Special Report

Review of the Compromise of Security Test Materials at the Y-12 National Security Complex

DOE/IG-0875 October 2012
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF ENERGY

FROM: Gregory H. Friedman
Inspector General


BACKGROUND

Following the July 28, 2012, security breach at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12), the Department of Energy's Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) was tasked with conducting a comprehensive inspection of the site's security organization. The inspection, initiated on August 27, 2012, included both practical exercises and tests designed to evaluate the knowledge, skills and abilities of the site's Protective Force.

At approximately 11:00 pm on the night of August 29, 2012, while conducting performance testing, an HSS inspector discovered a copy of what he identified to be a security knowledge test in the patrol vehicle of a WSI-Oak Ridge (WSI-OR) Protective Force official who was escorting him. The test was one that had been scheduled to be administered to a sample of the Protective Force officers on the following day. The inspector immediately raised concerns regarding what appeared to be a compromise of the upcoming test. Eventually, testing activities were suspended to permit HSS officials to rewrite the test to ensure that the integrity of the inspection was maintained.

As noted in our prior Special Report on Inquiry into the Security Breach at the National Nuclear Security Administration's Y-12 National Security Complex (DOE/IG-0868, August 2012), the July 28 security breach reflected multiple system failures. As such, in our continued monitoring of the situation, the Office of Inspector General initiated a special review into alleged compromise of the HSS inspection.

CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

Our inquiry confirmed that the security knowledge test, including answers to the test questions, had been compromised and that it had been distributed in advance of the test to numerous WSI-OR Captains, Lieutenants, and Security Police Officers (SPO), the very people whose knowledge was to have been evaluated as part of this process. Our conclusion was based on interviews with Federal and contractor officials who were involved with or had knowledge of the test distribution and on a review of supporting information pertinent to the actions taken by those individuals; both before and following the discovery of the compromised test in the patrol vehicle. WSI-OR personnel testified uniformly that there was no intent to cheat on the HSS inspection. While we had no direct evidence to the contrary, we found the credibility of this testimony to be
questionable, especially in light of a number of actions that we identified related to the
transmission, review and distribution of the test that, at best, demonstrated a lack of due care and
negligence. The failure to properly safeguard the test prior to its administration, especially given
the intense focus on Y-12 and the security concerns at the site, was, in our opinion, inexplicable
and inexcusable. Specifically:

- Despite the fact that the document was labeled as a test and was initially distributed via
encrypted email to individuals appointed as "Trusted Agents," WSI-OR officials treated
the document as if it were a training aid, mentioned its receipt at daily Protective Force
supervisor meetings, and widely distributed it to a variety of officers. Of equal concern, a
senior B&W Technical Services Y-12, LLC (B&W)\(^1\) official, who also serves at another
high-security Department site, indicated that he had taken similar actions to coordinate
inspection-related materials with Protective Force management prior to administration
while serving at the other site.

- While one would expect that in normal situations testing materials would be withheld
from the entity being tested, we learned that such was not the case in the Y-12 situation.
The Federal security official at Y-12 who was provided the test for review and comment
told us that it was not his role to provide input on the test. HSS officials explained that
Federal security officials at sites often lack detailed knowledge regarding security and
Protective Force operations that is needed in the execution of contractor knowledge tests.
Further, as a consequence, a senior security representative of the contractor was placed in
a position of reviewing and providing comments on a knowledge test designed to
evaluate its own performance. These HSS officials also noted that because of the "eyes
on, hands off" approach to contactor governance at high security sites, it was necessary to
distribute performance testing materials to security contractors for review prior to
administration of the test.

While we do not believe that they excuse actions taken in this case, we observed several
opportunities to improve the integrity and transparency of the knowledge testing process.
Although the Federal official who initially distributed the test took action to protect its contents
by encrypting the email used to transmit it and sending it only to "Trusted Agents," the email did
not contain specific instructions for protecting the test against compromise. The transmitting
email only asked for comments on the applicability of the security questions to the Y-12
environment. The lack of detailed instructions is particularly relevant in that the Department
Order regarding the designation of "Trusted Agents" does not specifically mention that the
practice is also applicable to security knowledge tests. The Order instead indicates that it may be
used in performance testing exercises, such as force-on-force and similar exercises. A contractor
official cited the lack of a direct reference to test questions in the Order as one factor that
contributed to their handling of the test and its ultimate compromise.

