

Algerian Perspectives of Counterinsurgencies

**A Monograph
by
MAJ Jose R. Laguna
US Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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Major Jose R. Laguna

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This monograph was defended by the degree candidate on 22 April 2010 and approved by the monograph director and reader named below.

Approved by:

Thomas A. Bruscano, Jr, Ph.D. Monograph Director

Bruce Stanley, Mr. Monograph Reader

Stefan J. Banach, COL, IN Director,
School of Advanced
Military Studies

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. Director,
Graduate Degree
Programs

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Abstract

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Recent scholarly work has devoted much attention to analyzing the French counterinsurgency war in Algeria from 1954 to 1962. The United States military has taken many of the lessons and principles offered by authors such as David Galula and Roger Trinquier based on this conflict and placed them into its doctrine. This monograph serves to explore other examples of internal conflicts in Algeria in light of the popular model normally presented by the insurgency against French occupation in 1954. It proposes that population centric counterinsurgency emphasizes a direct approach to the population. It will show that in two other instances in Algeria an indirect model of counterinsurgency proved more effective. The study will commence with a brief review of the 1954-1962 war of independence from France and the counterinsurgency theory that emerged from it. Next, the study explores the Ottoman experience in Algeria from 1515 to 1830. Subsequently, the work will review the recent Algerian Civil War (1991-2002). The monograph will conclude with an analysis of the applicability of current counterinsurgency doctrine, as derived from the French theory, to the other insurgencies in Algeria. It will further show that the US chose as a model a theory that proved strategically ineffective in Algeria.

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Introduction

In a recent article published by the United States Army War College, COL Gian Gentile notes, “Population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) has become the American Army’s new way of war.”¹ He argues that the United States Army has taken an “ahistorical” approach focusing on a narrow set of lessons “learned while combating the FLN insurgents in Algeria, Malaya Communist insurgents, and other Communist-inspired insurgencies.”² Indeed, recent scholarly work has devoted a lot of attention analyzing the French counterinsurgency war in Algeria from 1954 to 1962. It provides a complex and large-scale example of a war of insurrection on the part of the Algerian nationalist of the National Liberation Front (FLN) against the French colonial government, which had been in existence since 1830. The United States military has taken many of the lessons and principles offered by authors such as David Galula and Roger Trinquier based on this conflict and placed them into its doctrine.³ The most recent example is the Joint Publication 3-24: *Counterinsurgency Operations* released in October 2009.

This monograph serves to explore other examples of internal conflicts in Algeria in light of the popular model normally presented by the insurgency against French occupation in 1954. It proposes that population centric counterinsurgency emphasizes a direct approach to the population. It will show that in two other instances in Algeria an indirect model of counterinsurgency proved more effective.

The conflict of 1954-62 ended the French colonial rule in Algeria, but there were other counterinsurgencies, both before and after, which took place in Algeria. Prior to the French

¹ Gian P. Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-Centric COIN and the Army” *Parameters* 39, (Autumn 2009): 4

² *Ibid.*, 11.

³ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (St.Petersburg, Florida: Hailer Publishing, 2005).

invasion of 1830, the Ottoman Empire ruled a population of millions with a small and ethnically distinct military caste in a state of constant conflict for the better part of three centuries. Persistent and costly struggles between the Turkish rulers and indigenous tribes led the Ottomans to adopt policies of ever-increasing autonomy for the Algerians under a Regency system.⁴ The Ottomans focused their efforts on controlling the elites, protecting their strategic interests, and manipulating internal rivalries to achieve control.

In 1991, Islamists in Algeria began to make gains on establishing political strongholds with the population of Algeria. That year the government, still under the control of the non-secular FLN, cancelled elections in fear that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) could win the elections. Following this decision, the military took control of the government and forced the President Chadli Bendjedid to resign. The military led government then banned FIS and had several members arrested in an effort to consolidate control. Subsequently several Islamist armed groups emerged and began to conduct violent campaigns against the government and the people of Algeria. The conflict ran a complex and bloody course until 2002 when the Algerian government attained the surrender of two of the largest armed groups, the Islamic Salvation Army and the Armed Islamic Group. Estimates show that the conflict cost between 150,000 and 200,000 lives.⁵

The study will commence with a brief review of the 1954-1962 war of independence from France and the counterinsurgency theory that emerged from it. Next, the study explores the Ottoman experience in Algeria from 1515 to 1830. Subsequently, the work will review the recent Algerian Civil War (1991-2002). The monograph will conclude with an analysis of the

⁴ Benjamin Stora, *Algeria 1830-2000: A Short History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 3-4.

⁵ Luis Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War, 1990-1998*. Translated by Jonathan Derrick. The CERI Series in Comparative Politics and International Studies, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 1-5.

applicability of current counterinsurgency doctrine, as derived from the French theory, to the other insurgencies in Algeria.

The study will show that, in Algeria, the population centric approach proved the least strategically feasible and ultimately unsuccessful. Both the Ottomans and the Algerians applied a more indirect approach towards the population and were more successful than the French were in protecting their strategic interests from internal threats. Based solely on the experiences in Algeria, it would appear that the US highlighted a theory of counterinsurgency which is costly and strategically ineffective.

Setif, War of Independence 1954-1962, and the emergence of Counterinsurgency Theory

The nationalist sentiment that gained popularity under Abdelhanid Ben Badis and the Association of Muslim Algeria Ulema, and Messali Hadj and the *Etoile Nord-Africaine* (ENA) in the 1930s rekindled on May 8, 1945 (VE Day). There had been a few indicators of mounting hostilities against the colons in the form of rock throwing incidents, graffiti, and minor civil disobedience in the weeks prior to that Tuesday. The French authorities had received information that an insurrection was brewing and had issued orders banning the display of inflammatory material. That morning, thousands of Muslim Algerians demonstrated in city streets across Algeria displaying green and white flags signifying the standard of the resistance against the French employed by Abd-el-Kader in the 1840s. The demonstrations were organized by members of numerous political parties that ran from the more nationalist PPA (who had been outlawed) to the more moderate *Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberte* (AML) under the leadership of Ferhat Abbas and with some degree of approval given by Messali Hadj.⁶ The demonstrations would

⁶ Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War*, 147. Messali Hadj had been released from prison and was under house arrest in Brazzaville

coincide with the celebration of the victory in Europe. Most of the demonstrations went off without the emergence of violence, although most met some degree of antagonism on the part of the *colons*.⁷ Setif, however, sparked five days of chaotic violence with an estimated 6,000 Algerians and 103 Europeans killed.

Setif is a small mining and farm town 80 miles west of Constantine and, unlike the larger cities of Oran and Algiers, was predominantly Muslim with a history of nationalist fervor. Poor crops during the previous two years had devastating effects on the population of Algeria. Though food was not as scarce around Setif as in other areas, the presence of large European owned farms that were prospering from preferential treatment proved insidious to the Muslim population. Amplifying this effect was the fact that Vichy France depleted rations stored in Algeria for use in supporting the war effort of Germany.⁸ May 8, 1945 also coincided with market day in Setif, which brought farmers and merchants from the neighboring countryside into the town. An estimated crowd of 8,000 Algerians gathered to protest carrying banners and flags. The twenty police in the town encountered the demonstrators and altercations broke out leading to gun fire.⁹ The demonstrators countered by attacking police and Europeans, which began a spontaneous cycle of reciprocating violence. Violence quickly spread to the countryside between the towns of Setif and Guelma and the mountains of Kabyle, surrounding Constantine.

⁷ A *colon* refers to a person of European heritage living in Algeria also referred to as *pied noir* by the French.

⁸ Alistar Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd, 1977), 24.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 25.

In response, the French deployed 10,000 troops into the area and began a *ratissage* operation (literally raking over) to repress the Algerian militants.¹⁰ During the week following the initiation of military operations, the French Army showed little restraint in putting down the insurrection. The operations included the use of Senegalese ground units, Aerial bombardment and strafing, and even Naval Artillery on Arab and Kabyle villages. Accounts point to numerous instances of indiscriminate use of force and summary executions on the part of the French forces. Additionally the violence on both Algerian and European sides were unusually brutal and included violence against children, rapes, and mutilations.¹¹ After a week, the majority of the insurrection was under control, though clean-up operations lasted through the end of May. Arrests by the French authorities continued throughout that year with 5,560 Muslims imprisoned and 99 sentenced to death.¹² The Governor General of Algeria arrested Ferhat Abbas, who had been a moderate and condemned the violence during the ordeal.

The Setif incident and the reprisals following marked a turning point for the nationalist movement in Algeria. Shortly after Setif, thousands of young Algerian men returned home from wartime service to France. Many of these soldiers came from Constantine and the surrounding areas where the some of the most violent actions occurred. Some of the future members and leaders of the FLN were among those soldiers. France largely overlooked the effects that this had on Algeria predominately due to their occupation with domestic issues of the metropolitan, which were plentiful in the days following liberation. In France, the popular belief was that the incidents

¹⁰ Ratissage Operations entail isolating an area and then conducting deliberate search operations to flush out fighters, discover caches, and gain intelligence through interrogations.

¹¹ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 27. The author also makes it a point to note the reputation of the Senegal units for their ferocity.

