

MILITARY STRATEGY OF BANGLADESH TO
COUNTER TERRORISM IN NEAR FUTURE

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Strategy

by
A K M AZAM CHOWDHURY, MAJOR, BANGLADESH ARMY
M.S., Bangladesh University of Professionals, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2010

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Name of Candidate: Major A K M Azam Chowdhury

Thesis Title: Military Strategy of Bangladesh to Counter Terrorism in Near Future

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Timothy R. Hentschel, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Michael J. Burke, M.Ed

_____, Member
Raun G. Watson, M.A.

Accepted this 10th day of June 2011 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

MILITARY STRATEGY OF BANGLADESH TO COUNTER TERRORISM IN NEAR FUTURE, by Major A K M Azam Chowdhury, 83 pages.

Bangladesh is a developing country of South Asia which earned its independence from Pakistan in 1971. With a majority Muslim populace, it enjoys a reputation as a moderate Muslim country where its people are traditionally more Bengali than Muslim. Since independence, Bangladesh has faced criminal and terrorist acts by leftist cadres, separatist armed cadres and ethnic insurgents, transnational terrorists, and political cadres. However, religious fanaticism has also terrorized Bangladesh recently in the decade. Bangladesh has taken various reactionary measures to counterterrorism. Political initiatives to resolve insurgency and reactive actions to counter radical terrorism have temporarily subsided those problems. However, the core reasons behind these problems still exist and terrorism, in different forms, is likely to resurface anytime. This possibility of escalation reiterates the necessity for adopting a proactive, aggressive counterterrorism strategy for Bangladesh. It should develop this strategy to use all instruments of power. Military and security forces should be utilized in accordance with a military strategy to enable and complement the overall strategy to be effective. The military strategy of Bangladesh needs to prepare its military and security forces in both short and long-term considerations to enable them for disrupting, degrading, and finally uprooting terrorism.

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ACRONYMS

ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ATO	Anti-Terrorism Ordinance
BDR	Bangladesh Rifles
BGB	Border Guards Bangladesh
CHT	Chittagong Hill Tracts
GOC	General Officer Commanding
HDC	Hill Districts Local Government Council
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICPAT	Intergovernmental Authority on Development Capacity Building Program against Terrorism
JCLEC	Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation
JMB	Jama'atul Mujahedeen Bangladesh
MLPO	Money Laundering Prevention Ordinance
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCJSS	Parbatya Chattagram Jana Shanghati Shamity
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
RAB	Rapid Action Battalion
RC	Regional Council
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
UPDF	United People's Democratic Party
VDP	Village Defense Party
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

Bangladesh is a vastly populated (about 150 million), predominantly Muslim country of South Asia. It has a land mass of about 56 thousand square miles of mostly plain land situated in the delta of the Ganges river system. It has India towards the west, north and northeast, a small border with Myanmar towards the southeast, and the Bay-of-Bengal towards the south. Like the rest of the Indian sub-continent, the British ruled Bangladesh for about 200 years before it became part of a newly formed independent state named Pakistan in 1947. Pakistan was a unique state having its two land masses, West Pakistan (present day Pakistan) and East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh), separated by India for more than one thousand miles. The psychological, cultural, and historical separation between West and East Pakistan exceeded even the physical separation. This was compounded by the “military-political” leadership of West Pakistan.¹ A Pakistan based on only religious commonality could not last long. In 1971, Bangladesh finally sought and earned independence from Pakistan after a bloody, nine-month long, liberation war.

An independent and secular Bangladesh became the only country in the sub-continent with one dominant language (called ‘Bangla’) and with very few ethnic and religious minorities. Present Bangladesh, as a state and a nation, inherits traditions and historical precedence of the Indian sub-continent. Most importantly, Bangladesh has a

¹Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan-The Enigma of Political Development* (Kent-England: William Dawson and Sons, 1980), 104.

unique way of life that has evolved through time immemorial and based on a balanced mix of tradition, religion and culture.² Consequently, Bangladesh has long enjoyed a reputation as a moderate Muslim country that is culturally more Bengali than Muslim. Bangladesh is a minor and a relative newcomer to the congregation of nations affected by terrorism.

Soon after independence from Pakistan, Bangladesh was faced with acts of terrorism waged by a number of small left-leaning terrorist groups. They were known as Shorboharas and Nakshals. They were somewhat subdued by the government's use of force at that time; however, they continue to operate even today in some of the southwestern districts of the country. Over time, they have lost motivation and external support for furthering their leftist ideologies through violent means. Presently, they have essentially become a local criminal outfit rather than a terrorist organization.³

Another terrorist organization also emerged soon after the birth of Bangladesh in the form of an insurgency movement. The political wing of the separatist insurgent group, Parbatya Chattagram Jana Shanghati Shamity (PCJSS), demanded autonomy, its own legislature, and the retention of traditional institutions of the tribal kingdom on behalf of the people of Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), comprised primarily of three hill districts named Khagrachari, Rangamati, and Bandarban. The government of Bangladesh rejected these demands and as a consequence, the frustrated PCJSS leaders formed their

²Pranab Chatterjee, *A Story of Ambivalent Modernization in Bangladesh and West Bengal: The Rise and Fall of Bengali Elitism in South Asia* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 2010), xi.

³Syed Fattahul Alim, "Left Movement in Post-Independence Era," *The Daily Star* (Dhaka), 17 March 2011, <http://www.thedailystar.net/suppliments/2011/anniversary/section2/pg11.htm> (accessed 26 March 2011).

party's armed wing namely Shanti Bahini and took up arms. The insurgents resorted to illegal tax and toll collection, grafting, kidnapping as well as violence and massacre, especially against the non-tribal community living in CHT. The Bangladesh government deployed the bulk of its armed forces to CHT to fight the insurgency. With the exception of occasional cease-fires between the government and the insurgents, the insurgency continued for about 23 years.

In 1997, a peace accord was signed between the PCJSS and the government of Bangladesh whereby the PCJSS agreed to surrender its weapons.⁴ In 1998, Shantu Larma, the leader of the PCJSS, became the Chairman of the CHT Regional Council - a post equivalent to a state minister, which he holds to date. Today, PCJSS is in the process of transforming itself into a political party. Thus, the CHT insurgency problem has been quelled for the time being. However, new groups opposing the peace accord rose immediately after the accord was signed. Mutual mistrust among the terror groups coupled with delayed implementation of the peace accord have contributed to creation of defecting factions from within the terrorist groups.⁵ Frequent low scale violent incidents of the recent past suggest that CHT may again turn into a hotspot in no time.⁶ Today, CHT is regularly finding its place in the print and electronic media due to the ongoing

⁴Nusrat Jahan Chowdhury, "The Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord Implementation in Bangladesh: Ideals and Realities" (Paper presented to the international conference on 'Challenges of Governance in South Asia' in Kathmandu, Nepal, 15-16 December 2008).

⁵Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, "Political Developments December 1996-April 1998," 1 April 1998, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a84f4.html> (accessed 26 March 2011).

⁶UNB Connect, "JSS-UPDF Gunfight Leaves Five Killed in Rangamati," 15 May 2010, <http://www.unbconnect.com/component/news/task-show/id-20792> (accessed 29 December 2010).

conflict between PCJSS and the United People's Democratic Front (UPDF), two opposing pro and anti-peace-treaty rivals, respectively.

From the earliest years of Bangladesh's existence, a countrywide muscleman culture, political rifts, cadre politics, hooliganism, and extortion have infected the society, politics, and economy of Bangladesh. Lack of political vision, criminals sheltered by political godfathers, and corruption in law enforcement agencies gave birth to organized crime that jeopardized the country's overall law and order situation.⁷ Since 1991-92, a huge influx of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar first into the south-eastern part of the country and then spreading across the country as well as transnational insurgent groups moving to and fro from both neighbouring countries through unprotected inaccessible border areas, have all contributed to undermining the country's security situation.⁸ Even in the recent past, a huge cache of arms and explosives was confiscated at CHT.⁹ These weapons were assumed to belong to some Myanmar transnational terrorist group. However, most of these acts fall into the category of clandestine, intermittent and low profile criminal acts, and not necessarily into organized terrorism.

The first major bomb blast in Bangladesh by religious fanatics took place on March 7, 1999 in a public cultural program at Jessore, a south-west district of Bangladesh. It killed eight and injured about one hundred, and most importantly, made a

⁷Sreeradha Datta, "Bangladesh's Political Evolution: Growing Uncertainties," *Journal of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses* 27, no. 2 (May 2003): 233-234.

⁸Medecins Sans Frontieres, *10 Years for the Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: Past, Present and Future* (Holland: Medecins Sans Frontieres, March 2002), 5.

⁹"Biggest Arms Haul in CHT in 3 Years," *The Daily Star* (Dhaka), 5 March 2006, <http://www.thedailystar.net/2006/03/05/d6030501011.htm> (accessed 29 December 2010).

strong public statement on behalf of those fanatics.¹⁰ Since then, there has been a major shift upwards in the tempo and style of terrorism. Between March 1999 and January 2005, militant Islamists killed at least 156 people in Bangladesh and injured more than one thousand.¹¹ Bombs were detonated mostly at secular cultural gatherings, courthouses, and at Sufi shrines. Notable ones among them were the bomb attacks at “Udichi” (a secular cultural organization) program during celebration of Bangla New Year on 14 April 2001 at Dhaka University, a bomb attack at the Ahmadiyya mosque (a minority Islamic religious sect), bomb-blasting movie theaters, and a hand-grenade attack against the Bangladeshi born British High Commissioner to Bangladesh.¹² A hand-grenade attack on August 21, 2004 on a political procession led by the country’s then leader of the opposition in the National Parliament (presently Prime Minister) was, probably, the worst of all.¹³ The bomb attack that shocked the country most was the blast of August 17, 2005, when 459 bombs exploded in 63 of the 64 districts in the country between 11:00 to 11:30

¹⁰ABM Ziaur Rahman, “Terrorism: The Case of Bangladesh” (Paper presented at first bi-annual international symposium of the Center for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR) at Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia, 19-21 October 2005).

¹¹A.M.M.Shawkat Ali, *Faces of Terrorism in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2006), 35.

¹²Animesh Roul, “Terror and Politics: Lashkar-e-Taiba, HuJI and Assassinations in Bangladesh,” *Asia Security Initiative*, 28 January 2011, http://asiasecurity.macfound.org/blog/entry/111terror_and_politics_lashkar-e-taiba_huji_and_assassinations_in_banglades/ (accessed 26 March 2011).

¹³“Assassination Attempt on Hasina,” *The Daily Star* (Dhaka), 22 August 2004, <http://www.thedailystar.net/2004/08/22/d4082201011.htm> (accessed 29 December 2010).

a.m.¹⁴ Though only two were killed along with more than a hundred injured, the purpose of the simultaneous bomb blasts was to draw the attention of the world and establish credibility as a power within the country. This is the first time Jama'atul Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB), a nationally banned organization, claimed credit for the bomb blasts. In the leaflets, written in both Bangla and Arabic, found with the bomb devices, JMB claimed: "It is time to implement Islamic law in Bangladesh. There is no future with man-made law."¹⁵

More militant actions immediately followed the simultaneous bomb blasts and it created a reign of terror in the minds of the common people. The government reacted rapidly to combat this wave of terrorism. It employed all available security forces except armed forces in an attempt to catch the ringleaders of different militant groups and to destroy their command structure. Efforts were taken to isolate them from resources, especially from financial support. Eventually, six militant leaders including the JMB leader Sheikh Abdur Rahman were arrested, put through judicial trial, and found guilty. On March 30, 2007, all of them were executed.¹⁶ These executions mark the end of country's first ever, overt militancy campaign.

¹⁴Sarwar Alam, "The Genesis of Islamic Extremism in Bangladesh," 8 September 2008, <http://www.humiliationstudies.org/documents/AlamNY08meeting.pdf> (accessed 27 December 2010).

¹⁵"459 Blasts in 63 Districts in 30 Minutes," *The Daily Star* (Dhaka), 8 August 2005, <http://www.thedailystar.net/2005/08/18/d5081801011.htm> (accessed 29 December 2010).

¹⁶"Six JMB Militants Hanged," *The Daily Star* (Dhaka), 31 March 2007, <http://www.thedailystar.net/2007/03/31/d7033101011.htm> (accessed 29 December 2010).

