Psychological warfare: objects and channels of attack in a war of nerves

Lawrence E. Sommers
Lt. Col., FA

31 May 1949
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE:
OBJECTS AND CHANNELS OF ATTACK
IN A WAR OF NERVES

Lawrence E. Sommers
Lt. Col., FA
0-31405

31 May 1949
# Table of Contents

**Subject** .................................................. 1

**Problem** .................................................. 1

**Assumptions** ............................................. 1

**Discussion** ............................................... 1

**Psychological Warfare—General** ....................... 1

**Objects** .................................................. 5

**Channels of Attack** ...................................... 8

**Conclusions** .............................................. 10

**Annex 1—Directive.** ........................................

**Annex 2—Definitions.** .....................................

**Annex 3—Bibliography.** ....................................
BRIEF

SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare: Objects and Channels of Attack in a War of Nerves.

1. PROBLEM.--From a study of the objects and channels of attack in psychological warfare determine the status of a war of nerves in the military structure.

2. ASSUMPTIONS.--a. That psychological warfare tactics, techniques, methods and defenses will be essentially the same for all nationalities.

   b. That democratic nations will form the alliance against totalitarian nations in a war of the future.

   c. Definition of terms will be as defined in Annex 2.

3. DISCUSSION.--

   a. Psychological Warfare--general.

      (1) Psychological warfare has many definitions. For this discussion the broad definition is used wherein psychological warfare may take any form serving to reduce the enemy's military and civilian will to resist.

      (2) Present and future concepts of a psychological war of nerves may find this type of warfare the major operation in itself with a few military operations and battles superimposed to accomplish aims and objectives. A psychological war will be waged aggressively long before and continue long after the shooting phase.

      (3) Psychological warfare as a national weapon can, unless proper defense against it is developed, be the most potent form of a destructive weapon a nation could possess against an enemy. Psychological warfare properly waged could produce such unrest and revolt
in a country as to render it militarily useless.

(4) Psychological warfare will be used to destroy from within, to conquer a nation through itself. Psychological weapons can disintegrate a war before it even starts.

(5) Psychological warfare is not a World War II innovation, even though it was during this period that Germany and the allies alike contributed to its greatest development and established it as a military weapon. As early as 539 B.C. fifth columns were used in Babylon to sell that country out to Cyrus the Persian because of hatred for Nabonidus.

In 1238 A.D. Genghis Khan perfected the "attack in the rear" aiming at non-combatant morale.

In 1914 propaganda was used to prostitute hatred of evil to produce raw hate. Allied psychological warfare was based on political warfare developed by Woodrow Wilson. In World War I domestic and political propaganda was not as difficult for the Germans as it was later to be in World War II. The Germans had been too clever to unite the U.S. and forced them to make the decision to declare war, while in World War II the Japanese united the U.S. by their psychological blunder at Pearl Harbor. A civilian agency controlled psychological warfare.

World War II finds Psychological Warfare taking the form of a weapon to assist military operations. A change in concept was made from striving to produce hate to one of prostituting love of peace to produce sheer defeatism or cowardice. The basic German strategy was to paralyze conduct of the war by the allies by destroying the combative spirit of the soldiers and citizens, while the basic strategy of the allies was to separate the German people from their leaders. Hitler developed strategic psychological warfare techniques--simplicity, clarity, repetition, splitting the opponents, alternate appeasement and intimidation of antagonists to gain power. Hitler used psychological warfare in the broad sense as well as strategic and tactical
propaganda, and to be successful the program had to be backed up by threat of armed force.

The allies waged psychological warfare by means of propaganda and the Germans simply waged war psychologically.

History proves that psychological warfare is an effective weapon, even a method, of modern warfare.

(b) Objects.

(1) The undermining of the enemy's morale and ability to resist is one of the most important objects in a war of nerves. Hitler said in 1939 when England and France went to war with Germany that "he would disintegrate their war." He accomplished his threat in eight months. The Nazis never intended to convert outsiders to their cause. Rather, their aim was to demoralize the enemy, destroy his cohesion, discipline and collective morale; to break the enemy's will-to-win or will-to-resist.