\(^1\) B&W is the prime contractor responsible for operating the Y-12 facility.
Test Distribution

Based on our interviews and testing, we determined that HSS sent the test to B&W and the NNSA Production Office (NPO) with a request that it be reviewed for accuracy. We noted that the email message from HSS stated that one of the two attached documents was "the proposed knowledge test." B&W then forwarded the email to a WSI-OR manager, an individual that had not been designated as a Trusted Agent, requesting comment. The manager forwarded the email to two other Protective Force officers, neither of whom had been designated as Trusted Agents. One of the officers provided the requested comments and returned the attachments to the manager who returned them to B&W. While the manager told us that this was the last he saw of the test until the night it was discovered in the patrol vehicle, the distribution by contractor management officials set the stage for the eventual compromise of the test.

By the next day, the test material appears to have lost its identity and widespread distribution began. After commenting on the test, the officer that provided comments actually discussed the receipt of what he categorized as revised "job knowledge questions" during the Protective Force's Plan of the Day meeting. He followed up the discussion by emailing the questions to the Protective Force Shift Captains for use as a job knowledge aid in preparing their SPOs for the HSS inspection. At least two of the Captains forwarded the test to their subordinate officers, and one forwarded it to two additional Lieutenants. One of those Lieutenants in turn made copies for distribution to the SPOs and further forwarded the test to his subordinates. One of those individuals then passed the email attachments to the official in whose patrol vehicle the test was ultimately found.

Guidance and Direction

The Department Order on Protective Force was unclear as to the requirements for the use of Trusted Agents. In particular, Department Order 473.3, Protection Program Operations, Annex 2, Performance Testing, stated that Trusted Agents may be designated in preparing for and conducting performance tests of the Protective Force. According to the Order, performance tests include: Limited Scope Performance Tests; Force on Force exercises; Command Post exercises; Command Field exercises; and, Joint Testing exercises. The Order does not specifically require that Trusted Agents be designated in any of these circumstances, and notably does not make mention of job knowledge testing.

While HSS officials told us that the use of Trusted Agents applied to both performance and job knowledge testing, the responsible B&W official told us he thought that Trusted Agents were only for use in relation to performance testing – not for general job knowledge tests. That same official also indicated that in a similar position at another Department site, he had treated job knowledge questions in the same manner as he had in the recent Y-12 event. An HSS official told us that HSS did not have a procedure specific to the designation of Trusted Agents for job knowledge testing.

None of the emails to which the HSS test was attached provided specific direction to the recipient regarding the responsibility to limit distribution of the documents. Although the test was clearly marked as a test (see Figure 1), the Protective Force supervisors we spoke with stated that they had not noticed the specific header of the document. We found this purported lack of attention not to be credible. Rather, the Protective Force supervisors told us they just looked
over the questions that were contained therein, determined that they looked similar to those that were already being used to prepare the SPOs for the upcoming inspection, and decided to further distribute them as a training aid.

![Y-12 PROTECTIVE FORCE TEST KEY](image)

**Figure 1 – HSS Job Knowledge Test Header**

**Contractor Governance**

As with the recent intrusion at the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility described in our Special Report on *Inquiry into the Security Breach at the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Y-12 National Security Complex* (DOE/IG-0868, August 2012), problems with the administration of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s contractor governance system appeared to have had a role in the compromise of the test materials at Y-12, certainly, the assurance system did not prevent the compromise. As previously noted, the cognizant Federal security official at Y-12 told us he did not believe that it was his role to provide input on the test. Although not explicitly stated, this position was consistent with the failure to take an active role in contractor governance that we observed during our review of the recent intrusion.

As noted by HSS officials, the issue at Y-12 does not appear to be unique to that site. A senior HSS official told us that Federal officials at many other sites lacked the knowledge necessary to provide informed feedback on knowledge testing materials and as such, the materials were provided directly to contractors. In our view, Federal officials should have an active role in reviewing, commenting and controlling testing material. The use of contractors is not an optimal situation and, if necessary because of gaps in coverage by Federal officials, should be minimized and tightly controlled.