Unfortunately, despite their top leaders being executed, the JMB is still active and trying to revitalize their stand in the country. However, law enforcement agencies are successfully mitigating the militant efforts. The JMB is reportedly in a shambles due to arrest of its present chief, Saidur Rahman, military wing chief, Shiblu, and acting chief Anwar Alam, alias Nazmul, over a one and a half month period beginning in 12 July 2010.¹⁷ The Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), an elite police force dedicated to special assignments including counter-terrorist actions, and police officials say that JMB is still a concern for them as some dedicated operatives are still active in the organization.

Not all the security challenges posed to Bangladesh are internal. There are a number of regional factors that also influence its overall security dynamics. Bangladesh is situated at the cross roads of South Asia and Southeast Asia. Its northwestern tip is just twenty-seven miles from Nepal with a small corridor of India between. India has a long history of insurgency problems especially in the states which are in close proximity to Bangladesh. India's Home Minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram, brought into focus the internal security of India at the conference of Chief Ministers on 17 August 2009, by saying, "while militancy was on the decline in Jammu and Kashmir, the situation in the north-eastern states continues to remain volatile."¹⁸ Assam, Manipur, Tripura, Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh, the seven states of northeastern India popularly known as "Seven Sisters," have experienced a large number of armed and

¹⁷"JMB Active Despite Arrest of Top Brass," *The Daily Star* (Dhaka), 17 August 2010, <http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=151076> (accessed 30 December 2010).

¹⁸"Terrorism, Naxalism, Insurgency Continue to Threaten India: Chidambaram," *Zee News*, 17 August 2009, <http://www.zeenews.com/news555879.html> (accessed 29 December 2010).

violent rebellions for a long time. The reasons for this violence are varied and include some of them seeking separate states, some fighting for autonomy and others demanding complete independence. It has resulted in keeping the entire region in a state of turmoil. The Maoist movement in Nepal had long been associated with terrorism until they came into power. However, the Maoists could not sustain their gains for long and they are now prematurely out of office.¹⁹ Additionally, Bangladesh is situated in the infamous “Golden Crescent” and close to the “Golden Triangle”-both located in Myanmar. This makes it a transit point for the smuggling of heroin and illegal arms from Myanmar. From Bangladesh, one can easily reach Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the past, some students, mainly from religious education institutes (commonly known as “Madrasa”), of Bangladesh migrated to Pakistan and later moved to Afghanistan to join “Afghani Jihad” in the “Proxy War” against the then Soviet invasion. Some also joined the same war moving directly from Bangladesh. Many of them came back and apparently provided the backbone of JMB and other religious militant organizations in Bangladesh.²⁰ Taken in total, these regional factors pose a considerable threat to Bangladesh’s security concerns.

Above discussions delineate a fact that the contemporary security situation of Bangladesh is highly complex and influenced by many internal and external parameters. Radical terrorism is one of the most significant recently observed phenomena. Bangladesh has had and is likely to experience more terrorist acts in the near future.

¹⁹“Nepal’s Political Crisis: How Fierce will the Maoist be Now?” *The Economist* (Kathmandu), 7 May 2009, <http://www.economist.com/node/13610927> (accessed 25 March 2011).

²⁰Bhaskar Roy, “A Brief Anatomy of Bangla Terrorism,” *South Asia Analysis Group*, 4 March 2008, <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers27%5Cpaper2623.html> (accessed 29 December 2010).

Consequently, there is a necessity for an integrated approach to combat terrorism. It will be prudent for Bangladesh to adopt an aggressive posture to combat terrorism. Hence, countering terrorism, instead of antiterrorism, is likely to be a more viable option. In fact, there is no national strategy for countering terrorism in Bangladesh. On 29 November 2010, Dr. Gowher Rizvi, the foreign affairs adviser to the Prime Minister of Bangladesh said, “Bangladesh is a victim of both domestic and international terrorism. We need a counterterrorism strategy to fight the evil.”²¹

Bangladesh’s counterterrorism strategy should take into account a wide range of issues. It should encompass the use of all instruments of national power, especially economic, diplomatic, information and military as well as other security forces to counter terrorism. The use of military and other security forces for countering terrorism is nothing but the utilization of one element of national power. Its use should be concurrent, supplementary, and complimentary to the utilization of the other instruments of power and should never be used as a solitary method for countering terrorism.

Problem Statement

Bangladesh needs to develop a comprehensive strategy to counterterrorism stemming from long and short-term political, ethnic, local, transnational, and religious radical problems and catalyzed by long standing unresolved regional security issues. In that comprehensive strategy, the use of military and other security forces should be considered. This paper will only examine the use of military and security forces to counterterrorism in harmony with the other instruments of power.

²¹“Frame Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” *The Daily Star* (Dhaka), 30 November 2010, <http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=164229> (accessed 30 December 2010).

Proposed Research Questions

The research will address following questions:

Primary Question. What strategy should Bangladesh adopt to employ its military and other security forces in harmony with the other instruments of power for countering terrorism in the near future?

Secondary Questions. How has terrorism affected Bangladesh in the recent past and what is the potential for the future? What was Bangladesh's strategic response to employ military and other security forces to counterterrorism in the recent past? What strategies have been adopted by India to counter terrorism?

Definition of Related Terms and Ideas

The words "terrorism" and "terror" were adopted from a French word "terreur," which originates from the Latin word "terrere" meaning "to frighten." During the French revolution, these were widely used for the first time to indicate the reign of terror but with a positive connotation.²²

It is difficult to define terrorism and there exists no unanimous definition. Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d)(2), defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."²³ Terrorism may also be defined as the intentional use or threat to use violence against innocent

²²Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, revised and expanded edition, chapter 1), 3.

²³"Annual Country Reports on Terrorism," *Cornell University Law School*, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/422/usc_sec_22_00002656---f000-.html (accessed 1 May 2011).

targets by a vested group in order to attain political, religious, or ideological objectives. Both terrorism and crimes involve violence, but these two are widely different in their objectives. Terrorism generally aims to attain political, ideological or religious objectives, whereas the objectives for criminal activities are purely personal and limited in nature. In the Anti-Terrorism Ordinance 2008, Bangladesh made an attempt to define terrorist acts or terrorism as “striking terror in the people or any section of the people in order to compel the Government of Bangladesh or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act with intent to threaten the unity, solidarity, security or sovereignty of Bangladesh through a) Killing, injuring grievously, abducting a person or causing damage to the property of a person; or b) Possessing or using explosives, inflammable substance, firearms, or any other chemical to achieve the purpose of sub section (a).”²⁴

The term “military” used in the research will mean Armed Forces of Bangladesh comprised of the Bangladesh Army, Navy, and Air Force including intelligence organizations, inter-service organizations, service support elements, and any military headquarters or offices necessary to direct, employ, control, and coordinate with those forces. The term “other security forces” would mean all paramilitary forces of Bangladesh such as Bangladesh Border Guards, Bangladesh Police including the Rapid Action Battalion, Bangladesh Coast Guard, Bangladesh Ansar and Village Defence Party, and Bangladesh National Cadet Corps.

²⁴“Anti-Terrorism Ordinance (ATO), 2008,” *Bangladesh Gazette* no. 28, 11 June 2008, https://www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Bangladesh/Bangladesh_Anti_Terrorism_Ordinance_2008.pdf (accessed 1 May 2011).

Limitations and Delimitations

The research will focus on devising strategic options for the utilization of the military and other security forces by Bangladesh to counterterrorism. Formulation of a national strategy for achieving a particular goal is a challenging task. It necessitates due consideration of all available instruments of national power. However, this research will be restricted to the military instrument and will not address the use of any other instrument of national power. For a comprehensive national counterterrorism strategy, it would be necessary to consider all with equal importance.

Assumptions

It is assumed that, regardless of the party in power, Bangladesh will continue with its basic foreign policy of “friendship to all, malice to none.”²⁵ Bangladesh will pursue her proposed regional counterterrorism initiative; Bangladesh will simultaneously, as applicable, utilize all her national instruments of power to counterterrorism; Bangladesh’s counterterrorism strategy will fulfill or be in conformity with or not contradict the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy; Bangladesh will sufficiently comply with the human rights issues related to countering terrorism; and the common societal, economic, and other causes identified for terrorism in any third world country also be true of Bangladesh.

Summary

Bangladesh is a vastly populated developing country of South Asia. With a population of 88 percent Muslim, it is and will remain a predominantly Muslim country.

²⁵Asif Md Fahad, “Foreign Policy of Bangladesh: A Very Simple Idea,” *Academia.edu*, http://cu-bd.academia.edu/ASIFMDFAHAD/Papers/346985/Foreign_policy_of_Bangladesh_a_very_simple_idea (accessed 25 March 2011).

However, historically the Bangladeshi people, in their personal identity, have been more Bengali than Muslim. Hence, Bangladesh has long enjoyed a reputation as a moderate Muslim country. Since independence, Bangladesh has faced criminal and terrorist acts by leftist cadres, separatist armed cadres, transnational terrorists, and political cadres.

However, religious fanaticism has terrorized Bangladesh only recently. The close proximity of Bangladesh to Myanmar, Pakistan, Afghanistan and insurgency affected states of India results in a high probability for Bangladesh to have complex security problems arising from terrorism. Although the government of Bangladesh has already taken significant actions against the known terrorist groups in the country, it still lacks a strategic vision to counterterrorism. Contemporary incidents suggest that terrorist groups are still active in the country. Hence, there is a need for Bangladesh to develop a strategic vision encompassing all instruments of national power to counterterrorism in near future.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Global Perspective

Scholars throughout the world have made valiant efforts to define terrorism and to determine its root causes and linkages with other tangible and intangible entities. In his book, *Inside Terrorism*, Bruce Hoffman has presented an in-depth account of the trends and key historical themes of terrorism. The book is well researched, providing valuable insights into the difficulties of defining terrorism, the dominance of ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism in the post-colonial era, the internationalization of terrorism heralded by acts perpetrated by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and after the Cold War, religious motivation becoming prevalent characteristics of terrorist activity. In addition, the book also discussed the evolution of targets, tactics and technologies of terrorists, and explored the relationship between terrorism, the media, and public opinion. The author concluded, among other things, that religiously motivated terrorism, especially with the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), would present the most serious threat to global stability.²⁶

In the present world, while religious terrorism easily overshadows any other form of terrorist acts, there are proponents to remind us that religious terrorism also needs other necessary and sufficient conditions in order to blossom. In his research, Johan Holmgren finds that as per Failed States Index 2007, many of the nations that western political leaders have accused of harboring or supporting terrorism are among the top

²⁶Tan Puay Seng, review of *Inside Terrorism* by Bruce Hoffman, *Journal of the Singapore Defence Forces* 28, no. 4 (October-December 2004), http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safty/pointer/back/journals/2002/Vol28_4/7.htm (accessed 26 March 2011).

twenty nations that are close to becoming failed states.²⁷ These states are not just a danger to themselves; they can threaten the progress and stability of countries half a world away from them.

Terrorism has been on the international agenda since 1934. The then League of Nations took the first major step towards curbing the scourge by discussing a draft convention for the prevention and punishment of terrorism. Although the convention was eventually adopted in 1937, it never came into force.²⁸ Since 1963, the international community has developed thirteen universal legal instruments and three amendments to prevent terrorist acts. Those instruments were elaborated under the auspices of the United Nations, and its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). They are open to participation by all the member states. In 2005, the international community also introduced substantive changes to three of these universal instruments to specifically account for the threat of terrorism. The world leaders have yet to agree to a unanimous UN definition for terrorism. However, on 8 September 2006, The United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy was adopted by the member states. The strategy broadly delineates following plan of actions: measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, measures to prevent and combat terrorism, measures to build states' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism, and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard, and measures to ensure

²⁷Johan Holmgren, "Terrorism and Its Connection to Failed States" (Master's Thesis, Jönköping University, August 2008), 49.

²⁸UN International Legal Instruments to Counter Terrorism, "UN Action to Counter Terrorism," <http://www.un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml> (accessed 29 December 2010).

respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.²⁹

US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism recognizes that

today the principal terrorist enemy confronting the United States is a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals – and their state and non-state supporters—which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends. In addition to this principal enemy, a host of other groups and individuals also use terror and violence against innocent civilians to pursue their political objectives. Though their motives and goals may be different, and often include secular and narrow territorial aims, they threaten US interests and those of its partners as they attempt to overthrow civil order and replace freedom with conflict and intolerance.³⁰

South-Asia Regional Perspective

Terrorism in South Asia, edited by Dipankar Sengupta and Sudhir Kumar, aims to capture the nature of terrorism in South-Asia. It reviews the genesis of terrorism and insurgencies in the various parts of the Indian sub-continent and traces their linkages with external forces. Further, it attempts to predict the future of these movements. It also examines links between the terrorists and politicians as well as political movements.

