

COMPILATION OF HEARINGS ON ISLAMIST
RADICALIZATION—VOLUME II

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AND THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 7, 2011

Serial No. 112-63

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security and the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs



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**HOMEGROWN TERRORISM:
THE THREAT TO MILITARY COMMUNITIES
INSIDE THE UNITED STATES**

Wednesday, December 7, 2011

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, AND
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committees met, pursuant to call, at 9:40 a.m., in Room HVC-210, The Capitol, Hon. Peter T. King [Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security] presiding.

Present from the House Committee on Homeland Security: Representatives King, Lungren, Rogers, Broun, Miller, Walberg, Cravaack, Duncan, Turner, Thompson, Sanchez, Jackson Lee, Cuellar, Richardson, Clarke of Michigan, Keating, Hochul, and Hahn.

Present from the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: Senators Lieberman, Carper, Pryor, and Collins.

Chairman KING. Good morning. The joint hearing of the House Committee on Homeland Security and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs will come to order. The committees are meeting today to hear testimony on the threat posed by homegrown terrorists to our Nation's military communities. Pursuant to the agreement reached by the committees, today's hearing will be governed by the Rules of the House of Representatives and the House Committee on Homeland Security unless any Senator raises an objection when any specific issue arises.

The Chairman wishes to remind our guests today that demonstrations from the audience, including the use of signs, placards, and T-shirts, as well as verbal outbursts, are a violation of the Rules of the House of Representatives. The Chairman wishes to thank our guests for their cooperation in maintaining order and proper decorum.

I recognize myself for an opening statement. Today the House Committee on Homeland Security and the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee are holding a joint investigative hearing on the homeland terrorist threat within the military itself and to military communities inside the United States. Let me start by thanking Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins for their leadership in the Senate in addressing the

threats posed by Islamist radicalization, which they began examining 5 years ago. I appreciate Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins working with our House committee on today's hearing, which is the first-ever joint House-Senate Homeland Security hearing.

I also want to thank our distinguished witnesses for appearing today to discuss this growing security issue, including Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Stockton and Chief Daris Long, a retired Marine Corps veteran, and the father of Army Private William Long, who was killed in a terrorist attack on his recruiting station in Little Rock. I would also acknowledge that with Mr. Long today is Melvin Bledsoe, the father of the young man who murdered Private Long.

This is the fourth hearing in a series the House committee has held this year on the serious threat of violent Islamist radicalization within the United States. Our committee has previously investigated radicalization within the Muslim-American community generally, radicalization in U.S. prisons, and probed the recruiting and radicalization carried out inside the United States by the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab group in Somalia.

This joint investigative hearing will seriously examine the emerging and growing danger to our men and women serving in uniform. I believe it is particularly appropriate that we do this on Pearl Harbor Day, when so many troops were killed in a surprise attack 70 years ago.

We had an obligation to react in response to alarming new developments concerning a growing security threat from radicalization both within the military as well as against military personnel and their families residing in the United States. Our troops volunteer to go into harm's way overseas to protect all of us. They should not be in harm's way here at home, and yet they are.

There is a dominant threat from Active-Duty military within the Armed Forces. This threat is persistent and enduring. More than 5 Islamist terror plots have been disrupted involving U.S. military insiders in the past decade, and 11 cases involve veterans or those who attempted to join law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

The total number of radicalized troops is more than publicly realized or acknowledged. Since the 9/11 attacks, at least 33 public cases have been prosecuted or probed in which homegrown terrorists living and operating in the United States, and sometimes inside the military itself, posed a grave threat, plotted to carry out attacks, or perpetrated violence aimed at America's Armed Forces in the homeland or deployed to overseas war zones. Twenty-three of these military-targeted plots, or 70 percent of the total, have unfolded since mid-2009 as part of the broader surge of homegrown Islamist terrorism. At least 16 external terror plots by jihadis inside the United States, who were aiming for military personnel stationed in the homeland, have been disrupted or investigated. At least nine other external plots were thwarted involving U.S. persons in the homeland who traveled or planned trips overseas to kill GIs in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.

A growing number of terrorist threats are directed at families of military personnel. Particularly of concern is the safety of relatives

whose loved ones are in units deployed on secret counterterror operations.

I would also note that within the last 2 weeks in New York City, we saw a man, Jose Pimentel, arrested, and among his goals was to attack returning veterans from Afghanistan.

As recent history illustrates, the only successful attacks on the homeland resulting in deaths since September 11 have been against the military: At Fort Hood, where 13 were murdered in an active-shooter attack by Army Major Nidal Hasan; and at a Little Rock recruiting center, where Army Private William Long, the son of Chief Long, was fatally shot point blank by a radicalized homegrown Islamist, Carlos Bledsoe, whose father is also with us today and testified at our first hearing back in March.

In summary, today's hearing will address the two-fold threat from within the military and against the military. The Fort Hood attack was not an anomaly. It was part of al-Qaeda's two-decade success at infiltrating the U.S. military for terrorism, an effort that is increasing in scope and threat. Military communities in the United States have recently become the most sought-after targets of violent Islamist extremists seeking to kill Americans in the homeland. We cannot stand idly by while our heroes in uniform are struck down in the place they should feel the safest.

The homegrown terrorist threats to military communities inside the United States is of critical significance, and one which we simply cannot afford to neglect. That is why these hearings on radicalization are so vital, and why we cannot back down to political correctness. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on these matters.

It is now my privilege to recognize a very good friend, but, more importantly, the Chairman of the Senate Homeland Security Committee, the gentleman from Connecticut, Senator Lieberman, for any statement he may have.

[The statement of Chairman King follows:]

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE PETER T. KING, CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY

DECEMBER 7, 2011

Today, the House Committee on Homeland Security and the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee are holding a joint investigative hearing on the homegrown terrorist threat within the military itself and to military communities inside the United States. Let me start by thanking Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and their committee for their leadership in the Senate on addressing the threats posed by Islamist radicalization, which they began examining 5 years ago. I appreciate Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins working with our House committee on today's hearing, which is the first joint House-Senate homeland security hearing held since the establishment of our House committee in 2005.

I also want to thank our distinguished witnesses for appearing today to discuss this growing security issue including Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Stockton, and Chief Daris Long, a retired Marine Corps veteran and the father of Army Private William Long, who was killed in a terrorist attack on his recruiting station in Little Rock.

This is the fourth hearing in a series the House committee has held this year on the serious threat of violent Islamist radicalization within the United States. Our committee has investigated the problem of radicalization within the Muslim-American community generally, sounded the alarm over radicalization in U.S. prisons, and probed the recruiting and radicalization carried out inside the United States by the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab group in Somalia.

This joint investigative hearing will seriously examine the emerging and growing danger to our men and women serving in uniform, as reflected by the facts that are known to us.

We had an obligation to act in response to alarming new developments concerning a growing security threat from radicalization both internally within the military, as well as externally toward military personnel and their families residing in the United States. Our troops volunteer to go into harm's way overseas to protect all of us—they should not be in harm's way here at home, and yet they are.

The dominant threat is from active duty military within the armed forces. This threat is persistent and enduring.

More than five Islamist terror plots have been disrupted involving U.S. military insiders in the past decade and 11 cases involved veterans or those who attempted to join law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The total number of radicalized troops is more than publicly realized or acknowledged.

Since the 9/11 attacks, at least 33 public cases have been prosecuted or probed in which homegrown terrorists living and operating in the United States—and sometimes inside the military itself—posed a grave threat, plotted to carry out attacks, or perpetrated violence aimed at America's Armed Forces in the homeland or deployed to overseas war zones. Twenty-three of these military-targeted plots, or 70% of the total, have unfolded since mid-2009 as part of the broader surge of homegrown Islamist terrorism:

- Two successful attacks against the military were perpetrated by radicalized soldiers assigned to U.S.-based Army units at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait in 2003 and at Fort Hood, Texas, in 2009;
- At least 16 external terror plots by jihadis inside the United States who were aiming for military personnel stationed in the homeland have been disrupted or investigated;
- At least nine other external plots were thwarted involving U.S. persons in the homeland who traveled or planned trips overseas to kill G.I.s in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere;
- A growing number of terrorist threats are directed at families of military personnel. Particularly of concern is the safety of relatives whose loved ones are in units deployed on secret counterterror operations.

As recent history illustrates, the only successful attacks on the homeland resulting in deaths since September 11 have been against the military—at Fort Hood, where 13 were murdered in an active-shooter attack allegedly by Army Major Nidal Hasan, and at a Little Rock recruiting center, where Army Private William Long was fatally shot point-blank by radicalized homegrown Islamist Carlos Bledsoe.

In summary, today's hearing will address the two-fold threat from within the military and against the military.

The Fort Hood attack was not an anomaly. It was part of al-Qaeda's two-decade success at infiltrating the U.S. military for terrorism—an effort that is increasing in scope and threat.

Military communities in the United States have recently become the most sought-after targets of violent Islamist extremists seeking to kill Americans in their homeland. We cannot stand idly by while our heroes in uniform are struck down in the place they feel safest. The homegrown terrorist threat to military communities inside the United States is of critical significance and one which we simply cannot afford to neglect.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on these matters.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Chairman King. Good morning, and welcome to everyone to this really historic joint hearing of the House and Senate Homeland Security Committees. My thanks to my friend Chairman Peter King for proposing this hearing, and to Ranking Members Susan Collins and Ben Thompson for supporting this idea.

There is no subject that should unite us more across both ends of the U.S. Capitol and across partisan and ideological lines than the threat that Islamist extremists pose to our homeland and to our people. This joint hearing, I think, is a demonstration of exactly that kind of unity, and I hope it is not the last occasion on which our two committees come together for this purpose.

Today we focus on the threat of violent Islamist extremism to members of the U.S. military at home. The men and women who

have sworn to defend our country, our security, our freedom expect, should realize, a respite from wartime conditions when they are home. But the record shows that the United States military has become a direct target of violent Islamist extremism here in the United States, and that means that America's troops, and perhaps their families, are potentially vulnerable at work and at rest, in a military setting or a civilian one, on a base or off a base, at a recruiting station, or even at a military hospital.

I want to now go to two facts which in part Chairman King mentioned, but I think are probably surprising to most Americans, and the first one is this: The only Americans who have lost their lives in our homeland to terrorists since 9/11 and the follow-on anthrax attacks have been killed at U.S. military facilities. Private William Long, who was killed by Abdulhakim Muhammad at a Little Rock recruiting station on June 4, 2009, and whose father we will be honored to hear testify today, was the first killed only because he was wearing the uniform of the United States Army. Thirteen more Americans were murdered on November 5, 2009, during the Fort Hood attack by Nidal Hasan. In addition, two soldiers were killed at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait in 2003 by a fellow American service-member, Hasan Akbar.

Here is the second fact, and this one perhaps will surprise people, too: Since 2001, law enforcement has thwarted and prosecuted more than 30 plots or attacks against military targets within the United States. According to the Congressional Research Service, that represents more than half of the 54 homegrown jihadist plots and attacks that have occurred between 9/11/01 and today.

The stark reality, therefore, is that American service members and their families are increasingly in the terrorists' scope, and not just overseas in traditional war settings, so that the premise of this hearing, this joint hearing, is not theoretical, it is based on fact.

Today we want to ask our Defense Department witnesses what our country is doing to protect our military personnel and facilities here at home, and, in a broader sense, what the future of military homeland security should look like. Our Government's counterterrorism capabilities are critical to uncovering plots against military installations and personnel so that they can be prevented, and that means that the FBI, which has primary domestic counterterrorism responsibility, and the Defense Department have to open their lines of communication to each other and work more closely together than in the normal course of events they ever would or ever have before. Law enforcement agencies and communities across the country, and other Government agencies also should continue to reach out to Muslim Americans so that they can help our Government meet this threat to our country from a small, but deadly number of people who are radicalizing to violent Islamist extremism.

Finally, I want to say, not for the first time, but I am going to keep saying it, that our Government has to recognize at some point who the enemy is and call it by its exact name. The enemy is not a vague catch-all of violent extremism, but a specific violent Islamist extremism, an exploitation and corruption, I would say, of the religion of Islam. But it is adherents to that violent Islamist extremism who attacked us on 9/11/01 and have plotted to attack

or have attacked those more than 30 American military installations here at home since 9/11/01. I repeat, that is a fact, not a theory or rhetoric.

One of the unfortunate conclusions that I take away from the last decade is that violent Islamist extremism, notwithstanding the extraordinary advances that our military intelligence and law enforcement personnel have made against it, will continue to threaten us for years to come, both around the world and here at home, and its targets will continue to be both civilians and military personnel, both around the world and here at home. We have weakened our enemies, but they are not vanquished, and protecting Americans in general, and our service members in particular, will require continuing preventive, defensive, and, where necessary, offensive action by all the assets of the United States Government. That is particularly true for American military facilities and the patriotic Americans who serve in and from them.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The statement of Senator Lieberman follows:]

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHAIRMAN, SENATE COMMITTEE
OF HOMELAND SECURITY

DECEMBER 7, 2011

Good morning. I too want to welcome everyone to this historic, first-ever joint hearing between the House and Senate Homeland Security Committees. My thanks to my friend Chairman Peter King for proposing this hearing and to Ranking Members Susan Collins and Bennie Thompson for supporting this idea. There is no subject that should unite us more across both ends of the U.S. Capitol and across partisan or ideological lines than the threat that Islamist extremists pose to our homeland and to our people. This joint hearing is a demonstration of exactly that kind of unity and I hope it's not the last occasion on which our two committees come together for this purpose.

Today we focus on the threat of violent Islamist extremism to members of the military at home. The men and women who have sworn to defend our country, our security, our freedom expect a respite from wartime conditions when they are home. But the record shows that that the United States military has become a direct target of violent Islamist extremism here in the United States, and that means America's troops and perhaps their families are potentially vulnerable at work and at rest, in a military setting or a civilian one, on a base or off a base, at a recruiting station or even at a military hospital.

I want to go to two facts that are probably most surprising to most Americans. The first one is this: The only Americans who have lost their lives in our homeland to terrorists since 9/11 and the follow-on anthrax attacks have been killed at U.S. military facilities.

Private William Long—who was killed at a Little Rock recruiting station in June 2009, and whose father we will be honored to hear testify today—was the first. He was killed only because he was wearing the uniform of the United States military. Thirteen more Americans were murdered on November 5, 2009 during the Fort Hood attack. In addition, two soldiers were killed at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait in 2003 by a fellow American service member.

Here's the second fact, which will perhaps surprise people to learn that, since 2001, law enforcement has thwarted and prosecuted more than 30 plots or attacks against military targets within the United States. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), that represents more than half of the 54 homegrown jihadist plots and attacks that have occurred between 9/11 and today.

The stark reality, therefore, is that American service members and their families are increasingly in the terrorists' scope and not just overseas in traditional war setting. The premise of this joint hearing is not theoretical, it is based in fact. I look forward to asking our Defense Department witnesses what our country is doing to protect our military facilities here at home and in a broader sense what the future of military homeland security should look like.

Our Government's counterterrorism capabilities are critical to uncovering plots against military installations and personnel so that they can be prevented. And this

means the FBI—which has primary responsibility for domestic extremism and terrorism—and the Defense Department have to open their lines of communication with each other and work more closely together than they ever would have before.

Law enforcement agencies in communities across the country have been and must also continue to reach out to Muslim-American communities so they can help our Government meet this threat that comes from a small but deadly number of individuals who are radicalizing or to violent Islamist extremism.

Finally, I want to say our Government has to recognize who the enemy is and call it by its exact name. The enemy is not a vague catch-all of violent extremism, but a specific violent Islamist extremism, an exploitation and corruption of the religion of Islam. It is adherents to that extremism who attacked us on 9/11/01 and who have tried to attack, or have attacked, those 30 American military installations here at home since 9/11/01. I repeat—that's a fact, not a theory or rhetoric.

One of the unfortunate conclusions of the past decade is that violent Islamist extremism—notwithstanding the extraordinary progress our military, counterintelligence, and law enforcement have made against it—will undoubtedly threaten us for years to come both at around the world and here at home, and its targets will be both civilians and military personnel, both around the world and here at home. We have weakened our enemies but they are not vanquished. Protecting Americans, in general, and our service members in particular, will require continuing preventive, offensive, and defensive action. That is particularly true for American military facilities and the patriotic Americans who serve from and in them.

Chairman KING. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman.

I now recognize my good friend, the Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Homeland Security, the gentleman from Mississippi, and the former Chairman, Mr. Thompson, for any statement he may have.

Representative THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Chairman King, for holding this hearing. I also want to welcome our colleagues from the Senate who have joined us here today.

This hearing will examine the steps the military has taken to ensure the safety of its bases, installations, and recruiting stations. In the last 2 years, two attacks on American military installations within the United States have been successful. One attack occurred at Fort Hood, Texas, where 13 people were killed. In the Fort Hood incident, the defendant is still awaiting a military court martial.

A second attack occurred in a recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas. One person was killed, and one person was wounded. In the Little Rock case, the defendant pled guilty to murder in State court.

I imagine my colleagues on the other side of the aisle want to use these two attacks to paint a picture about the nature of violent extremist threat facing this Nation. Once again, the picture they draw is not likely to be accurate, nuanced, or subtle.

In the past I have expressed my concerns about the nature and directions of these hearings. My concerns are amplified today. Focusing on the followers of one religion as the only creditable threat to the Nation's security is inaccurate, narrow, and blocks consideration of emerging threats. Our military is open to all faiths. A Congressional hearing that focuses on religion and the military is likely to harm unit cohesion and undermine morale within our military. A Congressional hearing that identifies one religion as a likely threat within the military is not only inaccurate, but unwise. As a matter of practicality, I am certain that on the battlefield how a soldier prays is probably less important than how well he or she shoots.

But practicalities aside, as we begin this hearing, I think it is appropriate to acknowledge and remember that today is the anniver-

sary of the bombing of Pearl Harbor. That single event, an unprovoked attack on an American military installation in an American territory, propelled this country into World War II. December 7, 1941, was a day that will live in infamy.

The veterans of World War II fought to stop the spread of totalitarian rule, halt genocide, and restore freedom. They risked their lives to defend this Nation. The same can be said of today's veterans. The men and women returning from Afghanistan and Iraq have placed their lives on the line, and each one volunteered to go. So as we think about the significance of this day in history and the possible meaning of this hearing, we must begin by thinking about what these two groups of soldiers fought for. Each of them answered the call to arms because they believe in America. Each fought because they believe this country is a beacon of hope and freedom in a troubled world. They will be willing to shed their blood to protect and defend the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.

So as we think about our debts to the veterans of past wars, let us not forget our most basic obligation to those who currently serve. We owe them a clear understanding of their mission and a clear definition of the enemy. That enemy is not a religion. Their mission is not to defeat an ideology. While some of my colleagues appear to have difficulty grasping this, I am glad the military people understand it.

In the days after the Fort Hood shooting, then-Defense Secretary Gates refused to lay this tragedy at the feet of one man or one religion. He appointed a board, and gave them the mission of reviewing what happened, why it happened, and what could be done to prevent the same thing from happening in the future. The review board did not sweep this incident under the rug. They did not seek easy explanations and simple answers. They identified deficiencies in DOD programs and policies on force protection, emergency response procedures, and threat identification. Once they identified the problems, they began to solve them.

To date, DOD has completed 43 of the review board's recommendations. Fifteen additional recommendations should be completed by March 2012. However, the military's ability to move forward and complete the remaining recommendations depend entirely on us. Since September 11, Congress has approved a total of \$1.283 trillion for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans health care associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Budget cuts may prevent the implementation of the rest of these recommendations. Today I hope we can reach a bipartisan, bicameral agreement that the military should have the funding it needs to prevent another tragedy like Fort Hood. If we can, then something good will have come out of this hearing.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

[The information follows:]

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE BENNIE G. THOMPSON, RANKING MEMBER, HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

DECEMBER 7, 2011

I want to thank the Chairman for holding this hearing. I also want to welcome our colleagues from the Senate who have joined us today. This hearing will examine the steps the military has taken to ensure the safety of its bases, installations, and recruiting stations.

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December 7, 1941, was a day that will live in infamy. The veterans of World War II fought to stop the spread of totalitarian rule, halt genocide, and restore freedom. They risked their lives to defend this Nation. The same can be said of today's veterans. The men and women returning from Afghanistan and Iraq have placed their lives on the line. And each one volunteered to go.

So as we think about the significance of this day in history and the possible meaning of this hearing, we must begin by thinking about what these two groups of soldiers fought for. Each of them answered the call to arms because they believe in America. Each fought because they believe this country is a beacon of hope and freedom in a troubled world. They are willing to shed their blood to protect and defend the rights and liberties guaranteed in the Constitution.

So, as we think about our debt to the veterans of past wars, let us not forget our most basic obligation to those who currently serve. We owe them a clear understanding of their mission and a clear definition of the enemy. Their enemy is not a religion. Their mission is not to defeat an ideology.

And while some of my colleagues appear to have difficulty grasping this, I am glad that the military people understand it. In the days after the Ft. Hood shootings, then-Defense Secretary Gates refused to lay this tragedy at the feet of one man or one religion. He appointed a board and gave them the mission of reviewing what happened, why it happened, and what could be done to prevent the same thing from happening in the future.

The review board did not sweep this incident under the rug. They did not seek easy explanations and simple answers. They identified deficiencies in DOD programs and policies on force protection, emergency response procedures, and threat identification. And once they identified the problems, they began to solve them. To date, DOD has completed 43 of the review board's recommendations. Fifteen additional recommendations should be completed by March 2012.

However, the military's ability to move forward and complete the remaining recommendations depends entirely on us. Since September 11, Congress has approved a total of \$1.283 trillion for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans' health care associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Budget cuts may prevent the implementation of the rest of these recommendations.

Today, I hope we can reach a bi-partisan, bi-cameral agreement that the military should have the funding it needs to prevent another tragedy like Fort Hood. If we can, then something good will have come out of this hearing.

Chairman KING. I thank the Ranking Member.

I would just note for the record that in the investigative report that the Majority is releasing today, we point out that more than 6,000, actually 6,024, service members who declared Islam as their faith have served honorably on overseas deployments since 9/11, and 14 Muslim troops have been killed in battle, and 4 are buried right nearby here in Arlington. So there is no desire on anyone's part to denigrate the tremendous contributions made by the Muslim-American community. We are talking about a small, small minority, but a lethal minority.

With that, I yield to the gentlelady, the Senator from the State of Maine, the Ranking Member of the Senate Homeland Security Committee, my good friend Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me first point out that this unusual House-Senate hearing demonstrates our joint concern for the safety of our military personnel and their families, who are increasingly the targets of terrorist plots. Regardless of our analysis of the cause or what the remedy should be, I am certain that each and every Member of both the Senate and the House Committee is committed to doing everything that we can do to ensure the safety of our military personnel and their families. In that regard, I would also like to recognize the family members here today whose lives have been forever changed by terrorism.

Our military service members have been on the front lines in the war against terrorism for 10 years. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and wherever they are called upon, America's military men and women put their lives on the line for us. We are profoundly grateful to them, and we must work to ensure that their lives are not in jeopardy due to insider threats.

Tragically, in recent years we have seen several attacks from both inside and outside the gates of our military bases. As we have seen with the attacks at Fort Hood and at the Little Rock recruiting center, our military is, in fact, a target for Islamist extremists in our own country. In a recent report, the Congressional Research Service notes that 23 of the plots targeting the military have unfolded in just the last 18 months. How do we identify and stop the next homegrown attack on our military?

In my judgment, this effort must be addressed through a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that carefully differentiates between peaceful practicing Muslims and violent Islamist extremists. As Chairman Lieberman and I highlighted in our investigation into the Fort Hood attack, the administration, unfortunately, has been unwilling to name violent Islamist extremism as the ideology driving the main homegrown terrorist threat that we face. For example, in response to our committee's continued interest in the Fort Hood massacre, the Department of Defense responded a few weeks ago that it is dealing with the threat of violent Islamist extremism in the context of the broader threat of workplace violence. This approach, I would note, stands in stark contrast to past DOD policies that specifically addressed White supremacist activities

after the racially-motivated murders of two African Americans by two Army soldiers in the 1990s.

Among the recommendations in the Senate Fort Hood report, we urged that there be training for service members, and yet a combined House-Senate committee staff review has confirmed that the only Department-wide instruction to date is interim guidance distributed to commanders on potential indicators of violent behavior. That is woefully inadequate.

I do understand that DOD is moving to develop a long-term policy solution, and that the Army is currently implementing an updated threat awareness reporting program with associated training. We simply must arm our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines with the knowledge to differentiate between the vast majority of Muslim soldiers and military members who are peaceful, practicing members of a major esteemed religion and a service member who is radicalizing and poses a potential threat. Identifying factors that lead to violent radicalization, understanding behaviors that could be indicators of such radicalization, and engaging to stop the radicalization process are all vital components of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.

It is frustrating that even the Senate's repeated calls for a single Federal official to coordinate activities against violent Islamic extremism across the entire Government have gone unheeded. This committee, both in the Senate and the House Committee, have been examining the process of radicalization for more than 5 years, as Chairman King indicated. Whether radicalization occurs in prisons or via the internet, the threat that such radicalization poses to our military members must be acknowledged and addressed. Today's hearing should serve as a call to accelerate action to protect those who have put their lives on the line for our freedom. Our service men and women deserve no less.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information follows:]

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE SUSAN M. COLLINS, RANKING MEMBER, SENATE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

DECEMBER 7, 2011

Thank you, Chairman King. Let me first point out that this unusual House-Senate hearing demonstrates our joint concern for the safety of our military personnel and their families, who are increasingly the targets of terrorist plots.

I would also like to recognize the family members here today whose lives have been forever changed by terrorism.

Our military service members have been on the front lines in the war against terrorism for 10 years. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and wherever called upon, America's military men and women put their lives on the line for us. We are profoundly grateful to them, and we must work to ensure their lives are not in jeopardy due to insider threats.

Tragically, in recent years, we have seen several attacks from both inside and outside the gates of our military bases. As we have seen with the attacks at Fort Hood, Texas, and at a Little Rock, Arkansas, recruiting center, our military is a target for Islamist extremists in our own country. In a recent report, the Congressional Research Service notes that 23 plots targeting the military have unfolded in just the last 18 months.

How do we identify and stop the next homegrown attack on our military? This effort must be addressed through a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that carefully differentiates between peaceful, practicing Muslims and violent Islamist extremists.

As Chairman Lieberman and I highlighted in our investigation into the Fort Hood attack, the administration has been unwilling to name violent Islamist extremism as the ideology driving the main homegrown terrorist threat we face. For example, in response to this committee's continued interest in the Fort Hood massacre, DoD responded a few weeks ago that it is "dealing with the threat of violent Islamist extremism in the context of a broader threat of workplace violence."

This approach stands in stark contrast to past DoD policies that specifically addressed white supremacist activities after the racially motivated murders of two African-Americans by two Army soldiers in 1995.

Among the recommendations in the Senate Fort Hood report, we urged that service members "receive specific training concerning the ideology and behaviors associated with violent Islamist extremism—and how they differ from the peaceful practice of Islam." And yet, a combined House-Senate Committee staff review has confirmed that the only Department-wide instruction to date is the "interim guidance" distributed to commanders on potential "indicators of violent behavior."

I understand that DoD is moving to develop a long-term policy solution, and that the Army is currently implementing an updated Threat Awareness Reporting Program and associated training. We must arm our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines with the knowledge to differentiate between a peaceful, practicing member of a major esteemed religion and a service member who is radicalizing and poses a potential threat.

Identifying factors that lead to violent radicalization, understanding behaviors that could be indicators of such radicalization, and engaging to stop the radicalization process are all vital components of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.

Even our repeated call for a single Federal official to coordinate activities against violent Islamist extremism across the entire Government has gone unheeded.

Our committee has been examining the process of radicalization for more than 5 years. Whether it occurs in prisons or on the internet—the threat such radicalization poses to our military members must be acknowledged and addressed. The Congressional Research Service's documentation of 29 plots and three attacks targeting military personnel and bases since September 11 requires the full attention of the military and the administration.

Today's hearing should serve as a call to accelerate actions to protect those who have put their lives on the line for our freedom. Our service men and women deserve no less.

Chairman KING. Thank you, Senator Collins.

Other Members of the committees are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record.

In correspondence with today's witnesses, they have indicated the topic we are examining is of a sensitive nature, and, depending on the questions asked, may endanger National security or compromise sensitive law enforcement information. I have consulted with Senator Lieberman, and we are in agreement that should it become necessary, the hearing should recess after the second panel has concluded and reconvene in a closed, classified session. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the hearing move to a closed session at the appropriate time should that be determined by Chairman Lieberman and by me. Without objection, so ordered.

I would also ask unanimous consent to insert into the record a statement from Congressman Ellison. He has not provided the statement to us yet, but he said he would. So I ask that it be included in the record. Without objection.*

Chairman KING. I would now like to welcome our witnesses today. I would remind you that your full testimony will be submitted for the record, and ask you to summarize your statements at this time.

