Interagency Cooperation in the War on Drugs: Can Campaign Planning be the Unifying Factor?

A Monograph
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Second Term AY 91-92

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Accepted this 23rd day of May 1992
Abstract


This monograph analyzes the potential of the military campaign planning process to unify the national interagency counternarcotics effort. Currently, DoD's antinarcotics mission includes the detection and monitoring of the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States, and the integration of command, control, communications, and intelligence, (C3I) into an effective communications network. DoD also provides manpower and equipment resources to support the interdiction efforts of law enforcement agencies both in the United States and overseas. The military campaign planning has been posited as a method to foster interagency unity and to bridge the gap between the national counternarcotics strategy and the tactical level of the drug war.

The potential of the campaign planning process to unify interagency counternarcotics efforts is the focus for the monograph. The paper also weighs the merits of DoD assuming a more active role in coordinating interagency campaign planning. The study establishes the context of United States military participation in the drug war by describing examples of previous and evolving military involvement. Current initiatives to improve interagency cooperation and to broaden the scope of military participation are also examined. Two campaign planning models are analyzed to show the adaptability of the campaign planning process to the drug war.

The analysis suggests that the campaign planning process has utility for fostering interagency unity of effort and coordinating more effective employment of available national counternarcotics assets. While the planning process may be applicable, the drug war is a complicated, multifaceted problem. The analysis indicates that neither the military, nor military campaign planning offer panaceas for solving the drug problem at a national level. To attain strategic victory in the drug war, both drug supply and domestic demand must be attacked with equal determination.
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Chapter I. Introduction

When a team takes to the field, individual specialists come together to achieve a team win. All players try to do their best because every player, the team, and the home town are counting on them to win. So it is when the Armed Forces of the United States go to war. We must win every time.\textsuperscript{1} General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 November 1991.

In his 1990 version of the \textit{National Drug Control Strategy}, President George Bush declared illegal drug production, trafficking, and use to be a "terrible scourge" and he proposed a national plan to combat the use of illegal drugs.\textsuperscript{2} The scope of America's drug problem is of epidemic proportions. During 1989, it was estimated that 25 million Americans used some type of illegal drug, and that more than $150 billion flowed to drug dealers. Drug related absenteeism from work, inefficiency, embezzlement, nonproductivity, and medical expenses, cost Americans an additional $60 to $80 billion annually. Street crimes, domestic violence, the corruption of government officials, and criminal involvement in banking and other legitimate business interests are also spawned by the illegal drug trade. Collectively, these problems have a substantial impact on our national security and economic vitality.\textsuperscript{3}

Citing many of these statistics in the 1991 version of the \textit{National Drug Control Strategy}, the President reaffirmed his commitment against a "continuation of the..."
largely reactive, uncoordinated, and piecemeal efforts of past anti-drug campaigns."

...to fight drugs successfully we must--as a nation--exert pressure on all parts of the problem simultaneously.⁴

These "parts" of the drug problem include what Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts labeled as the five pillars of the drug war: eradication, interdiction, law enforcement, education, and treatment.⁵ Eradication, interdiction and some law enforcement activities must target the "supply side" of the drug problem with the primary focus outside of the United States. Domestically, the "demand side" of the drug war still focuses on law enforcement, but also includes educational and drug treatment programs.

This comprehensive national approach demands centralized strategy formulation and planning, the meticulous use of available assets and resources, and cooperation and unity of effort among the many federal, state and local agencies involved in counternarcotics operations.⁶ One possible way of creating interagency unity of effort in the drug war is through the application of the military campaign planning process. Murl D. Munger and William E. Mendel posited the utility of the campaign planning process for conducting antinarcotics operations in their 1991 United States Army War College study, Campaign Planning and the Drug War. In the foreword, former US Attorney General Edwin
Meese articulated his support for military methods for fighting the war on drugs:

The need to utilize intelligence, develop strategic and operational plans, and conduct coordinated tactical actions exists as much in the battle against drugs as it does on the battlefield. Thus, leaders in the fight against drugs can learn much from tested military methods.⁷

This quest for interagency unity of effort through deliberate military campaign planning provides the focus and the framework for the monograph. Following a description of the Department of Defense (DoD) counternarcotics mission, the paper highlights problems that have hindered DoD and interagency cooperation.

Chapter Two provides an overview of previous military involvement in counternarcotics operations, highlighting problems encountered and lessons learned. With that background, the third chapter describes the current national counternarcotics organizational structure and evolving DoD participation in the drug war. Military participation in Operation Alliance and as a part of the National Drug Control Policy Board are addressed. This chapter also illustrates how the military has organized forces and command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I) for these efforts, and how the military supports the total national effort.

Chapter four analyzes the adaptability of the military campaign planning process and the application of operational art to national interagency
counternarcotics efforts. Two proposed campaign design models are examined and key campaign design concepts are evaluated to determine if they are viable for use in counternarcotics campaign planning. The monograph concludes by analyzing the potential of the campaign planning process to unify national interagency counternarcotics efforts and weigh the merits of DoD assuming a more active role in coordinating synergistic interagency campaign planning. To set the stage for this analysis, the military's specified mission in the national counternarcotics strategy must be established.

The Department of Defense (DoD) plays a key role in the national counternarcotics strategy. In broad terms, the war on drugs appears to fit the policy guidelines expressed in Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, "to promote national security and protect our national interests." A 5 March 1991 statement by General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reinforced this policy:

The detection and countering of the production and trafficking of illegal drugs is a high-priority national security mission for our Armed Forces. The President and the Secretary of Defense have directed that we deal with this threat as a clear and present danger. We have accepted that mission and remain fully committed to achieving success...this mission will continue to require deployed, properly trained and well-equipped forces for the foreseeable future.

