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**A EUROPEAN NAVY: CAN IT COMPLETE EUROPEAN
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION?**

by

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June 2012

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ECONOMIC INTEGRATION?**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

With the euro-crisis of the year 2011 threatening to fracture the European Union, the timing may seem wrong for makers of policy and sailors to imagine a unitary European Navy within a comprehensive European defense policy. But as Europeans explore the limits of economic and financial harmony in the EU and NATO amid financial distress, they may embrace European integration in the defense sector, especially in its maritime dimension. The ongoing global and regional budget crises demand that responsible governments seek cost savings where they can; a unified European security and defense structure certainly would eliminate redundancies and spread the burden of regional defense more evenly among member states. In addition, though, the European Union and NATO could leverage the incremental, but steady progress toward a unified defense structure to bolster the European project at this sensitive moment. If the European Union puts in place the few remaining policy commitments that would create a single European Navy—hardly the stuff of fantasy fiction these days, in light of several recent initiatives—its internal and external unity would be stronger.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

C2:	Command and Control
CFSP:	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP:	Common Security and Defense Policy
EC:	European Council
ECSC:	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC:	European Defense Community
EEC:	European Economic Community
EPC:	European Political Community
ESA:	European Space Agency
ESDI:	European Security and Defense Initiative
ESS:	European Security Strategy
EU:	European Union
EUMC:	European Union Military Committee
EUMS:	European Union Military Staff
NAC:	North Atlantic Council
NATO:	North American Treaty Organization
R&D:	Research and Development
SLOC:	Sea Line of Communication
TEU:	Treaty of the European Union
UN:	United Nations
WEU:	Western European Union

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I. INTRODUCTION

With the euro-crisis of the year 2011 threatening to fracture the European Union, the timing may seem wrong for makers of policy and sailors to imagine a unitary European Navy within a comprehensive European defense policy. But as Europeans explore the limits of economic and financial harmony in the EU and NATO amid financial distress, they may embrace European integration in the defense sector, especially in its maritime dimension. The ongoing global and regional budget crises demand that responsible governments seek cost savings where they can; a unified European security and defense structure certainly would eliminate redundancies and spread the burden of regional defense more evenly among member states. In addition, though, the European Union and NATO could leverage the incremental, but steady progress toward a unified defense structure to bolster the European project at this sensitive moment. If the European Union puts in place the few remaining policy commitments that would create a single European Navy—hardly the stuff of fantasy fiction these days, in light of several recent initiatives—its internal and external unity would be stronger.

This thesis examines the project of a European Navy in context of a potential catalyzing step that could complete European integration while simultaneously solidifying a European identity. On the one hand, France and Britain in a bilateral arrangement of 2010 attempted to build a joint aircraft carrier, a move that might have laid the foundation for an all-European Navy centered on these two major naval partners. In the end, for reasons this thesis will investigate, the Franco-British carrier was unsuccessful. On the other hand, the model for a different kind of European Navy operations is already in place with the advent of EU Naval Forces (EU NAVFOR) Somalia. EU NAVFOR in 2012 is operating in the Horn of Africa combating piracy with contributions of personnel and material from those countries that are willing to provide resources to do so, based on a percentage of their gross domestic product. EU NAVFOR Somalia is completely voluntary and is an example of successful European military integration across a broader range of states. Can this model be expanded? It is a short step, institutionally, and, in fact, the bureaucratic way has been laid by the European

Space Agency (ESA). ESA also operates on a pay-as-you-go basis, allowing greater and smaller powers, alike, to share the prestige (as well as the formidable costs) of space projects. In this regard, the space agency represents a promising comparison for a proposed naval undertaking. As the following pages make clear, while Europe has successful organizations that already have achieved extremely high levels of integration, a European Navy could help the EU achieve greater internal unity and greater security at the same time.

A. THESIS OVERVIEW

Initially, this thesis provides a background of various European organizations and their attempt to integrate Europe. Chapter II provides the logic and benefits of creating a European Navy. Chapter III outlines historically how these various organization and alliances used politics, economics, and defense integration to bring members closer in these realms and, ultimately, to establish a European identity. Chapter IV demonstrates present-day failures and successes in the project of European naval integration. The first case study, the Franco-British carrier, demonstrates that a successful effort cannot proceed on a bilateral basis between the EU's bigger powers alone. In contrast, the second case study, EU anti-piracy efforts in the Indian Ocean, illustrates that when all European Union countries are involved, the likelihood for success is increased. Chapter V provides the blueprint for a European Navy using an ESA-like model for the development and maintenance of those forces. This chapter also briefly highlights why integration and development of a European identity is so important and concludes that the European Union, with a European Navy, is heading in the right direction regarding European integration. Ultimately, this thesis posits that a unitary European Navy can and will emerge as a considerable and legitimate unified force for regional defense and global security.

B. WHY EUROPEAN INTEGRATION?

At least since the Schuman Declaration in 1950, which inaugurated the European Coal and Steel Community,¹ economics has led the European integration effort, with all other sectors, including defense, swept along in its wake. The European Defense Community effort of the years 1950–1954 looms as a forgotten episode of the path not taken in European integration at an early date. Today with the significant rifts in the euro zone and the economic instability of Europe, further economic integration—to say nothing of financial integration—has lost its appeal in many European capitals beset by a populist backlash to the single currency and enlargement of the EU. In contrast, among many European states, including the largest powers in the Union, continued synchronization and even integration in the security and defense sector remains plausible, even desirable because of budget cutting in the financial crisis. In these economic straits, the leading nations of Europe may well find themselves at the edge of a momentous change in their military and defense structures: a unitary, supranational European military. While some more conspicuous efforts have gone into integrating Europe’s land forces, the time may soon be right—politically, economically, culturally, and strategically—for an EU Navy.

Since the end of World War II, Western Europe has relied heavily on the United States directly and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for regional defense as well as in engagements beyond the European continent. To be sure, Europe also has attempted to achieve collective defense that did not involve the United States through such organizations as the European Defense Community (EDC), Western European Union (WEU) and currently the European Union. In 1999, the EU took a major step toward military integration with the advent of the European Security and Defense Policy

¹ Robert Schuman was the French Foreign Minister in 1950 that proposed and advocated for the ECSC to control the production and distribution of coal and steel, the two key products used to wage war.

(ESDP).² On both sides of the Atlantic, the question, in various formulations,³ has been how much a stronger European force would contribute to regional defense and global security—and how much duplication or competition it might engender.

In the fiscally constrained environment of 2012, many European countries must tackle the difficult question of how to allocate most effectively their limited resources for national defense while maintaining an effective and competent military force. The calculus is particularly tricky in light of the diffuse threats of the post–Cold-War world, as well as such issues as prolonged engagements well beyond the national or regional borders, coalition operations, and the changing roles of the military. The United States is struggling with the very same questions. These circumstances lend a particular urgency—and charm—to the idea of a more fully functional, integrated European military. Especially with global missions amid dwindling resources, a European Navy may well provide the most bang, literally and figuratively, for the euro.