We have a very distinguished panel of witnesses for our important hearing today. The first panel, we have Assistant Secretary of

*The information was not submitted at the time of publication.

Defense Paul Stockton, Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, a position he has held since April 2009. In this role he is responsible for the supervision of homeland defense activities, defense support of civil authorities, and Western Hemisphere security affairs for the Department of Defense.

From 1986 to 1989—and, Senator Lieberman, this goes along with the interests of bipartisanship—Secretary Stockton served as legislative assistant to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the only politician from New York I know who has been recommended for sainthood by Republicans and Democrats. That was a while ago, but he certainly is a hero to all New Yorkers. Prior to his confirmation, Secretary Stockton was a senior research scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation.

I have had the privilege of meeting with Secretary Stockton, and certainly look forward to his testimony today.

Secretary Stockton is accompanied by Mr. Jim Stuteville, who is a senior advisor to the United States Army for counterintelligence operations, and liaison to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Finally on the panel we have Lieutenant Colonel Reid Sawyer, who is the director and one of the founders of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. A career intelligence officer, Colonel Sawyer has served in a variety of Special Operations assignments, including operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Africa, and South America. Colonel Sawyer also actively advises a number of Federal, State, and local government agencies, and is a member of the Fire Department of New York Terrorism Task Force. He has edited two books on the challenges involving international terrorism, and he has lectured widely, and we look forward to his testimony today.

Now I am pleased to recognize Secretary Stockton for his testimony.

Secretary Stockton.

STATEMENT OF PAUL N. STOCKTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND AMERICAS' SECURITY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY JIM STUTEVILLE, UNITED STATES ARMY, SENIOR ADVISOR, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, AND LIAISON TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. STOCKTON. Chairman King, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Thompson, Ranking Member Collins, thank you for the opportunity today to testify on such an important issue, and thank you so much for your focus on these topics and your leadership, and for your contributions to National security as a whole.

Let me begin with my bottom-line up-front. The threat that we are discussing today is serious, and it is enduring. The Department of Defense has taken important steps in order to meet this challenge, but we do not intend to rest on our accomplishments. With your help, and with the strong support of my Department's leadership, I pledge to continue strengthening the preparedness of our domestic military communities against the homegrown terrorist threat as it continues to evolve.

The past several years have seen increased numbers of American citizens or residents inspired by al-Qaeda's ideology, and the De-

partment of Defense has become their target of choice. My statement for the record summarizes actions we have under way to counter the threat. Our initiatives are directly targeted to fix the shortcomings revealed by the tragic shootings at Fort Hood. In that regard, I want to thank the Members of both committees for the support and the work that you have done in order to identify the shortfalls that previously existed, and make recommendations on the improvements that we ought to pursue in the Department of Defense. In addition, we are looking forward to the threat evolving in the future. We want to make sure that we anticipate how the threat is likely to evolve so we can be prepared to counter it for years to come.

I would like to highlight some specific actions we have under way in three areas: First of all, information sharing; second, identifying and reporting on possible violent extremists; and finally, improving our incident response capabilities.

Four months ago, Secretary Panetta and the Attorney General implemented a groundbreaking agreement to strengthen information sharing and cooperation between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Defense. Chairman Lieberman, I take very seriously the importance that you and all of us attach to continuing to strengthen the FBI–DOD relationship. I will also welcome the opportunity to discuss the ways that we are working together with State and local law enforcement in order to make sure that we are better prepared in the future to meet the challenges that we face.

We have also launched the eGuardian system to share suspicious-activity information between State and local law enforcement, Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and the Department of Defense, including installation commanders around the Nation. Together with other information-sharing initiatives now under way, we have greatly strengthened our ability to connect the dots and prevent future attacks against our military communities.

We have also made progress in the second role, and that is providing commanders and other supervisory personnel with the guidance they need to identify potential violent extremists in our ranks and ensure that necessary follow-up and intervention actions occur. In 2010, then-Secretary of Defense Gates provided interim guidance on how our personnel should identify and report on potential insider threats. We have a series of studies under way right now to refine and build on that guidance and anticipate future home-grown threats.

In March of next year, the Defense Science Board will issue a study that recommends additional training tools to better enable our military supervisors to recognize when and how they should intervene in order to thwart potential insider threats. Two longer-term studies that we have under way are also looking—they are diving deep into the behavioral processes that lead to radicalization so, again, we can refine our programs, we can refine our training efforts to ensure that we can successfully intervene and prevent future terrorist attacks from occurring against our military communities.

Finally, knowing that perfect prevention will always be our goal, but it is unattainable, we have been strengthening our ability to

respond to attacks that do occur. We have launched an Active Shooter training program for military police and other personnel. We have greatly improved our incident notification systems that will enable us to warn and direct personnel and their families, support emergency response efforts, and make other life-saving improvements.

Chairman Lieberman, Chairman King, Ranking Member Collins, Ranking Member Thompson, distinguished Members of both committees, thank you again for your leadership in advancing the security of the United States, and for your particular focus on securing the homeland against the threats we will be discussing today. I look forward together to working with you in that effort, and to your questions and your recommendations. Thank you.

[The statement of Mr. Stockton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL N. STOCKTON

DECEMBER 7, 2011

Chairman King, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Thompson, Ranking Member Collins, distinguished Members of the committees: Thank you for the opportunity to address you today on the homegrown terrorist threat to military communities inside the United States. Let me provide you with my bottom-line up-front. The terrorist threat to our military communities is serious, and will remain so for years to come. The Department of Defense (DoD) has greatly improved its ability to meet this threat, through internal initiatives and partnerships with the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and law enforcement agencies across the Nation. This is no time to rest on our accomplishments, however. With your help, and with the strong support of the leadership of my Department, I pledge to continue to strengthen the preparedness of our domestic military communities against the enduring, evolving threats of terrorism they confront.

When it comes to defining the enemy, this administration wishes to avoid imprecise terminology that may cause confusion and may unjustifiably give credence to the falsehood—despite our best intentions—that we are waging a war on Islam. Muslim Americans are important allies in the effort to counter violent extremism in the United States. This is consistent with the administration’s strategy “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States” which affirms, “The best defenses against violent extremist ideologies are well-informed and equipped families, local communities, and local institutions.” Muslim Americans are also important in DoD operations. Every day, patriotic Muslim Americans serve in our military, often providing linguistic and cultural competencies essential to disrupting and defeating our actual enemy: Al-Qaeda and its adherents and affiliates world-wide.

Deputy National Security Advisor Denis McDonough noted in March 2011 that “Al-Qaeda and its adherents are constantly trying to exploit any vulnerability in our open society. This threat is real, and it is serious. How do we know this? Well, al-Qaeda tells us. They make videos, create internet forums, even publish on-line magazines, all for the expressed purpose of trying to convince Muslim-Americans to reject their country and attack their fellow Americans.” The Department of Defense faces a special challenge in this regard. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates seek to inspire and instruct U.S. military personnel and other radicalized U.S. citizens to conduct “lone actor” attacks on U.S. military targets. These adherents are, as Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan has said, “individuals, sometimes with little or no direct physical contact with al-Qaeda, who have succumbed to [al-Qaeda’s] hateful ideology and who have engaged in, or facilitated, terrorist activities here in the United States . . . and we have seen the tragic results, with the murder of a military recruiter in Arkansas two years ago and the attack on our servicemen and women at Fort Hood.”¹

¹ Brennan, John. “Remarks on Ensuring al-Qa’ida’s Demise” as prepared for delivery, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Washington, DC. June 29, 2011.

As noted in a White House statement in August 2011: “The past several years have seen increased numbers of American citizens or residents inspired by al-Qaeda’s ideology and involved in terrorism.”² Over the last decade, a plurality of these domestic violent extremists chose to target the Department of Defense (DoD), making military communities the target of choice for homegrown terrorists. Fourteen of 17 Americans killed in the homeland by domestic violent extremists have been DoD personnel.

As President Obama said in September, “The death of [Anwar al-Awlaki] was a major blow to al-Qaeda’s most active operational affiliate. Al-Awlaki was the leader of external operations for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In that role, he took the lead in planning and directing efforts to murder innocent Americans.” The fact that al-Qaeda’s adherents are openly and specifically recruiting Americans to support or commit acts of violence—through videos, magazines, and on-line forums—poses an on-going and real threat.³

As acknowledged in the June 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, “[m]ass media and the internet in particular have emerged as enablers for terrorist planning, facilitation, and communication . . . Global communications and connectivity place [al-Qaeda’s] calls for violence and instructions for carrying it out within easy reach of millions.” Given the adversary’s emphasis on recruiting U.S. military personnel to attack our communities from within, the Department has taken numerous actions to broaden its approach to force protection beyond its traditional focus on external threats.

After the tragic shooting at Fort Hood, then-Secretary Gates commissioned the DoD Independent Review Related to Fort Hood to identify gaps and deficiencies in DoD’s force protection programs, policies, and procedures. In response to the Independent Review’s recommendations, then-Secretary Gates directed that the Department make every effort to safeguard civil rights and civil liberties while implementing several specific actions to adapt effectively to the challenging security environment in which we operate. These initiatives will significantly improve the Department’s ability to mitigate internal threats, ensure force protection, enable emergency response, and provide care for victims and families should another attack occur.

It is important to recognize that although al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents currently pose the pre-eminent security threat to the United States, history has shown that the prevalence of particular violent extremist ideologies changes over time, and new threats will undoubtedly arise in the future.⁴ The July 2011 tragedy in Norway and the April 1995 Oklahoma City bombing underscore this point. The administration’s August 2011 strategy, *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, provides a useful definition for violent extremists: “individuals who support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals.” Though the nature and significance of these threats can vary, our obligation to protect the American people demands that we maintain a strategy that counters all of them. Consistent with the “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States” the Department of Defense’s initiatives address the range of violent extremist threats we face.

As a matter of law and National policy, DoD is generally restricted from collecting and storing law enforcement information on U.S. citizens; therefore, DoD must rely on civilian agencies to play an increasingly important role in the protection of U.S. military communities. As part of the Fort Hood review, then-Secretary Gates directed several actions to improve DoD collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Effective August 2011, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense implemented a single, overarching information-sharing Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to promote systemic, standardized, and controlled information sharing. This MOU establishes a general adjudication process whereby DoD and the FBI can resolve potential future differences of opinion to whether and when information should be shared.

This MOU will be supplemented by a series of specific annexes, several of which are in the final stages of negotiation before proceeding to signature. These annexes will clarify coordination procedures and investigative responsibilities between DoD and the FBI. Most significantly, Annex A, “Counterterrorism Information Sharing,” will allow DoD to articulate its force protection information requirements to elimi-

²The White House. *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. Washington: August 2011.

³The White House. *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. Washington: August 2011.

⁴The White House. *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. Washington: August 2011.

nate confusion or doubt about what threat information is considered to be of value to DoD. Threat information with a DoD nexus is shared at the institutional level and at the local level. As a result, DoD will be able to evaluate the threat information from a high-level perspective to “connect the dots” more effectively. At the same time, installation commanders have the information they need to take appropriate force protection and antiterrorism measures to protect their communities from the threat. We anticipate this annex will be signed early next year.

We also have drafted an annex addressing Counterintelligence Information Sharing (Annex B) that we anticipate will be signed by January 2012. Additional annexes addressing the subjects of “Terrorist Screening Information” and “DoD Participation in FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces” will enter coordination shortly. Once the “DoD Participation in FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces” annex is finalized, we will publish a conforming DoD Instruction, “DoD Support to the Federal Bureau of Investigation Joint Terrorism Task Force Program,” which will provide policy and guidance for each DoD component represented in the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). By fiscal year 2015, DoD will provide approximately 123 detailees to support 60 FBI JTTFs throughout the United States. The FBI has instituted a formal training program to ensure these DoD professionals are familiar with all available JTTF tools, databases, and information. DoD is also working closely with State and local law enforcement agencies to recognize the indicators of a “lone actor” threat and to share suspicious activity reports to prevent another Fort Hood-type of attack from occurring. In September 2010, DoD began using eGuardian, an unclassified, secure, web-based capability to report suspicious activity that can be accessed through the Law Enforcement Online (LEO) network. eGuardian is part of the Nation-wide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI). The eGuardian system appropriately safeguards privacy and civil liberties, enabling information sharing among Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement partners, including State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers and the FBI JTTFs. When fully implemented in February 2012, eGuardian will have approximately 1,500 DoD users world-wide, and all DoD law enforcement entities will have access. The system was designed to remedy information-sharing gaps that the review of the Fort Hood shootings revealed and has already resulted in at least 384 new investigations or case enhancements. In addition, DoD is working to identify funding for the Defense Data Exchange (D-DEX), which will allow all 13 DoD law enforcement entities to post and query criminal investigation and other law enforcement data in a single repository.

DoD is also acting on lessons learned. For instance, the Independent Review related to Fort Hood (“Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood”) found DoD force protection policies and programs were not sufficiently focused on internal threats. To improve intradepartmental information sharing on insider threats, as well as to synchronize force protection and law enforcement policies and programs across DoD, we established a permanent Force Protection Senior Steering Group (FP SSG). My office and the Joint Staff co-chair the FP SSG, which meets not less than semiannually and reports progress and recommendations to the Deputy Secretary’s Defense Management Action Group (formerly known as the Defense Advisory Working Group).

The FP SSG has an “Insider Threat Working Group” (or “InTWG”), which includes representatives from the Joint Staff, the Military Departments and Services, and most DoD components. The InTWG examines the insider threat from three perspectives: (1) Workplace violence, (2) terrorism, and (3) security threats (including espionage and threats to information systems). Unique among other similar Federal Government insider threat working groups, the InTWG addresses both kinetic and non-kinetic insider threats. The InTWG is drafting a DoD Instruction to provide guidance that will improve information sharing among DoD law enforcement and intelligence entities and establish a single, DoD-wide definition of insider threat as: “A person with authorized access, who uses that access, wittingly or unwittingly, to harm National security interests or National security through unauthorized disclosure, data modification, espionage, terrorism, or kinetic actions resulting in personal injury or loss or degradation of resources or capabilities.” Under this broad strategic umbrella, individual DoD components may initiate programs tailored to address their distinctive vulnerabilities.

In order to recognize potential threats before they materialize, DoD must first identify and validate behavioral indicators of, or precursors to, violent behavior. In August 2010, then-Secretary Gates issued interim guidance on how to identify and report potential insider threats. This guidance, developed in consultation with academic experts and law enforcement practitioners, familiarizes leaders with a list of behaviors that may indicate a potential propensity to commit violent acts. Behaviors on the list vary in degrees of severity—some behaviors are themselves illegal or vio-

late DoD rules—others may be cause for concern only in certain contexts. Military personnel who exhibit indicators, such as hatred or intolerance of American society and culture, advocacy for violence-promoting organizations, and history of poor work performance or substance abuse problems, should elicit concern from commanders or supervisors. In all cases, leaders are expected to exercise proper judgment and consider the full range of administrative and disciplinary actions when addressing personnel whose behavior adversely affects good order, discipline, or safety of the unit. This interim guidance is intended to protect the force in the near term.

In April 2010, then-Secretary Gates approved the Defense Science Board (DSB) study on violent radicalization. In addition to validating indicators of violence, the DSB was asked to recommend training tools to enable commanders and supervisors to recognize when and how to intervene and thwart potential insider threats. I expect the DSB report to be completed in March 2012. In addition, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs will conduct two scientific studies—one retrospective and one prospective—to examine DoD populations and to develop a scientifically-based list of behavioral indicators of violence in the military population. As findings from these studies become available, DoD will refine its interim guidance to incorporate what we learn into other existing workplace violence prevention and intervention programs and policies. DoD has already supplemented pre- and post-deployment health care screening questionnaires to help health care providers assess the risk of violence by DoD personnel and to refer such personnel for further evaluation or treatment as necessary.

Although DoD's intent is to prevent insider threats from materializing, we have also taken several measures to improve emergency response when they do. Since March 2010, "Active Shooter" training has been an important component of mandatory Antiterrorism Level 1 training. Active Shooter best practices are being included in revisions to the minimum standards for military police (and equivalents).

Finally, DoD is implementing installation emergency management (IEM) programs, including "Enhanced 9-1-1," mass notification and warning systems, and a "common operating picture." "Enhanced 9-1-1" provides dispatchers with the caller's location, even during cell phone calls, which is especially important in case the caller becomes incapacitated. Mass notification and warning systems automate guidance (e.g., evacuation orders) to warn and direct installation personnel, helping emergency responders manage affected populations over the course of an incident. The "common operating picture" is intended to enable coordination among emergency responders by sharing information in real-time during an incident. This "common operating picture" is also intended to improve installations' capacity to report force protection information to the Combatant Commands. IEM program implementation will save lives, promote interoperability with civilian first responders, and ensure compliance with National preparedness and response guidelines.

Chairman King, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Thompson, Ranking Member Collins, distinguished Members of the committees: I commend you for your leadership, continued interest, and support of DoD's efforts on this important matter. We have an obligation to ensure that the men and women who are prepared to sacrifice so much for our Nation anywhere in the world are safe here at home.

Chairman KING. Thank you very much, Secretary Stockton.
I now recognize Colonel Sawyer.
Colonel Sawyer.

**STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL REID L. SAWYER,
DIRECTOR, COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT**

Colonel SAWYER. Chairman King, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Thompson, Ranking Member Collins, and distinguished Members of both committees, as the Director of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, it is my distinct honor and pleasure to be here before you today to discuss such a critically important topic.

The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point is committed to studying the intellectual underpinnings of the terrorist threat, and as such, my remarks are based on an exhaustive 14-month study of the domestic jihadist threat, with specific insights to the threat that the military faces from this purview.

My remarks will center on two critical points. First, the rapid rise of al-Qaeda-inspired threat in the United States beginning in 2007 reveals a complex landscape that is only growing more opaque each year. Second, and critical for our discussion here today, is the emergence of the military as the preferred target for al-Qaeda-inspired individuals within the United States, a trend that is greater than many realize, and thus the importance of today's hearing, and which I thank you as well.

Let me turn to my first point. Since 9/11, the United States is witness to the radicalization of 170 of its residents and the targeting and supporting of violent action in multiple locations throughout the United States. Put another way, this amounts to an average of one attack every 3 months for a 12-year period, with the overwhelming majority of these attacks occurring since 2007. Concurrently, we have witnessed an increasing number of groups overseas aligned or affiliated with al-Qaeda, which increases the number of entry points for individuals radicalizing in the United States, functionally decreasing the barriers of entry for those that wish to participate in the global jihad.

The conclusions that there are few successes within this data misses the point that the distance between failure and success is far shorter than realized. We need to only look to the 2004 Madrid attacks that killed 198 individuals or the devastating attacks in London to grasp the damage possible from a homegrown cell. In other words, while the number of failures is an important metric of both counterterrorism successes and the terrorist incompetence, it may also provide a false sense of security. In the United States context, the 2010 Najibullah Zazi plot provides a stark reminder of what might have been.

Turning to my second point, the focus on the military. Perhaps the most disturbing trend that has been noted by many here today is the intense focus by the domestic jihadists on the military targets. The military presents a qualitatively different target when attacked at home than when engaged in combat abroad. There is an expectation among our citizenry that our service members are safe within their home environment, and a cursory look at the data reveals that nearly 21 percent of domestic radicalized plots since 9/11 within the United States target our military forces at home. But this number does not reflect the totality of interest in targeting the U.S. military forces by domestically inspired al-Qaeda individuals.

A second category of homegrown terrorists are those that radicalize here are equally committed to targeting our military, but travel overseas to participate in the global jihad. When these numbers are included, the percentage increases to nearly 50 percent of all plots within the United States that are seen as directly targeting the U.S. military. While it is difficult to assess whether the second group, were they unable to connect to their external networks abroad, would have indeed focused on military targets at home, it is undeniable that the U.S. military amongst this population is of significant interest.

If we expand the aperture even further to include all plots that considered military targets and changed course for whatever rea-

son, we find that the percentage jumps to 56 percent of those post-9/11 domestic plots that target the military.

Increasingly, we are witnessing individuals that radicalize in near isolation, creating cells that are self-organizing. There is little direct contact between these cells and the radicalizing agent. The mental and moral barriers to targeting U.S. soldiers are less than when targeting civilians. This is a function of both the nature and specificity of al-Qaeda's narrative that frames the U.S. military as war criminals, and creates an imperative for striking the military in a pre-emptive manner.

Of those individuals that move to actual attack against the military, it is a group that is exclusively made up of lone wolves. Whether by strategic choice or lack of access to extremist networks, the lack of contact with others significantly limits the ability to identify, prevent, and interdict these individuals.

The second category of military threats is the person who radicalizes once inside the military. Insider threats are not only dangerous because of their access, which is certainly crucial to their attacks, but it is the combination of access and knowledge of their organization that enables these plots to potentially be significantly more dangerous than they otherwise might have been.

The number of insider cases are statistically insignificant when looking across the entire data set, but pose a disproportionate impact when we think about the effects that this has across our military and how it reifies al-Qaeda's narrative. By design or happenstance, these attackers produce significant psychological effects. It is all too easy to forget that, at its fundamental level, terrorism is about the psychology of fear.

In conclusion, while the domestic violent extremists have only realized limited success in the United States today, the threat is significant. The potential of physical violence from these cells is only one dimension. Radicalization of U.S. citizens tears at the fabric of our society in the way that attacks from Yemen or Pakistan do not. Effective intelligence and law enforcement efforts to detect and disrupt these cells are critical, but not sufficient to fully address the problem. Interdiction and prevention efforts must be coupled with programs to counter violent extremism, to ultimately foster inhospitable conditions for the emergence of al-Qaeda-inspired extremists in the United States, and to decrease the threat to our military forces.

Thank you very much for holding this hearing, and I look forward to your questions.

[The statement of Colonel Sawyer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL REID SAWYER

INTRODUCTION

The attacks of September 11, 2001, provided a stark warning that analysts had grossly misjudged the nature of the terrorist threat facing the United States.¹ While the ensuing decade of conflict has greatly constrained al-Qaeda's ability to operate with impunity, the threat from the organization and its affiliated movements has proved far more resilient than anticipated. The rise of new organizations, the align-

¹This testimony represents the personal opinion of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the United States Military Academy, Department of Defense, or any other Government agency. This testimony is based on a 14-month-long, comprehensive research project conducted at West Point by Reid Sawyer and Michael McGee.

ment of existing groups and the emergence of domestic cells inspired by al-Qaeda's ideology create a complex tapestry of actors that continues to present a very real and persistent threat to the United States. It is this last category of—homegrown al-Qaeda-inspired violent extremists—that represents perhaps the most unique dimension to this varied and dynamic landscape. Self-organizing and largely autonomous in their operations, these cells challenge the long-held notion that al-Qaeda is a solely exogenous threat to the United States.

Yet domestic terrorism is not a new phenomenon to the United States. As Brian Jenkins notes, the 1970s witnessed a far greater frequency of terrorist attacks in the United States than in the post-9/11 era.² However, the emergence of al-Qaeda-inspired violent extremism in this country since 2005 marks an environment that did not exist prior to—or even immediately after 9/11.³ Since 2001, 170 individuals in the United States have radicalized and seeking to conduct attacks. U.S. military members stationed inside the United States have emerged as the most prevalent target selected by al-Qaeda-inspired, homegrown terrorists. In 2011 alone, of the seven publicly acknowledged plots by such groups, six targeted some aspect of the military. The nature of this phenomenon is not well understood nor fully appreciated and deserving of more analysis.

As homegrown terrorism has evolved over the past decade it is significant to note that the vast majority of al-Qaeda-inspired cells in the United States have, at best, limited contacts with core elements of the organization. This is an increasingly common hallmark of an era in which globalized communication technology has simplified the transmission of ideas from one corner of the world to another, enabling action without connection. However, it is not simply the ease with which ideas are shared today that enables the global jihad, but also the construction of a virtual, global ummah—a community of believers—through which individuals can locate personal grievances within a broader framework of dissent. This process ensures that individuals can find meaning in something greater than themselves as they seek to define their level of participation in the movement. Ten years of war in two Muslim countries combined with the rapid proliferation and growing presence of global Salafi extremist jihadist ideology on the internet has created a charged environment whereby participation in the movement is not dictated by, or restricted to, an individual's country of residence. Today, individuals can “belong” to al-Qaeda with little or no physical contact with the group itself. These dynamics have enabled the rise of domestic, or homegrown, terrorism within the United States.

Fortunately, numerous law enforcement and intelligence successes against al-Qaeda and its affiliated have prevented all but a handful of attacks since 9/11. The fact that the United States has not witnessed a significant successful terrorist attack since 2001 is a testament to the advances made by the counterterrorism and law enforcement communities. As important and comforting as these metrics may be, the conclusion that al-Qaeda-directed or -inspired cells are impotent misses two significant and important dimensions of the present threat.

1. Despite the number of failures and the ineptitude displayed by some cells, homegrown terrorists are capable of inflicting significant damage. One need only look at the March 2004 bombings in Madrid, in which 191 people were killed and more than 1,800 were wounded after homegrown terrorists planted 13 bombs on four commuter trains, or the July 2005 attack in London, when 56 people were killed and 700 were injured after four suicide attackers detonated bombs on three subways and one double-decker bus, to understand that a homegrown cell can inflict significant damage. The distance between success and failure in domestic terrorist attacks is not as great as many would presume, and even one successful attack can have devastating National effects no matter the number of failures that preceded the attack.

2. The frequency of attempted attacks against the United States reveals a much more robust threat than is commonly understood. In the nearly 12 years since

²Brian Michael Jenkins, *Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010, 8–9.

³Throughout this testimony, the terms “domestic terrorism,” “homegrown terrorism” are used interchangeably. The term “homegrown terrorists” refers to terrorists who have been radicalized in their host country as opposed to those who have been radicalized in another location and then traveled to the West or the United States. Homegrown terrorists range from lone-wolf actors to small, isolated groups with little or no connection to the international jihad to groups whose members together radicalized, trained, and connected to international jihadist organizations. This definitional concept is drawn from Kimberley L. Thachuk, Marion E. “Spike” Bowman, and Courtney Richardson, “Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat Within,” Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, May 2008, 6.

the first al-Qaeda-sponsored attack on the U.S. homeland, there have been no less than 13 major plots supported by al-Qaeda or its affiliates—an average of more than one per year for 12 years. The list includes such plots as the Millennium Bomber in 2000, Najibullah Zazi's 2009 plan to attack New York City's subways and the Christmas day bomber in 2009.⁴ When the aperture expands beyond externally supported plots targeting the United States to include all domestic plots, the data reveal that there has been an attempted plot once every 2 months for 12 years within the United States. Despite the overwhelming number of failed attacks over the past 12 years, the high frequency of attacks over such an extended period of time speaks to both the resiliency and the appeal of al-Qaeda's narrative to animate an increasingly diverse group of individuals within the United States.

These two factors—the potential risk of large-scale attacks and the ability of a self-organizing movement to sustain its efforts with such frequency over so long a period of time—point to a stark reality: That while the United States and its allies have been very successful in constraining al-Qaeda's ability to operate from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen, the risk of homegrown terrorism is a more significant and persistent threat than many realize. This frustrating and troublesome state of affairs is the result of two main factors: (1) The salience of al-Qaeda's narrative ideology to a diverse audience, even those living in the United States; and (2) the organization's ability to maintain appeal across generations and to remain a relevant voice across a decade of conflict and emerging world events.

This statement first explores the prevailing assumptions about the nature of the homegrown threat and the discord that results from a lack of a common understanding of the problem. Second, it considers the changing radicalization dynamic and challenges posed by this self-organizing system of violence. Third, the statement examines the nature of this persistent threat and its focus on targeting the U.S. military in a domestic context. This data is predicated upon a 14-month comprehensive research project conducted by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point examining the homegrown jihadist threat within the United States.

HOMEgrown TERRORISM CONTEXTUALIZED

The domestic al-Qaeda threat is both a product of an international system of violence as well as a contributor to that system. While this is seemingly an obvious relationship, it is important to note that as much as homegrown terrorists are products of the broader al-Qaeda movement, the broader movement itself derives significant benefit from incidents such as those at Fort Hood, the Christmas day bomber or the attack on the Little Rock recruiting center. Attacks within the homeland, especially against military targets, provide significant propaganda value for al-Qaeda. The now infamous *Inspire* magazine highlighted these attacks as models for others to emulate and as inspiration for others to act.

This symbiotic relationship between its domestic and international aspects is integral to al-Qaeda's nature. The organization has always benefited, and at times suffered, from the activities of those inspired by its ideology or the plots of its affiliates. The very idea of al-Qaeda is rooted in a transnational vision of global jihad defined by its ideology, and has been embodied in the core of the organization that operates from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Yet al-Qaeda's fundamental constitution is built upon local, homegrown organizations. From al-Qaeda's earliest members from the Islamic Jihad to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the myriad of organizations in al-Qaeda's "diaspora" are almost exclusively homegrown movements. This fact is easy to forget when groups such as AQAP assume a transnational mantle with attacks against the U.S. homeland or the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, AQAP was born from the conflict in Yemen and ultimately remains focused on its goals within Yemen; the same is true of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or Jemmah Islamiya in Indonesia.