¹² John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: Origins and Development of a Nation* (Indianapolis, Indiana. Indiana University Press, 1993), 149.

nothing more than food riots and not a true call for independence. The belief was still strong that there was no existence of an Algerian identity separate from a French colony. This sentiment prevailed despite the warnings from the military commander responsible for the pacification of the riots who stated, “I have given you peace for ten years. But don’t deceive yourselves...”¹³ The colons were shocked at the violence and fearful that it would be repeated in the future and demanded more oppressive measures and the suspension of reforms. The result of Setif was further polarization of the communities in Algeria.¹⁴

The French military’s response reflects their recent experience in World War II. The response was limited in time and geography to the source of the belligerents and executed with models developed by Nazi-Germany and Vichy France for anti-partisan operations in occupied territories. In essence, it reflected the conventional response of the time.

The Algerian war for independence began in 1954 and ended in 1962 when French President Charles De Gaulle pronounced Algeria an independent country on July 3. The war played out in three distinct phases; the birth of the FLN and associated popular movements and the FLN’s consolidation of power (1954-1957), the Open War of French military victories and political defeats (1957-1959), and the bloody search for a political end (1960-62).

From this experience in Algeria, and those in Indochina, the French developed a theory of counterinsurgency that had a profound influence on the US Army’s contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine. The works of Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, and David Galula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, define

¹³ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 28. The Commander was General Duvall in a communiqué with the French administration.

¹⁴ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 150.

the American interpretation of the lessons and doctrines employed and recommended by the French Army of the time. The authors approach their study by examining how the goals and techniques of anti-colonial and communist insurgents differed from traditional warfare. They conclude that traditional methods focused on the defeat of an enemy in battle would not work in counterinsurgencies because the insurgent's military arm is too elusive and even when defeated, the insurgency will continue because it feeds off a vast clandestine organization.¹⁵ The authors each assert that the key to winning the insurgency is winning the battle for the population. In essence, the population is the insurgent's center of gravity. Trinquier offers three principles that drive operations in counterinsurgencies, "to cut the guerrilla off from the population that sustains him; to render guerrilla zones untenable; and to coordinate these actions over a wide area and for long enough, so that these steps will yield the desired results."¹⁶ David Galula offers four laws for counterinsurgency. The first law states, "The support of the population is as necessary to the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent."¹⁷ Again, this law makes the population the objective and the source of strength for both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent. The second law is that "Support is gained through an active minority."¹⁸ This law states that the population generally falls into three categories consisting of a minority who actively supports the insurgent, an active minority who supports the counterinsurgent, and a neutral majority. The problem then becomes how to boost the active minority who supports the counterinsurgent and mobilize the neutral majority against the insurgent minority. The third law states "Support from the population is

¹⁵ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 64; Roger Trinquier. *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, Translated by Daniel Lee, Frederick A. Praeger, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964). 8

¹⁶ Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, 65.

¹⁷ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 74.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 75.

conditional.”¹⁹ In order to receive support, the population must believe that the counterinsurgent has the will, means, and ability to win and that it can safeguard them from the insurgent’s violence. The fourth law follows from the third law in stating, “Intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential.”²⁰ This law speaks to the necessity to commit large concentration of efforts in personnel and resources for a long duration in order to win over the confidence of the population.

In the early morning hours of November 1, 1954, Algeria erupted into explosions. Egyptian radio announcements explained that the coordinated attacks on police stations, barracks, and industrial plants throughout the cities signaled the start of the Algerian war of Independence. The date coincided with the catholic holiday of All Saints’ Day. The *Front de Liberation Nationale* (FLN) leadership chose a day that afforded reduced police vigilance, and maximum propaganda value.²¹ The FLN marked the birth of their movement with a grand proclamation that communicated a vision of an independent social democratic nation within an Islamic framework.²²

The French response was immediate. Within hours, France mobilized 600 French police and flew them into Algeria by that afternoon. The French Prime Minister, Pierre Medes-France, quickly established a policy that separated Algeria from other colonies such as Vietnam and Tunisia. In a speech delivered on 12 November 1954, Mendes-France set the communicated the policy to the French National Assembly, “One does not compromise when it comes to defending the internal peace of the nation, the unity and the integrity of the Republic...*Mesdames*,

¹⁹ Ibid., 78.

²⁰ Ibid., 79-81.

²¹ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 83.

²² Ibid., 95.

Messieurs, several deputies have made comparisons between French policy in Algeria and Tunisia. I declare that no parallel is more erroneous, that no comparison is falser, or more dangerous. *Ici, c'est la France!*[Here it is France].”²³

The FLN had hoped that the All Saints' Day attacks would galvanize Algerian independence emotions and cause the French Government to reappraise its policy. However, the offensive failed to meet the scope and expectations its initiators. Within two weeks police dismantled the insurgent network in Algiers acting on intelligence provided by local informants. On January 15, 1955 the French troops killed the leader of the FLN in Constantinois, Didouche Mourad, in a small skirmish in Constantine. On January 20, 1955 the French army launched a major operation in the Aures. In the mountains, the French mechanized force deployed to put down the unrest proved ill equipped for the operations lacking the mobility, training, and intelligence support from *pied noirs* required to pursue the insurgents.²⁴

The lessons from these operations, along with the French experiences in Indochina, began to form the French theory of counterinsurgency.²⁵ They recognized the inadequacies of traditional warfare and the need to combine police action with military action to be effective in counterinsurgency. Roger Trinquier, in *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, asserts that “Police action will therefore be actual operational warfare. It will be methodically

²³ Ibid., 98. In July 1954 French troops withdrew from Vietnam after being defeated at Dien Bien Phu. In June 1954, new French President Pierre Mendes came to power and immediately instituted a withdrawal policy from Tunisia to lessen the violent backlashes occurring in the colonies.

²⁴Ibid., 36. The term *pied noir* (black feet) is the name given to European colons in Algeria. By independence, the *Pieds-Noirs* accounted for 1,025,000 people, or roughly 10 percent of the total population.

²⁵ For the purpose of this monograph, the works of Roger Trinquier and David Galula represent the French Theory of counterinsurgency. Understanding that there are other French officers who have contributed to this topic; the two authors are chosen due to their influence in contemporary US counterinsurgency doctrine and the existence of readily available English language works.

pursued until the enemy organization has been entirely annihilated.”²⁶ He further discounts the use of large unit sweeps of short duration that “temporarily disperse guerrilla bands rather than destroy them.”²⁷ The principle purpose of police operations should, in his view, be to gather the intelligence necessary not just to neutralize the insurgent, but to dismantle the entire organization “that feeds him, informs him, and sustains his morale.”²⁸

In the months preceding the inaugural offensive, six educated rebel leaders (Ben Boulaid, Larbi Ben M’hidi, Didouche Mourad, Rabah Bitah, Krim Belkacern, and Mohammed Boudiaf) created the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (CRUA).²⁹ It succeeded in establishing an internal organization and vision that provided the structure for the next seven and a half years of insurrection. It divided the country into five (an additional sixth was later added) military districts known as *wilayas*. Each district further divided into zones (*mantaqas*), regions (*nahayas*), sectors (*qasmas*), and finally circles (*duwwars*).³⁰ The districts were to have a leader (colonel) with an assistant for political affairs, one for logistics, and one for information. The further subdivisions were to have lesser officers and NCOs with assistant to provide the same basic functions (logistics, political affairs, information). The military arm had not yet developed fully in 1954, but consisted of loose organizations comprised of regulars (called *moujahidines* or *fellaghas*) and auxiliaries (called *mousseblines*). Later, regular forces organized into the *Armee de Liberation Nationale*, or ALN. Ideally, a commander of regulars (*moujahidines*) worked in a

²⁶ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, Translated by Daniel Lee, Frederick A. Praeger, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964). 48

²⁷ Ibid., 58.

²⁸ Ibid., 28.

²⁹ CRUA is derived from the French Acronym for *Commitee revolutionnaire d’unite et d’action*. See John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 155

³⁰ Galula, *Pacification in Algeria*, 29.

number of subdivisions (sectors), and the regional commanders were responsible for providing auxiliary forces, however, this was not always the case in reality. The subdivision commanders were responsible for providing intelligence, support and counterintelligence to the regulars and for mobilizing popular support.³¹

Realizing they had failed to gain the support of the Muslim population to join the rebellion, the FLN leaders opted to raise the level of violence to incite hatred and fear among the population. On 20 August, 1955, Zighoud Youcef, Mourad's successor, launched a series of operations in north Constantinois centered around the cities of Collo, Philippeville, Constantine, and Guelma. A few uniformed regulars from the *Armée de Liberation Nationale* (ALN, the armed branch of the FLN) organized and led the attacks. For the first time the FLN openly lifted restrictions on women and children and authorized the execution of Muslim political elite. When French troops arrived at a village near Philippeville (El-Halia), "an appalling sight greeted them. In houses literally awash with blood, European mother were found with their throats slit and their bellies slashed open with bill-hooks. Children had suffered the same fate, and infants in arms had their brains dashed out against the wall."³²

As terrorism emerged as a tactic in Algeria, the French began to study it and to analyze how insurgents used it to further their cause. David Galula offers two types of terrorism; blind terrorism and selective terrorism. Blind terrorism consists of random spectacular acts perpetrated to gain attention to the insurgents cause and to attract "latent supporter."³³ Selective terrorism

³¹ Ibid., 30-31.

³² Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 120-121.

³³ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 58. Terrorism- While the term is contentious and there is considerable room for debate on the subject, this paper views terrorism as a means employed by a belligerent (non-state actor) to achieve desired effects against his enemy along a spectrum of conflict, typically used in conjunction with an insurgency. This definition is consistent with Joint Publication 3-24

aims at isolating the counterinsurgent from the population and consists for assassinations of key individuals who work closely with the population.³⁴

In February 1956, newly elected French Prime Minister Guy Mollet installed a hard liner politician, Robert Lacoste as governor general of Algeria. Under Mollet, the French government established their policy towards Algeria. This policy sought to win the war first, and then establish moderate reforms to appease the Algerian elites, while maintaining *pieds noirs* as the ruling caste and quelling the international pressure for decolonization.³⁵ In order to win the war first, the military strategy sought to increase the number of forces dramatically and conduct a population focused counterinsurgency campaign. In March and April 1956, the French government authorized exceptional measures and special powers to suppress violence in Algeria. Algeria was divided into three zones; a zone of operation where the objective was to crush the rebels, a zone of pacification which sought to protect Europeans and friendly Muslims, and a forbidden zone where whole populations were resettled into camps and placed under the control of the army. French authorities began to conduct mass arrests, detentions, and interrogations.³⁶ In November 1956, the French government appointed General Raoul Salan, a veteran of the Indochina counterinsurgency, as the commander of the armed forces in Algeria.³⁷ The French increased their army in Algeria to 400,000 by 1956.

Counterinsurgency Operations, which defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; which is intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological,” VIII-20.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 59.

³⁵ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 155.

³⁶ Stora, *Algeria 1830-2000*, 46.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 48.


The French approach, described by Galula and Trinquier, calls for a methodical system of dividing the territories (*quadrillage*) in to categorized zones according to level of security (white area-secured, red areas-insurgent strongholds, pink areas-contested territory).³⁸ Then operations focus on clearing a designated area of insurgents, building a secure environment that the counterinsurgent can control, and then spreading out from that secured area to roll back the territory and support available to the insurgent. This system, often referred to as *inkspot*, is the foundation for what US Army Field Manual 3-24: *Counterinsurgency* calls the Clear-Hold-Build approach.³⁹ This requires large amounts of troops in order to bring about the required level of security needed to uncover the organization that supports the insurgent.

In Algeria, the large-scale deployments initially resulted in further polarizing the population (*pied noirs* and Muslims) and driving more and more Muslims to side with the FLN.⁴⁰ The FLN began to receive the support they intended to incite in 1954. Faced with increasing escalation of French troops, and increasing alienation by the Colonial government, moderate Muslim elites (Ben Youssef Ben Khedda, Saad Dhalab, M'Hamed Yazid, and Hocine Lahouel-members of the UDMA) aligned themselves and their followers with the FLN. The number of members of the ALN began to swell, and by 1956, the FLN was leading a vast and complicated clandestine network that included guerilla forces, a diplomatic arm, political parties, and terrorist organizations.

³⁸ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 81.

³⁹ Department of the Army, FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* (2006), 5-18. The term inkspot was coined by the British during their experiences in Malaya (1948-1960). The term and concept is closely related the French oilspot concept developed by Joseph-Simon Gallieni in the pacification of Indo China and later employed by the same in North Africa. See Douglas Porch, "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyatuey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare" in Peter Paret, Gordon Alexander Craig, and Felix Gilbert, *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 388.

⁴⁰ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 163.



The challenge now for the FLN was to coordinate, assimilate, and co-opt all the different political and ideological interest of newly acquired supporters. The FLN provided a conduit for two major movements among the people of Algeria; the socialist movement and the traditional Islamic movement.⁴¹ By the end of 1956, the FLN had only one remaining political challenger, the M.N.A. of Messali Hadj, and it only seriously influenced the Algerian Diaspora.⁴²

The FLN understood victory through military means alone was not realistic, and gave great emphasis to exerting international political pressure on France. The diplomatic arm of the FLN composed of three offices; one in Cairo, one in New York, and one in Morocco. The efforts were led by Mohammed Khider working predominantly from Cairo, his brother-in-law (and former military leader of the MTLD) Hocine Ait Ahmed worked in New York and lobbied in the UN, and Ben Bella who travelled throughout the Middle East and Africa (office in Morocco).

⁴¹ Stora, *Algeria 1830-2000*, 65.

⁴² Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 165.

Their mission was to “defeat French efforts to define Algeria as an internal affair and to take the FLN’s case to the United Nations.”⁴³ Ben Bella also had the mission to acquire weapons, ammunitions, and supplies to feed the insurgency in Algeria.

On March 16, 1956, the FLN struck again with a wave of random killings in Algiers and Oran in retaliation of the new special powers legislation. In April 1956, Ferhat Abbas, a long time moderate nationalist officially joined the FLN. Additionally, both Tunisia and Morocco gained their independence in the spring of 1956 giving the insurgents safe staging grounds for their forces and equipment, “the new geographic reality greatly complicated France’s pacification effort tactically and materially”⁴⁴

The French tactics were increasingly devastating for the FLN command and control. The segregation of the *quarillage* (zones) and the policy of *regroupement* (resettlement) effectively isolated the leadership and interdicted supplies and weapons, in effect “taking the water away from the fish.”⁴⁵ Attacks in the countryside were progressively more difficult to orchestrate and movement restrictions made it impractical to surge the ALN to a location for action. The French greatly improved their counterinsurgency tactics as new and more experienced leaders weighed in on the problem. The new commanders studied local circumstances more closely and customized their operations to the environment.⁴⁶ For instance, in Kabylia the French co-opted the council of elders to extend control, while in Constantine (where tribal affiliations were not strong) zoning,

⁴³ Matthew Connelly, “Rethinking the cold war and decolonization: The grand strategy of the Algerian war for independence,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33 (May 2001): 221-239.

⁴⁴ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 165.

⁴⁵ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 132.

⁴⁶ Jean Larteguy, *The Centurions*, Translated by Xan Fielding, (London; Hutchinson & Co., 1962). The commanders of the French army of this period were a special caste of officers seasoned by years of fighting in WWII and Indo-China. These officers were featured in the famous book by Jean Larteguy, *The Centurions*, and includes famous officers such as Marcel Bigeard, Roger Trinquier, Maurice Challe, and Raoul Salan.

psychological warfare and physical presence were emphasized.⁴⁷ In October 1956 the French interdicted a an airplane carrying five of the top leaders of the FLN (Ahmed Ben Bella, Hocine Ait Ahmed, Mohamed Khider, Mohamed Boudiaf and Rabah Bitat) bound for a negotiations meeting in Tunis and forced it to land in Algiers. The French imprisoned the leaders for the remainder of the war.⁴⁸

As the success of the French operations increased and the leadership became more isolated, the FLN developed a new approach to the war. The architects of their new approach, Ramdane Abane and Ben M'Hidi, rationalized that operations in the countryside were becoming too costly and were insignificant to the international audiences. The new approach called for a focus on terrorism against the European populations of the cities.

On September 30, 1956, the FLN launched their campaign in Algiers under the direction of the Saadi Yacef, leader of the Algiers zone (nahaya). That day three young Muslim women, dressed to look like Europeans, planted bombs in heart of European Algiers in locations known to be favorite stops for families and young people returning from a day at the beach. Similar attacks followed into the winter of 1956. On December 28, the FLN assassinated the mayor of Algiers and followed up with a bomb at his funeral procession which targeted a crowd already “seething with anger.”⁴⁹ In early January 1957, the FLN perpetrated another round of assassinations in the city.

Governor General Lacoste, facing challenges now from both the FLN and the *pieds noirs* escalated the conflict to an open war. On 7 January, Lacoste held a meeting with General Salan

⁴⁷ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 166.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 160.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 187.

and General Jacques Massu, commander of the elite and renowned 10th Para Division. At the meeting, Lacoste granted Massu “full responsibility for maintenance of order in the city.”⁵⁰ Through a combination of proven methods, Massu affected a stranglehold on the population of Algiers and the FLN networks. In early February, the FLN followed up with more bombings carried out by women in disguise, but by the end of the month, 10th Para had developed more complete picture of Yacef’s networks through its interrogation methods. Systematically, the FLN in Algiers began to crumble. The harsh tactics of the Army received widespread criticism in the media and in metropolitan France, but to the Army leaders the tactical success validated their approach. By the summer of 1957, Massu’s forces had stopped a general strike, captured (later assassinated) Ben M’Hidi, the commander of district (wilaya) four, and forced the remaining leaders of the *Comite de Cordination et Execution* (CCE) to flee the country.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Ibid., 188

⁵¹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 169. The CCE was constituted from the highest leaders in the FLN from the original members of the CRUA not already in French prisons. The members that were able to escape from Algiers were Abane, Krim (leader of the ALN), and Dahlab. These men took up refuge in Tunis, Tunisia.



