for vigilance (voluntary restraint) with respect to providing international lending to Iran and providing trade credits and other financing and financial interactions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calls on countries to inspect cargoes carried by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines—or by any ships in national or international waters—if there are indications they carry cargo banned for carriage to Iran. Searches in international waters would require concurrence of the country where the ship is registered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Sanctions Committee, composed of the fifteen members of the Security Council, monitors implementation of all Iran sanctions and collects and disseminates information on Iranian violations and other entities involved in banned activities. A seven member “panel of experts” is empowered to report on sanctions violations and make recommendations for improved enforcement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Missiles and Chemical/Biological Weapons

Iran has an array of weapons that could pose problems for the United States and its allies in the Persian Gulf. In particular, Iran’s missiles are considered to pose a threat to U.S. ships, forces, and allies in the Gulf region and beyond.

#### Chemical and Biological Weapons

Official U.S. reports and testimony state that Iran maintains the capability to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents and “probably” has the capability to produce some biological warfare agents for offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so. This raises questions about Iran’s compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which Iran signed on January 13, 1993, and ratified on June 8, 1997.

#### Ballistic and Cruise Missiles and Warheads

The Administration view is that Iran’s growing inventory of ballistic missiles and its acquisition of indigenous production of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) provide capabilities for Iran to project power. Tehran views its conventionally armed missiles as an integral part of its strategy to

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deter—and if necessary retaliate against—forces in the region, including U.S. forces. On the other hand, U.S. defense officials say that U.S. forces are able to destroy these capabilities shortly after Iran uses them against U.S. assets in the Gulf region. A particular worry of U.S. commanders remains Iran’s inventory of cruise missiles, which can reach U.S. ships in the Gulf quickly after launch.

The April 2012 Defense Department report, cited earlier, says that Iran is steadily expanding its missile and rocket inventories, and has “boosted the lethality and effectiveness of existing systems with accuracy improvements and new submunition payloads. This reports appears to credit Iran’s missile technology to a greater degree than past official reports. However, the report does not alter the longstanding U.S. estimate that Iran would likely not be able to fully develop a missile of intercontinental range until 2015. Secretary of Defense Panetta said in January 2012 that Iran might be able to develop a nuclear-armed missile about a year or two after developing a nuclear explosive device. The U.N. experts panel created by Resolution 1929 reported in May 2011 that might be getting ballistic missile technology from North Korea, in violation of U.S. sanctions against Iran. Table 7 contains some details on Iran’s missile programs.

On November 12, 2011, an unexplained explosion at a ballistic missile base 25 miles from Tehran killed 17 IRGC missile force officers, including commander Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam. He reportedly was instrumental in developing Iran’s missile force and his death might set back the program. Iran said the explosion was accidental, caused during a movement of munitions at the base. However, the death of Moghaddam in the blast raised suspicions that it was caused by sabotage, possibly by an outside power or possibly by a domestic opposition group. The base was almost completely destroyed, according to commercial satellite photos posted on various websites.


37 Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, February 2, 2010.
### Table 7. Iran’s Missile Arsenal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missile Type</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Description and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shahab-3 (“Meteor”)</td>
<td>800-mile range</td>
<td>The missile is operational, and Defense Department report of April 2012, indicates Tehran has improved its lethality and effectiveness, tempering previous assessments by experts that the missile is not completely reliable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahab-3 “Variant” /Sijil/Ashoura</td>
<td>1,200-1,500-mile range</td>
<td>The April 2010 Defense Department report had the liquid fueled Shahab-3 “variant” as “possibly deployed,” and the April 2102 report indicates the solid fuel version (Sijil or Ashoura) is increasing in range, lethality, and accuracy. These missiles potentially put large portions of the Near East and Southeastern Europe in range, including U.S. bases in Turkey. A U.N. experts panel reported in May 2011 that Iran tested the missile in October 2010 although the launch was “reported by a [U.N.] Member state,” and not announced publicly. In concert with the beginning of 10-day “Great Prophet Six” military exercises, on June 28, 2011, Iran unveiled underground missile silos and undertook some missile tests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BM-25</td>
<td>1,500-mile range</td>
<td>On April 27, 2006, Israel’s military intelligence chief said that Iran had received a shipment of North Korean-supplied BM-25 missiles. Missile said to be capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The Washington Times appeared to corroborate this reporting in a July 6, 2006, story, which asserted that the North Korean-supplied missile is based on a Soviet-era “SS-N-6” missile. Press accounts in December 2010 indicate that Iran may have received components but not the entire BM-25 missile from North Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. officials believe Iran might be capable of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (3,000 mile range) by 2015, a time frame reiterated by the April 2012 DOD report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short Range Ballistic Missiles</td>
<td></td>
<td>Iran is fielding increasingly capable, short range ballistic missiles, according to DOD 2012 report, such as ability to home in on and target ships while in flight. One version could be a short range ballistic missile named the Qiam, tested in August 2010. Iran has long worked on a 200 mile range “Fateh 110” missile (solid propellant), which it again tested in August 2012. Iran also possesses a few hundred short-range ballistic missiles, including the Shahab-1 (Scud-b), the Shahab-2 (Scud-C), and the Tondar-69 (CSS-8). In January 2009, Iran claimed to have tested a new air-to-air missile. On March 7, 2010, Iran claimed it was now producing short-range cruise missiles that it claimed are highly accurate and can destroy heavy targets. Iran also is able to arm its patrol boats with Chinese-made C-802 cruise missiles. Iran also has Chinese-supplied Seerseekers and C-802’s emplaced along Iran’s coast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space Vehicle</td>
<td></td>
<td>In February 2008 Iran claimed to have launched a probe into space, suggesting its missile technology might be improving to the point where an Iranian ICBM is realistic. Following an August 2008 failure, in early February 2009, Iran successfully launched a small, low-earth satellite on a Safir-2 rocket (range about 155 miles). The Pentagon said the launch was “clearly a concern of ours” because “there are dual-use capabilities here which could be applied toward the development of long-range missiles.” A larger space vehicle, Simorgh, was displayed in February 2010. Iran claimed to have launched a satellite into orbit on June 16, 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warheads</td>
<td></td>
<td>Wall Street Journal report of September 14, 2005, said that U.S. intelligence believes Iran is working to adapt the Shahab-3 to deliver a nuclear warhead. Subsequent press reports say that U.S. intelligence captured an Iranian computer in mid-2004 showing plans to construct a nuclear warhead for the Shahab. The IAEA is seeking additional information from Iran.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Foreign Policy and Support for Terrorist Groups

Iran’s foreign policy is a product of the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution, blended with longstanding national interests and the belief that the United States seeks to overturn Iran’s Islamic revolution. Iran’s leaders increasingly assert that Iran is a major regional power whose interests must be taken into account. Others interpret Iran’s foreign policy objectives as beyond defensive—attempting to overturn the power structure in the Middle East that Iran believes favors the United States, Israel, and their “collaborators”: Sunni Muslim regimes such as Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf states. Iran couches that policy as support for an “oppressed” underclass in a region dominated by elites, while downplaying the underlying Iranian intent to empower fellow Shiites against the Sunni Muslims that dominate the region.

Because of Iran’s objectives, some experts saw Iran as a potential strategic beneficiary of the uprisings that have toppled the leaders of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, and which have threatened the grip on power of the Sunni ruler of Bahrain. Some evidence of Iran as beneficiary could be provided by reports of a willingness of the new leaders of Egypt to end decades of diplomatic estrangement with Iran, and their decision to allow Iranian ships to transit the Suez Canal since the fall of President Mubarak. President Mohammad Morsi of Egypt attended the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Tehran during August 27-31, 2012. On the other hand, at the meeting, Morsi strongly denounced Syria’s use of military action against its armed opposition, directly countering Iran’s efforts at the meeting to increase international support for the Syrian government. Some assert that the holding of that meeting in Tehran, attended by nine heads of state and U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, as well as representatives of the nearly 120 countries in the NAM, illustrates that Iran is not isolated.

Others assert that, even before Arab uprisings, Iran had benefitted from the installation of friendly regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the continuing political strength of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, Iran itself has become threatened by the unrest in its key Middle Eastern ally, Syria. Should that regime fall, Iran might lose its ability to intervene in the Arab-Israeli dispute. In addition, countries in the region increasingly are helping the United States enforce strict sanctions against Iran, and Iran finds itself potentially isolated in the region.

A key Iranian policy objective is to undermine and be positioned to strategically threaten Israel. Ahmadinejad’s various statements on Israel were discussed above, and Supreme Leader Khamene’i has repeatedly called Israel a “cancerous tumor.” In December 2001, Rafsanjani, now considered a moderate, said that it would take only one Iranian nuclear bomb to destroy Israel, whereas a similar strike against Iran by Israel would have far less impact because Iran’s population is large. Iran has hosted numerous conferences to which anti-peace process terrorist organizations were invited (for example: April 24, 2001, and June 2-3, 2002). The formal position of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, considered a bastion of moderates, is that Iran would not seek to block an Israeli-Palestinian settlement but that the process is too weighted toward Israel to yield a fair result. Iran supports Palestinian efforts to obtain U.N. recognition of statehood.

Support for International Terrorism

Iran’s foreign policy is broad and complex, and often involves support of groups that are considered terrorist by the United States. The State Department report on international terrorism for 2011, released July 31, stated that Iran “remained an active state sponsor of terrorism in
2011,” but did not repeat previous years’ characterizations that it is “the most active state sponsor of terrorism.” The report again cites the IRGC Qods Force as the primary instrument by which the regime supports militant movements abroad and uses these movements to implement Iran’s foreign policy. The current Defense Minister of Iran is Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, the former Qods Forces commander.

In 2011 and 2012, U.S. officials have emphasized what they see as a new dimension to the Iranian threat—the potential for Iran to try to commit acts of terrorism in the United States itself. This was discussed by DNI Clapper in testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee on January 31, 2012, and represents a change from the previous U.S. view that the risk of U.S. retaliation makes Iran’s leaders highly unlikely to authorize attacks inside the United States. The altered assessment is based on an Iranian alleged plot, revealed on October 11, 2011, by the U.S. Justice Department, to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States.

A further trend in 2012 has been apparent Iranian-sponsored attempts to attack Israeli diplomats and citizens, perhaps in retaliation for what Iran alleges has been Israeli assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists. India reportedly has concluded the Qods Force was responsible for wounding the wife of an Israeli diplomat in an attack in Delhi in February 2012. Israel says Iran, working through its Lebanon ally Hezbollah, was responsible for a July 19, 2012, terrorist bombing in Bulgaria that killed five Israeli tourists. Other alleged Iranian plots against Israeli and other targets have been reported in 2012 in Thailand, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, and Kenya.

Earlier, Iranian terrorism also took the form of assassinating dissidents abroad. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Iran allegedly was responsible for the assassination of several Iranian dissidents based in Europe, including Iranian Kurdish dissident leader Abdol Rahman Qasemlu, several other Kurdish leaders (including those killed at the Mykonos café in Berlin in September 1992), the brother of PMOI leader Masud Rajavi, and several figures close to the late Shah of Iran. In May 2010, France allowed the return to Iran of Vakili Rad, who had been convicted in the 1991 stabbing of the Shah’s last prime minister, Shahpour Bakhtiar. Iran has not been accused of dissident assassinations abroad in well over a decade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Incident/Event</th>
<th>Likely/Claimed Perpetrator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 18, 1983</td>
<td>Truck bombing of U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. 63 dead, including 17 U.S. citizens.</td>
<td>Factions that eventually formed Lebanese Hezbollah claimed responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 23, 1983</td>
<td>Truck bombing of U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. 241 Marines killed.</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 12, 1983</td>
<td>Bombings of U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait City. 5 fatalities.</td>
<td>Da’wa Party of Iraq—Iran-supported Iraqi Shiite militant group. 17 Da’wa activists charged and imprisoned in Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 20, 1984</td>
<td>Truck bombing of U.S. embassy annex in Beirut. 23 killed.</td>
<td>Factions that eventually formed Lebanese Hezbollah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 25, 1985</td>
<td>Bombing of Amir of Kuwait’s motorcade</td>
<td>Da’wa Party of Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 14, 1985</td>
<td>Hijacking of TWA Flight 847. One fatality, Navy diver Robert Stetham</td>
<td>Lebanese Hezbollah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 5, 1988</td>
<td>Hijacking of Kuwait Air passenger plane.</td>
<td>Lebanese Hezbollah, seeking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Two killed.

March 17, 1992
Bombing of Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires. 29 killed.
Lebanese Hezbollah, assisted by Iranian intelligence/diplomats.

July 18, 1994
Bombing of Argentine-Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires.
Same as above

June 25, 1996
Bombing of Khobar Towers housing complex near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. 19 U.S. Air Force personnel killed.
Saudi Hezbollah, supported by Iran. Some assessments point to possible involvement of Al Qaeda as well.

Source: CRS. Prepared with the assistance of Hussein Hassan, Knowledge Services Group.

Foreign Policy: Relations with the Persian Gulf States

The Persian Gulf monarchy states (Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates) are concerned about Iranian strategic influence in the Gulf. Several Gulf rulers have asserted, mostly privately, that the United States should move decisively to end Iran’s nuclear program, and they are cooperating with U.S. containment and missile defense strategies and with many aspects of U.S. and multilateral sanctions against Iran, as discussed later in this paper. In particular, those Gulf states with spare oil production capacity are offering more oil to customers that are reducing purchases of Iranian oil. However, the Gulf states have not openly supported U.S. conflict with Iran, fearing doing so might cause Iran to retaliate against Gulf state targets, and they maintain relatively normal trade and other interactions with Iran. On May 14, 2012, the GCC states largely rejected a Saudi plan for greater political and economic integration of the GCC states—a plan proposed in part to present a united front against Iran but which would forfeit some of their individual sovereignty. The Gulf states also appear to be working toward the ouster of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in part to weaken Iran strategically in the region.