The report “Countering Terrorism in South Asia: Strengthening Multilateral Engagement,” by Center for Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, USA notes that terrorist attacks throughout South Asia highlight numerous gaps in the region’s response capacity. These include a lack of coherent national counterterrorism strategies, which place too much emphasis on the role of the military and security services, underfunded

²⁹UN General Assembly, Resolution 60/288, *The United Nation’s Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 20 September 2006.

³⁰US Department of Defense. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 5.

and poorly coordinated National intelligence services, outdated legal architecture, and generally inadequate rapid response networks.

Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia, edited by Satu P. Limaye, Mohan Malik and Robert G. Wirsing discusses the background and rise of religious radicalism in South Asia. It identifies that the Global War on Terrorism launched in October 2001 has had profound impact on the states of South Asia, in general, and on Pakistan, in particular.³¹ South Asia does not house any of the so-called rogue states and none of the notorious axis of evil states. Even though, in large part, the states of South Asia have taken the war on terrorism, more or less, in stride. Religious radicalism and its terrorist offshoots were already entrenched in these states long before they appeared in New York and Washington. Fundamentalist religious parties with extreme ideas have been politically accepted by a large number of people in most of the South Asian countries. This applies especially to the two largest and most populous countries in the region, India and Pakistan, but it also applies, though to a lesser extent, to Bangladesh.³²

Bangladesh Perspective

Bangladesh Perspective Research Foundation determined eleven logical reasons for extremism or radicalism: poverty; inferiority complex; western imperialism and the damage it has caused to second and third world cultures and economies; futility and being under authoritarian leadership; biased media indoctrination; restraint of freedom of speech and free thought; Islamic fundamentalists believing that it is their job to rid the world of

³¹Satu P. Limaye, Mohan Malik, and Robert G. Wirsing, eds., *Religion, Radicalism, and Security in South Asia* (Honolulu, HI: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), 2-5.

³²*Ibid.* 5.

infidels; a refusal of those responsible to address the issues they caused; specific actions by super powers such as TPAJAX; the instigation of Iran/Iraq war; and the support of various sides in proxy wars that ended in the deaths of their families and neighbors over foreign struggles.

Lack of modern education and poverty are more or less responsible for social discrimination for the Madrasa students. As per the report, the Madrasa educated students suffer from an inferiority complex and a sense of deprivation that impacts their outlook. They cannot stand the existing social order which they consider as discriminatory towards them. So when they are asked to change the existing social order, which is man-made and discriminatory as well, they become the easy target of the extremist perpetrators.³³

In his research, Summit Ganguly points out that Bangladesh, which lacked a tradition of militant Islamism, has indeed moved in that direction in recent years. Given the weak governance and lack of political order in Bangladesh, the increase in Islamist militancy could easily turn it into a fertile area for various radical groups to take root and flourish.³⁴

In his work “Mapping Terrorism Threats in Bangladesh,” M Aynul Islam discusses on the level of terrorism threats, challenges, risk factors for Bangladesh, and the possible response to minimize its impact on the society. He suggests that there are several

³³Bangladesh Perspective Research Foundation, “Social and Political Factors Giving Rise to Radicalism or Militancy: The Mainstream and Fundamentalism,” <http://bcisbd.org/bprf.html#> (accessed 27 March 2011).

³⁴Summit Ganguly, “The Rise of Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh,” *United States Institute of Peace*, August 2006, <http://www.usip.org/publications/rise-islamist-militancy-bangladesh> (accessed 26 March 2011).

Islamist terrorist groups operating in Bangladesh in different scopes, capacity, and nature. Imbalanced national education structure and curricula, proliferation of un-regulated religion based institutions and organizations in rural areas are earmarked as other related factors those generate extremist motivation.³⁵

In her column, “Assessing the Terrorist Threat in Bangladesh,” Naureen Chowdhury Fink, an eminent policy analyst of International Peace Institute, writes,

The story in Bangladesh is also shaped by a number of positive trends, which contribute to the resilience of both state and society in the face of threats like terrorism and violent religious radicalization. A strong sense of nationalism, based on a carefully balanced mix of Bengali culture and Islam, prevents the populace at large from favoring policies that unduly tip the scales towards one or the other. Undoubtedly, Islam plays a major role in the private lives of many Bangladeshis; however, as a recent Gallup poll demonstrated, a large majority of Bangladeshis say that a democratically elected government is very important to them (61 percent) or “essential and something they cannot live without” (32 percent).³⁶

Countering Terrorism in Bangladesh, edited by Farooq Sobhan, provides some insights on the linkages between religion, politics, poverty and violence. This book concludes that religion has been both misinterpreted and misrepresented to provide a moral justification for violence. However, in addition to the religious fanatics inciting terror, inequalities in education, economic opportunities, social welfare and lack of political will have contributed significantly in the rise of terrorism in Bangladesh.³⁷

³⁵M. Aynul Islam, “Mapping Terrorism Threats in Bangladesh,” *BISS Journal* 29, no. 2 (April 2008): 32-33.

³⁶Noureen Chowdhury Fink, “Assessing the Terrorist Threat in Bangladesh,” *International Peace Institute*, 19 January 2010, <http://www.ipacademy.org/news/comment-a-analysis/144-assessing-the-terrorist-threat-in-bangladesh.html> (accessed 28 December 2010).

³⁷Farooq Sobhan, ed., *Countering Terrorism in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2008), xvi.

It is evident that in the beginning of 21st Century, terrorism appears as a global, regional, and local problem. The history of human evolution is an onlooker of terrorist acts of various forms. However, religious fanaticism has become more pronounced in the last fifty years. The world has realized the importance of unified actions against terrorism in general and religious terrorism in particular. Several international initiatives, such as UN resolutions 65/34 (General Assembly Resolution), 1373 (Security Council Resolution) etc, have been undertaken to globally counter terrorism. Most of the countries are also reacting positively to such initiative. As for Bangladesh, the terrorism situation is no different from any other country. Bangladesh's terrorism has its own local and regional parameters. In addition, it has been recently characterized by religious extremism as well. However, Bangladesh is a relatively new third world country faced with multifarious problems. In the recent past, the country has taken several measures to react to any unwanted terror situation. But, for the betterment of the country, it is important for Bangladesh to adopt a proactive counterterrorism strategy.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research Development Concept

The research will try to answer the subsidiary questions and, thereby, answer the primary question. In the process of answering the questions, the researcher will formulate recommendations for Bangladesh in the development of its strategy. The first question to be answered will be “How has terrorism affected Bangladesh in the recent past and what is the potential for future?” The Answer to this question will help formulate the vision for the threat and its perception. It will have a direct bearing on the overall recommendations for viable strategic options for Bangladesh. The research will address the question “What was Bangladesh’s strategic response to employ military and other security forces to counterterrorism in the recent past?” It will try to identify Bangladesh’s military and security forces’ preparedness to face this future challenge. It will also bring out facts regarding over or under reliance of Bangladesh to use its military and security forces for countering terrorism. To integrate regional perspective into the country’s counterterrorism strategy, it will be prudent to study the question, “What strategy has been adopted by India to counterterrorism?” This will ensure that Bangladesh remains in a position to effectively contribute in the regional counterterrorism initiative and that it will be able to influence other regional actors in doing so. The concept model of the research is depicted in figure 1.




Figure 1. Concept Model of the Research

Source: Created by author.

Research Methodology

This research will be qualitative in nature. By characteristics, qualitative research uses a naturalistic approach that seeks to understand phenomena in context-specific settings, such as a “real-world” setting. Qualitative research, broadly defined, means “any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures

or other means of quantification.”³⁸ This research also will analyze the real-world settings for Bangladesh in the face of terrorism and try to analyze the related issue without using any major statistical tool.

This research will primarily depend on content analysis to discover answers to the primary and secondary questions. Various unclassified, open-source data and information sources such as books, periodicals, journals, newspapers, research papers, keynote papers, monologues, seminars, and symposiums will be used. Currently, the Internet remains as the most valuable source of information.

A comparative case study will be conducted to outline the regional and international perspectives on common issues. It will give an insight to formulate expected recommendations for Bangladesh. However, there is a problem with case study of “generalization to a larger population.”³⁹ Two or perhaps three case studies are used to study the counterterrorism strategy of neighboring countries (India, Pakistan, Myanmar, and other subcontinent state actors). This will minimize the “generalization to larger population” error.

³⁸A. Strauss, and J. Corbin, *Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques* (London: Sage Publications Inc., 1990), 17.

³⁹Michael Bloor and Fiona Wood, *Qualitative Methods: A Vocabulary of Research Concepts* (London: Sage Publication Inc., 2006), 29.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Having decided to first answer the secondary questions to ultimately answer the primary question, this chapter will chronologically address the secondary questions. It will start with analyzing the history and pattern of terrorism already seen in Bangladesh. Based on the pattern observed and the expected changes in foreseeable future, a probable future pattern of terrorism will be anticipated. Then it will examine Bangladesh's demonstrated past responses to use military and other security forces in combating terrorism. Lastly, it will analyze counterterrorism strategy adopted by neighboring countries.

Past and Likely Future Trends of Terrorism in Bangladesh

Origin of Islam in Bangladesh

Bangladesh (ancient name Bengal) came under Muslim rule in the early 13th century after Turkish General Ikhtyar Uddin Muhammad bin Bakhtyar Khalji conquered Bengal in 1204.⁴⁰ However, the people of Bengal, especially those in the coastal areas, were introduced to Islamic traditions long before. Arab traders had visited the coastal areas of Bangladesh as early as in the 8th century.⁴¹ In addition, historical evidence shows that some Sufis (Muslim mystics) visited and settled in different parts of Bengal even before the Turkish invasion. Many people embraced Islam drawn by the simplicity, social equality, and brotherhood that those Sufis established through their personal and

⁴⁰Richard M. Eaton, *The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), UC Press e-books collection 1982-2004.

⁴¹Syed Ali Ahsan, *Bangla Shahitter Itihas: Adi Parbo* (Dhaka: Shilpataru Prakashani, 1998), 6, 17.

societal conduct.⁴² The post-Bakhtyar period witnessed a large influx of Sufis in Bengal, who were engaged not only in preaching Islam but also in developing an indigenous Muslim culture.⁴³ The development of coexistence and tolerance between Hindus and Muslims is one of the greatest achievements of the Sufis in Bengal. Sufis' ideologies deeply influenced the common masses. Today, Sufi shrines are acclaimed not only by Muslims, but also by the followers of other religions. So, a conclusion can be stated that Islam had not come to the eastern parts of India and present-day Bangladesh as a conquering force. Instead, Islam diffused throughout the region as a by-product. As a result, Islam in this part of the world came to share many of the attributes of the prevalent Hindu culture, and the two cultures interpenetrated.⁴⁴ Their coexistence was not always peaceful and harmonious; class and religious differences, combined with tensions over land tenure resulted in periodic riots. However, as a whole, a harmony existed in the region. This coexistent character of Bengali Islam continued until the coming of Islamic revivalist movements in the 19th Century.

After the British colonization of Bengal in 1757 and the rest of South Asia by 1793, Muslims experienced two major challenges in the 19th century: anti-Islamic propaganda by Christian missionaries and the colonial government's categorization of

⁴²Abdul Karim, *Social History of the Muslims in Bengal (Down to A. D. 1538)* (Chittagong-Bangladesh: Baitush Sharaf Islamic Research Institute, 1985), 46.

⁴³Muhammad Enamul Haq, *A History of Sufi-ism in Bengal* (Dhaka-Bangladesh: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1975), 287.

⁴⁴Ganguly, "Rise of Islamist Militancy," 3.

local communities in terms of religious affiliation.⁴⁵ Muslims countered this situation in two ways; first, they initiated movements of religious reform, and second, they established educational institutions to promote a sense of Islamic identity. As a whole, Islamic reform remained a central issue to the Muslims until the partition of India in 1947. Among the religious reforms, some prominent movements were Farai'di, Tayuni, and Tariqa-i-Muhammadiyya. The Farai'di and Tayuni movements were exclusively puritanical in nature, but the Tariqa-i-Muhammadiyya was radical and militant in nature.⁴⁶ Another movement similar to the latter was the Ahle Hadith movement. The followers of the Tariqa-i-Muhammadiyya and Ahle Hadith movements were also commonly known as the Wahhabis in India.⁴⁷

In 1947, the subcontinent was divided based on a 'Two Nations' theory; a theory that sought a separate state for the Muslims and Hindus respectively. East Bengal was linked to West Pakistan to form Pakistan. Another Muslim reform movement called Tablig became popular. Tablig is a temporary gathering by a group of Muslims at a distant place from home where they stay for a short period and visit nearby places to invite people towards Islam. In fact, by the end of 19th century, Tablig has become the largest religious movement having the largest annual congregation in Bangladesh called

⁴⁵Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity At Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 131.