In the end, both Europe and the United States would benefit. The United States would be able to allocate more resources at home or to other areas of crisis, without leaving Europe under-defended or unable to participate in global security missions. Also the United States would benefit because an integrated European military, in particular a Navy, could assist in providing presence and security in the region and around the world. The U.S. Navy is already spread far too thin and struggling to fulfill its global requirements while protecting the thousands of sea lines of communications (SLOCS). For its part, Europe would benefit for having a more substantial role in security in and around Europe, embedded in a truly European security and defense policy. The individual EU member states would enjoy a comprehensive and complete defense structure, perhaps even more effective and cost-efficient than is possible with the current lineup of distinct national militaries. Moreover, a European Navy could help achieve and

² ESDP is now referred to as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under the Lisbon Treaty of 2007.

³ The concept of burden sharing and the potential future role of the EU are discussed in Wallace Thies, *Friendly rivals : Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003) and Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi, *The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025?* (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2006), respectively.

instill a European identity while simultaneously assisting the United States more as equal partners. The unique present conditions are potentially ideal to bring Europe closer together, in this case under the flag of a unified European Navy.

C. ISSUES SURROUNDING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Several practical problems of politics, operational issues, and economics stand between Europe as it is arranged today and a truly integrated military:

1. How do twenty-seven different member states of the European Union agree on what is best for the whole of Europe? Each region and state has its own perceived threats and therefore its own associated priorities and preferences. A (more) unified Europe must identify common universal threats. If consensus cannot be established on threats, collective defense will never occur.⁴
2. If the European Union is going to play a larger role on the world stage as a military power, how is it going to overcome its planning and command and control shortfalls? Currently the European Union leans greatly on NATO and its resources at all levels to conduct military operations.⁵ A truly autonomous European defense presence requires truly autonomous capabilities—though the EU will want to account for its partners' circumstances, especially the United States, as it strives for recognition and acceptance as its own military power.
3. The European Union must determine how to deal with countries in Europe that are not members of the European Union. Such countries as Switzerland, Croatia, and Turkey most likely will be apprehensive about other countries attempting to dictate strategy and policy in their state. For

⁴ Toje Asle, *The EU, NATO, and European Defence – A slow train coming*, in Occasional Paper, no. 74 (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2008).

⁵ Luis Simón, *Command and control? Planning for EU military operations*, in Occasional Paper No 81 (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2010).

the European Union to be successful in uniting Europe and providing collective defense, the non-members will have to be addressed.

D. IDEAS AND VISIONS OF EUROPE

Over the past six decades, a long list of books, articles, and various other publications have been written discussing European defense integration and why it will or will not work. The vast majority of the literature does not specifically address the impact of the financial crisis of 2007 on European defense integration, because events are too fresh for scholarship of this kind. The scholarship and journalism on the topic today focus on cutbacks and draw-downs in the short term, rather than exploring the options for truly innovative reform. Currently, there is no literature that specifically discusses the benefits of a European Navy and its importance.

One helpful strand of scholarship focuses on the role or reaction of the United States vis-à-vis Europe and its integration schemes. This literature can easily be placed into three categories: (1) the so-called two-world view—Europe and United States develop as separate and (more or less) equal; (2) the one-world view—Europe and United States continue to mesh Western security and defense together; and (3) the uncertain view—Europe must provide but analysts are unsure if it can.⁶

The first category encompasses the “two-world view,” based on the idea that Europeans can provide for themselves without the undue influence of another country or organization, such as the United States or NATO, respectively. The two-world view contends that Europe is an equal player with the United States in the world and can provide for its own security and defense autonomy. Contained within the two-world view are those scholars who believe European defense integration is well on its way and succeeding with the advent of CSDP and the Lisbon Treaty. The following authors

⁶ The categorization of the literature in this proposal derives from the typology of trans-Atlantic views that appears in John L. Harper, *American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Esther Brimmer and Stefan Frölich,⁷ Hall Gardner,⁸ Fraser Cameron,⁹ Geoffrey L. Williams and Alan L. Williams,¹⁰ basically supports the belief that Europe and the European Union is, or will be depending on when the book was written, a key player on the world stage. J. Weiler, Iain Begg and John Peterson,¹¹ and T.R. Reid,¹² as well as Schnabel and Rocca,¹³ take the two-world literature one step farther believing that Europe is going to be a strategic superpower that will challenge the United States. The main focus of these works contends that the European Union will work aside from NATO and act in the best interests of Europe as a whole, without the influence of the United States.

Alternately, there is the literature that holds to the one-world line. The one-world view basically contends that the United States must be involved in European affairs and help provide security and defense within Europe via NATO. Most of the literature within this view believe that the European Union plays more of an economic role and less of a military role. The one-world view relies almost exclusively on NATO because the European Union is unable to provide adequate security within Europe. The European Union is seen as having no real legitimate military presence, aside from routine

⁷ Esther Brimmer and Stefan Frölich, *The Strategic Implications of European Union Enlargement* (Washington, DC: The Johns Hopkins University, 2005).

⁸ Hall Gardner, *NATO and the European Union New World, New Europe, New Threats* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004).

⁹ Fraser Cameron, *The Future of Europe Integration and Enlargement* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004.) and *The Foreign and Security Policy of the Europe Union* (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999).

¹⁰ Geoffrey L. Williams and Alan L Williams, *The European Defence Initiative* (New York, NY: San Martin's Press, 1986).

¹¹ Andrew Moravcsik, "Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union" in *Integration in an expanding European Union : Reassessing the fundamentals* ed. Joseph H.H. Weiler, Iain Begg, and John Peterson (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2003).

¹² T.R. Reid, *The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2005).

¹³ Rockwell Schnabel and Francis Rocca, *The next superpower?: The rise of Europe and its challenge to the United States* (Lanham, MD: Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005)

peacekeeping operations. Such authors as Stanley Sloan,¹⁴ Richard Youngs,¹⁵ Asle Toje,¹⁶ and Florian Trauner¹⁷ have done considerable scholarly research attempting to prove the point that Europe is unable to provide for its own security. These authors essentially believe that NATO, not the EU, ultimately will remain the security guarantor for Europe and not the European Union.

Contained within the one-world view are also those authors who discuss the role of NATO and the importance of the transatlantic link between the United States and Europe. Authors such as Wallace Thies,¹⁸ Ian Q. R. Thomas,¹⁹ Ronald D. Asmus,²⁰ Alexandra Gheciu,²¹ and Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen and Allen G. Sens²² do not specifically address the role of the European Union in security and collective defense but rather focus on NATO's role in Europe. These authors more or less assume that NATO will be the security provider in Europe hence they fall into the one-world view. "The future of the North Atlantic Alliance, and also of the NATO-CSDP framework, is of paramount importance to the EU common foreign and security policy...The Treaty on European Union (TEU) specifically provides for compatibility with NATO membership, stating that the common security and defence policy of the Union shall respect the

¹⁴ Stanley Sloan, *NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009).

¹⁵ Richard Youngs, *Europe's Decline and Fall, The Struggle Against Global Irrelevance* (Great Britain, UK: Profile Books Ltd, 2010).

¹⁶ Asle Toje, *The European Union as a Small Power After the Post-Cold War* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) and Asle, Toje, *The EU, NATO, and European Defence – A slow train coming*, in Occasional Paper no. 74 (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2008).

¹⁷ Florian Trauner, *The Internal-external Security Nexus: More Coherence Under Lisbon*, in Occasional Paper no. 89 (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2011).

¹⁸ Wallace Thies, *Friendly rivals : bargaining and burden-shifting in NATO* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003).

¹⁹ Ian Q.R. Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1997).

²⁰ Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2002).

²¹ Alexandra Gheciu, *NATO in the "New Europe": The Politics of International Socialization After the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).