- Saudi Arabia. Iran and Saudi Arabia represent opposite poles of influence and interests in the region. Saudi Arabia sees itself as leader of the Sunni Muslim world and views Shiite Muslims, including those in eastern Saudi Arabia, as heretical. Saudi alarm over Iranian influence in the Gulf was a major factor in the military intervention by Saudi Arabia (joined by UAE) on behalf of the Bahrain government in March 2011. The Saudis repeatedly criticize Iran for past actions, including inspiring violent demonstrations at some of the annual Hajj pilgrimages in Mecca in the 1980s and 1990s—and which caused a break in relations from 1987-1991), and for supporting a pro-Iranian movement in the Kingdom, Saudi Hezbollah, that the Saudis hold responsible for the June 25, 1996, Khobar Towers bombing.39 Saudi-Iran ties progressed to high-level contacts during the presidency of the relatively moderate Mohammad Khatemi, including visits by him to the Kingdom in 1999 and 2002. Despite Saudi differences with

39 Walsh, Elsa. “Annals of Politics: Louis Freeh’s Last Case.” The New Yorker, May 14, 2001. The June 21, 2001, federal grand jury indictments of 14 suspects (13 Saudis and a Lebanese citizen) in the Khobar bombing indicate that Iranian agents may have been involved, but no indictments of any Iranians were announced. In June 2002, Saudi Arabia reportedly sentenced some of the eleven Saudi suspects held there. The 9/11 Commission final report asserts that Al Qaeda might have had some as yet undetermined involvement in the Khobar Towers attacks.
Ahmadinejad, he has visited the Kingdom on several occasions, and Iran’s intelligence minister, Heydar Moslehi, visited in December 2011 to reduce tensions. Saudi leaders have threatened to try to acquire a nuclear weapon if Iran acquires one.

- **United Arab Emirates (UAE)** concerns about Iran have not recovered from the April 1992 Iranian expulsion of UAE security forces from the Persian Gulf island of Abu Musa, which it and the UAE shared under a 1971 bilateral agreement. (In 1971, Iran, then ruled by the U.S.-backed Shah, seized two other islands, Greater and Lesser Tunb, from the emirate of Ras al-Khaymah, as well as part of Abu Musa from the emirate of Sharjah.) The UAE seeks to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but Iran insists on resolving the issue bilaterally. (ICJ referral requires concurrence from both parties to a dispute.) The UAE formally protested Iran’s setting up of a maritime and ship registration office on Abu Musa in July 2008. The issue reignited on April 11, 2012, when Ahmadinejad visited Abu Musa, causing the UAE to submit to Iran and to the United Nations a formal letter of protest. On May 2, 2012, when IRGC Commander Mohammad Ali Jaafari, accompanied by several Majles deputies, visited the island and discussed developing a tourism industry there. UAE officials say the visits undid about one year of quiet diplomacy between the two countries on the issue, which included the naming of negotiators by both sides. The United States supports UAE proposals but takes no formal position on sovereignty.

Earlier, seeking to avoid antagonizing Iran, in May 2007 the UAE received Ahmadinejad (the highest-level Iranian visit since the 1979 revolution) and allowed him to lead an anti-U.S. rally of several hundred Iranian-origin residents of Dubai at a stadium there. This large Iranian-origin resident community (about 300,000) in Dubai may explain why Dubai takes a generally softer line on Iran than does the federation capital, Abu Dhabi.

In cooperating with U.S. and international sanctions, the UAE has increased scrutiny of exports to Iran and restricted Iranian banking activities in the UAE since the passage of Resolution 1929 in June 2010, and it has frozen the assets of Iranians subject to asset freezes under the U.N. resolutions. In February 2012, a major bank in Dubai (Noor Islamic Bank) ended transactions with Iran; Iran was using the bank to process hard currency oil payments. UAE officials say their cooperation with sanctions enforcement has reduced trade with Iran by about 30% since 2010 (when the level was about $12 billion). The UAE is also close to completing a new oil pipeline that will allow its oil exports to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and lessen the vulnerability of UAE oil exports.

- **Qatar** is wary that Iran might eventually seek to encroach on its large North Field (natural gas). It shares that field with Iran (called South Pars on Iran’s side) and Qatar earns large revenues from natural gas exports from it. Qatar’s fears have been heightened by occasional Iranian statements, such as one in April 2004, when Iran’s deputy oil minister said that Qatar is probably producing more gas than “her right share” from the field and that Iran “will not allow” its wealth to be used by others. Possibly to try to ease such implied threats, Qatar invited Ahmadinejad to the December 2007 GCC summit there.
• **Bahrain** is about 60% Shiite-inhabited, many of whom are of Persian origin, but its government is dominated by the Sunni Muslim Al Khalifa family. In 1981 and again in 1996, Bahrain publicly accused Iran of supporting Bahraini Shiite dissidents in efforts to overthrow the ruling Al Khalifa family. These concerns underlie the government response to the 2011-2012 uprising against the Al Khalifa regime by mostly Shiite demonstrators. In November 2011, an investigatory commission (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry) concluded there is no evidence to indicate Iran instigated the protests, although U.S. officials say there is evidence Iran is working with Shiite hardline groups to block a political settlement there. Tensions have flared several times since July 2007 over Iranian attempts to question the legitimacy of a 1970 U.N.-run referendum in which Bahrainis opted for independence from Iran.

• **Oman.** Of the GCC states, the Sultanate of Oman is closest politically to Iran and has tended not to directly criticize Iranian policies. During the Shah’s rule, Iran sent troops to help the Sultan suppress rebellion in the Dhofar region. Sultan Qaboos made a state visit to Iran in August 2009, coinciding with the second inauguration of Ahmadinejad that coincided with substantial Iranian unrest inside Iran over his reelection. Oman played a brokering role in obtaining the release from Iran of U.S. hiker Sara Shourd in September 2010, and her companions in September 2011. Some press reports say Omani officials routinely turn a blind eye to or even cooperate in the smuggling of western goods to Iran.

• **Kuwait** had pursued ties to Iran as a counterweight to Saddam Hussein, who invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Since Saddam’s overthrow in 2003, Kuwait has become more distant from and critical of Iran and, in May 2010, Kuwait confirmed that it had arrested some Kuwaiti civil servants and stateless residents for allegedly working on behalf of the Qods Force in an alleged plot to blow up Kuwaiti energy facilities.40 In March 2011, a Kuwait court sentenced two Iranians and a Kuwaiti to death in the alleged plot. In a related development that month, Kuwait expelled three Iranian diplomats, and Iran expelled three Kuwaiti diplomats in response. Iranian official visits to Kuwait in May 2011 defused the issue, to some extent, but the suspicions flared again in November 2011 when Iran arrested two persons its says are Kuwaiti spies. About 25% of Kuwaitis are Shiite Muslims, and Iran supported Shiite radical groups in Kuwait in the 1980s as a means to try to pressure Kuwait not to support the Iraqi war effort in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Some of those acts are listed in the table above.

**Yemen**

Yemeni leaders have long claimed that Iran was trying to destabilize Yemen—making such claims perhaps in order to secure more financial and military aid from the Arab Gulf states. More recently there have been independent indications of a growing Iranian role inside Yemen. In the north, an unnamed U.S. official reportedly said that Iranian smugglers backed by the Quds Force are using small boats to ship in AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades and other arms to replace older weapons used by the Houthi rebels.41 On July 19, 2012, Yemen’s President accused Iran of

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41 A rebellion in northern Yemen was begun by dissident Shiite cleric Hussein Badruddin Al Houthi, and the rebellion (continued...)
spying on Yemen and threatened unspecified retaliation if Iran continued to do so. The overlay of
the conflict in Yemen is an uprising against longtime President Ali Abdullah Saleh that began in
2011 and led to his departure from Yemen in January 2012.

**Iranian Policy in Iraq**

The U.S. military ousting of Saddam Hussein in 2003 benefitted Iran strategically by removing its
long time antagonist and bringing to power a government led by Shiite Islamists with long-
standing ties to Iran. The Iraqi government first formed in May 2006 is still led by Prime Minister
Nuri al-Maliki, the head of a Shiite Islamist party called the Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party. He has
made numerous visits to Iran during his tenure and is strongly backed by Iran in his political
disputes with Iraq’s Sunni-dominated factions. He and allied Iraqi leaders are sympathetic to
some of Iran’s regional goals, such as keeping in power Iran’s ally President Bashar al-Assad of
Syria, and of eliminating Iranian opposition groups from Iran’s borders. Iraq reportedly has
allowed Iran to overfly Iraqi airspace with cargo flights to supply the Syrian military in its battle
against armed dissidents, although U.S. pressure on Iraq in September 2012 reportedly has led
Baghdad to cease that permission. Iraq also reportedly continues to conduct a full spectrum of
trade with Iran, sometimes allegedly running afoul of U.S. and international sanctions against
Iran. On July 31, 2012, the United States sanctioned the Elaf Islamic Bank of Iraq for conducting
sanctionable banking transactions with Iran. (For more information, see CRS Report RS21968,
*Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, by Kenneth Katzman.)

Aside from Iran’s ties to Maliki and governing institutions, Iran exercises influence in Iraq
through Shiite factions, particularly that of Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr. Iran continues to
support Sadrists and other pro-Iranian Shiite militias in Iraq—such as the Promised Day Brigade,
As’aib Ahl Al Haq (League of the Righteous) and Kata’ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades).
However, these and other Shiite militias are reported to be less active since the U.S. departure in
December 2011—a departure that removed their rationale for remaining armed. Iran reportedly
used its influence with Sadr to dissuade him from directing his 40 followers in the Iraqi
parliament to side with factions seeking a vote of no-confidence against Maliki.

Another possible sign of Iranian intent to influence Iraq came in November 2011 when supporters
of an Iraq-born senior cleric, longtime resident in Iran, Ayatollah Mahmoud Shahrudi, began
opening representatives offices in the holy Iraqi city of Najaf. This is viewed as an Iranian effort
to position Shahrudi as a successor to the frail senior Iraqi cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.
Iraqi Shiites reportedly are shunning Shahrudi, suggesting they do not want additional Iranian
religious influence in Najaf. Maliki met with Shahrudi during his April 2012 visit to Iran.

**Supporting Palestinian Militant Groups**

Iran’s support for Palestinian militant groups has long concerned U.S. administrations, as part of
an apparent effort by Tehran to obstruct an Israeli-Palestinian peace, which Iran believes would

(...continued)

is widely referred to as the Houthi rebellion. Eric Schmitt and Robert F. Worth, “With Arms for Yemen Rebels, Iran

42 Background on this issue is covered in CRS Report RS22323, *Iran-Iraq Relations*, by Kenneth Katzman.

strengthen the United States and Israel. The State Department report on terrorism for 2011 repeated previous year’s reports assertions that Iran provides funding, weapons, and training to Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). All are named as foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) by the State Department for their use of violence against Israel.

Iran and Hamas

Since mid-2011, the Iran-Hamas relationship, once considered a key to Iran’s influence in stoking Israeli-Palestinian conflict, appears to have deteriorated over their differing views of the unrest in Syria. Hamas opposes the military-led crackdown against unrest by Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, possibly out of sectarian sympathy with the mostly Sunni protesters in Syria. Because it took this position, Hamas’ Syria-based leaders left that country in late 2011. This position is at odds with Iranian policy and, perhaps as a punishment, Iran reportedly suspended payments to Hamas as of July 2011. In an attempt to signal that the two continue to have good relations, the prime minister of the Hamas authority in Gaza, Ismail Haniya, visited Tehran on February 10, 2012. However, on March 6, 2012, Hamas leaders stated they would not necessarily retaliate against Israel, on Iran’s behalf, if Israel undertook unilateral military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. The Iran-Hamas rift appears to affirm the basic underlying vulnerability of the relationship—Hamas activists have long downplayed the Iran relationship, asserting that Iran is mostly Shiite, while Hamas members are Sunni Muslims.44 For well over a decade, the State Department report on terrorism, including the report for 2011, has said that Hamas receives funding, weapons, and training from Iran. However, the 2011 report contains information as of the end of 2011 and may not fully reflect the apparent rift.

When the Iran-Hamas relationship was strong, Iran’s regional policy was strengthened by Hamas successes, such as its victory in the January 25, 2006, Palestinian legislative elections, and even more so by Hamas’s June 2007 armed takeover of the Gaza Strip. Iran provided material support to Hamas during the December 27, 2008-January 17, 2009, Israel-Hamas War in Gaza. Then Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen said on January 27, 2009, that the United States boarded but did not seize a ship carrying light arms to Hamas from Iran; the ship (the Monchegorsk) later went to Cyprus. On February 1, 2009, one of Hamas’ main leaders, Khaled Meshal, publicly praised Iran for helping Hamas achieve “victory” over Israel in the conflict.45 Iran joined in regional criticism of Israel for its May 31, 2010, armed inspection of a Turkish ship, carrying humanitarian goods, that attempted to evade Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza. In March 2011, Israel intercepted a ship, the Victoria, off its coast, and seized a “large quantity” of mortars and C-704 cruise missiles that Israel said were bound for Hamas in Gaza. These shipments appeared to violate Resolution 1747, which bans Iranian arms exports.

Lebanese Hezbollah46

Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s chief protégé movement in the region. That relationship began when Lebanese Shiite clerics of the pro-Iranian Lebanese Da’wa Party began to organize in 1982 into

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46 For detail on Hezbollah, see CRS Report R41446, Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress, by Casey L. Addis and Christopher M. Blanchard.
what later was unveiled in 1985 as Hezbollah. Iran's political, financial, and military aid to Hezbollah has helped it become a major force in Lebanon’s politics; it remains politically close to Iran but is no longer seen as Tehran’s “proxy.” Acts of terrorism by the group and its antecedents are listed in the table above, but Hezbollah has largely forsaken acts of international terrorism in recent years, focusing instead on its role in Lebanon.