**Positive Actions**

As a result of the situation at Y-12, and during our inquiry, we were told that HSS initiated action to update its internal procedures to ensure that documents are clearly marked and that the role of Trusted Agents is better defined and communicated. We noted, however, that the new, updated version of the Trusted Agent agreement provided to us still did not specifically address the applicability to job knowledge testing. In addition, HSS stated that it began using email encryption features that required receipt acknowledgement and prevented emails from being forwarded. Further, in at least one case, test materials were validated in person rather than via email. In comments to our draft report, HSS indicated that these practices would be institutionalized in a pending revision to its internal guidance.
Impact and Path Forward

While the actions taken to date are positive, additional effort is necessary to ensure that the underlying problems with Departmental criteria and National Nuclear Security Administration's governance system are addressed. In this case, harm was averted by mere happenstance when the compromised testing material was discovered prior to the time the test was actually administered. Based on disclosures by contractor officials, there is also a possibility that compromises of test materials may have occurred at other sites without discovery. Security of the Nation's most sensitive nuclear material storage and processing facilities must not be left to chance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To help restore confidence in the integrity of the Department's protective forces, in addition to the actions recently initiated, we recommend that the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security/Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration in conjunction with the Chief, Health, Safety and Security:

1. Update Department directives, as necessary, to clearly define when Trusted Agents are to be used;

2. Revise internal procedures and practices to ensure that all communications related to HSS testing are marked and protected in a manner to avoid any ambiguity as to whether they are to be shared; and,

3. Clarify the contractor assurance process to address concerns with the range of authorities granted to and responsibilities of Federal oversight officials.

OTHER MATTER

During the course of our inquiry, B&W officials brought a matter to our attention related to inconsistencies in materials provided by a WSI-OR Officer during its investigation of the test compromise. The results of our review of that matter are discussed in Attachment 1.

MANAGEMENT REACTION AND OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL RESPONSE

NNSA did not agree that its implementation of the governance process was a contributory cause of the knowledge test compromise. Rather, management concluded that the compromise was caused by abuse of the Trusted Agent concept by a contractor official. Accordingly, management suggested that we revise our recommendation related to the contractor assurance system to reflect that view. Management agreed to work with HSS to implement our recommendations regarding the integrity of security testing at all sites.

We recognize that there was a breakdown of controls at the contractor level regarding the Trusted Agent concept. However, our analysis also led us to conclude that there was a more fundamental issue involving the lack of in-depth security knowledge and involvement of Federal oversight officials. This issue directly contributed, in our opinion, to the environment that necessitated placing the testing materials in the hands of the contractor in the first place. We
recognize that, in some cases, the contractor has to be involved as a Trusted Agent to ensure the safety and efficacy of the performance tests; however, the use of contractors as Trusted Agents in knowledge tests of their own operations should be minimized to the extent practical by reliance on Federal officials who are knowledgeable of contractor operations. Accordingly, we did not modify our recommendation regarding the clarification of the governance process.

HSS management concurred with the Recommendations 1 and 2 and stated that it had initiated action to address the issues identified during our review. In particular, HSS stated that it would update both its trusted agent form and appraisal process guide to clarify the expectations for use of trusted agents as they apply to knowledge testing. With regard to Recommendation 3, HSS management deferred to NNSA for action. Finally, HSS noted its disagreement with the benefit to be gained from the implementation of one of the recommendations in our draft report. We agreed with management's assessment and removed that recommendation from the final report.

Management's comments and planned corrective actions were responsive to our recommendations. Management's comments are included in their entirety in Attachment 3.

Attachments

cc: Deputy Secretary
    Associate Deputy Secretary
    Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration
    General Counsel
    Chief of Staff
ALLEGED DOCUMENT SUBSTITUTION

On August 31, 2012, B&W Technical Services Y-12, LLC (B&W), the management and operating contractor at Y-12, issued a Cure Notice to WSI-OR, its Protective Force subcontractor. The notice required WSI-OR to correct the issues that led to the compromise of the test material. On September 19, 2012, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) was contacted by B&W officials concerning the response to the Cure Notice that B&W had received from WSI-OR. B&W was concerned about two documents contained within the response. Specifically, copies of email messages found behind separate binder tabs appeared to contain an identical email message (dated August 23) that stated:

"…Attached are the revised set of Job Knowledge questions that I spoke of this morning in POD [Plan of the Day]. Please remember the sensitivity issue with these questions. It would not be a good idea for these to be left lying around or for a SPO [Security Police Officer] to have these in hand during an audit. It is a useful tool to see where your personnel stand. Most of the information has been reviewed in the classes at CTF [Central Training Facility] over the past couple of weeks."