²² Allen G. Sens, "The Widening Atlantic, Part II: Transatlanticism, the New NATO, and Canada," in *NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism*, ed. Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen, and Allen G. Sens (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003).

obligations of certain Member States, which under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with common security and defence policy established within that framework.”²³ The main gap in the literature of the one-world view is the impact that the financial crisis has had on the United States and NATO and the role the European Union is attempting to play.

The last group of scholarly work neither falls into the one-world or the two-view. These authors are uncertain who will ultimately provide defense and security within Europe. The only certainty, they believe, is that the European Union is going to play more of a role Europe but are uncertain exactly how they will achieve that role. Ariella Huff,²⁴ Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi,²⁵ Luis Simón,²⁶ Wolfgang Wagner²⁷ and Nicole Gnesotto et al.²⁸ subscribe to the opinion that the European Union is poised to become a more recognized and legitimate organization within Europe and beyond, but they realize that with its present organizational structure the European Union is not ready.

The EU can hardly be expected to bring further added value if its Member States refrain from engaging in serious political debate on what they want to do together, and if they are reluctant to put their money and resources where their mouth is. That requires first and foremost that national political establishments change gear, and switch their discourse on foreign and security policy from a national to a European level.²⁹

²³ Sven Biscop, Nicole Gnesotto, Jolyon Howorth, Daniel Keohane, Stefano Silvestri, and Teija Tiilikainen, *What do Europeans want from NATO?*, in Report no. 8 (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2010), 4.

²⁴ Ariella Huff, *The Role of EU Defence Policy in the Eastern Neighborhood*, in Occasional Paper no. 91 (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2011).

²⁵ Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi, *The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025?* (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2006).

²⁶ Luis Simón, *Command and Control? Planning for EU Military Operations*, in Occasional Paper no. 81 (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2010).

²⁷ Wolfgang Wagner, *The Democratic Legitimacy of European Security and Defence Policy*, in Occasional Paper no. 57 (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2005).

²⁸ Nicole Gnesotto, Jean-Yves Haine, André Dumoulin, Jan Foghelin, Francois Heisbourg, William Hopkinson, Marc Otte, Tomas Ries, Lothar Rühl, Stefano Silvestri, Hans-Bernhard Weisserth and Rob de Wijk, *European Defence, A Proposal for a White Paper* (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS] 2004).

²⁹ Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi, *The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025?*, (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2006), 207.

These authors understand that the United States and NATO will not always be able to provide security and defense within Europe, and the ensuing gap could potentially be filled by the EU.

This thesis contends that the successful way forward for Europe is to be found the two-world view, though the observations and critiques of the other views merit serious attention, as well. The European Union, through the use of integrated military structures, can bring Europe together. Countries not currently members of the European Union could be lured into the union rooted in the idea of a European national identity reinforced by integrated military structures. Integrated military structures benefit all involved in some form or fashion. At the end of the day, the European Union will fill the void soon to be left by NATO.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

Two case studies illustrate the impact that the current state and future promise of European defense integration. The first case study is the attempt of the year 2010 by France and Britain to work together to create an aircraft carrier that will service both countries. The idea was that both nations could deploy, land, and conduct operations with their respective aircraft from the joint platform. In the end, this bilateral effort failed to a large extent because it did not include the other EU countries. That is, in its concept and execution, the Franco-British carrier was insufficiently European to succeed.

In contrast, the integrated military structure of European Union Naval Forces Somalia has posted consistent successes in conducting anti-piracy operations off the coast of Africa. With every country in the European Union contributing resources based on a percentage of its gross domestic product, there is relative equality and participation, which is a large part of its success. This model has much to say about next steps for a broader EU defense organization.

The analytical emphasis falls on various European Union Institute for Security Studies documents discussing the role and future of the European Union with respect to defense and security. In addition numerous books and articles will provide insight into

the role of NATO and why the European Union will become an equal player to the United States. Despite the blow to integration that the Eurozone crisis seems to have delivered, Europe's success rests on creating integrated military structures starting with a European Navy.

European integration has been the ultimate goal of many European countries since the idea of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the late 1940s. Integration efforts have been driven by such underlying factors as politics, economics, and defense integration, all of which will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters. In an attempt to push integration forward two countries within the EU, France and Britain, attempted to lead the way through a bi-lateral agreement to invest in aircraft carriers. While the bilateral agreement had good intentions the general execution was flawed. Why the bilateral agreement failed and what a successful European Navy would look like and the benefits that could be brought to Europe will be discussed later. Ultimately Europe stands to benefit tremendously from the development a European Navy. A European Navy could be the backbone of the development of a complete and functional European identity that could bring together politics and economics while leading the way in defense integration. In the end, a European Navy can be used as a catalyst for unifying Europe.

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II. WHY A EUROPEAN NAVY?

The definition of a superpower is an entity:

that has the capacity to project dominating power and influence anywhere in the world, and sometimes, in more than one region of the globe at a time, and so may plausibly attain the status of global hegemon. The basic components of superpower stature may be measured along four axes of power: military, economic, political, and cultural.³⁰

The focus here will be on the military axis because it has elements of the other three and directly involves the Navy. The axis of military power is only as strong as its maritime component. This claim particularly holds true if the ocean encircles the superpower. Stated differently:

Maritime power has a unique combination of attributes. It operates in the medium that covers over two thirds of the world's surface and which gives access at a range of no more than a hundred miles to a similar proportion of the world's population. Maritime strategy exploits these attributes to achieve political objectives. The ability to execute a maritime strategy—one that must by definition be joint but rests on an ability to operate on, over, under and from the sea—is therefore one of a nation's most useful and powerful assets, especially in that nation is surrounded by the ocean.³¹

The creation of a EU Navy would force consolidation of efforts regarding collective defense while aiding in maritime domain awareness. The maritime environment is unlike any other in that the effects of globalization are felt the most.

The oceans have effectively been globalized for over a century—that is, their use as what Alfred Thayer Mahan would call “the great common” has been open to all nations with the desire, access, and resources to master it. The maritime world can also be seen as a primary source—in

³⁰ Lyman Miller, “China an Emerging Superpower?,” *Stanford Journal of International Relations* 6 no. 1 (Winter 2005), http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.03_miller.html (accessed May 15, 2012).

³¹ Eric Grove, “Principles of Maritime Strategy,” in *Dimensions of Seapower: Strategic choice in the Modern World*, eds. Eric Grove and Peter Hore (Hull, UK: The University of Hull Press, 1998), 31.

recent parlance, a root cause—of globalization because it is the medium by which 90 percent of world trade (when measured by weight and volume) is transported.³²

Europe has a vested interest in developing a Maritime Strategy that will aid in protecting shipping in and around Europe. Alfred Thayer Mahan stated, “The use and control of the sea is and has been a great factor in the history of the world.”³³ With the creation of a European Navy, the European Union could provide for freedom of the seas in and around Europe while simultaneously shaping history around the European continent. There are numerous benefits for Europe through the development of a supranational navy, the main ones of which are featured in the pages that follow.