Hezbollah’s attacks on Israeli forces in southern Lebanon contributed to an Israeli withdrawal in May 2000, but Hezbollah maintained military forces along the border. Although Iran likely did not instigate Lebanese Hezbollah to provoke the July-August 2006 war with Israel, Iran has long been its major arms supplier. Hezbollah fired Iranian-supplied rockets on Israel’s northern towns during the fighting, including at the Israeli city of Haifa (30 miles from the border), and, more intensively, at cities within 20 miles of the Lebanese border.47 During that conflict, on July 14, 2006, Hezbollah hit an Israeli warship with a C-802 sea-skimming missile probably provided by Iran. Iran’s 50 Qods Force personnel in Lebanon reportedly advised Hezbollah during the conflict, although that number might have increased during the conflict to help Hezbollah operate the Iran-supplied weaponry. Even though Hezbollah reduced its overt military presence in southern Lebanon in accordance with the conflict-related U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 (July 31, 2006), Hezbollah was perceived as a victor in the war for holding out against Israel.

Ahmadinejad advertised Iran’s continued strong commitment to Hezbollah during his October 14-15, 2010, visit to Lebanon, the first by a president of the Islamic Republic, which included his visiting villages near the border with Israel. Iran was perceived as a political beneficiary of Hezbollah’s decision in January 2011 to withdraw from the Lebanese cabinet, which led to the fall of the Hariri government and the formation of a government by Hezbollah-selectee Najib Makati, a Sunni Muslim. (Under a long-standing agreed political formula in Lebanon, the prime minister is a Sunni Muslim.)

However, there has been more vocal criticism of Hezbollah within and outside Lebanon because it continues to support its other key patron, Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, despite his violent crackdown against protesters in Syria. Because of the perceived vulnerability of Assad, and Hezbollah’s linkage to his regime, Iran is reported to be trying to broaden its relationships in Lebanon, particularly with the Christian community. In May 2012, Iran’s first vice president visited Lebanon with a large delegation and numerous proposals to fund development projects in areas inhabited by all of Lebanon’s different sects and confessions. One controversial project is to provide $40 million for a dam to provide electricity to parts of Lebanon’s Christian heartland. Lebanon’s cabinet is considering the offer.48

Recent Arming and Funding

Since the 2006 conflict, Iran has resupplied Hezbollah with at least 25,000 new rockets, and49 press reports in early 2010 said Hezbollah maintains a wide network of arms and missile caches around Lebanon. Among the post-war deliveries were 500 Iranian-made “Zelzal” (Earthquake) missiles with a range of 186 miles, enough to reach Tel Aviv from south Lebanon. In November 2009, Israel intercepted a ship that it asserted was carrying 500 tons of arms purportedly for

47 “Israel’s Peres Says Iran Arming Hizbollah.” Reuters, February 4, 2002.
Hezbollah. Iran also made at least $150 million available for Hezbollah to distribute to Lebanese citizens (mostly Shiite supporters of Hezbollah) whose homes were damaged in the Israeli military campaign. Many experts believe Hezbollah might fire those rockets at Israel if Israel were to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities.

As far as funding, the State Department terrorism report for 2008, released on April 30, 2009, specified Iranian aid to Hezbollah as exceeding $200 million in 2008, and said that Iran trained over 3,000 Hezbollah fighters in Iran during that year. The report for 2009 used similar figures for Iranian aid and training for Hezbollah but over an unspecified time frame. The State Department report for 2011 repeated the 2010 report’s assertion that Iran “has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Hezbollah and has trained thousands of Hezbollah fighters at camps in Iran.” Some experts believe Iranian support to Hezbollah declined in 2011 as international sanctions have taken a toll on Iran’s economy and supply of available hard currency.

**Syria**

Syria is Iran’s closest Arab ally and Iran fears a strategic setback if the Sunni-led rebellion in Syria succeeds. Iran’s relationship with Syria is key to Iran’s efforts to support Hezbollah because Syria is the transit point for the Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah. Both Iran and Syria have used Hezbollah as leverage against Israel to achieve their regional and territorial aims.

To try to prevent Assad’s downfall, Iran has materially supported the Syrian regime. In March 2011, shortly after the uprising in Syria broke out, Turkey intercepted and removed weapons from an Iranian cargo plane bound for Syria. Turkey impounded another such shipment consisting of several truckloads in late April 2011. On April 14, 2011 and on several occasions since, U.S. officials have said that Iran is providing Syria with equipment to suppress crowds and to monitor and block protestor use of the Internet.

U.S. officials told journalists in May 2011 that Iran was sending Qods Force advisers to help Syria crush the unrest. The April 2012 Defense Department report on Iran’s military power, released in July 2012, said that “Iran probably has provided military trainers to advise Syrian security forces.” On May 17, 2012, press reports quoted a study by the “panel of experts” that is monitoring Iranian compliance with the U.N. resolutions (see above) as saying that Iran has shipped weaponry to Syria (and Afghanistan).

The first tentative confirmation of Iran’s presence in the Syria conflict came in January 2012, when the armed opposition in Syria captured several men who it said were members of the Qods Force, and showed them and their identification cards on a video. In late May 2012, senior Qods Force officer General Esmail Ghaani publicly confirmed in Iranian media that there are Qods Force personnel in Syria, saying they have helped stop attacks on civilians carried out by Syrian armed rebels. IRGC Commander-in-Chief Jafari affirmed that assertion on September 16, 2012. On August 28, 2012, an IRGC commander said Iran is “involved in fighting every aspect of a war, a military one in Syria” and a cultural one as well.

On the other hand, there are signs of strains in Iran over the aid to Syria. Some reports indicate that the architect of the support effort, Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani, has come under criticism for funneling substantial Iranian state resources to the Syria effort—criticism stoked by Iran’s economic problems laid bare in its early October currency collapse. Other criticism stemmed from a threat in early October 2012 by Syrian rebels to execute 48 Iranians they captured in Syria and claim are Qods personnel. Perhaps to address these criticisms, about 275 Qods Force personnel reportedly were withdrawn from Syria in early October.

In response to the Qods presence in Syria, on May 4, 2011, the Treasury Department designated the Qods Force as an entity subject to a U.S. assets freeze for human rights abuses in Syria (under Executive Order 13572). On May 18, 2011, the Treasury Department designated Mohsen Chizari, a Qods Force officer, and Qods Force overall commander Qasem Soleimani under that order. Other Iranians were sanctioned in late June under that order. In late August 2011, the European Union sanctioned the Qods Force for assisting the Syrian crackdown.

Iran bases its justification for its intervention in Syria on a longstanding defense relationship with the Assad regime. On December 13, 2009, the Syrian and Iranian defense ministers signed a defense agreement to “face common enemies and challenges.” In late June 2010, it was reported that Iran had sent Syria a sophisticated air defense radar system that Syria could potentially use to thwart Israeli air strikes. In March 2011, Iranian officials commented that they might contribute to improving some Syrian port facilities or other installations. On some occasions, including the early 1990s, Iran purportedly has acted as an intermediary with North Korea to supply Syria with various forms of WMD and missile technology. Iran reportedly has helped Syria expand its chemical weapons arsenal.

At the same time, perhaps trying to hedge its position should President Bashar Al Assad fall, Iran has tried to encourage President Assad to take steps to calm the unrest through reforms. Foreign Minister Salehi said on August 28, 2011, that Syria should recognize its people’s “legitimate demands.” In September 2011, Ahmadinejad called on Assad to cease using force against demonstrators and open dialogue on reforms, and he and other Iranian leaders have expressed similar themes since. In late January 2012, Iran said Syria should hold free elections, but that doing so would take time to organize.

The Caucuses and Central Asia

Iran’s policy in the nearby Caucasus has thus far emphasized Iran’s rights to Caspian Sea resources, particularly against Azerbaijan. That country’s population, like Iran’s, is mostly Shiite Muslim, but its leadership is highly secular. Azerbaijan is ethnically Turkic, and Iran fears that Azerbaijan nationalists might stoke separatism among Iran’s large Azeri Turkic population, which demonstrated some unrest in 2006 and during the uprising in Iran in 2009. These factors could explain why Iran has generally tilted toward Armenia, which is Christian, and which is at odds with Azerbaijan over territory and control of ethnic Armenians. In May 2012, Azerbaijan refused entry to a senior aide to Khamene’i. Iran has often slowed or stopped Azerbaijani truck traffic that

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must transit Iran in order to reach a non-contiguous part of Azerbaijan (Nakichevan), which is cut off from the rest of Azerbaijan by Armenia’s occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh.

In July 2001, Iranian warships and combat aircraft threatened a British Petroleum (BP) ship on contract to Azerbaijan out of an area of the Caspian that Iran considers its own. The United States called that action provocative, and has since been engaged in border security and defense cooperation with Azerbaijan. The United States successfully backed construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, intended in part to provide alternatives to Iranian oil.

Israel also is apparently looking to Azerbaijan to counter Iran, announcing in February 2012 a major sale of defense equipment. In mid-March 2012, Azerbaijan arrested 22 persons it said were Iranian agents plotting attacks against Israeli and Western targets there.

Along with India and Pakistan, Iran has been given observer status at the Central Asian security grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO—Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). In April 2008, Iran applied for full membership in the organization, but, not wanting to antagonize the United States, in June 2010 the SCO denied Iran’s bid by barring admission to countries under U.N. Security Council sanctions. Ahmadinejad attended the latest SCO meeting in Beijing on June 6-7, 2012, which he primarily used to press his case with China and Russia for relief from international sanctions over its nuclear program.

South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India

Iran looks to its eastern neighbors in South Asia as allies and potential allies to help parry U.S. and European pressure on Iran’s economy and its leaders.

Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, as in Iraq, Iran is viewed by U.S. officials as pursuing a multi-track strategy—attempting to help develop Afghanistan and enhance its influence there, while also building leverage against the United States by arming anti-U.S. militant groups. Iran’s main goal appears to be to restore some of its traditional sway in eastern, central, and northern Afghanistan, where Persian-speaking Afghans predominate. Many Afghans, even those of Pashtun ethnicity, speak Dari, a dialect of Persian language. Reports in mid-2012 suggest that Iranian merchants and traders are conducting financial or currency transactions in Afghanistan in an effort to acquire U.S. dollars and blunt the effects of international sanctions against Iran.

Iran has sought some influence by supporting the government of President Hamid Karzai, who is a Sunni Muslim and a Pashtun. Karzai has said publicly, most recently in December 2011 (during a visit by Defense Secretary Panetta) that he does not want proxy competition between the United States and Iran in Afghanistan. Karzai regularly meets with Ahmadinejad bilaterally and in the context of several regional summit series that include Pakistan and Central Asian states. The latest such summit, between Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, was held during February 17-18,


Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses

2012. Karzai admitted on October 26, 2010, that press reports were true that Iran has given Afghanistan direct cash payments (about $2 million per year) to support its budget and to possibly drive a wedge between Afghanistan and the United States. In addition, the two countries are said to be cooperating effectively against narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan into Iran; Iranian border forces take consistent heavy losses in operations to try to prevent this trafficking.

While dealing with Karzai, Iran also is positioning itself—in ways at odds with Afghan government interests—to threaten U.S. forces. Reflecting concern about the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, Iran reportedly tried to derail the U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement that was signed on May 1, 2012, and which provides for the possibility that the United States will keep forces in Afghanistan beyond the planned transition to Afghan lead in 2014. The agreement prohibits the United States from using Afghanistan as a base from which to launch military action against other countries. Still, U.S. officials say Iran tried to sway Afghan parliamentarians against the pact with bribes, but the Afghan legislators accepted Iran’s payments but voted in favor of the pact anyway.

Iran is particularly concerned about the U.S. use of the air base at Shindand, in Herat Province, which Iran believes could be used for surveillance of or strikes on Iran. The U.S. drone that crashed in Iran in December 2011 was believed to be based in Shindand. The State Department terrorism report for 2011 continued to accuse the Qods Force of supplying various munitions, including 107 mm rockets, to select Taliban and other militants in Afghanistan, and of training Taliban fighters in small unit tactics, small arms use, explosives, and indirect weapons fire. The report again asserts that Iran has supplied militants in Qandahar, which is a Pashtun-inhabited province in southern Afghanistan and demonstrates that Iran is not only assisting militants near its borders. In February 2011, British forces captured a shipment of 48 Iranian-made rockets in Afghanistan’s western province of Nimruz, allegedly bound for Taliban militants. On the other hand, U.S. commanders have consistently maintained that the Iranian assistance to Afghan militants is not decisive on the battlefield.

Iran’s materiel support for Taliban elements may also give it leverage in any Taliban-government political settlement in Afghanistan; Iran reportedly invited some Taliban members to an “Islamic Awakening” conference in Tehran in mid-September 2011. The invitation was reportedly part of an attempt to broker a meeting between the Taliban representatives and Afghan government representatives attending the conference—the chief Afghan representative was the then head of the Afghanistan High Peace Council overseeing the reconciliation process, former President Burhanuddin Rabbani who was assassinated in Kabul after returning from the conference. In July 2012, Iran reportedly allowed the Taliban to open an office in Zahedan, in eastern Iran—possibly to better coordinate policy with the Taliban or possibly to facilitate and Iranian role in political reconciliation in Afghanistan.

In August 2010, the Treasury Department sanctioned two Iranian Qods Force officers allegedly involved in supplying funds and materiel to Afghan militants. They were sanctioned under Executive Order 13224 for supporting international terrorism.

Because Iran has multifaceted influence in Afghanistan, some U.S. officials reportedly are arguing that the United States should develop a bilateral dialogue on Afghanistan, to be conducted by their respective ambassadors in Kabul. Iran may have signaled a willingness for such

engagement when it attended the October 18, 2010, meeting in Rome of the 44-nation “International Contact Group” on Afghanistan. The United States did not object to the Iranian attendance at the meeting, which included a briefing by General David Petraeus (then top U.S./NATO commander in Afghanistan). Iran also attended the a Contact Group meeting on March 3, 2011, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (at the headquarters of the Organization of Islamic Conference). Iran did not attend the January 28, 2010, international meeting in Britain on Afghanistan, but it did attend a follow-up meeting in Kabul on July 20, 2010. Iran attended the regional meeting on Afghanistan in Istanbul on November 2, 2011, at which all regional countries pledged to support Afghan stability and sovereignty. It also attended the major international Bonn Conference on Afghanistan on December 5, 2011, and subsequent international conferences on that issue (with the obvious exception of the May 20-21, 2012, NATO summit in Chicago).