However, one version had the phrase "…or for a SPO to have these in hand during an audit" removed. B&W was concerned that WSI-OR was attempting to cover-up actions by its personnel to cheat on the HSS inspection.

Based on work conducted during our review, we were unable to conclusively discern whether the existence of the two emails was the result of an administrative error or an actual attempt to cover-up information that the sender felt could indicate an attempt to cheat. We were told, however, that the modified email was inadvertently included in the WSI-OR response to B&W's cure notice. Specifically, following the discovery of test materials in a Sergeant's patrol vehicle, WSI-OR launched an internal investigation into the matter. As part of the investigation, the Officer that initially distributed the document was asked to provide all inspection-related materials he had in his possession. The Officer told us that while the message in his original email referred to a "sensitivity issue" with the documents and stated that "…it would not be a good idea for these to be left lying around or for a SPO to have these in hand during an audit…," he was attempting to convey that the attachments were need to know information specific to the Protective Force; not that they included a test that would be administered by HSS.

The Officer explained to us that he became concerned that the email's message would be misconstrued after WSI-OR officials did not understand his meaning when he attempted to explain it. As such, he told us that he considered altering the email – going so far as to delete the phrase regarding the SPOs – before he determined that this course of action may cause trouble as the original email had been sent to several individuals. He ultimately determined that the best course of action would be to provide a written explanation of what he meant by the sensitivity issue along with the original email. He told us that unfortunately, in his haste to provide his documents to WSI-OR, he must have inadvertently printed out the modified email message rather than the original.
Within hours of realizing how the modified document came to be in the possession of WSI-OR, the Officer approached WSI-OR General Counsel to provide his explanation. The Officer also reported this information to the OIG as part of our ongoing review. Ultimately, WSI-OR terminated the Officer because it believed that the Officer had been less than truthful regarding statements made about the email discrepancy.
RELATED REPORTS

- Special Report on *Inquiry into the Security Breach at the National Nuclear Security Administration's Y-12 National Security Complex* (DOE/IG-0868, August 2012). This review was initiated to examine the circumstances surrounding the July 28, 2012, security breach at Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12). We found that the Y-12 security incident represented multiple systems failures on several levels. For example, we identified troubling displays of ineptitude in responding to alarms, failures to maintain critical security equipment, over reliance on compensatory measures, misunderstanding of security protocols, poor communications, and weaknesses in contract and resource management. In addition, we determined that contractor governance and Federal oversight failed to identify and correct early indicators of these multiple system breakdowns. We made several recommendations to further enhance security at Y-12 and across the complex. In response, management identified corrective actions it had initiated or completed.

- Special Report on *Management Challenges at the Department of Energy – Fiscal Year 2012* (DOE/IG-0858, November 2011). As part of our annual report to identify the most significant challenges facing the Department of Energy (Department), we identified eight challenges and three areas for the "watch list" for Fiscal Year 2012. Specifically, the report identified contract and financial assistance award management as a management challenge and safeguards and security as an area that warrants special attention from Department officials. We also noted in our report that there may be significant economy of scale cost benefits associated with protective force contract consolidation that could encourage a more uniform and consistent approach to protective force organization, management, training, and equipment purchases.

- Inspection Report on *Incident of Security Concern at the Y-12 National Security Complex* (DOE/IG-0785, January 2008). This review was initiated because we received an allegation that unauthorized portable electronic devices (including laptop computers) were introduced into a Limited Area which employs physical controls to prevent unauthorized access to classified matter or special nuclear material at Y-12 and that this breach in security was not properly reported. Our inspection substantiated the allegation and identified additional concerns related to the incident. Specifically, we found that Y-12 personnel discovered that an Oak Ridge National Laboratory employee had brought an unclassified laptop computer into the Limited Area without following proper protocols, the cyber security staff had not properly secured the laptop, the incident was not reported until 6 days after it was discovered, and as many as 37 additional laptop computers may have been improperly introduced into the Limited Area. We made several recommendations to further enhance the security of information systems and responses to incidents of security concern. In response, management identified corrective actions taken, initiated, or planned.