⁴⁶Muinuddin Ahmad Khan, *History of the Faraidi Movement in Bengal (1818-1906)* (Karachi-Pakistan: Pakistan Historical Society, 1965), quoted in Alam, "Genesis of Islamic Extremism," 8.

⁴⁷Sufia M. Uddin, *Constructing Bangladesh: Religion, Ethnicity, and Language in an Islamic Nation* (Chapel Hill, NC The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 54-58.

Ijtema. It is claimed to be attended by about four million people from about 110 countries. It is the second largest in the world immediately after the Hajj of Saudi Arabia.⁴⁸ Thus, Tablig and its annual congregation have significantly contributed in the religious education of Muslims in Bangladesh.

Immediately after the creation of Pakistan, conflicts began between the two wings of Pakistan as the ruling elites of West Pakistan undermined the ethno-linguistic nature of Bengal's culture. Later, a separate Bengali nationalism emerged, centering mostly on the secular language issue. During the period between 1947 and 1971, ethnicity and language subsumed religion in Bengali nationalism.⁴⁹ Bangladesh emerged as an independent country in 1971 based on ethno-linguistic and socio-political issues.

Bangladesh adopted 'secularism' as one of the four core principles of the constitution. To Bangladeshis, secularism meant religious neutrality. So, Islam remained as an element of most Bangladeshis' personal identity. Following the military coup of 1975, religion and religious political parties became strong stakeholders in the country's politics. This trend continued even in the new democratic era after the fall of the last military dictator of the country in 1990.

⁴⁸"Biswa Ijtema Ends with Prayers for Peace on Earth," *The Nation* (Dhaka), 25 January 2010, <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/International/25-Jan-2010/Biswa-Ijtema-ends-with-prayers-for-peace-on-earth> (accessed 3 January 2011).

⁴⁹Syed S. Islam, "Islam in Bangladesh: A Dichotomy of 'Bengali' and 'Muslim' Identities," *The Islamic Quarterly* 41, no. 3 (September, 1997): 223-224.

Rise of Religious Terrorism in Bangladesh

With the changes in the country's political dimensions, Bangladesh slowly and gradually drifted away from its long cherished moderate Muslim identity. The reason for this drift is beyond the scope of this research but the fact remains that the tolerant nature of the religious character of Bangladesh, to some extent, started taking radical and reactionary disposition.⁵⁰

Since the beginning of 1990s, religious militants in Bangladesh appear to have been imbued with the spirit of Jihad in their effort to establish Islamic rule in the country. This spirit is probably the result of the "Holy War" which was waged against the Soviet invaders in Afghanistan.⁵¹ In the 1980s, madrasas (educational institutions offering instruction in Islamic subjects including, but not limited to, the holy Quran, the hadith - saying of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), jurisprudence or fiqh, and law) in Afghanistan and Pakistan were allegedly boosted by an increase in financial support from the United States,⁵² European governments, Saudi Arabia, and other Persian Gulf states all of whom reportedly viewed these schools as recruiting grounds for anti-Soviet mujahedin fighters. In the early 1990s, the Taliban movement was formed by Afghan Islamic clerics and talibs ("students" in Arabic), many of whom were former mujahedin who had studied and trained in madrasas and who advocated a strict form of Islam similar

⁵⁰Bertil Lintner, "A Cocoon of Terror," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), 4 April 2002, 14.

⁵¹Golam Hossain, "Madrasahs and Muslim Militancy in Bangladesh," June 2007, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/4836809/Madrasahs-and-Muslim-Militancy> (accessed 28 March 2011).

⁵²Mary Ann Weaver, "Children of the Jihad," *New Yorker*, 12 June 1995, 40.

to the Wahhabism practiced in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries.⁵³ Though the name of Bangladesh did not appear in the Congressional Research Service report, it is assumed that many Bangladeshi Madrasa students also took part with the mujahedin in the war against Soviets. In his research paper, “Madrassas and Muslim Militancy in Bangladesh,” Professor Dr. Golam Hossain, an eminent researcher of Jahangirnagar University (Department of Government and Politics), Bangladesh wrote:

Evidence shows that about 3000 Bangladeshis went to Afghanistan to join the Jihad and 24 of them died in the war. Confirmed sources also say that a few hundred Bangladeshi Muslim youths participated in the Palestine war against Israel and in Kashmiri war against India. The safe collection of small arms during trafficking from Chittagong coastal belt to the hills and mountainous roads, and the patrons’ use of arms against political opponents further paved the way for the rise of armed Muslim militants in Bangladesh and elsewhere in the region.⁵⁴

While we may trace the roots of Bangladeshi Islamic militancy back to British period or beyond, the fact remains, the phenomenon of Islamic militancy observed in today’s Bangladesh is largely attributable to the Soviet-Afghan war.⁵⁵ Later, it has been used by different internal and external state, non-state, political or apolitical powers to further their respective interest.⁵⁶ As a result a number of Islamic organizations emerged in the country those have had involvement in militant behavior. It is difficult to precisely determine an operative time-line for those organizations but it is believed that mostly

⁵³Christopher M. Blanchard, “Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background,” CRS report for Congress, Code RS21654, 23 January 2008, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21654.pdf> (accessed 27 December 2010).

⁵⁴Golam Hossain, “Madrassas and Muslim Militancy,” 13.

⁵⁵Ibid., 13-14.

⁵⁶Subhash Kapila, “South Asia on a Short Fuse,” *South Asia Analysis Group*, 29 December 2001, <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers4%5Cpaper385.html> (accessed 27 March 2011).

they came into being after 1991. On 16 March 2009, the Secretary of Home Ministry, Abdus Sobhan Sikder, submitted a report to the cabinet meeting on militant organizations of Bangladesh. The report named 12 militant groups⁵⁷ - Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Harkatul Jihad al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI), Hizbut Towhid, Ulama Anjuman al Bainat, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Islami Democratic Party, Islami Samaj, Touhid Trust, Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), Shahadat-e al Hikma Party Bangladesh, Tamira Ar-Din Bangladesh (Hizb e Abu Omar) and Allahr Dal. Earlier, there was a claim of approximately 33 militant groups by different sources, which seems an exaggeration of the fact.⁵⁸ In 2005 the government of Bangladesh banned four Islamist militant outfits - JMB, HuJI, JMJB, and Shahadat-e al Hikma. On 22 October 2009, the Bangladesh government proscribed the Hizb-ut-Tahrir in the interest of public security.⁵⁹

The relationship between international terrorism and terrorism in Bangladesh has yet to be conclusively established. So there is a danger of misinterpretation of the linkage between Soviet-Afghan war and Islamic militancy of Bangladesh. It should be understood that, contemporary religious militancy in Bangladesh has inherited the so-called Jihadi spirit of the Soviet-Afghan War but not necessarily the international linkage

⁵⁷“12 Militant Outfits Active in Bangladesh: Home Ministry,” *Thaindian News*, 16 March 2009, http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/world-news/12-militant-outfits-active-in-bangladesh-home-ministry_100167313.html (accessed 3 January 2011).

⁵⁸Katie Hamann, “Islamic Militancy: Bangladesh’s Elephant in the Corner,” *Asia Calling*, 8 August 2009, <http://www.asiacalling.org/en/special-reports/bangladesh-battles-its-past-and-future/1094-islamic-militancy-bangladeshs-elephant-in-the-corner> (accessed 28 March 2011).

⁵⁹“Hizb ut-Tahrir Banned,” *The Daily Star* (Dhaka), 23 October 2009, <http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=110960> (accessed 28 March 2011).

as such to Al-Qaeda or other known international terrorist organizations. Instead, the militancy in Bangladesh has been supposedly promoted by some other organizations mostly from the middle-eastern region. This information, as discussed in the subsequent paragraph, was revealed by several suspects and arrested terrorists to the law enforcement agencies of Bangladesh.

The arrested ideologue of Ahle Hadith, Dr. Asadullah al-Ghalib, confessed during interrogation that he received more than four million dollars every year from the Middle East, especially from the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society of Kuwait. Quoting intelligence sources, *The Daily Star* reported on 22 August 2005 that militants received funds for madrasas from the UAE-based welfare organizations named Al-Fuzaira and Khairul Ansar al-Khairia, the Kuwait-based Doulatul Kuwait, and the Bahrain-based Doulatul Bahrain. It also reported that one arrested terrorist confessed to the police that he had distributed approximately \$300,000 among 421 madrasas to train activists of HuJI.⁶⁰ He received this sum from a Pakistani citizen named Muhammed Sajid. This newly founded and foreign funded madrasas, popularly known as Ahle Hadith or Wahhabi madrasas, are believed to be the breeding ground of militant and terrorist activities. It is reported that there are as many as 700 madrasas in Bangladesh controlled by the Ahle Hadith organization and run by the financial support of the Hayatul Ighatha and Revival of Islamic Heritage Society.⁶¹ It is alleged that these madrasas have been

⁶⁰“Foreign Funding, Local Business Keep Them Going,” *The Daily Star* (Dhaka), 22 August 2005, <http://www.thedailystar.net/2005/08/22/d5082201044.htm> (accessed 3 January 2011).

⁶¹“Ahab Men on the Run, JMJB Flouts Ban,” *The Daily Star* (Dhaka), 26 February 2005, <http://www.thedailystar.net/2005/02/26/d5022601033.htm> (accessed 3 January 2011).

providing their students guerrilla training to realize their dream of establishing an Islamic state in Bangladesh. There may have been as many as 233 madrasas across the country where such training took place.⁶² In June 2004, several mosques in the southern district of Barguna were used by JMJB Islamic militants before 32 of them were arrested by the police. Of those arrested, some were students of Barguna Aliya Madrasa and some of Borguna Government College.⁶³ Government investigation and arrests identified several Islamic terrorists as madrasa students and teachers, both from Aliyas and Qawmis, and some others are their political recruits.

“The most prominent and active organization engaged in the recruitment and training of young madrasa students is HuJI.”⁶⁴ The militants of HuJI, JMB, and other organizations have undergone training in at least six organized camps in the madrasas in Chittagong, Rajshahi, Tangail, Shatkhira, Kustia, Jamalpur and elsewhere in the country. HuJI-JMB had camps for recruitment and training in the inaccessible, rugged hill terrain of Cox’s Bazaar and Bandarban, and along the Bangladesh–Myanmar border. They enjoyed support and patronization from about 30 madrasas in the Chittagong region. Investigative reports by *The Prothom Alo* (Dhaka) published on 14 August 2004 disclosed the involvement of several madrasas in the border areas of Naikhangchhari and Ukhia in providing weapons, training and motivating the Muslim youths to launch an

⁶²“Qoumi Madrassahs Under Vigil Over Aug 17 Blasts,” *The New Age* (Dhaka), 5 September 2005, <http://www.newagebd.com/2005/sep/05/front.html#2> (accessed 3 January 2011).

⁶³“32 Islamic Militants Nabbed in Raid on Barguna Mosque,” *The Daily Star*, 1 July 2004, <http://www.thedailystar.net/2004/07/01/d4070101011.htm> (accessed 3 January 2011).

⁶⁴Golam Hossain, “Madrassas and Muslim Militancy,” 14.

Islamic revolution in Bangladesh.⁶⁵ Recent revelations of another so-called madrasa (actually militant training camp) at “Bhola” further substantiate terrorist use of madrasas as a breeding ground.⁶⁶ As a whole, it has been found that there are foreign funded madrasas in Bangladesh that promote militancy, and there are a number of students in those madrasas connected to extremism.

It should be noted that not all madrasas are linked to terrorism. To be precise, only a very small percentage of madrasas have been involved in such activities. The madrasa education system is a “key and fundamental institution in Bangladesh.”⁶⁷ In the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the USA and the bombings on 17 August 2005 throughout Bangladesh, madrasas came under greater suspicion for their alleged link to militancy and terrorism. There are 16,270 government registered and monitored madrasas⁶⁸ called Aliya Madrasa and more than 15,000 privately owned traditional madrasas⁶⁹ called Qawmi Madrasas in the country serving the educational needs of more than 1,000,000 students. Madrasas fill a gap that the government of Bangladesh is unable to bridge. By

⁶⁵Prothom Alo (Dhaka), 14 August 2004, referred by Wilson John, “The Roots of Extremism in Bangladesh,” *Terrorism Monitor* 3, no. 1, (January 2005).