Pakistan

Iran’s relations with Pakistan have been partly a function of events in Afghanistan, although relations have worsened somewhat in late 2009 as Iran has accused Pakistan of supporting Sunni Muslim rebels in Iran’s Baluchistan region. These Sunni guerrillas have conducted a number of attacks on Iranian regime targets in 2009, as discussed above (Jundullah).

Iran engaged in substantial military cooperation with Pakistan in the early 1990s, and it was revealed in 2003 that the founder of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, A. Q. Khan, sold Iran nuclear technology and designs. However, Iran-Pakistan relations became strained in the 1990s when Pakistan was supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan, which committed alleged atrocities against Shiite Afghans (Hazara tribe), and which seized control of Persian-speaking areas of western and northern Afghanistan. Iran remains suspicious that Pakistan might want to again implant Taliban militants in power in Afghanistan, but Iran-Pakistan relations have improved since mid-2011 as Pakistan’s relations with the United States have worsened. Iran and Pakistan now have a broad bilateral agenda that includes a potential major gas pipeline project. Iran has completed the line on its side of the border, and Pakistan is trying to accelerate work on its part of the line. However, Pakistan reportedly has had trouble financing the project on its side of the border, and U.S. officials say they consider it potential sanctionable under the Iran Sanctions Act.

India

India and Iran have sought to accommodate each others’ interests and avoid mutual conflict. Their interests have tended to align on several issues, particularly Afghanistan, where both countries support the minority factions based in the north and west. India reportedly wants to expedite the development of Iran’s Chabahar port, which would give India direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia without relying on transit routes through Pakistan.

As international sanctions have increased in 2011-2012, India appears to be wrestling with a choice of preserving its ties to Iran—which has provided it with needed oil for its growing economy—or joining U.S. and international attempts to isolate Iran. In 2012, it has sided with the United States and the EU by cutting its purchases of Iranian oil, and has received an exemption from U.S. sanctions. India’s participation in the trans-Pakistan gas pipeline discussed above.

appears unlikely, at least initially, not only for fear of potential U.S. sanctions but also because of India-Pakistan mistrust but also over pricing and security issues. India and Iran reportedly have discussed an alternative undersea pipeline that would bypass Pakistan. Perhaps to balance these actions in support of sanctions, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh attended the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Tehran in August 2012. This is discussed more extensively in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions.

Of particular concern to some U.S. officials, particularly in the late 1990s, were India-Iran military-to-military relationships and projects. The relationship included visits to India by some Iranian naval personnel, although India said these exchanges involve junior personnel and focus mainly on promoting interpersonal relations and not on India’s provision to Iran of military expertise. The military relationship between the countries has withered over at least the past five years. India and Iran, along with the United States, backed anti-Taliban factions in Afghanistan during 1996-2001.

Al Qaeda

Iran is not a natural ally of Al Qaeda, largely because Al Qaeda is an orthodox Sunni Muslim organization. However, some experts believe that hardliners in Iran still might want to use Al Qaeda activists as leverage against the United States and its allies, despite the May 1, 2011, death of Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden in a U.S. raid in Pakistan. Some allege that Iran is forging links to Al Qaeda affiliates in Africa, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al Shabab in Somalia, for the purpose of extending its influence in Africa. However, it is unclear whether any Iranian ties to these groups have been approved at the highest levels of the Iranian leadership.

The 9/11 Commission report said several of the September 11 hijackers and other plotters, possibly with official help, might have transited Iran, but the report did not assert that the Iranian government cooperated with or knew about the plot. A U.S. district court filing in May 2011 in New York named Iranian officials and ministries as materially supporting the Al Qaeda in the September 11 attacks. The court found, on December 15, 2011, in favor of the plaintiffs and later ordered Iran, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban to pay $6 billion in damages to the relatives of the September 11 attacks. Earlier, on November 28, 2011, a U.S. district court issued a ruling linking Iran (and Sudan) to the August 1998 Al Qaeda bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

Even though bin Laden has been killed, Iran might see possibilities for tactical alliance with Al Qaeda. Three major Al Qaeda figures believed to still be based mostly in Iran include spokesman Sulayman Abu Ghaith, top operative Sayf Al Adl, and a bin Laden’s son, Saad. All three have been reported, at least on occasion, to have been allowed outside Iran to travel to Pakistan. (U.S. officials blamed Saad bin Laden, Adl, and Abu Ghaith for the May 12, 2003, bombings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, against four expatriate housing complexes, saying they have been able to contact associates outside Iran.) The Department of Treasury, on January 16, 2009, designated four Al Qaeda operatives in Iran, including Saad bin Laden (and three lesser known figures) as terrorist entities under Executive Order 13224. On July 28, 2011, under that same order, the Treasury Department sanctioned six Al Qaeda members for allegedly moving funds to Al Qaeda.

in Pakistan and Afghanistan via their bases in Iran, and under a specific agreement between Al Qaeda and Iran. Another bin Laden ally, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, killed by U.S. forces in Iraq on June 7, 2006, reportedly transited Iran into Iraq after the September 11 attacks and became an insurgent leader there.

Iran has, to some extent, confirmed the presence of Al Qaeda militants in Iran. It asserted on July 23, 2003, that it had “in custody” senior Al Qaeda figures. On July 16, 2005, Iran’s intelligence minister said that 200 Al Qaeda members are in Iranian jails. U.S. officials have said since January 2002 that Iran has not prosecuted or extradited any senior Al Qaeda operatives. In December 2009, Iran’s foreign minister confirmed that a teenage daughter of Osama bin Laden had sought refuge in the Saudi embassy in Tehran—the first official confirmation that members of bin Laden’s family have been in Iran. She left Iran in March 2010. As many as 20 other family members have been said to be living in a compound in Iran since the September 11, 2001, attacks, and accusing Iran of refusing to allow them to leave for Saudi Arabia or other places. Some family members have said the young bin Ladens have never been affiliated with Al Qaeda.

**Latin America**

A growing concern in Congress has been Iran’s developing relations with countries and leaders in Latin America. Iran views some Latin American countries, particularly Cuba and Venezuela, as sharing its distrust of the United States and as willing to help Iran circumvent some international sanctions. Suggesting expanded Iranian interest in the Western Hemisphere, during 2006-2011, Iran opened six embassies in countries in the region (Colombia, Nicaragua, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Bolivia), and expanded embassies in Cuba, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. In January 2012, Ahmadinejad undertook a visit to Latin America, including Venezuela, Ecuador, Cuba, and Nicaragua. By all accounts, few concrete economic agreements were reached during that visit, which expands on past patterns in which agreements tend to be announced but not implemented. Ahmadinejad attended the U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development in Brazil on June 21, 2012, which was bounded by his travel to Bolivia and Venezuela.

On March 1, 2012, a House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade reported out H.R. 3783, the “Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act,” requiring the Administration to develop a strategy to counter Iran’s purportedly growing influence in Latin America. It was reported out by the full committee on March 7, 2012. Many outside experts, however, believe that most Latin American countries see little benefit to a major expansion of ties to Iran and that assessments of Iran’s influence in the region may be overstated by some think-tank experts. No Latin American leader or head of government attended the NAM summit in Tehran in August 2012.

**Venezuela and Cuba**

Venezuela under President Hugo Chavez continues to be Iran’s main champion in the region. Iranian leaders were undoubtedly relieved at Chavez’s re-election on October 7, 2012; his opponent in the election, Henrique Capriles, was considered likely to align Venezuela closer to the United States and end Chavez’s close ties to Iran. Still, there is no consensus on the degree of

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threat posed by Iran-Venezuela ties; in July 2012, President Obama stated that Iran-Venezuela ties do not constitute a strategic threat to the United States. The April 2012 Defense Department report on Iran does not address this issue at all, although the 2010 version of the report was the first U.S. government publication to say that Qods Force personnel are in Venezuela, where their presence had “increased” in recent years, according to that report.

President Chavez has visited Iran on several occasions, offering to engage in joint oil and gas projects, and Ahmadinejad has visited Venezuela on each of his six trips to Latin America as president, including the June 2012, trip. However, contrary to the assertions of some experts, a State Department official testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 24, 2011, that Iran’s embassy in Caracas has only about 14 diplomats and is not particularly active in terms of open diplomatic activity, casting doubt on reports that Iran has a large, active presence in Venezuela. About 400 Iranian engineers have reportedly been sent to Venezuela to work on infrastructure projects there.

It was reported in May 2011 that the two may have signed an agreement in October 2010 to develop a joint missile base in Venezuela, but Venezuela has denied these reports and the Obama Administration has said there is no evidence to support the missile base assertion. Venezuela reportedly has purchased some Iranian military equipment, such as rifles, as well as $23 million in military equipment upgrades and an explosives factory.62

Many accounts say that most of the agreements between Iran and Venezuela are agreements in principle that have not been implemented in reality. Among the arrangements implemented are the establishment of direct air links through an obscure air service dedicated to this route, although the route was suspended in 2010. A firm deal for Petroleos de Venezuela to supply Iran with gasoline was signed in September 2009, apparently in a joint effort to circumvent the reduction in worldwide sales of gasoline to Iran. In part because of this trade, the firm was sanctioned under the Iran Sanctions Act in May 2011. Other Venezuelan firms have also been sanctioned for ties to Iran, as discussed in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions.

**Cuba**

Iran’s relations with Cuba are long-standing and Cuba has routinely been included in Ahmadinejad’s several visits to Latin America. In the past, Cuba reportedly has helped Iran jam the broadcasts of Iranian dissidents based in Los Angeles and elsewhere in the United States. Still, Cuba’s economy is widely considered too small to be able to materially reduce the effect of international sanctions against Iran.

**Other Ties in the Region**

Iran also has built ties to Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Brazil, although some press accounts may exaggerate the extent and strategic significance of these relations. Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi visited Bolivia in May 2011, but President Evo Morales was then compelled to apologize to Argentina for inviting him because of Vahidi’s alleged involvement in the 1994 Buenos Aires bombing listed in the table above. Vahidi was, at the time, the head of the Qods Force. Iran reportedly has $1 billion in joint ventures with Bolivia. These ventures reportedly

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were the subject of discussion during Ahmadinejad’s June 2012 visit, discussed above. Trade with Ecuador expanded from $6 million annually to $168 million from 2007 to 2008.

Iran’s embassy in Managua, Nicaragua, is said by close observers to be small, contrasting with some reports on that issue, and Nicaragua has refused Iranian demands to repay $164 million in debt it owes Iran for past crude oil deliveries. Nicaragua reportedly was upset that Ahmadinejad’s January 2012 visit did not result in an Iranian pledge to forgive that debt. Iran also failed to implement some promises to undertake joint ventures with Nicaragua, including a $350 million deep water port there. Still, President Daniel Ortega hosted Ahmadinejad during his visit there in January 2012.

Because of its large economy, Brazil, under previous President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, emerged as Iran’s most significant supporter, particularly because of Brazil’s engagement with Iran to forge the “Tehran Declaration” on nuclear issues in June 2010. Iran also succeeded in persuading Brazil to publicly oppose additional U.N. sanctions on Iran. However, the government of President Dilma Roussef, whose term began January 1, 2011, has been less supportive of Iran than was her predecessor. Ahmadinejad did not visit Brazil during his January 2012 visit to the region, furthering the impression that Iran’s influence in South America is limited to mainly smaller nations. However, the mid-April 2012 statement that Ahmadinejad would “soon” visit Brazil appeared to be an effort by Tehran to show that its relations with Brazil are not in decline.

**Africa**

To reduce Iran’s isolation, Ahmadinejad has reached tried to enlist the support of some African leaders. Some observers believe that Iran’s outreach is focused on those African countries that might be able to export natural uranium for Iran’s nuclear program to compensate for Iran’s domestic deficiencies; such uranium producers include Zimbabwe, Senegal, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In April 2010, Ahmadinejad visited Uganda and Zimbabwe, even though Zimbabwe’s leader, Robert Mugabe, has himself been heavily criticized by the international community in recent years. Iran has also cultivated Senegal as an ally. Still, it is believed that African support for Iran is unlikely to outweigh Iran’s growing estrangement from Europe and other regions. Ten heads of state or government attended the NAM summit in Tehran in August 2012, including Mugabe.

As an example of what the Administration called Iran’s exports of lethal aid to foment violence in Africa, in October 2010, the Qods Force reportedly attempted to ship weapons to Gambia, via Nigeria, but the shipment was intercepted in Nigeria. Several Iranian entities, and a Nigerian shipping agent, were sanctioned by the United States in April 2012 for facilitating this incident. The Nigerian shipping agent allegedly helped Qods Force personnel enter Nigeria. U.N. panel of experts report on Iranian arms sales embargo violations, discussed above, have cited Iranian attempts to ship weapons to allies in the Middle East via Nigeria. (For more information, see CRS Report RS20871, *Iran Sanctions*, by Kenneth Katzman.)

Some Members of Congress are concerned that Iran is supporting radical Islamist movements in Africa. Allegations of Iran’s support for Al Qaeda affiliates in Africa are discussed above in the section on Al Qaeda. There have been allegations that Iran might have supplied Al Shabab in Somalia with anti-aircraft and anti-tank weaponry, although the few press reports about such activity suggests it is a minor component of Iranian policy, if at all. In the 111th Congress, H.Con.Res. 16 cited Hezbollah for engaging in raising funds in Africa by trafficking in “conflict diamonds.”
Iran also appears to have a residual relationship with the government of Sudan. Relations reportedly were close in the early 1990s when Islamist leaders in Sudan were attempting to make Sudan into a hub for international Islamist movements. The relationship apparently cooled in the mid-1990s when international sanctions compelled Sudan to expel Osama bin Laden and to downplay its Islamist links abroad. Still, Iran is said to supply the Sudan government with weapons it is using on its various fronts, such as the one with South Sudan, and the Qods Force reportedly continues to train the Popular Defense Force militia. Some observers say Iranian pilots may be active in Sudan on behalf of the government there. President Omar Hassan Al Bashir attended the NAM summit meeting in Tehran in August 2012.