(2) The creation of internal demoralization, confusion and dissatisfaction through domestic propaganda and methods was practical in the early stages of the war with a great degree of success. The initial break-through at Sedan by the Germans was made as a result of mass surprise and terror. Victory and defeat are habits, and it is bad for defeat to be met on the first enterprise. An enemy's invincibility becomes real and serves as a psychological excuse for those who want to retreat.

(3) The peace sentiment based on the conviction that struggle is hopeless proved to be an object that was exploited in the psychological endeavors of the axis. The clouds of war make propaganda easy and many people are inclined to believe in "peace at any price." A standard weapon in a nerve war is simultaneous rumors of war and peace creating confusion resulting from alternate optimism and pessimism.

(4) The attempt to turn allies against each other was propagandized by the Nazis in World War II. Germany tried to
separate England and France by such phrases as "England has no soldiers; they will fight to the last Frenchman," and picturing the United States as a war mongering neutral nation. The firm and united stand for the "unconditional surrender of the axis" was the counter-attack against this form of psychological attack.

(5) Psychological warfare has a direct relationship to espionage. To the standard espionage service is added the soldier of psychological warfare. He has been thoroughly trained and schooled in normal espionage activities plus sabotage, subversion, and perverse talents of meanness and intimidation. He adds terror, fear, mass hysteria and destruction to his otherwise normal pursuits. He becomes the fifth column.

c. Channels of Attack.

(1) The media through which psychological warfare may be waged can be grouped under four general headings: spoken--radio, loudspeaker, and oral address; written--leaflets distributed by balloon, aircraft, cannon, mortar, or hand carried, pamphlets, stickers, newspapers and books; pictorial--posters and moving and still pictures; and material--those items necessary to conduct psychological warfare. Whenever possible normal facilities in the enemy country are used to distribute the desired propaganda.

(2) News and information agencies, even to include their own military intelligence service, were widely used by the Germans to conduct their propaganda war. The press can be so powerful that war or peace might depend on how news is handled by correspondents. The neutral press should exercise its power in a firm manner and never permit itself to be unwittingly used to assist in prostituting foreign propaganda.

(3) Influential foreigners, world travelers and tourists are frequently channels of attack in spreading propaganda, making contacts with agents and building up fifth columns.
(4) Much can be accomplished in spreading propaganda by utilizing special groups for special appeals. Such groups as minority groups, pacifist groups, veterans groups, labor groups, etc., are used.

4. CONCLUSIONS.--

a. Precautions, defense, and organization.

(1) Psychological warfare must be considered in the same light as any conventional weapon of modern warfare, and as such a defense against it must be developed. Defense measures are simple but difficult of application.

Censorship is the negative phase of propaganda and the principal weapon of defense against psychological warfare.

The war of the future will be total in nature, and together with atomic and bacteriological weapons will make psychological warfare of greater importance than ever before. Defense measures must include complete cooperation and understanding of all the people by education and a sound censorship program, and the military tactics of defense and offense must be developed together with an organization for implementation. In the future there must be trained specialists for psychological warfare, as well as training for all commanders, staffs and men the same as any other weapon of war.

Lawrence E. Sommers
Lt. Col., FA
SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare: Objects and Channels of Attack in a War of Nerves.

1. PROBLEM.--From a study of the objects and channels of attack in psychological warfare determine the status of a war of nerves in the military structure.

2. ASSUMPTIONS.--a. That psychological warfare tactics, techniques, methods and defenses will be essentially the same for all nationalities.
   
   b. That democratic nations will form the alliance against totalitarian nations in a war of the future.
   
   c. Definition of terms will be as defined in Annex 2.

3. DISCUSSION.--
   
   a. Psychological warfare--general.
      