The fiscal year 1989 National Defense Authorization
Act specifies that the DoD mission is to act as the Federal Government's single lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. This mission permits military support for civilian law enforcement efforts while upholding the prohibition of direct participation by the military in civilian law enforcement. DoD is also responsible for the integration of C³I into an effective national communications network.¹⁰

Restrictions on the Department of Defense to participate with or to assist civilian law enforcement agencies can be traced to provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits federal troops from enforcing civil law. Congress has granted the military authority to assist civilian law enforcement agencies under Title 10, US Code. This provision allows DoD to provide training, assistance, equipment, and facilities to civilian agencies as long as military readiness is unaffected. Title 10 specifically prohibits federal military forces from searching, seizing, arresting, or conducting any related law enforcement activity involving civilians.¹¹

By definition, the detection and monitoring mission allocated to DoD is intended to be consistent with all statutory requirements. The mission requires that DoD "lead" the detection and monitoring efforts for civilian
agencies, while only "supporting" the interdiction efforts of those same agencies. This situation presents a potential dilemma because DoD must "lead" without having any real authority over other federal agencies while providing rather undefined and open-ended "support". DoD's other mission mandate, the integration of the national C3I network, further complicates these interagency relationships. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, anticipated the ramifications of this intricate relationship:

When the United States undertakes military operations, the US Armed Forces are only one component of a national-level effort involving the various instrument of military power: economic, diplomatic, informational, and military. Instilling unity of effort at the national level is necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving a variety of federal departments and agencies.

Joint Pub 1 cites examples, to include Joint Task Force (JTF) 4's involvement in counterdrug operations, to illustrate the constant need for the military to coordinate among various interagency national security organizations while not always being in overall command. The manual states that, "Military leaders must work with other members of the national security team in the most skilled, tactful, and persistent way to promote unity of effort." The requirement to build consensus among different agencies with competing interests potentially places the military in the tenuous position of arbiter...
when conducting interagency operations.

This examination of the DoD antinarcotics mission establishes the mandate for DoD to foster interagency cooperation while also suggesting that unity of effort can be difficult to obtain. This difficulty is clearly manifested in interagency counternarcotics efforts. The synchronization of operations and the coordination of C^3^I for a national interagency effort that involves all five "pillars" of the drug war inevitably leads to conflicts of interest and "turf battles" among the many agencies participating in antinarcotics initiatives.

In 1990, Terrence M. Burke, the acting Deputy Director of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) conceded that "there have always been turf battles, and there will always be turf battles." There are fourteen federal government agencies directly involved in some aspect of drug law enforcement. In addition to DoD agencies and the DEA, some of the principals include, the US Customs Service (USCS), the US Coast Guard (USCG), the US Border Patrol (USBP), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). There are myriad other local and state law enforcement agencies also participating in counterdrug operations. The involvement of many agencies with competing interests and different organizational structures exacerbates the problem of attaining unity of effort.
Federal, state, and local agencies participating in counterdrug operations have different and often diverse measures of success. These can include: tonnage or numbers of seizures of controlled substances, numbers of arrests and convictions of drug offenders, current street price of the narcotics, or in the case of the military, the success of detection and monitoring efforts leading to the interdiction and seizure of drug shipments. Agencies must also compete for limited assets, particularly in this time of constrained federal budgets. These divergent measures of success and the competition for funding, fuels the rivalry among different agencies seeking greater responsibility in counterdrug efforts. Ultimately, this results in duplication of effort and detracts from a unified strategy.

The DEA and the FBI, for example, perform similar functions in the apprehension of drug offenders and have often overlapped in their counterdrug efforts. Initially, the FBI resisted drug fighting responsibilities altogether. In 1982 when granted jurisdiction with the DEA to fight drug related crime the FBI focused mainly on the large drug trafficking networks. The DEA's focus was more international and it became the lead agency for antinarcotics intelligence. More recently, as the DEA's domestic antidrug programs have accelerated and expanded, it has overlapped with
the FBI's domestic law enforcement mission. Another problem reminiscent of America's anti-liquor prohibition period is corruption. In a $150 billion business, there is a great deal of money available for illegal payoffs and the coercion or bribery of public officials. While these cases are limited, they damage trust among different agencies and have inhibited cooperative efforts.

Differing perspectives and policies heightened by these problems and competing interests hinder interagency cooperation and intelligence sharing. The use of the military has been posited as a potential solution to assist with these problems and to unify the interagency counternarcotics effort. The military's manpower, hardware, and C³I infrastructure has been recognized by the President and the Congress as a means to enhance national drug interdiction efforts. The use of the military campaign planning process is a logical extension of that involvement. The prospect of the military assuming a greater planning and leadership role causes some concern among other agencies.

While federal agencies may appreciate the vast manpower and equipment resources the military can provide, they are also wary of a potentially dominate military presence. "The good news, according to Terrence M. Burke, acting deputy administrator of the DEA, is that the military is joining the drug war. That
is also the bad news."  

The military can kill people better than we can, says a senior DEA official, but...when we go to a jungle lab, we're not there to move onto the target by fire and maneuver to destroy the enemy. We're there to arrest suspects and seize evidence.  

The controversy surrounding an expanded military role in the drug war is also apparent within DoD. Senior Pentagon officials have expressed concerns over greater military involvement in the drug war. The military is inherently uncomfortable with deviating from traditional warfighting missions and is also concerned over becoming too closely involved with a potentially intractable problem.  

Military success achieved during the Persian Gulf War might indicate that the US Armed Forces are well-suited to develop and integrate a campaign plan to unify the national counternarcotics effort and to foster similar success in America's war on drugs. The relative merits of that proposition will be evaluated by examining the evolution of the military's involvement in the drug war and by analysis of the application of campaign design principles for planning national level counternarcotics operations. The analysis will attempt to determine the utility of using the military campaign planning process to create interagency unity for planning and fighting the nation's war on drugs.
Chapter II. An Overview of Previous Military Involvement in Counternarcotics Efforts

In a March 1990 article for Military Review, Donald Mabry, a Fellow in the Center for International and Strategic Studies, proposed that Americans have great respect for the integrity and ability of the US military. He further asserted that Americans are frustrated with the inability of federal, state and local governments to eradicate the domestic flow of illicit drugs and the effects of drug related crime. Citing the overseas presence of the US military and that key elements in the drug trafficking business operate outside of US borders--out of the reach of US law enforcement officials--Mabry suggests that some Americans consider military force as a potential solution for fighting the drug war:

To some, the use of the military is a "quick-fix solution" that seems relatively painless, precisely because it would occur outside the United States. From its very inception, US antidrug policy has tended to blame non-Americans for the US Drug disease, thus preserving the myth that Americans are naturally good but are corrupted by evil foreigners.\(^2^6\)

This chapter examines the recent history of military participation in the drug war focusing on some specific examples of previous military involvement in counternarcotics operations, and the problems and frustrations that plague unity of effort and the
formation of a viable interagency counternarcotics strategy. To further establish the scope of the problem, it may prove illustrative to define the enormity of the detection and monitoring mission and the difficulty the federal government has encountered in reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.