U.S. Policy Approaches and Additional Options

The February 11, 1979, fall of the Shah of Iran, a key U.S. ally, opened a long and deep rift in U.S.-Iranian relations. Although U.S. concerns about Iran and its nuclear program are long-standing, a growing Israeli threat to use military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities—with or without U.S. backing—has made U.S. policy toward Iran an urgent issue. Many of the policy options being implemented or under consideration are the same options that have faced the United States since 1979—and virtually no policy option has been taken “off the table.”

Background on Relations Since the 1979 Revolution

The Carter Administration sought a degree of engagement with the Islamic regime during 1979, but it agreed to allow in the ex-Shah for medical treatment and engaged some moderate Iranian officials of the new regime who were viewed by Khomeini loyalists as insufficiently revolutionary. As a result, the U.S.-Iran estrangement began in earnest on November 4, 1979, when radical pro-Khomeini “students in the line of the Imam (Khomeini)” seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and held its diplomats hostage until minutes after President Reagan’s inauguration on January 20, 1981. The United States broke relations with Iran on April 7, 1980 (two weeks prior to the failed U.S. military attempt to rescue the hostages during April 24-25, 1980), and the two countries had only limited official contact thereafter.63

The United States tilted toward Iraq in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, including U.S. diplomatic attempts to block conventional arms sales to Iran, providing battlefield intelligence to Iraq64 and, during 1987-1988, direct skirmishes with Iranian naval elements in the course of U.S. efforts to protect international oil shipments in the Gulf from Iranian mines and other attacks. In one battle on April 18, 1988 (“Operation Praying Mantis”), Iran lost one-quarter of its larger naval ships in a one-day engagement with the U.S. Navy, including one frigate sunk and another badly damaged. Iran strongly disputed the U.S. assertion that the July 3, 1988, U.S. shoot down of Iran Air Flight 655 by the U.S.S. Vincennes over the Persian Gulf (bound for Dubai, UAE) was an accident.

63 An exception was the abortive 1985-1986 clandestine arms supply relationship with Iran in exchange for some American hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon (the so-called “Iran-Contra Affair”). Iran has an interest section in Washington, DC, under the auspices of the Embassy of Pakistan; it is staffed by Iranian Americans. The U.S. interest section in Tehran has no American personnel; it is under the Embassy of Switzerland.

After the Iran-Iraq War ended, President George H. W. Bush laid the groundwork for a rapprochement with Iran. In his January 1989 inaugural speech, saying that, in relations with Iran, “goodwill begets goodwill,” implying better relations if Iran helped obtain the release of U.S. hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran reportedly did assist in obtaining their releases, which was completed in December 1991, but no thaw followed, possibly because Iran continued to back groups opposed to the U.S.-sponsored Middle East peace process.

Upon taking office in 1993, the Clinton Administration moved to further isolate Iran as part of a strategy of “dual containment” of Iran and Iraq. In 1995 and 1996, the Clinton Administration and Congress added sanctions on Iran (a ban on U.S. trade and investment with Iran and the Iran Sanctions Act that penalizes foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector) in response to growing concerns about Iran’s weapons of mass destruction and its efforts to subvert the Arab-Israeli peace process. The intent of these sanctions was to persuade U.S. allies to restrict trade with Iran. The Administration expressed skepticism of the EU’s policy of “critical dialogue” with Iran—a dialogue consisting of EU meetings with Iran that included criticisms of Iran’s human rights policies and its support for militant movements in the Middle East.

The election of Khatemi in May 1997 precipitated a U.S. shift toward engagement; the Clinton Administration offered Iran official dialogue, with no substantive preconditions. In January 1998, Khatemi publicly agreed to “people-to-people” U.S.-Iran exchanges, but ruled out direct talks. In a June 1998 speech, then-Secretary of State Albright called for mutual confidence building measures that could lead to a “road map” for normalization. Encouraged by the reformist victory in Iran’s March 2000 Majles elections, Secretary Albright, in a March 17, 2000, speech, acknowledged past U.S. meddling in Iran, announcing an easing of the U.S. trade ban with Iran, and promised to try to resolve outstanding claims disputes. In September 2000 U.N. “Millennium Summit” meetings in New York, Albright and President Clinton sent a positive signal to Iran by attending Khatemi’s speeches.

George W. Bush Administration Policy

With Iran’s nuclear program emerging as an issue in 2002, the George W. Bush Administration undertook multi-faceted efforts to limit Iran’s strategic capabilities through international diplomacy and sanctions. Although Iran appeared to have no role in the September 11, 2001, attacks, President Bush appeared to define Iran as an enemy of the United States when he included Iran as part of an “axis of evil” in his January 2002 State of the Union message (along with Iraq and North Korea). President George W. Bush’s second inaugural address (January 20, 2005) and his State of the Union message of January 31, 2006, stated that the United States would be a close ally of a free and democratic Iran, perhaps reflecting the views of those in the Administration, such as Vice President Richard Cheney, who argued that policy should focus on U.S. efforts to change Iran’s regime.65

Bush Administration statements that it considered Iran a great nation and respects its history66 reflected the views of those in the Bush Administration who believed in keeping the option of diplomacy open—particularly in light of Iran’s potential to harm U.S. troops deployed in

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66 These were prominent themes in speeches by President Bush such as at the Merchant Marine Academy on June 19, 2006, and his September 18, 2006, speech to the U.N. General Assembly.
Afghanistan and Iraq. The Administration engaged Iran on specific regional issues: for example, it conducted a dialogue in Geneva with Iran on Iraq and Afghanistan from late 2001 until May 2003, when the United States broke off the talks following the May 12, 2003, terrorist bombing in Riyadh. This represented the first confirmed direct dialogue between the two countries since the 1979 revolution. The United States aided victims of the December 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran, including a reported offer—rebuffed by Iran—to send a high-level delegation to Iran, reportedly including then Senator Elizabeth Dole and President George W. Bush’s sister, Dorothy. An amendment by then Senator Joseph Biden to the FY2007 defense authorization bill (P.L. 109-364) supported the Administration joining nuclear talks with Iran.

“Grand Bargain Concept”

The George W. Bush Administration did not offer Iran an unconditional, direct U.S.-Iran bilateral dialogue on all issues of U.S. concern. However, some say the Bush Administration “missed an opportunity” for a “grand bargain” with Iran on its nuclear program and other issues of concern by rebuffing a reported comprehensive overture from Iran just before the May 12, 2003, Riyadh bombing. The Washington Post reported on February 14, 2007, (“2003 Memo Says Iranian Leaders Backed Talks”) that the Swiss ambassador to Iran in 2003, Tim Guldimann, had informed U.S. officials of a comprehensive Iranian proposal for talks with the United States. However, State Department officials and some European diplomats based in Tehran at that time question whether that proposal represented an authoritative Iranian communication. Others argue that the offer was unrealistic because an agreement would have required Iran to abandon key tenets of its Islamic revolution.

Overview of Obama Administration Policy:
Combining Engagement and Pressure

President Obama’s Administration took office asserting that there was an opportunity to diplomatically dissuade Iran from expanding its nuclear program and potentially to build a new framework for relations with Iran after the decades of estrangement and enmity. After taking office, the Administration offered to integrate Iran into the world economy in return for Iranian compromises on its nuclear program. Some officials, including Secretary of State Clinton and then Secretary of Defense Gates expressed skepticism that engagement would yield changes in Iran’s policies. Others believed that the United States needed to present Iran with clear incentives and punishments for continuing uranium enrichment.

The first major public manifestation of President Obama’s approach to Iran policy came in his message to the Iranian people on the occasion of Nowruz (Persian New Year), March 21, 2009. He stated that the United States “is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran, and the international community.” He also referred to Iran as “The Islamic Republic of Iran,” a formulation that suggests acceptance of the Islamic revolution and an aversion to any regime change option. Obama Administration officials did not indicate support for military action against

Iran, although no option was explicitly “taken off the table.” Prior to the June 12, 2009, election in Iran, other steps included

- President Obama’s reported two letters in 2009 to Iran’s Supreme Leader expressing the Administration’s philosophy in favor of engagement with Iran.

- A major speech to the “Muslim World” in Cairo on June 4, 2009, in which President Obama said the United States had played a role in the overthrow of Mossadeq, and said that Iran had a right to peaceful nuclear power if it complies with its responsibilities under the NPT.

- An announcement on April 8, 2009, that U.S. officials would attend all P5+1 meetings with Iran.

- Loosened restrictions on U.S. diplomats to meet their Iranian counterparts at international meetings, and permission for U.S. embassies to invite Iranian diplomats to the 2009 celebration of U.S. Independence Day. (The July 4, 2009, invitations did not get issued because of the Iran unrest.)

2010-2012: Focus on Pressure and Preventing a Nuclear-Armed Iran

The crackdown on the 2009 election-related unrest by Iran and its refusal to agree to technical terms of the October 1, 2009, nuclear agreement shifted the Administration’s focus to pressuring Iran economically and diplomatically. In a statement following the June 9, 2010, passage of Resolution 1929, President Obama described Iran as refusing to accept the path of engagement and choosing instead to preserve all elements of its nuclear program. Since then, the Administration has emphasized imposing and implementing additional sanctions, while still offering dialogue and negotiations if Iran is willing to bargain seriously on the core concerns about its nuclear program. As discussed below, President Obama has, in 2012, explicitly ruled out containing a nuclear Iran and stated that U.S. policy is to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear state. Secretary of Defense Panetta said on August 1, 2012, during a visit to Israel that “We [the United States] will not allow to develop a nuclear weapon. Period.” S.J. Res. 41, discussed below, and which passed the Senate on September 22, 2012, rejects any U.S. policy that relies on containment but acknowledges that President Obama has ruled out relying on containment.

The Administration has downplayed the possibility of military action but emphasizes that this U.S. option remains “on the table.” In attempting to dissuade Israel from striking Iran militarily, President Obama said during the March 4-6, 2012, visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that sanctions are beginning to work and should be given more time. President Obama has made this argument several times since the visit, based on signs that Iran’s economy is suffering severely and on Iran’s willingness to re-engage in nuclear negotiations in 2012. However, amid Israeli statements in August and September 2012 indicating that the talks with Iran have proved fruitless, the White House said on August 21, 2012, that there is still “time and space…to resolve this diplomatically. But it is also clear that the window that is open now to resolve this diplomatically will not remain open indefinitely.”

With the nuclear talks not yielding clear progress, the Administration has continued to impose additional sanctions beyond the EU oil embargo and related U.S. sanctions that took full effect as of July 1, 2012. The President signed into law the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act on August 10, 2012 (P.L. 112-158, H.R. 1905), a bill that, among other provisions, sanctions the transport of oil from Iran.
In concert with the democratic uprisings in the Middle East that began in 2011, the Administration also has expressed more direct criticism of Iran for its human rights abuses. As noted above, President Obama’s March 20, 2011, Nowruz statement was significantly more supportive of the pro-democracy movement in Iran than it was in prior years. The focus of his March 20, 2012, Nowruz statement was on stating that the United States will seek to help Iranians circumvent government restrictions on the Internet and other media forms. These pronouncements have been supported by imposition of sanctions on Iranian human rights abusers, as discussed further below in the section on regime change.

**U.S. and Other Military Action “On The Table” as Israel Threatens a Unilateral Strike**

President Obama has repeatedly stated that military options are “on the table.” In a March 2, 2012, interview (*The Atlantic*), he clarified that when he says that “all options are on the table” he means that there is a military component to preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. Yet, President Obama and other senior officials have always maintained that military action is a last resort if sanctions and diplomacy fail. And, the Administration has refused to accept Israeli urgings—such as by Prime Minister Netanyahu in his September 27, 2012, U.N. General Assembly speech, to set clear “red lines”—actions that, if taken by Iran, would trigger certain U.S. military action.

Senior U.S. officials have repeatedly stressed the potential adverse consequences of military action, such as Iranian retaliation that might expand throughout the region or even beyond, a reduction of Iran’s regional isolation, a strengthening of Iran’s regime domestically, an escalation of world oil prices, and the likelihood that military action would only delay Iran’s eventual acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by about one to two years. These points were enumerated by Secretary of Defense Panetta in a speech to the Brookings Institution on December 2, 2011. Most U.S. allies oppose military action.

Some argue that U.S. military action could set back Iran’s nuclear program substantially because there are a limited number of key targets, all of which are relatively vulnerable, including the enrichment site at Fordow that is hardened. On the other hand, reports about U.S. confidence in its ability to do substantial damage to any Iranian nuclear target could be intended to signal to Israel—which is threatening unilateral action as discussed below—that the United States can destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, if needed and so ordered.

**Iranian Retaliation and Alternative Scenarios of U.S.-Iran Conflict**

Consistent with U.S. assessments, Iran’s Supreme Leader and other Iranian political and military figures have repeatedly warned that Iran will retaliate for any U.S. military action taken against

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Iran. In September 2012, IRGC officials warned that even if military action were taken only by Israel, the action would trigger retaliation against U.S. targets. U.S. officials view as increasingly significant the potential for Iran to try to retaliate inside the United States through terrorism. Some believe that Iran would try to retaliate against U.S. personnel abroad, such as embassies and facilities in Europe or the Persian Gulf. Iran could also try to direct anti-U.S. militias in Iraq and Afghanistan to attack U.S. personnel. There are no U.S. troops left in Iraq, but there are about 13,000 U.S. personnel at diplomatic installations there.

Iran's capability to retaliate appears to be increasing. The Defense Department April 2012 report on Iranian military power indicates that Iran's retaliatory ability is growing, as discussed above. That ability has been enhanced through acquisition of additional ships and submarines, increasingly accurate and lethal short range ballistic missiles, and new missile capabilities to re-target, while in flight, U.S. ships or related installations. Iran has also added naval bases along its Gulf coast, according to the DoD report, enhancing its ability to threaten shipping in the Strait. Many U.S. naval planners also worry about Iran's ability to use its large fleet of small boats to "swarm" U.S. ships, and its ability to lay numerous mines in the narrow Strait of Hormuz. Earlier, Iran demonstrated its willingness and ability to act militarily: in February 2007, Iran seized 15 British sailors that Iran said were patrolling in Iran's waters, although Britain says they were in Iraqi waters performing coalition-related searches. They were held until April 5, 2007.