- Inspection Report on *Protective Force Training at the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge Reservation* (DOE/IG-0694, June 2005). This inspection was initiated because we received an allegation that a security police officer was given credit for training that was not received at the Oak Ridge Reservation. The inspection concluded that there were
material shortcomings in the implementation of the protective force training program. Specifically, we found that personnel spent about 40 percent less time on combat readiness refresher training than that specified in the training plan, planned training time was formally reported as actual training time, personnel routinely worked in excess of the maximum threshold for safe operations of 60 hours per week, and personnel signed attendance rosters for training not received. Because of the importance to the Nation's security, several recommendations were made to ensure the protective force is properly trained.

- Inspection Report on *Protective Force Performance Test Improprieties* (DOE/IG-0636, January 2004). The inspection was initiated at the Y-12 Site Manager’s request to examine whether there had been a pattern over time of site security personnel compromising protective force performance tests. Our inspection confirmed that the results on a performance test may have been compromised as two protective force personnel were inappropriately permitted to view the computer simulations of four scenarios on the test. In addition, we were provided information that inappropriate actions had occurred going back to the mid-1980s in connection with performance tests at the Department’s Oak Ridge complex. The National Nuclear Security Administration concurred with our findings and recommendations made in our report and provided a series of corrective actions that had been initiated or planned.
MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

Department of Energy
National Nuclear Security Administration
Washington, DC 20585

October 25, 2012

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR GREGORY H. FRIEDMAN
INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO
ADMINISTRATOR

SUBJECT: Response to The Inspector General’s Draft Special Report on
“Review of the Compromise of Security Test Materials at the Y-12
National Security Complex”

Thank you for the opportunity to review the subject draft report. The National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) has reviewed the draft, and we share the Inspector General’s (IG)
concern regarding the compromise of testing materials. We believe the IG appropriately
questioned the practice of and processes for providing testing materials to contractors for review,
and the judgment of contractor personnel who continued to distribute the materials to other than
“Trusted Agents” within the contractor organization. NNSA will work diligently, and will share
with the Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) our plan of action, to institute improved
processes and controls to ensure that there are no similar lapses in the effective control of
performance test information in the future. NNSA understands the concerns expressed by the IG
regarding the current governance system as it has been applied to the execution of the security
program. I anticipate that recommendations from the Task Force led by Brigadier General
Sandra Finan on the Assessment of NNSA Federal Organization and Oversight of Security
Operations will sufficiently address such concerns. The following comments are provided with
the intent of improving the clarity of the report.

1) Page 2, 2nd bullet, third sentence. This is a broad statement that as written applies to all
NNSA sites. The evidence presented appears to be from one federal site staff member. We
believe that this sentence would be better if recast as a concern over the degree to which
cognizant federal site security management and staff have sufficient detailed knowledge
regarding security and protective force operations to be as effective as needed in the
execution of contractor performance testing.

2) Page 2, 2nd bullet, last sentence. The statement as written asserts that HSS believes that
the “eyes on, hands off” approach made it necessary to distribute performance testing
materials to security contractors for review prior to administration of the test. This appears
inconsistent with previous discussion of distribution to “Trusted Agents”. This issue
appears to be the unilateral decision on the part of the contractor to make further internal

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dissemination to a broader number of individuals, including those who might be expected to improve their performance with this advanced knowledge of specific testing information. This does not appear to the NNSA to be properly associated with the issue of the applicability of the “eyes on, hands off” approach or other interpretations of Governance Reform approaches to the execution of the NNSA security program. We recommend that this last sentence be deleted.

3) Page 4, Governance Discussion, first sentence. For the same reason as in point 2 above, we believe the sentence should be rewritten and the discussion of the role of the governance system be deleted since the issue is not the release of the testing material to the contractor’s Trusted Agents, but the abuse of discretion (or disregard of controls on further distribution) on the Contractor’s part in releasing the materials to a broader group of employees.

4) Page 5, Recommendation number 4 should be revised because of the above discussion regarding governance. The NNSA believes that the following wording more effectively describes what should be done: “Identify, document, implement, and validate the process for the contractor’s receipt, distribution and protection of testing materials while undergoing an appropriate review and comment process by Trusted Agents and when formally issued as part of implementing testing.”