The military's primary mission is the detection and monitoring of drug trafficking operations. The success of these detection and monitoring efforts have a direct impact on the success of subsequent interdiction operations performed by law enforcement agencies. Attempting to detect and monitor illegal shipments of contraband into a nation with the extensive international trading interests of the United States is a Herculean task. Of more than 8 million containers that arrived in the United States by truck or ship in 1989, only 3% were checked by government inspectors. Although significant amounts of illegal drugs were seized, it is certain that larger amounts escaped detection.²⁷ The almost unlimited means drug traffickers employ to smuggle their products makes detection, monitoring, and interdiction, complicated problems.

In addition to using aircraft, shipping containers, and small boats, many resourceful smugglers also employ lower technology means to evade high technology
detection and interdiction efforts. It is difficult to estimate how many tons arrive in small private boats, or by infiltration by smugglers on foot, rafts, or on horseback across the Mexican border.\textsuperscript{28} A recent \textit{Time} magazine article underscored this problem likening it to an example of another unsuccessful interdiction effort during the Vietnam War:

Nor does the military have much of an interdiction success record: in Vietnam it was never able to close the primitive Ho Chi Minh Trail; quarantining 38,000 miles of U.S. shoreline is at least as daunting.\textsuperscript{29}

In an article for \textit{International Defense Review}, Tammy Arbuckle and Bernard Fitzsimons used the same Ho Chi Minh trail analogy to underscore the problems interdicting cocaine production and trafficking during Operation Snowcap in Peru. US spy satellites, helicopters, DEA agents and Special Forces trainers operating from a base in Santa Lucia, in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley, support Peruvian security police raids against cocaine producers and the Shining Path Guerrillas that back them. Remote jungle locations and inaccessible terrain force the police to rely upon helicopter mobility. The rebels and the drug traders maintain the advantage of surprise:

...the rebels early-warning capability and their knowledge of the position of available helicopter landing zones, means police raids will share the fate of US Special Forces teams working the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Indochina: They will find their quarry long gone, their LZ under fire or themselves under fire in "adverse circumstances", somewhere between the
LZ and their intended target.30

Operation Snowcap highlights other nagging problems that confront Americans fighting the drug war at the source. Corruption and the involvement of foreign governments in drug trafficking make it difficult to determine who can be trusted. In March 1990, an American helicopter operating in Peru was fired upon by five Peruvian soldiers guarding a clandestine jungle airstrip.31 A secret Pentagon memo obtained by Newsweek magazine, quoted a Pentagon source who cited Peru as "... a quagmire of deceit and corruption, attainment of U.S. objectives is impossible."32

Operations in Peru have been hindered by a lack of interagency cooperation. For example, tensions exist between the DEA, the Department of State, and the military over the use of limited military helicopter assets. The DEA favors the use of the aircraft to conduct drug eradication operations while the Department of State and the military want to use the helicopters to assist in training Peruvian military and police for antinarcotics and counterinsurgency operations.33 Until very recently, DEA pursued paramilitary interdiction operations with virtually no military expertise, ignoring the on-site availability of experienced U.S. military personnel.34 The DEA considers the military inexperienced in antidrug intelligence and law enforcement operations.35
Another controversial military counternarcotics mission in Latin America that received considerable national attention, was Operation Blast Furnace conducted in Bolivia in 1986. Blast Furnace was the first ever combined interagency, United States and host nation antidrug effort. Blast Furnace identified one "center of gravity" ³⁶ for the cocaine industry to be the coca producing labs and a plan was designed to conduct routine raids targeting coca leaf processing. The US military provided helicopters and aircrews, soldiers for base security and logistics assistance, and intelligence support. The DEA assisted the Bolivian authorities with the actual law enforcement and interdiction operations.

Although the cocaine industry in Bolivia was hampered during the four month operation—supply of coca products from Bolivia decreased by 90%—few actual arrests or significant seizures were made. The center of gravity—the labs—existed in more than one location so the traffickers simply shifted their focus to other regional coca producing countries and "waited out" Blast Furnace before returning to Bolivia. While the operation did not drastically alter the traffickers' financial bottom line, it greatly affected the financial well-being of the peasant farmers who produced the coca leaf and worked the labs. This alienated the population, discredited the Bolivian government, and strengthened the support of the people for drug
traffickers and insurgents.  

This points to the need for designing an integrated campaign planning strategy. Blast Furnace ultimately amounted to little more than a series of drug lab raids. According to Lieutenant Colonel Sewall Menzel, US Army Attache in Bolivia before and during Blast Furnace, planners focused on attacking the narcotrafficking production system. This focus was aimed at encouraging the coca growers "to be receptive to shifting to legitimate agricultural crop production," following the collapse of the local coca market. While successful in its limited tactical aim of targeting and interdicting coca labs, Blast Furnace proved to be a strategic failure.  

In his after action assessment, Menzel asserts that an overall strategy was needed to provide an alternative to cocaine production for local farmers while stabilizing the local economy and political system. Simultaneously, the drug traffickers should have been attacked across a broader front, specifically, in the other regional coca producing countries. It is quickly discernable that implementing this type of comprehensive interdiction strategy would be resource and manpower intensive.  

The situation is more complicated in Colombia, the nation most often associated with the most powerful and influential of the Andean ridge drug lords and their
powerful cartels. There is no conventional or trafficker-led guerilla war in Colombia. The narcotraffickers are not trying to overthrow the government or to control territory. Instead, they are more like gangsters who run well organized, large scale criminal organizations.40

The United States employs a different strategy in Colombia that involves a lesser commitment of manpower. The US provided Colombia a significant amount of military hardware to include helicopters—amounting to more than 15 million dollars in 1989—and 5 million dollars more to protect Colombian government officials and the press against narco-terrorist attacks. Since 1989, six US military advisors have been assigned to Colombia for security assistance to train the military and police, and more US personnel routinely deploy to Colombia to assist with the maintenance of helicopters and other military equipment.41 This approach is designed to assist the Colombian military in employing more effective firepower and mobility against the narcotraffickers. It also reflects a fundamental difference between US and Latin American military forces. While the priority for the US military is external security, the Colombian military focuses on internal security and law enforcement, tacitly assisting the government in maintaining power.42