Seen through this lens, the evolution of domestic actors inspired by al-Qaeda does not seem as exceptional as it might otherwise appear. However, the qualifying difference between the U.S. experience of homegrown terrorism and that of other countries' is the nature of the actors in the United States. In many ways, the U.S. manifestation of al-Qaeda represents a devolution of the jihadist threat marked by the emergence of self-organizing, largely autonomous cells. These cells are rarely part of a larger organization, nor have they ever grown into a more robust organization


⁴The 13 plots included in this statistic include: Millennium Bomber, 9/11 attacks, Richard Reid, 2004 Citibank Plot, 2006 airliner plot, Najibullah Zazi New York City plots, Christmas day plots, Times Square plot, Faris, Padilla, al-Marri, and the Cargo Aircraft plots.

such as AQAP. This is due as much to the inexperience of the cell members themselves as to the largely inhospitable environment in which they operate.^d

This experience is not entirely unique to the United States. Europe has witnessed far greater levels of jihadist activity than the United States has, yet important differences separate the two. First, al-Qaeda and like-minded organizations have long-established support networks throughout Europe that have created a much more fertile environment for recruitment than in the United States. Prior to 9/11, Osama bin Laden and others were openly supported by select community and religious organizations, and in 2006, the then-head of Britain's MI-5 intelligence service noted that they were tracking 1,600 suspects in over 200 cells.⁵ The sheer scale of jihadist activity, the diversity of groups, and the largely permissible environment prior to 9/11 within the European context created vastly different conditions for the emergence of homegrown activities after 2001 than in the United States.⁶

The emergence of homegrown terrorism in the United States cannot be examined in a vacuum. As noted above, homegrown extremist activity in the United States is both a product of the external environment and a driver of such activity. It is the interplay of international and domestic plots that shapes the radicalization and mobilization of domestic audiences through four distinct but related dimensions of the al-Qaeda-inspired threat:

1. Threats targeting the United States that originate externally to the United States;
2. Individual al-Qaeda-inspired violent extremists in the United States, proceed overseas to receive training or material support and return to the United States to conduct attacks or support al-Qaeda-inspired activity;
3. Violent extremists who radicalize within the United States but travel and remain overseas to participate in the global jihad;
4. Individuals who radicalize and remain within the United States.



⁵ Alan Cowell, "Blair Says Terrorist Threat to Last a Generation," *New York Times*, 10 November 2006.

⁶ This is not to suggest that the United States did not see its own "open" activities. Some estimates put the number of U.S. residents who participated in Afghanistan, Bosnia, or Chechnya jihads ranging from 1,000 to 2,000. See Congressional Research Service report titled "American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat," 7 December, 2010. Furthermore, Abdullah Azzam and Gulbuddin Hekmaty, founder of the HiG in Afghanistan, made repeated recruiting trips through the United States—the latter doing so both during and after the end of the Afghan-Soviet war—to recruit U.S. residents.

The examination of threats originating externally to the United States may appear counterintuitive in studying domestic terrorism. However, the communicative aspects of terrorist violence are equally important, if not more important, than the physical results. Such exogenous terrorist attacks demonstrate that al-Qaeda (the organization) remains relevant, that the United States remains an important target and that success is measured in terms beyond the actual destruction of a target. These plots both demonstrate to others that security measures are not impenetrable and inspire them to act.⁷ While the mobilization of recruits in the United States is not the primary purpose of such attacks, it is an important by-product of this system of violence. Of the 15 cells in this category since 1993, the four most or nearly successful post-9/11 attacks centered on aviation targets.⁸ This category included the most complex plots as measured in the data set.⁹ Each of these attacks that originated external to the United States involved explosives and none of the targets selected in the post-9/11 era were military targets.

The second dimension of the framework concerns individuals who radicalize to violence inside the United States and desire to participate in the global jihad. These individuals vary in terms of experience, background, and connections with overseas jihadist networks, yet are consistent in their desire to gain an authentic experience and in their desire to fight against U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. However, once they enter the foreign terrorist networks the individuals in this category are convinced that their true value rests in returning to the United States and conducting an attack in the homeland. In total, there have been 12 cells to date in this dimension, all occurring in the post-9/11 environment. Eight of the 12 were connected to al-Qaeda's core organization and four were connected to al-Qaeda's affiliated organizations. The greatest density of these plots occurred between 2008 and 2011.¹⁰ Six of the 12 cells attacked a total of eight civilian targets, and only one cell targeted the U.S. military in the homeland—a successful attack against a Little Rock Armed Forces Recruiting Station. This strongly suggests that the networks training these individuals value civilian targets more than military targets and seek to inflict damage in a large-scale attack. Of the seven plots where the particular tactics were known, five planned to use explosives. The plots in this group range are among the most complex within the data set, reflecting an investment by al-Qaeda in these cells with the intention to stage spectacular attacks inside the homeland.

The third category involves U.S. residents who travel overseas to participate in the global jihad and do not return to the United States. These cases range from the Somali youths from Minneapolis who joined al-Shabaab as foot soldiers to Adnan G. El Shukrijumah, an American from Florida, who has risen to become one of al-Qaeda's external operations planners. These individuals provide significant value to al-Qaeda. At the simplest level, U.S. residents who join the al-Qaeda provide significant propaganda value for the movement and its claims against the United States and the West. While such individuals are limited in number, it is the others that are of greater concern—those individuals who, produce propaganda or serve in more senior operational roles. The “Americanization” of jihad that has occurred over the past 4 years has altered the threat environment and has direct implications for domestic radicalization. Much in the same way that prospective members of any group want to join an organization that is viable and relevant, individuals are far more likely to join an organization if they see people like themselves in that organization. American al-Qaeda members provide this example, help tailor al-Qaeda's narrative to appeal to domestic audiences and inspire others to join the jihad. These individuals do more to make the al-Qaeda's narrative relevant to domestic audiences than any other factor within al-Qaeda.

The final grouping concerns those individuals who radicalize and mobilize within the United States but do not travel abroad for training, receiving very little if any support from broader jihadist networks. Since 9/11 there have been 46 plots in this category, involving 85 individuals. These individuals present the greatest challenge to the law enforcement and intelligence communities. In each plot, the members were autonomous adherents to al-Qaeda's ideology. That is to say, they lacked any

⁷ Perhaps nowhere is this more clearly on display than in *Inspire* magazine, where the authors celebrated the success of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in penetrating airline security to inspire others to act.

⁸ For the purposes of this study, successful plots included those that alluded interdiction but where the device failed to detonate as in the example of the Christmas day bomber. This conclusion will be controversial to some, yet the fact that this sub-category of plots was successful in moving to execution phase without disruption by law enforcement is a success.

⁹ Complexity was measured as a combination of factors including nature of the target (hard or soft), attack modality, target selection, group size, etc., to gauge the degree of complexity involved across the data set.

¹⁰ There were four individuals total in this period: Vinas, Bledsoe, Zazi, and Shahzad.

formal connections to extremist networks. Furthermore, 30 of the 46 plots were perpetrated by lone-wolf actors. Perhaps not surprisingly, this category realizes the most success of any in successfully carrying out terrorist attacks (8 of 46). The reasons for this are simple: Lone-wolf actors present a lower profile, making detection more difficult as they do not have to pass through customs or trigger terrorist watch lists, allowing them to hide in plain sight. In general they represent the least complex terrorist plots of the four categories; in addition, and six of the eight successful plots utilized firearms greatly simplifying the nature of attack.¹¹

The degree of interplay between these categories is impossible to quantify, yet the fact that there is interaction between these four dimensions of the homegrown terrorist threat is undeniable. Locating the domestic threat within this system of violence, and addressing that it is both a product of the broader dynamics as well as a contributor to this system creates a unique opportunity to analyze new radicalization patterns, capture the dynamic of the threat through a different lens and examine in detail the disruption and interdiction of these plots.

Through all of this a perplexing question remains: Why, as the core of al-Qaeda is increasingly constrained and discredited as a viable organization, is the domestic jihadist activity on the periphery of the movement becoming increasingly active in the United States? From a practical perspective, this state of affairs seems somewhat counter-intuitive. To accept significant personal risk in joining a vibrant or successful terrorist movement presents a fairly high barrier to entry. However, accepting those risks for an organization that appears to be waning and whose viability is in question seems even more difficult to understand. Two explanations seem to offer insight to this paradox. First, the fact that 170 people have radicalized within the United States in the post-9/11 environment points to the relevance and appeal of al-Qaeda's narrative even if to a select, narrow group. Second, the data are almost certainly a lagging indicator of the accumulation of a more sophisticated and targeted narrative, the perceptions of a protracted conflict and the evolution of an al-Qaeda diaspora. The emergence of homegrown terrorism and the targeting of U.S. military forces requires a renewed examination of the nature of radicalization and the changing nature of autonomous radicalization—a process that today occurs largely in isolation from direct connection with external networks, creating new challenges for law enforcement and intelligence communities to detect, prevent, and deter homegrown terrorism.

RADICALIZATION REDEFINED

The rapid rise of homegrown terrorism in the past 3 years has triggered discussion about the extent and nature of radicalization within the United States. While the numbers of homegrown terrorists are small, al-Qaeda's ability to inspire and animate residents of the United States to join or act on behalf of al-Qaeda is unquestioned. On its surface, the appeal of al-Qaeda's narrative to U.S. residents is perplexing. Muslims living in the United States have a far higher degree of socioeconomic attainment than in many other countries; do not face the same assimilation or integration dilemmas experienced in other locations, and while they have experienced some levels of discrimination after 9/11, have been largely accepted in this country.¹² This paradox is further complicated by an apparent shift in the nature of radicalization whereby peripheral actors are joining the movement with little contact to physical networks.

Despite large numbers of studies focusing on radicalization, it remains one of the most opaque issues within the terrorism studies field. The sheer diversity of backgrounds and motivations to join violent extremist movements complicates any attempt to draw detailed conclusions as to the reasons people accept such risks. Gerald Post, one of the most noted scholars of terrorism psychology, cautions that efforts to provide an overall "terrorist profile" are misleading, writing that "There are nearly as many variants of personality who become involved in terrorist pursuits as there are variants of personality."¹³ For instance, within the domestic al-Qaeda-inspired population there are individuals who are educated and uneducated; those who are immigrants, first generation, second generation, and native-born participants; those who are employed and those who are unemployed and the list goes on. Even within cells there is wide variance between members. The Northern Virginia or "paintball" cell (a Lashkar-e-Taiba cell) is a prime example. The cell included three Arabs, three South Asians, one Korean, two African Americans, and two Cau-

¹¹The other two plots utilized vehicles as weapons—also a very simply attack modality.

¹²The Muslim West Facts Project, Muslim Americans: A National Portrait. Washington, DC: Gallup, Inc., 2009, 13.

¹³Gerald Post, "Current Understanding of Terrorist Motivation and Psychology: Implications for a Differentiated Antiterrorist Policy," *Terrorism* 13, no. 1 (1990), 65–71.

casians. Of those, six were born into Muslim families whereas the other five were converts to Islam. Finally, six of the members were native-born, two were naturalized citizens, and the remaining three were permanent legal residents.

The reality of this situation presents significant challenges to the understanding of radicalization, its causes and the mobilization to violence, leaving most models to reflect only the most general qualities as markers of the radicalization process. Most descriptions include elements such as an affiliative need to belong to contribute to something larger than him or herself (or alternatively a desire for adventure); disaffection with his or her current situation; identification with both the victims of state oppression and the terrorist cause (both become personal and motivate action); a belief that violence is a moral response; and finally, that the individual has a duty to act.¹⁴ The overwhelming generality of these characteristics makes it difficult to discern or identify the triggers that lead a person from sympathizing with a cause to activist behavior and finally to violent action.

Research suggests that radicalization is a fluid process, one in which participants may enter, exit, or re-enter at different points in time and the commitment of an individual to a group typically occurs in stages. It is important to note that the factors driving radicalization—in other words—why someone joins a terrorist organization—are distinct from those affecting retention in a terrorist organization. Commitment to a movement does not last on its own accord and must be maintained in some manner such that the individual's participation in a terrorist organization remains satisfying.¹⁵ Ultimately, the outcome of the radicalization process involves the subordination of previously-held identities with the new identity as a member of an extremist organization. Issues that were once peripheral move to the center of an individual's world, replacing previously-held value systems and world outlooks. For instance, an individual no longer sees himself as an American but rather sees his service to a greater cause.

Successful mobilization to violence hinges upon an organization's ability to communicate an ideology that is relevant and meaningful to the target audience. The past decade of conflict and shifting world events have challenged al-Qaeda's ability to keep its narrative relevant to the wide variety of its audiences—internal supporters, those it would like to attract to the movement and those the movement opposes—all while operating in an extremely contested environment. However, its relatively sophisticated media efforts, including “news” releases, direct messaging from movement leaders, the revisiting of historical events and the creation of interactive forums, have enabled the organization to target these various audiences in a fairly sophisticated manner.

Radicalization is best understood as occurring along a continuum of interaction between an organization and a recruit. At one end are cases in which a recruit is directly connected to the movement by ideological entrepreneurs with whom he has personal contact. At the other end are cases in which a recruit actively seeks or encounters information and ideas from an extremist movement but lacks direct personal contact. The difference between the members of the Hamburg Cell who formed the core of the 9/11 plot and Major Nidal Hasan's contact with an jihad ideologue is reflective of this continuum—presuming, for the purposes of this paper, that Hasan was motivated by the al-Qaeda's ideology. In the former case, Mohammed Atta and three colleagues attended the Quds mosque in Hamburg, Germany, in which a radical cleric routinely discussed violent jihad.¹⁶ In the Fort Hood case, that role was fulfilled by a U.S.-born Yemeni cleric whose sermons in English extolled the virtues of the al-Qaeda narrative.¹⁷ The only difference between the two radicalization types is that in a “self-radicalization” event, it is necessary for the individual to initially have a higher degree of commitment to the cause than an individual who is engaging in direct personal contact with the group or movement. In other words, direct contact with committed group members can make it possible for

¹⁴These factors are adapted from John Horgan's “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes,” *Annals of Political and Social Science* (The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2008) 618: 85.

¹⁵As one study of social movements noted: “Leadership, ideology, organization, rituals, and social relations which make up a friendship network each contribute to sustaining commitment and the most effective is, of course, a combination of all five.” Klandermas Bert, “Disengaging from Movements,” in Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper (eds), *The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 16.

¹⁶*The 9/11 Commission Report*, New York: Norton, 2003, 164.

¹⁷Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 2009. 111th Cong, 1st sess.; Also see Michael Leiter, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Remarks at Aspen Institute's “The Terror Threat Picture and Counterterrorism Strategy,” 30 June 2010.

individuals who are less committed at the onset to become more firmly radicalized than he might become on his own.

This phenomenon of self-organizing, autonomous radicalization became extremely pronounced in the United States after 2001. Since 9/11, U.S. law enforcement has severely constricted the environment in which radicalizing and mobilizing networks can operate. By doing so, they have essentially isolated the would-be-terrorist, forcing them to actively seek out materials on-line to expose themselves to these views. In other words, absent a peer network or other direct assistance, the individual must proactively engage the ideas to commit themselves to the radicalization pathway. Of the homegrown terrorists that radicalize and remain in United States, as opposed to those who radicalize and go abroad to fight, 56% (26 of 46 cells) of the cells radicalize in near-complete isolation from al-Qaeda or its affiliated networks—either physical or virtual. When considering all of the homegrown cells in totality, 44% of these cells are largely disconnected from jihadist networks and move through the radicalization process in isolation. The explanation for the lower figure is simple. The second number includes domestically radicalized individuals who seek to fight abroad and, with few exceptions, it is necessary for these cells to make contact with a network to successfully engage in the broader global movement.

In an effort to continue to drive radicalization in the United States (and the West in general), al-Qaeda and its affiliates have had to specifically tailor their message to reach the “self-radicalizing” audience. This is especially important as the vast majority of cells that have radicalized and remained in the United States since 9/11 are lone wolf plots (65%). *Inspire* magazine is one of many examples of this type of media that has been produced over the last few years. Created by Samir Khan and Anwar al-Awlaki, two American citizens, *Inspire* magazine served a unique function as each issue provided both ideological instruction and tactical know-how to the aspiring domestic jihadist.¹⁸ Prior to the establishment of *Inspire* magazine, most of al-Qaeda’s materials were ideological, motivational, or tactical in nature. The combination of these dimensions in single product was an evolutionary step for al-Qaeda’s outreach and recruitment efforts functionally providing a one-stop reference to interested parties.

A recent plot that was fueled by *Inspire* magazine was the 2011 Ft. Hood bomb plot. In an early issue of *Inspire* magazine, Anwar al-Awlaki praised Nidal Hasan for the 2009 Fort Hood shooting that killed 13 and injured 32 military personnel. This previous attack and subsequent validation by Anwar al-Awlaki, fueled Army PFC Naser Jason Abdo to plot a similar attack near the same post. His plan was to detonate two improvised explosive devices inside a restaurant popular with military personnel and to shoot those fleeing the attack. This plot was developed by Abdo in almost complete isolation. When the FBI interdicted the plot they discovered bomb-making materials and a copy of *Inspire* magazine containing an article entitled, “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.” He was reported to have been using the exact recipe found in the magazine to construct his improvised explosive devices.¹⁹

THE MILITARY AS TARGETS

As the decade of conflict has evolved, the predominant target of choice for homegrown terrorists in the United States has become the U.S. military. Nearly 50 percent of all plots in the homeland since 9/11 (41 of 87 plots) considered targeting U.S. military personnel. In one sense, the military focus is perhaps an obvious choice by those aspiring to participate in the global jihad. To an al-Qaeda adherent, the U.S. military represents the manifestation of American foreign policy more so than any other target choice as the military—in al-Qaeda’s narrative—is responsible for the oppression and humiliation of Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen, among other locations.

The targeting of U.S. military forces within the homeland presents a unique and perhaps qualitatively different target set than transportation infrastructure, religious, or other civilian entities. The perception that the military is to blame for the plight of Muslims abroad is overwhelmingly privileged in al-Qaeda’s propaganda from *Inspire* magazine to recruiting videos featuring improvised explosive devices killing U.S. soldiers. This portrayal of U.S. military forces as war criminals and the accompanying call for reprisals create a compelling narrative for those seeking to define their participation in the fight.

¹⁸These individuals prominently figure in the creation of the publication and are listed in the publication numerous times.

¹⁹*United States of America v. Naser Jason Abdo*, Criminal Complaint. Western District, TX, 2011, 1–2.

However, there is a more subtle dimension to the selection and justification of the military as a preferred target, but one that is equally important to consider. For many homegrown terrorists, attacking the military may well represent a choice that is “easier” to overcome in terms of the moral barriers of targeting symbols of U.S. foreign policy rather than the shopping mall, restaurants, or public spaces in which he or she may have frequented with his or her friends. The social distance between a terrorist’s individual experiences and the military is in most cases far greater than that of other potential targets, making it easier to objectify military targets. Abdul-Latif, the perpetrator of the planned attack against the Seattle Military Entrance Processing Station captured this sentiment best: “The key thing to remember here is, is we are not targeting anybody innocent—that means old people, women out of uniform, any children. Anything. Just people who wear the green for the kaffir Army, that’s who we’re going after.”²⁰

Finally, while any al-Qaeda-inspired attack within the United States is a high-profile event for both the violent extremists and the citizens of this Nation, successful attacks against the military in the homeland represent a particularly unique event. Government agencies including military garrisons, recruiting stations, and law enforcement offices, have long been considered primary and important targets by terrorist groups around the world. Not only does the targeting of these agencies seek to interfere with the execution of Governmental affairs, but as instruments of National power, these targets serve an expressive purpose as well as an instrumental one. The symbolic value of targeting military or law enforcement is significant. Such attacks demonstrate a degree of power by the terrorist, seek to draw attention to structural violence by the state serving an agenda-setting function and, finally, hope to deter others from supporting the Government.

All of these factors are at play with al-Qaeda-inspired violence in the homeland targeting military facilities, yet there is still another dimension. Violence against service members in their barracks, offices, or with their families shocks the National conscience in ways that combat deaths do not. This is not to say that combat losses mean less than a soldier killed during a homegrown terrorist attack, but rather that the effect of these events in the press and National psyche differ: Soldiers are supposed to be safe when at home, they are not supposed to die from a terrorist’s bomb or rifle.²¹

In examining the threat to military forces in the homeland, it is important to note that most analyses under-represent the scope and dimensions of the threat by homegrown, al-Qaeda-inspired terrorists. A cursory look at the data would indicate that there have “only” been 18 attacks that directly target U.S. military forces within the United States; 14 of those have occurred since 2007. This is a significant number to be sure, however, these numbers do not reflect the totality of interest in targeting U.S. military forces amongst the domestic jihadi population. A broader look at the issue reveals two other groups requiring examination. The first focuses on those homegrown extremists that sought to fight U.S. forces abroad. Ten cells actually accomplished this and 13 others intended to do so. This group is of primary concern. When these cells leave the United States with the purpose of engaging in classical jihad against American military forces they enter the “black box” of jihad in which they can be directed towards a myriad of different targets. Some of the largest threats America has faced in recent years from homegrown extremists have occurred when individuals’ interest was redirected after arriving overseas or planned on returning to the United States to conduct an attack. Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, arrived in Pakistan intent on joining the Pakistani Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) in the hopes of fighting American military forces in Afghanistan. The TTP leadership quickly recognized that his value was far greater if he were trained and redirected to carry out a terrorist in the United States. Although, Shahzad’s limited training prevented him from designing a successful car bomb, his ability to avoid detection and to place the bomb in Times Square on a busy Saturday evening was a blow to Americans’ perception of security.

The second group to evaluate is those individuals within the United States that considered attacking military forces in the homeland but, for whatever reason, changed course as they moved forward. This group includes an additional eight plots. Military targets were the first step in their vision of participating in the global jihad with the homeland given the strong symbolism of U.S. military targets. While these cells ultimately did not select a military target, the numbers reflect a

²⁰ Complaint at page 31, *US v. Abdul-Latif, et ano.*, No. MJ11–292 (W.D. Wash., 2011).

²¹ For example, in a Google News search that ranges 90 days from two incidents, the November 2009 Fort Hood shooting and the August 2011 Chinook crash that killed U.S. Navy SEALs in Afghanistan shortly after the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, the number of articles referencing the Fort Hood shooting outnumbered the Chinook crash by a factor of 7:1.

strong interest in doing so. Together, this expanded look at the data reveals 49 cells over the past decade planned to, or desired to, attack U.S. military forces. This represents more than half (56%) of the total number of cells (87) in the data set. The more pressure al-Qaeda's core is subjected to, the more difficult it will be for people in the United States to connect with foreign networks overseas. While it is impossible to know for certain if these cells would have selected military targets had they been unable to travel to Pakistan, the primacy of the U.S. military as a target for al-Qaeda's adherents is likely to remain steady for some time to come.

Any examination of al-Qaeda's targeting of homeland military forces must include a discussion of what has colloquially become known as the insider threat.²² The effect of these actors on the military is perhaps more divisive and damaging than attacks against military targets staged by external actors. At the tactical level, insiders also have the potential to do more harm than external threats given their knowledge of installations, schedules, and ability to gain access to areas that would be restricted to civilians. At the organizational level, insider threats tear at the social fabric of an organization and make people question the patriotism of those serving next to them. At the strategic level, these attacks provide al-Qaeda with immense propaganda value and, in one sense, these actors are the ultimate prize for al-Qaeda. The rejection of the values that their uniforms stood for and an abandonment of the oaths they swore validate al-Qaeda's narrative in a way that no other domestic, homegrown radicalized individual could hope to achieve. Simply put, the potential effects of the insider threat are grossly disproportionate to the extremely small number of these cells. The characteristics of the insiders reveal four interesting trends.

1. The radicalization process for all individuals took place in near-isolation and was passive in nature. The contact with outside extremists was exceptionally sparse and often over email. For example, Abujihaad maintained limited correspondence with two subjects and through these individuals, disseminated sensitive data but he lacked direct ties with these subjects. Abdo, Akbar, and Anderson also appeared to lack any meaningful, direct communication with extremist networks.
2. Related to the first dynamic, the individuals that engaged in physical attacks were exclusively lone-wolf actors. Whether the decision to act alone resulted from lack of access to extremist networks or resulted from a strategic choice (or social disposition) is not known—but the lack of contact with external networks significantly limit the opportunity for detection and interdiction.
3. The strong degree of isolation of the actors is strongly correlated to a low level of plot complexity. Again, it is largely impossible to discern the actors' intent or attack preference but given the attack profiles, it is clear they favored the readily available rather than intricate mass-casualty tactics. Despite the desire of two individuals to use explosives, firearms were the preferred tactic of four of the six in this group.
4. In the two mass casualty attacks, target selection evidenced the value of knowledge and access of an insider. Insider threats are not dangerous solely because of their access—which is crucial—but it is the combination of access with knowledge of the organization, time schedules, and vulnerable points that enable plots to become significantly more dangerous than they otherwise might be.

By design or happenstance, these attackers produced significant “psychological anxiety” (in the words of Abujihaad) within the U.S. military. It is all too easy to forget that, at its fundamental level, terrorism is about the psychology of fear. Targeting of the military, either from the inside or external to the Armed Forces, presents uniquely different outcomes than exist in other quarters. This is not to say these attacks mean more or have a greater impact than similar deaths among civilian communities but rather to suggest that the prevalence of interest among homegrown extremists to target the military is a persistent issue that must be taken seriously.

²²For the purposes of this study, the insider threat includes active-duty service members, Government civilian employees, military contractors, Reservists or National Guard members and former military members. This expansive definition permits the inclusion of the threats that have unique knowledge about military installations, patterns of behavior, access requirements, and can use that knowledge to gain advantages external actors would not otherwise possess.

CONCLUSION

While domestic violent extremists have only realized limited success in the United States, the initial data presented here paint a picture of a greater threat than many realize. However, the potential physical violence from these aspiring cells is only one dimension of the threat. The radicalization and mobilization to violence of U.S. citizens tears at the fabric of society in a way that attacks originating from Yemen or Pakistan do not. Xenophobic responses to these incidents foster mistrust of Muslim diaspora communities and risk creating the very conditions that work against counterterrorism efforts in which communities turn inward and cooperation with law enforcement officials is reduced. Effective intelligence and law enforcement efforts to detect and disrupt homegrown cells are critically necessary but are not sufficient to fully addressing the problem of homegrown extremism. Law enforcement efforts must be coupled with programs to counter violent extremism to ultimately foster inhospitable conditions for the emergence of al-Qaeda-inspired extremists within the United States.

Chairman KING. Thank you, Colonel Sawyer. Also thank you for your prepared statement, which I read last night. It was really a treatise on terrorism. Thank you very much.

Secretary Stockton, in your prepared testimony, and also in an article you wrote entitled "Ten Years After 9/11: Challenges for the Decade to Come," you said, among other things, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is actively recruiting U.S. military personnel to conduct lone-actor attacks on U.S. military targets. How significant do you believe the threat is from within the military, and how successful has al-Qaeda been at recruiting members of the American military?

Mr. STOCKTON. The primary threat to security at home comes from al-Qaeda, its affiliates like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and its adherents. We take very seriously the continuing efforts by AQAP and other al-Qaeda components to recruit members of the United States military, to inspire others to attack U.S. military facilities and communities, and it is an issue that we take very seriously. It is my focus in order to build the policies, the training programs, everything else that we need in order to defeat this threat, because those recruitment efforts are on-going. Again, this is a persistent threat, it is an enduring threat, it is an evolving threat that we need to stay in front of.

Chairman KING. Secretary Stockton, we are in open session, so I am not going to ask for precise numbers, but are there cases within the military right now involving prospective jihadists and terrorists that you are aware of or monitoring?

Mr. STOCKTON. I welcome the opportunity to answer that question in closed session.

Chairman KING. Okay.

Senator Lieberman, we will go into closed session at the end of the second panel. All right. We will reconvene in closed session. Thank you very much.

Mr. Stuteville, as Senator Collins mentioned, during the 1990s, when there were white supremacist attacks within the military, when there were right-wing extremist attacks carried out within the military, the military made it clear that right-wing extremists and white supremacists were those who carried out the attacks, and those ideologies were identified. Yet it appears that the ideology of violent Islamist extremism is not identified by name, including in your most recent documents. So I would ask why does the Army now believe that it should not identify who the enemy

is when it was particularly appropriate to identify the enemy 16, 17 years ago?

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Sir, after the tragic attacks at Fort Hood, the Army made the decision based upon the Department of Defense guidance to revise our AR 3D1—Army Regulation 3D1-12, the Threat Awareness and Reporting Program. When we rewrote that regulation, we changed the focus from—the older version of that regulation was a Cold War-focused, espionage-focused regulation. When we updated this regulation, we included updated indicators of espionage, updated indicators of international terrorism, and updated indicators of extremist activity, which was a first for the Army in addressing that particular problem in this manner. These indicators, though, are focused on behavioral activity, not on any specific ideology, religion, or ethnic group. We have adopted that approach because we want to make sure that we can account for any type of threat, both those previously and those in the future. So focusing on the behavioral activity is how we have looked at doing this.