A. BLUE WATER CAPABILITY—SEA CONTROL

Most countries in Europe that currently have their own respective navies are considered to be Coastal Powers. That is to say they are a “small or medium-sized state situated by the ocean. Among the major sources of its wealth and political influence are the resources in its economic zones, on its continental shelf or in its coastal waters.” Also for various reasons, these Coastal Powers have elected not to develop or invest in a blue water navy “beyond the reach of its own shore-based aviation or surface-to-surface missile systems. It cannot therefore challenge or compete with Naval Powers on the high seas.”³⁴

With the establishment of a blue water navy there is a certain implied connotation of power. According to the dictionary one definition of power is “the capacity or ability to direct or influence the behavior of others or the course of events.” Europe is currently comprised of too many smaller nation states and would be unable to counter larger naval powers such as North Korea and China.

³² Sam J. Tangredi, “Introduction,” in *Globalization and Maritime Power*, ed. Sam J. Tangredi (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2002), xxvi.

³³ Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660–1783* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications Inc., 1987), iii.

³⁴ Jacob Børresen, “The Seapower of the Coastal State,” in *Seapower: Theory and Practice*, ed. Geoffrey Till (Portland, OR: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1994), 149.

The primary task of seapower [ie—blue water navy] has traditionally been to protect merchant shipping (and fisheries), to protect the freedom of the Seas whereby the seaborne trade can go on unhindered. Second, the establishment of sea control outside the coasts of an opponent, enables the Naval Power to exert force across the coastline of that opponent.³⁵

In 2010, roughly 1.8 billion tonnes of freight, 847 million tonnes of liquid bulk cargo, 341 million tonnes of dry bulk cargo, 290 million tonnes of goods transported in roll on–roll off vessels, and 213 million tonnes in containers were shipped between the main twenty-seven EU ports via merchant vessels.³⁶ Europe can ill afford to have such a key artery disrupted. European countries are going to have no choice but to attempt collective blue water operations. If they do not, then they risk succumbing to the political and economic influence of others. Moreover, a Europe comprised of several more or less coordinated but independent national navies will not be able to project its own might on or beyond the high seas. Conversely, a thoroughly maritime Europe would include new and important ways for the coastal states to contribute to the regional project—a category that includes all of the present-day “problem states,” namely Greece, Spain, Italy, and Ireland.

A blue water navy is the hallmark and prerogative of the most powerful polities on earth in no small part because of the steep costs associated with creating and maintaining a blue water navy. One solution for Europe is to create a supranational navy where respective EU defense budgets are pooled, like in NATO,³⁷ sharing the cost for creating and maintaining a blue water navy.

³⁵ Jacob Børresen, “The Seapower of the Coastal State,” in *Seapower: Theory and Practice*, ed. Geoffrey Till (Portland, OR: Frank Cass & Co., 1994), 154.

³⁶ Statistics were obtained from EUROSTAT website provided by the European Commission at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Maritime_transport_statistics_-_short_sea_shipping_of_goods (accessed on May 21, 2012).

³⁷ The concept of pooling and sharing resources and capabilities is discussed in detail in Wallace Thies, *Friendly rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003). One condition for acceptance into NATO is providing an agreed upon percentage of the respective countries GDP for NATO defense spending.

B. DEVELOPMENT OF CONSOLIDATED EU MARITIME STRATEGY

The effects of globalization can be felt throughout Europe as countries become more dependent on one another. Nonetheless, there is still no consolidated EU Maritime Strategy. The next-closest thing would be CSDP, which is vague at best on the issue of naval strategy. As such, Europe requires a unified EU Maritime Strategy to create and sustain a EU naval “presence and intervention in locations not previously considered of vital interest...[while simultaneously creating] new, unpredicted effects on alliances and coalition-formation and their maritime components.”³⁸ Focus of the strategy would center on concepts such as stability, security, and seapower. There must be a unity of effort by the various EU countries. The United States currently provides presence in numerous international shipping lanes ensuring freedom of the seas. With a EU Navy operating under one strategy, they could share the burden with the United States. Europe would then be able to establish bilateral agreements with the United States where there is concept of equality vice dependence. The overall situation would create a win-win for Europe and the United States. Europe establishes a navy that can protect and provide for itself while simultaneously sharing the burden of international security with the United States.

C. EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS

Expeditionary operations are “Military Operations which can be initiated at short notice, consisting of forward deployed or rapidly deployable self-sustaining forces tailored to achieve a clearly stated objective in a foreign country.”³⁹ The first part of the definition calls for short notice and rapidly deployable forces. Currently, the EU does not have ships that can quickly be deployed for operations because each individual nation-state in Europe controls its respective military forces. The persistence of the nation-state slows the process. The EU is structured in a way that allows for a respective country to decide to opt out of a given conflict. As an example, the 2003 Iraq War illustrated how

³⁸ Sam J. Tangredi, “Introduction,” in *Globalization and Maritime Power*, ed. Sam J. Tangredi (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2002), xxix.

³⁹ Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004), 235.

some countries such as the United Kingdom were willing to provide troops whereas others like Germany and France were not. The EU as a whole was unable to provide expeditionary forces collectively with effective logistical support. If the EU was integrated militarily, the response could have been more effective and unified among European countries.

Creating a European Navy would allow for EU member states' navy vessels to fall under the control of a higher European authority with designated officials. This command and control architecture, in theory, would streamline the deployment process in support of European interests allowing Europe to undertake Expeditionary Operations.

The other part of the definition to Expeditionary Operations calls for self-sustaining forces to achieve a clearly stated objective in a foreign country. Looking at the U.S. Navy as an example, one of the biggest advantages is its ability to sustain Expeditionary Operations for long periods of time without having to redeploy additional forces. The United States waged the 1991 Gulf War and in the 2003 invasion of Iraq with no lulls or gaps because of this ability. While the face of those operations was the United States Army, success would not have been possible without the continued Naval Gun Fire Support (NGFS) as well as logistical support. Ground forces rely heavily on naval forces for logistical support as well as fire support.

First-hand experience working with European navies at sea has proven that sustained naval operations are a considerable challenge for numerous European countries.⁴⁰ In 2008, while deployed with Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) 2, European naval ships were only able to operate for five to seven days at sea and then needed to pull in. Another challenge was replenishment at sea. Many European oilers were very small and only able to refuel two ships before they needed to pull into port themselves. Europe's inability to operate at sea for long periods of time negates the key element of Expeditionary Operations—sustainment.

⁴⁰ From September 2007 to March 2008 the author was deployed to the Mediterranean Sea assigned to Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 working for a Turkish 2-Star Admiral.

The EU currently relies on the United States too heavily in the fulfillment of Expeditionary Operational requirements, as was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 2010 National Security Strategy of the United States, signed by President Obama, indicates focus will be shifting to the Asia-Pacific Theater with less emphasis on Europe. Europe is going to have to invest together to ensure that it will be able to meet potential future Expeditionary Operations.

D. INCREASE AND DEVELOP CAPABILITIES

There are basic missions that any navy today should be able to accomplish. These missions include Air Warfare, Surface Warfare, Submarine Warfare, and Mine Warfare. In order to accomplish these missions a Navy must be comprised of ships like Destroyers, Minesweepers, Amphibious Ships, Aircraft Carriers, and Submarines. Finally, a Navy needs aircraft that fall into the following categories: fighters, electronic warfare, surveillance, close air support, and numerous helicopter variants. While this list of requirements seems long and expensive, Europe already has all of these capabilities, though distributed unevenly among the member states. Currently, the member states of the EU possess 579 surface ships and 58 submarines.⁴¹ The United States Navy, by comparison, only has 212 surface ships and 71 submarines. The EU members have more than twice the number of ships as the United States! If these assets were pooled under a unitary European Navy Commission, the EU would easily be able to fulfill the required force composition and mission sets of a navy.