      (1) Any discussion of psychological warfare will find the subject defined many different ways. In this discussion, the broad definition as stated in Annex 2 will apply. Psychological warfare may take any form serving to reduce the enemy's military and civilian will to resist, and not merely the reduction of morale of the enemy civil and political elements.
      
      (2) Present and future concepts of a psychological war of nerves may find this type of warfare the major operation in itself, with a few military operations and battles superimposed to accomplish aims and objectives. Psychological warfare will be waged aggressively during the period we know as peace, during the war period in which military operations will be conducted, and following the war. The real battle may well be fought before a
metal bullet is fired, and continue long after firing has ceased.

(3) Psychological warfare as a national weapon can, unless proper defense against it is developed, be the most potent form of a destructive weapon a nation could possess against an enemy. A war of nerves properly conducted could produce such unrest and revolt in a country as to render it militarily useless. That country would expend so much of its effort taking care of its own affairs as to make it impotent of defense against an enemy.

(4) Psychological warfare will be used to destroy from within, to conquer a nation through itself. Psychological weapons in the hands of a skilled enemy can disintegrate a war before it ever starts. A war waged and won by psychological means could be the cheapest and most economical form of warfare for a nation.

(5) Psychological warfare is not a World War II innovation, even though World War II saw its greatest development and use by the Axis and Allies alike. As early as 539 B.C. fifth columns undermined Babylon because Nabonidus was hated for his reforms and religious tolerance and sold Babylon out to Cyrus the Persian.

The mongol conquerors in 1238 A.D., under Genghis Khan, perfected the "attack in the rear" aiming at non-combatant morale. The inhabitants of Scandinavia were scared and terrorized because the mongol strategists wanted them frightened, even though they were a whole year's march away and never approached as far as Sweden.

In 1914 propaganda was used to prostitute hatred of evil to produce raw hate. Political warfare was used extensively. The Central Powers used a very old-fashioned political warfare. They were unable to exploit the revolutionary, democratic, or autonomist sentiments of the time. Their chief political warfare consisted of inducing Turkey to proclaim a war against the allies. Germany assisted Lenin to travel from Switzerland to Finland hoping he would enter Russia, commit high treason and take Russia out of the war. He did this very thing, but the aftermath contributed to the
defeat of Germany as well. Allied psychological warfare was based pre-eminently on the political warfare developed by Woodrow Wilson. The U.S. strove for "fourteen points", "a league to enforce peace", "no seeking of new territory". This political offensive was propagandized by official government action and was carried by ordinary news channels all over the world. Britain supplemented American political warfare effectively. Domestic or internal propaganda in World War I was not as difficult for the Germans as it was later to be in World War II. The U.S. had to decide to declare war, and the Germans had been too clever to unite the U.S. as did the Japanese with their psychological blunder at Pearl Harbor. Psychological warfare was handled separately from the War Department or General Staff by a civil agency. Tactical propaganda was disseminated by means of leaflets on the battle fronts, delivered mainly by mortars and balloons as Germany had threatened to take measures against pilots who dropped leaflets.

In World War II psychological warfare takes the form of a weapon to assist military operations: a change in concept from striving to produce hate as in World War I, to one of prostituting love of peace to produce sheer defeatism or even cowardice. The basic German strategy was to paralyze the conduct of the war by the allies by destroying the combative spirit of the soldiers and the citizens, while basic strategy of allies was to separate German people from their leaders. Hitler had to resort to psychological warfare methods to gain control of Germany in time of peace by mass methods. They learned strategic psychological warfare techniques—simplicity, clarity, repetition, splitting the opponents, alternate appeasement and intimidation of antagonists to gain power. Once in power they subordinated their policies to propaganda. The Nazis overdid their propaganda so much that no one in Germany--people or party members--could tell what they really wanted. Once in power, Hitler began applying the same tactics in his foreign affairs. He
called the bluff of the allies by remilitarizing the Rhineland, and bullied Austria into submission. This was done by careful analysis of public opinion in the possible enemy states, and by use of propaganda to scare the victim. Hitler used psychological warfare in the broad sense, as well as strategic and tactical propaganda. His greatest psychological warfare victory was in 1938 at Munich when England and France agreed to the partition of Czechoslovakia. Hitler's propaganda emphasized German claims, promised no more aggression, and used threats of force and the manipulation of anti-world war opinion in the democracies themselves. Hitler's propaganda won. A few months later he took the remainder of Czechoslovakia and bullied Russia into a neutrality agreement. Psychological warfare had made the victims themselves agree to each single aggression, had made them hope it was the last, and had prevented their forming an alliance to meet the common danger. These successes won only because Hitler's psychological warfare program was backed up by a very real threat of armed force. This serves to demonstrate the axiom that psychological warfare cannot work purely by itself; it needs force or the threat of force to make it effective.