Chairman KING. Mr. Stuteville, if we are relying on behavioral analysis and ignoring a person's ideology, the fact is, as Senator Lieberman said, the enemy here is extreme, violent Islam, a small minority, a tiny minority, but the fact is they are not rallying toward Christianity, or Judaism, or atheism, or Buddhism, or Hinduism. The particular enemy today comes from a very violent form of Islam. Just as in the 1990s there were white supremacists, and there were skinheads, and there were Klan members, and it seemed the military never hesitated in targeting that enemy and identifying that enemy, yet it appears that, for instance, again, in this new Threat Awareness Reporting Program—you know, yes, I am not saying we go back to the Cold War, but the fact is white supremacists, that was not the Cold War; that was a particular virulent ideology that was, I believe, rightly and correctly and effectively attacked by the military. It appears as if today we are being politically correct by not identifying who the target is. I would say the same thing if we were talking about Irish Catholics who were carrying out attacks. Identify them. Say who they are.

I think we are sort of being too politically correct here, and I find that very frustrating. I will give you an opportunity to answer that.

Then also my final question, and then I will be out of time, will be we have learned, the committee staff, that, for instance, in barracks that *Inspire* magazine is available to members of the Armed Forces. Now, was that just an aberration? Is that policy? Because I know, for instance, people can't fly Confederate flags or Nazi flags in a barracks, and yet *Inspire* magazine is the propaganda organ of the enemy, and a number of us, including myself, have actually been named in that magazine by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

So I would ask you to answer the specific question regarding *Inspire*, and also why this change in policy to go from naming an ideology to ignoring the ideology.

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Sir, I will answer your question about *Inspire* magazine. Sir, regarding *Inspire* magazine, yes, sir, there are soldiers—we have documented incidents where soldiers have gone on line and gotten *Inspire* magazine. In our current AR 3D1-12,

Threat Awareness and Reporting Program, which I referred to earlier, we requested the behavioral indicators that we have identified in our table 3.3 on extremist activity, that is one of those behavioral indicators that we want soldiers to report when they observe other soldiers reading *Inspire* magazine either on-line—

Chairman KING. If it is reported, is the person allowed to keep it in the barracks and it is just put up as one more indicator, or is it removed?

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Sir, if it is reported to the counterintelligence authorities, we will investigate to determine if there is a logical reason for the soldier to have the magazine. If he is associated with terrorist activity or other activity that is deemed not supportive of the Army values, then obviously we will deal with the situation. But the bottom line, there are sometimes intelligence analysts and others who read *Inspire* magazine for logical reasons, and that is what we would want to determine.

Mr. STOCKTON. Mr. Chairman, could I briefly speak to the larger policy questions here? We know who the adversary is. The primary threat is al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Everything that we are doing in terms of primary focus of our efforts concentrates on that threat. So when you look at the interim guidance issued by former Secretary Gates, and we provide this overall policy to each of the Armed Services, expressing sympathy or support for a violence-promoting organization, associating with terrorists, having a copy of *Inspire* magazine under your desk, these are behavioral indicators that we apply and focus on the primary threat. We are not at war with Islam; we are at war with al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and its adherents. That is how we concentrate our effort.

Chairman KING. Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I want to ask two questions that come off of the report that our Senate committee did after our extensive investigation of the killings at Fort Hood. The first builds on what Chairman King has just been pursuing. We found, I will go into this briefly, that Major Nidal Hasan had made statements, either informally in the presence of fellow members of the U.S. Army or actually in one case in a lecture he gave to other members of the Army at Walter Reed, which were incendiary, provocative, talking about really showing that he had radicalized to violent Islamist extremism. Yet none of the personnel in the Army who heard those statements reported them or attempted to do anything to raise a question about whether this individual really should be in the U.S. Army before he did somebody great damage. So one of the recommendations in our report was that the Pentagon begin to train members of the U.S. military in signs of radicalization to Islamist extremism, both obviously to protect the safety of members of the military from another incident like Fort Hood, but, frankly, also to protect the religious observance of the thousands of Muslim Americans who serve honorably in our military so that people could be able to tell the difference.

I mean, I think part of what we heard in our investigation was that some of the reason why people who heard Hasan say these outrageous, violent things weren't sure whether it was—that was really Islam, or he had politicized Islam may have also been that

they just didn't want to create a problem, so they turned away from it.

But I am concerned that the Pentagon has not implemented that kind of training program, which is not only in the interests of securing the hundreds of thousands, millions of Active and Reserve and Guard, but also in protecting the thousands of Muslim Americans in the military.

Secretary Stockton, you want to take a try at that?

Mr. STOCKTON. Chairman, I would, and then I would like to turn it over to Mr. Stuteville to talk about how the Army is applying overall guidance.

We agree that it is critical to continue to ensure that our supervisory personnel in the military can recognize signs of radicalization. The interim guidance issued by former Secretary Gates takes us a long way in that regard. Indeed, many of the behavioral indicators retrospectively look back at the obvious warning signs, the red flags that should have been going off before, prior to Fort Hood, that now we can prospectively look forward, and again continue to refine these training tools so that our supervisors are able to monitor and detect and then effectively intervene when, for example, military personnel espouse violent ideology, when they praise an extremist group abroad, and, above all, when they attack American values.

But I would like to turn it over to Mr. Stuteville to talk about—

Senator LIEBERMAN. So is there a training program of that kind going on now either for all military personnel or at least for supervisors?

Mr. STOCKTON. Yes, sir. I think if I could turn it over to Mr. Stuteville to talk about how the Army is applying it, then I could have some additional thoughts to share on the other services.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Sir, after we revised the Army Regulation 3D1-12, which I referred to earlier in talking to Mr. King, we have since gone out and professionalized the training program across the Army. So besides putting out the Army regulation, we have adopted a professional training program. We train a cadre of trainers to be able to present this training in an effective way, to be able to tailor the briefings to their audience, whether it be a Brigade Combat Team or a group of researchers and scientists. We have ensured that there are a number of professionally-done vignettes in this training that cover each of the behavioral indicators that we put into the new regulation.

If you look at table 3.3 in the Army Regulation 3D1-12, the indicators of extremist activity that may pose a threat to DOD or disrupt U.S. military operations, you would see that three of those indicators that we list in that table, those indicators you were talking about reference Major Hasan earlier in your question to Secretary Stockton, would have been covered under that table 3.3. So in today's regulation, soldiers are trained to report these behavioral indicators, and we are confident that we would have received reports on those had we educated our force properly prior to Fort Hood.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. I appreciate that answer. That is encouraging.

Let me just ask you a final question, because my time is running out. The other question was about what we found to be the lack of coordination between the FBI and DOD in the Hasan Fort Hood case. In that case it was particularly that personnel at the FBI had not really taken action based on emails that they knew were going from Hasan to al-Awlaki, the now-dead radical cleric in Yemen.

But I want to ask a different question before my time is up. We have more than 5,000 recruiting centers, military recruiting centers, in the United States the last time I looked at the numbers. The first American killed by a violent Islamist extremist here in the homeland after 9/11, after 2011, was Private William Long outside an Army recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas. I want to ask about what the level of cooperation is, because these recruiting centers, of course, are on Main Streets all across America, they are in shopping malls, they are wherever, but these are areas of jurisdiction for local and State law enforcement, and perhaps the FBI. So just give us a quick answer on what we are doing now to secure those recruiting centers of the U.S. military.

Mr. STOCKTON. Chairman Lieberman, under the Memorandum of Agreement between DOD and the FBI now, we have DOD personnel embedded in over 60 FBI JTTFs around the Nation. We have liaison relationships with State and local law enforcement in all of the communities across the Nation where our recruiting centers exist. This is all facilitated by the new eGuardian system for sharing of suspicious-activity information that local law enforcement have, that our own personnel have, so that together they can take the anti-terrorism and force protection measures necessary to secure facilities that are embedded in our communities, and where local law enforcement will always be in the lead. What we need to do is continue to strengthen that collaborative relationship in order to secure our military communities.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. My time is up. I thank you. I am going to ask you some more particular questions about that for the record.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STOCKTON. I welcome that.

Chairman KING. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

Just so people are aware—on the order of questioners, it is going to be those who were here when the gavel came down, and then after that in order of seniority. We are trying to get at it the best we can. So we will go to the Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson.

Representative THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Stockton, you have had ample time to review Fort Hood's shooting and look at some of the information gleaned from that review. Have we come up with any lessons learned from that that you think would be instructive for this committee?

Mr. STOCKTON. Yes, sir. The first lesson learned was that we had an inadequate flow of information from the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces to the Department of Defense and then down to the installation commanders responsible for antiterrorism measures. The specific problems, the specific failures that helped facilitate the breakdowns in the Fort Hood incident, those are the ones that we have helped model in order to fix in our new relationship.

Let me give you a few examples. First of all, we have now had the opportunity to carefully explain to the Department of Justice and the FBI what kind of information that we need. We have now an institutionalized flow. So it doesn't only come from the FBI to one or two people inside the Department of Defense; it is spread around so there isn't a single point of failure. So there isn't a risk that the institution as a whole will sit on information rather than acting on it.

We have a special training program for the DOD personnel who are now being embedded in 60 Joint Terrorism Task Forces around the Nation so they know what to look for so they can identify a DOD nexus, a reason why we need that information to flow to us, and we have very careful measures in place to protect civil liberties and to make sure that, as a matter of law and policy, the Department of Defense is fully respecting privacy, civil liberties, and the Constitutional guarantees under which we all live.

Representative THOMPSON. So your testimony is that after that review and the regulations and rules that have been instituted, that similar occurrences like Fort Hood would be minimized?

Mr. STOCKTON. Yes, sir.

Representative THOMPSON. Thank you.

Lieutenant Colonel Sawyer, one of your responsibilities I see is to review some of the training material that is going out in the broader community to address this issue. I think part of it is that some of this training material has been identified as perhaps misleading. Can you suggest to the committee a way to address some uniformity standards within the training for this issue?

Colonel SAWYER. Yes, sir. There are two critical parts to this. The first is that we do not want to inhibit our ability to educate, whether it is—our forces, whether it is in the interagency, the intelligence community, or the military, on these critical threats. How do we get our soldiers or our intelligence or law enforcement officials to understand these threats in which they can react to them in a proactive manner and to understand them in depth to be able to focus on the changing trajectory of our time? To achieve uniformity in this, what we need to do is really instill that there is a competency in the people that are producing the training material, that they are academically rigorous, that they are based on sound research in which they are producing, and that they are fact-based and not—and devoid of political agenda or personal opinion in those. If we accomplish that, I think that the training materials become much more responsible in a general sense across the broader enterprise. In fact, the reviews have shown this to be the case.

Representative THOMPSON. Thank you.

Listen, Mr. Stuteville, one of the issues that some of us grapple with is whether or not putting into place these standards, whether we can do that and maintain the desired unit cohesion necessary for the military to do its job. Are you comfortable that those items you have worked on will on one hand identify the issues, but will not jeopardize unit cohesion on the other?

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Sir, yes, I am. To elaborate, one of the issues that we push when we give this training to the soldiers and civilians in the Army is that there are a multitude of reporting mechanisms should they observe one of these behavioral indicators and

need to report it. They can report it to a counterintelligence agent; they can report it to a criminal investigator; they can report it to their commander, to their squad leader, to their security officer. We have put in place a link on the Army Knowledge Network that they can report this electronically. So we have put so many mechanisms in place to allow soldiers to report the information, the behavioral indicators, in a manner in which they feel comfortable, and that we have seen soldiers using all of these venues for reporting, and that is why we believe it is very effective.

Representative THOMPSON. Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman KING. I thank the gentleman.

The order for the next several speakers is Mr. Cravaack, Ms. Sanchez, Mr. Turner, Ms. Jackson Lee, Mr. Lungren, Mr. Cuellar, Mr. Rogers, and Senator Pryor.

The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Cravaack, is recognized.

Representative CRAVAACK. Thank you, Chairman King, thank you, Chairman Lieberman, for holding these what I consider extremely important discussions in open forum. As a retired military officer, I, quite frankly, find it frustrating that we are playing politics on threat assessment. We should be able to identify the enemy, know who they are, and call them for what they are—and it is violent radical Islamic extremism—and be able to identify that. Our troop—we owe that to our troops to identify the enemy and make sure that they are aware of it to protect them. As a military commander, that is one of my most important jobs is to protect my troops.

So with that said, Secretary Stockton, if you would, sir, thank you for being here. I just found out today you were a fellow Minnesotan. So good to hear.

In your testimony you refer to an administrative strategy empowering local partners to prevent violent extremism in the United States, stating the best defense against violent extremist ideologies are well-informed and -equipped families. Could you elaborate a little bit more what you meant by this?

Mr. STOCKTON. My pleasure.

The President has issued a new strategy last August 2011 empowering local partners to prevent violent extremism in the United States. Families are an important part—Muslim families are an important part of the effort in order to defeat the recruitment and radicalization of American citizens and residents and the efforts of al-Qaeda to turn them into attackers against military communities and all Americans. We view the opportunity to treat families across the Nation as partners in this shared endeavor as an important component of the overall strategy that the President has issued.

Representative CRAVAACK. Thank you, sir. I appreciate you elaborating on that.

Mr. Stuteville, sir, according to our committee's investigation, the Army doesn't currently share counterterrorism information given to it by the FBI with its own military intelligence analysts or even commanders. Could you confirm this? If you can confirm this, why is this the case?

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Sir, with all due respect, sir, I disagree with that statement. In fact, we do share counterterrorism information with our local commanders, the force protection officers in installa-

tions, security officers in the chain of command. Every time we receive information, whether it be from the FBI or other Federal agencies, or within our own Department of Defense or Army, that indicates a threat to an installation, we go to great means to make sure that all the leaders at every echelon have the information so that they make the appropriate decisions to protect our force and their families.

Representative CRAVAACK. Excellent. That is good to know. Thank you very much. I appreciate you expanding upon that.

Colonel Sawyer, sir, the question I have was to what extent al-Qaeda is attempting—can you elaborate—to infiltrate its members into the U.S. military and also to conduct counterterrorist attacks, and if you see an increase in a trend in this.

Colonel SAWYER. Sir, parts of that question would probably be best addressed in a closed session. But in terms of the recruitment and the radicalization efforts by al-Qaeda, essentially what they have done is by creating a distributive network in the rapid proliferation of their materials on-line, which makes it accessible for anybody, regardless of their country or residence or ethnicity, to participate and belong to this movement, it really increases the number of entry points. As I mentioned before, it really functionally decreases the barrier of entry for these individuals to join and to be radicalized. As they continue to paint the military in this essence of war criminals, as it legitimates military as targets, it certainly will induce individuals to further target the U.S. military and will increase the risk from insider threat.

Representative CRAVAACK. Thank you.

Secretary Stockton, if I can. The clear evidence I have read so far is that I have read and heard that jihadists have discussed and are tragically carrying out in some instances attacks on soft military-related targets, such as recruiting centers, military funerals, Metro stations frequented by military personnel, et cetera. What can be done to harden these targets? How do you see how we can protect our military troops when they are actually most vulnerable?

Mr. STOCKTON. Congressman, I welcome the opportunity to address that question in closed session. I promise in the closed session I will also explain that there are places warmer than Minnesota. We will keep that classified.

Representative CRAVAACK. Roger that. Okay. My time is expiring, and I thank you very much for your answers. I yield back.

Chairman KING. The gentleman yields back.

I recognize for 5 minutes the gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez.

Representative SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, once again for being before us.

You know, my husband Jack is a retired military officer, and on 9/11, he was in Germany, and he headed up pretty much all of the law—he is a lawyer—all of the law institutions that we have and oversaw that in Germany. He recalls that the day after 9/11, he had to go in and talk to the lawyers on the other side for local municipalities and explain to them why we had driven our tanks all over the towns. Obviously we had somewhat overreacted to what was happening over here, and he had to go and explain what the

heck we were doing by driving our tanks all over towns and shutting things down.

So I think we need to plan ahead so that we don't have these types of reactions, and we need to plan ahead just as we learned in that issue with Germany to plan ahead with our local municipalities and our local law enforcement when these types of things happen, when we have—or to plan against a terrorist attack that might happen overseas or here in the United States. So I think that when we soul-search to try to figure out what do we need to do, I think that is very important. As a Member who also sits on the Armed Services Committee for 15 years now, we have looked at much of this to try to figure out, you know, what do we do, and how do we do it.

So I think planning is important. I think education is very important, education of the troops.

I would like to ask unanimous consent to put into the record some documents that we have here, some of the experiences that—and in particular that we have of some of our Muslim soldiers and airmen, et cetera, and how they feel being in the military, wanting to be a part of what is really a great institution of the United States, and, you know, talking about how they are looked at differently within their units or their corps, even though some of them have Bronze Stars, Silver Stars, you know, Medals; that they are always looked at with questions in the eyes of even some of their fellow unit members.

So my question to you is, first of all—

Chairman KING. Does the gentlelady wish to introduce them into the record?

Representative SANCHEZ. May I introduce them into the record, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman KING. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information follows:]

STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY HON. SANCHEZ—FROM CURRENT AND FORMER U.S. MILITARY

LETTER FROM ABDUL-RASHEED MUHAMMAD, MILITARY CHAPLAIN

5 DECEMBER, 2011.

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate, 340 Dirksen Senate Office, Washington, DC 20510.

Committee on Homeland Security,
U.S. House of Representatives, H2-176 Ford House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.

DEAR SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVES: My name is Abdul-Rasheed Muhammad, on 3 December 1993, I was affirmed at the Pentagon to be our Nation's first Islamic military chaplain. I have served as a chaplain on active duty for the past 18 years. Currently, I am assigned as a Behavioral Health Program Manager in the Health Promotion and Wellness Portfolio, United States Army Public Health Command (USAPHC), Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

I write today as a chaplain and senior officer deeply concerned as we approach this week's hearing titled: "Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat to Military Communities Inside the United States."

Why am I concerned? I'm concerned because I'm not really sure who's being referred to during these hearings? Who needs to be under suspicion? Who is actually considered a threat to our military communities? Will this process simply identify individuals based upon their first and/or last name? Perhaps their religious preference would be enough to determine their potential threat to our military communities? Or maybe they'll be identified or categorized as a potential threat simply based upon their race or ethnicity? I'm certain you would agree, if these characteris-

tics are the sole criteria for such categorization, of single group of people, it would not only be ludicrous, it would guess it might be outright presumptive and even discriminatory.

During my 18 years on active duty as a chaplain, which included: A 1-year unaccompanied tour to the Republic of South Korea, a 3-year accompanied tour to the Federal Republic of Germany, a 12-month deployment to Iraq during OIF II, as well as a 3-month deployment to Afghanistan for OEF in 2008. Of the many awards I've earned for military service, the most distinguished has been the Bronze Star for my service during OIF II. Prior to my service as an Army chaplain, I served as an enlisted Soldier from November 1982 to November 1985. I was honorably discharged as an active duty enlisted Soldier on 3 NOV 1985.

Throughout my 21 years of performing and providing ministerial services to multiple groups and hundreds of our Soldiers, Family members, and DA civilians, I've found Muslim Soldiers to be no different than any other group Soldiers by religious preference. Amongst them (Muslim Soldiers) generally speaking, I found them to be honest, loyal, trustworthy, patriotic, also at times, they've been challenging, stubborn, unmotivated no different than many other Soldiers that I've helped, supported, counseled, consoled, or just simply worked with. They just happened to be of the Islamic faith. These same Muslims in uniform have faithfully and consistently modeled our Army's values as both Soldiers, and leaders throughout the Army.

It is because of my years of service in our Nation's military that I feel so strongly about these hearings and its potential for ultimately doing a disservice to all of our men and women in uniform, particularly those who've made the ultimate sacrifice at home and abroad. I believe it is inaccurate, unjust, as well as potentially unethical to blame or cast dispersion upon any entire race, religion, or ethnic group of people, for the misguided, hate-filled machinations of a few.

It has been my experience as a chaplain and enlisted soldier, to often see the important role diversity can play in facilitating and increasing morale, as well as establishing good order and discipline amongst all of our troops. To think that our trusted, elected representatives would be willing to cast such a critical eye, by merely singling out, or "investigating" a single group amongst our brave men and women primarily based upon their faith preference, race, or ethnicity is unconscionable as well as morally wrong.

I am no more personally responsible for the misgivings of the few misguided Muslims who committed crimes against innocents in our country, than any random Euro-American would be responsible today for misgivings of slavery in the antebellum south.

Additionally, my religious endorser, the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) has been integral in providing the moral and spiritual foundation from which my ministry in the Armed Services has been allowed to flourish. ISNA, continues to provide quality religious leadership to 30 chaplains, and Lay Leaders throughout the DOD, and DOJ. During these troubling times, organizations like ISNA have been out front in its portrayal of the correct image of Islam and Muslims within our pluralistic environment. That is, Islam the last of the three great Abrahamic faith traditions is a religion of Peace, and the vast majority of Muslims are Peacemakers, not Peace breakers! During the past 21 years, I've been blessed to serve both Muslims and non-Muslims within this pluralistic environment and I am forever grateful for this privilege.

Finally, I believe these hearings can have the potential of continuing the divide of the American people based solely upon the promotion of religious-based prejudice and fear, which can potentially further the discord amongst the diverse groups within our general society and subsequently strengthen the propaganda machine of our enemies abroad.

I stand firm and ready to make these claims formally or informally at any place and at anytime. If additional information is needed, please free to contact me[.]

Respectfully submitted,

ABDUL-RASHEED MUHAMMAD,
Chaplain (LTC), USA, Behavioral Health Program Manager.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL L. "MIKEY" WEINSTEIN, FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT,
MILITARY RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOUNDATION

DECEMBER 7, 2011

On behalf of the Military Religious Freedom Foundation (MRFF), a non-profit organization with the sole mission of protecting the Constitutionally-guaranteed civil rights of United States armed forces personnel and veterans, I am grateful for the

opportunity to submit this statement for the record of the joint hearing on “Home-grown Terrorism: The Threat to Military Communities Inside the United States.”

MRFF’s exclusive focus is protecting its clients’ religious freedom. We currently represent the interests of approximately 26,000 United States marines, soldiers, sailors, airmen, cadets, and midshipmen at West Point, the Air Force Academy, Annapolis and other service academies, coast guard personnel, reservists, national guard personnel, and veterans. This number grows by thousands each year. Approximately 96% of our clients are self-professed Christians (about $\frac{3}{4}$ are Protestants of numerous denominations and the remaining $\frac{1}{4}$ are mostly Roman Catholic). The remaining 4% of our clients are from many other faith traditions including, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, Muslims, Sikhs, and Native American spiritualists, as well as agnostics and atheists. It is the stories of our more than 450 Muslim-American clients (who are nearly 10% of all such men and women in the armed services) that are particularly heartbreaking and what I would like to focus on today.

MRFF recognizes that military life requires individual adherence to shared patriotic principles. But this adherence cannot mean that a soldier, sailor, airman, or marine has a right to question another’s beliefs nor that one’s Constitutionally-guaranteed religious freedom must be compromised (except in the most limited military circumstances). Yet, our Muslim-American clients tell us every day that their Constitutional guarantees of religious freedom are under direct assault.

The ways in which the religious freedom of Muslim-American members of the armed services is harmed can best be described as systemic and pernicious throughout the armed forces. For example, military officers and enlisted personnel alike frequently use derogatory and racist terms such as “towel head,” “raghead,” “camel jockey” or the most universally used term of “Haji” to describe their Muslim-American colleagues in uniform as well as all Muslims everywhere. One of my clients calls what he’s experienced “unjust discrimination and unbelievable mistrust.”

I. WHERE DOES THIS PERVASIVE ANTI-MUSLIM PREJUDICE COME FROM?

Perhaps from lectures, training exercises, and military leaders themselves perpetuating the harmful stereotypes that Muslims and Arabs are somehow different from their fellow Americans, and thus suspicious, and that all Muslims seek to harm other Americans.

For example, in June 2007, Brigitte Gabriel, who the *New York Times* called a “radical Islamophobe,” delivered a lecture at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC). Her lecture was part of the JFSC’s elective course on Islam, open to American military and National security personnel.

During the question-and-answer period of her lecture, she said Muslims seeking political office should be resisted:

“If a Muslim who has—who is—a practicing Muslim who believes the word of the Koran to be the word of Allah, who abides by Islam, who goes to mosque and prays every Friday, who prays five times a day—this practicing Muslim, who believes in the teachings of the Koran, cannot be a loyal citizen to the United States of America.”

Then she asserted that a Muslim’s oath of office is meaningless:

“A Muslim is allowed to lie under any situation to make Islam, or for the benefit of Islam in the long run. A Muslim sworn to office can lay his hand on the Koran and say ‘I swear that I’m telling the truth and nothing but the truth,’ fully knowing that he is lying because the same Koran that he is swearing on justifies his lying in order to advance the cause of Islam. What is worrisome about that is when we are faced with war and a Muslim political official in office has to make a decision either in the interest of the United States, which is considered infidel according to the teachings of Islam, and our Constitution is incompatible [sic] with Islam—not compatible—that Muslim in office will always have his loyalty to Islam.”

She made further comments on the Islamic community in the United States and racial profiling:

“We need to see more patriotism and less terrorism, and especially on the part of the Islamic community in this country, who are good at nothing but complaining about every single thing instead of standing up and working with us in fighting the enemy in our country.”

Another example of these harmful stereotypes: In formal military training exercises, Muslim-American service members are very often reminded that “the enemy” in the War on Terror is Islam as an entire religion, and, accordingly, that any of its adherents and followers are seriously suspect. Non-commissioned officers have

ordered Muslim-American service members to dress up in Arab garb to play the role “terrorist” in training exercises.

Further, an Army general, while in uniform, went on speaking tours of churches, declaring that the War on Terrorism was a battle between Satan and Christians, explaining, “We in the Army of God, in the House of God, the Kingdom of God have been raised for such a time as this.” And, at a West Point graduation ceremony, a top Army official said ominously, “Your sons and daughters are fighting to protect our citizens . . . from zealots who would restrain, molest, burden, and cause to suffer those who do not share their religious beliefs, deny us, whom they call infidels, our unalienable rights.”

II. WHAT ARE THE HARMS TO OUR MILITARY COMMUNITIES?

This anti-Muslim prejudice has significant consequences and leads to discrimination—and real harm to the Muslim-American members of our military communities.

Muslim-American service members have been denied leave time. They have been subjected to hurdles in accessing the military’s health care system. They have been denied rank and choice assignments. They have been unlawfully detained and falsely accused of crimes and offenses of moral turpitude. They have been the victims of scurrilous devastating rumors and innuendo. They have been unjustly ordered to perform objectionable military tasks and chores.

And this systemic discrimination doesn’t just affect Muslim-American service members. Their families suffer as well. They and their families have been derided as exemplifying “the enemy amongst us.” They and their families have been assaulted and abused both stateside and abroad. They and their families have endured harmful and humiliating taunts and threats. They and their families have been accused of not being “real Americans” and told that they are not remotely welcome in America. They and their families have been told to “go back to your Arab lands.”

I asked one of MRFF’s Muslim-American clients—a graduate of one of our U.S. military academies who has served multiple combat tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan, is highly decorated, and has received the Purple Heart and the Silver and Bronze Stars for exemplary courage in battle—to describe what he has endured.

He tells of being indoctrinated, from his first days at the military academy to his current position as an officer, with the belief America’s military is a Christian military and that its greatest enemy is Islam and its followers. He tells of his repeated attempts to protect and speak for his subordinate Muslim-American military members and describes with tears how these many attempts are futile and essentially trivialized by the responsible military chain of command. He tells of the officially-endorsed Islamophobia rampant throughout the U.S. military and of Muslim-American service members being baited with lies, attacks on their character. He tells of the loneliness and estrangement of being told in innumerable ways that he is not a reliable or dependable part of either his own combat unit or of the United States military because of he is Muslim. He tells of countless instances of being both proselytized by military chaplains and his own direct military chain of command.

He tells of memorizing (and advising many other fellow Muslim-American military members and their families to as well) the names of Muslim Americans who have been killed or wounded in combat so that he can repeatedly tell those who doubt Muslim service members’ commitment of their honorable sacrifice. But he also tells of callous and ambivalent responses when he shares the names of the service members and their sacrifices.

Military life is very different from civilian life. Unless one has served in the military it is almost impossible to appropriately convey the formidable magnitude of the imperative to be viewed as a trusted and respected member of the military team. Muslim-American military members have been told repeatedly that they have no place in America’s military because of their faith. They have been told that, as Muslims, they cannot and will not be allowed into the otherwise impenetrable brotherhood and sisterhood of trust and loyalty of their respective military organizations.

Most heartbreaking, though, is what this decorated service member’s family has suffered. He tells of his children being harassed on base elementary schools—even proselytized to “save their souls from the evils of Islam and Allah.” He tells of his wife being spat upon while shopping at the base commissary and whispered about and given looks of revulsion when she shops in the Post Exchange store and gets gas at the base gas station. He tells of his family having to endure disrespect and dismissiveness every day for merely being Muslims.