During the same period, General Salan stepped up pressure against the ALN throughout the rest of the countryside. The French Army conducted major operations against Berber militias in the Grand Kabylia, and resettlement operations against rebel strongholds in villages north of Constantine. Meanwhile, the ALN had to fight battles against dissidents in the Aures who supported Messali Hadj and aligned with the French against the FLN.⁵² The outlook for the FLN was bleak in 1957. More and more the insurgents had to rely on exterior lines of operations from Tunisia and Morocco. The French responded to this tactic by erecting the Morice line and other fortifications along the Tunisian and Moroccan borders, which it completed by the end of 1957.⁵³

⁵² Charles-Robert Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1964). 115

⁵³ Thomas A. Bruscino Jr., *Out of Bounds: Transnational Sanctuary in Irregular Warfare* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 7. The Morice line was the most famous of the border fortification erected by the French during the war. It stretched over 200 miles along the Tunisian and 435 miles along the Moroccan borders and included electrified fences and state of the art sensors and cameras

The French approach to counterinsurgency places great emphasis on the development of intelligence.⁵⁴ Both Galula and Trinquier assert that the key to gaining vital intelligence on the insurgents is creating a sense of safety in the population. By securing the population and giving them a stake in maintaining security, the counterinsurgent removes the barriers of intimidation protecting the clandestine organization. This, however, takes time to develop and much vital intelligence is lost. Trinquier, as with many French officers, endorsed the use of torture in order to gain time sensitive intelligence while Galula did not.⁵⁵ The use of torture and the strict measures imposed on the population, in order to create a secure environment, met with harsh criticism in France and in the international community.

In September 1957, the battle for Algiers ended with the capture of Saadi Yacef and the killing of his trusted lieutenant Ali la Pointe.⁵⁶ Dissension among the leader of the FLN emerged and in late 1957, FLN operatives assassinated Abane for supposedly attempting peace negotiations on his own. The remaining leaders of the FLN reorganized and reconstituted the CCE in Tunis in early 1958. Immediately, they came under bitter criticism for the decisions they had made. The criticism included the call for a general strike in the face of overwhelming French forces, the shift from the traditional rural strongholds into the weakly supported urban centers, and the move towards tactics that discredited the mujahidin by inciting repression.⁵⁷ Algiers was

to alert the military of crossings or smuggling operations. At times, the French had as many as 80,000 troops deployed along the borders.

⁵⁴ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 72.

⁵⁵ Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, 21.

⁵⁶ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 218. Saadi Yacef provided the location of Ali la Pointe to the French upon his capture. The French cordoned his hideout in the Casbah and set off demolitions charges when he refused to come out. The blast set off secondary detonations of cached explosives and caused the collapse of several adjacent building, killing seventeen and wounding four French soldiers.

⁵⁷ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 169.

a costly loss of face for the FLN, particularly among the uncommitted Muslims of Algeria. After Algiers, the war shifted to the frontier where French might caused the resistance to stagnate.

For the French officers, the *pieds noirs*, and government officials in Algeria the successes were indisputable. For many officers and career soldiers of the French army, Algiers was a vindication and a bright victory in careers that had seen the fall of France in WWII, the bitter defeat of Dien Bien Phu, and the debacle of the Suez Canal in 1956.⁵⁸ The outlook was not the same in France. The commitment of nearly half a million soldiers to the war, many of them conscripts, meant a raising toll on the French youth. Many of the conscripts returned from the war with news and experiences that repulsed an already war weary population. The French government itself was turmoil stemming from bitter internal politics, mounting debts and a poor economy, and mounting international pressure.⁵⁹

In February 1958, the French retaliated against ALN forces who had staged attacks from the Tunisian village of Sakiet by leveling the village with a squadron of American-built B-26 bombers. It was market day in Sakiet and hundreds of civilians packed the town. Newswires throughout the world carried the stories and photos depicting eighty Tunisian civilians killed and an additional 130 wounded.⁶⁰ The American and British governments now publicly announced their concern of the French handling of the war. In fact, Senator John F. Kennedy now became a vocal advocate for Algerian self-determination.⁶¹ As it turned out, however, the army carried out the bombing without the approval of the French government.

⁵⁸ Stora, *Algeria 1830-2000*, 51-52.

⁵⁹ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 238-240.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 266-267.

⁶¹ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 247.

Both Galula and Trinquier acknowledge the large role that international opinion played in Algeria and how the FLN used the actions of the counterinsurgent against them in propaganda. Trinquier even highlights the Tunisian bombardment to demonstrate the futility of traditional methods.⁶² Their approach calls for extensive use of propaganda to target the population and the insurgents, but does not offer a means to address international audiences. Their efforts were proving effective at the tactical level, but were losing ground at the strategic level and losing the support of their countrymen.

On May 13, 1958, crowds of colons overthrew the government of Lacoste and installed the Committee of Public Safety, which included Generals Salan, Massu, Allard and Admiral Auboyneau. From this platform, the Generals and opposition leaders in France (Gaullists) orchestrated the downfall of the Fourth Republic and reinstated Charles de Gualle as the leader of the Fifth Republic.⁶³ With de Gualle the Generals hoped to have a government that finally understood that the war in Algeria was about France, and that it required the will and commitment to win. For unknown reasons, the Generals chose to ignore de Gualle's historical stance on Algeria and other colonies of France. As early as 1944, de Gualle stated in a speech that it should be France's policy to "lead each of the colonial peoples to a development that will permit them to administer themselves, and later, to govern themselves."⁶⁴ As de Gualle established his administration and restructured government under the Fifth Republic, further discussions and speeches on Algeria began to worry the *pieds noirs*. Weary of the climate of civil-military relationships, he purged some 1,500 officers from Algeria and recalled them back to France. Further, he ordered officers to withdraw from the Committee of Public safety, which

⁶² Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, 102.

⁶³ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 172.

⁶⁴ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 281.

subsequently disbanded. He promoted out General Salan and replaced him with an Air Force General, Maurice Challe.⁶⁵

Meanwhile the FLN reorganized once again and formed the GPRA (Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria). They also embarked on a new strategy to export the movement to metropolitan France and as the MNA (Messali Hadj) had done year prior. They intensified their recruitment efforts in France beginning in 1958 and by the next year doubled their membership 15,000, and to 150,000 by 1961. The support of the Diaspora generated large amounts of funding for the FLN and gave them a means to affect the French economy directly by orchestrating labor strikes.⁶⁶

In 1959, de Gualle escalated actions against the ALN in an effort to force the FLN into negotiations. That year General Challe conducted major operations in the districts of the Kabylia and Sahara (wilayas III and IV) which killed both of the FLN commanders. Under Challe's orders more than 2 million Algerians were displaced. In a stunning blow to many military leaders and the *pieds noirs*, de Gualle announced his policy on Algeria on September 16, 1959 in a television address, "Given all the facts in Algeria, national and international, I consider it necessary that the recourse to self-determination be proclaimed beginning today."⁶⁷ In contrast to his military leaders, de Gualle understood geopolitical reality of an international community committed to the decolonization movement and he decided that France's place was Europe, not Africa. The open war was over; all that remained was to find a political end.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 309.

⁶⁶ Stora, *Algeria 1830-2000*, 64-65.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 74.

Prime Minister de Gualle replaced General Massu in January 1960, after criticizing the new policy in Algeria.⁶⁸ The *pieds noirs*, incensed with the turn on policy and the action of de Gualle, formed their own rebellion. During “Barricades Week” the army that had defended Frenchmen from terrorists and guerillas for six years, was now defending itself from those same people based on a policy that most did not support. Militant *pieds noirs* staged insurrection that left fourteen dead and 123 wounded on January 24.⁶⁹

The first round of talks between the FLN and the French government opened on June 25, 1960 and were a complete failure. The FLN position was that nothing short of complete self-determination was acceptable, French officials were not willing to accept. The FLN strategy was to increase international pressure within the UN and wait for France to further divide.⁷⁰ That year the FLN succeeded in rebuilding its networks in Algiers and in the suburbs. Despite the determination of de Gualle to end the war in Algeria, the violence actually increased in 1960 as French army, the colons, and the Algerians all stepped up operations aimed at winning popular sentiment and separating each other from the population.

De Gualle sought to cut the FLN out of the equation entirely and take a referendum directly to the people. In January 1961, the French president put forward a referendum concerning the establishment of public powers in Algeria under French supervision prior to self-determination (a transitional government). The referendum passed in both France and Algeria. As this was unfolding, the General Challe took an early retirement in protest. Later that same month Generals Salan, Jouhad, Zeller, and the newly retired Challe formed a clandestine organization called the Organisation Armee Secrete (OAS). Challe secretly flew back into Algiers and on 21

⁶⁸ Ibid., 76.

⁶⁹ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 363-4.

⁷⁰ Stora, *Algeria 1830-2000*, 80.

April 1961, using the parachute regiment of the First Foreign Legion initiated the “General’s Putsch.”⁷¹ The OAS took over all key governmental and security facilities in Algiers that afternoon. The next morning Challe went on the radio and called for all the commanders to join the movement, which called for the takeover of the Republic and the reversal of policy on Algeria. Unfortunately, for the organizers, the remainder of the Army remained loyal to the government and on 25 April, Challe surrendered and the other officers were arrested or fled into hiding.⁷² Thereafter, the OAS would operate secretly and proved to be a destructive force against movement toward self-determination.