To reduce the effectiveness of Iranian retaliation, some argue that the United States would need to strike not only nuclear facilities but all of the retaliatory capabilities discussed above. Earlier, press reports in late February 2012, citing reported Defense Department briefings of President Obama on military options on Iran, say that a U.S. strike could include IRGC and leadership targets.

Still others argue that there are U.S. military options available that do not require actual combat. Some say that a naval embargo or related embargo is possible and could pressure Iran into reconsidering its stand on the nuclear issue. Others say that the imposition of a "no-fly zone" over Iran might also serve that purpose. Still others say that the United Nations could set up a special inspection mission to dismantle Iran's WMD programs, although inserting such a mission is likely to be resisted by Iran and could involve hostilities. A U.S. ground invasion to remove Iran's regime has not, at any time, appeared to be under serious consideration in part because of the likely resistance an invasion would meet in Iran.

U.S.-Iran military conflict could result from events or actions other than a deliberate U.S. decision to strike Iran. Such possibilities drew increased attention in relation to Iran's repeated threats to close the Strait of Hormuz if sanctions are imposed on Iran's exportation of oil. Iran reiterated that threat in late June 2012 on the eve of the entry into full force of the EU oil embargo on Iran on July 1, 2012. This issue is discussed in substantial detail in CRS Report R42335, Iran's Threat to the Strait of Hormuz, coordinated by Kenneth Katzman.

**Containment of Iran and U.S. and Gulf Defensive Preparations**

Some believe Iran will inevitably become a nuclear armed state, no matter what policies are put into effect, and that containing a nuclear armed Iran is a viable option over the long term. Critics see a reliance on containment as an abandonment of U.S. efforts to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear state. As noted above, during the visit of Netanyahu in early March 2012, President Obama explicitly ruled out such a strategy.
Several “sense of Congress” resolutions introduced in the 112th Congress urge the President to “reaffirm the unacceptability of an Iran with nuclear weapons capability and oppose any policy that would rely on containment as an option in response to the Iranian nuclear threat.” H.Res. 568 passed the House on May 17, 2012, by a vote of 401-11. Its companion measure in the Senate, S.Res. 380 did not advance. On September 22, 2012, the Senate passed S.J.Res. 41, by a vote of 90-1, containing language similar to H.Res. 569 and S.Res. 380, with an additional clause acknowledging that President Obama had ruled out the containment option. Provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013 (H.R. 4310) would mandate additional Defense Department planning for exercises and other actions, such as those involving the U.S. Fifth Fleet that is headquartered in Bahrain, that would demonstrate U.S. resolve to Iran.

Even though Iran has not yet acquired a nuclear weapon, many elements of a containment strategy have already been put in place by successive Administrations to try to prevent that outcome, or to limit Iran’s regional influence in general. A key component of the strategy has been to enhance the capabilities of U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf. Major initiatives to do so were put in place during the Clinton Administration and further developed during the Bush Administration. In mid-2006 the State Department, primarily the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (“Pol-Mil”), established the “Gulf Security Dialogue” (GSD). The Obama Administration has continued the GSD effort. During a visit to the Middle East in March 2009, Secretary of State Clinton said, after meeting with several Arab and Israeli leaders in the region, that “there is a great deal of concern about Iran from this whole region.” Iran was also the focus of her trip to the Gulf region (Qatar and Saudi Arabia) in February 2010, in which she again raised the issue of a possible U.S. extension of a “security umbrella” or guarantee to regional states against Iran, as a means of preventing Gulf accommodations to Iranian demands or attempting themselves to acquire countervailing nuclear capabilities. The Middle East unrest that spread to the Gulf states of Bahrain and Oman in 2011 caused the Administration to announce a broad arms sales review of all Middle East arms sales. That at first appeared to place the GSD concept in some doubt, but the continuing threat from Iran has largely overtaken those considerations—with the exception of those to Bahrain, most major arms sales to the Gulf states appear to be continuing without interruption.

An cornerstone of the GSD has been to improve and link into one system Gulf state missile defense capabilities, as well as to improve border and maritime security equipment through sales of combat littoral ships, radar systems, and communications gear. During her visit to Saudi Arabia on March 30-31, 2012, Secretary Clinton inaugurated a U.S.-GCC strategic dialogue that revived the longstanding concept of a GCC-wide, integrated missile defense architecture. She again discussed this issue with GCC leaders during a meeting at the margins of the late September 2012 meetings at the U.N. General Assembly. Several GSD-inspired missile defense sales include PAC-3 sales to UAE and Kuwait, and Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) to Saudi Arabia and UAE; and the very advanced “THAAD” (Theater High Altitude Area Defense) to UAE. The THAAD sale, previously notified to Congress, was finalized in early January 2012.73 In early September 2012, it was reported that the United States would soon put in place an early-warning missile defense radar in Qatar that, when combined with radars in Israel and Turkey, would provide a wide range of coverage against Iran’s missile forces.74

73 For more information on this and other U.S. sales to the UAE, see CRS Report RS21852, The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
Other Recent and Pending Deployments to Deter Iran and Reassure U.S. Allies

To enhance its strike capabilities and reassure its allies, including Israel, the United States has announced augmented capabilities during June and July 2012. During that period it has moved a second aircraft carrier into the Gulf region, added a ship (USS Ponce) in the Gulf that serves as a platform for helicopters and Special Operations Forces, and added minesweeping capabilities including underwater drones that can find and destroy mines. In late September 2012, the United States and 30 other nations held minesweeping exercises in the Persian Gulf to reinforce their ability to respond to any Iranian military action there.

Other Strategic Missile Defense Concepts Against Iran

As part of the effort to demonstrate to Iran that nuclear weapons have no utility, there has also been planning to defend against an eventual long-range Iranian missile system. In August 2008, the George W. Bush Administration reached agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic to establish a missile defense system to counter Iranian ballistic missiles. These agreements were reached over Russia’s opposition, which was based on the belief that the missile defense system would be used to neutralize Russian capabilities. However, reportedly based on assessments of Iran’s focus on missiles of regional range, on September 17, 2009, the Obama Administration reoriented this missile defense program to focus, at least initially, on ship-based systems, and systems based in other European countries, including Romania, possibly later returning to the idea of Poland- and Czech-based systems. Some saw this as an effort to win Russia's support for additional sanctions on Iran, although Russia continues to disagree with the plan.

Presidential Authorities and Legislation on Military Action

Perhaps in the belief that there needs to be more advanced planning for U.S. military action, the FY2011 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383, signed January 7, 2011) contained a provision (§1243) requiring the Administration to develop a “National Military Strategy to Counter Iran.” A provision (Section 307) of a FY2013 intelligence authorization bill (H.R. 5743) requires an assessment of the consequences of a military strike on Iran.

A decision to take military action might raise the question of presidential authorities, but no legislation has been passed by both chambers and signed into law limiting the President’s authority to use military force against Iran. In the 109th Congress, H.Con.Res. 391, introduced on April 26, 2006, called on the President to not initiate military action against Iran without first obtaining authorization from Congress. A similar bill, H.Con.Res. 33, was introduced in the 110th Congress. An amendment to H.R. 1585, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008, requiring authorization for force against Iran, was defeated 136 to 288. A provision that sought to bar the Administration from taking military action against Iran without congressional authorization was taken out of an early draft of an FY2007 supplemental appropriation (H.R. 1591) to fund additional costs for Iraq and Afghanistan combat (vetoed on May 1, 2007). Other provisions, including requiring briefings to Congress about military contingency planning related to Iran’s nuclear program, were in a House-passed FY2009 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5658).
**Incidents at Sea Agreement?**

In the 111th Congress, H.Con.Res. 94 called for the United States to negotiate an “Incidents at Sea” agreement with Iran. Section 1240 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011 (P.L. 111-383) calls for a DOD report, within one year of enactment, on the merits of such an agreement with Iran and other Persian Gulf countries. A press report in September 2011 said that some Defense Department officials are contemplating establishing formal communications channels to Iranian naval officers to prevent misunderstandings and unintended conflict.75 The idea grew out of a series of incidents with Iranian vessels, some of the incidents involving British warships, that nearly prompted confrontation with Iran.

**An Israeli Strike?**76

Some Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, view a nuclear Iran as a potential existential threat, and say they are determined to prevent a nuclear Iran, even if Israel has to take unilateral action. Implicit in these Israeli statements is the view that Israeli leaders do not completely trust that the United States will take military action to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear state. Following the November 2011 IAEA report and the start of enrichment activities at the hardened site at Fordow, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and other Israeli leaders expressed concern that Iran’s nuclear program might be entering a “zone of immunity” beyond which Israel will have no military options.

In his U.S. visit during March 4-5, 2012, Prime Minister Netanyahu expressed the right of Israel to act in its self-defense. President Obama, in speeches to the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee on March 4, 2012, and in statements before and after the Netanyahu visit, acknowledged Israel’s “sovereign right” of self-defense.77 While the possibility of an Israeli strike on Iran is widely viewed as low while the Iran-P5+1 negotiating process continues, Israeli leaders reportedly have again stepped up internal discussion of this option as the prospects for success in the P5+1—Iran talks has faded. Several high level U.S. visits to Israel in July 2012, including by National Security Advisor Donilon, Secretary Clinton, and Secretary Panetta, were apparently intended to ensure full U.S.-Israel coordination on policy toward Iran by assuring Israel that the United States is fully committed to preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. And, U.S. deployments in the Gulf, discussed above, as well as additional planned moves to implement sanctions, and possible planned covert action, have been intended to reassure Israel that the United States is dealing adequately with the nuclear threat from Iran.78 Still, suggesting he remains wary, and in advance of a late September 2012 U.S. visit, Prime Minister Netanyahu said early September 2012 that Iran would not halt its nuclear program unless presented with a clear “red line” against doing so. In his September 27, 2012, U.N. General Assembly speech, he stressed the need for the international community, primarily the United States, to set a clear red line for Iran short of acquiring enough high enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon. However, as of mid-October 2012, Israeli officials appear to be stressing additional Iran sanctions rather than military options—pushing out the time horizon for such action until at least early 2013. This shift may

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76 This option is analyzed in substantial depth in: CRS Report R42443, *Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities*, coordinated by Jim Zanotti.
77 Jeffrey Goldberg. “Obama to Iran and Israel…” op. cit.
have been caused by an Israeli assessment that it not injure relations with the Obama Administration over the issue of taking military action, as well as by evidence that sanctions are weakening the Iranian economy are mounting. At the time of the Netanyahu U.N. speech, an Israeli newspaper released information about an Israeli government study saying Iran’s economy is on the “verge of collapse.”

Although Israeli strategists say that a strike might be a viable option, several U.S. experts doubt that Israel has the capability to make such action sufficiently effective to justify the risks. The IAF is capable but far smaller than that of the United States, and could require overflight of several countries not likely to support Israeli action, such as Iraq.

While the Israeli strike possibility has become acute, it is not new. In mid-June 2008, Israeli officials confirmed reports that the Israel Air Force (IAF) had practiced a long-range strike such as that which would be required for an attack on Iran’s nuclear sites. Debate recurred in September 2010 following the publication of an article in The Atlantic by Jeffrey Goldberg entitled “Point of No Return” that hinted at a possibly impending strike in early 2011.79

**Reported Covert Action**

As international concern about Iran’s nuclear program has grown, there is increasing discussion about a reported covert component to U.S. attempts to slow Iran’s nuclear program. An option is for the United States and partner countries to increase this activity, which is distinct from covert action to support groups inside Iran looking to overthrow Iran’s regime.

Previously, during 2006-2008, it was reported that the United States and Israel conducted operations that resulted in the sale to Iran of nuclear and other technology rigged to have a destructive effect on Iran’s programs. Another example includes the Stuxnet virus, discussed above. The killings of some Iranian scientists over the past few years remain unexplained and could have been the result of covert action. The latest Iranian scientist to be killed was Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, a chemical engineer at the Natanz enrichment facility, who died when a bomb placed under his car exploded on January 10, 2012. Earlier, on December 5, 2011, a U.S. drone, the RQ-170 Sentinel, went down in Iran; it reportedly was based in Afghanistan and may have been sent over Iran to monitor Iran’s nuclear sites. Iran has refused a U.S. request to return the drone.

**Regime Change**

Throughout its first year, the Obama Administration sought to allay Iran’s long-standing suspicions that the main U.S. goal is to unseat the Islamic regime in Iran. Iran’s suspicions of U.S. intentions are based on the widespread perception that the United States has hoped for and at times sought to promote regime change in Iran since the 1979 Islamic revolution. The United States provided some funding to anti-regime groups, mainly pro-monarchists, during the 1980s.80

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80 CRS conversations with U.S. officials responsible for Iran policy. 1980-1990. After a period of suspension of such assistance, in 1995, the Clinton Administration accepted a House-Senate conference agreement to include $18-$20 million in funding authority for covert operations against Iran in the FY1996 Intelligence Authorization Act (H.R. 1655, P.L. 104-93), according to a Washington Post report of December 22, 1995. The Clinton Administration (continued...)
and the George W. Bush Administration expressed attraction to this option on several occasions. The Obama Administration’s stated policy remains to alter Iran’s behavior, not change its regime.

The 2009 domestic unrest in Iran complicated policy for the Obama Administration because it demonstrated that the regime in Iran might be vulnerable to overthrow. However, the Administration, assessing that outcome as unlikely, sought to preserve the possibility of a nuclear agreement with Iran while expressing support for human and political rights demanded by the Green Movement. As 2009 progressed, the statements of President Obama and other U.S. officials became progressively more critical of the regime. On December 28, 2009, President Obama expressed forthright support for the opposition by saying, in regard to the unrest in Iran, “Along with all free nations, the United States stands with those who seek their universal rights.” With the protests absent in Iran for nearly a year, Secretary of State Clinton reiterated this position on September 19, 2010, but said the United States needs take care not to be so overtly supportive as to make the Iranian opposition appear as “stooges” of the United States.