Where the allies waged psychological warfare by means of propaganda, the Germans simply waged war psychologically. The Fifth Column; a term coined in the Spanish Civil War when one of Franco's generals boasted as his forces invested Madrid: "I have five columns. Four here, and a fifth column inside the city," was adopted by Hitler and used to advantage in overthrowing the many countries overrun by Germany. The history of psychological warfare shows us that it is an effective weapon, even a method of modern warfare, and the nation or group of nations waging a successful psychological campaign may win their objectives without military operations. As a weapon of modern warfare a further analysis of the objects and channels of attack in a psychological war of nerves should be
considered, as well as a defense against it.

b. Objects.

(1) The undermining of the enemy's morale and ability to resist is one of the most important objects in a war of nerves. Hitler said in 1939, when France and England went to war with Germany, that "he would disintegrate their war." He accomplished his threat after eight months of waiting. During this time the armies faced each other and the allies, tired of digging, waiting, inactivity, and the Germans were employing every psychological weapon at their disposal. Hitler felt that the allied leaders would be blind to the new, the surprising things, and would have developed no defense against such tactics applied in a modern civilized war. Even their generals would be wrapped in the tenacles of technical knowledge, and would be impotent to meet Hitler's new concept and application of psychological warfare. The Nazis never intended to convert outsiders to their cause. Rather, their aim was to demoralize the enemy, destroy his cohesion, discipline and collective morale of social groups: to break the enemy's will-to-win or will-to-resist. This was to be the objective of military operations while economic and military attack were considered merely as a means to this end. In time of peace Germany intended to attack from within to break the enemy's will-to-resist, which to them meant the pre-military phase of war, and war itself the pre-diplomatic stage in negotiations.

(2) The creation of internal demoralization, confusion, and dissatisfaction through domestic propaganda and methods was practiced in the early stages of the war with a great degree of success. The initial break-through in France at Sedan by the Germans was made as the result of mass surprise and terror. Tanks with flame throwers, airplanes with sirens, clogging of roads by terrorized civilians who were victimized by an efficient fifth column, created a vision of the supernatural. The bravest men, placed unexpectedly before such a menace for which they had not been prepared nor given proper defensive weapons as no anti-tank guns were
available, had little chance of holding ground and combating the enemy. Victory and defeats are habits, and it is bad for defeat to be met on the first enterprise. An enemy's invincibility becomes a reality and serves as an excuse for those that want to retreat. Rumors run riot, and untrue reports of battle are received as true. The resultant confusion and conflicting reports create myths and rumors which travel faster than planes, creating fear and distrust of all. Fear alone increased the effectiveness of parachutists ten fold. Small enemy units with bold action under these conditions could accomplish miracles, when under normal conditions those in possession could and would have defended themselves successfully. Racial, political, economic and religious groups were also targets for creating internal demoralization and dissatisfaction. The propaganda used baited such groups as Jews, Communists, and industrialists, who were accused of being war mongers and munitioners.