The remainder of 1961 and into 1962 the OAS and FLN carried out a relentless campaign of progressive retaliations. From January to February 1962 alone, there were 1,007 attacks in Algeria that caused 811 deaths and over 1500 wounded. In Paris region another 128 attacks occurred in the same time.⁷³ The official end of the war came with signing of the Evian accords on March 19, 1962, however, the violence continued well into the summer as the OAS became increasingly radical and the FLN began to punish the *hariks* (supporters of the French occupation).⁷⁴

The dictums and principles developed by the French Army for counterinsurgency were sound and proved to have overwhelming effects against the FLN guerillas and terrorists working in the cities and hamlets of Algeria. The methodical process of their counterinsurgency eroded the insurgents’ command and control, freedom of movement, and interdicted supplies to feed the insurgency. However, the level of commitment required in terms of lives and resources from the

⁷¹Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 441-3.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 458.

⁷³ Stora, *Algeria 1830-2000*, 96.

⁷⁴ Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present*, 126.

French citizenry, and the effect the tactics had on international and French public opinion proved too burdensome for France. In Algerian history, the Ottoman model of pacification provides a more pragmatic answer maintaining control of internal threats within the capacity of the government.

Pacification under Ottoman Rule

Algeria was the first territory in the Maghreb ruled by the Ottoman Empire. In 1515 Turkish privateering brothers, Aruj and Kahyr al-Din, were already operating in Tunisia. Algeria was divided by two weakening powers; in the east the sultanate of the Hafsids and in the west that of the Abd al Wadid dynasty. These powers were facing external threats from the Spanish and Hapsburgs who sought to establish bases along the Mediterranean coast. There was also increasing turmoil from tribal elites within the region (some of which had had arrangements with the Spanish). With the Spanish threat looming, elites from Algiers propositioned the al-Din brothers to help with the situation.⁷⁵ For the corsairs, establishing a base of operations in Algiers would allow the brothers to expand their privateering operations and divorce themselves from the Sultan of Tunis. In 1516, the brothers embarked on a campaign to wrest Algiers for themselves, which they accomplished in short term. Aruj would die in battle against a coalition of Spaniards and local tribes in Tlemcen in 1518. Kahyr al-Din, however, would prove to be tenacious and successful in dominating the area on both land and sea and earned the nickname Barbarossa from his European adversaries.⁷⁶ In 1519, Kahyr sought and received submission to the Ottoman government in exchange for reinforcements and material to continue his drive. The Sultan, Selim I, granted Khayr the royal title of Beylerbey (Governor General) of North Africa and with the title

⁷⁵ Tal Shuval, "The Ottoman Algerian Elite and Its Ideology," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 32 (August 2000): 325.

⁷⁶ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 17.

came the services of the Janissary infantry and artillery, and the full protection of the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁷ By 1529, he had driven the Spaniards and the Hafids from Algiers, Penon, Tlemcen, and Constantine. By 1545 he had expelled the Abd al Wadids from western Algeria, defeated numerous Spanish attacks on the coastal cities, and defeated a naval invasion attempt by Charles V. Khayr would go on to become Admiral of the Ottoman Mediterranean fleet under the Sultan Suleiman I. His son Hasah Pasha took over after Kahyr retired in 1535 and would rule until 1552.

After 1552, the Ottoman government began assigning governors, called Pashas, over Algeria on fixed three-year rotations and did away with the office of beylerby in order to exert tighter control over the region. The structure excluded Arabs and Berbers from government posts and established Turkish as the official language. The actual effect of rotating Turkish rulers every three years meant that the Janissary officers, collectively known as the *ojaq*, exerted great power in the political institutions.⁷⁸ At its height in the early seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire maintained up to 15,000 Janissaries in Algiers.⁷⁹ The army in Algeria became increasingly powerful and harder to maintain. The pasha was responsible for paying the salaries of the army and the army itself controlled the government institutions.

The primary interest for the Ottoman rulers in Algeria was to control the Mediterranean, and privateering remained dominant source of revenue throughout its tenure. Therefore, the government and military served two purposes, to repel European expansion and to control the population in order to allow the corsairs to dominate the sea. On both of these fronts, the Turkish

⁷⁷ The Janissary was Ottoman regular army. One of the first armies to be truly full time professional standing army.

⁷⁸ Shuval, "The Ottoman Algerian Elite," 324. *Ojaq* is an Arabic and Ottoman term for hearth or fireplace. It originally designated a platoon-sized unit of men who ate, lived, and maneuvered together. It was subsequently applied to the whole body of Janissaries.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 325.

rulers of Algiers met numerous challenges throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Spanish occupied Tlemcen, bombarded Algiers, and held Oran from 1732 to 1792. The Kabyle tribes of the mountains of Grand Kabylia in northeast Algeria proved to be difficult to control and maintained a perpetual state of rebellion.


The topography in Algeria created an agricultural base that was limited and dispersed, making revenue difficult and dangerous to collect directly. Thus, corsair captains who comprised the *taifa al rais* controlled the primary source of funds to run the government and pay the Janissaries.⁸⁰ In the mid seventieth century, the *ojaq* staged numerous revolts against the pashas stemming from the inability of the pashas to pay their bimonthly salaries. At one point, they evicted the pasha and the commander of the Janissaries assumed rule, but the military leaders were no more successful in generating the necessary revenue. In 1671, the military finally turned to the *taifa al rais* and transferred supreme power to a corsair captain giving him the title of Dey and establishing a power sharing Regency between the dey and the pasha. Istanbul reluctantly accepted a new power-sharing concept, and the office of pasha became increasingly meaningless until 1710 when the dey assumed this title as well. A council of sixty representatives, known as the *divan*, selected the deys. This council was predominantly composed of Janissary officers, but later included larger participation by local religious and tribal elites. With this arrangement complete, “the Algerian elite had hit upon a formula which eventually permitted both stabilization of the political process and de facto independence of the Ottoman central government.”⁸¹

The Ottomans exercised a loose but effective system of control over the population by segmenting tribes and religious groups and promoting competition amongst them, while ensuring

⁸⁰ *Taifa al rais* is the Arabic name given to the organization of privateering captains. Translates to the captains (rais) community (taifa). See Tal Shuval, “The Ottoman Algerian Elite and Its Ideology,” 328.

⁸¹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 19.

the balance of power remained on the side of the Turkish elite. Additionally, throughout most of their tenure they demanded little in the form of taxation from majority of inhabitants.



By the seventeenth century, the Dey created three administrative territorial subdivisions know as *beyliks* (provinces), and in conjunction with the divan appointed Beys (governors) to administer and project power of the Regency. The Beylik of the East had its Capital in Constantine and was the largest and wealthiest due to a strong agricultural base and dominance over trade routes with Tunisia. In the center was the Beylik of Titteri, whose capital was Medea. The Western Beylik had its capital originally in Mascara and, upon expulsion of the Spanish, moved to Oran in 1794. The Western Beylik encompassed vast plains and valleys and a

population dominated by nomads and semi nomads. Conflict was prevalent in the west due to enduring hostilities with Morocco and Spain and many tribes made a livelihood out of war.⁸²

The cities comprised of only five to six percent of the population but exerted disproportionate influence over the country. The cities were the base moral, economic, and military power. They possessed the citadels, the seat of Shari'a courts, the madrasas and kuttabs, markets, trading posts, and access to the sea. The Turks dominated the political and economic life in the cities with the support of the janissaries. They balanced an exclusive caste system that promoted solidarity of the Turkish elite while at the same time allowed certain collaboration between favored local religious and tribal elites.⁸³ In the rural areas, the Ottoman approach to control emphasized the role of the tribe and sought to exploit competition between tribes to prevent powerful tribal confederations that existed prior to the days of Kahyr al-Din.⁸⁴ They accomplished this by giving certain tribes preferential treatment and by conducting campaigns against others to maintain their threats segmented.

The Ottoman political system consisted of three concentric circles. At the center is the city, the source of prosperity and power to which revenues and commerce flow. The first ring of the circle is composed of the *makhzan* tribes who benefitted from preferential treatment, often tax exemption, and constituted local militia. The next ring held the *rayat* who were taxpaying tribes (or villages). The final circle consisted of the dissidents who refused to submit or pay taxes.⁸⁵ Even within the *rayat* and *makhazan* there existed further divisions and forms of competition. For

⁸² Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 32-34.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 21-23.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁸⁵ Douglas Johnson, "Algeria: Some Problems of Modern History," *The Journal of African History* (1964): 224-225.

instance, one *makhzan* tribe may receive weapons and materials and not be required to collect taxes from the *rayat*, while another may be excused from fighting, and yet another is required to fight and receives no weaponry. Through these systems, they continuously checked the balance of power to keep their threats manageable.