Finally, I want to share the story of two of my clients, who have suffered tremendously because of the widespread mistrust of American Muslim service members by those with whom they serve.

Yassine Bahammou and Khalid Lyaacoubi moved to the United States from Morocco in search of freedom and opportunity. In 2009, hoping to settle their new country, they enlisted in the Army program for U.S. citizens and green-card holders who are native Arabic speakers. They would serve as linguistic and cultural experts for front-line commanders. Thus, it was a dangerous assignment. Errol Smith, the Army's assistant deputy for foreign language programs, said about soldiers in the program, "The most important thing . . . is their ability to save lives, whether it's their fellow soldiers, their commanders, or civilians. They bring an essential skill."

The Army offered incentives such as higher rank and bonuses for those who enlisted in this program. But their ultimate motivation to serve in the Army was the same as so many others who enlist. "The United States is known for fighting for other people's freedoms," explained Bahammou. "I like it and I wanted to help do that." Another reason, particular to these men: "We wanted to prove to Arabic nations," Lyaacoubi explained, "that we were Arabic and that we lived with Americans and socialized with Americans and that we know that they are good."

Their first step was basic training at Fort Jackson, which they successfully completed. Next they began a specialized translator's course at the Advanced Individual Training School also at Fort Jackson. At first, the training went well. Then their lives turned upside down.

Across the country at Fort Hood, tragedy struck: Maj. Nidal Malik Hassan massacred 13 people. After this tragedy, over at Fort Jackson, Bahammou and Lyaacoubi began to experience harassment at the hands of their fellow soldiers. They were called names like "terrorists" and "hajis." They were referred to as "garbage." Their bunkrooms were ransacked.

And within weeks, the Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) arrested Bahammou, Lyaacoubi, and three of their colleagues. These five soldiers who were being trained as translators to serve on the front line were charged with somehow conspiring to poison the food supply at the facility.

For the next 45 agonizing days, these men were held in their barracks under 24-hour guard—even at the mess hall and latrine. They were prohibited from speaking Arabic either to each other or to friends or family members who called to try to find out what was happening to them, some of whom spoke no English. And the threats and insults continued—this time from the guards and investigators. Their guards said they were going to be shipped off to Guantanamo; an investigator threatened to send one of them back to Morocco "in a box." And then someone from CID confirmed their fears. They were being treated like terrorists because of their religion. Lyaacoubi distinctly remembers an investigator said, "The United States is in a war against Islam and you are a Muslim."

After 45 days, they were suddenly released. CID had no evidence against them and no charges were filed. But their laptops, cell phones, and passports were confiscated. Their absolutely unjust detention ended, but their anguish would continue.

As part of the deal offered by the Army, they were returned to their homes in the Washington, DC area, where they joined the National Guard. But Bahammou and Lyaacoubi were kept segregated and not allowed to train with their company.

The Army conducted an internal review and concluded that the allegations against them—which were initially made by a relative of a soldier—were unfounded, but, not surprisingly, concluded there was no racism or harassment in its handling of the Muslim soldiers. Although the CID might have been "overly restrictive" in the soldiers' detention, the review determined that the Army had acted in accordance with the tense situation following the Fort Hood shootings. And yet, CID turned the case over to the FBI, perpetuating the appearance that the men were, in fact, guilty of something, even if it was only their Muslim faith.

The FBI seems to have kept its investigation of Bahammou and Lyaacoubi open—which is causing far-reaching harm. Bahammou, who always wanted to work in law enforcement, applied for a job as a security guard, but was denied a concealed weapon permit because he was the target of an investigation and the background check said he was "dangerous" and had conspired to harm fellow soldiers.

The program in which they enlisted promised a fast-track to citizenship. (It should also be noted that anyone who has even 1 day of honorable active duty service since 9/11—which Bahammou and Lyaacoubi had—can apply for citizenship.) But their promised accelerated path to U.S. citizenship has been blocked. The Army has given them all the documents clearing their names. One's immigration officer tells him that his file is fine. But an Army immigration specialist tells him that there is an FBI hold on his case. And he has a copy of an email from someone in the Army asking his immigration officer to put a military hold on his file. He goes to interviews, provides documentation over and over again, and deadlines for making decisions pass. He even volunteered to take a polygraph test to clear his name, but an FBI agent told him it wasn't necessary because the FBI doesn't have any-

thing on him. The other is in an endless loop of being told his background check needs to be completed; he needs to resubmits paperwork; he's cleared; and then that he needs another background check. He's actually taken two polygraphs. Yet his case remains open. For him, not getting the citizenship that he's entitled to is devastating. He has a good job with a Government contractor. His company wants to keep him on, but they may have to let him go because he does not yet have citizenship. He has a family to take care of and cannot afford to lose his job. He's told me, "It's stressful. I'm worn every day. I try everything and I'm just still waiting." He continued, "They falsely accused me, but no one will take the responsibility to restore my rights."

Alarming, Bahammou has even been searched by local police after being stopped for routine traffic violations. He was stopped and he can't remember committing a violation. Saying Bahammou might have a warrant outstanding (which he didn't), the officer called in reinforcements. Several other police cars arrived. Then saying they smelled marijuana (which Bahammou doesn't use), the police handcuffed him and made him stand on the side of the road for half an hour while they turned his car inside out, searching for things unknown. They found nothing and eventually he was given a ticket for making an illegal turn—at a place where there's no turn to make.

When traveling to visit their families in Morocco, each man has encountered difficulties. While transferring planes in Paris on their return, each man was stopped by a U.S. Government agent. They were asked about where they'd been, why they'd traveled, and the addresses where they'd stayed in Morocco. The agent who questioned one of the men had his picture and walked directly up to him to begin the questioning. The agent said he was stationed in Miami but the Government had flown him to Paris just to question him. Each man was also stopped upon landing in the United States. They were questioned—one for 3 hours—about why they travelled, who they stayed with, the addresses where they'd stayed, and how they got the money to pay for their trips to Morocco. They were searched—agents copied everything in one's wallet and the memory card for his phone. One had his luggage returned a day after he landed, after someone had rifled through it. At various points, agents expressed embarrassment and apologized for having to subject these men, with military identification, to such scrutiny. But because these men are trapped in the system based on false accusations, these agents must do their jobs.

Bahammou recently said to me, "I know that this will affect me my whole life and it's hurting me in my heart. And it's hurting me even more because I didn't do anything. My dream is to be in the military and law enforcement." It seems very unlikely he'll be able to fulfill his dream. He explained, "I joined the Army to fight for other people's freedom and I ended up losing mine."

Lyaacoubi lived in the United States for 5 years before joining the Army. "I thought joining the Army would change my life for the good, but it changed my life for the worse." He said, "Wherever we go, we're the bad guys, no matter how much good we do." Yet, he wants to continue to serve his country and he's going to reenlist in the reserves. He said, "I'm willing to overlook those who are prejudiced against me; I know I'm a good person."

Days after the Fort Hood shootings, General George Casey, chief of staff of the Army said, "I'm concerned that this increased speculation could cause a backlash against some of our Muslim soldiers. And I've asked our Army leaders to be on the lookout for that. It would be a shame—as great a tragedy as this was, it would be a shame if our diversity became a casualty as well."

His fears were realized. There's been a terrible backlash against Muslim Americans. They have been targeted for suspicion and discrimination because of their beliefs and not because of anything they've done.

I've shared with you just a few examples of the grave and harmful effects of the ingrained prejudice, racism, and distrust experienced by Muslim Americans in the military—that is only reinforced by this series of hearings. I believe it is critical to focus on why the racism and distrust is so pervasive in the military. This deep-seeded prejudice is taught and disseminated. And it is pernicious. It has real-world consequences and causes real harms—the on-going discrimination against not just service members but their families. This is a real threat to our military communities. Not only is it unjust and un-American, but it undermines the cohesion of our military and the ability to retain Muslim-American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who are committed to fighting to protect everyone's—theirs and ours—freedom.

STATEMENT OF COLONEL LAWRENCE B. WILKERSON, U.S. ARMY (RET.), DISTINGUISHED VISITING PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY, THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY

DECEMBER 7, 2011

I, Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, submit this written statement for the record of the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, and U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs joint hearing entitled, "Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat to Military Communities Inside the United States."

I am a Colonel in the United States Army with 31 years of service, having retired in 1997. I served as Special Assistant to General Colin Powell when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as his Chief of Staff when he was Secretary of State. Since retirement, I have taught National security affairs at The George Washington University, and am currently a professor of Government and public policy at The College of William and Mary.

I am well aware of the threats facing our country. There are those who would seek to do us harm, both within the United States and abroad. The effectiveness and integrity of our military, however, demand that the steps we take to defend our Nation from these threats be consistent with the values of our country. And how we treat members of our armed services, young men and women who put their lives on the line for our safety and freedom, must also be consistent with the values of our country and our military. Today's hearing, "Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat to Military Communities Inside the United States," contrary to its purported purpose, has the potential to undermine the values of our military and our Nation.

Thankfully, we live in a country where all Americans, regardless of race, ethnicity, and religion, are by law to be treated equally. America's promise of equal treatment under law is upheld everyday in the U.S. military, and efforts to erode this fundamental value threaten the unity and cohesion that is essential to the effectiveness and integrity of the U.S. military. Values of hard work, service, and loyalty are an essential part of service in the military. So are the values of tolerance and diversity.

Focusing on a singular threat, specifically that posed by American Muslims serving in the military, does grave injustice to our Muslim soldiers, some of whom have died defending our country. As Matthew Alexander, an Air Force Intelligence officer, stated:

"I know what Muslim-American interpreters and soldiers are doing for their country—some are now buried in Arlington National Cemetery . . . we need to stop demonizing an entire community. This is simply not the way to fight terrorism. And it's not who we are, as Americans."

By its very existence, the hearing suggests that American Muslim soldiers are prone to violence simply because of their faith. Such an assumption questions the patriotism of these brave men and women and their allegiance to our country, and sows fear and mistrust among Americans. In 2008, my former boss, General Colin Powell, specifically condemned this type of blanket suspicion and fear-mongering when he recounted the story of a young American Muslim soldier, now buried in Arlington National Cemetery:

"Is there something wrong with being a Muslim in this country? The answer's no, that's not America. Is there something wrong with some 7-year-old Muslim-American kid believing that he or she could be President? . . . I feel strongly about this particular point because of a picture I saw in a magazine. It was a photo essay about troops who are serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. And one picture at the tail end of this photo essay was of a mother in Arlington Cemetery, and she had her head on the headstone of her son's grave. And as the picture focused in, you could see the writing on the headstone. And it gave his awards—Purple Heart, Bronze Star—showed that he died in Iraq, gave his date of birth, date of death. He was 20 years old. And then, at the very top of the headstone, it didn't have a Christian cross, it didn't have the Star of David, it had a crescent and star of the Islamic faith. And his name was Kareem Rashad Sultan Khan, and he was an American. He was born in New Jersey. He was 14 years old at the time of 9/11, and he waited until he could go serve his country, and he gave his life."

Powell's eloquent testimonial to the sacrifice of that Muslim soldier demonstrates emphatically how today's hearing could be detrimental to the morale of our troops and to unit cohesion. One of the greatest strengths of our military is the diversity of its soldiers who come from all ethnic and religious backgrounds and from small

towns and big cities across our country. These young men and women are fighting together in the trenches, and the trust and bond between them is of utmost importance to their performance as well as their safety and security. A hearing like this—that sows fear and mistrust and singles out one group of soldiers based on religious practice—will only serve to divide our troops and cause soldiers to question and regard others with suspicion. As General George Casey, the Army Chief of Staff at the time of the Fort Hood attack in 2009, stated:

“I’m concerned that this increased speculation could cause a backlash against some of our Muslim soldiers . . . Our diversity, not only in our Army, but in our country, is a strength. And as horrific as this tragedy was, if our diversity becomes a casualty, I think that’s worse.”

Finally, by focusing on one particular religious group for investigation during today’s hearing, Congress is ignoring the broader range of extremist violence that threatens our country. This includes threats by neo-Nazis, Christian militias, and white supremacist gangs among others. Timothy McVeigh was not a Muslim. The Unabomber was not a Muslim. Violent extremism within the United States and, in particular, within our armed forces, is something that our leadership should take very seriously and should not tolerate. But a true and honest examination of threats within our military community should address all violent extremists who seek to do us harm.

Like the military, Congress has the job of making our country safer, and protecting and honoring our troops, consistent with the values of our Nation. Today’s hearing is a step in the wrong direction.

Congress does not have a stellar record in this regard. Much of the history of the House Un-American Activities Committee, for example, is a stain on the fabric of this Nation. Rarely did its members do anything on behalf of America’s security. What they did was bring the cameras and publicity to the soapbox appearances of now much-derided men such as Senators Joseph McCarthy and William Jenner—men who today most knowing Americans, as well as global citizens, excoriate for their extreme prejudice, hatred, and rank opportunism. Now, surely, is not the time to resurrect the intolerance of such men and the witch-hunts they orchestrated.

Rather it is time to live up to the values we constantly put before the world as representative of our country. It is time to act the way we say we believe. It is time to put away prejudice and hatred, to recognize the service of all our fine men and women in our armed forces, and to treat them the way they deserve to be treated. Protecting the Nation does not require and has never required the sacrifice of our cherished beliefs.

Thank you for the opportunity to share my views with the committees.

STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY HON. SANCHEZ—FROM ORGANIZATIONS

STATEMENT OF LAURA W. MURPHY, DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON LEGISLATIVE OFFICE
AND DEVON CHAFFEE, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
(ACLU)

DECEMBER 7, 2011

Chairmen Lieberman and King and Ranking Members Collins and Thompson: The American Civil Liberties Union is a non-partisan organization of over half a million members, countless additional activists and supporters, and 53 affiliates Nation-wide dedicated to the protection of individual rights and civil liberties under the U. S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

The danger posed by modern terrorists is real and Congress must understand the scope and nature of the threat and exercise its authorities appropriately in overseeing the Government’s response, holding our military, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies accountable, and crafting sensible legislation that enhances security while protecting the rights of innocent persons. But the security threat was no less real during the first “Red Scare,” during the Cold War, and during the era of protests against the Vietnam War. The question is not whether Congress should respond, but how it should respond. History tells us that conflating the expression of unorthodox or even hostile beliefs with threats to security only misdirects resources, unnecessarily violates the rights of the innocent, and unjustly alienates communities unfairly targeted as suspicious. Today, on the 70th anniversary of attacks against Pearl Harbor, the lesson we should remember is that targeting entire communities on the basis of race, religion, or ethnicity is unjustified and un-American

and results in consequences that the Nation later comes to regret, as with the targeting of Japanese-American communities during World War II.

In announcing today's hearing, the Chairmen of both committees singled out Islam and the Muslim-American community as the focus of their inquiry into threats to military communities as they have in previous hearings and committee reports.¹ Such needless targeting of entire communities on the basis of religious ideology alienates those community members. This is especially so for Muslim-Americans who serve in the military—such racial and religious profiling leads to discrimination and tangible harm. After the shooting at Fort Hood, four-star General George Casey, then-Army Chief of Staff, stated, "I'm concerned that this increased speculation could cause a backlash against some of our Muslim soldiers . . . Our diversity, not only in our Army, but in our country, is a strength. And as horrific as this tragedy was, if our diversity becomes a casualty, I think that's worse."² As Casey's statement suggests, singling out Muslims within our military does a disservice to American service members, leads to unwarranted discrimination against these service members, and threatens to spread distrust amongst our troops. Instead of working to resolve the obstacles that Muslim Americans serving in our military face, today's hearing threatens to contribute to a predisposition to unfairly target Muslim Americans serving our country.

Many U.S. officials continue to focus their counterterrorism analysis on Muslim-American communities even though empirical studies show that violent threats cannot be identified by any religious, ideological, ethnic, or racial profile. Such unjust targeting is widespread and is often based on the unsound reasoning used in ill-conceived and methodologically flawed reports that ignore empirical evidence that there is no direct link between religious observance or radical ideas and violent acts.

The Senate Committee's Fort Hood report in particular relied heavily on a single report produced in 2007 by the New York Police Department (NYPD), *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*. The NYPD report purported to identify a four-step "radicalization process" that terrorists follow, with each step involving Constitutionally-protected religious and associational conduct—conduct that millions of people may engage in without ever committing an act of violence.

In contrast, the Department of Defense's (DoD) report on force protection after the Fort Hood shootings looked at the scientific literature, rather than flawed theories, and determined that "researchers have yet to develop a single model that can estimate who is at risk for potential violence."³ The DoD report concluded that predicting who might become violent is extremely difficult. While researchers have identified certain risk factors, "few people in the population who have risk factors . . . actually assault or kill themselves or others."⁴ The study further emphasized that religious fundamentalism is not a risk factor, "as most fundamentalist groups are not violent, and religious-based violence is not confined to members of fundamentalist groups."⁵

The DoD report's conclusion is further supported by independent empirical analysis. According to reports, a recent United Kingdom analysis based on hundreds of case studies of individuals involved in terrorism concluded that there is no single identifiable pathway to extremism and "a large number of those involved in terrorism do not practice their faith regularly."⁶ Moreover, according to reports, the study identified "facing marginalization and racism" as a key vulnerability that could tend to make an individual receptive to extremist ideology.⁷ The conclusion supported tolerance of diversity and protection of civil liberties and was echoed in a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) paper published in August 2008. In ex-

¹ Press Release: King, Lieberman Announce Joint House-Senate Hearing on Homegrown Terror Threat to Military Communities, Nov. 28, 2012, at <http://homeland.house.gov/press-release/king-lieberman-announce-joint-house-senate-hearing-homegrown-terror-threat-military>; see also *The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and That Community's Response*, Hearing before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Mar. 10, 2011; U.S. Senate Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, *A Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons from the U. S. Government's Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack* (Feb. 3, 2011).

² Interview with Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey regarding Fort Hood shooting, *State of the Union* (CNN television broadcast Nov. 8, 2009), at <http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/11/08/casey-im-concerned-about-possible-backlash-against-muslim-soldiers/>.

³ Dep't of Defense, *Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood D-1* (Jan. 2010), at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/DOD-ProtectingTheForce-Web_Security_HR_13jan10.pdf.

⁴ Id.

⁵ Id. at D-3.

⁶ Alan Travis, *M15 Report Challenges Views on Terrorism in Britain*, *The Guardian*, (Aug. 20, 2008), at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism>; Alan Travis, *The Making of an Extremist*, *The Guardian* (Aug. 20, 2008), at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism>.

⁷ Id.


ploring why there was less violent homegrown extremism in the United States than the United Kingdom, the authors cited the diversity of American communities and the greater protection of civil rights as key factors.⁸

By singling out Islam and Muslim-Americans in its reports and hearings on the terror threat, Congress increases the likelihood that U.S. law enforcement officials will misunderstand the scientific evidence surrounding risk factors for violence and focus their investigative efforts on innocent Americans because of their beliefs rather than on true threats to the community. The ACLU has documented how U.S. law enforcement agencies are already exhibiting anti-Muslim bias in their trainings, operations, and intelligence products.

Recently, the ACLU, through Freedom of Information Act requests and litigation, and investigative reporters have uncovered numerous FBI counterterrorism training materials that falsely and inappropriately portray Arab and Muslim communities as monolithic, alien, backward, violent, and supporters of terrorism. These documents show that the use of these erroneous and biased materials occurred between at least 2003 to 2011, and has been an integral part of FBI training programs, despite recent efforts by the FBI to minimize the scope of this problem. For example, a 2003 FBI memorandum from San Francisco shows that the FBI sought to renew a contract with a trainer and “expert” advisor to FBI agents, whose draft lesson plan asserted racist and derogatory assertions about Arabs and Islam. These lesson plans asserted:

“the Arab mind is a Cluster Thinker, while the Western mind tends to be a linear thinker,” and
 “although Islam was not able to change the cluster Arab mind thinking into a linear one . . . it alleviated some of the weakness that inflicted the Arab mind in general.”

Another FBI training included a graph that shows Islam as a consistently violent religion over a 1,300-year span while graphing Judaism and Christianity as inexplicitly ascending directly to non-violence from 1400 BC to 2010 AD.⁹



While FBI officials have attempted to characterize these biased trainings as isolated incidents, similar problematic biases can be found in official intelligence products. A 2006 FBI Intelligence Assessment, “The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad,” identifies religious practice—including frequent attendance at a mosque or a prayer group, growing a beard, and proselytizing—as indicators that a person is on a path to becoming a violent extremist. The ACLU and 27 other orga-

⁸National Counterterrorism Center Conference, *Towards a Domestic Counterradicalization Strategy* (Aug. 2008). Notwithstanding the conclusion, the paper inexplicably went on to examine how the United States could better adopt U.K. counterterrorism strategies.

⁹See Appendix for copies of additional biased training material.

nizations have called on the FBI to revoke such flawed products.¹⁰ The flawed theories are not just part of FBI trainings and products, however. The same theories are incorporated in trainings across the country conducted for local law enforcement agencies under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

It is also important to remember that Muslim and Arab groups aren't the only ones affected by the Government's inappropriate reliance on unsubstantiated theories of radicalization that focus on ideology instead of violent action. Non-violent protest groups have repeatedly been targeted for surveillance and infiltration by law enforcement over the last several years, based on their opposition to Government policies from both sides of the political spectrum. An assessment published by DHS in 2009 warned that right-wing extremists might recruit and radicalize "disgruntled military veterans."¹¹ An intelligence report produced for DHS by a private contractor accused environmental organizations like the Sierra Club, the Humane Society and the Audubon Society as "[m]ainstream organizations with known or possible links to ecoterrorism."¹² Similarly, a Missouri Fusion Center released an intelligence report on "the modern militia movement" that claimed militia members are "usually supporters" of Presidential candidates Ron Paul and Bob Barr.¹³ Slandering upstanding and respectable organizations does not just violate the rights of these groups and those who associate with them, it wastes security resources and undermines public confidence in the Government.

The basis for bringing law enforcement and intelligence resources to bear on a problem should rest on whether the targets are prone to violence and/or criminal behavior. Ideological or religious beliefs, even extreme ones, are entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The inquiry of these committees has thus far rested on a wholly contrary assumption—that radical beliefs alone justify suspicion and investigation. Such an assumption is wrong under the First Amendment, wrong under traditional American principles, and wrong in light of empirical data and should not serve as the basis for the committees' continued targeting of Muslim-American communities.

¹⁰ Letter to Robert Mueller, Director, FBI, Oct. 4, 2011, available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/sign_on_letter_to_dir_mueller_re_radicalization_report_10.4.11.pdf.

¹¹ See U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Assessment, *Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment* (Apr. 7, 2009), at <http://wnd.com/images/dhs-rightwing-extremism.pdf>.







¹² Helios Global, Inc. for National Preparedness Directorate, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Universal Adversary Dynamic Threat Assessment, *Eco-terrorism: Environmental and Animal Rights Militants in the United States* (May 7, 2008), available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/12251436/DHS-Eco-Terrorism-in-US-2008>.






¹³ T.J. Greaney, 'Fusion Center' Data Draws Fire Over Assertions, *Colombia Daily Tribune*, (Mar. 14, 2009), at <http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/2009/mar/14/fusion-center-data-draws-fire-over-assertions/>.

APPENDIX.—FBI TRAINING MATERIAL: MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

POWER POINT PRESENTATION

By William Gawthorp (Excerpts)





APPENDIX.—ANTITERRORISM ADVISORY COUNSEL—PA

DoD HAZMAT CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

21ST CENTURY TERRORISM: HISTORY, PERSPECTIVE, DEVELOPMENT

By John Marsh, Intelligence Specialist (Excerpts)

Grassroots Jihadist Movement

- People Worldwide
 - inspired by the al Qaeda core and the franchise groups
 - but who may have little or no actual connection to these groups.

2009 US Attacks

- AG Prime
- AG Franchise
- Grass-roots

How Did This Guy Become That?

New York City → Detroit → Fort Hood

Road Map

What's Important and Why?

1. We have important values to Appreciate & Protect

- Liberty
- Justice
- Democracy
- Rule of Law
- Individualism
- Capitalism
- Free Enterprise
- Innovation
- Entrepreneurship
- Risk-taking
- Creativity
- Competition
- Hard Work
- Self-reliance
- Initiative
- Responsibility
- Accountability
- Integrity
- Honesty
- Transparency
- Openness
- Communication
- Teamwork
- Cooperation
- Respect
- Tolerance
- Compassion
- Empathy
- Understanding
- Patience
- Persistence
- Perseverance
- Resilience
- Flexibility
- Adaptability
- Open-mindedness
- Curiosity
- Inquisitiveness
- Learning
- Growth
- Improvement
- Progress
- Innovation
- Creativity
- Risk-taking
- Entrepreneurship
- Initiative
- Responsibility
- Accountability
- Integrity
- Honesty
- Transparency
- Openness
- Communication
- Teamwork
- Cooperation
- Respect
- Tolerance
- Compassion
- Empathy
- Understanding
- Patience
- Persistence
- Perseverance
- Resilience
- Flexibility
- Adaptability
- Open-mindedness
- Curiosity
- Inquisitiveness
- Learning
- Growth
- Improvement
- Progress

Our Values are Threatened

Strategic: "Civilizational Jihad"



STATEMENT OF REV. DR. C. WELTON GADDY, INTERFAITH ALLIANCE

DECEMBER 7, 2011

As a Baptist minister, a patriotic American and the President of Interfaith Alliance, a National, non-partisan organization that celebrates religious freedom and is dedicated to protecting faith and freedom and whose 185,600 members Nation-wide belong to 75 faith traditions as well as those without a faith tradition, I submit this testimony to the House Committee on Homeland Security and Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs for the Joint Hearing Record on "Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat to Military Communities Inside the United States."

From its inception, citizens of this Nation have appreciated, if not revered, both religion and the military. Our armed forces are key to the security of the American people and often, our service members who bravely defend our Nation are our rep-

representatives abroad. Ensuring their safety is of the utmost importance and we should all be cognizant of the enormous sacrifice the men and women who serve in our armed forces make on our behalf every day.

There is no doubt that our military faces serious threats which should be rooted out, but the continued demonization of Muslims and questioning of the Muslim faith is not the answer. I fear that this approach is misguided and will only result in further alienating the American Muslim community. Homegrown terrorism and countering violent extremism require serious investigation based on fact. I am concerned that the line of inquiry likely to be taken up in this hearing may do a disservice to American Muslims serving in our Armed Forces and the memory of those who have died serving their country, and spreads distrust amongst our troops.

By singling out one particular religious community for investigation, these hearings, as have several others held this year by the House Committee on Homeland Security, fly in the face of religious freedom as it is enshrined in the First Amendment to our Constitution. Furthermore, these hearings are not only the wrong answer to the wrong question, but in the end, they may only perpetuate the problems the committees seek to solve, as well as add to a disturbing climate of anti-Muslim sentiment extant in America today.

Freedom of religion as guaranteed by the First Amendment protects the freedom of all Americans to believe in any religious faith, as they choose, without fear of criticism, retribution, or investigation because of it. In our Nation, all people and all faiths are equal with none favored over any other. The fact that Muslims in this country are taking full advantage of all clauses of the First Amendment does not make them inherently any more radical than any other religious community in this country. These freedoms are an integral part of American democracy.

There exists in our country today a pervasive and unsettling trend of anti-Muslim fear, bigotry, and rhetoric and a general lack of understanding about Islam. Targeting one particular faith for scrutiny when the overwhelming majority of that faith's adherents in this country are peaceful, law-abiding citizens seems counterproductive and just plain wrong. It is the responsibility of our elected officials to promote reason, truth, and civility in the public forum—especially at a time when anti-Muslim bigotry is on the rise—not to waste time and public resources on victimizing select groups.

Interfaith Alliance's work is driven by the fundamental principle that protecting religious freedom is most critical in times of crisis and controversy. Even the most basic knowledge of the history of the First Amendment includes the understanding that religious freedom exists in part to protect the rights of the minority from what Alexis de Tocqueville not unrealistically called the tyranny of the majority. In fact, it would not be a stretch to say that if our Founding Fathers had relied on polling data, the First Amendment might not exist at all. Unfortunately, in today's political climate, it may not ensure an "electoral win" to defend the rights of the American Muslim community, but there is no question that it is the right thing to do.

That today's hearing falls on the anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor should give us reason to pause and reflect. With 70 years' hindsight we are now able to see just how wrong our treatment of the Japanese-American Community after Pearl Harbor was. We have a responsibility to ensure that 7 decades from now, our Government and our neighbors are not apologizing to the American Muslim community for how they were treated. I hope we can make the right decisions today so we do not repeat the mistakes of our past.

Thank you for the opportunity to submit testimony on this important issue.