(3) The peace sentiment, based on the conviction that struggle is hopeless, proved to be an object that was exploited in the psychological endeavors of the axis powers. The clouds of war, and the tension existing before the actual outbreak of hostilities, tend to turn the thoughts of people to war and all its horrors, creating an emotional situation which makes propaganda easy. Many people under these circumstances are inclined to believe in "peace at any price." This creates a fertile field for the work of psychological warfare in obtaining their military objectives in the quickest and easiest possible manner. This was clearly illustrated by Prime Minister Chamberlain's Munich agreements to achieve "peace in our time" by throwing Czechoslovakia to the Nazis. The press can unwittingly cooperate with the enemy by playing up extremes and exciting public fright and panic. The enemy is able to exploit the morale weapon of terrorism through the press and poison people with their own hallucinations. A standard weapon of the nerve war is
simultaneous rumors of war and peace to create the confusion resulting from alternate optimism and pessimism. People psychologically want to believe the optimistic, and will invariably close their minds to the pessimistic, even though it be inevitable.

(4) The attempt to turn allies against each other was propagandized by the Nazis in World War II. Germany tried to separate France from England by such phrases as "England has no soldiers; they will fight to the last Frenchman," and picturing the United States as a war mongering nation encouraging the war in Europe for profit. England did not react to this form of propaganda as readily as France because of her past history of 900 years in which she had not won all her battles but won all her wars, and had built up an invincible optimism entirely devoid of any inferiority complex. Berlin and Moscow had expended huge sums on propaganda aimed primarily at seduction of the French people. When the military situation begins to turn against a nation the propaganda theme may take on a note of bids for separate peace, which tends to reduce unity between nations and creates some favorable sentiment toward the country making such a bid. The allies united and firm stand for "unconditional surrender of the axis" in World War II was the counter-attack against this form of psychological warfare.

(5) Psychological warfare has a direct relationship to espionage, but may or may not be inclusive of the secret service of the nation from which the agent comes. The spy has only the job of finding important information or facts in an enemy country and reporting his findings to his own country. He remains quiet, unknown, and avoids violence that might bring attention to his presence. To this standard espionage service we might add a new recruit. He becomes the combatant soldier in the ranks of psychological warfare. He is pictured as an up-to-date storm trooper thoroughly trained and schooled in methods and techniques of the normal espionage activities plus being an expert at sabotage,
blackmail, kidnapping, and perverse talents of meanness and intimidation. He adds terror, fear, mass hysteria, and destruction to his otherwise normal pursuits. He is the fifth columnist who performs the tactics of psychological warfare from within. In Belgium at the beginning of World War II the assistance from the fifth columns worked so well that the Germans advanced much faster than had been foreseen. When the British Army entered Belgium the Germans refrained from bombing even though they had superiority of the air, and permitted the British to advance. The fifth columnists in each village then started their tactics to spread fear and terror by urging the inhabitants to leave their homes by spreading the propaganda that villages would be bombed and the Gestapo was coming. The fear and panic thus created so clogged the roads, and the contagion of flight spread so rapidly there was no means available to stop it and the maneuver of troops was impossible. Hitler's propaganda machine even played on the psychology of dates and seasons. He succeeded in convincing the German people that there was significance in the fact that it had been 25 years since World War I had started, and that August was the best time to start operations and assure success since it was the harvest month beginning the harvest season.

c. Channels of attack.

(1) The media through which psychological warfare may be waged is limited in number but very broad in its application. These media can be grouped under four general headings as spoken, written, pictorial, and material. Under the spoken group will be found such means of dissemination as radio, loudspeaker, oral address, and word of mouth from people or agents. The written medium utilizes such things as leaflets distributed by aircraft, balloon, cannon, mortar, or hand carried; pamphlets; stickers; newspapers and books. Pictorially will be found posters, moving pictures and still pictures. The material medium will include those items usually necessary to conduct the subversive activities of fifth columnists and
agents, such as incendiaries, and pencils and other infernal devices known as booby traps and mines. This group will also include those materials necessary to conduct or produce the results desired in a war of nerves such as radio stations, photographic equipment, printing equipment and others. Whenever possible the normal facilities in the enemy country are used to distribute the desired propaganda. The value is increased greatly if the country unwittingly distributes enemy propaganda to its own people. In World War II the Germans were masters at securing assistance of the foreign press. They were very liberal with foreign correspondents and secured their cooperation by playing up extremes to excite public fright and panic.