The majority of the janissaries were garrisoned in or surrounding Algiers and rotated troops to a small number of *nubas* (outposts) scattered throughout important trade routes. At one point, the Ottomans attempted to control the Trans Saharan trade route as far south as Touggourt and Ouargla, however, this proved too costly to maintain and they soon withdrew back to the portal cities. When not otherwise actively campaigning against external threats, the janissaries conducted punitive campaigns (*mahallas*) twice a year.⁸⁶ These campaigns typically coincided with harvest and served to inflict punishment on belligerent tribes, test the strength of tribal confederations, and extract taxes. They typically employed auxiliary forces from the *makhzan* tribes. A typical engagement was a raid, or a *ghaziya*. An aged practice in the region, in a *ghaziya* the expedition would attack suddenly against an unprepared village or herding camp and seize livestock, crops, goods, and on rare occasions women, while allowing victims to flee. On more severe occasion, the level of violence increased and at times whole villages and populations disappeared.⁸⁷ If the campaigns met with a serious challenge, they could withdraw and use sea power to mass reinforcements quickly to outnumber and out gun their adversaries.

During the end of the eighteenth century, the deys of Constantine and Oran became more and more effective at combining family politics and military presence to extend authority. In the east, Dey Muhammad ibn Uthman (1766-91) established military outposts in troublesome

⁸⁶ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 35.

⁸⁷ Thomas Rid, "Razzia: A Turning Point in Modern Strategy," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21, (2009): 618.

portions of Kabylia lands and deftly played internal rivalries to reduce significantly “the independent mountaineers’ ability to spread sedition to the surrounding valleys.”⁸⁸ Of note, Turkish rulers were never successful in fully subjugating the Kabyle people. In the west, Muhammad al-Kabir conquered the most powerful tribes between 1780 and 1797.

Ottoman power steadily declined throughout the eighteenth century under increasing pressure from European powers. At the same time the deys of Algiers were increasing the effectiveness of their beys and extending the government’s authority, the sources of economic revenue were diminishing. European naval powers seriously decreased Ottoman privateering operations, and the colonization of Atlantic ports in Africa reduced the caravan routes of the Sahara. As the revenues diminished, so did the number of janissaries. By 1830, when France invaded Algiers, Turkish troops numbered only 3,700. In his book, *Modern Algeria*, John Ruedy describes a process of “deturkification” in the eighteenth century whereby “the state became increasingly dependent upon internal resources and hence upon the support of indigenous elites” and relied less on the Sublime Porte.⁸⁹ Economic and fiscal crisis peaked during the Napoleonic wars when a series of sanctions and naval blockades cut trade for almost eighteen years between Algiers and its traditional European trade partners. When trade finally resumed, much of Europe had found substitute markets and Algeria was unable to recoup its losses. Taxes levied on the *rayat* steadily increased as did the force used to extract them.

At the start of the nineteenth century, the Regency was in full-blown crisis. In 1805, religious elites mobilized the Oran province and parts of Titteri and succeeded taking Mascara and laying siege to Oran. That same year the ojaq in Algiers revolted against the Dey (Mustafa)

⁸⁸ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 39.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 42.

and killed him, his treasurer and a prominent Jewish merchant who was responsible for securing commercial relationships with Europe. In the next eleven years, the ojaq and the divan installed six other Deys, and subsequently killed them when they were unable to satisfy all the factions and assure fiscal stability. Between 1810 and 1815, there were massive Kabyle revolts in the eastern regions fueled by religious elites in loosely associated with those in the western rebellion. In 1815, the United States declared war on Algeria, captured two of her ships with 200 corsairs, and forced the Algiers into turning over slaves and signing a treaty to stop privateering operations against the United States.⁹⁰ The following year a combined Dutch and British fleet British under Admiral Exmouth went to Algiers and forced the Dey to free slaves held as their possession. After doing the same to Tunis, he returned and demanded a treaty ending slavery and privateering. When the Dey refused, Exmouth bombarded Algiers for nine devastating hours firing 50,000 shots and consuming 118 tons of gunpowder.⁹¹ The next day, Umar ben Mohammad Dey signed the treaty. A few months later, the ojaq assassinated him and nominated Ali Khodja to replace him. Ali Khodja proved to have keen survival instincts, made the bold move to secretly remove the state treasury from the Janina palace, and relocated his seat of power in the Qasba where he received protection from Kabyle and Kouloughli supporters.⁹² With this protection, Ali Khodja Dey fought off an attempted revolt by the garrison in Algiers and repatriated or killed 1,700 janissary rebels. Ironically, he soon died from the plague. Before his

⁹⁰ Frederick Leiner, *The End of Barbary Terror* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 122.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 178.

⁹² Kouloughli were offspring of Turkish fathers who received some preferential treatment, but were nonetheless excluded from holding official titles. See Shuval, 331

death, he named his successor Hussein Dey, who ruled until the French made their entrance in 1830.⁹³

In the twelve years that he ruled, Hussein Dey began to repair the Regency and made progress towards restoring control. Some historians offer that between 1817 and 1830 the office of the dey was beginning to take steps towards becoming a true Monarchy by relying more on indigenous troops and by relaxing policies based on ethnicity to include Turkish descendants.⁹⁴ On April 29, 1827, Hussein Dey met with the French consul, Pierre Duval to discuss grievances of outstanding debts owed to Algiers by France. The Dey requested to know why the King of France had not responded to his inquiries, Duval responded that the King would not lower himself to correspond with him, and the Dey slapped the consul with a feather fly swatter. In June, a French squadron anchored at Algiers and demanded apologies and that the French Flag be flown over the Qasba in respect to the King. The Dey refused, and the French began a blockade, which it maintained until 1830.

The Ottomans were defeated by what they always feared the most, a European military power. They ruled a population of millions with a small and ethnically distinct military caste for the better part of three centuries. Their approach to control relied on managing the persistent conflict within their territories. The conflict among the tribes served to check the balance of power and ensure that no tribal confederation emerged to challenge the Janissaries.⁹⁵ This required constant maintenance in the form of punitive campaigns (*mahallas*) and raids (*ghaziyas*). They divided the territories into regions (Beyliks) and they too had to pay particular attention to

⁹³ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 41.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁹⁵ Douglas Johnson, "Algeria: Some Problems of Modern History," *The Journal of African History* 2 (1964): 223.

the mountains of Kabylia. They established outposts in areas of that were strategically important to them (nubas) where they could control the flow of revenue and monitor the strength of the tribes.

On a few occasions, the Ottomans attempted to exert direct control of populations in the hinterlands, but the realities of the level of effort required outweighed the potential benefits and drew them back to the economic centers. They controlled the religious elite and scholars because they controlled the cities and the institutions that they offered. Through controlling the elite and managing the competition between tribes, they maintained enough power to protect their strategic interests and allowed local leaders enough autonomy to placate sentiments of social injustice stemming from their strict adherence to the ethnic caste system.

Islamist Movement 1988-2002

Since its independence in 1962, the FLN ruled Algeria as a single party system, and adopted many socialist policies based on substantial oil and natural gas revenues. The radical Islamist movement emerged as a major feature of Algerian politics in the mid 1970s. Under the neo-socialist, administration of Houari Boumediene, Algeria adopted a policy of Arabization. This policy set in place reforms to phase out the French language and replace French educators with Arabic speakers from Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria, many of whom were members of the Muslim Brotherhood.⁹⁶ In 1979, Chadli Benjadid assumed the presidency and began to slow down the pace of Arabization and socialist policies. Several factors led to this reversal strategy. Principally, a sharp decline in revenues from oil and gas meant that the state could not keep up with the demands of a rapidly growing population. The cities were becoming increasingly

⁹⁶ Hugh Roberts, *The Battlefield Algeria 1988-2002: Evidence and Analysis*, vol 2: (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 12

crowded with the young and unemployed, crime increased drastically, and health and housing services could not keep up with the demands. This resulted in a dramatic decline in the standard of living throughout the 1980s.⁹⁷ A number of religious and other dissident organizations began to emerge in secrecy since the regime did not allow other political organizations to exist.

In 1985, the Mouvement Islamique Algerien (MIA) staged protests against the single party regime (FLN) that included attacks on police stations and government offices. Escalating tensions precipitated by declining oil prices led to large-scale demonstration in October 1988. In September of the same year, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) emerged as one of the leading clandestine opposition organizations.⁹⁸ During this five-day event, more than 500 people perished in the streets of Algiers. The government of Chadli Bendjedid resisted temptations and calls to crack down on the demonstrations. The government continued to hope that it could either use the fundamentalist as a means to maintain order and absorb them into the FLN party system.⁹⁹ Following the riots, President Bendjedid put forth a referendum on the constitution to allow additional political parties to form. Numerous political parties emerged around ideologies ranging from labor unions, to feminist organizations, to Berberist, and finally to Islamic.¹⁰⁰ In September 1989, the government formally recognizes the FIS as a political party in Algeria. The FIS rapidly became the most popular Islamist party in Algeria with its base of support emanating from large urban areas in Algiers, Oran, and Constantine. The FIS and other Islamic organization began to impose local rules banning, so-called, Western symbols of corruption such as alcohol and satellite TV and began to impose the wear of the *hijab* (veil) by women.

⁹⁷ Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War*, xiii.

⁹⁸ The acronym FIS is derived from the French *Front Islamique du Salut* meaning Islamic Salvation Front.

⁹⁹ James Ciment. *Algeria: The Fundamentalist Challenge* (New York: Facts On File Inc, 1997), 154.

¹⁰⁰ Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War*, xii.