Enhancing the power of the Colombian military has
potential problems. The first is widespread corruption. In spite of the use of helicopters for better mobility and surveillance, and more effective weapons and training, the element of surprise is often compromised by corrupt officials known to tip off traffickers about impending raids. Another problem is that Latin-American militaries have often dismal human rights records. This factor alienates the populace causing resentment against the government and apathy, or even sympathy, for the traffickers. Enhancing the military’s power base is also dangerous because military dictatorships have proven to be perennial problems in Latin America.\textsuperscript{43}

Colombia is trying to handle its narcotrafficking problem within the confines of its own laws and judicial system. The principal aim of Colombian President Cesar Gaviria is to end drug related violence. To this end, the assistance Colombia desires from Washington is more economic than military.\textsuperscript{44} US military involvement in Colombia, however limited, is integrated into other US government antinarcotics activities through the US Embassy and the military attache.\textsuperscript{45}

Using the US military to support the DEA and the civil and military authorities in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru has chased drug traffickers into neighboring countries to avoid detection and interdiction efforts.\textsuperscript{46} Since the summer of 1991, detection, surveillance, and monitoring efforts have increased in Latin America. US

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Air Force and Navy surveillance assets have increasingly been employed and the use of improved C³I facilities have enhanced the ability of the military to monitor transhipment routes. These initiatives have been resisted by the Andean nations concerned with broader economic and political issues. They would prefer greater emphasis on providing incentives to coca farmers to stop growing the coca plant.⁴⁷

Although the Latin American cocaine trade receives the greatest emphasis in the national antidrug strategy, DoD has also conducted operations in other regions.⁴⁸ In the Caribbean, military operations have been aimed at monitoring and assisting in the interdiction of illegal drugs. Since 1982, Operation Bahamas and Turks (OPBAT) has employed military helicopters and support personnel to assist the Coast Guard and other federal authorities in the interdiction of illicit drugs at key maritime choke points and to deny the area to smugglers from South America for refueling and transshipment operations. In addition, US military personnel train local law enforcement personnel in drug interdiction activities.⁴⁹

On the United States and Mexican border, active and National Guard Army units have conducted frequent exercises aimed at border surveillance and the monitoring of illegal border crossing sites. Airborne and ground based radars and other sensing equipment have been employed to downlink drug trafficking intelligence
to law enforcement agencies. Sealing the Mexican border to drug trafficking has proven to be one of the most difficult challenges in national antinarcotics efforts.50

Another regional threat emanates from Asia and the "golden triangle" countries of Burma, Thailand, and Laos. Collectively, this region produces 80% of the world's opium and 50% of the heroin that reaches the United States. While the military's top priority has been cocaine, recent initiatives have focused on detection and monitoring efforts within the vast Pacific region. The commitment of assets required to adequately resource so vast of a geographical area is substantial. A military headquarters, JTF-5, has been established in California to coordinate military detection and monitoring and C3I efforts in the Pacific region.51

Historically, these early cases of military involvement in the drug war can be summarized as having achieved limited tactical success. While military forces performed well in often difficult and dangerous situations, and were able to assist DLEAs in antinarcotics efforts, there is little historical evidence of any coherent strategy or campaign plan for synchronizing these operations. In the last two to three years the scope of military involvement has increased and there has been progress towards unity of effort and coordinated, synchronized, planning.
However, significant problems remain.

A September 1991 Government Accounting Office report prepared for the United States Congress cited continuing rivalries, fragmentation, and duplication of effort in the detection, monitoring, and interdiction missions. The study concludes by suggesting that the current DoD strategy is doomed to fail:

DoD’s detection and monitoring efforts have not had a significant impact on the national goal of reduced drug supplies. The failure to reduce estimated cocaine supplies is the combined result of (1) the enormous profits that make interdiction losses inconsequential to drug traffickers and (2) the inability to efficiently find cocaine hidden in containers, large vessels, vehicles, and other conveyances...Interdiction alone cannot raise trafficker’s cost and risks enough to make a difference, regardless of how well DoD carries out its detection and monitoring mission.52

DoD has been involved in the drug war for over 10 years. These early operations have achieved limited success and have had the greatest effect in underscoring the extent and the complexity of the problem.
Chapter III. Current National Level Antinarcotics Organizational Structure and Evolving DoD Participation in the Interagency Drug War.

We’re in it (the drug war) for the long haul...and we’re serious about this fight.
General George Joulwan, Commander, US Southern Command

The President’s mandate for the military to pursue an expanded role in the drug war demands a coherent long-term strategy. Responding to the President’s policy direction, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney articulated a three part DoD antinarcotics strategy in a September 1989 policy memorandum. Entitled "Department of Defense Guidance for Implementation of the President’s National Drug Control Strategy," the memorandum outlines a strategy designed to attack the drug problem:

1. At the source, by providing increased training and operational support for host nations, and by working with those nations to reduce drug exports.
2. In transit to combat the flow of drugs into the United States by land, sea, and air.
3. Within the United States by assisting law enforcement agencies and the National Guard in counternarcotics activities to reduce the supply of illegal drugs. DoD will also attempt to reduce drug demand within the military and among DoD civilians and emphasize drug abuse awareness and prevention in DoD schools.

This chapter examines how the military is structured to implement the Secretary’s strategy and highlights ongoing DoD initiatives that go beyond the previous level of commitment. These more recent efforts
reflect increased DoD involvement, particularly in terms of manpower and equipment resources, and the expanded military role in drug war command and control. To establish DoD's relationship to other federal agencies engaged in the drug war, it is necessary to examine the national level counternarcotics organization.