(2) News and information agencies even to include their own military intelligence services were widely used by the Germans to conduct their propaganda war. The press can be so powerful that war or peace might depend on how news is handled by correspondents. Hitler's liberal policy with foreign correspondents, especially the U.S., was based on German strategy to impress the neutral countries with German might. France and England placed censorship in the hands of inexperienced men who themselves did not understand high strategy of their functions, while the German censorship was handled by men scientifically trained. By letting the correspondents express themselves frankly, even to revealing disagreeable things, German authorities made Berlin the most interesting European capital as a news source. Censorship so dulled the copy from London and Paris that German news got the best play in American, Swiss, Portugese and other neutral papers, and the impression was transmitted that Germany dominated the European scene because Berlin date lines dominated the front pages. The neutral press should exercise its power in a firm but polite manner and not permit unwitting assistance in prostituting foreign propaganda.

The Germans employed their intelligence services for
propagandistic rather than militaristic aims. Supposedly "surprise" plans were put out in advance, and intelligence of value to the allies was passed on to make the war psychologically effective, sustain suspense over a large period, and punctuate it with alarms and shocks interspersed with rays of cheer, and to break down men's will to face danger when confronted by it.

(3) Influential foreigners, world tourists and travelers are frequently channels of attack employed in spreading propaganda and making contacts with other agents and fifth columnists. Through this medium an enemy can in a period of time infiltrate a sizeable group to serve as cells for future eventualities. Under the present system of immigration to the U.S. there are now several tens of thousands of foreigners in the country who have failed to keep the government informed of their whereabouts and have been lost track of so far as the Immigration Service is concerned.

(4) Much can be accomplished in spreading propaganda by utilizing special groups for special appeals. Any group that might have a grievance is a fertile field for the propagandist. In general, this would include groups representing special interests such as minority groups, pacifist groups, veterans groups, labor groups, capitalist groups, public groups and religious groups, to mention only a few.

4. CONCLUSIONS.--
   a. Precautions, defense, and organization.

   (1) From the discussion it is shown that psychological warfare must be considered in the same light as any conventional weapon of modern warfare, and as such a defense against it must be developed. Defensive measures against this powerful weapon are relatively simple in themselves, but difficult of application since to a great extent every person is in himself a target of, and hence a defense against, psychological warfare.
Censorship is the negative phase of propaganda and the principal weapon of defense against psychological warfare.

Simplicity and yet importance of individual defense propaganda is illustrated by two excerpts from routine orders of the British Army to the English people: "Take care never to listen to a rumor. Object of enemy propaganda is to sow unrest and panic. Repeat only what you are certain of. Whoever says: 'I haven't seen it, but I've heard about it,' may become without realizing it an enemy agent"; and "Never repeat a piece of news you have not verified or had from a source that is trustworthy. Every pessimistic rumor forges an arm for the enemy."

The war of the future will in all likelihood be total in nature and encompass all the peoples of the nation, and together with the advent of atomic and bacteriological weapons will make psychological warfare of far greater importance than it was in any past war. In addition to defense afforded by the complete cooperation of all the people, by education and by a sound censorship program, the military tactics of defense and offense must be developed together with an organization for implementation. In World War II, although psychological warfare was recognized as a supporting military weapon, many staff officers and commanders did not understand the capabilities, limitations and requirements of it. In the future there must be trained specialists for psychological warfare as well as training for all commanders, staffs and men the same as any other weapon of warfare.

Lawrence E. Sommers
Lt. Col., FA

ANNEXES: 1. Directive
2. Definitions
3. Bibliography
ANNEX I--DIRECTIVE: PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE:
OBJECTS AND CHANNELS OF ATTACK IN A WAR OF NERVES.