In June of 1990, Algeria held its first pluralistic municipal elections in history. In Algeria, municipalities carry considerable political weight due to the impact of everyday life and because they form the base of organizing national politics. The FIS achieved an overwhelming victory with 850 of 1500 municipal councils and 54 percent of the popular vote.¹⁰¹ Through the remainder of that year and most of 1991 the FLN and FIS played a political battle of labor strikes and demonstrations (on the side of FIS) and electoral manipulation (on the part of FLN) which led to several postponements of the parliamentary elections. In June, Chadli Bendjedid declared martial law and had his foreign minister assume the head of state. The parliamentary elections finally took place on December 26, 1991 and resulted in the FIS winning 188 of 430 electoral districts. In fact, the FLN came in third place behind the FIS and the Kabylia based FFS of Hocine Ahmed.¹⁰²

Faced with the possibility of a takeover of complete power by the Islamists, the Algerian military decided to intervene on the political process. In January 1992, the High Security Council (equivalent to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff) took over the government and installed a military junta called the High Council of State (HCE) to fill the constitutional void. The military coup leaders forced President Chadli Bendjedid and his Prime Minister to resign. In February, the military junta installed Mohamad Boudiaf, who had been in exile since 1965, as the seventh president of Algeria.

In March 1992, the government officially banned the FIS and arrested 5,000 former members. Subsequently several Islamist armed groups emerged and began to conduct violent campaigns against the government and the people of Algeria.¹⁰³ While the FIS remained a central

¹⁰¹ Ciment, *Algeria*, 55.

¹⁰² Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 254.

¹⁰³ Ciment, *Algeria*, 58.

player in the Islamist movement, a number of other groups emerged over the next three years to challenge the central government; among them were HAMAS, the Islamic Resistance Movement (MNI), the Islamic Movement Army (MIA), the Islamic Army Group (GIA), and the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS- militant arm of the FIS).

In June 1992, one of Mohamed Boudiaf bodyguards assassinated the leader as he was conducting a televised address. The junta government reported that the bodyguard was a member of FIS sentenced him to prison. Noted historians on this conflict generally accepted that the FIS was not behind the killing and instead point to power plays within the FLN backed military junta.¹⁰⁴ The HCE quickly named Ali Kafi as Boudiaf's successor.

Up until mid 1993, the Islamist groups (AIS, GIA, MIA) targeted violence predominantly against government personnel (soldiers, police, and government officials) and against other Islamist organizations. Later that year Islamists killed seven foreigners throughout the country and announced they would kill all remaining foreigners after December 1. Some 4,000 foreigners heeded the warning and left Algeria in November 1993. The GIA announced its intent to transform the Arab world into a caliphate based on the model of the successors of the Prophet.¹⁰⁵ After 1993, terrorism spread across all sectors of the population.

During this period the military Government took the opportunity presented by the violence to opportunity to rally political support for the regime from other parties, including the FLN and the FFS who were by now convinced that a democratic election of the FIS would have been a mistake. The government's initial main priorities in combating terrorism focused on cleansing the mosques of radical elites, protecting the infrastructure of the oil industry, and

¹⁰⁴ Roberts, *The Battlefield Algeria*, 122; Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War*, 42, 133, 256.

¹⁰⁵ Carlos Echeverria Jesus, "Radical Islam in the Mghreb." *Orbis* (Spring 2004): 1-13

interdicting terrorist supplies of weapons and explosives.¹⁰⁶ Additionally, the government began to direct its Intelligence services to infiltrate FIS, GIA, and other organizations in order to draft in guerillas and exploit fractures between them. The government also conducted large-scale operations against known Islamist strongholds in the city slums and in targeted villages. Numerous reports from international agencies presented evidence of widespread torture and detentions.¹⁰⁷

From the onset of unrest, the Algerian government showed a different approach to counterinsurgency than the one practiced by the French in 1954 even though they faced a very similar tactics. Instead of focusing on securing the population from violence, instead they focused on targeting the elites, protecting their strategic interests (oil and gas industry), and infiltrating the Islamist networks. The Islamist were first in taking the conflict to the population, but the government refused to play in a grand scale, and when it did it played by hard rules.¹⁰⁸

Between 1992 and 1994, the attacks of the Islamists and the reprisals of the government and grass roots militias accounted for some 30,000 deaths throughout the country. An average number of forty to sixty persons were killed daily after May 1994.¹⁰⁹ The central government began to crack down on the press and by the end of 1994 controlled all press services in Algeria, and affected the expulsion of foreign press services. The international community could not help but take notice of the human rights violations and the obvious interventions in the political system. However, most economic powers did not want to see Algeria slip into an Islamic regime similar to Iran. In 1994, Algeria established a market economy and began large-scale

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 3.

¹⁰⁷ Ciment, *Algeria*, 175.

¹⁰⁸ Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War*, 226.

¹⁰⁹ Stora, *Algeria 1830-2000*, 215.

privatization of former government run oil and gas industries. In doing so, they earned the seal of approval of the International Monetary Fund at a crucial time. That year it obtained 40 million francs from the international community in the form of loans, gifts, credits and other financial arrangements.¹¹⁰

Between 1995 and 1999 the Algerian government conducted counterinsurgency along three efforts; military/paramilitary operations focused on security, political reform, and control of the propaganda.¹¹¹ Conventional military security operations continued to focus on strategically significant areas pertaining to the hydrocarbon industry and in commercial and affluent sectors of the cities. Throughout 1995, civil authorities began to form village guards and other paramilitary units to provide self-defense to the population from the “*ghazias* of the Moudjahidin.”¹¹² The central government distributed weapons and organized the militias using reserve soldiers, civic leaders, or tribal/family leaders. Some militias, established mainly in Kabylia, became active participants against Islamist organizations and worked with the army. The militias became a source of revenue and employment for many in Algeria and to some extent made the conflict profitable for the leaders on both sides of the conflict.¹¹³ In areas where the Islamist was too strong, the army deliberately decided to abandon the population to the control of the Islamist. In a tactic which Luis Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War 1990-1998*, calls “Let-them-rot” the army isolated the areas (neighborhoods, villages) and allowed dissention to fester within.¹¹⁴ In the border regions of the country, the army focused on interdiction of weapons and foreign fighters. The government enlisted the assistance of tribes and former rebel organizations in the border

¹¹⁰ Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War*, 228.

¹¹¹ Echeverria, “Radical Islam in the Maghreb,” 3.

¹¹² Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War*, 152.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 90.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 150.

regions of Mali and Niger, which included joint patrols these organizations and the army. The border with Morocco remained tense and to this day proves to be difficult for the government to control.¹¹⁵ In this manner, by the beginning of 1996, the government made major progress in exerting control over the territories and began to turn the tide on the Islamist insurgents.

Political reforms focused on transforming the military junta into a government that resembled a more pluralistic structure while reaching out to Islamist candidates with more moderate views. In 1995, the government established a, seemingly, formal division of labor between the newly appointed President, Liamine Zeroual and the military under the direction of Defense Minister.¹¹⁶ Later that year, the government held elections and Zeroual won the presidency in a semi-democratic process observed by international committees (Arab League, UN, and OAU) and declared free. Following his election, Zeroual passed a reconciliation law to allow former member of armed groups amnesty if they turned themselves over to security forces. The elections opened the door again for the government to re-establish foreign relations. In 1996, high-level U.S. diplomats visited Algiers and signaled new levels of cooperation between the governments. Later that year, the US detained a prominent FIS member, Anwar Haddam, in Washighton.¹¹⁷

The Algerian regime's approach to propaganda centered on tight control of the media and controlling the narrative that it produced towards Muslim and international audiences. In February 1996, the Interior Ministry revived censorship committees to allegedly control "security related matters deriving from non-official sources."¹¹⁸ The government took every opportunity to

¹¹⁵ Echeverria, "Radical Islam in the Maghreb," 4.

¹¹⁶ The Military still appointed President, the announcement of the division did not actually change who was in control, but did allow a structure for politics to resume.

¹¹⁷ Echeverria, "Radical Islam in the Maghreb," 4.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 6.

deliver the message that it was protecting mosques from corruption, attacks, and politics. It delivered the message that it was protecting the right of all Muslims to worship freely and safely. In the international stage, particularly among western powers, the Algerian government delivered the message that it was preserving freedom and democratic principles from radical Islamic ideologies.¹¹⁹

Meanwhile Islamist organization continued to fracture and increasingly focused their attacks on each other. In 1998, the government began negotiations with a number of leaders of the FIS and AIS. Following the negotiations the government began released some historic members of the FIS. As a result, a number of Islamist groups conducted a series of massacres throughout the countryside to counter the reconciliation efforts. The practice of massacres against civilians caused serious splits in the GIA, and on September 1998, a new group emerged from former GIA members called the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). As Martinez points out, by 1999, “the government succeeded in turning a conflict between Islamist guerillas and the security forces into a pitiless struggle between GIA and AIS.”¹²⁰

In 1999, former FLN fighter Abdelaziz Bouteflika, received the support of the army and won an arranged election becoming the tenth (and current) president of Algeria. Soon after his election, he concentrated on passing national reconciliation plan called the Civilian Concord Law and increased negotiations with leaders of the AIS. In 2000, over 6,000 members of the AIS and other groups accepted reconciliation and returned to their homes.¹²¹ The GIA continued to lose support, and many of its members moved into other countries. In 2002, the Algerian military killed the leader of the GIA, Antar Zouabri, and it effectively ceased to exist.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 6.