In 2011, the Administration reevaluated its stance slightly in the context of the broader Middle East uprisings. Statements by Secretary Clinton and the National Security Council accused Iran of hypocrisy for supporting demonstrations in Egypt while preventing similar free expression inside Iran. Many observers noted that President Obama’s 2011 Nowruz address (delivered March 20, 2011, the eve of Nowruz) was far more explicitly supportive of the Iranian opposition than in past years, mentioning specific dissidents who have been jailed and saying to the “young people of Iran ... I want you to know that I am with you.” Since that statement, the Administration has, as noted below, sanctioned Iranian officials for human rights abuses in Iran and for assisting Syria with its crackdown against demonstrations. In his speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 21, 2011, President Obama said “In Iran, we’ve seen a government that refuses to recognize the rights of its own people.” These statements and steps stop short of constituting a policy of “regime change,” although Iran interprets any public support for the domestic opposition as evidence of U.S. intent to overthrow the clerical government. As noted above, his 2012 Nowruz message (March 20, 2012) focused on U.S. efforts to help Iranians circumvent government restrictions on the Internet and other media—a so-called “electronic curtain.”

Some in Congress appear to advocate more direct, public, and broad U.S. support for the overthrow of the regime as a focus of U.S. policy. In the 111th Congress, one bill said that it should be U.S. policy to promote the overthrow of the regime (The Iran Democratic Transition Act, S. 3008).

(...continued)

reportedly focused the covert aid on changing the regime’s behavior, rather than its overthrow.

81 White House, Office of the Press Secretary. “Statement by the President on the Attempted Attack on Christmas Day and Recent Violence in Iran.” December 28, 2009.


Pursuing a Middle Ground: Democracy Promotion and Internet Freedom Efforts

In the absence of all-out U.S. pursuit of regime change, successive Administrations and Congress have agreed on more modest steps to promote political evolution in Iran through “democracy promotion” and sanctioning Iranian human rights abusers.

Sanctioning Iranian Human Rights Abusers and Abuses

As part of its efforts to isolate the regime on human rights grounds, on September 29, 2010, President Obama, acting in accordance with Section 105 of P.L. 111-195 (CISADA), issued Executive Order 13553, imposing sanctions on Iranian officials determined to have committed human rights abuses since Iran’s 2009 election. Sanctions include a ban on visas to the United States and freeze on U.S.-based assets or trade with them. In an annex, eight Iranian officials were named as violators and were subjected to the sanctions. Two more Iranian officials (Tehran prosecutor Abbas Dowlatabadi and Basij commander Mohammad Reza Naqdi) were added to that list on February 23, 2011, and, on June 9, 2011, the Administration added the IRGC (already sanctioned as a proliferator), the Basij, the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF), and LEF Commander Ismail Ahmadi Moghaddam to the list. The full list of Iranian sanctioned under this and other Executive Orders is provided in Table 6 of CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions.

In the 112th Congress, several bills have been introduced to increase sanctions on Iranian human rights abusers. S. 879 and H.R. 1714 made mandatory investigations of Iranian human rights abusers and sanction the sale to Iran of equipment that could be used to suppress demonstrations. Elements of these several bills were incorporated into a broad Iran sanctions bill, H.R. 1905, passed by both chambers on August 1, 2012, and signed on August 10 (P.L. 112-158). Its provisions are discussed in greater detail in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions.

Democracy Promotion Funding

Binding legislation to favor democracy promotion in Iran was enacted in the 109th Congress. The Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293), signed September 30, 2006, authorized funds (no specific dollar amount) for Iran democracy promotion. Iran asserts that funding democracy promotion represents a violation of the 1981 “Algiers Accords” that settled the Iran hostage crisis and provide for non-interference in each others’ internal affairs.

The George W. Bush Administration asserted that open funding of Iranian pro-democracy activists (see below) as a stated effort to change regime behavior, not to overthrow the regime, although some saw the Bush Administration’s efforts as a cover to achieve a regime change objective. A few accounts, such as “Preparing the Battlefield” by Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker (July 7 and 14, 2008) say that President George W. Bush authorized U.S. covert operations to destabilize the regime, involving assistance to some of the ethnic-based armed groups.

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84 This legislation was a modification of H.R. 282, which passed the House on April 26, 2006, by a vote of 397-21, and S. 333, which was introduced in the Senate.

discussed above. CRS has no way to confirm assertions in the Hersh article that up to $400 million was appropriated and/or used to aid the groups mentioned.

The State Department, the implementer of U.S. democracy promotion programs for Iran, has used funds in appropriations (see Table 9) to support pro-democracy programs run by at organizations based in the United States and in Europe; the department refuses to name grantees for security reasons. The funds shown below have been obligated through DRL and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in partnership with USAID. At least $60 billion of the funds have been allocated to date. Some of the funds have been appropriated for cultural exchanges, public diplomacy, and broadcasting to Iran. A further indication of the sensitivity of specifying the use of the funds is that the Obama Administration requested funds for Near East regional democracy programs in its FY2010, FY2011, FY2012, and FY2013 budget requests, but no specific requests for funds for Iran were delineated.

Many have consistently questioned the effectiveness of such funding. In the view of many experts, U.S. funds would make the aid recipients less attractive to most Iranians. Even before the post-2009 election crackdown, Iran was arresting civil society activists by alleging they are accepting the U.S. democracy promotion funds, while others have refused to participate in U.S.-funded programs, fearing arrest. In May 2007—Iranian American scholar Haleh Esfandiari, of the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, was imprisoned for several months, on the grounds that the Wilson Center was part of this effort. The center has denied being part of the democracy promotion effort in Iran.

Perhaps in response to some of these criticisms, the Obama Administration altered Iran democracy promotion programs somewhat toward working directly with Iranians inside Iran who are organized around such apolitical issues as health care, the environment, and science. During 2009, less emphasis was placed on funding journalists and human rights activists in Iran, or on sponsoring visits by Iranians to the United States. One issue arose concerning the State Department decision in late 2009 not to renew a contract to the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC), based at Yale University, which was cataloguing human rights abuses in Iran. Some outside experts believe that, particularly in the current context of a regime crackdown against democracy activists, the contract should have been renewed. That criticism went hand in hand with the view of some experts that the post-election unrest in Iran was evidence that such democracy promotion programs were working and should be enhanced.

Promoting Internet Freedom in Iran

In line with legislation and new assessments of the best use of U.S. assistance, recent U.S. actions have focused on preventing the Iranian government’s suppression of electronic communication. Among legislation that was enacted is the “Voice (Victims of Iranian Censorship) Act”

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86 Three other Iranian Americans were arrested and accused by the Intelligence Ministry of actions contrary to national security in May 2007: U.S. funded broadcast (Radio Farda) journalist Parnaz Azima (who was not in jail but was not allowed to leave Iran); Kian Tajbacksh of the Open Society Institute funded by George Soros; and businessman and peace activist Ali Shakeri. Several congressional resolutions called on Iran to release Esfandiari (S.Res. 214 agreed to by the Senate on May 24; H.Res. 430, passed by the House on June 5; and S.Res. 199). All were released by October 2007. Tajbacksh was rearrested in September 2009 and remains incarcerated.

87 CRS conversation with U.S. officials of the “Iran Office” of the U.S. Consulate in Dubai. October 2009.

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(Subtitle D of the FY2010 Defense Authorization, P.L. 111-84), which contains provisions to potentially penalize companies that are selling Iran technology equipment that it can use to suppress or monitor the Internet usage of Iranians. In February 2010, the Administration eased licensing requirements for Iranians to download free mass market U.S. software. And, the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control has reportedly licensed a California firm (Censorship Research Center) to export anti-filtering software to Iran. Under Secretary of State Sherman testified on October 14, 2011, that some of the democracy promotion funding has been to train Iranians in the use of technologies that undermine regime Internet censorship efforts.

In March 2012, the Administration focused on this issue anew. In his March 20, 2012, Nowruz message, President Obama stated that in recent weeks the regime had increased Internet restrictions and that the Administration is taking new steps to promote Internet freedom in Iran. Acting in accordance with P.L. 111-195 (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act), which allows U.S. exports of technologies used to expand Internet freedom in Iran, on March 20, 2012, the Administration announced that certain software that can be used to circumvent regime restrictions on Internet use could be exported to Iran without a specific license. The Administration announced examples such as software for personal communications, data storage, Internet browsing, document reading, and related technologies. This appeared to be a major new step in the Administration effort to break Iran’s “electronic curtain.”

On April 23, 2012, President Obama issued an Executive Order (13606) directly addressing the issue. The order blocks the U.S.-based property and essentially bars U.S. entry and bans any U.S. trade with persons and entities listed in an Annex and persons or entities subsequently determined to be operating any technology that allows the Iranian (or Syrian) government to disrupt, monitor, or track computer usage by citizens of those countries; or to have sold to Iran or Syria any technology that enables those government to carry out such disruptions or monitoring. (For more information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.)

Broadcasting/Public Diplomacy Issues

Another part of the democracy promotion effort has been the development of new U.S. broadcasting services to Iran. The broadcasting component of policy has been an extension of a trend that began in the late 1990s. Radio Farda (“tomorrow,” in Farsi) began under Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), in partnership with the Voice of America (VOA), in 2002. The service was established as a successor to a smaller Iran broadcasting effort begun with an initial $4 million from the FY1998 Commerce/State/Justice appropriation (P.L. 105-119). It was to be called Radio Free Iran but was never formally given that name by RFE/RL. Radio Farda now broadcasts 24 hours/day. Radio Farda has 59 full time employees. No U.S. assistance has been provided to Iranian exile-run stations.

According to information provided to CRS by the BBG, the costs of Radio Farda are FY2010: $9.9 million; FY2011: $11.84 million; and FY2012: $11.77 million.

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89 For more discussion of such legislation, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions.
90 Ibid.
91 The conference report on the FY2006 regular foreign aid appropriations, P.L. 109-102, stated the sense of Congress that such support should be considered.
**Persian News Network (PNN).** The VOA established a Persian language service to Iran (VOA Persian Service) in July 2003. In July 2007, it was renamed Persian News Network (PNN), encompassing radio (1 hour a day or original programming); television (6 hours a day of primetime programming, rebroadcast throughout a 24-hour period); and Internet.

Even though PNN has expanded its offerings significantly, it has come under substantial criticism from observers. Some say that PNN has lost much of its audience among young, educated, anti-regime Iranians who are looking for signs of U.S. official support. The Inspector General report cited above, as well as many observers maintain that decisions on who to put on PNN panel discussion shows have been made by a small group of Iranian exiles who deliberately deny appearances to certain Iranians with whom they disagree. Still others say that PNN frequently airs the views of Iranian groups that are advocates of U.S. engagement of the regime or who downplay regime transgressions. Some have criticized PNN for covering long-standing exiled opposition groups, such as supporters of the son of the former Shah of Iran. Other critics say PNN offers little coverage of the Green Movement, even though a mission of the network is, or should be, to highlight the purported unpopularity of the regime. Others say it has run pieces pointing out such U.S. social problems as homelessness and drug use, while refusing to air pieces showcasing U.S. democracy and rule of law. Other observers say there is wide-ranging nepotism at PNN, in which employees hire their relatives and deny opportunities to employment applicants based on merit. VOA officials said in September 2012 they are attempting address some of these issues through the human resources office of the VOA.

Several observers point to one particular PNN show as having particular effect on audiences inside Iran. That show is called “Parazit” (Persian for static); it is a weekly comedy show modeled on a U.S. program on Comedy Central network called “The Daily Show.” On Parazit, the writers of the show, Kambiz Hosseini and Saman Arbabi, mocked President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and other Iranian figures, using political satire. Observers say that the show deteriorated in quality in 2012 after Mr. Hosseini left the show or was ousted from it, and it was taken off PNN in February 2012. A different show that satirizes Iranian leaders and news from Iran—called On Ten—began in April 2012, and VOA officials say it is gaining a substantial audience. PNN said in August 2012 that Parazit is to be reconstituted, and based in New York.

Other issues relate to the PNN’s leadership and governance. In February 2011, Ramin Asgard, a former State Department officer, was hired as PNN director. tasked with redressing the PNN deficiencies. However, he left in January 2012, reportedly out of frustration at his inability to restructure PNN and make it more effective as a voice for U.S. policy. PNN is now temporarily run by VOA official Steve Redisch. He is assisted, in part, by former CNN anchor Rudi Bakhtiar, mentioned above, although she previously was briefly ousted by PNN under unclear circumstances. The VOA is attempting to recruit a permanent replacement for Asgard, and hire a deputy director and an executive producer.

According to a VOA briefing on September 21, 2012, PNN has 79 full-time employees and 114 contractors. Past costs for PNN are: FY2010, $23.78 million; FY2011, $22.5 million; and FY2012 (estimate), $23.32 million. In FY2013 its costs are expected to be about $18 million.