STATEMENT OF THE ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA

DECEMBER 7, 2011

The Islamic Society of North America shares the committees' commitment to ensuring the security of our service members during today's hearing on "Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat to Military Communities Inside the United States." However, we are concerned that the hearing may specifically scrutinize American Muslims, including those serving our country in the military. The House Committee on Homeland Security has already held three hearings this year which unfairly singled out American Muslims of various walks of life, threatening their civil rights and tarnishing their reputations, and we are concerned that its Senate counterpart is joining in this discriminatory approach.

American Muslims serve honorably in all of the Armed Forces, just as they serve in all areas of civil society. They serve in combat areas, fighting to protect the country they love, and some have made the ultimate sacrifice. This hearing, which ap-

pears to question their loyalty, does them a great disservice. It dishonors the memory of those who died serving their country, and it severely demoralizes those who are sacrificing so much on a daily basis. Casting suspicion on these brave individuals simply because of their faith crushes their spirits and spreads distrust and discord among our troops.

We urge you to take the Department of Defense's approach in the immediate aftermath of the horrific shooting at Ft. Hood, in an effort to prevent such violent behavior from reoccurring. The Department took immediate action, not by scrutinizing and laying blame to the American Muslim members of the Armed Forces, but rather by monitoring a variety of "indicators of potentially violent behaviors."¹ It is clear that the Department of Defense understands the importance of high morale and cohesion within our military and the very negative impact of singling out service members based on their faith. We are concerned that this hearing will place the retention and morale of our service members at risk, and we urge the committees to instead focus on the various indicators of violent behavior that may present a risk to the safety and security of our service members.

The Islamic Society of North America is wholeheartedly committed to keeping our country safe, for us, for our children, and for our American brothers and sisters of all religions or of no religion. We are seriously aggrieved each time the name of God is used to commit such ungodly acts as terrorism, and we have taken strides to counter extremist ideologies within our communities, as we would encourage everyone to do in theirs. Rather than emphasizing our differences, our safety as a Nation would be better enhanced if Congress chose to unite the diverse communities of America in working together to prevent violent extremism.

It is our hope that the committees will demonstrate great leadership in this regard, and that they will not let this hearing be another investigation of one single community in America. Instead, we hope they will unite us as one American community to do whatever it takes to keep our military safe. Thank you for the opportunity to submit testimony for this hearing, and we hope you will take these concerns into consideration.

STATEMENT OF S. FLOYD MORI, NATIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, JAPANESE
AMERICAN CITIZENS LEAGUE (JACL)

DECEMBER 7, 2011

Holding today's joint hearing on "Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat to Military Communities Inside the United States" on the seventieth anniversary of the attacks on Pearl Harbor is particularly poignant.

Seventy years ago today, nearly 2,500 Americans were killed in a surprise attack by the Japanese Imperial Navy on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor. The next day Japanese-American husbands and fathers were taken from their homes, under FBI escort, to Federal detention centers. Then a few short months later, all Japanese-Americans on the West Coast were sent to concentration camps for the duration of the entire war. They were held as prisoners, but charged with no crime. The purported reason for these unlawful and abhorrent detentions: A fear of homegrown terrorism. In reality, it was because the U.S. Government questioned the loyalties and beliefs of our community—of American citizens—based on nothing more than our race and religion.

The ramifications of the internments were enormous. The community lost their homes and businesses—lost the ability to provide for their families. It took years, in some instances, for families to be reunited. The result was immeasurable heartache and problems within our families that lingered for decades.

The internment of Japanese-Americans is one of the most shameful chapters in our country's history. Two decades ago, the Nation apologized for the grave injustice that was based on hysteria, racism, and poor political leadership and not justified by concerns about security. At the National Japanese American Memorial, these words are carved in stone: "The lessons learned must remain as a grave reminder of what we must not allow to happen again to any group."

I fear we have forgotten the lessons of that time.

Today's hearing purports to look at homegrown terrorism. But in reality, it will call the loyalties and beliefs of one community of Americans into question—based on nothing more than race and religion. Just like what occurred 70 years ago.

¹United States Department of Defense, *Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood* (Washington, DC, 2010), 11.

This very hearing is causing the harm it's intended to stop. By focusing exclusively on one group—Muslims—as the source for homegrown terrorism, we are threatening our communities. We perpetuate the discrimination and alienation experienced by Muslims. We invite more and more harassment and hate crimes. We provide excuses for biased law enforcement practices. And above all, we harm the American values of equality, diversity, and religious freedom.

The effects of this harm are already visible all around us. Unfounded animosity and threats towards Muslims are on the rise. A Brookings poll found that 47% of Americans view Islam as at odds with American values. Workplace discrimination against Muslim individuals has increased 150%, doubling over the past 10 years, and there has been an increase in bullying against Muslim children. The FBI has used its outreach to the Muslim community as a way to gather intelligence. This discomfort towards Muslims is being fueled by anti-Muslim rhetoric spread by military, religious, and political leaders and creates a fertile climate for discrimination.

This time, we must not let hysteria, racism, and poor political leadership take us down the same path we went down 70 years ago. We must not act in ways that sacrifice our most basic American values. We must not single out one community based on race or religion and deny them their civil rights. And we must not endanger the foundations of these communities—their families and houses of worship.

Today is the 70th anniversary of the “date which will live in infamy.” The date is infamous not only for the lives that were lost, but also for the grave injustices experienced by the Japanese-American community that followed. That another community, based only on race and religion, is also suffering grave injustices is disheartening.

The Japanese American Citizens League is the oldest and largest Asian-American civil rights organization in the United States. The JAACL monitors and responds to issues that enhance or threaten the civil and human rights of all Americans and implements strategies to effect positive social change, particularly to the Asian Pacific-American community.

STATEMENT OF SHOULDER-TO-SHOULDER: STANDING WITH AMERICAN MUSLIMS;
UPHOLDING AMERICAN VALUES

DECEMBER 7, 2011

Shoulder-to-Shoulder is a coalition of 27 American faith-based and interfaith organizations and religious denominations who have joined together to promote tolerance and put an end to anti-Muslim sentiment. We share a deep obligation to call upon our elected leaders to foster an ethical commitment to bedrock American values such as pluralism and religious freedom, mutuality, and respect—values also at the core of our religious traditions.

We therefore submit this testimony for the record of the House Committee on Homeland Security and Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs Joint Hearing entitled “Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat to Military Communities Inside the United States.” Several Shoulder-to-Shoulder member-organizations endorse military chaplains and minister to active duty and retired service personnel.

We firmly believe that keeping service members safe is paramount. Yet, by focusing only on the American Muslim community for threats of radicalization, this hearing does a disservice to American Muslims—especially those serving in the United States Armed Forces—by wrongly connecting faithful observance of Islam with suspect behavior. This connection sows mistrust of these men and women by distorting their military service. Some American Muslim soldiers, buried in Arlington Cemetery, have given what President Abraham Lincoln called “the last full measure of devotion” while serving their country.

As spiritual leaders and people of faith, we call on the United States Congress not to perpetuate damaging false witness against our neighbors. Instead, we urge the Members of these committees to honor all those who serve in the military protecting foundational American values of freedom of religion, of pluralism and opportunity for all. We encourage our elected leaders to honor the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution that have enabled the free exercise of religion across our great land—not to turn the exercise of these freedoms into a cause for suspicion.

All of our faith communities share a powerful prohibition against bearing false witness, with the understanding that destroying a person’s reputation is tantamount to destroying his or her life. To assert that American Muslim soldiers are not deeply devoted to America’s safety and the peaceful interaction of its entire citizenry or that these soldiers are more susceptible to commit acts of violent extre-

mism—that is false witness. By subjecting American Muslims to such scrutiny, we weaken our more perfect union, and we harm the National vision of our common good that is a witness to the nations.

American Muslims serve proudly and with distinction in all branches of the U.S. armed services, as well as in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on police forces, and in fire departments, next to service personnel of all faiths, many having given their lives for our country. In these and other vocations, Muslims work hard, give back to their communities, and worship in peace—just as do Americans of other faiths.

The Muslim community's clergy work closely with the leaders of our Nation's other faith groups in and out of the military. We study our sacred texts together, pray together, and join hands to address issues of shared concern, including Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, depression, trauma healing, overcoming suicidal tendencies, or coping with disabilities which often follow from military service. These are also burdens borne by American Muslim soldiers alongside all other service members.

As faith leaders, we are committed to building a future in which extremism is an artifact of the past, and where religious identity is not the cause of hostility but of acceptance. This country's spiritual, religious, and ethnic diversity serves to enrich our public discourse. When our public discourse is enriched, extremism is seldom given quarter.

We urge the Members of our Government as well as citizens of good will to refrain from passing judgment on religious or faith groups based on the actions of the few who pervert their spiritual traditions through acts of violence and hostile rhetoric. We believe that politicians, cultural figures, and members of the media are never justified in exploiting religious differences in order to advance ideological or political aims. Our leaders in Congress must stand up and speak out against hearings that perpetuate misrepresentations and harm our country rather than lead it to greater awareness and a strengthened citizenry.

We hope to see such lines of inquiry soon cease, for they simply perpetuate the damaging climate of anti-Muslim sentiment in America today. As spiritual leaders we have a moral responsibility and a sacred calling to categorically denounce derision, misinformation, or outright bigotry directed against any religious group in this country. Silence is not an option. Only by taking a stand together can we fulfill the highest calling of our respective faiths, and thereby play a role in building a safer, more secure America.

APPENDIX: LIST OF SHOULDER-TO-SHOULDER MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS AS OF
DECEMBER 5, 2011

*Shoulder-to-Shoulder Campaign Members**

American Baptist Churches USA
The Arab American Institute
Christian Church (Disciples of Christ)
Church of the Brethren
Cooperative Baptist Fellowship
The Episcopal Church
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America
Faith in Public Life**
The Foundation for Ethnic Understanding**
General Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church
Interfaith Alliance
Islamic Society of North America**
Jewish Council for Public Affairs
Jewish Reconstructionist Movement
The Jewish Theological Seminary
National Council of Churches**
National Religious Campaign Against Torture**
The New Evangelical Partnership for the Common Good
Presbyterian Church (USA)
Progressive National Baptist Convention
Rabbis for Human Rights—North America
Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism**
Sojourners
Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations

* Reflects campaign membership as of December 5, 2011.

** Indicates a member of campaign Executive Committee.

The United Church of Christ
 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops**
 Universal Muslim Association of America

Representative SANCHEZ. First of all, Secretary, what do they bring? Should we just consider maybe not having Muslims in our military? I mean, are they a vital part? I mean, I lived in the Middle East. So I think it is important to know the culture and the language of the people. But, you know, I mean, sometimes people look and say, let us just not have these people in our military. What would you say to something like that?

Mr. STOCKTON. I would begin by referring back to the comment that Chairman King made earlier in the hearing, and that is recognizing the tremendous contributions of Muslim Americans to National security in the Armed Forces in particular. We need Muslim Americans in the United States military. We need native Pashtun speakers, native Dari speakers, and we need patriots of all religions joining and maintaining the strength of our Armed Forces.

You raise an important challenge, and that is in today's environment, how do we both deal with the reality that al-Qaeda and its affiliates are targeting Department of Defense facilities as a target of choice, and yet recognize that we need and value Muslim Americans in the United States military? The way forward is to focus on indicators of violent behavior, indicators of radicalism, where we can watch the behavior and train our supervisory personnel to watch the behavior of their soldiers in order to identify early on and intervene effectively early on when they say indicators that within our ranks we may have potential terrorists.

Representative SANCHEZ. But it shouldn't just be Muslims. I mean, because my husband prosecuted plenty of non-Muslims for radical behavior and shoot-ups and, you know, killing their wives and their kids and everything else in the military.

Mr. STOCKTON. It should be anybody who is exhibiting behaviors that indicate a propensity to become a violent—to become terrorists. Let me emphasize again, this is about al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and its adherents as the primary threat to American security at home.

Representative SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Chairman KING. I recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Turner, for 5 minutes.

Representative TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A question for Lieutenant Colonel Sawyer. You had mentioned the intellectual underpinnings of radical Islam and—in the training. Now, the theology of Islam is easily understood. There is prayer and fasting and charity, similar to all religions, and adherence to the natural law, do unto others. Beyond that there is an overlay of politics, and there is a battle within Islam. The political aspects of this, of course, are problematic.

It would serve our interests if we understood more about what is going on within Islam, had we talked to imams and mullahs and—to get a better understanding of the politics and the theology; are they inextricable; can—is there a movement afoot for the intellectual justification for—to combat this within Islam; and are we

** Indicates a member of campaign Executive Committee.

taking advantage of it? Or is this considered too sensitive to address?

Colonel SAWYER. Sir, thank you very much for that question. I think that the best way to answer that is to point out that there is a significant distinction between the politics and the theology that are embraced within the faith, or within the tradition and within the culture as distinct from the ideology that is perpetrated and developed and advanced by al-Qaeda, its adherents, and its affiliates. Once we make this distinction between the faith and the ideology of these violent Islamist extremists, we then can start to parse these two pieces apart.

To the second part of your question, not only has the Department of Defense, but I would argue that the entire intelligence community, local and State law enforcement have had extensive outreach efforts to the Muslim-American community, the imams, to understand this not only from the perspective of what the faith means in consulting with academics and true Arabists, but also to understand what it means within the American context. Because within the diaspora, we can see different effects there.

This really comes back to the education question that the other two Members addressed, because if we are not educating our local law enforcement partners as to these distinctions, it inhibits our ability to really address the problem in a comprehensive manner. That is one of the things that the center at West Point has done very aggressively. In fact, over the past 2 years, we have educated over 4,100 local, State, and Federal law enforcement officials, over about 60,000 hours of education, student hours of education, on these issues, right? How is it that we can make these people smarter to understand these very distinctions so that what we don't do is harm our ability, harm the community, and create worse relations with the American Muslim community, which are absolutely essential to solving these problems?

Representative TURNER. Mr. Secretary, could you—

Mr. STOCKTON. Very quickly. Again, it is an excellent question. I would urge all Members and staff, if they haven't already, to become familiar with the new White House strategy empowering local partners, because it is focused precisely on the challenges you discussed and highlights a new way forward, a community-based approach, in order to meet the challenges that we confront.

Representative TURNER. Can you identify any leaders in the Muslim community that are helping you in this regard?

Mr. STOCKTON. I would be happy to take that question for the record.

Representative TURNER. All right. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman KING. Mr. Turner yields back, and I recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for 5 minutes.

Representative JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman and the Ranking Member, thank you for your courtesies.

Before I left Houston, I initiated with our community and soldiers a yellow ribbon campaign to welcome home returning troops that will be coming home from Iraq at the end of December. I think it is evidence not of one Member's actions, but really that America loves her military.

So if my Chairpersons would allow me, because I have questions, I do want to quote a comment from former Secretary Gates that says our All-Volunteer Force reflects the strength of our National diversity, and it is composed of patriots who are first and foremost soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines sworn to uphold our National values.

I would like to change the direction of the discussion and talk about Americans, American soldiers who happen to be of many different faiths. I indicated to my Chairman, Mr. King, that I am here to be a problem solver. Those who lost their lives were my neighbors and friends in Fort Hood, Texas. I went to the memorial service, and I can tell you it is a memory that I will never forget. Deepest sympathy and the pain that Fort Hood and those family members and extended friends continue to experience will never be, I believe, extinguished.

To Mr. Long and the loss of his son, and Mrs. Long, I say to them that we are paying for the enormous tragedy, and we should be here to solve problems.

I do want to, however, quote from you, Mr. Secretary, as I hold up a little book that I have done before and say that we are constant reminders of the value of this book, and our soldiers are, in fact, defending the Constitution, which says that we do have freedom of religion.

I think it is important to note the comment that you made that our primary threat is al-Qaeda, not at war with Islam. In your statement you indicated that homegrown terrorists that may happen to be of a particular faith have limited contact with al-Qaeda across the ocean, if you will, that they are intensified by their own research, by the internet. So we have within our borders and within our ability the skills and tools that should be utilized to extinguish and to stamp out those who would do us harm.

Let me just quickly note and pay tribute to Mohsin Naqvi, who died in Afghanistan, a 26-year-old Muslim, who was among five soldiers that were killed. His family acknowledged that in the military he was picked on, but that his goal was to die defending—or his relatives said defending against acts of terror and a violent interpretation of Islam the vast majority of Muslims denounce. Let us put that at least on the record and pay tribute to those who have died.

My question goes specifically to, I think, the major failures at Fort Hood. Why didn't the military who were aware of Captain Hasan's violence at Walter Reed pass that information on to the brass at Fort Hood? Where was the disconnect?

Let me quickly add two other questions so that you can quickly answer them. I am concerned about soft targets, and I know that you may refer to some of these, but soft targets. I am the Ranking Member on the transportation security committee. We see our soldiers traveling in airports, train stations, bus stations. Some soldiers will be coming home in their uniform and going into neighborhoods and corners around this Nation. What have we begun to do to already address the potential of soft targets and soldiers who are walking alone in various places in America?

On the idea of databases, one of the recommendations of the independent review was sharing databases.

May I yield to you to answer at least two of those questions?

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Ma'am, I would like to answer your first question about the activities of Major Hasan and why they were not reported to his chain of command or to Army leaders.

Prior to the Fort Hood shootings, as I have expressed in earlier comments to Chairman King, we did not have the right behavioral indicators to the force, and we did not educate our force in this regard. Since that time, we have revised the regulation, and I am confident today that the behavior indicators we have in this regulation would allow soldiers to report the information that—which you discussed about Major Hasan. So I believe that is—you know, the bottom line is we did not educate our force properly prior to that, and that information did not get reported.

Representative JACKSON LEE. We are doing more as it relates to behavioral training, which I think overcomes the idea of stigmatizing one religion versus another. Are we really focusing in on the actions of an individual soldier, internet use, overly aggressive in their faith or their actions towards their families?

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Ma'am, in the table 3.3, which I referred to earlier, those indicators of extremist activity, those indicators are focused on the behavioral activity that would encompass all of those topics you just mentioned.

Representative JACKSON LEE. Secretary Stockton, any response on the soft targets that are beyond the bases where soldiers are wearing their uniforms?

Chairman KING. The gentlelady's time has expired, but Secretary Stockton can answer the question.

Mr. STOCKTON. Very briefly, local law enforcement and having our military facility commanders tightly engaged with them so that local law enforcement can be in the lead for security in those kinds of soft targets.

Representative JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairman. I think we have much more distance to travel on these issues of securing our military families and soldiers in the United States.

I yield back.

Chairman KING. The gentlelady yields back, and I recognize the former attorney general of the State of California, the Chairman of our cybersecurity subcommittee, Mr. Lungren.

Representative LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, let me just say unequivocally my great support for those who are serving in the military today and for those of you who are appearing on this panel.

Secretary Stockton, are we at war with violent Islamist extremism?

Mr. STOCKTON. No, sir. We are at war with al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and adherents.

Representative LUNGREN. Okay. I understand that. But my question is, is violent Islamist extremism at war with us?

Mr. STOCKTON. No, sir. We are being attacked by al-Qaeda and its allies.

Representative LUNGREN. Is al-Qaeda—can it be described as being an exponent of violent Islamist extremism?

Mr. STOCKTON. Al-Qaeda are murderers with an ideological agenda—

Representative LUNGREN. That wasn't my question. My question was: Is al-Qaeda acting out violent Islamist extremism?

Mr. STOCKTON. Al-Qaeda is a violent organization dedicated to overthrowing the values that we intend to advance—

Representative LUNGREN. Is it yes or no?

Mr. STOCKTON. Can I hear the question again? I will make it as clear as I can. We are not at war with Islam.

Representative LUNGREN. I didn't ask that. I did not ask that, sir. I asked whether we are at war with violent Islamist extremism. That is my question.

Mr. STOCKTON. No. We are at war with al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

Representative LUNGREN. How does al-Qaeda define itself? Are they dedicated to violent Islamist extremism?

Mr. STOCKTON. Al-Qaeda would love to convince Muslims around the world that the United States is at war with Islam.

Representative LUNGREN. I didn't say that.

Mr. STOCKTON. That is a prime propaganda tool, and I am not going to aid and abet that effort to advance their propaganda goals.

Representative LUNGREN. My question is: Is there a difference between Islam and violent Islamist extremism?

Mr. STOCKTON. Sir, with great respect, I don't believe it is helpful to frame our adversary as Islamic with any set of qualifiers that we might add, because we are not at war with Islam.

Representative LUNGREN. I understand that. I never said we were at war with Islam. One of the questions we are trying to deal with is the radicalization of Islam, is the radicalization of Islamic youth. If we can't distinguish between violent Islamist extremism and Islam, then all this stuff about behavioral indicators doesn't mean anything.

Let me ask you this question: Is it a behavioral indicator to put on your card that you are a soldier of Allah?

Mr. STOCKTON. A behavioral indicator that you have a copy of *Inspire* magazine on your desk—

Representative LUNGREN. That is not my question. That is not my question. My question is: Is it a behavioral indicator to put on your card that you are a soldier of Allah, as Major Hasan did?

Mr. STOCKTON. We have behavioral indicators now that enable our personnel, our supervisors to focus on detecting indicators of violent extremism that reflect the lessons learned from Fort Hood.

Representative LUNGREN. Okay. Is that a lesson learned, that if you put "soldier of Allah" on your card, that you ought to follow up and investigate that?

Mr. STOCKTON. We are training our supervisors to follow up on appropriate indicators and exercise the leadership they need in order to provide for effective reporting and—

Representative LUNGREN. Do you agree with the statement to someone representing the Department of Defense on the weekend after the shooting that it would be a greater tragedy to lose our program of diversity than what had occurred?

Mr. STOCKTON. Let me go back to something that Chairman King said. I was trained up by Senator Moynihan. There was nobody less politically correct than Senator Moynihan. I follow the truth wherever it takes me, and I strongly support the programs of the

Department of Defense that focus on al-Qaeda and behavioral indicators.

Representative LUNGREN. I appreciate this.

Mr. STOCKTON. This is not about political correctness. This is about defeating our adversary.

Representative LUNGREN. Well, sir, I would disagree with you that it may not be about political correctness. We are here talking about the fact that we now have to have behavioral indicators. I agree with that. But my question is: If someone gives inflammatory remarks, as did Major Hasan, in an open setting, if he has on his card that he was a soldier of Allah, it seems to me to be beyond common sense to think that those are not behavioral indicators.

So my question is: If I am a member of the military today, and I see those two events or those two circumstances, would it be appropriate for me to report those as behavioral indicators? Now, that is not a question of whether or not you are being politically correct, sir. I am asking to answer that specific question. If I am a soldier and asked you that question, what do you tell me?

Mr. STOCKTON. Inflammatory rhetoric of the sort associated with Major Hasan, that needs to be reported. Our officers are trained up now to report on that behavior.

Representative LUNGREN. I thank you. I appreciate that.

Mr. Stuteville—

Chairman KING. The gentleman's time has expired.

Representative LUNGREN. Okay. Thank you.

Chairman KING. I recognize Senator Pryor for 5 minutes. Senator.

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for doing this, and thank you for all of us.

I want to thank the witnesses here for being here today, and thank you for your service, and just tell you how much we all appreciate everything you do for the country.

Let me start, if I may, with a sore subject for me, and that is as many of our Senators and Congressmen have mentioned today, we had a situation in Little Rock where two of our recruiters, servicemen, were killed and targeted by someone who had been radicalized, and he has been very open about that. He has told everyone who will listen that that is why he did this, and that is why they were targeted. But under the Department of Defense regulations, he is not—they are not entitled to receive their Purple Hearts. So, Mr. Stockton, could you talk to the joint committee here about why the Department of Defense has said they are not entitled to receive their Purple Hearts?

Mr. STOCKTON. This has been a decision led thus far by the Department of the Army, so I defer to Mr. Stuteville.

Senator PRYOR. Okay. Please. Thank you.

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Sir, the attacks on the Little Rock recruiting station were tragic, and the loss of our soldiers any time for any event is a tragic situation.

As you know, the award of the Purple Heart is governed by Federal statutes, Executive Orders, and the Department of Defense and Army regulations which state that the Purple Heart is to be awarded to soldiers for wounds or injuries received as a direct result of enemy action or international terrorist attack on the United

States. The incident at Little Rock, Arkansas, is considered a criminal act and was not deemed an international terrorist act, and therefore, as unfortunate as it is, the Secretary of the Army could not award the Purple Hearts to those two soldiers. Sir, should information surface in the future that would change that to an international act, then the Secretary would be allowed to relook at it. But at this time, the decision is based on that.

Senator PRYOR. The concern I have there is the perpetrator has admitted that it was a terrorist act. I mean, he intentionally did this, he intentionally sought out these two recruiters, he was trying to kill Americans in uniform. He had been to Yemen and had been radicalized, and he freely admits this. I mean, he is not hiding it. He is bragging about it to anyone who will listen. So I am having trouble understanding why you don't—why the Army does not consider this a terrorist attack.

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Sir, the Secretary of the Army did have all that information available to him when he made the decision; however, it still was not deemed as sufficient enough information to indicate this was a terrorist act. I will take your concerns back, sir, to the Army leadership at the conclusion of this hearing.

Senator PRYOR. Okay. Thank you. I know that the U.S. attorney in Little Rock wanted to try the case, but just for whatever legal reasons, I am not sure why it ended up in State court, and it was a criminal matter in State court. But certainly the U.S. attorney tried very hard, my understanding is, to characterize it as a terrorist act on U.S. soil and have the prosecution done in Federal court. But nonetheless, it ended up in State court.

So I would very much appreciate hearing back from you on this. I know Senator Boozman and I, my colleague from Arkansas, we have a bill to try and clarify this. But I just think we are sending a very mixed message about the threats we have here and the sacrifices our men and women in uniform make, and it is a head-scratcher to me. So I would appreciate you getting back with me after you relook at this.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Representative JACKSON LEE. Would the gentleman yield? Here I am, Senator. Here I am.

I simply want to—you are from Arkansas, but I simply want to join with you in seeking clarification. In the line of duty and in combat are two maybe confusing themes when your constituents are fallen, and the actor is associated with acts of terrorism. So I think we can do this in a bipartisan, bicameral manner, respecting the Department of Defense. You quoted a statute that I think was written by the Congress. So I would ask that as you take Senator Pryor's request back, that you would add for those of us who are from Texas who have the same pain from any families and find a way not to ignore the Department of Defense or disrespect the definition of a Purple Heart, but to find a way to come to recognition of the violence of the death of those who were at the hands of someone who was acting in the war on terror, the alleged war on terror, as it relates to the United States of America. I yield back to the gentleman.

Senator PRYOR. Thank you.

Representative CRAVAACK. Will the gentleman yield as well?

Chairman KING. The Senator's time has expired, but we will get to you.

Representative CRAVAACK. Thank you, sir.

Chairman KING. I would like to recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Duncan, and ask him if he would yield to me for 5 seconds.

Representative DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, the Obama administration refuses—

Chairman KING. Mr. Duncan, I asked you to yield to me for 5 seconds.

Representative DUNCAN. Okay.

Chairman KING. Just one observation, Mr. Stockton. You said al-Qaeda is the enemy. We seem to be focusing on al-Qaeda. That would exclude, for instance, the Pakistani Taliban, which carried out the Times Square bombing in New York. So I am just saying that it is not just al-Qaeda. It is al-Qaeda. It is also other Islamist extremist groups throughout the world.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Chairman, thank you. Very briefly. I agree with you. In other words, it includes Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan, al-Shabaab in Somalia. They are all part of this violent Islamist extremism movement, and they will all threaten the United States of America.

Chairman KING. Without antagonizing the gentleman from South Carolina further—

Representative DUNCAN. That is where I thought we were, Mr. Chairman. I apologize.

Just to further that point, because along those same lines, the administration refuses to understand and exploit terrorist semantics and the enemy code words. The 9/11 Commission report used the language identifying enemy 39 times, jihad 126 times, al-Qaeda 36 times, Shari'a 2 times. Then the most recent, *Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood*, in 2010, used these terms zero times.

I have said many times in committee hearings, Mr. Chairman, that we have got to be able to identify the enemy if we are ever going to defeat the enemy. I think that is important. During the Cold War, the United States conducted its diplomacy toward the Soviet Union on the basis of complete ignorance of the Soviet definition of the expression "peaceful coexistence." Unlike the conventional American understanding of it, i.e., we may dislike each other, but we will live and let live, Soviet literature and official political lexicons defined it rather as a form of struggle against capitalism where all forms of struggle are permissible except all-out war.

I think we have got to identify the enemy. I think we have to be willing to discuss the true threat to this Nation and discuss it in terms that are realistic. So according to the information provided the committee, the Army's new Threat Awareness and Reporting Program refuses to identify and discuss violent Islamist extremism.

So the question for you, Mr. Stuteville, is: Were Major Nidal Hasan and Sergeant Hasan Akbar, who killed 15, wounded 33 of their fellow soldiers—were they motivated by Islamist extremism?

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Sir, I would characterize it as their motivations, particularly in terms of Major Hasan, we really can't discuss those

today because his issue is still, as you know, awaiting prosecution. I would simply say in our new approach to—

Representative DUNCAN. Let me just establish the fact that he was in communication with al-Awlaki. I just establish that. That has been proven. Sorry to interrupt you.