Recognizing the need for greater synergy, unity of effort, and cooperation among the many federal agencies with antinarcotics responsibilities, the Bush Administration created the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). Created in 1988, this agency formulates the President's National Drug Control Strategy and coordinates federal, state, and local antidrug efforts within the continental United States. The Director of ONDCP is a member of the Executive Office of the President and advises him on the performance of federal agencies in supporting the national drug control strategy. The Director also chairs the Supply Reduction Working Group which functions as a central coordinating agency to provide oversight, establish supply related priorities, and identify those areas where agencies could work more effectively together. The working group consists of members from the Departments of Defense, State, Treasury, Transportation, Interior, Justice and Health and Human Services, and Agriculture; the CIA, the Office of Management and Budget, and the National
Security Council. 55

The Deputies of each agency attend monthly National Counterdrug Conferences and serve as the final arbiters of interagency disputes. They also help to define the order of battle and priorities for counterdrug operations. Through this forum, progress has been made at unifying the interagency effort at the national level. The military has performed a major role in this process by developing a more synergistic and coherent C3I architecture to translate that national level unity to the field. 56

A principal component of DoD's expanded counternarcotics mission is to assist in developing an effective command, control, communications and intelligence network among law enforcement and other supporting federal agencies. The Joint Staff's Counternarcotics Operations Division is DoD's staff focal point for the counterdrug effort and translates the President's National Drug Control Strategy and the National Security Directive into coordinated action among the unified and specified commands. 57 (The diagram for the national counternarcotics organizational structure for within the continental United States can be found in Appendix A.) This coordination is more readily achieved within the established military structure, but can become more complicated in the interagency arena.
Federal agencies have dissimilar command structures and are often decentralized between national and local levels of command. They often lack a functional "operational level". It is not unusual for example, for a high level DEA official to issue guidance directly to a small field office, bypassing intermediate levels in the organization. The command and control problem is further exacerbated by the inclusion of state and local law enforcement agencies at the "tactical" level. The military is forced to continually adopt new procedures to ensure that necessary information is provided to the right people within each different agency.58

Several efforts have been aimed at correcting this C3I shortfall. One means of enhancing coordination has been through increased liaison. The military services currently provide over 275 people in the fields of intelligence, planning, logistics, and communications to support non-DoD agencies that include, the departments of State and Justice, The FBI, DEA, U.S. Customs and the Office of National Drug Control Policy.59

A major effort has been undertaken to network C3I structures. The United States Coast Guard and Customs Service operate C3I Center East in Florida and C3I Center West in California to assist DoD and law enforcement agencies with monitoring, tracking, analyzing, and interdicting drug smuggling operations.60
Through the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and the use of air defense radars, interceptor aircraft, air traffic control systems, and other surveillance assets, DoD downlinks vital surveillance information to law enforcement agencies. Two other joint commands are specifically designated to assist in developing counternarcotics communications and intelligence networks.61

JTF-4, a subordinate command of the U.S. Atlantic Command runs a C3I center through its headquarters in Key West, Florida, that coordinates surveillance of Caribbean and Atlantic air and sea approaches to the continental United States. It provides information and support to assist law enforcement agencies with the interdiction mission. JTF-5, a subordinate joint command of the United States Pacific Command performs the same mission to detect and monitor Pacific maritime and air narcotrafficking originating in the far east.62

Another key C3I node, the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), was organized by the DEA in 1989 to provide a time sensitive intelligence picture of air, sea, and land drug movement around the world. EPIC is supported by DoD, US Customs, FAA, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, FBI, the IRS, and the US Marshalls Service. Intelligence information is shared by all of the agencies to support law enforcement programs concerned
with narcotrafficking, contraband, and alien smuggling.\textsuperscript{63}

Operation Alliance is a multi-agency, coordination center designed to halt the flow of illegal drugs and other contraband across Mexico's northern border, and to respond to requests for operational support from all law enforcement agencies in the Border region. Operation Alliance runs a tactical operations center to control current antidrug operations and has a permanent planning staff of 27 people to coordinate military assistance, operational planning and support, intelligence, statistics management and liaison. Alliance provides a framework and seeks consensus for Southwest border drug interdiction strategy. Headquartered at Fort Bliss, Texas, Alliance is collocated with JTF-6 an antinarcotics Joint Task Force organized under United States Forces Command.\textsuperscript{64}

JTF-6 was established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist Operation Alliance in coordinating DoD support to law enforcement agencies along the Southwest border. JTF-6 processes requests for assistance received from Operation Alliance and forwards them to Forces Command and to the JCS Counternarcotics Operations Division for approval. Typical Military support provided to Operation Alliance by JTF-6 includes intelligence analysis, ground radar sensing, airborne reconnaissance, ground and air
transportation, engineer operations, military exercises, ground reconnaissance, and mobile training teams. Additionally, JTF-6 assists Operation Alliance in the development of the Southwest Border Strategy for the ONDCP.  

For counternarcotics operations overseas, the National Security Council (NSC) performs many of the same national level coordination functions that the ONDCP does within the continental United States. Through policy committees and working groups, drug war policy is developed by the NSC, and—upon Presidential approval—implemented by other federal departments. The Department of State performs a lead role in policy implementation through worldwide US Ambassadors' country teams. (The diagram for the national counternarcotics organizational structure for overseas within the continental United States can be found in Appendix B.)

Country teams usually include the military security assistance office, the chief of station, the DEA narcotics attache, INS attache, Customs attache, Department of State Narcotics Assistance Unit, FBI legal attache, US Information Service, and the Defense attache. The Ambassador and the deputy chief of mission are charged with ensuring that this working group shares information and works towards common goals. The unified Commanders in Chief (CINC) are an important component in the linkage between the US military and the Ambassador's
country teams. A principal means of military support for the country teams include security assistance and operational training exercises. The CINCs' role is to integrate the military effort into country team counternarcotics operations and to provide the required C³I and other military support. According to Colonel John Becraft of the JCS, J3 Counternarcotics Operations Division, the unified overseas military commands have "become the focal point to bring interagency antidrug players together."

To maintain continuity from the detection and monitoring phase, throughout the handoff to the law enforcement agency responsible for the arrest and apprehension of drug traffickers, it is imperative for the different unified commanders and service components to work closely together and to share information. A typical detection and monitoring mission for an Andean Ridge narcotrafficking operation across the southwestern US-Mexico border can transit the domains and involve the cooperation of USSOUTHCOM, USPACOM, USLANTCOM, NORAD, and USFORSCOM. This provides a considerable challenge for JCS counternarcotics operatives.