NNSA recognizes the critical importance of HSS’s role in conducting inspections, including practical exercises and tests designed to evaluate the knowledge, skills and abilities of NNSA’s Protective Force. We will, in conjunction with HSS, pursue timely corrective action to address the IG’s recommendations to instill continued confidence in the integrity of our security testing programs at all sites.

If you have any questions regarding this memorandum, please contact Dean Childs, Director, Internal Control, at 301-903-1341.

cc:
Michael Lempke, Associate Principal Deputy Administrator
Brigadier General Sandra Finan, Acting Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security
Steve Erhart, Manager, NNSA Production Office – Y-12
MEMORANDUM FOR RICKEY R. HASS
DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL
FOR AUDITS AND INSPECTIONS
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: GLENN S. PODONSKY
CHIEF HEALTH, SAFETY AND SECURITY OFFICER
OFFICE OF HEALTH, SAFETY AND SECURITY

SUBJECT: COMMENTS FOR IG DRAFT SPECIAL REPORT on
"Review of the Compromise of Security Test Materials at the
Y-12 National Security Complex" (A12OR037)

The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) appreciates the opportunity to review the subject draft Office of Inspector General (IG) report and the efforts undertaken by the IG to evaluate the circumstances surrounding the compromise of test materials being used to support the Secretarial-directed HSS security inspection at the Y-12 National Security Complex. We did not identify any factual inaccuracies in the draft report as it relates to HSS actions. We do, however, believe the draft report provides only limited information regarding the controls that HSS has implemented since the compromise. In addition, we believe that the costs associated with implementing recommendation 3 will significantly outweigh any potential benefit that it may provide.

Under the “Contractor Governance” section, the draft report describes a concern with using contractor representatives to review knowledge tests because it places them in a position of making decisions that should be reserved for Federal officials specifically designated as trusted agents. This narrative can be construed as a broader indictment of the practice of using contractors in trusted agent roles. While we agree that using contractors as trusted agents should be minimized where possible and we have already changed our inspection practices to address this concern when validating knowledge tests, there are circumstances where it is necessary to have a contractor act as a trusted agent in order to ensure the safe and effective testing of site security performance.

HSS has employed new methods for controlling and validating knowledge test materials, in addition to having updated the trusted agent agreement. The test materials that were developed following the compromise and used during the Y-12 inspection were provided to trusted agents by email using encryption features that required the trusted agent to electronically sign indicating receipt of the material, and prevented the email from being forwarded. Further, during the security inspection currently being conducted by HSS at
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, none of the knowledge test materials were transmitted by email. Instead, HSS validated the content of the test materials with trusted agents in person and no copies of the materials were left with site personnel. In both cases, the test materials were also clearly marked for trusted agent use only and not to be disseminated. HSS will continue these practices for all future inspections and the practices will be institutionalized in a pending revision to the HSS Office of Security and Cyber Evaluations Appraisal Process Guide.

HSS accepts recommendation 1 and will update its trusted agent form and appraisal process guide to clarify that a knowledge test is a type of performance test for which the use of trusted agents applies. HSS accepts recommendation 2 and will revise its appraisal process guide as described above. HSS also believes that this recommendation should be broadened to apply not only to test materials developed by HSS, but also to any such materials developed by Program Offices, Site Offices, or contractors for conducting knowledge and performance tests. HSS does not agree that recommendation 3 will provide any benefit to DOE, including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), or HSS, or that the information derived from such a review will have any impact on the corrective actions already being undertaken to address the issues identified in the IG's report. Furthermore HSS believes that if line management has any concerns regarding the efficacy of testing at their site, they should review their practices at the local level as a part of good management. HSS suggests that recommendation 3 be deleted given that the costs associated with implementing it are not expected to result in any substantive benefit. HSS defers to the NNSA regarding recommendation 4.

We have provided some specific additional comments on the report for the IG's consideration in the attachment to this memorandum. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact me at (202) 586-0271, or you may contact John Boulden, Director, Office of Enforcement and Oversight, at (301) 903-2178.


cc: Thomas P. D’Agostino, US
    Cynthia A. Lersten, NA-MB-1
    William Eckroade, HS-1
    John S. Boulden III, HS-40
    Pernell B. Watson, HS-44
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3. What format, stylistic, or organizational changes might have made this report's overall message more clear to the reader?

4. What additional actions could the Office of Inspector General have taken on the issues discussed in this report that would have been helpful?

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