First-hand experience again illustrates the need for increasing individual European naval capabilities. While deployed in 2007–2008 in support of Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) 2, the participating European countries demonstrated a wide range of capabilities. The British and Spanish ships were able to conduct Air Defense Exercises (ADEX), whereas the Romanian and Greek ships were unable to participate due to radar limitations.⁴² Moreover, about half of the time, at least one

⁴¹ Information on the total number of ships that the twenty-seven EU countries possess was obtained from each country's respective navy website.

⁴² While deployed with SNMG-2 I coordinated and participated in approximately twenty ADEX events.

country was unable to establish secure voice communications due to equipment malfunctions or operator error. A unified and unifying European Navy would standardize basic equipment and procedures, facilitating effective exercises and coordination with other naval units.

E. CONCLUSION

With 90 percent of world trade, as measured by weight and volume, traveling by water, Europe has a vested interest in protecting and ensuring freedom of the seas around Europe. In order to achieve freedom of the seas however, Europe must establish a robust blue water capability. As such other countries as China and North Korea continue to advance their respective naval forces, specifically encompassing blue water operations, Europe will have little choice but to work more collectively to keep pace. By combining their respective budgets and forces, Europe could easily establish a blue water capability that is the hallmark of powerful nations.

Once all of Europe's naval assets are brought together, Europe would then benefit through the development of a collective Maritime Strategy. This Strategy would focus the collective's efforts toward achieving stability, security, and seapower within the EU's given area of responsibility. By focusing and better coordinating efforts, Europe would be able to take on more complex and robust expeditionary operations. Europe would be able to quickly deploy forces for long periods of time ultimately supporting complex ground operations, such as those accomplished during the 2003 Iraq War.

While some European countries are able to accomplish difficult operations and exercises with allied countries, such as the United States, some European countries are unable to participate for various reasons. Working together and sharing technology and capabilities benefits everyone involved. Those who have the technology will have the burden shared by those who are receiving it.

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III. FOUNDATIONS: EARLIER INITIATIVES FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Europe realized very early after World War II that it could not rely solely on the United States, through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to provide security in and around Europe. Several alliances and organizations⁴³ were founded to provide security in and around Europe while simultaneously trying to prevent another war of annihilation in Europe—in part through the care and encouragement of new bonds of common identity. Early attempts were more rallying calls against communism and were not necessarily aimed at complete integration of European political, economic, or defense organizations. For example, Winston S. Churchill delivered a speech on September 19, 1946, “calling for a United States of Europe...seen as a signal by the leaders of an emerging European movement,” by which he meant to distinguish Western Europe from the Soviet-dominated east and bolster the morale of those states struggling to rebuild after the war.⁴⁴ Even these much-quoted words stopped well short of proclaiming a unified Europe as its own entity. Churchill was, after all, a *British* politician who, like many of his countrymen, rejected out of hand a fully “Europeanized” Britain.

Still, the ideal of integration was built into even the earliest postwar European organizations. Although Jean Monnet’s plan for the European Coal and Steel Community was famously pragmatic and focused on the workings of a single sector of the economy, Monnet himself had long cherished an ideal of political unity in Europe.⁴⁵ These organizations and alliances represent the building blocks for the current design of the European Union.

Although these entities ranged widely in their purpose, function, and composition, all of them represented efforts to answer three related questions for (and of) Europe:

⁴³ The various organizations to be discussed in this chapter are the European Political Community, European Council, European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, European Defence Community and the Western European Union.

⁴⁴ Julian Lindley-French and Katja Flückiger, *A Chronology of European Security & Defence 1945-2005* (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2005), 17.

⁴⁵ Frederic Franssen. *The Supranational Politics of Jean Monnet: Ideas and Origins of the European Community* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group Inc., 2001), 87–88.

(1) How was Europe going to accomplish integration, at least among the western European states? (2) How, if at all, should the United States fit into or relate to the new European identity? and (3) Could a European only identity counter the Soviet threat in Eastern Europe? This chapter examines several of the leading organizations of each kind of integration—political, economic, and defense—to show the drastic progression in Europe from a collection of fractious and periodically belligerent states to an integrating supra-national polity developing an identity of its own.

A. POLITICAL INTEGRATION

The *sine qua non* of European integration is political unity. Two early attempts in the postwar period to establish the foundation for political integration were the European Political Community and the European Council. Some, such as Alcide De Gasperi of Italy, believed political integration to be a catalyst for and requirement of a European identity that would, in turn, beget economic and defense integration.⁴⁶

Political integration, however, is not without its limitations. One extremely difficult political problem that must be addressed is the persistence of individual nation-states in Europe. As long as European countries continue to rely on the nation-state for a political identity a true collective and integrated European political identity will never be established. The process of political integration attempts to answer the following questions:

(1) Who belongs to Europe and who can be excluded? (2) Which values are genuinely (and uniquely) European? and (3) Is there a threat toward Europe and where does the threat come from—from within or from without? ... [A]nswers to such questions have immediate political consequences and begin to explain why the interpretation of the term 'Europe' has been so disputed.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press Inc, 1980), 214.

⁴⁷ Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen, *The History of the Idea of Europe* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1993), 83.

1. European Political Community

The European Political Community was an idea proposed by Alcide de Gasperi of Italy in the early 1950s, in conjunction with the European Coal and Steel Community, with the belief that political organizations could provide the foundation and legitimacy for economic and defense integration endeavors. At the core of this line of thinking was the belief that politics was the force that would ultimately bring together Europe's economy and defense industries.⁴⁸ The European Political Community was meant to be “an umbrella organization for the other communities,” namely the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Defence Community. The major downfall and ultimate failure of the EPC owed to French fears of German rearmament and so the French parliament did not ratify the treaty to officially establish the EPC.⁴⁹

2. Council of Europe

The initial five Brussels Treaty Powers⁵⁰ along with Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland officially established the Council of Europe on May 5, 1949, which also created under the Council a Consultative Assembly and a Council of Ministers via the Treaty of London.⁵¹ The goals the Council of Europe were to integrate Europe economically and politically. Specifically, the Council was an attempt to merge numerous political parties in various countries throughout Europe in an attempt to create a European identity with one European political goal in mind.

The desire of most delegates at the time was for the creation of a real European political authority...[but] this was impossible, so in compromise

⁴⁸ The initial six countries involved were Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and West Germany—the “Europe of Six” of the original ECSC.

⁴⁹ Coling Hay and Anand Menon, *European Politics* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press Inc., 2007), 156.

⁵⁰ The initial five powers that signed the Brussels Treaty on March 17, 1948 in Belgium were Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

⁵¹ Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History* (New York, NY: St. Marin's Press Inc, 1980), 17.

the members had to try and do what they could to pursue their goals within a body 'with limited functions and real powers.'⁵²

Europe was quickly realizing that a European identity would be extremely difficult to establish but was in fact a need in Europe. The Council of Europe is another project, in the spirit of Gasperi, that begins with the idea that politics should lead integration efforts and that economic and defense integration, in theory, will logically follow.

The Council was one of the first politically driven organizations after World War II with the primary aim of integrating Europe by creating a legitimate European political authority. Many countries immediately requested membership to the Council of Europe because, according to Article 4, any European state could apply. Moreover, "the Council of Europe seeks to develop throughout Europe common and democratic principles based on the European Convention on Human Rights and other reference texts on the protection of individuals."⁵³ Arguably the longevity and success of the Council of Europe is because membership is relatively open, provided an applicant country has stable democratic values and supports the protection of human rights.