DoD has made progress in expanding the nation's detection and monitoring capabilities and through the improved coordination and integration of interagency operations. Although improvements in capabilities
continue, real success in reducing drug supply has not been realized. While the tonnage of seizures and numbers of arrests are up, drug traffickers are still successful in supplying their products to a US market where the demand remains high. In recognition of this trend, the military campaign planning process has been proposed as one way to promote interagency unity and to further coalesce national antidrug efforts. In their 1991 study, *Campaign Planning and the Drug War*, Murl D. Munger and William W. Mendel offer the campaign planning process as a mechanism to facilitate a more efficient application of the nation's limited drug war resources "in a sequential manner in order to achieve strategic objectives."
Chapter IV. Analysis of the Campaign Planning Process and the Applicability of Operational Art to National Interagency Antinarcotics Efforts

When the United States undertakes military operations, the US Armed Forces are only one component of a national-level effort involving the various instruments of national power: economic, diplomatic, informational, and military. Instilling unity of effort at the national level is necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving a variety of Federal departments and agencies. Joint Pub 1

In their 1991 study, Campaign Planning and the Drug War, Murl D. Munger and William E. Mendel cite the reasons they believe military campaign planning is adaptable to the fighting the war on drugs:

...it eventually becomes necessary to write the commanders vision into a cogent command and control instrument—the campaign plan...The campaign planning process can be helpful in tying together the broad strategic objectives and concepts of the National Drug Control Strategy and other strategies and policy and the tactical efforts of federal, state, and local drug law enforcement agencies. The campaign plan is an effective command and control instrument that fills the gap between strategy and tactics.

When juxtaposed against a doctrinal foundation for military campaign planning—FM 100-5, Operations—Munger and Mendel's reasoning closely parallels the doctrinal definitions. FM 100-5 defines the campaign as "a series of joint actions designed to attain a strategic objective in a theater of war." The linkage that demonstrates the relationship of the campaign to strategic goals is encompassed in the FM 100-5 definition of operational art: "the employment of
military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations." Munger and Mendel state that operational art requires that the leader determine: the conditions that must be met to achieve strategic objectives, the sequence of actions most likely to produce the conditions, and how available resources can be applied to accomplish the sequence of actions. They further expand this doctrinal foundation by introducing their ideas of what comprise the tenets of campaign planning.

Munger and Mendel claim that the tenets "describe what a campaign plan is and does." The first tenet dictates that the campaign should orient on the center of gravity of the threat. The other tenets stress: the importance of providing concepts for sustainment and operations, the need to portray the commander's vision and intent, and to provide a basis for subordinate unit planning and the definition of what constitutes success. Munger and Mendel also include the need to phase major operations and tactical actions, to designate command relationships, and to provide operational direction and tasks to subordinates. The concept that they discuss in the greatest detail is the center of gravity.

In defining the concept of a "center of gravity" they include the following thoughts:

The center of gravity is not a vulnerability or a weakness. Rather, it is easiest to
discern in terms of that main concentration of
every power which can interpose itself between
us and our strategic objective, thus causing
our campaign to fail...In identifying the
enemy's center of gravity, one might ask what
could win for the enemy or what is vital to
the enemy to accomplish his strategic aim.78

Munger and Mendel further express the concept of center
of gravity in terms of the drug war. They cite examples
of enemy centers of gravity for the drug war and
include: key individuals (first and second echelon
leaders); key nodes in the distribution system; major
transportation assets; communications capabilities; or
perhaps most important, the financial war chest, i.e.
major money caches to sustain operations.79 This
discussion of a center of gravity for a problem as
multifaceted as the drug war is more complicated and
requires additional analysis.

The previous two chapters provided examples of
operations that sought centers of gravity similar to
those suggested by Munger and Mendel. Although tactical
successes were achieved, the gains were limited and did
not contribute to any measurable strategic success. The
centers of gravity proposed by Munger and Mendel are
exclusively oriented on the reduction of drug supply.
To address the problem holistically, a national level
interagency campaign aimed at reducing America's use of
illegal drugs would also have to include the issue of
drug demand. To achieve unity of effort among all of
the federal, state, and local agencies involved in
counternarcotics efforts, campaigns would have to be
developed to attack centers of gravity in each of the
"five pillars"--eradication, interdiction, law
enforcement, education and treatment--introduced
earlier. The interagency drug war would have to
include simultaneous and sequential campaigns, both at
home and overseas, orienting on both supply and demand.
This broader focus necessitates expanding the discussion
of campaign design.

Munger and Mendel offer minimal detail of other
campaign design concepts, but do introduce the concepts
of lines of operation, culminating points, and decisive
points. The campaign plan format they propose (See
Appendix C) is a slightly expanded version of the five
paragraph military field order. Their model may be
easily applied for planning a campaign with limited
aims, but it may prove overly simplistic to apply to the
a problem as diverse and multifaceted as the drug war.
To explore the adaptability of campaign planning to the
drug war in more complete detail, it is beneficial to
introduce another campaign planning model for analysis.

Lieutenant Colonel James M. Dubik's draft edition
entitled, A Guide to the Study of Operational Art and
Campaign Design, is a very comprehensive and deliberate
attempt to incorporate both the doctrinal and
theoretical basis for campaign design. Lieutenant
Colonel Dubik's basic definition of a campaign is
similar to that of Munger and Mendel except that he emphasizes that "a campaign is an expression of operational art." This leads to a more thorough development of the operational concepts that are critical to campaign design. Lieutenant Colonel Dubik stresses the importance of the linkages and balance of ends, ways, and means which he defines as follows:

...strategic aims are a campaign's end; the forces available to the commander--air, ground, and sea--are the means he has to use the to attain the end; the campaign plan is the way the commander intends to use the means--the series of tactical engagements, battles, and major operations to attain the end. 

Munger and Mendel define ends, ways, and means in a similar manner but do not stress the use of air, ground and sea components in their definition. This synchronization of different components is of paramount importance, particularly when considering the need to enjoin the myriad array of law enforcement and DoD resources available when planning a national level, interagency antidrug campaign. The remainder of this chapter highlights other aspects of campaign design suggested by the Dubik model (See Appendix D for extracts of the Dubik model) that seem pertinent to the effective use of campaign planning in the war on drugs.