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Sir, I still believe that our current approach of focusing on the behavioral indicators of any individual who does certain things and those get reported back is the best way to prevent these type of attacks from recurring in the future. That, to me, is the focus, and that is the Army's approach, and we believe it is successful to prevent any of these in the future.

Representative DUNCAN. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I really just wanted to make that point. I really don't have anything further for these gentlemen other than just to encourage you going forward and the policies of this administration and the military going forward is that we truly identify the enemy of this country. Let us have the courage to discuss openly and honestly and use the terms that are necessary to defeat this enemy once and for all and make this country and this world a safe place. I think we do that by being honest with ourselves and honest with the American people.

So I yield back.

Chairman KING. If the gentleman from South Carolina would yield to the gentleman from Minnesota the balance of his time?

Representative DUNCAN. Yes, sir, I do.

Chairman KING. The gentleman from Minnesota.

Representative CRAVAACK. Thank you for yielding.

I appreciate the comments regarding the Purple Heart. Why these young men are not receiving the Purple Heart I do not understand. I think that they are casualties of war, a war on terrorism, quite frankly. I also would like to see—have a statement back explaining to me from the Secretary of the Army why he does not consider two of his troopers victims—not victims, but warriors that were killed in combat.

Thank you, sir. I yield back to my gentleman.

Chairman KING. The gentleman yields back, and I now recognize the gentlelady from California Ms. Richardson for 5 minutes.

Representative RICHARDSON. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to thank you both, Chairman King, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins and Thompson, for bringing us forward on this very important subject.

Gentlemen, thank you for your service. I am going to ask you a couple of questions that will simply require a yes or no answer.

Question No. 1: Is there a threat to military communities limited to only Islamic extremists? Yes or no. I will start with you, Secretary Stockton.

Mr. STOCKTON. Thank you for that question. It allows me to address a couple of the other questions that came—

Representative RICHARDSON. I am sorry, Mr. Stockton. I am not a Ranking Member within leadership, so I have only got 5 minutes. So if you would just simply—a yes or no.

Mr. STOCKTON. Al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and its adherents are a primary threat. That is the center of gravity, but we recognize other threats confront the United States as well.

Representative RICHARDSON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Stuteville.

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Ma'am, in keeping to your yes or no answer, I would have to say no in this particular case.

Representative RICHARDSON. So the question was: Is there a threat to military communities only limited to Islamic extremists, and your answer is no, correct?

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Correct.

Representative RICHARDSON. Lieutenant Colonel Sawyer.

Colonel SAWYER. Ma'am, I would agree with the previous panelists, that it is not only limited.

Representative RICHARDSON. Second question: Is the threat to U.S. communities limited to Islamic extremists only? Yes or no. Secretary Stockton.

Mr. STOCKTON. My same answer would apply.

Representative RICHARDSON. Mr. Stuteville.

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Ma'am, that would be no.

Representative RICHARDSON. Lieutenant Colonel Sawyer.

Colonel SAWYER. Yes, ma'am, no to that as well.

Representative RICHARDSON. Third question: What other violent extremist groups exist?

Secretary Stockton.

Mr. STOCKTON. I would prefer to take that for the record and go into some detail with you.

Representative RICHARDSON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Stuteville.

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Ma'am, I would have to follow Mr. Stockton's lead on that, please.

Representative RICHARDSON. Okay. Lieutenant Colonel Sawyer.

Colonel SAWYER. Ma'am, we have also seen a proliferation of other movements that share—outside the Islamic faith as has been characterized by other members that have been targeting from the Christian right movement and the identity movement within the United States, and that is the reason why my answer is no.

Representative RICHARDSON. Thank you, gentlemen.

My next question is: It has been said here today that there were in the 1990s skinheads, white extremists and so on. Would you agree that skinheads and white extremists no longer exist and are not a threat to this country or our military bases?

Secretary Stockton.

Mr. STOCKTON. They are likely to still be a threat.

Representative RICHARDSON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Stuteville.

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Ma'am, my answer would be no.

Representative RICHARDSON. Lieutenant Colonel Sawyer.

Colonel SAWYER. I don't really have knowledge on those threats, ma'am, so I would defer that question to the record, please.

Representative RICHARDSON. Would you say that they exist?

Colonel SAWYER. Yes.

Representative RICHARDSON. Mr. Stuteville, would you say that they exist?

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Yes, ma'am, I would.

Representative RICHARDSON. Okay. Thank you.

I went through those questions because what we were told as Members, the topic of this hearing was "Homegrown Terrorism:

The Threat to Military Communities Inside the United States.” It doesn’t say “Islamic” anywhere in here.

Let me ask a separate question that I think might be helpful for you gentlemen, particularly you, Secretary Stockton. The budget cut effects in this dire environment that we are all facing, there is included in the sequestration the possibility of cutting the military. How would you see that these cuts would affect the work that you need to do?

Mr. STOCKTON. Thank you for that question. Both to sustain the progress that we have under way, but also to accomplish new starts that we have been able to launch due to—the current fiscal environment, they would be put at risk. Secretary Panetta has made it clear that National security would be at risk by sequestration, and I fully support his position.

Representative RICHARDSON. Mr. Stuteville.

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Ma’am, I second Secretary Stockton’s comments.

Representative RICHARDSON. Lieutenant Colonel Sawyer.

Colonel SAWYER. I would completely concur, ma’am.

Representative RICHARDSON. Okay. Last question: Assistant Secretary Stockton, when DOD begins to implement the CVE and the violent behavioral training throughout the services, how important is it to make sure that our soldiers are not targeted; that we are not going to find stereotyping going on based upon race, religion, and ethnicity? What specific steps are you going to do to assure that the appropriate training and monitoring exists; so even after you do the training and you say, no, this isn’t supposed to be stereotyping and targeting, what are you going to do to ensure that that won’t occur?

Mr. STOCKTON. We have a White House-directed review under way right now to address the challenges you identified. We are in it for the long haul to not only to make sure that in a snapshot we are doing what we need to do, but to sustain those standards in the future.

Representative RICHARDSON. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman KING. The time of the gentlelady has expired.

I recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg, for 5 minutes.

Representative WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the panel for being here. I apologize for not having a chance to hear some of the questioning that went on.

But let me ask Lieutenant Colonel Sawyer first, to what extent is al-Qaeda targeting military communities in the United States? Is this trend increasing?

Colonel SAWYER. Sir, it is a difficult question to answer in terms of whether or not there is direct targeting from abroad. What we do know is that about 56 percent of those direct attacks against the military for the past 10 years since 9/11 have been through passive radicalization; in other words, individuals here within the United States that reach out and subscribe to the ideology of al-Qaeda and its adherents and its affiliated organizations and mobilize and radicalize on their own. So the fact that al-Qaeda is perpetrating this ideology, that they are proliferating it in a way and identifying the military as a prime target and as a legitimate target, to act in

a preemptive manner is significant because it allows these individuals within the United States to seek that out and understand why the military is such a powerful target that reifies their narrative.

Representative WALBERG. So the trend is increasing?

Colonel SAWYER. Yes, sir. It is certainly persistent as we have seen it, and it certainly has increased since 2007.

Representative WALBERG. That would be equal or—there would be an increasing trend as well with other radicalized Islamic terrorist organizations, including al-Shabaab and others. Would that be the same concern?

Colonel SAWYER. Yes, sir.

Representative WALBERG. Okay. We are all—I think safely we could say we are all delighted that Osama bin Laden is no longer anything but room temperature, wherever that room might be. We are glad that he is not the focus or the face of radical terrorism at this point. But in the process of locating him, approaching him, and dealing with him, there are some of us that have at least some concerns or questions about how it was carried out before and aftermath.

So let me ask you, Colonel Sawyer, was it harmful for the Special Operations Forces involved in the May 1, 2011, killing of Osama bin Laden to be publicly identified?

Colonel SAWYER. Sir, this is—this is a difficult question. I would like to take it for the record and address in classified session, if we may.

Representative WALBERG. Secretary Stockton.

Mr. STOCKTON. I would recommend that approach as well.

Representative WALBERG. I assume, Mr. Stuteville, the same thing?

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Yes, sir.

Representative WALBERG. Did their public identification endanger these units' members and/or their families?

Mr. Stockton.

Mr. STOCKTON. I would welcome to take that issue on in classified session, please.

Representative WALBERG. Let me try one other question related to that. Should units involved in such sensitive operations be identified in the future?

Mr. STOCKTON. Again, I welcome the opportunity, sir, to discuss that in closed session.

Chairman KING. If I could just say to the gentleman from Michigan, Tim, we are going to be meeting in the closed session after this hearing, so the Secretary will be available.

Representative WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would yield my time back.

Chairman KING. I would like to recognize the newest Member of the committee—or the newest Member on the Minority side, one of the hardest working, Ms. Hahn from California.

Representative HAHN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, both Ranking Members. Thanks for this opportunity.

It has been a very interesting hearing. There are so many things that I am disturbed about, particularly with the Fort Hood massacre and the failure, in my opinion, of the higher-ups to properly take discipline action against Major Hasan. I don't think it was

about political correctness. I think there were so many indicators, you know, and policies that I believe were probably already in place that were just not adhered to; the fact that the guy, you know, was an Army psychiatrist, he was transferred, he had bizarre behavior, you know, he had a bad performance evaluation, and yet nothing was done.

I am happy that we have got new policies in place where you think some of these indicators are going to be more recognized, but I still believe there was a failure with policies that were already in place that were not adhered to, and that is really a huge part of the tragedy that I am disturbed about.

You know, my question is going to be about—and I believe, as has been said, that I think all threats, regardless of religion or ideology, are what we need to be paying attention to. If we just are focusing on a certain particular ideology, then we are exposing ourselves to threats that will put our country at risk.

I am concerned about the military families and the military bases. In my district out in California, my district includes the L.A. Air Force base, so certainly that is a big concern of mine. But also in my community of San Pedro, we have housed military families forever. We have the Army families there. We have Navy family housing there. We have Air Force housing.

So my question is going to be what are we doing, and what can you tell me that we are doing, to protect the families who live in our communities, the kids who are going to school in our schools? Are we paying attention to the potential risk and danger that families of militaries have in these identified military housing projects in communities throughout this country?

Mr. STOCKTON. I would like to say a few words and then turn it over to my colleague. I have regular meetings with Sheriff Baca. State and local fusion centers that apply to your district are focused on this kind of challenge. Aagain, being tight with law enforcement, between law enforcement and our installation commanders so that we can take care of military families as well as personnel who are on base, behind the perimeter and in uniform, that is part of our area of focus.

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Ma'am, I have referred to our Threat Awareness and Reporting Program several times this morning. As part of that training, we make that training available to family members as well. The primary focus of the training is to soldiers and civilians in the Armed Forces and in the Army.

But the other thing we have done is, we have put that training on-line so that any dependent with a common access card can access that training through the Training and Doctrine Center on-line, as well as we make it available for dependents to attend the training. Should the situation warrant, they have a large enough facility like an auditorium at their installation to allow that.

The other part of that is we have since put in place across the Army the iWATCH program, which is a little bit like the "See Something, Say Something" program. We have disseminated that program widely across our family communities so they all have access to that information.

Representative HAHN. Thank you.

My colleague Congresswoman Richardson alluded to the tough decisions that Congress is going to be making about budgets, and it seems to me all of the recommendations that are made are all going to really be dependent on budget. Can you tell me what sequestration will have—what kind of an effect that will have particularly on base security?

Mr. STOCKTON. I would like to take that, please, for the record and give you a detailed response.

Representative HAHN. Thank you.

Anybody else?

Thank you. Let me just add on to the family members. Are we also working with schools who have these kids in their schools? Are we working with teachers, counselors to also to be able to maybe identify some of the behavior that we are talking about that maybe we are only targeting the adults who exhibit that kind of behavior?

Mr. STOCKTON. Community engagement has a special focus now on schools, and we are taking that part of the overall strategy that the White House has issued this summer very, very seriously.

Representative HAHN. Thank you very much. I yield back my time.

Chairman KING. The time of the gentlelady has expired.

I recognize the Chairman of the Oversight Subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul.

Representative MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to both Chairmen here today having this historic hearing. It is very important.

My district—well, Fort Hood is just right outside my district, just north of my district. I went to the funeral services for the 13 slain soldiers with the combat boots and the rifles and the helmets. I know you are very familiar and aware of all of this. It was very emotional. At that time, we didn't really know the connection between Major Hasan and al-Awlaki, and to some extent we still don't know how much of a connection there really was.

I do recall asking soldiers who were wounded, who I thought were the best evidence, you know, what did he say as he shot you? They said, "Allahu Akbar," over and over. He screamed it. At that point in time, I realized that there may be something a little more to this case than just a murder case. Since that time, I think Senator Lieberman came out with an excellent report outlining a lot of this investigation.

I was—you know, I worked in the Justice Department, Joint Terrorism Task Force. I understand how this all works. I understand FISAs. But when it came to my attention that the JTTF in San Diego had information that Major Hasan at a military base just north of my district was communicating with Anwar al-Awlaki, perhaps the greatest terrorist threat while he was alive, over the internet, and the idea that that information was not shared with Fort Hood, and I asked General Cone at the ceremony, I said, wouldn't you have liked to have known more about this guy or just a heads-up that maybe you want to take a look at this guy, keep an eye on him? That possibly could have stopped the death of the 13 soldiers.

What I would argue is it was the greatest attack on American soil since the 9/11 terrorist attack.

I think in the report that Senator Lieberman issued, the FBI of course said, "That is our boy." That was their response when they saw Major Hasan being arrested.

So my first question is, you know, why wasn't that information shared that could have prevented this attack? What are we doing to make sure that never happens again?

I guess probably the best person would be, I guess, Mr.—okay, Mr. Stockton?

Mr. STOCKTON. I will start, and then I will invite my colleagues to add more.

The first problem, the most severe problem, is that the personnel in that Joint Terrorism Task Force did not understand the duty to share this information when there is what we call a Department of Defense nexus. Our installation commander at Fort Hood needed to know the information that the JTTFs had, and the JTTF needed to understand that they have a duty to share that with us.

Second, we didn't have the kind of personnel around the Nation from the Department of Defense in Joint Terrorism Task Forces to make it stick, to build the habitual relationships, to build the practices of sharing that would ensure that, again, the base commander was getting the information needed.

Then, finally, we need to ensure that it is not happening by onesies and twosies, that institution-to-institution we get information from the FBI that is widely distributed on a regular basis throughout the Department of Defense so our installation commanders in all of the armed services are getting what they need in a timely and effective fashion.

Representative MCCAUL. Well, I hope we fixed it. We can't change what happened in the past, but I sure hope, you know, that we have fixed that problem.

You know, the way this guy was kicked—the can kicked down the road, no one wanted to deal with it. Chairman King always talks about political correctness, and this was political correctness gone just awry. You know, time after time, flags coming up about, you know, he is defending bin Laden, he is proselytizing, and nobody wants to deal with it.

Is the military changing its strategy in dealing with people that they can, you know, perceive to be radicalizing within our military, at our bases?

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Sir, again, as I have reiterated a lot this morning, our behavioral indicators capture all the key indicators that we believe would indicate someone is going down the path of radicalization.

To answer your question further about the information-sharing between the Department, the services, and the FBI, I would be glad to share specific examples with you in the closed hearing about how that process now works much more effectively.

Representative MCCAUL. You may not be able to answer this question. Perhaps it is more appropriate in the closed hearing, but—

Chairman KING. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Representative MCCAUL [continuing]. I would like to know about the connection between al-Awlaki and Mr. Hasan. Because there is one.

I yield back.

Chairman KING. The gentleman yields back.

I recognize my colleague from upstate New York, the gentlelady, Ms. Hochul.

Representative HOCHUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do appreciate this opportunity. I am sorry I missed some of the earlier questioning, but Fort Hood is personal to me. I was with the father of a young man who was stationed there while he was still awaiting word on whether or not his son was dead or alive. So we suffered through this, as did the country, as do the families who survived. I know you want to get it right. Let that be the last case we ever have, that act of domestic terrorism on one of our military bases.

I currently represent a base in upstate New York, the Niagara Falls Air Force Base. Through the hearings that we have had since my brief 6 months on this committee, I have learned a lot. There is a Hezbollah threat facing us right across the border in Toronto. That is not very far from my Air Force base. Homeland Security has reported that there are more threats to terrorism in this country along the Northern Border than the Southern Border. We have a large expanse of land on our border with Canada which is virtually unprotected.

I just want to ask the question: Do you feel that there is an additional threat to any bases along the Northern Border as opposed to the Southern Border? Are additional safeguards being taken to protect them?

Mr. Secretary and former colleague of Senator Moynihan's, we are alumni, so we both understand the political-correctness issue, as well, so—

Mr. STOCKTON. And why we are not going to be politically correct.

Base commanders have the obligation not only to take the general guidance that the Department of Defense applies, but to take in local threats, local circumstances, as a prime factor in building their specific anti-terrorism and force-protection packages.

So I would say, yes, indeed, along the Northern Border, as well as in other specific areas where there are challenges for security, base commanders are required to take those special circumstances into account.

Representative HOCHUL. Thank you.

Mr. STUTEVILLE. Ma'am, I would like to further amplify that by—U.S. Northern Command, as you know, NORTHCOM, has the authority to set the force-protection conditions at bases in CONUS. Of course, their AOR, their area of responsibility, includes the Northern and Southern Borders. So I think they do that very well. So that is to amplify Secretary Stockton's comments on that.

Representative HOCHUL. Thank you.

Colonel SAWYER. In addition to that, I would add that there has been a significant movement in a Northern Border initiative between the interagency with DOJ, FBI, U.S. attorney's offices to share information and to make that available to the variety of forces. So a specific look at that is really helping our understanding, and then the cooperation amongst the variety of agencies that are needed to address this problem.

Representative HOCHUL. I understand that today's hearing is focused on threat to our domestic bases. I am also very concerned about our bases overseas. We have had attacks, we have lost nine CIA members because of threats that became reality. I want to make sure that our focus is not limited to our bases here, because we have men and women serving in harm's way elsewhere.

We protect them on the battlefield—I am also on the Armed Services Committee—but we also have to protect them from these threats, as well. I hope we are taking a holistic approach to this. This is very important to me.

Also, again, my area has been affected by really the first-known domestic terrorists after 9/11, which was the Lackawanna Six case. We had people who lived in our backyards who had gone over and trained with Osama bin Laden, and they knew that there was going to be an attack on 9/11 before 9/11. So we need to be vigilant. Those people have been prosecuted, they were sent to jail, and they are now back, and they are actually becoming cooperating witnesses and have been very helpful to us.

That case aside, I want to make sure that there is no place else where people are engaging in activity that could be harmful to our bases. This is very important. I understand that you understand the lessons from Fort Hood, as well. I am pleased to hear that we all agree this can never happen again in our country. So thank you very much.

I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman KING. The gentlelady yields back.

I will note that she was too modest to point out that her husband is one of the lead prosecutors against terrorism in northern New York.

I would now like to ask the panel to step down, but ask them to remain for the closed session which will follow the testimony and questioning of our next witness.

While we are waiting for the people to leave and come in and Mr. Long to take his seat at the panel, I don't want to embarrass Lauren at all on my staff, but Lauren Wenger has done a tremendous job in putting this hearing together, and her parents are here in the committee room today. Lauren will never speak to me again after embarrassing her like this, but I do want to acknowledge you and thank her.

I am now pleased to welcome as our next witness, Mr. Daris Long. Mr. Long is the father of William Andrew Long, a young Army private who was killed outside an Arkansas military recruiting center in 2009.

Mr. Long has a distinguished record of service to his country that includes 17 years of enlisted service in the United States Marine Corps and 10 years as an officer. During his military career, Mr. Long served nearly 8 years overseas and nearly 19 years in the operating forces of the Fleet Marine Force.

In addition, due in part to his father's extensive overseas service with the Federal Government, Mr. Long spent his childhood in Afghanistan and has visited roughly 50 countries, including Pakistan, India, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Between him and his wife Janice, his family has been connected with the United States Armed Forces since 1918.

Before I recognize Mr. Long for his opening statement, I would like to acknowledge the presence of Mr. Melvin Bledsoe, who is seated directly behind Mr. Long. Mr. Bledsoe, as you may recall, testified before the House committee in March of this year. He is the father of Carlos Bledsoe, who has been convicted of murdering Mr. Long's son. Mr. Bledsoe's presence here, and in support of Mr. Long, is a testament to how two fathers have channeled their considerable pain to stand together in the fight against violent Islamist extremism.

Mr. Bledsoe, thank you for being here again today. Thank you for your testimony back in March.

Now I am privileged to recognize Mr. Daris Long for his opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF DARIS LONG, PRIVATE CITIZEN, FATHER OF
WILLIAM ANDREW LONG**

Mr. LONG. Chairman King, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Thompson, distinguished Members of Congress, since my son's death my view of things has changed. I have lain awake through my wife's nightmares when she relives being 50 feet away while Andy and Quinton were shot.

I was a career Marine, both enlisted and as an officer of Marines. My wife served in the Navy, was honorably discharged. Our family has served in various military branches since World War I. We have one son who served in Iraq as an Army cavalry scout and one son who was infantry, who is buried in the ground.

My faith in Government is diminished. It invents euphemisms instead of accurate language, while perpetrators speak freely, using the very words deemed offensive, to justify their actions. Clarity is absent. Little Rock is a drive-by; Fort Hood is just workplace violence.

Three days after Andy died, it was reported on the internet by Major Garrett, who stated the White House had released a statement on the Little Rock shootings but only to Arkansas news outlets—if they asked for one. According to Garrett, the White House didn't think there was much interest in the story otherwise.

We believe the push from certain press outlets and talk radio put pressure on the White House over the President's response on a "terrorist" attack against an abortion doctor, which starkly contrasted with the "saddened" statement on the killing and wounding of American soldiers in America's heartland. The White House issued a letter of condolence. We received a personal phone call from the President. The President's press statement is conspicuously absent from the White House website.

Two New Jersey men, 14 Minnesota men arrested for planning to go to Somalia and join al-Shabaab, and 2 men in Seattle planning on attacking a recruiting center—all resulting in Federal indictments for terrorism. The Government caught a Somali crossing from Yemen to Somalia, then sneaked him to arraign him in a New York Federal court. He now has all the legal rights of an American citizen, while Andy and Quinton's rights bled out on the pavement in Little Rock.

People within the Federal Government like to trumpet its success in thwarting attacks. Former Homeland Security Security Tom

Ridge said we just got lucky when the Christmas day and New York Times Square bombers failed. Luck is not an effective counterterrorism strategy. Great law enforcement, but nothing was thwarted.

The latest Fort Hood episode was planned by a soldier who had previously been the subject of a mainstream-media blitz for taking his conscientious-objector stand to get out of going to Afghanistan. He was painted as the peaceful Muslim poster boy with principles. It is telling that his discharge was on hold because he was facing child pornography charges and was AWOL from Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Once again, Federal terrorism charges.

In an attack that resulted in the first death and wounding of American soldiers on U.S. soil since 9/11, action by the Department of Justice is absent. Little Rock has morphed into nothing more than a drive-by shooting. Abdulhakim Muhammad's jihad in America has been downplayed by the Federal Government and the mainstream media, causing irreparable change to the families involved, as well as flat-out lying to the American people.

I am convinced the Government's position is to deny Little Rock as a terrorist attack. By not being open and transparent, and despite promises to do so, to this administration's shame, two soldiers have been abandoned on the battlefield in the advancement of a political agenda.

November 5, 2009, an attack took place at Fort Hood. In each instance, a clear tie to Yemen, but still no Federal indictments. My take is that if you plan or fail in a terrorist attack, you will be charged, but if you kill in this country under the banner of jihad, we are told it isn't terrorism, and Federal judicial response is neither confirmed nor denied.

We firmly believe that if the White House had shown the same attitude concerning Little Rock as was shown in the killing of Dr. Tiller, a clear message could have been sent. The political correctness exhibited by our Government over offending anyone in admitting the truth about Islamic extremism masked alarm bells that were going off. Warnings were ignored. Major Nidal Hasan was able to openly praise the Little Rock shootings in front of fellow Army officers and then commit his own jihad.

The last planned attack at Fort Hood was stopped because an ordinary citizen recognized the signs. If our Government and press had done their jobs in calling out and honestly reporting on Little Rock, Fort Hood may have been avoided.

The blatant masking and disregard of the facts not only endanger American citizens of non-Muslim faith but those of Muslim heritage who do not adhere to the extremist beliefs demonstrated by a militant and political form of jihad. I grew up in Afghanistan, living there for a decade. I have traveled in over 50 countries, many of them primarily of Muslim culture. I will not condemn the religious rights of over 1.5 billion people.

But rational people do not deny these terrorist events were the result of men who adopted and practiced what we are told is a particularly warped interpretation of their religion. The confusion being sown by our leaders is undermining the security and tears at the fabric of our Nation. The message being sent to the military community denies these heinous acts as terrorism.

Abdulahkim Muhammad, formerly Carlos Bledsoe, was unquestionably a radicalized, violent Islamic extremist determined to wage jihad. My family kept silent for over 2 years. We will not be silent again. We are speaking not out of hate but because our country needs to hear the truth. This administration needs to heed the words of 1 Corinthians 14:8. "In fact, if the trumpet makes an unclear sound, who will prepare for battle?"

Thank you.

[The statement of Mr. Long follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DARIS LONG

7 DECEMBER 2011

Since my son's death my view on things has changed. I've lain awake through my wife's nightmares when she relives being 50 feet away while Andy and Quinton were shot. My faith in Government is diminished. It invents euphemisms instead of using accurate language while the perpetrators speak freely using the very words deemed offensive to justify their actions. Clarity is absent. Little Rock is a drive-by and Fort Hood is just workplace violence: The truth is denied.

Three days after Andy died this was on the internet and I quote: "FNC Special Report's on-line broadcast from last night is well worth the watch on the topic. Major Garret comes on to discuss the White House handling of it. The White House prepared a comment to be released about the attack for 'those who requested comment.' He goes on to explain the White House explained this was available upon request instead of just releasing it because the press didn't seem interested. Garret was clearly squirming, knowing how awful what he was saying sounded."

We believe the push from certain press outlets and talk radio put pressure on the White House over the President's response on the "terrorist" attack against an abortion doctor which starkly contrasted with the "saddened" statement on the killing and wounding of American soldiers in America's heartland. The White House issued a letter of condolence and we received a personal phone call from the President. The President's press statement is conspicuously absent from the White House website.

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The latest Fort Hood episode was planned by a soldier who had previously been the subject of a mainstream media blitz for his taking a conscientious objector stand to get out of going to Afghanistan. He was painted as the peaceful Muslim poster boy with principals. It is telling that his discharge was on hold because he was facing child pornography charges and was AWOL from Fort Campbell; once again Federal terrorism charges.

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This administration needs to heed the words of 1 Corinthians 14:8 "In fact, if the trumpet makes an unclear sound, who will prepare for battle."

Chairman KING. Thank you, Mr. Long. Thank you for your testimony. Thank you for your courage in being here today. Thanks to your wife, who is not here but, as you have told us, is the rock of the family.

Mr. Long, one of the issues that struck us when Mr. Bledsoe testified back in March is why the Federal Government, why the Justice Department did not treat this as a terrorist prosecution.

Now, if I could just say some of the things we have heard. The fact is the FBI was aware of Mr. Bledsoe. The FBI had been monitoring. Then, for whatever reason, it appears the monitoring was pulled back or something was allowed to happen, obviously unintentionally. Rather than go through an embarrassing case, an embarrassing prosecution, it was deferred to the State.

Because I find it very unusual in a case where you had someone who was actually trained overseas, sent back here, carrying out a jihadist murder, is not treated as a terrorist, when, as you said, people getting on the plane to go to Somalia are arrested as terrorists.

So could you tell us what you have learned in your investigation as to why this was not prosecuted by the Federal Government as a terrorist offense?

Mr. LONG. I really cannot tell you why. Rational people couldn't tell you why.

We looked at what happened to my son, and after querying the Army on the Purple Heart the first time, they came back and they said, he just doesn't rate it. The second time we come back, they said, we don't have enough information. So I sat down and went through the internet. Abdulhakim Muhammad has 38,300 entries on the internet alone.

This is what I submitted to the Secretary of the Army. It was not to make the determinative thing; it was to get the Army to go through the regulation that was mentioned in here. It comes from Army Regulation 600-8-22, paragraph 2-8. You go down to paragraph 8(k)(4), and it specifically says, in the case of international terrorism, the Secretary of the Army has the authority do that, but

it has to have an investigation done and then submitted by a major command intelligence and security officer.

To this point, we still have no answer on whether that is done. What we get now is, it is just a criminal act. That denies the fact that Abdulhakim Muhammad flew to Yemen on 9/11/2007. Out of 365 days a year, why would he pick that day?

He was arrested on November 14, 2008. In his possession, he has bomb-making materials, he has *Inspire* stuff, he has al-Alwaki tapes, he has a fake Somali passport. Why would he have a fake Somali passport? He was going to Somalia. When I met with the FBI in September 2009, I asked them that question, and they said they couldn't say it, and I said, "It is rhetorical." Because I have been to Somalia. I served there during Restore Hope. The average guy can't read, but if you show him a piece of paper with a bunch of rubber stamps on it, he is going to let you go through because he doesn't know if it is his warlord or the next warlord who took care of it. He was on his way there.