First and foremost the primary topic of concern among European countries was what to do with Germany, particularly the rearming of Germany. The Council of Europe decided to allow Germany membership to the Council of Europe in July of 1950, less than a year after the Federal Republic gained full sovereignty and some five years before Germany officially acceded to NATO membership. Arguably if Germany was not granted membership and left on the outside looking in, resentment and discontent could have festered and have potentially caused further aggression—a redux of the Rapallo accord of 1926.⁵⁴ The Council of Europe was also instrumental in another key area within Europe, human rights. In particular the Council "provided a framework of

⁵² Ibid., 17.

⁵³ Council of Europe, "Council of Europe in Brief," (n.d.), <http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=quisommesnous&l=en> (accessed April 1, 2012).

⁵⁴ Germany was left on the outside looking in after WWI within Europe. The Rapallo Treaty of 1926 was signed between Russia and Germany because other European countries wanted nothing to do with Germany. Rapallo essentially unified Germany.

principles for the protection of human rights and key freedoms considered essential to a free and peaceful Europe.”⁵⁵ Essentially any democratic state within Europe that supports and believes in human rights and peaceful resolution to conflicts can become a member of the Council of Europe. One glaring success of the Council is that it did not succumb to the same fate as the European Political Community. It attempted to create a forum for each country to discuss issues of integration within the borders of Europe.

B. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Whereas the early efforts at politics-led European integration produced mixed results, rapprochement and cooperation came more readily in the economic realm. Not least because of the requirements of postwar reconstruction, economics led the European agenda after World War II, notably the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community.

1. European Coal and Steel Community

The European Coal and Steel Community is the direct descendent and by-product of the European Political Community. The European Political Community never was established because while Alcide De Gasperi of Italy was lobbying for political integration, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman were working toward economic integration under the auspices of the European Coal and Steel Community. The main goal of the ECSC was to put “production of those [coal and steel] resources under control of a supranational authority.”⁵⁶ The European Coal and Steel Community and the European Political Community were both vying for support simultaneously. Nation-states viewed the European Political Community as an organization that would infringe on national sovereignty so support was very limited. The European Coal and Steel Community, on the other hand, presented itself as an organization centered on economics

⁵⁵ Andreas Staab, *The European Union Explained* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2011), 7.

⁵⁶ Rockwell A. Schanbel and Francis X. Rocca, *The Next Superpower? The Rise of Europe and Its Challenge to the United States* (Lanham, MD: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2005), 14.

that would not affect individual nation state's sovereignty beyond the very circumscribed area of members' coal and steel sectors. In the end, the European Coal and Steel Community ultimately won out.

To be sure, the European Coal and Steel Community included within itself a certain capacity for

spill over, whereby international cooperation in one policy area leads to cooperation in related areas, often technical fields apparently of interest only to bureaucrats. The result is that integrations takes place below the radar of most political discourse, and in some cases even contrary to the long-range aims of national leaders.⁵⁷

In the event, the European Coal and Steel Community did institutionalize “supranationalism [and] it [the ECSC] set a precedent and provided a framework for future integrative initiatives”⁵⁸ such as the European Economic Community.

One key legacy of the ECSC in terms of European integration was that it set events in motion toward the creation of a common market within Europe. In order for a true European identity to be established, there must a system in place that allows for integration of goods, persons, services and capital; elements that the European Union today refers to as the Four Freedoms.⁵⁹ The European Coal and Steel Community would later evolve and be known as the European Economic Community.

2. European Economic Community

The concept of economic integration that was started by the European Coal and Steel Community was advanced even farther under the European Economic Community (EEC). The six founding countries of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and West Germany that previously attempted to establish the European Political

⁵⁷ Rockwell A. Schanbel and Francis X. Rocca, *The Next Superpower? The Rise of Europe and Its Challenge to the United States* (Lanham, MD: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2005), 14.

⁵⁸ Coling Hay and Anand Menon, *European Politics* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 155.

⁵⁹ European Union, “Europa – The EU at a Glance - Eurojargon,” (n.d.), http://europa.eu/abc/eurojargon/index_en.htm (accessed February 8, 2012).

Community were truly establishing a common market. Some of the goals that were set out by the European Economic Community were

removal of all existing national customs duties and quantitative restrictions that hampered the import and export of goods between the member countries; the setting of a deadline for the establishment of a common customs union; the removal of all inter-Community obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital within the six-area region; and the creation of a number of common EEC policies in such areas as agriculture, transportation, external trade and competition.⁶⁰

The concept of supranationalism that was previously set in motion by the European Coal and Steel Community was no longer restricted to the coal and steel markets. The hopes of the six countries involved was that by establishing a stable integrated economic model that was functioning effectively other European countries would inevitably want to join thus expanding the common market throughout Europe.

The importance of the European Economic Community and the establishment of the common market cannot be understated. By linking numerous aspects of various countries' economies, the foundation is set for the concept of pooling and sharing resources. From the farmer harvesting crops to the politician deciding legislation, the countries are invariably linked across social classes. The European Economic Community was so instrumental in that it remained in effect and evolved into what was later referred to as the European Community up until 1993.

C. EUROPEAN DEFENSE INTEGRATION, 1947 – TODAY

One area of integration that is extremely vital and covers both political and economic boundaries in Europe is the concepts of collective defense and military integration. While political and economic integration have essentially stalled, defense integration has shown longevity and demonstrated real strides towards European integration. The modern day European Union owes a very large portion of its current collective security identity to the structure of the Western European Union. Most

⁶⁰ Lousie B. van Tartwijk-Novey, *The European House of Cards, Towards a United States of Europe?*, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, London: MacMillan Press LTD, 1995) 18.

countries would agree that defense is an important aspect of integration but the manner in which that integration is achieved is a separate issue all together. Politicians within one country can rarely, if ever, agree on how and what to spend their respective defense budgets on. When multiple countries are involved, the problem of how to spend money on defense gets exponentially more difficult. One question that needed to be answered by Europe was how to provide for its own collective security within its collective borders? Making the issue of collective defense and security through a European identity even more difficult were the competing ideas and concepts of the newly established North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Europe had already proven twice through World War I and World War II that it could not prevent or counter wars on the European continent without outside assistance from the United States. Europe was eager to establish a European organization that did not involve the United States. The European Defence Community and the Western European Union were the first two organizations that established the foundation for European defense integration while simultaneously advancing Europe's political and economic interests.

1. European Defence Community, 1950 – 1954

Importance must be given to framing the Europe in which the European Defence Community was created. Europe had just completed two very brutal and bloody World Wars that required the assistance of the United States and nobody wanted another war of annihilation. One glaring goal of any organization needed to be an attempt to add security to an area that had historically demonstrated its instability. Europe was extremely fragile following the conclusion of World War II and the United States was arguably the only power physically able to match up against the Soviet military threat and create a balance of power in Europe. Europe still attempted to create an organization that had a European identity that was driving European integration, the European Defence Community.