In defining the ends, or the strategic aims, the planner must consider the nature of the war. The drug war clearly demonstrates characteristics of an
unconventional war and warrants special planning considerations. Political considerations dominate unconventional war and political and military efforts should be conducted as a continuing parallel process. The political leadership must establish an agenda that focuses the national attention and will, against illegal drugs. Like an unconventional war, the war on drugs constitutes a protracted struggle and demands presence, perseverance, and unity of effort.85

Once the nature of the war is understood and the strategic aims are established, centers of gravity can be identified. These centers of gravity must be continually reappraised for they can shift during the course of the campaign.86 In evaluating potential centers of gravity for the drug war, several factors should be considered that were not included in the analysis offered by Munger and Mendel. If, for example, at the operational level it is determined that a cocaine cartel’s center of gravity is the cocaine laboratory structure, the planner must evaluate the effects caused by attacking that structure. The planner should consider that destroying the labs could ruin the local economic base and alienate the local population. Therefore, simultaneous and sequential interagency operations should be planned to lessen those negative effects. The campaign plan should also include an evaluation of the means available to expand the scope of
the campaign if the traffickers decide to relocate the cocaine labs to another country. This analysis of the center of gravity becomes increasingly important when the question of "will" is considered.

The "friendly" center of gravity the drug traffickers are attacking could be the will of the American people to resist using illegal drugs. Conversely, the will of other Americans to continue to abuse drugs (or the demand) could be considered as the traffickers' center of gravity. The drug trafficker is likely to maintain his will to produce his product and smuggle it into American markets as long as sufficient demand remains for him to make a profit. To have the desired strategic impact, the United States must protect its center of gravity by taking steps to reduce domestic demand, and at the same time, attack the sources of supply. Conducted simultaneously or sequentially, these two mutually supporting actions might have some impact on the traffickers' center of gravity by reducing his incentive—or his will—to produce and distribute illegal drugs.

This concept of simultaneous and sequential actions requires a degree of synchronization and coordination that establishes the conditions for the overall success of a campaign. If campaign planning is intended to foster a higher degree of unity of effort in the war on drugs, this aspect is of paramount importance.
Interagency planners should consider the phasing of the campaign and designating objectives that must be accomplished for each phase. These objectives constitute possible decisive points, in that collectively, they may result in the ability to strike a decisive blow against the enemy and represent the key to unhinging his center of gravity. In short, the synchronization of the actions and resources of many agencies on many fronts must coalesce into a phased campaign—or a series of campaigns—that results in the defeat of the enemy center of gravity and the attainment of the desired end state.

Military campaign planning is not a panacea for unifying national level interagency efforts in the drug war. Campaign planning is a complex process, even for military organizations with similar C³I systems and other institutional and doctrinal similarities that enhance their compatibility. Designing a national interagency counternarcotics campaign with the level of detail prescribed by the Dubik model would be a monumental task, particularly considering the diversity in organization, command and control, and aims and objectives of the myriad agencies involved. In spite of the complexity of campaign planning, however, the process offers the potential to clarify the scope of the drug war, and to provide a better understanding of how to fight it more systematically. In this manner, the
campaign planning process may enhance interagency unity of effort.
Chapter 5. Conclusion

The Department of Defense ought to be judged in terms of its ability to cooperate in the broad-gauged strategy the President has laid out for us. It's going to take years and the cooperation of millions of Americans. Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense, 18 September 1989.90

This paper analyzed the potential of the campaign planning process to unify national interagency counternarcotics efforts and weighed the merits of DoD assuming a more active role in coordinating synergistic interagency campaign planning. Background information provided in the paper established two main points: (1) that early military involvement in the drug war achieved only marginal tactical success. (2) That since 1989, a national drug control strategy and C3I structure has been formed, and that the military has been given specific missions to perform within that national interagency system. The analysis that followed determined that military campaign planning appears to have utility for unifying the interagency effort.

Fighting the drug war is a complex and multifaceted problem. If, as President Bush asserts, "to fight drugs successfully we must—as a nation—exert pressure on all parts of the problem simultaneously,"91 the five pillars of the drug war: eradication, interdiction, law enforcement, education and treatment must all be considered. This approach mandates that the domestic demand side of drug abuse be attacked with the same
intensity as drug supply. The campaign planning approach posited by Munger and Mendel is largely oriented on attacking the supply side. A series of simultaneous or sequential campaigns oriented against the domestic (demand side) issues of law enforcement, education, and treatment would have to be planned and executed for an overall strategic campaign to have a lasting impact. The analysis indicated that a national campaign of this magnitude would be significantly more complicated and encompass a broader national commitment.

In this era of reduced government spending, scarce resources must be used judiciously, and without waste or redundancy. The military has proven to be effective in systematically applying its vast manpower and equipment resources to achieve specific goals. Adopting the military campaign planning process to achieve the national goal of combatting illegal drugs could be the logical extension of the mandate for greater military involvement in drug war command and control. This should not infer, however, that the military should be the lead agency for the actual campaign planning.

The prescribed military missions for the war on drugs have a distinctively overseas focus, oriented on the prevention of the supply of illegal drugs from reaching United States' shores. The military role in the integration of a national C^3I network has also traditionally focused beyond our national borders. To
expand the DoD mission to include planning and coordinating national efforts against the demand side of the drug problem would potentially redefine the military's role in domestic law enforcement and exceed both the military's capabilities and constitutional authority.

The analysis suggested that the military campaign planning process has the potential to maximize the effectiveness of available national assets for the drug war and to help create a linkage between drug war strategic aims and tactical actions. The use of campaign design principles clarifies drug war centers of gravity and assists planners in deciding how to attack them. Campaign design also assists in the development of phased, simultaneous and sequential actions that will help to create the conditions for success. In these ways, campaign planning can foster greater interagency unity of effort in the nation's war on drugs.

The military can continue to be a viable interagency participant in the drug war, but it is not a war the military can plan or win by itself. This war must be enjoined by the entire nation. The destructive effects of illegal drugs threaten the fabric of our society. If victory is our goal, the war against the demand for drugs on the home front must be waged with equal determination and resolve as the war against the supply of illegal drugs that reach our shores.
Various Military Units, Training Teams, Exercises

Various Federal Teams (U.S. Coast Guard, FBI, DEA, USBP, Customs, USAID, USIS, etc.)

Direction  Administration/Technical Guidance
1. SITUATION
   STRATEGIC GUIDANCE
   ENEMY SITUATION
   FRIENDLY SITUATION

2. MISSION

3. EXECUTION
   CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
   TASKS

4. LOGISTICS

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

   PLAN FORMAT.

Tenets of Campaign Planning—An Ideal Model.