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93 http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=54504. Confirmed to CRS on February 25, 2011, by a member of the BBG.
Table 9. Iran Democracy Promotion Funding

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<td>FY2004</td>
<td>Foreign operations appropriation (P.L. 108-199) earmarked $1.5 million for “educational, humanitarian and non-governmental organizations and individuals inside Iran to support the advancement of democracy and human rights in Iran.” The State Department Bureau of Democracy and Labor (DRL) gave $1 million to a unit of Yale University, and $500,000 to National Endowment for Democracy.</td>
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<td>FY2006 sup.</td>
<td>Total of $66.1 million (of $75 million requested) from FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234): $20 million for democracy promotion; $5 million for public diplomacy directed at the Iranian population; $5 million for cultural exchanges; and $36.1 million for Voice of America-TV and “Radio Farda” broadcasting. Broadcasting funds are provided through the Broadcasting Board of Governors.</td>
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<td>FY2007</td>
<td>FY2007 continuing resolution provided $6.55 million for Iran (and Syria) to be administered through DRL. $3.04 million was used for Iran. No funds were requested.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY2008</td>
<td>$60 million (of $75 million requested) is contained in Consolidated Appropriation (H.R. 2764, P.L. 110-161), of which, according to the conference report $21.6 million is ESF for pro-democracy programs, including non-violent efforts to oppose Iran’s meddling in other countries. $7.9 million is from a “Democracy Fund” for use by DRL. The Appropriation also fully funded additional $33.6 million requested for Iran broadcasting: $20 million for VOA Persian service; and $8.1 million for Radio Farda; and $5.5 million for exchanges with Iran.</td>
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<td>FY2009</td>
<td>Request was for $65 million in ESF “to support the aspirations of the Iranian people for a democratic and open society by promoting civil society, civic participation, media freedom, and freedom of information.” H.R. 1105 (P.L. 111-8) provides $25 million for democracy promotion programs in the region, including in Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2010</td>
<td>$40 million requested and used for Near East Regional Democracy programming. Programs to promote human rights, civil society, and public diplomacy in Iran constitute a significant use of these region-wide funds.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY2011</td>
<td>$40 million requested and will be used for Near East Regional Democracy programs. Programming for Iran with these funds to be similar to FY2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2012</td>
<td>$35 million for Near East Regional Democracy, and Iran-related use to be similar to FY2010 and FY2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2013</td>
<td>$30 million for Near East Regional Democracy, with Iran use similar to prior two fiscal years.</td>
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</table>

Sources: Information provided by State Department and reviewed by Department’s Iran Office, February 1, 2010; FY2012 Congressional Budget Justification; author conversation with Department of State Iran Office, April 21, 2011.

State Department Diplomatic and Public Diplomacy Efforts

Since 2006, the State Department has been increasing the presence of Persian-speaking U.S. diplomats in U.S. diplomatic missions around Iran, in part to help identify and facilitate Iranian participate in U.S. democracy-promotion programs. The Iran unit at the U.S. consulate in Dubai has been enlarged significantly into a “regional presence” office, and “Iran-watcher” positions have been added to U.S. diplomatic facilities in Baku, Azerbaijan; Istanbul, Turkey; Frankfurt, Germany; London; and Ashkabad, Turkmenistan, all of which have large expatriate Iranian populations and/or proximity to Iran. An enlarged (eight-person) “Office of Iran Affairs” has

been formed at the State Department, and it is reportedly engaged in contacts with U.S.-based exile groups such as those discussed earlier.

The State Department also is trying to enhance its public diplomacy to reach out to the Iranian population.

- In May 2003, the State Department added a Persian-language website to its list of foreign language websites, under the authority of the Bureau of International Information Programs. The website, according to a statement issued by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell, is intended to be a source of information about the United States and its policy toward Iran.

- On February 14, 2011, the State Department announced that it had begun Persian-language Twitter feeds in an effort to connect better with Internet users in Iran.

- In part to augment U.S. public diplomacy, the State Department announced in April 2011 that a Persian-speaking U.S. diplomat, Alan Eyre, based at the U.S. Consulate in Dubai, would make regular appearances on Iranian official media to explain U.S. positions.

- On October 27, 2011, Secretary Clinton announced the United States would set up a “virtual Embassy” to Iran on the Internet, which would provide Iranians with information on visas to the United States and exchange programs.

**Option: Enhanced U.S. Interests Section**

Some go further and say that the United States should staff the U.S. interests section in Tehran with U.S. personnel, who would mostly process Iranian visas and help facilitate U.S.-Iran people-to-people contacts (the interests section is currently under the auspices of the Swiss Embassy). U.S. staffing was considered by the George W. Bush Administration in late 2008, but the decision was left to the Obama Administration. The Obama Administration appeared inclined toward U.S. staffing, but no decision was announced. Such a step was likely delayed or derailed outright by the Iranian response to the post-election protests. However, some observers say that there are State Department officials who see U.S. staffing as a way to broaden U.S. contacts with representatives of the Green Movement and more accurately gauge its strength. Perhaps as a temporary alternative, the State Department is attempting outreach to the Iranian people by establishing, as of November 2011, an Internet-based “virtual embassy,” that explains the visa application process and other items of interest to Iranians. However, press reports say Iran has censored the site and rendered it at least partially inaccessible.

**Additional Sanctions**

Amid signs that sanctions are weakening Iran’s economy and possibly pressuring its leadership, the Administration and its international partners continue to impose additional sanctions on Iran—particularly with nuclear talks failing to achieve a breakthrough after three rounds during April—June 2012. Iran has demanded that the negotiating process produce an early rollback of the EU oil embargo, but the EU has not pledged that step in advance of verified Iranian commitments on the nuclear issue. The lack of clear progress in the talks caused a major Iran sanctions bill, H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 to advance. Different versions of the bill, each of which has multiple provisions, were passed by
both chambers and an agreed version—which has provisions not in either prior version—was filed on July 30, 2012, and passed by both chambers on August 1, 2012. It was signed on August 10 (P.L. 112-158). The primary new provision in the enacted version is to sanction shipments of Iranian oil unless the country buying the Iranian oil has received an exemption from sanctions for significantly reducing purchases of oil from Iran each 180 days. Thus far, 20 countries—all of Iran’s main oil customers—have reduced their buys of Iranian oil and received such an exemption. This provision is highly similar to an Executive Order 13622 issued on July 31, 2012. For information on U.S. sanctions against Iran, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.

Aside from the provisions of H.R. 1905, there are numerous ideas and suggestions for additional economic and diplomatic sanctions against Iran, should the negotiating process break down completely. Some are U.S. sanctions, some are U.S. sanctions against foreign entities intended to compel them to exit the Iranian market, and others are multilateral or international. These and other options, as well as existing sanctions, are discussed in significant detail in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman:

- Mandating Reductions in Diplomatic Exchanges with Iran or Prohibiting Travel by Iranian Officials.
- Banning Passenger Flights to and from Iran.
- Limiting Lending to Iran by International Financial Institutions. Resolution 1747 calls for restraint on but does not outright ban international lending to Iran.
- Banning Trade Financing or Official Insurance for Trade Financing. This was not made mandatory by Resolution 1929, but several countries imposed this sanction (as far as most trade financing) subsequently.
- Banning Investment in Iran’s Energy Sector. Such a step is authorized, not mandated, by Resolution 1929, and the Iran Sanctions Act allows for U.S. sanctions against foreign investment in that sector. A growing number of countries have used that authority to impose these sanctions on Iran.
- Restricting Operations of and Insurance for Iranian Shipping. A call for restraint is in Resolution 1929, but is not mandatory. The EU and other national measures announced subsequently did include this sanction (IRISL) to take effect as of July 1.
- Imposing a Worldwide Ban on Sales of Arms to Iran. Resolution 1929 imposes a ban on sales of major weapons systems to Iran, but another option is to extend that ban to all lethal equipment.
- Imposing an International Ban on Purchases of Iranian Oil. As noted, the EU has agreed to stop all purchases of Iranian oil as of July 1, 2012. Another option is to impose a worldwide ban on all purchases, or to further pressure or incent nations to end buys of oil from Iran.
Table 10. Digest of Existing U.S. Sanctions Against Iran

| Ban on U.S. Trade With and Investment in Iran | Executive Order 12959 (May 6, 1995) bans almost all U.S. trade with and investment in Iran. Modifications in 1999 and 2000 allowed for exportation of U.S. food and medical equipment, and importation from Iran of luxury goods (carpets, caviar, dried fruits, nuts), but P.L. 111-195 (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, CISADA) restored the complete ban on imports. The trade ban does not apply to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms. |
| U.S. Sanctions Against Foreign Firms that Deal With Iran's Energy Sector | The Iran Sanctions Act (P.L. 104-172, August 5, 1996, as amended, most recently by H.R. 1905/P.L. 112-158) authorizes the President to select five out of a menu of twelve sanctions to impose against firms that the Administration has determined: have invested more than $20 million to develop Iran's petroleum (oil and gas) sector; that buy Iranian oil (unless such country has a sanctions exemption under the P.L. 112-81, see below); have sold Iran more than $1 million worth of gasoline or equipment to import gasoline or refine oil into gasoline; have sold energy $1 million or more worth of energy equipment to Iran; that provided shipping services to transport oil from Iran; that have engaged in an energy joint venture with Iran outside Iran; or that buy Iran's sovereign debt. |
| Sanctions On Iran’s Central Bank | CISADA bans accounts with banks that do business with the Revolutionary Guard and sanctioned entities and the Treasury Dept. in November 2011 declared Iran’s financial system an entity of primary money laundering concern. Section 1245 P.L. 112-81 signed December 31, 2011, prevents new foreign banks that do business with Iran’s Central Bank from opening U.S. accounts. |
| Terrorism List Designation Sanctions | Iran’s designation by the Secretary of State as a “state sponsor of terrorism” (January 19, 1984—commonly referred to as the “terrorism list”) triggers several sanctions, including the following: (1) a ban on the provision of U.S. foreign assistance to Iran under Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act; (2) a ban on arms exports to Iran under Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 95-92, as amended); (3) under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (P.L. 96-72, as amended), a significant restriction—amended by other laws to a “presumption of denial”—on U.S. exports to Iran of items that could have military applications; (4) under Section 327 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (P.L. 104-132, April 24, 1996), a requirement that U.S. representatives to international financial institutions vote against international loans to terrorism list states. |
| Sanctions Against Foreign Firms that Aid Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs | The Iran-Syria-North Korea Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178, March 14, 2000, as amended) authorizes the Administration to impose sanctions on foreign persons or firms determined to have provided assistance to Iran’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Sanctions include restrictions on U.S. trade with the sanctioned entity. |
| Sanctions Against Foreign Firms that Sell Advanced Arms to Iran | The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 102-484, October 23, 1992, as amended) provides for U.S. sanctions against foreign firms that sell Iran “destabilizing numbers and types of conventional weapons” or WMD technology. |
| Ban on Transactions With Foreign Entities Determined to Be Supporting International Terrorism | Executive Order 13324 (September 23, 2001) authorizes a ban on U.S. transactions with entities determined to be supporting international terrorism. The Order was not specific to Iran, coming 12 days after the September 11, 2001, attacks, but several Iranian entities have been designated. |
| Ban on Transactions With Foreign Entities that Support Proliferation | Executive Order 13382 (June 28, 2005) amended previous executive orders to provide for a ban on U.S. transactions with entities determined to be supporting international proliferation. As is the case for Executive Order 13324, mentioned above, Executive Order 13382 was not specific to Iran. However, numerous Iranian entities, including the IRGC itself, have been designated. |
| Divestment | A Title in P.L. 111-195 authorizes and protects from lawsuits various investment managers who divest from shares of firms that conduct sanctionable business with Iran. |
| Counter-Narcotics | In February 1987, Iran was first designated as a state that failed to cooperate with U.S. anti-drug efforts or take adequate steps to control narcotics production or trafficking. The Clinton Administration, on December 7, 1998, removed Iran from the U.S. list of major drug producing countries. This exempted Iran from the annual certification process that kept drug-related U.S. sanctions in place on Iran. |
| U.S.-Iran Assets Disputes | Iranian leaders continue to assert that the United States is holding Iranian assets, and that this is an impediment to improved relations. See CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman. |
| Sanctions Against Human Rights Abuses and Internet Monitoring | Various laws discussed above, and Executive Orders, impose sanctions on named Iranian human rights abusers, and on firms that sell equipment Iran can use to monitor the Internet usage of citizens or employ against demonstrators. |

Source: CRS. For analysis and extended discussion of U.S. and international sanctions against Iran, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
Conclusion

Mistrust between the United States and Iran’s Islamic regime has run deep for more than three decades and will be difficult to reverse. Some argue that, no matter who is in power in Tehran, the United States and Iran have a common long-term interest in stability in the Persian Gulf and South Asia regions. According to this view, major diplomatic overtures toward the regime might not only help resolve the nuclear issue but yield fruit in producing a new, constructive U.S.-Iran relationship.

Others argue that U.S. concerns stem first and foremost from the character of Iran’s regime, and that no diplomatic breakthrough is possible until the regime changes. Those who take this view see in the Green Movement the potential to replace the regime and to integrate Iran into a pro-U.S. strategic architecture in the region. Many argue that a wholesale replacement of the current regime could produce major strategic benefits beyond potentially reducing the threat from Iran’s nuclear program, including an end to Iran’s effort to obstruct a broad Arab-Israeli peace.

Others argue that many Iranians are united on major national security issues and that a new regime would not necessarily align with the United States. Some believe that many Iranians fear that alignment with the United States would produce a degree of U.S. control and infuse Iran with Western culture that many Iranians find un-Islamic and objectionable.

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<th>Table 11. Selected Economic Indicators</th>
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<td>Economic Growth</td>
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<tr>
<td>Per Capita Income</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proven Oil Reserves</td>
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<td>Oil Production/Exports</td>
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<td>Major Oil/Gas Customers</td>
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<td>Major Import Markets</td>
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<td>Major Imports</td>
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<td>Major Non-Oil Investments</td>
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<td>Development Assistance Received</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
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</table>

**Sources:** CIA, *The World Factbook*; various press; IMF; Iran Trade Planning Division; CRS conversations with experts and foreign diplomats.
Figure 1. Structure of the Iranian Government

ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS
Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani (86 seats, elected)

selects can remove, choose successor

SUPREME LEADER
Ali Khamenei

oversees, can dismiss on recommendation of Majles or Supreme Court

COUNCIL OF GUARDIANS
(12 members — 6 clerics appointed by Supreme Leader, 6 legal scholars appointed by the Judiciary)

reviews laws, screens candidates

screens candidates

PRESIDENT
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (directly elected)

appoints

Supreme National Security Council
(Seyyed Javid)

commander-in-chief

JOINT HEADQUARTERS

Regular Military

Revolutionary Guard

Basij

QODS Force

EXPEDITIONARY COUNCIL
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (appointed)

arbitrates legislative disputes between Majles & Council of Guardians

Majles (Parliament)
(290 seats, elected)

speaker: Ali Larijani

Source: CRS.
Figure 2. Map of Iran

Source: Map Resources, adapted by CRS (April 2005).

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