¹²⁰ Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War*, 19.

¹²¹ Echeverria, “Radical Islam in the Maghreb,” 6.

Luis Martinez likens the current state of Algeria, and the government's approach to control, to the Beyliks of the Ottoman Regency.¹²² He uses the analogy to explain the nature of the conflict, the motivations behind it, and the approach of the Algerian regime. The analogy is particularly insightful when used to explain their approach to counterinsurgency. Faced with an internal threat, the military exploited conflict to consolidate its power and assimilate elites into the government. They focused their intelligence services on infiltrating insurgent organizations in an effort to manipulate their actions. Instead of focusing on the population, they focused on defeating the extremist elites, protecting their strategic interest, and managing conflict between militias and tribes. They used propaganda and draconian control of the media to control the narrative in the international stage and among other Muslim communities. In doing so, they exploited fears of Islamist movement to justify their actions, which included the morally offensive practices of the French counterinsurgency (torture, mass arrests, and suppression of free speech).

Conclusions

From their experiences in Indochina and in Algeria, the French developed a theory of counterinsurgency that focused on securing and controlling the population directly. The works of Roger Trinquier and David Galula propose that the key to winning the insurgency is winning the battle for the population. In essence, the population is the insurgent's center of gravity. Therefore, the counterinsurgent must drive a wedge between the insurgent and the population by establishing a level of security that is inhospitable to the insurgent's attempts to manipulate the population. Trinquier offers three principles that drive operations in counterinsurgencies, "to cut the guerrilla off from the population that sustains him; to render guerrilla zones untenable; and to coordinate

¹²² Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War*, 220-244.

these actions over a wide area and for long enough, so that these steps will yield the desired results."¹²³ This approach calls for a methodical and systematic campaign to secure the population and stop the violence, winning over their active support in a “strategic Hamlet,” then spreading out from there to roll back the clandestine organization that supports the insurgent.¹²⁴ Their approach proved to be successful tactically in isolating the insurgents in areas that they controlled (within the National Boundaries), commensurate with the level of effort they exerted. However, the amount of effort required in terms of French troops (between 300-400,000 sustained between 1956 and 1960) and economy resources placed a heavy burden on the nation strategically as it tried to put decades of fighting and defeats behind. The preservation of a colonial state was a policy that drew international scorn from France’s allies, and the tactics employed by the French (torture, mass detentions, and violation of international boundaries) further degraded their cause at home and on the global stage.

The Ottomans maintained power over Algeria for over three centuries with a small and ethnically distinct military oligarchy. They imposed a loose but effective system of control over the population by segmenting tribes and religious groups and promoting competition amongst them, while ensuring the balance of power remained on the side of the Turkish elite. The principle focus of the military was to protect their strategic interests emanating from commerce along the Mediterranean Coast and the Tran-Saharan trade routes. They established system of Beyliks and regions that provided them a means to exert control through elites. The elites were responsible for dealing with dissidence of tribal confederations. Thus, the warring parties unconsciously reinvented political organizations that supported the regime. Their tactics for

¹²³ Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, 65

¹²⁴ Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, 73; Galula. *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 74-80.

dealing with direct threats consisted of adapting to the already existing practice of *ghazia* (raids) among competing tribes. When larger threats emerged, they conducted punitive campaigns that targeted not only the warriors, but also the entire population of the tribe/village. They exerted control over the religious and intellectual elites by controlling the institutions (mosques and schools) which supported them. As the base of their economy diminished, they instituted additional political reforms to incorporating indigenous elites into the regime to reduce the burden of maintaining a large professional military. This system proved effective at maintaining relative stability in Algeria; however, it degraded their ability to protect their interest from the European powers.

The Algerian military regime in 1992 adopted a modernized version of the Ottoman approach and defeated an insurgency in 2002. They initially focused their security efforts on protecting the regime and the hydrocarbon industry that provided the lifeline of the economy. Then, they infiltrated insurgent organization in order to promote fighting amongst them. As the insurgents stepped up and spread their attacks throughout the population, the military regime consolidated support from other political parties based on a common enemy. They armed tribes and local militias to provide self-defense in areas and to challenge directly the insurgents on their own strongholds in other areas. In areas where the insurgents were strong and strategic interests were not in danger, they adopted a “Let-them-rot” tactic that was the antithesis of population centric counterinsurgency.¹²⁵ On a number of occasions, the army reportedly allowed massacres and violence to worsen in certain areas, rationalizing that the population would eventually lash back at the insurgents on their own. They focused on co-opting, so called, moderate elites who were interested in the political process. They employed some of the same tactics of mass

¹²⁵ Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War*, 150.

detentions, and torture that the French had in the 1950s, however, the international reaction was much less critical. Finally, the Algerian government strictly controlled the narrative of the conflict through a state controlled media to portray an image that they were fighting to preserve pluralism and the rights of all Muslims against the radical Islamist ideology.

The comparison of these case studies shows that both the Ottomans and the Algerians were more effective at combating internal threats than the French because they managed conflict within the limits of their means. The key difference in their approaches dealt with the tolerance of violence, the level of control required and the amount resources committed to securing the population. The French saw the population as the center of gravity, and population centric counterinsurgency was a direct approach to that center of gravity. The French approach seeks to maintain a monopoly on violence and shelter the population from the insurgent's acts, or at least offer a better alternative for survival by collaborating with the counterinsurgent. David Galula offers that a key objective is "To isolate the population as much as possible, by physical means, from the guerilla."¹²⁶ This requires the commitment of massive resources to protect the population. The US Counterinsurgency manual recommends "between 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1000 residents."¹²⁷ The larger amount of security forces increases the burden on society and increases the opportunity for discontent with security measures (checkpoints, searches, detentions, etc.). Security then becomes a right owed to the population by the government. The French approach sees violence as a risk and the goal is always to reduce it. Violence perpetrated against the population, by either belligerent, is a loss of legitimacy to the counterinsurgent.

¹²⁶ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 115.

¹²⁷ FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* (2006). 1-13

In contrast, the Ottoman and Algerian approach viewed violence as both a risk and an opportunity. Their approach sought to control the population indirectly by relying on local elites. Both the Ottomans and the Algerians recognized that the means required for direct control of the violence were too costly and jeopardized the strategic interests. They each focused on securing strategic interests with the means available and embarked on the management of violence, as opposed to the control of violence. They accepted a higher tolerance for violence, and used violence coercively on the population. They made violence profitable to those who opposed the insurgent and focused on removing incentives for those who backed the insurgent. In essence, security became a commodity. The more invested the local population was in the central government the greater their chances at security. The Algerian military regime learned the importance of intelligence and propaganda from their experiences in the war of independence. They used this knowledge extensively to infiltrate the insurgent networks and manage the international perceptions of the conflict. This approach allowed the Algerians to localized conflict, exploited fractures within insurgent groups, and consolidated their power over time.

These case studies show that the French, Ottomans, and Algerians had similar objectives and effects they desired to achieve against the insurgents and on the population. The French employed a set of tactics that sought to directly influence the population in order to achieve greater collaboration and deny the support to the insurgent. After eight years, they were not successful in gaining the popular support to achieve victory and lost credibility at home and internationally. The Ottomans and Algerians employed an indirect approach consistent with their strategic interest that proved more effective at defending against internal threats.

This work did not set out to disprove the theory of population centric counterinsurgency, nor does it claim to do so in the end. In a process that historian John Lewis Gaddis calls particular

generalization, this work set out to analyze how the counterinsurgency approaches in Algeria differed with respect to their outcomes.¹²⁸ Though it shows that French were unsuccessful in achieving victory in Algeria with their model, it also shows that it was because the model was inconsistent with the realities they faced. In any campaign, a military commander assesses critical factors that define his strategic environment. These factors may typically include the threat, geography, economics, national values, history, beliefs, allies, technology, and national security interests. The commander then applies this reality through two lenses; the lens of the theory of action, and the lens of the collective aims and priorities of his nation. This analysis then allows for the creation of an operational approach. The only conclusion arrived at safely from this study is that, in Algeria, the Ottoman and Algerian approaches were more consistent with their respective strategic realities. Obviously, the Ottomans approach to external defense was critically flawed. The French commanders allowed the tactical success of their approach to obscure their assessment of the environment.

The US counterinsurgency doctrine places a premium on lessons from the French experiences in counterinsurgency and the theories shown in David Galula's and Roger Trinquier's works. In essence, it has created an excellent operational approach based on assumed strategic realities, a theory of action (population centric counterinsurgency), and assumed aims and priorities. This study shows that, conceivably, the doctrine could use a more balanced perspective by analyzing approaches that have proven to be successful in other environments. The assumptions that drive the French model require the commitment of large amounts of resources over a long term and are well embedded in current US doctrine.¹²⁹ This leaves little strategic

¹²⁸ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 62-63.

¹²⁹ FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* (2006). 1-24

flexibility. The options are to either commit to a long and costly conflict, or do nothing. What this study shows is that other options exist historically that our doctrine should explore. While it may be intuitive to a rational thinker that a less direct approach to the population will be less effective or require more time, history in Algeria shows the opposite.

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