The following tenets of campaign planning can guide the supply side counterdrug planning process. These tenets describe what a campaign plan is and does:

- Orients on the center of gravity of the threat.
- Provides concepts for operations and sustainment to achieve strategic objectives.
- Displays the commander’s vision and intent.
- Provides the basis for subordinate planning and clearly defines what constitutes success.
- Phases a series of major operations and their tactical actions.
- Provides operational direction and tasks to subordinates.
- Composes subordinate forces and designates command relationships.
B. EVALUATING THE DESIGN OF A CAMPAIGN

Trying to evaluate the design of a campaign requires that the student attempts to understand the process that results in a campaign plan. This is very difficult, for it requires the student to first, discover; second, understand; then, evaluate a creative process. Therefore, while it is possible to outline guidelines for evaluating the design of a campaign, it is not possible to identify formulae that can be applied as one would apply the axioms of geometry.

When evaluating a campaign plan, the student should first try to discover the facts of the case: what was the actual thought process which resulted in the design of the campaign in question. Second, the student should take time to understand why the commander in question reasoned and concluded as he did. Only then can the student begin evaluation.

In evaluation, the student can use the guidelines listed below. The campaign plan expresses the commander's vision—what he wants done, why he wants it done, and how he sees it being done. The guidelines described below outline a model for campaign analysis. The model below describes a method of thinking, not a type of solution. As such, the model is useful in testing the completeness of the actual thought process used in designing the campaign in question.

CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS MODEL.

1. Understanding of the strategic environment: an identification of the type of war and the actual political, military, social, and geographic conditions within which the war must be fought.

2. Identification of the strategic aim(s).

3. Identification of the strategic and operational centers of gravity, if any.
   a. Friendly (to be protected) and enemy (to be attacked or precluded from forming)
   b. Actual (for use in targeting or protecting) and potential (for use as as "IPB targets," Named Areas of Interests, or Target Areas of Interest so as to preclude them from forming)

4. Identification of decisive points.

5. Determination of military end-state for the campaign.

6. Setting of operational objectives based upon the enemy disposition, military end-state conditions, centers of gravity, form of maneuver chosen, main effort, and decisive points.

7. Identification of any political, military, economic, or public opinion constraints—domestic, international, or coalition as applicable.

8. Conduct of a psychological assessment to determine what can be done to:
   a. break the will of the enemy commander and his forces and
   b. reinforce the will of friendly commanders and forces.
9. Determination of:

a. Which campaign design concepts apply to the case at hand. (see paragraph C)
b. What resources are available: air, ground, naval, SOF, other.
c. What resources are not available and resulting risk analysis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Assets Required</th>
<th>Assets on hand</th>
<th>Balance</th>
<th>Risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


d. Determination of simultaneous and sequential actions required to realize the military end-state conditions and, based upon these actions, whether or not additional objectives must be set.
e. Determination of how, or whether, the campaign should be phased and what kind of campaign it should be.
f. Identification of information shortfalls and incorporation of shortfalls into collection plan.

10. Achievement of strategic, operational, and tactical synchronization by using available resources (means) to take the actions necessary to address identified centers of gravity, accomplish objectives, realize the end-state, and attain the strategic aims. Check control measures developed by component commanders, to include CSS and Intel, to depict operations by phase.

a. If the friendly commander had superior combat power, did his plan call for: fixing the enemy with the minimum force and attack flanks and rear with the bulk of your force; attempting to cut enemy lines of support and command and control; and using the reserve to follow through and turn tactical victory into operational success by pursuit and exploitation.

b. If the friendly commander had equal combat power or is fighting outnumbered, did his plan call for: dividing the enemy into "beat-able" pieces, preventing the enemy from uniting, or reducing the enemy numbers to defeat each piece in turn as described in 10a above.

c. If the friendly commander had inferior combat power, did his plan call for: attacking to attrit the enemy until "a" or "b" above applies; attacking only portions of the enemy force, defend and conduct similar attrition minded actions; or not accepting battle.

11. Seeking of decisive result in all engagements, major operations, or battles--air, ground, sea--within the campaign. Set the conditions that result in overwhelming combat power--air, ground, and sea--concentrated at the decisive point and economy of force elsewhere. Attempt to identify or create an enemy weakness, then attack that weakness in strength. Have reserve forces identified and ready to pursue, exploit, reinforce, block, or counterattack and deal with the unexpected that is ever-present in war. Combine the effects of firepower and maneuver --from the forces of each dimension--to break the enemy's will and cohesion.
ENDNOTES


8. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1, 1.


14. Ibid., 39.

16. Munger, *Campaign Planning and the Drug War*, 2; Federal agencies involved with drug law enforcement include: The Drug Enforcement Administration, United States Customs Service, United States Coast Guard, United States Border Patrol, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Marshals Service, Internal Revenue Service, National Park Service, Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of Defense, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Immigration and Naturalization Service.


19. Ibid., 24.


23. Ibid., 26.


28. Ibid., 23.

29. Ibid., 23.


34. Ibid., 53.

35. Lane, "The Newest War," 22.

36. John T. Fishel, "Developing a Drug War Strategy: Lessons From Operation Blast Furnace," Military Review LXXI (June 1991) 67; Sewall H. Menzel, "Operation Blast Furnace," Army 39 (November 1989) 29; The term "center of gravity" and its specific application to the drug war will be analyzed in Chapter 4. A generic definition of the term from U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations, is: "It is the characteristic, capability, or locality from which the force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Clausewitz defined it as the hub of all power and movement on which everything depends."


45. Mabry, "Andean Drug Trafficking and the Military Option," 32-33; The author was assigned to a U.S. Army Aviation battalion in Panama that routinely provided helicopter maintenance and training support to the Colombian Army. These efforts were coordinated through the United States Army Security Assistance for Latin America Office in Panama to the United States Embassy in Bogota, Colombia.


55. Munger, Campaign Planning and the Drug War, 17.

57. Munger, Campaign Planning and the Drug War, 22, 42.

58. Interview, Becraft, author; Munger, Campaign Planning and the Drug War, ix.

59. Munger, Campaign Planning and the Drug War, 22.


61. Munger, Campaign Planning and the Drug War, 22, 30.


65. Munger, Campaign Planning and the Drug War, 29; Brigadier General Pickler, interview conducted by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 19 December 1991.


67. Ibid., 45.

68. Ibid., 44-47.

69. Interview, Becraft, author.


72. Munger, Campaign Planning and the Drug War, xi.
77. Ibid., 56.
78. Ibid., 52.
79. Ibid., 52.
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