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
22 November, 1948

MONOGRAPH SUBJECT NUMBER 2-90
Regular Course, Phase V, 1948-49

STUDENT: Summers, Lawrence E., Lt. Col., FA
(Name) (Rank)

FACULTY ADVISOR: Cathrae, William F., Major
(Name) (Bldg & Rm No)

SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare: Objects and Channels of Attack in
a War of Nerves.

REFERENCES:
Hitler, Mein Kampf, II, Ch 7; Taylor, The Strategy of
Terror; Hitler's Frightful Weapon: Propaganda, New York Times
Magazine, June 1, 1941; Whittaker, War by Radio, Foreign Affairs,
July 1941; Committee for National Morale, German Psychological
Warfare; Rauschning, The Voice of Destruction, Chs 1, 5, 11; Taylor,
How America Can Take the Offensive, Fortune, May 1941; Schlamme,
This Second War of Independence, especially Chs 4, 7, 8; Possony,
The French General Staff, The Infantry Journal, Nov 1941; Maurois,
Tragedy in France, Ch 4; Rowan, Terror in Our Time: The Secret
Service of Surprise Attack.

NOTE TO STUDENTS:
1. The references above are furnished to give the student enough
material with which to begin his research. It is anticipated that the
student will make use of all other available sources in order to give
adequate scope to his subject and, when appropriate, to complete devel­
opment of the subject to date.

2. The scope suggested below is intended as a guide only, and is
not to be construed as a limitation on the student's perusal of the
subject.

SCOPE:

1. Objects.
   a. Undermining the enemy's morale and ability to resist.
   b. Creating internal demoralization, confusion, and dissatis­
      faction.
   c. Creating a peace sentiment based on a conviction that the
      struggle is hopeless.
   d. Creating favorable sentiment in neutral and enemy-occupied
      countries.
   e. Relation of propaganda to sabotage and fifth-column activ­
      ities.

2. The channels of attack.
   b. Information and news agencies.
   c. Influential foreigners.
   d. Special appeals to special groups: veterans, pacifists,
      capitalists.
ANNEX 2--DEFINITIONS: PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE; OBJECTS AND CHANNELS OF ATTACK IN A WAR OF NERVES.

DEFINITIONS.

1. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. Warfare psychologically waged, that is, military operations carried out with close and studied reference to the politics, opinion and morale of the enemy. Broadly it encompasses all measures to reduce the enemy's civilian and military will-to-resist by use of such measures as propaganda, subversion, fifth columnists, war of nerves and operational measures as may be required.

2. PROPAGANDA. Propaganda consists of the planned use of any form of communication designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given enemy, neutral or friendly foreign group for a specific strategic or tactical purpose. Loosely it is described as "organized non-violent persuasion."

3. COUNTER-PROPAGANDA. Counter-propaganda is designed to refute a specific point or theme of enemy propaganda.

4. POLITICAL WARFARE. Political warfare (also called "crisis diplomacy", or "war of nerves", or "diplomacy of dramatic intimidation") consists of the framing of national policy in such a way as to facilitate propaganda or military operations, whether with respect to the direct political relations of governments to one another or in relation to groups of persons possessing a political character.

5. MEDIA. The devices by means of which the communication is conveyed. (In every day life, the most common media are the living voice, the telephone, print and the typewriter. In war propaganda the most common media are voice radio, wireless in plain code, leaflets and pamphlets.)

6. FIFTH COLUMN. Fifth Column is those forces operating behind the lines of an enemy applying the media of psychological warfare to accomplish psychological and military objectives.
ANNEX 3--PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE: OBJECTS AND CHANNELS OF ATTACK IN A WAR OF NERVES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hitler, Adolph, MEIN KAMPF.

Taylor, THE STRATEGY OF TERROR, 1940.


Marrow, Andre, TRAGEDY IN FRANCE, 1940.

Rowan, TERROR IN OUR TIME, The Secret Service of Surprise Attack, 1940.


Cavalry School, TACTICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, Fort Riley, Kans., 1946.