⁶⁶“4 Bhola Militant Suspects Placed on 10-Day Remand,” *The Daily Star*, 26 March 2009, http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/latest_news.php?nid=15856 (accessed 3 January 2011).

⁶⁷Tiffany Ellis, “Madrasas in Bangladesh,” *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/656053960IPCS-SpecialReport47-Tiffany.pdf (accessed 3 March 2011).

⁶⁸Bangladesh Madrasa Education Board (BMEB). “Information on BMEB, Dhaka,” (May 2009), 1.

⁶⁹Moulana Abdul Jabbar, General Secretary, Bangladesh Qawmi Madrasa Board, interviewed by author, Dhaka, 06 August 2009.

providing basic education to poor families who cannot afford to send their children to modern schools, the madrasas perform an important function in an impoverished country like Bangladesh. There is some truth that certain madrasas function as “camouflage” for underground Islamic terrorist groups in the country, but to regard these so called madrasas as representative of all madrasas is an over-generalization and unwarranted. More so, militancy espoused by the few radical madrasas has little to do with any tendency inherent in the traditional madrasa system. However, it appears as a major concern and needs to be addressed by the government.

As described earlier, Islamic militancy appeared in Bangladesh after 1990. In the beginning, fundamentalist sentiments were expressed through fatwa (Islamic decree) and salish (a traditional age-old model of arbitration to resolve conflicts on wide range of issues by village elders, influential persons, and clergies) in the rural areas. But these pronouncements soon turned to organized violence, terrorist attacks, and suicide bombings after the emergence of militant fundamentalist organizations.⁷⁰ The internal rise of militancy was furthered by external dynamics, such as the Soviet-Afghan War, the attack on Iraq by the US-led coalition forces, the perceived US double standard policies on Middle-East crisis, and sympathetic response from regional terrorist organizations.

As a whole, religious militancy in Bangladesh is a relatively new phenomenon and is not readily welcomed by the general population of Bangladesh who consider themselves more Bengali than Muslim. Bangladeshi religious extremist groups have sources of foreign funding, mostly from Middle East, to bear their cost of operation. There are a few local madrasas run by different extremist groups to maintain a steady

⁷⁰Alam, “Genesis of Islamic Extremism,” 17.

flow of followers to materialize their dream. In the period from 1995 to 2005, there were number of violent attacks launched on various individual and institutional targets by some militant groups. However, leaders of the most prominent groups have been arrested, tried in court, and, when found guilty, have been punished. Law enforcement agencies constantly monitor militant activities. At the moment, the tone of violence is low and within a tolerable limit.

Other Forms of Terrorism in Bangladesh

The history of struggle for indigenous identity by the CHT people can be traced back to the Mughal period (a dynasty that ruled Indian sub-continent from early fifteenth to mid eighteenth century). Tension rose when the Chakma (the largest tribe of CHT) chief denied paying tribute to Mughal emperor in 1724. Consequently, he was attacked by the Mughal dewan (commissioner), Kishan Chand.⁷¹ The Chakma chief fled to Arakan and died there. By 1737, new Chief Shermust Khan yielded to the Mughal authority. Under the influence of the Mughals, a new administrative post designated as dewan was introduced in the Chakma tribal administration, and continued up to 1900. After the British took over Indian sub-continent, Hill Tracts Manual 1900 was introduced by them to administer CHT. Accordingly, CHT was divided into three revenue circles, each headed by a Raja (king) from the largest and dominating tribe. The three circles, known as the Chakma, the Mong, and the Bohmang were constituted. A hierarchical system of

⁷¹Bushra Hasina Chowdhury, "Building Lasting Peace: Issues of the Implementation of Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord," *Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre*, August 2002, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/%28httpDocuments%29/B3E9457237E05FD9C12575F40043EA88/\\$file/ChowdhuryOP.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/%28httpDocuments%29/B3E9457237E05FD9C12575F40043EA88/$file/ChowdhuryOP.pdf) (accessed 27 March 2011).

authority was created, with each circle divided into *mouzas* (369 *mouzas*, each headed by a headman), and each *mouza* comprising a number of villages (each headed by their own *karbaris*). The headman of a *mouza* had the power to collect revenue, settle disputes, and allocate land for *Jhum* (shifting cultivation).⁷² This provision of the special status of the CHT was further underlined with the Government of India Act 1935 that designated the CHT as a “Totally Excluded Area.” To many tribal people, this meant a formal recognition for the region and its indigenous inhabitants. Also, the first Constitution of Pakistan in 1956 gave recognition to this special status of the CHT. However, construction of a hydroelectric dam at Kaptai, CHT in 1960 by the Pakistan government created a huge artificial lake over an area of 1,036 square kilometers. The dam reservoir submerged approximately 40 percent of all cultivable lands of the region and in the process around 50,000 families (about 1/3 of the total population at that time), to include the Chakma king, lost their ancestral homes forever. Compensation for the victims was far from appropriate—in fact, many did not receive any compensation at all. In about the same period, the government also decided to withdraw the special status for CHT. In this way, the seeds of discontentment in the indigenous peoples of the region were sown in Pakistan period.⁷³ During the Bangladesh Liberation War, the Chakma king sided with Pakistan. So, when independence came, the adivasis’ (adivasi means indigenous) plea for special status did not have any appeal to the country’s leadership.⁷⁴

⁷²Chowdhury, “Building Lasting Peace,” 6.

⁷³CHT Archive, “CHT History,” 2 March 2010, <http://www.chtarchive.com/cht-history> (accessed 27 March 2011).

⁷⁴BBC Worldwide, “CHT History,” *Lonely Planet*, <http://www.lonelyplanet.com/bangladesh/chittagong-division/chittagong-hill-tracts/history> (accessed 28 March 2011).

As Bangladesh proceeded with the framing of its state constitution, a CHT people's delegation, led by Manobendra Narayan Larma, called on “Bangabandhu” Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the father of the nation and the then prime minister, and made the following demands:

1. Autonomy for the CHT with its own legislature;
2. Retention of the 1900 CHT Manual;
3. Continuation of the offices of tribal chiefs; and
4. Provisions restricting the amendment of the CHT Manual and imposing a ban on the influx of non-tribal people into the CHT.⁷⁵

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman rejected the demands, advising the hill people to assimilate with the new Bengali nationalist identity. Subsequently, M. N. Larma, leader of Hill people’s delegation, refused to endorse the constitution and argued against it in Parliament by saying, “You cannot impose your national identity on others. I am a Chakma not a Bengali. I am a citizen of Bangladesh, Bangladeshi. You are also Bangladeshi but your national identity is Bengali. . . . They (Hill people) can never become Bengali.”⁷⁶

Larma's contentions failed to make any impact on the Bengali policymakers. He saw it as a failure of the state to recognize the indigenous identity issue of hill people. This political and economic marginalization led Larma to form the Parbattya Chattagram

⁷⁵PCJSS, “Brief History and Struggle of the CHT,” http://pcjss-cht.org/cht_history&struggle.php (accessed 28 March 2011).

⁷⁶UNDP, “Bangladesh: A Critical Review of the Chittagong Hill Tract Peace Accord,” 2005, http://regionalcentrebangkok.undp.or.th/practices/governance/documents/Bangladesh_000.pdf (accessed 14 May 2011), 7.

Jana Samhiti Samiti (PCJSS—the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peoples’ Solidarity Association) in March 1972. Subsequently, a military wing called Shanti Bahini was added to it. Thus the seeds of Jumma nationalism—an identity that the PCJSS now claims for the hill people—were sown. The discontent created among the hill people was immediately exploited by India and it rendered all possible economic and military support to PCJSS to include training, providing weapon-ammunition and shelter.⁷⁷ Shanti Bahini began its operation when they ambushed a Bangladesh military convoy in 1977. After the ambush, the CHT region was placed under the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the 24 Infantry Division of the Bangladesh Army and the Bangladesh military began counterinsurgency operations. Thus, the nation was faced with an armed insurgency movement.⁷⁸ The CHT problem has been addressed by each successive government differently. Though the use of military was the most pronounced one, there were some efforts taken for resolving the problem through economic development. Towards the end of 70s, a huge influx of non-tribal Bengalis into CHT added new dimension to this problem. From a different perspective, it helped the government maintain an effective balance of tribal versus non-tribal ratio in the CHT. However, endeavor for a political settlement to the problem started in late 80s and it ended on 2 December 1997 by signing a peace accord between government of Bangladesh and PCJSS.

The 68 point accord dealt with a variety of subjects ranging from organizing civil administration in CHT, withdrawal of military camps from CHT, land settlement and

⁷⁷Subir Bhaumik, *Insurgent Crossfire North-East India* (Delhi: Spantech and Lancer, 1996), 8.

⁷⁸Chowdhury, “Building Lasting Peace,” 6.

disputes, refugee settlement, non-tribal settler issue, and many more issues. This accord is divided into four parts, namely (1) General, (2) Hill Districts Local Government Council (HDCs), (3) the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council (RC), and (4) Rehabilitation, General Amnesty and other Matters. But, has it really brought peace in CHT?

As has been mentioned in chapter 1, apart from religious terrorism, the only other form of reckonable terrorism in Bangladesh is the armed conflict in CHT. For sure, peace accord has created the only credible possibility of lasting peace in CHT. But, though the peace accord was signed in 1997, to date peace is yet to reign in CHT. In his paper “Elusive Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts: A Backgrounder,” R. Ramasubramaniam writes,

Beside the rise in Islamic fundamentalism, the political and law and order situation in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) have deteriorated alarmingly in recent times as the two main rival organizations of the region, Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS) and the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF), and several groups of armed cadres are resorting to open confrontation. Abductions are being followed by kidnappings while murders are being avenged by gruesome killings. A total of five hundred persons were killed, around one hundred abducted and more than one thousand injured during the last five years in CHT. As many as twenty-four armed clashes between the activists of PCJSS and UPDF had occurred during the same period. Besides, the miscreants were engaged in gun battles with army men and police eight times during the last four months. The armed cadres of both PCJSS and UPDF had set fire to tribal villages and markets in remote hill areas of CHT. Sources said the activities of the rival political parties in CHT resulted in more than sixty gunfights in the last eleven months. Moreover many incidents of abduction took place in the CHT including the kidnapping of three foreigners from Naniarchar under Rangamati district on February 16, 2001.⁷⁹

Findings indicate that the accord suffers from some debatable policy standard and objectives and there is a profound lack of political commitment on the part of all the post-

⁷⁹R. Ramasubramaniam, “Elusive Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts: A Backgrounder,” *South Asian Analysis Group*, 15 September 2005, <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers16%5Cpaper1540.html> (accessed 28 March 2011).

accord governments towards its implementation. Moreover, personal and institutional interests of elites (local political leaders, army and bureaucrats), ideological conflict between different tribal organizations, intra-tribal rivalry, and distrust between Bengali-tribal people are affecting the implementation of the accord.⁸⁰ The burning issues that need immediate attention by the government are land settlement and non-tribal settler issue.⁸¹ Additionally, India's past involvement in the issue in terms of supporting the insurgency should always be remembered to engage and build a relationship of trust, cooperation, and mutual support with India.

Causes and Pattern of Terrorism in Bangladesh

As pointed out in chapter 1, the generally acceptable and identified reasons for terrorism in many other third world countries are also true for Bangladesh. So, instead of offering rationale for each of the selected reasons, this paper will make a list of reasons for terrorism in Bangladesh. Those are reasons include poverty, the rise of religious extremism, the need for ethnic identity, an unregulated and unequal education system, the influence of neighboring states, corruption, political rivalry and growing intolerance, a population boom, and unemployment. Having discussed different forms of terrorism in Bangladesh, the threat pattern seen in the recent past should be analyzed in an attempt to predict the likely evolution of this threat in the future. It is difficult to make any precise forecasts about terrorism when the picture is as confusing and complex as it currently is.

⁸⁰Chowdhury, "Hill Tracts Accord Implementation."

⁸¹UN Economic and Social Council, "Study on the Status of Implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997," 18 February 2011, <http://www.chtcommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/CHT-Accord-Study-Final.pdf> (accessed 27 March 2011).

Analyzing the past, one can ascertain that the ethnic identity issues of the CHT people and rise of Islamic extremism in Bangladesh have been the core issues resulting in terrorism in Bangladesh. Regional factors such as insurgency in neighboring states, drug and illegal arms trade, support to local insurgents by neighboring states, and financial support to religious extremists by some foreign organizations have also contributed significantly to proliferate terrorism in Bangladesh. The pattern shown by the terrorists in making their actions are discussed below.