He goes into a jailhouse in there. Within just hours, from what I have been told, an FBI agent from Nashville is interviewing him in Yemen. On 9 February this year, the *Los Angeles Times* reports that the Federal Government knew this guy was dangerously radicalized before he ever came back to the United States. The FBI agent goes back in and tells him, "If you ever get out of this God-forsaken place, I am going to hound you until you die." He is deported.

I didn't know if the State Department had anything to do with that, but it was also reported that under urging from the Embassy, he was deported out of there, rather than have a trial there. As of the hearings that we had in here before that Mr. Bledsoe testified at, the State Department was involved in getting this guy here. So now we are importing these people back in.

He gets back here. He is interrogated again in Nashville. He stays in Memphis for a couple, 3 months, moves to Little Rock. Within a month of moving to Little Rock, he gains over 1,000 rounds of bullets, buying in a parking lot, an SKS rifle, a 380 pistol, and a .22-caliber rifle. He decides to go on his jihad. When he bought the .22-caliber rifle and no one stopped him, he said, it's on.

This was his plan that he worked up, according to his letters to the Commercial Appeal, while he was in the political prison in Yemen with his fellow, brother al-Qaeda people. The FBI, in a brief to the National Guard in Little Rock, call Abdulhakim Muhammad an "al-Qaeda adherent."

The Army, last August, put out a big training syllabus on how to deal with terrorism. Part of that thing is they identify the Little Rock shootings as terrorism. They come back in a letter to me saying, this is just a criminal event. They don't get it both ways.

He was left on a battlefield. It took me 2 years to get these back. These are my son's dog tags. He wore these when he took four rounds of 7.62 ammo from about 3 feet. On it, there is the warrior ethos. The last line of it is, "I will never leave a fallen comrade." Well, the Army left him.

Chairman KING. The Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Lieberman. Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks to you, Chief Long. Thanks for having the courage to come before the committee, to speak out in public. Thanks for your eloquence. Your statement was extremely powerful.

You know, it brings to mind the very important role that family of people who were killed on 9/11 have had in influencing and shaping our Government's reaction to 9/11. Thankfully, this group of survivors that you are in is smaller, but I hope you will think about being in contact with survivors of people who were lost at Fort Hood and making yourselves available. Because your testimony is very powerful, and it is real, and it is what I think any of us sitting here would feel if we were the father or the mother of the young man who was killed, again, simply because he was wearing the uniform of the United States Army.

So I appreciate your testimony. It is very moving that Mr. Bledsoe is here and that you have established some kind of relationship after this tragedy. I am sure he feels a kind of pain that is a different kind of pain but—because of what his son has done.

I want to say, incidentally, that before preparing for this hearing I did not know about this problem regarding the awarding of the Purple Heart in this case and maybe in Fort Hood. I think, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Thompson, just to echo what was said, we ought to get together and—I know there is an administrative process over there. I got worried when I heard this described with the first panel of witnesses, that the language as it exists now in law and Executive Order and regulation regarding the awarding of Purple Hearts has the folks at the Defense Department in a box that nobody in Congress wants them to be in. Because your son should obviously be awarded the Purple Heart posthumously.

So it is probably a little bit too quick, but I am kind of wondering, because there is a conference committee this afternoon on the two Department of Defense authorization bills that have passed, and I wonder—because I am sure everybody will support this. I am going to see if we can draft up some language that might even be included in that conference report, which hopefully will be passed by the end of this calendar year. If not, we will do it separately as quickly as we can.

Incidentally, we argued a lot about how to handle detainees, in the Senate and in the House, on this bill I am talking about. One thing that was mentioned over and over again is that there is now a U.S. Supreme Court holding that says that an American citizen, such as Mr. Bledsoe, now also known as Abdulhakim Muhammad, who is found to be an enemy combatant can be treated that way—in other words, as having committed an act of terrorism—perhaps, in my opinion, best being subject to military incarceration and a military tribunal.

Coming off of what you have experienced, I just want to ask you—and I know you have spoken from your heart, and the disappointment and anger about some of the things that the Government has not done. Have you received any support, and how sufficient has that support been, from the U.S. Government and other sources after the killing of your son?

Mr. LONG. I believe that if it was left up purely to the U.S. attorneys in Arkansas and the senior agent in charge of the FBI, this thing would have been in Federal court.

The Army, I have to say, in dealing with the casualty affairs officer, he happens to become a very good friend of mine. We talk to each other on a weekly basis. He has me pulled into the survivor outreach thing. I have talked to several other families.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Good.

Mr. LONG. Arkansas has lost around, I think at last count, 119 people that are connected with the war on terror.

There are a lot of good things that have come out of this as a part of it, but most of it is on the local scale.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yeah.

Okay, my time is up. Again, I want to thank you. To the extent that it is possible, because it is not easy, and I know you have a life of your own that you are living, the occasions on which you can come forward and speak out, you can change the policy of this Government, I believe. I thank you for being here today.

Chairman KING. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman.

I now recognize the gentleman from Mississippi, the Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson.

Representative THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Long, thank you for your service. Thank you for coming to this joint hearing today. Like my colleagues before me, we are deeply saddened by your tragic loss.

I also want to say to Chairman Lieberman, I am one of the conferees on this DOD authorization effort. If there is a possibility that we can craft some language that would provide the relief for this family in this situation, I would love to do it.

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is great. Thank you, Mr. Thompson. Let's work together today.

Representative THOMPSON. I look forward to it. The broader public policy issue, I think, is also in conversation, too. So I look forward to working with you on that.

Again, let me offer my personal condolences and sympathies to the tragic loss. I look forward to doing whatever we can as a committee to correct any past issue that we have identified because of this situation going forward.

I yield back.

Chairman KING. I thank the Ranking Member.

I would just point out that Chairman Lungren is a conferee also, and he fully supports the recommendation for a Purple Heart.

With that, I recognize the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Cravaack.

Representative CRAVAACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Long, for being here. Mr. Bledsoe, thank you for being here, as well. Your combined efforts here in representing your sons are very powerful.

You know, I just don't get it. I am a military officer of 24 years. Why your son has not received a Purple Heart—I don't understand it.

This is what it said in Wikipedia: "After his arrest, Muhammad acknowledged the shooting of the men. He told police that he intended to kill as many Army personnel as possible. He had an SKS rifle, a Mossberg International 702 rifle, two handguns, 562 rounds of ammo, and military books in his car. He said he had been sent by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and that the attack was jus-

tified according to Islamic laws and the Islamic religion—jihad, to fight those who wage war on Islam and Muslims. He recently returned after 16 months in Yemen and was the first of two gunfight attacks in 2009. Muhammad was charged with capital murder, attempted capital murder, and 10 counts of unlawful discharge of a weapon. Muhammad also reportedly faced 15 counts of engaging in a terrorist act.”

Now, I don't understand why the Army has not gone ahead and offered your son the Purple Heart at the very least.

Mr. LONG. They are looking at a State crime.

Representative CRAVAACK. Correct.

Mr. LONG. The portion that they are talking on the terroristic threatening, that is gang-related. It has do that you have to turn around—it is a State law dealing with gang suppression, that you are targeting someone inside a house in a drive-by-shooting-type thing.

The thing that I don't understand is that, in Muhammad's own handwriting to the FBI, to the TBI, to the prosecutor, on 30 May, midnight, he started his jihad by shooting up a Jewish rabbi's house in west Little Rock. He then drove to Memphis, where he parked outside another Jewish rabbi's house, but because the neighbors were too loud, he moved on.

He then drove up to Florence, Kentucky, which was his first recruiting center that he was planning on hitting, but it was closed. So, in frustration, he decided to come back to Little Rock, and, on the way, he stopped by Nashville and threw a Molotov cocktail that he had made in Little Rock at another rabbi's house in the west end of Nashville. It failed to explode. My understanding is they have that Molotov cocktail in evidence.

When he came back to Little Rock, he drove by, saw the target of opportunity, my son and Quinton, coming out of the recruiting center, and drove into the parking lot, came around, and did his attack.

At this point, I am sitting here looking at, this guy is a 20-percenter. I mean, his BDA is 20 percent. But where are the Feds on the other 80 percent? Material support for terrorism, in that he provided his own body on 9/11/2007 to these people in there. In a taped interview by the FBI that was allowed in the trial in Little Rock, he specifically tells the FBI that he went places in Yemen. They ask him what those places were; he says Dammaj.

If you go back to the Army doctrine published in 2007, “Terrorism in the 21st Century,” they specifically identify Dammaj as a front for radical jihadists and terrorists. This guy was in Dammaj. There is nothing there. There are vineyards, 200 mud huts, and a big madrassa run by Yahya al-Hajuri, who was of the Red Mosque fame in Saudi Arabia in 1979. It is the same place that John Walker Lindh went to for his training.

Now, material support for there. Attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction. Title 18, U.S. Code, Chapter 113(b), paragraph 2332(b). Where are these guys? Where are they in here doing this stuff?

Representative CRAVAACK. Well, I can tell you, sir, I will not leave your son behind.

Mr. LONG. Thank you, sir.

Representative CRAVAACK. I will take this as a personal challenge to me. I am very disappointed in the Secretary of the Army for not recognizing your son, and I will continue forth with that mission.

Mr. LONG. Thank you, sir.

Representative CRAVAACK. With that, sir, I will yield back.

Chairman KING. The gentleman yields back.

I now recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for 5 minutes.

Representative JACKSON LEE. Mr. Long, I mentioned earlier of our remorse and sympathy to your family, and I want to thank you for not remaining silent. The presence of Mr. Bledsoe acknowledges the pain that he experiences, as well.

I think we clarified for the record, and I think you were present in the room, that those who were representing the United States military are certainly remorseful of this enormity of loss of life. Combined with that, I think the virtues of our Constitution and the First Amendment make us a great country and make us able to answer the concerns that you have expressed.

But I think we have a solution here. You have heard a Senator, a House Member, another House Member, another Senator from Arkansas, and a Member from Texas who experienced and mourned with those in Fort Hood going in a fast pace to resolve this. I think because our country is new—not very new—at dealing with this issue of terrorism, our statutory laws may not have, in essence, grappled with the change.

Anyone, as your son was and the other fallen soldier, in uniform in the action of their duty, Andy and Quinton, clearly are defined, as far as I am concerned, as fallen heroes.

Fort Hood has the same crisis and the same situation. I can't ask you why our soldiers were unarmed. I won't ask that question to you. It is a question that I raised. It is a policy on domestic territory, on the land of the United States. Some Americans would be wondering, why did this happen? Why weren't they armed? They have to understand that our soldiers are called to battle. Out of our civilian government, we are not arming them. Maybe in consideration of what we face, we have to look at those questions.

The one thing that I will hope, Mr. Long, is that, from hearing from us today, that your words that indicated that your faith in Government is diminished will be somewhat, if I might say, tempered and you might see a glimmer of hope and also a response to the activism of your family. I hope that that will be something that you will come away from today.

But I do want to ask this question, because out of your pain can come insight. You heard the open discussion of beginning to look at a behavior of an individual. In this instance, of the perpetrator that you were dealing with, there were actions over and over again. The behavior as evidenced by Captain Hasan was not passed from one person to the next because there was no policy at that time.

What other tool do you think we need when we begin to look at this domestic terrorism, recognizing the particular actor and associated with a particular style, but recognizing that this does not condemn Muslims, Muslim soldiers, Muslim Americans? But what tool do we need, Mr. Long?

Mr. LONG. First of all, Mr. Bledsoe and I both lost our sons that day, and we are very aware of that. I am very thankful for him being here.

The tools? I hear this discussion about behavioral tools. I am a father. My kids come home, and they do certain things. I know they have done something, but they are not going to tell me what they are doing. It takes me a while to figure out what they are doing. That is a neat kind of thing.

“Sun Tzu” came out 2,000 years ago. In my various schools in the Marine Corps, he said basically, in Arkansas terms, if you know what the bad guy is doing and you know what you are doing, you are going to win all your wars. If you don’t know what the bad guy is doing and you know what you are doing, you are going to win half of them. But if you don’t know what you are doing and you don’t know what they are doing, you are going to lose everything.

To me, the banishment of certain terms and words, they are set up—that is the words that Muhammad used; that is not the words that I used. In Islamic law, carried out in “Reliance of the Traveller,” you know, “War and Peace” in Islam, it describes jihad as a war against non-Muslims.

If you understand those terminologies, you can get inside their decision cycle and break that cycle. It has to be both. But it has to be clear, and it has to be concise. You have to say the truth, work the truth.

Representative JACKSON LEE. We are doing that here. We will not leave, as my colleague said, your soldiers, your son and the other soldier, and the soldiers at Fort Hood, we will not leave them behind in not being honored by the United States of America. I think you have a chorus of support here today. I think, by the end of this hearing, we will have a resolution to honor all of those who fell in this type of action.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I think we have learned a lot, and we are ready to move forward as quickly as possible.

With that, I yield back.

Chairman KING. The gentlelady yields back.

I recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Turner, for 5 minutes.

Representative TURNER. I thank you for your testimony, Mr. Long. You were eloquent and spot-on. I simply want to thank you for your service and shining the light on this problem.

Jihad is not clearly understood. Even the tools of jihad are not. Takia is a—

Mr. LONG. Yes, sir, I am well aware of takia.

Representative TURNER [continuing]. A term for deceiving and fooling the enemy—a useful tool in jihad, one we should know a little more about.

Again, I thank you for your testimony. God bless you and your family.

I yield back. Thank you.

Chairman KING. The gentleman yields back.

I recognize the gentlelady from California, Ms. Richardson, for 5 minutes.

Representative RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, Mr. Chairman, I would like to request unanimous consent to enter in a final statement for the record regarding our hearing today.

Chairman KING. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information follows:]

DECEMBER 5, 2011.

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 340 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC 20510.

U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security, H2-176 Ford House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.

U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security Democrats, H2-117 Ford House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.

DEAR CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN, RANKING MEMBER COLLINS, CHAIRMAN KING, AND RANKING MEMBER THOMPSON: As retired military chaplains we write to you out of years of experience caring for the spiritual well-being of United States military service members. We are retired Christian and Muslim chaplains who have served and counseled in the Army, Army Reserves, and Navy, and we have cared for soldiers across faith lines for the betterment of the United States armed services. We are deeply concerned about any inquiry into threats to military members which would only focus on the adherents of one religion. To only accuse Muslim soldiers of extremist behavior is inaccurate and very unfair to Muslim service members who are loyal to the United States and its military.

We must make clear that religion is not the sole indicator of violent behavior and that all religions have included adherents prone to such violent behavior. Following the shooting at Ft. Hood the Department of Defense issued a report highlighting changes necessary in base safety to protect service members and their families from internal threats. In that report, multiple indicators of violence are highlighted:

“ . . . genetic and biological causes; specific mental illnesses and personality disorders; reactions to medications or substance abuse; religion, social, and political motivations; and environmental factors. The causes of violence do not fall neatly into discrete categories, and several factors may combine to trigger violent behaviors.”¹

Focusing primarily on religious adherence distracts from appropriately evaluating the other indicators of violence. Such distraction runs the danger of spreading anti-Muslim sentiment within the ranks of the U.S. military, weakening unit cohesion and trust.

While we applaud effective efforts to protect our service members from all threats, internal and external, we are concerned that these hearings do a disservice to American Muslim soldiers. Generalized rhetoric about Islam provides a distorted understanding of the faithfulness of these American Muslim soldiers—both in religious practice and in service to the United States.

Threats to military personnel, like that of the Ft. Hood shooting, should not weaken the unity of the armed services or cast suspicion on American service members; they should rather strengthen the cohesion of our soldiers. Indeed, since the tragedy at Ft. Hood the response of the U.S. military has made bases and soldiers safer than by developing strategies that effectively responded to strategies and behavior which may lead to violence—not by targeting faithful religious observance.

Responsible prevention of such attacks requires the trust and commitment of all American soldiers, and we cannot get there by defining faithful American Muslim soldiers by the behavior of Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan.

American Muslims are valued service members in the U.S. military. Many have linguistic skills and cultural competencies relevant to Iraq and Afghanistan which have been unique contributions to meeting U.S. goals abroad.

As Members of Congress overseeing homeland security, it is of the utmost importance that you take violent extremism seriously by rejecting the assertion that there is support for terrorism among American soldiers. American soldiers of all faiths

¹United States Department of Defense, *Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood* (Washington, DC, 2010), 11.

protect this country by taking their duty seriously and they deserve leaders back home who do the same.

Sincerely,

REV. STEPHEN B. BOYD,
*Chaplain (COL), U.S. Army Reserves, Retired Minister for Government and
Professional Chaplaincies, United Church of Christ.*

GEORGE M. CLIFFORD,
Captain, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy (Retired).

CH (COL) HERMAN KEIZER, JR.,
U.S. Army retired.

JAMES YEE,
Former U.S. Army Chaplain (CPT).

Representative RICHARDSON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Long, I would like to say that you can count on me, in standing with my colleagues who have already spoken today, in my efforts as I will join with them for the proper recognition of your son and his service. I want to thank you personally for your service and also for both of your sons'.

No. 2, I want to commit to you that I am going to forward today your testimony, when it is available, to both the President and his administration, with a personal note of what I personally heard you say here today. You shouldn't have to say it time and time again, but I appreciate your willingness to continue to talk to us and to make sure that we are better informed and we don't make these same mistakes in the future.

Finally, I want to thank you, Mr. King, for your relationship with Mr. Long and for bringing him here today. It is these experiences that we, as Members of Congress, must know so that we can do better and this administration can all do better.

Thank you, sir, for being here.

Representative LUNGREN [presiding]. Mr. Long, I am not Mr. King, but I am sitting in his chair for just a moment. I just happen to have my 5 minutes up at this point in time.

Mr. Long, it is interesting, we can view a certain subject from different perspectives. When I was privileged to serve my State as the attorney general, I tried to take the perspective of the victims when I looked at the criminal justice system, because I thought that was a perspective that had not been appreciated for a long period of time. It doesn't mean it was the only perspective, but it was an appropriate perspective.

You have a unique perspective here. In your testimony you said that we suffer from a lack of clarity in our effort. Do you find anything wrong with the expression used of "radical jihad" or "violent Islamic extremism," with the knowledge that you have of that part of the world and of different religions? Does it mislead us? Does it help us? Is it part of the lack of clarity, or is it part of clarity?

Mr. LONG. I believe it is part of the lack of clarity.

Let me put it this way. In the 10 years that I grew up there, I graduated high school there, I was there during the Cuban missile crisis in Afghanistan. My dad built the canals that we are fighting over in Helmand Province. My brother-in-law is the grandson of a former king of Afghanistan. My nieces are his offspring. I have a love for those people over there. I was glad that we decided to do something about this terror that was going on with them.

However, Islam is many things. It is a religion, and our First Amendment gives freedom with respect to the Government won't interfere with that. But it is also political, it is also social, it is also economic, and it is also military. When we can sort out what is what, I think we can have a better discussion on it. But if you lump it all under the protections of religion, you will never get to that.

Now, we gave a certain portion of my son's insurance to Dr. Michael Youssef down in Atlanta. He sends messages into North Africa, Korea. They were moved that we didn't have this feeling of going out, saying, "Okay, we need to bomb them all." I am absolutely opposed to that. But we need to be responsive, but we need to be honest in what we are doing. That is the real thing, clarity.

"Manmade disaster," "kinetic military action." That is a war. In Arkansas, they would laugh you out the store if you came up with words like that.

Representative LUNGREN. Well, you are someone who has served this country, in addition to your son having given the last full measure. As someone in the military, under the circumstances we are talking about, would you consider it something that you should bring to the attention of your superiors if you saw a fellow officer that put on his card that he was a soldier of Allah?

Mr. LONG. 1995, I had a troop over in Okinawa, he had a tattoo. It is now a practice in the Marine Corps, when you recruit people or if you get selected for an officer program, on part of your physical they take pictures of the tattoos to make sure they are not gang-related. If you have those, you are not getting promoted and you are not getting into the service.

If someone is doing—it is the statutory oath that you take, "I do solemnly swear to support the Constitution of the United States." There shouldn't be a policy that you should do this. When you see something wrong, you need to execute that statutory thing. You all took that oath. I still go by that oath. My son took that oath. When it is wrong, you need do something about it. Otherwise, you are derelict in your duties.

To formalize it in a policy, that tells me something is broken.

Representative LUNGREN. Well, I thank you very much for your testimony. I think it is wonderful that we are attempting to learn from the lessons and that we are trying to change things.

It is an old saying that common sense isn't so common anymore, where you have to tell people that those signs are the red flags. It seems to me self-evident those are red flags, unless there is a pressure being created in your environment where you are afraid to raise the red flags.

Mr. LONG. Yes, sir.

Representative LUNGREN. That goes beyond defining what the red flags are; that goes to the atmosphere that has been created.

I don't know if you overturn the atmosphere by just saying those are red flags. I mean, it is good that we are saying they are red flags, but it seems to me it is the manner in which you put those in context and bring an alert when an alert ought to be done.

So I thank you very much.

I return my time to the Chairman.

Chairman KING [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Representative WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Long, for your service. Thank you for bringing clarity to the room today in a more complete way.

My wife and I had the opportunity to be more proud of our son than ever before because of recruiters like your son, who recruited my son into the Army, and a son who spent part of his MOS training at Fort Hood, as well. So it has some relation, in my mind, as I can picture that experience.

To have the pride of a son who served willingly, with great desire, his country is one thing. To have the distinction of honoring a son who served his country to the last ounce of blood is even greater.

So thank you for being here.

Mr. LONG. Yes, sir.

Representative WALBERG. If I am not crossing a line here, I would like to ask if you would be willing to elaborate on—and I appreciate the fact that Mrs. Long is not here and chose not to be here at this hearing. But if you would be willing to elaborate on what she heard, what she saw, what her reaction was, what was the last time your wife saw your son alive, I would appreciate hearing that.

Mr. LONG. About 10:15 in the morning, and she had driven my son down to Little Rock to the recruiting station. He didn't have a car, and, at the time, we were running with one car, so he wasn't going to get it.

She drove him down there, and she was sitting outside in the parking lot. He had gone in, and they hadn't been keeping him very long. But he was kind of a shill to get others to come in: "Look what I did; you can do this, too."

He stepped out of the recruiting office with—and my wife looked out and says, maybe I ought to go over and talk to him. She was about ready to get out of the car to go do this when another soldier came out with him. She said, no, he has a friend there, I will let them talk.

Well, she sat down back in the car, started reading. At that time, she heard three separate gunfire bursts. As she was getting out of the car, she looked over, she could see one soldier on the ground, another one trying to get back into the recruiting center, and a black truck driving off.

At about that time, Sergeant Kennedy came out and grabbed ahold of her, because he knew she was in the parking lot, and they escorted her back through past my son. Sergeant First Class Dobbs was out there doing CPR on my son. Inside the building, some of the other recruiters were in there trying to take care of Quinton Ezeagwula.

I got a call at 10:19. She called me up and said, "Andy's been shot." Of course my reaction is, "What? What are you talking about?" She says, "They are doing CPR on him right now."

Her biggest regret is she didn't get over to him. But she also knows there were people who were competent that could provide the first aid. That is her biggest regret.

I had to almost pry these out of her fingers to bring them up here to show you these today. It took us 2 years, 3 months to get them back.

The dealings with going through this, all she could see was my son's legs popping up as they were performing CPR on him. The next time we saw him, he was in the emergency room, he was declared dead. They allowed her to go in there. It was still all messy. There wasn't the tarp over him. She saw all the wounds. Then the next time I saw him was they had cleaned him up. We weren't able to touch him; he was evidence.

Then it was 2 years of trying to figure out what is going on, who shot John, are the Federal people going to step in. We were promised by the Little Rock U.S. attorney's office that they would go for that. We have since met with them again. It just goes on and on.

But I can tell you our first reaction on November 5, 2009. I was out in the garage working on a project and watching the news, and it came up, Fort Hood. I ran into the house because I know she watched the news. I said, "You got to turn the TV off. It's happened again." Her first thing was, "I told you it would happen. They are not listening." Then our thing was to get ahold of my daughter so that she wouldn't see the news.

So every time this happens, it is a traumatic event. Their loss down there is not lost on us. There are 13 more parents that are going through this.

Representative WALBERG. Mr. Long, thank you. Evidence, but not a Purple Heart. That is clarity, that is graphic, and that is an impetus and a reminder to us. Thank you for your willingness to share that.

Mr. LONG. Thank you, sir.

Representative WALBERG. I yield back.

Chairman KING. The gentleman yields back.

Chief Long, I want to thank you on behalf of myself and all the Members of the committee for your testimony. It was a privilege to have you here today.

We will do all we can, really on two levels: One, do all we can to ensure that what happened to your son happens to no one else; and also to ensure that he gets the type of recognition that he deserves, which will be a Purple Heart.

Representative JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman KING. The gentlelady from Texas.

Representative JACKSON LEE. I echo your remarks. May I make a parliamentary inquiry, an inquiry to Chairman Lieberman?

Chairman KING. Yes.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, ma'am.

Chairman KING. State your inquiry.

Representative JACKSON LEE. Chairman Lieberman, you indicated on the record that there might be a conference—and I didn't hear whether you said a conference call or a conference—on the DOD. But, obviously, there are—I am so delighted that Mr. Long chose to be courageous on behalf of his son, but he also mentioned the tragedy at Fort Hood. Is it your intent that your language would be generic, that, ultimately, depending on the circumstances in Fort Hood, it might cover that situation as well?

Senator LIEBERMAN. To my friend, the gentlelady from Texas, it happens by coincidence that this afternoon at 3:00 the first meeting of House and Senate conferees on the Department of Defense authorization bill for the next fiscal year is convening, actually here on the House side. We are asking staffs—Mr. Thompson said he is a conferee, which I did not know, and we will work together—and Mr. Lungren is, too—we will work together on this.

But I think our aim would certainly be to amend the language in a manner that would not just relate to Private Long and the other soldier wounded there but to, certainly, the folks at Fort Hood, but really to change the statute so it can be clear that in circumstances of this kind there shouldn't be any question about the awarding of a Purple Heart.

Representative JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairman for his clarification. I thank all the conferees. I might want to just engage with the Chairman on some thoughts on the language, in light of the overall circumstances that we find ourself in. But I thank him for that clarification. Our overall sympathy to all who have fallen in battle.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.

Chairman KING. The gentlelady yields back.

Again, Chief Long, I want to thank you for being here today. Thank you for your testimony. We will do all we can, as I said, to ensure that what happened to your son does not happen to others. Also, as you have heard from the colloquy between the gentlelady from Texas, also comments of the Ranking Member Mr. Thompson, Chairman Lieberman, and Chairman Lungren, everything will be done at the defense authorization conference to try to bring some measure of justice to your son and to others who have also been killed or wounded in such a tragic way.

So, with that, again, thank you for your testimony.

I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony.

I know the Members of the committee may have some additional questions. We will ask you to respond to those in writing. The hearing record will be held open for 10 days.

Pursuant to the motion—actually, before that, Senator Lieberman, do you have any closing remarks? I am sorry.

Senator LIEBERMAN. No, not at all. Just to thank you, Chairman King. I think this has been a very productive hearing. A good, really, spirit and content of unity among the Members of the committee. I think I, for one—I speak for myself—I have learned a lot. I think we are carrying out our responsibility to oversee the protection of people here at home from terrorist attack, in this case particularly members of the armed services and their families. It happens that this particular action that we have the ability to carry out on the Purple Hearts emerges from this testimony.

So I think this has been a very thoughtful and informative and productive hearing. I look forward to working with you and our Members to find other occasions to get together again in exactly this way.

Chairman KING. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

The gentleman from Mississippi, do you have any closing remarks?

Representative THOMPSON. No, but I do look forward on the Purple Heart matter, that, since there is unanimity of agreement, that we can do what we need to do to try to make it happen.

Chairman KING. I thank the Ranking Member.

Again, I want to thank Senator Lieberman especially for his willingness to hold this joint hearing. This is a very serious hearing, so just allow me a little bit of levity to say: I don't know how many of you in the room realize the significance of having prominent Senators walk over to the House side to abide by House rules in a bicameral hearing.

But, again, to me, it shows the dedication and patriotism of Senator Lieberman. He has been involved in this struggle for so many years. Long before any of us were involved, Senator Lieberman was there. I want to thank him for his work he has done as Chairman of the Homeland Security Committee in the Senate, for coming together today on this joint hearing. Again, he is a great friend and a great American, and I am just so proud to be able to work with him.

With that, I will say the hearing record will be held open for 10 days. Pursuant to the motion we agreed on earlier today, the hearing will stand in recess and will reconvene in 10 minutes in closed session in Room HVC-301, which is down one floor, right below us.

With that, the committee stands in recess.

[Whereupon, at 12:38 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 12:50 p.m., the same day.]