One of the primary purposes of the European Defence Community to create an organization whose sole purpose was to provide for collective defense and security within

Europe while rearming Germany in a controlled environment without the involvement of the United States. French Premier René Pleven who

envisioned the eventual creation of a European army within which token German units would be included originated the concept. The army would not be formed until a European decision-making framework had been established, with a European defense minister and a European parliament to approve funds for the operation.⁶¹

The European Defence Community was attempting to integrate defense structures among European countries. Early on Europe realized the importance of attempting to establish some sort of European defense identity.

While some view the European Defence Community as a failure, looking at its accomplishments and legacies in a different context could change the perception of the organization. Unfortunately the European Defence Community was ahead of its time. First and foremost the European Defence Community established the initial momentum required for integrating defense and security structures in and among European countries. In doing so the European Defence Community also was directly contributing to the establishment of a European identity. Many of the ideas and concepts, such as collective defense and collective security that are cornerstones of the European Union, were originated under the European Defence Community. In the end, the European Defence Community suffered from poor timing and an overall lack of support due to the presence of the United States via NATO in Europe.

2. Western European Union, 1954 – 2010

After the European Defence Community lost its momentum the Western European Union was the next organization that attempted to complete European defense integration. To accomplish the very difficult task of convincing Europeans and the United States that the Western European Union was a viable organization, a distinction was made between military alliances and European integration. Konrad Adenauer the Chancellor of Germany summarizes the main premise behind the creation of the WEU;

⁶¹ Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community, The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered* (Lanham, MD: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2003), 21.

“it [the WEU] was not by any means a primarily military alliance. It is an instrument of European integration in all fields.”⁶² By portraying the Western European Union as an organization that was not competing for control of military assets European countries were more open to the concept. NATO was now the only organization competing for and controlling military assets. West Germany was accepted into NATO ending the Franco-German hostility and rearmament concerns.⁶³ NATO could now monitor West Germany and the WEU could focus on the strategy of unifying Europe. The Western European Union allowed for a forum where the influence of the United States was not present. Unfortunately the Western European Union took a subordinate role to NATO and did not establish an effective and organized military structure.

The WEU did provide a few key long term strategic benefits for Europe: (1) the Western European Union provided a channel of communication between major West European states that would help to strengthen European relationships without the influence of the United States, (2) American leadership in NATO was accepted from the 1950s onward and the United States supported European economic integration via the WEU to help Europe one day better defend itself, (3) many European states widely agreed by the 1960s that Europe needed to speak with a more unified voice to project its influence on the world stage and (4) the WEU was more attractive to smaller countries that were not members of NATO but still wanted to identify with a European identity.⁶⁴ Ultimately, the WEU would still exist but essentially fall of the map until the 1980s because NATO was taking the lead and many Europeans still enjoyed the security guarantee provided by the United States under NATO. The European Security Defence Identity and the Common Foreign and Security Policy can trace its roots all the way back to the European Defence Community and the Western European Union. In the end, the Western European Union provided the foundation that would shape the future of the European Union and European integration across all levels.

⁶² Ian Q. R. Thomas, *The promise of alliance : NATO and the political imagination*. (Lanham, MD: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 1997), 44.

⁶³ Lecture NPS NS4722, COL Dirk Rogalski, 19 January 2011.

⁶⁴ Lecture NPS NS4722, COL Dirk Rogalski, 10 January 2011.

D. CONCLUSION

Integration efforts in Europe owe their genesis to the initial political and economic organizations established after World War II; presently, however, they reached a plateau and momentum was lost. Politics attempted to implement policy that infringed on the sovereignty of the individual nation state. In particular, political integration was schools of thought were “split between federalist plans from France and Belgium and more minimalist plans, in particular from Britain. This split parallels the later difference between...political integration versus free trade” and politics did not shape a European supranational identity and lead integration efforts.⁶⁵ In actuality, politics was more dividing Europe as opposed to integrating it. Economic integration efforts on the other hand initially appeared by some, such as French Foreign Minister Schuman and Belgian Prime Minister Spaak, to be the answer to completing European integration. Unfortunately economic integration could not complete the task of European integration anymore than politics could. France, under de Gaulle, did recognize the benefits to France’s economy and the potential to boost French industry but would not embrace the concept of supranationalism.⁶⁶ As long as countries, such as France, are not willing to embrace the idea of supranationalism, political or economic efforts will always fail.

Contrary to politics and economics defense integration efforts are founded on the idea of supranationalism. Defense integration efforts made more sense because it provided answers and solutions to the following: (1) The demand by President Harry Truman for Western Europe to share the security burden and provide for its own security; (2) Answer the American demands for how Europe was going to address the future of West Germany’s military complex; (3) How could Europe take advantage of West

⁶⁵ Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen, *The History of the Idea of Europe* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1993), 165.

⁶⁶ Coling Hay and Anand Menon, *European Politics* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 157.

Germany's military complex? and (4) How could Western Europe safely develop an effective strategy that integrated West German forces into the democratic structure of Western Europe?⁶⁷

Defense integration was the answer to all of these questions while establishing real growth toward European integration. The importance of the defense sector in achieving the goal of European integration is evident still today with the bilateral attempt by Britain and France to create an aircraft carrier and by successes of European Union Naval Forces Somalia in combating piracy in the Horn of Africa.

⁶⁷ Andreas Staab, *The European Union Explained* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2011), 153.

IV. EUROPEAN NAVAL INTEGRATION EFFORTS: FAILURES AND SUCCESSES

Examination of two case studies will provide insight into what a European Navy might and might not look like. The first case study is the failed bi-lateral attempt by France and Britain to create joint aircraft carriers to service both countries simultaneously. While the intentions were good, the manner in which the concept was attempted was flawed. The second case study takes a look at the successful Naval endeavor of European Union Naval Forces (EU NAVFOR) Somalia. EU NAVFOR Somalia is proof that a supranational navy is possible. When looking at the two case studies attention is given to the driving factors behind each endeavor and why in the end one failed and one succeeded. Creation of a European Navy needs to be an endeavor led by the European Union because a couple or even a few countries cannot effectively accomplish the magnitude and scope of such a project.

Europe has more than 50,000 miles of coastline and a population that exceeds 500 million people. Separately, the twenty-seven individual member states within Europe combined have almost 600 ships. Each nation is tasked with providing its own repair, maintenance, and logistics facilities. While exact figures are not available as to how much this entire infrastructure costs to maintain, it is reasonable to assume that such outlays monopolize a large portion of each respective defense budget. Looking just France's, the United Kingdom's, and Germany's defense expenditures in 2004 they spent ~\$51 billion, ~\$50 billion and ~\$38 billion, respectively.⁶⁸

On the other hand, naval budgets still may not be at the levels needed, which accounts for the more or less chronic condition today of some ships not getting underway fully capable of completing the mission they were built for. Bringing the respective naval infrastructure together makes sense in that it could lessen the burden of keeping a

⁶⁸ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 118.

navy in struggling countries such as Greece and Italy. (To the extent that these states are also coastal powers, themselves, they can also expect to participate more in the combined security of the region.)

Then considering that the United States announced its new focus is on the Asia Pacific theater, it makes all the more sense for Europe to pool and share its navy assets. In doing so, Europe would most likely emerge as the security provider around Europe while protecting its commerce.

While Europe has yet to integrate its military forces, including its constituent navies, to such a degree, the foundations and conditions have been established for Europe to create a European Navy. These bases have been wrought of experience—some helpful, some less than helpful. The following pages analyze two such cases and draw conclusions for a future all-European Navy.