Religious extremist actions were directed predominantly against observance of Bangalee traditions or customs such as the attacks on Udichi cultural functions and the celebration of Bangla New Year at “Botomul.”⁸² Attacks were also launched against persons who were widely known for their secularist views such as Mr. Golam Kibria (ex-finance minister), and Bangladesh borne British High Commissioner Mr. Anwar.⁸³ Attacks were also launched against the judicial system such as suicide attacks in Chittagong, Jhalokathi, and Gazipur Courts on at least three different occasions.⁸⁴ These attacks were meant to undermine Bangladesh’s judicial system and thereby establish credibility for the terrorists as a power. In 2005, near simultaneous bomb blasts were conducted to draw the attention of the world. A number of grenade and bomb attacks

⁸²“10th Anniversary of the Ramna Tragedy,” *Glocal24.com*, <http://www.glocal24.com/10th-anniversary-of-the-ramna-tragedy.html> (accessed 14 May 2011).

⁸³“Ramna Batamul Blast Case,” *The Daily Star* (Dhaka), 16 April 2010, <http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=134379> (accessed 13 May 2011).

⁸⁴Nizam Ahmed, “Suicide Bombing Campaign in Bangladesh by Islamists—8 Killed in 10th Attack This Year,” 8 December 2005, <http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/1376> (accessed 13 May 2011).

have been conducted against the political party leaders and party offices known as more liberal and secular views.⁸⁵ Attacks were also launched against Sufi shrines, and minority Islamic groups that the terrorist groups had declared as banned. Information gathered from different sources indicates that terrorists use some madrasas in rural areas to train activists.⁸⁶ They also have foreign linkages for funding in pursuit of their objectives.⁸⁷ However, terrorist members come from all walks of life, from both madrasa and general education systems, and from both rich and poor classes of society. This suggests the presence of a congenial atmosphere in the country allowing the spread of extremist ideas. On the other hand, ethnic confrontation in CHT has now been characterized by mistrust among the various factions of tribal groups and also between the parties who signed the peace accord in 1997.⁸⁸ There have been growing incidents of violence among the tribal groups and settler Bangalees in CHT. Different groups are now trying to establish their own areas of control. They have yet to purposefully engage the army or other security forces. However, they have past experience fighting against the army and know how not to lose and prevail. They had and supposedly have trans-border ties to get military and logistical support. The weapons that have been surrendered by Shanti Bahini after the

⁸⁵“Bangladesh Bomb Blast Kills 21” *BBC News*, 16 June 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1392771.stm (accessed 14 May 2011).

⁸⁶Alam, “Genesis of Islamic Extremism,” 16.

⁸⁷Sudha Ramachandran, “Mixing Aid with Terror,” *Asia Times Online*, 22 September 2005, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GI22Df01.html (accessed 14 May 2011).

⁸⁸“Non-Implementation of CHT Accord is a Shame: Roundtable,” *Priyo* (Dhaka), 15 May 2011, http://www.priyo.com/politics/2011/05/03/non-implementation-cht-accord-24968.html?quicktabs_1=0 (accessed 15 May 2011).

signing of peace accord were mostly cast iron replicas, not actual weapons. Some of them are selling their actual weapon in black markets.⁸⁹ It is believed that, different factions of armed members of ex-Shanti Bahini have huge caches of weapons.⁹⁰ Should they feel like reverting to insurgency again, they would be able to start their proceedings without any external help.

The future trend suggests that religious extremist activities in Bangladesh are likely to be clandestine and intermittent. However, those intermittent actions are likely to be violent to draw attention of a wider audience. Actions conducted on symbolic targets will help them reach to a substantial political gain. Additionally, ethnic terrorism in CHT may resurface at any time adding diversity to the problem. It can be assumed that the critical sectors in Bangladesh, namely energy (power, oil and natural gas), transportation (airways, railways, roads, and shipping), law enforcement (defense, paramilitary, and intelligence), judiciary, information and communication technology (networks and telecom), the financial sector (banking, trade and commerce, stock exchange, financial instruments and insurance), and public health (medical care, water, and sanitation) are vulnerable to terrorist activities.⁹¹

⁸⁹Graduate Institute for International Studies, Geneva. *Small Arms Survey 2002* (UK: Oxford University Press, 2002), 144.

⁹⁰Neila Husain, “Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons,” *The Daily Star*, 19 February 2006, [http://www.thedailystar.net/suppliments/2006/15thanniv/bangladesh&the world/bd_world27.htm](http://www.thedailystar.net/suppliments/2006/15thanniv/bangladesh&the%20world/bd_world27.htm) (accessed 15 May 2011).

⁹¹Farooq Sobhan, M. Shafiullah and Shahab Enam Khan, “Countering Terrorism in Bangladesh: A Strategy Paper,” *Bangladesh Enterprise Institute*, July 2007, http://www.icj.org/IMG/BEI_Bangladesh_Paper.pdf (accessed 2 May 2011).

Bangladesh's Strategic Response to Employ Military
and Other Security Forces to Counter Terrorism

Bangladesh has yet to adopt a specific, concrete and well-coordinated strategy to counterterrorism. Growing political initiative to combat terrorism is a recent phenomenon in Bangladesh. In the past, terrorism has been seen primarily as a security issue; use of military and security forces only to combat and counterterrorism was the norm. But the end state of a peaceful Bangladesh could not be achieved by the solitary use of military and other security forces. The CHT problem reached a somewhat acceptable solution only when the problem was addressed politically. The subsequent political failure to capitalize on the opportunities of earlier success is creating possibilities for a renewed problem in CHT.⁹²

To fight terrorism elsewhere in the country, especially against radical terrorism, law enforcement agencies have been used extensively. Initially, it was the Bangladesh Police who shouldered the responsibility. Later, the creation of an elite force Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) under the police umbrella added new dimensions in countering terrorism. Though there are issues such as unlawful killing and human rights violation by RAB, they have had some spectacular successes in counterterrorism to include the capture of the leaders of the Harkatul Jihad–Bangladesh.⁹³ Unfortunately, the use of RAB, police, and other security forces were mostly reactionary and in isolation. So their efforts may be perceived to have had only a short-term positive impact. Many of the law

⁹²Ishtiaq Jamil and Pranab Kumar Panday, “The Elusive Peace Accord in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh and the Plight of the Indigenous People,” *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 46, no.4 (November 2008): 472-473.

⁹³“RAB Needs Reform,” *New Age (online edition)*, 15 May 2011, <http://newagebd.com/newspaper1/letters/18757.html> (accessed 15 May 2011).

and order and terrorism related problems re-surfaced almost immediately with the fading tempo of their aggressive operation.⁹⁴ Therefore, in the author's opinion, a need exists for achieving a synergy of efforts and a whole of government approach to deal with the growing problem of terrorism. It can be concluded that the use of military force alone will not suffice; it can be at best an enabling instrument.

Capacity and Capability of Security Forces to Counter Terrorism

Security forces alone are not capable of countering terrorism in Bangladesh but a capable security force is a prime necessity for Bangladesh to enable its counterterrorism efforts. A credible security force must possess the critical capabilities to enable for the government to counterterrorism. Their critical capabilities should include information gathering, effective monitoring, strategic communication, detecting and disrupting terrorists, effective border control, and greater consequence management. Building these capabilities in security forces is very much subject to the country's economic capabilities.

In 2006, Bangladesh had a police force of 117 thousand.⁹⁵ However, this is inadequate in both quality and quantity.⁹⁶ This organization needs to be upgraded to become more effective in their counterterrorism role. They also lack modern equipment

⁹⁴“Rethinking International Security Sector Assistance: British Assistance to the Rapid Action Battalion in Bangladesh,” *Asian Center for Human Rights*, 25 February 2011, <http://www.achrweb.org/briefingpapers/Bangladesh-BP-01-11.html> (accessed 14 May 2011).

⁹⁵Bangladesh Police, “*Bangladesh Police: Introduction*,” <http://www.police.gov.bd/index5.php?category=18> (accessed 2 May 2011).

⁹⁶“Modernization of Police Force Under Way: Bangladesh Home Minister,” *BDNews24.com*, <http://bdnews24online.com/2011/02/06/modernisation-of-police-force-under-way-bangladesh-home-minister/> (accessed 2 May 2011).

and uniforms. A further setback for Bangladesh Police is to their reputation. This organization is widely believed to be corrupt and, sometimes, a collaborator with the miscreants.⁹⁷ Though this perception of police forces is overly generalized, there is a considerable amount of truth in this perception. It is extremely important for police to have an improvement in their credibility in the minds of the general populace. Though RAB is a better-equipped police force, they are small in numbers and widely staffed by officers and personnel from defense services.⁹⁸ It seems to signify the general lack of training standards in the police force. It also results in the possibility of discontinuation of institutional professional knowledge and experience due to the frequent changing of personnel with the defense services.

Bangladesh has a relatively large standing defense force dominated by its army. The standard of their training is relatively high though they lack modern equipment and proficiency in their use. But they have a better-educated officer corps in the defense force that is trained on current affairs at home and abroad. The general capability and standard of their officer corps has significantly shaped the international perception (in the UN and elsewhere) about Bangladesh defense forces.⁹⁹ The strength of the Bangladesh defense forces lies in their capability to perform satisfactorily even in the face of constraints such

⁹⁷Business Anti-Corruption Portal, “Bangladesh Country Profile,” <http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/south-asia/bangladesh/corruption-levels/police/> (accessed 1 May 2011).

⁹⁸Asian Human Rights Commission. “Bangladesh: Military Must Not Dominate Civil Administration,” 1 September 2008, <http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-227-2008> (accessed 15 May 2011).

⁹⁹fatman17 (pseudo.), “World Armies: Bangladesh,” Pakistan Defence blog, entry posted 8 April 2009, <http://www.defence.pk/forums/bangladesh-defence/24698-world-armies-bangladesh.html> (accessed 15 May 2011).

as logistics and transportation resources. The defense forces are trained to devise indigenous means to negotiate or undermine constraints. Bangladesh has used its defense forces extensively to aid civil power in maintaining law and order throughout the country, to fight terrorism in CHT, and to aid humanitarian relief work after any devastating floods or cyclones. Defense forces have their integral intelligence organizations that contribute significantly to the overall intelligence needs and analysis for the country. The backbone of the country's intelligence organization is also staffed by the personnel assigned from the defense forces. Unfortunately, the Bangladesh defense forces lack strategic communications, effective detection, and rapid disruption capabilities. They also do not have large scale consequence management capabilities. More importantly, they are not habituated to operate in a strategic environment with other instruments of government power to achieve a synergistic strength.

Controlling its borders is vitally important for Bangladesh in order to eradicate trans-border criminal activities and prevent terrorist movement to and from neighboring states. Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB), previously known as Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), is entrusted with this job. BGB is expected to screen the borders of Bangladesh to control illegal migration, trans-border black marketing, and drug-arms-human trafficking. BGB is neither adequately staffed nor technologically proficient enough to perform as expected. They lack tracking and monitoring devices, sensors, and communication assets. Additionally, BGB leadership is assigned from the army. This has allowed the BGB to overcome some of its weakness in regard to indigenous training deficiencies. However,

frequent changes of its leadership from the army often contribute to missing linkage between intelligence and situational awareness.¹⁰⁰

Additionally, there is a large size paramilitary force named Ansar and Village Defense Party (VDP) available to be used with any law and order situations or to address any other special need as envisaged by the government. Though they have very limited capabilities, they may be utilized for less important static duties releasing assets (defense forces, police forces, etc.) for other crucial tasks. They have experience of service in CHT under army control resulting in a common understanding between defense forces and Ansar and VDP.¹⁰¹ The greatest potential for them to be used in countering terrorism is their indigenous nature. They are local forces and operate in areas where they live and have a natural advantage of mingling with the local population.

Legal Support for Countering Terrorism

Bangladesh already has a broad legal authority necessary for its counterterrorism efforts. Bangladesh became a party to the UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in 2005. Bangladesh is also a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and the UN Convention against Corruption. In August 2008, Bangladesh signed the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. Though Bangladesh is not yet a signatory to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, it has clearly

¹⁰⁰“Bangla Security Up-Gradation and Force Modernization,” Security-risk.com, 10 September 2009, <http://www.security-risks.com/security-trends-south-asia/bangladesh/bangla-security-upgradation-and-force-modernisation-328.html> (accessed 15 May 2011).

¹⁰¹Bangladesh Ansar and VDP, “About Bangladesh Ansar and Village Defense Party (VDP),” <http://www.ansarvdpbd.org/about/org.php> (accessed 15 May 2011).

expressed its stand for a peaceful world by being signatory to many international acts and agreements, as is written by Md Nur Khan in his “Impact of Terrorism and Counterterrorism on Human Rights:”

Bangladesh has so far acceded to eleven international anti-terrorism conventions: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic agents, adopted in 1973; International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted in 1979; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted in 1997; Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 1963; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, adopted in 1970; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1980; Protocol on the Suppression on Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving, International Civil Aviation, 1988; and Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988.¹⁰²

Bangladesh has endorsed the spirit of the UN counterterrorism initiative and published a draft anti-terrorism ordinance (ATO) in 2007.¹⁰³ Later, the final version of the ordinance was promulgated on June 11, 2008 by the president in the dissolution of the Eighth Parliament and before the commencement of the Ninth. In addition, in 2007, the interim government of Bangladesh also enacted the Money Laundering Prevention Ordinance (MLPO). It came as an amendment to the existing Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2002.¹⁰⁴ In 2009, after modification and ratification by parliamentary

¹⁰²Md Nur Khan, “Impact of Terrorism and Counter Terrorism on Human Rights,” *Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK)*, February 2007, <http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/ASKSubmission.pdf> (accessed 2 May 2011).

¹⁰³“Anti-Terrorism Ordinance on Cards,” *News from Bangladesh*, 31 December 2007, <http://www.bangladesh-web.com/view.php?hidRecord=182077> (accessed 10 May 2011).

¹⁰⁴Government of Bangladesh, “Amendment of Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2002 (Act 7 of 2002),” *Bangladesh Gazette* no. 17 (30 July 2007), 1.

committees these ordinances were passed at the beginning session of the ninth Parliament.

The ATO has defined an “act of terrorism” across a broader spectrum as:

striking terror in the people or any section of the people in order to compel the Government of Bangladesh or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act with intent to threaten the unity, solidarity, security or sovereignty of Bangladesh through a) Killing, injuring grievously, abducting a person or causing damage to the property of a person; or b) Possessing or using explosives, inflammable substance, firearms, or any other chemical to achieve the purpose of sub section (a).

2) Whoever commits terrorist act shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life or to a maximum 20 years and not less than 3 years rigorous imprisonment, to which fine may be added.¹⁰⁵

According to the ATO, sheltering a terrorist is punishable by a maximum of five years’ imprisonment. Anyone who carries, spreads, or broadcasts informational material in support of any militant group or proscribed party can also be imprisoned for a minimum of two to a maximum of seven years, along with a financial penalty.

The Money Laundering Prevention Ordinance enacted by Bangladesh is a complimentary tool to the Anti-Terrorism Act in fighting terror financing. In a discussion about the MLPO, the following was noted:

MLPO lists 16 predicate offenses, including corruption and bribery; counterfeiting currency or documents; extortion; fraud; forgery; and illicit trafficking in persons or arms or narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The ATO further tightens the terrorist financing regime in Bangladesh. . . . The ATO authorizes the filing of suspicious transaction reports related to terrorist financing, empowers the central bank to monitor suspected financial transactions related to terrorist financing, and prohibits a person from possessing property or proceeds of terrorist activity. In accordance with the ATO, property or proceeds of terrorist activity is liable to be confiscated and forfeited to the government. These

¹⁰⁵Government of Bangladesh, “Bangladesh Anti-Terrorism Ordinance (ATO), 2008,” *Bangladesh Gazette* no. 28 (11 June 2008), Chapter 2 Section 6, 2.

ordinances also allow the central bank to order any financial institution to suspend a transaction or freeze an account.¹⁰⁶

The ATO does summarize the anti-terrorism role of police, judiciary and special tribunal but does not define the possible use of military forces in fighting terrorism. Terrorism in Bangladesh is likely to call for use of military forces, especially in CHT. This necessity may be addressed in the form of an amendment to the act, as currently the head of the state possesses the executive power to employ defense forces in maintaining law and order or for any nation-building job as necessary. Additionally, there are some loopholes in the MLPO also. The MLPO does not clearly define all possible financial institutions of Bangladesh. It is not clear that the clause “institutions involved in financial activities” mentioned in MLPO exactly means which institutions, what should be the procedure for freezing financial assets, and whether there should be any safe harbor provision.¹⁰⁷

Bangladesh is likely to introduce two amendments to the existing MLPO to strengthen it and to prevent the further flow of funds that may be used for terrorism. “The amendments will be brought in Anti Money Laundering Act 2009 and Terrorist Financing Act, 2009, including the issues of anti-money laundering and terrorist

¹⁰⁶eSTANDARDSFORUM, “Anti-Money Laundering/Combating Terrorist Financing Standard,” Financial Standards Foundation, June 2009, <http://www.estandardsforum.org/bangladesh/standards/anti-money-laundering-combating-terrorist-financing-standard> (accessed 10 May 2011).

¹⁰⁷Nazmul Hasan, “Effective Use of Anti-Money Laundering Law in Countering Terrorism in Bangladesh,” *Countering Terrorism in Bangladesh*, ed. Farooq Sobhan (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2008), 122.

financing in the existing Extradition Act, and enacting Mutual Legal Assistance Act.”¹⁰⁸

These amendments are likely to strengthen and modernize the act.

Analysis of Counter Terrorism Strategy of India

As mentioned earlier, Bangladesh shares a long and porous border with India. India has long experienced turmoil perpetrated by various kinds of terrorism. It would be prudent for Bangladesh to learn about India’s perspective of fighting terrorism and to build regional cooperation in countering terrorism.

The Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, is the ministry responsible for concluding mutual legal assistance treaties in criminal matters. In its web page, it writes:

these treaties are designated to facilitate possible measures of mutual assistance in investigation, prosecution and prevention of crime, service of summons and other judicial documents, execution of warrants and other judicial commissions and tracing, restraint, forfeiture or confiscation of proceeds and instruments of crime. These agreements assume importance in combating transnational organized crimes, trans-border terrorism, crimes and other serious offences, such as, drug trafficking, money laundering, counterfeit currency, smuggling of arms of explosives, etc. India has so far instrumented these treaties with 26 countries. Further India along with other SAARC countries has signed a convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters in 2008. India has since ratified the convention. The convention will come into force after ratification of the convention by all the member states of SAARC. The convention aims to strengthen regional cooperation in investigation and prosecution of crime.¹⁰⁹

The Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, is the nodal authority for regional and international joint working group to counterterrorism and transnational

¹⁰⁸“Anti-Money Laundering Legislation of Bangladesh to be Strengthened,” Anti Money Laundering Blog, entry posted on 11 September 2011, <http://anti-money-laundering-offshore-journals.com/anti-money-laundering-legislation-of-bangladesh-to-be-strengthened/558/> (accessed 2 May 2011).

¹⁰⁹The Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. *Policy Planning Division*, http://mha.nic.in/uniquepage.asp?Id_Pk=241 (accessed 3 May 2011).

organized crimes. It facilitates exchange of information and strengthens regional and international cooperation. India has so far established joint working groups on counterterrorism/international terrorism with 25 countries and co-operative entities.¹¹⁰

Policing in India and their internal security system is highly disjointed and not very well coordinated. Policing responsibilities are mostly vested on to the states.¹¹¹ The states also share the larger burden of anti-terrorism necessities by their own forces and resources. These forces, especially local police, are often poorly trained and equipped. While analyzing the infrastructure and capabilities of India to counterterrorism, Paul Staniland writes:

Local personnel are frequently hired (in police jobs) on the basis of political patronage and are known for high levels of corruption. There is also a diversity of central investigative, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies. The Ministry of Home Affairs includes the Intelligence Bureau, Central Reserve Police Force, Indian Police Service, and new National Investigation Agency, while the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) are answerable to the prime minister. The military--which is primarily geared toward foreign threats, including terrorism--also generates intelligence with relevance to domestic terrorism, and there is a centrally controlled National Security Guard (NSG) that specializes in hostage and terrorist attack situations. The combination of state and central authorities is supposedly coordinated through joint committees, task forces, subsidiary intelligence bureaus, and a multi-agency center. All of these coordinating mechanisms aim to complement the intelligence gathered by these agencies and to generate shared threat perceptions and associated responses. But, they are often slow and cumbersome. In addition, many of the security institutions at all levels of government are understaffed, undertrained, and technologically backward.¹¹²

¹¹⁰The Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. *Policy Planning Division*, http://mha.nic.in/uniquepage.asp?Id_Pk=241 (accessed 3 May 2011).

¹¹¹John Varghese, "Police Structure: A Comparative Study of Policing Models," *Social Science Research Network*, 12 May 2010, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1605290> (accessed 11 May 2011).

¹¹²Paul Staniland, "Improving India's Counterterrorism Policy after Mumbai," *CTC Sentinel* 2, no. 4 (April 2009): 11-14.

This fragmented and multi-layered national political and security force structure, compounded by lack of good governance has made India's anti-terror initiatives less effective, reactionary, and time consuming. "India's response to terrorist attacks has been intermittent; soon after an attack the government took some short-term measures but lacked in an integrated strategy for a long term counter measure to terrorism."¹¹³ This also indicates that there is probably no integrated strategy for India to counterterrorism. "India lacks a coherent strategic response to terrorism; there is no doctrine and most of our responses are kneejerk - says retired Major General Sheru Thapliyal, who works at the Center for Land Warfare Studies in New Delhi."¹¹⁴

It is evident that India also lacks a strategic vision to counterterrorism. The problems faced by India are more diverse and deep rooted than Bangladesh. However, India also has some success in combating terrorism in states like Punjab. The greatest strength of India is in its long flourishing multi-party democracy. Because of the strength of this democracy, necessary resources, and the political acumen of their leaders may allow India to find a balanced way forward to combat terrorism. But, India alone will not be able to fight it out effectively. Regional and international co-operation in combating terrorism is equally important for India as it is for its partners, especially Bangladesh.

Regional Cooperation to Counter Terrorism

Some say that SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) needs to develop its own indigenous mechanism to handle security issues. There is precedence

¹¹³Eben Kaplan, and Jayshree Bajoria, "Counterterrorism in India," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 27 November 2008, <http://www.cfr.org/india/counterterrorism-india/p11170> (accessed 3 May 2011).

¹¹⁴Ibid.

elsewhere, in different regions of the world, for South Asia to learn lessons. In his speech, “SAARC as a Regional Mechanism to Counter Terrorism,” Professor Amal Jayawardane reiterates the necessity of regional cooperation by saying:

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) provides a model for a comprehensive and common security for Europe. Other regions have also developed mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). SAARC can learn from the experience of other regions, which have successfully established such counter-terrorism training centers such as the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in South-East Asia and Intergovernmental Authority on Development Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT) in Horn of Africa.¹¹⁵

In this regard countries outside the region may be explored for helping SAARC in many ways such as: exchange of technical expertise and information, training for capacity building, sharing of best practices, and experience. This new mechanism may fulfill a number of requirements, which SAARC has not been able to do so far.

In 2009, right after taking the oath of the office, the prime minister of the Government of Bangladesh recommended creation of a South Asian task force to counterterrorism. “This initiative by Bangladesh sent out a political message to South Asian leaders and beyond that Bangladesh is a pro-active pro-peace member of the regional and international community.”¹¹⁶ It signifies that Bangladesh gives highest importance to counterterrorism nationally, regionally and internationally. It also

¹¹⁵Professor Amal Jayawardane. “SAARC as a Regional Mechanism to Counter Terrorism” (Remarks at a conference on “Building Stronger Partnerships to Prevent Terrorism,” Organized by the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, Washington, DC, 8 October 2009).

¹¹⁶“South Asian Counter-Terrorism Task Force,” *The Daily Star* (Dhaka), 7 February 2009, <http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=74705> (accessed 30 March 2011).

expresses Bangladesh's will to make the SAARC effective in setting aside bilateral differences between member states and work in concert with others for the common good of the people of this region especially against terrorism.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Bangladesh is a moderate Muslim country of South Asia, which is a thriving democracy, a vibrant economy with a reasonable GDP growth of about 6 percent,¹¹⁷ a pioneer in micro-credit as exemplified by Nobel laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus, in empowerment of women, and is the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping missions around the world. Since independence, Bangladesh has faced some internal and external security challenges. Leftist movement in the north and southwestern part of the country, and ethnicity based insurgency movements in the southeastern part of the country have marked the security dynamics from the beginning of its existence. Involvement of neighboring states in supporting the insurgency movement, spillover effects of their own problems and close proximity of Bangladesh to known drug and illegal arms route through Myanmar- all have negatively affected the country's security situation.

Bangladesh resorted to a political solution to resolve the insurgency problem and could affect a relative peace in the insurgency prone area of CHT by signing a peace treaty. But, the problem is yet to be eradicated. The root causes of the conflict are yet to be addressed politically. Following the stalemate in implementation of the peace treaty, the security situation is once again on the verge of deterioration. Insurgency escalation looks imminent and may be more violent and destructive than earlier. It clearly signifies the need for prompt and bold political decisions to resolve the issue.

¹¹⁷Global Finance, "Bangladesh Country Report," <http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports/321-bangladesh-gdp-country-report.html#axzz1M3LBBMHI> (accessed 11 May 2011).

The vast majority of Bangladesh's populace is poor and illiterate in the modern sense of education. Madrasas in Bangladesh have fulfilled the educational needs of this poor populace in remote pros and corns of the country and emerged as an important institute. But, being largely unregulated by the state, some of these madrasas fell prey to the internationally sponsored insurgency by many developed countries to include the USA directed against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in late 1970s. That insurgency ultimately turned into terrorism and emerged as the Frankenstein. Some madrasas have long since been founded and funded by some middle east based so-called charity institutes that promoted militancy and radical religious movement within and beyond the borders of Bangladesh. Though the percentage of these militant madrasas against the total number of madrasas is very benign, they remain a considerable source for commissioning of radicals into the militant path.

The partisan and non-accommodative politics, hooliganism, and muscleman culture mostly sponsored by politically influential people have also contributed to undermine the security situation of the country. These acts may be recognized only as miscreant activities and may not be attributed as terrorism. However, they too need to be addressed in the appropriate manner to uplift the overall security situation of the country.

Bangladesh has only so far reacted to the actions of terrorists and has not adopted a proactive aggressive policy to counterterrorism. While it is of utmost importance to use all instruments of national power to combat terrorism, there should be an aggressive policy, which exerts enough deterrence against the opposing force to discourage any form of violent extremism. It reiterates the need for having a strategy, which may be developed

in line with the UN four pillar counterterrorism strategy and a credible force to effectively employ the use of force part of the strategy, if necessary.

Bangladesh has an inadequately staffed and equipped police force and a moderate standing military to act as enablers of countering terrorism. The police force is inadequate in number and they suffer from a credibility crisis among the general populace. As the prime enabler of the available counterterrorism forces, the police need to be reorganized, modernized, and better trained. The elite police force RAB may be utilized for special and focused operations. Bangladesh also needs to modernize their military. Rapid modernization of the relatively large force may not be possible immediately. But, a phased approach in modernization, focused training on small group action and integration of all ranks in the process would be significant first steps. The military should focus primarily on fighting counter insurgency and aid the police force in maintaining law and order, as necessary.

The most important improvement needed for both police and military is to enhance their capability in respect of information gathering, monitoring and conducting disruptive operations. Use of modern equipment, sensors, analytical skills, and strategic communications will be vital for future counterterrorism efforts. Screening its own borders and preventing illegal weapon and drug trafficking through Bangladesh needs to be stopped. Border Guards Bangladesh may be instrumental in performing this task. However, this force also needs modernization and capability building to be more effective. The changing popular perception to fight terrorism needs focused action causing minimum collateral damage in an effort to avoid creating accidental terrorists.

In the midst of growing interconnectivity of the world, no country can succeed against terrorism in isolation. Bangladesh needs to take counterterrorism measures nationally, regionally, and internationally. For the common good and against a common problem like terrorism, countries should put aside their differences and work together. There are bi-lateral and multi-lateral issues between and among the countries in the South Asia region. Sharing of intelligence and expertise to counterterrorism may prove to be vital in the future.

Bangladesh has enacted necessary acts and ordinances to counterterrorism and curb financial support for the terrorists. Necessary amendments may be added to these acts to accommodate current needs and address the necessity of regional and international cooperation against terrorism.

Participation of the general populace in the fight against terrorism is the most important parameter for a sustained effort leading to success. The government has to bear the political responsibility to generate popular support against terrorism and address issues politically through utilizing other instruments of national power. Security forces should not be used solely and should always complement other initiatives. The short and long-term measures against terrorism must complement each other and should not suffer piecemeal isolation.

Recommendations

Consistent with the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, Bangladesh should also adopt a counterterrorism strategy that utilizes all elements of national power simultaneously, judicially, and systematically to counterterrorism. In this comprehensive national strategy, use of military and security forces will continue to provide a deterrent

and disruptive effect. Initially, Bangladesh will need to prepare its military and security forces to disrupt, in the process degrade, and finally uproot the existing terrorism and terrorist organizations from the country.

Keeping in mind the economic trend of Bangladesh, the recommendations have been limited to feasible options possible with the current trend of budget allocation for military and security forces. A few recommendations may be implemented by just reorganizing, reallocating and rearranging existing resources; a long-term perspective plan will be necessary for implementing some recommendations. As for the use of military and other security forces, the following recommendations may be adopted in the military strategy of Bangladesh to counterterrorism in near future.

Preparing the Military and Security Forces

Preparing the military and security forces would mean to reorganize them and to make them capable for countering terrorism.

To fight terrorism other than insurgency, Bangladesh Police may be the nodal organization. They must be reorganized down to district level to deal with the terrorism. There must be dedicated intelligence units to monitor terrorist organizations. They should have adequate funds available to gather intelligence. There should be a small but well trained and equipped standing force to conduct offensive operations to disintegrate and de-capacitate terrorist organizations. Any additional force beyond such a specialized standing force can be through temporary augmentation from RAB and local police resources available.

In the event of scarcity of manpower to provide for the dedicated police force at district level, a small group from the military may be assigned in the capacity as RAB or

other police force to each district to form the nucleus of the special operation force. In that event, the military should include counterterrorism special operations training in their regular training curriculum.

Capacity and capability of the special operations force needs to be enhanced through improved training, introducing light and accurate weapons and equipment, and by giving fast means of communication. Integration of helicopter in the special operations should be a norm and resources should be maintained at respective divisional police ranges. A long-term plan to buy necessary helicopters for police or RAB may be undertaken. Until it is purchased, Bangladesh Air Force helicopters may be used for this purpose.

To fight insurgency, the military must be prepared accordingly. The use of helicopter gunships, aerial operations and real time monitoring of an area of operation by satellite round the clock may need to be added to existing operational capabilities by the military. To do so, the military needs to be equipped with relatively modern helicopter gunships as part of the aviation wing of the army, and there should be the necessary training for conducting and integrating nighttime aerial operations in support of ground troops. After closure of many counter insurgency camps from CHT, for the military to be effective, a large area in a short time must be covered by them from their designated cantonments. It also reiterates the need for aerial operations by day and at night by the military. Army should undertake a long-term development plan to buy off the shelf suitable helicopter gunships. For now, available helicopters may be customized to make them capable for night operations. For real time satellite surveillance, necessary bandwidth may be purchased from a reliable company. In the long run, public-private-

partnership (PPP) project may be sponsored to have our own satellite and use some of its capacity for military and security forces.

There must be improvements in surveillance, in terms of both technology and human intelligence, investigation, and interrogation capability of the military and security forces. These efforts may need to be supplemented by advanced interception, forensic analysis and capability to counter cybercrime.

Pursuing the Terrorist Organizations

Instead of waiting for the terrorists to act first, military and security forces may be utilized to pursue terrorists and disrupt their planned subversive actions. The intelligence and law enforcement agencies may be utilized to locate and monitor their command and control, and support infrastructure. The timely sharing of relevant intelligence to appropriate government agencies should also be ensured.

The intelligence infrastructure of the country may be reorganized to ensure that necessary redundancy and coordination is built into the system. There should be a central agency to collate, sift, and coordinate all intelligence efforts to make an aggregated picture for the policy and decision makers. Good coordination between the intelligence and enforcement agencies is a prerequisite in order to carry out an effective and comprehensive counter operation against existing or potential terrorist threats to Bangladesh. This could be done by establishing a central interagency counterterrorism coordination cell to coordinate and monitor the activities of the counterterrorism cells in all of the intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Otherwise, National Security Intelligence of Bangladesh may be staffed and prepared accordingly to play this role. There should be an established chain to share intelligence with neighboring states as well.

A regional drive to counterterrorism would necessitate responding to neighbors legitimate and credible requests as well. By reacting positively to neighboring country's request, Bangladesh may expect the similar respond in return. The existing ATO and MLPO should be amended to provide legal cover for the proactive actions by the military and security forces in countering terrorism.

Protection against Terrorism

The terrorist organizations must be denied any opportunity to conduct violent and subversive actions against nationally important structures, institutions, personnel, and anything important to country's interest. This will deny them any opportunity to make a strong public statement and at the same time, prevent government credibility being maligned.

Police and paramilitary forces may be utilized to protect key infrastructures. Critical government sectors such as transportation, public health, and telecommunication may be directed to build an indigenous security mechanism. Every key sector should be self-sufficient in providing first-degree security to its own infrastructures. The military and police forces can provide training and preparation for their staffs for indigenous security needs. The military may be utilized for protecting infrastructures like the Jamuna Multi-Purpose Bridge. However, a public sense for protection should be promoted throughout the country to reduce the burden on police and paramilitary forces.

Protection of land and maritime borders is vitally important for the physical protection of the country. Border Guards Bangladesh and Bangladesh Coast Guard must be adequately staffed and equipped to ensure protection of the country from illegal weapon trafficking, smuggling and drug dealing. The Bangladesh Navy should augment

the Bangladesh Coast Guard in their operation to protect the maritime border as well as to ensure the safety of the sea route of communications. In the long run, inclusion of naval air-wing with helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft in the air force will be highly instrumental in protecting the maritime boundary.

Consequent Management

Training, rehearsal, and resource identification would be necessary for consequent management. Bangladesh should introduce the use of a nationwide or locally applicable threat level to alert the general populace of any perceived threat. Security forces and other agencies of the government may conduct periodic rehearsals of their consequence management preparation.

Necessary equipment may be purchased for consequence management. Resources should be maintained at strategic, operational and tactical level as necessary to provide flexibility of action at all levels. Military assets and capabilities may be identified which could support coordinated disaster response efforts. The assets may include air both fixed and rotary wing, sea and river transportation, field medical units and hospitals, and logistics support.

Integration of nongovernment organizations and their capabilities in providing emergency support should also be taken into consideration. International cooperation between military forces may also be planned for consequence management. Multinational exercises like Balance Buffalo,¹¹⁸ conducted between the US and Bangladesh military to

¹¹⁸Shah Mohammed Saifuddin, "Bangla, US Begin Second Joint Military Exercises," Bangladesh Strategic and Development Forum blog, entry posted 26 September 2004, <http://www.bdsdf.org/forum/index.php?showtopic=2333> (accessed 11 May 2011).

create and test readiness for crisis management should also be arranged periodically at regional level. Further research may be undertaken to study the feasibility of having a national security council, and to formulate an all-encompassing strategy for Bangladesh to create a coherent utilization of all the instruments of national power in countering terrorism.

Bangladesh is a small thriving country of South-Asia. It is located in the crossroad between South and South-Asia having India and Myanmar as neighbors. It is faced with various forms of terrorism and insurgency from its independence. Leftist movement and ethnic insurgency were the most prominent ones faced by Bangladesh in early days. Later poverty, illiteracy, unregulated education structure, problems in the neighboring states, and foreign patronization of radicalism have created favorable situation for the spread of radical religious ideas followed by terrorism. However, inclusion of religious terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon to the country's security dynamics. So far Bangladesh has taken various measures to counterterrorism. Political initiative to resolve insurgency and reactive actions to counter radical terrorism have temporarily subsided those problems. It seems that the core reasons behind those problems still exist. Hence, terrorism is likely to resurface anytime. It reiterates the necessity for adopting a proactive aggressive counterterrorism strategy for Bangladesh. Bangladesh should develop this strategy to use all its instruments of power. Military and security forces should be utilized in accordance with a military strategy to enable the overall strategy to be effective. In this paper, military strategy to use the military and security forces has been discussed. The recommended strategy suggests preparing and capacitating military and security forces in both short and long-term basis. It also recommends integration of efforts locally,

nationally, regionally and internationally to counterterrorism. However, to address the current needs, a formulated strategy should always be periodically analyzed, criticized and updated.

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Department of Joint Interagency and Multinational Operations
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Mr. Raun G. Watson
Department of Center for Tactics
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Dr. Timothy R. Hentschel
Department of Joint Interagency and Multinational Operations
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301