A. FRANCO-BRITISH AIRCRAFT CARRIER

In November 2010, the leadership of the United Kingdom and France, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy, respectively,⁶⁹ officially announced the establishment of a fifty-year Franco-British treaty on defense and security with three specific strategic goals in mind: (1) establishment of a joint carrier group; (2) the creation a 10,000-person joint expeditionary force; and (3) the creation of joint nuclear testing facilities.⁷⁰ The joint carrier group was going to be comprised of both French and British aircraft equally. The 10,000 person joint expeditionary forces was vague in that is merely stated a joint force for of 10,000 personnel. One could logically assume that this would be split 5,000 a piece but no exact force composition is outlined. The last part about joint nuclear testing facilities might raise an eyebrow or two but both countries assure NATO and the United States that they will only “collaborate in the technology associated with nuclear

⁶⁹ David Cameron is the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and Nicolas Sarkozy is the President of the French Republic.

⁷⁰ Patrick Wintour, “Anglo-French defence agreement hailed by leaders: 50-year deal sets up joint expeditionary force with countries also sharing aircraft carriers and nuclear facilities,” *The Guardian*, November 2, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/nov/02/anglo-french-defence-agreement> (accessed April 28, 2012).

stockpile stewardship in support of our respective independent nuclear deterrent capabilities, in full compliance with our international obligations.”⁷¹ Then Cameron stated:

Britain and France will be sovereign nations able to deploy our forces independently and in our national interest when we choose to do so. The two biggest defense budgets in Europe are recognizing that if we come together and work together we increase not just our joint capacity, but crucially we increase our own individual sovereign capacity so that we can do more things alone as well as together.⁷²

Unfortunately, this project was a less-than-exemplary bilateral effort by two of the EU's leading states—both major naval AND nuclear states, looking to combine efforts in these costly realms and, perhaps, to drag the rest of Europe along to greater cooperation and even union. In the end, the Franco-British carrier seemed like an exercise in “great powers” acting like great powers, though disagreements between them on the fundamentals further doomed the effort from the inside, as well.

France and Britain attempted to spark more interest in European integration through the creation of a joint aircraft carrier. The initial idea was that they “could provide a road-map to more effective European defence cooperation, based on deeper capability planning and mutual dependency...[setting] a new ‘gold standard’ for defence cooperation.”⁷³ Essentially there would be two aircraft carriers co-owned by Britain and France, with each state having possession of one. The aircraft to be used on the carriers would be an “integrated strike force ensuring [both] French and British aircraft [could]

⁷¹ Jorge Benitez, “UK–France Summit 2010 Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation,” *NATO Source Alliance News Blog*, November 2, 2010, <http://www.acus.org/natosource/uk-france-summit-2010-declaration-defence-and-security-co-operation> (accessed May 23, 2012).

⁷² Patrick Wintour, “Anglo-French defence agreement hailed by leaders: 50-year deal sets up joint expeditionary force with countries also sharing aircraft carriers and nuclear facilities,” *The Guardian*, November 2, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/nov/02/anglo-french-defence-agreement> (accessed April 28, 2012).

⁷³ Ben Jones, *Franco-British military cooperation: a new engine for European defence?*, in Occasional Paper no. 88, (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2011), 5.

operate off both the planned new British carrier and the French carrier.”⁷⁴ The problem is that this bilateral model envisions two sovereign militaries coming together periodically and in a limited fashion. In this regard, the arrangement is, in the most benevolent view, akin to the ECSC—a sectorially limited bit of stepped-up cooperation among a limited number of participants. At worst, it marks an attempt by two of Europe’s major powers to hijack the union for their own—ill-defined—purposes.

Second, the idea of sharing aircraft and carriers has the potential to save upfront and backend costs to both France and Britain while providing an overall increase in both countries’ respective sea power capabilities. Initially, pooling their respective money for research and development would mean no duplication of effort. In addition, the return on investment by both nations would be much higher than if France and Britain pursued new carriers and planes independently. On the back end, money could be saved because maintenance facilities could be standardized in France and Germany for both carriers and all aircraft expanding the potential operating range of both. The expanded maintenance and repair facilities could also create an economic boost with jobs and resources in the respective regions as well. These European carriers could provide projection of power from the sea in the Pacific where nations like India and China are also investing in carrier technology.⁷⁵ The problem with this line of thinking is that it also excludes everyone else in the EU. Involving other EU countries would actually benefit the carrier project as a whole by adding more logistic support facilities throughout Europe.

⁷⁴ Patrick Wintour, “Anglo-French defence agreement hailed by leaders: 50-year deal sets up joint expeditionary force with countries also sharing aircraft carriers and nuclear facilities,” *The Guardian*, November 2, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/nov/02/anglo-french-defence-agreement> (accessed April 28, 2012).

⁷⁵ Nick Childs, “Navy’s £5bn aircraft carrier conundrum,” *The Guardian*, October 19, 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11570276> (accessed April 28, 2012).

One of the larger reasons for the failure of the bilateral agreement between France and Britain is that the endeavor did not have a European basis. The costs and the benefits accrued exclusively to Britain and France, despite the optimistic rhetoric about integration and regional security. The rest of Europe would essentially be excluded, which begs the question: What about the smaller countries within Europe? Europe is not just comprised of such “great powers” as France and Britain. Other coastal states surely have their own interests and assets that they would want to bring to such a grand project. Similarly, smaller countries that lack the facilities or industrial base to create a navy on their own could potentially want buy-in—a supranational European navy would protect their economic and security interests, as well. Both France and Britain are members of the European Union and as such the new carriers could one day be called upon to defend European interests.

While the intent was to appear as though the agreement benefits Europe as a whole, the perception is much different. Cameron’s speechifying sounds as though British and French interests come before Europe’s. The potential to create division among European countries rather eclipses any hope for unity through such an undertaking. In this sense, it works directly at odds with the whole history of European integration since 1950.

Another reason for the failure of the project is because the European defense market is fragmented. Basically “progress has been made in some elements of aerospace and particularly in complex weapons, other areas such as armored vehicles and maritime procurement remain inefficient.”⁷⁶ Europe has not established a collective identity that supports integration of military capabilities, assets and resources. The fragmentation was evident in France and Britain’s inability to agree on something as simple as the propulsion system that was to be installed in the new carriers. On the one side, Britain adamantly opposes the use of nuclear propulsion in its navy vessels because of the associated costs and risks. France, however, uses nuclear propulsion in its submarine force and on the carrier *Charles de Gaulle* and is comfortable in its application. Britain

⁷⁶ Ben Jones, *Franco-British military cooperation: a new engine for European defence?*, in Occasional Paper no. 88 (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2011), 15.

will most likely never change its views on utilizing nuclear technology to power their fleet. Both sides entered into the agreement already understanding the other's position regarding propulsion systems. Because France already utilizes nuclear power, it would most likely view a conventional powered nuclear carrier as a step back rather than a step forward regarding technological advances. Of course, while France and Britain never even attempted to square the circle of nuclear propulsion between them, one hardly needs to mention that the disagreement would rage all the more fiercely if the rest of Europe were to gain a voice in it.⁷⁷

While the bilateral agreement was established under the auspices of promoting EU integration, the EU was never involved in the process. Instead, two “great powers” proceeded in a manner more suited for 1950—or perhaps even 1820. France, Britain, and other larger powers in Europe must realize that times have changed. Europe requires solutions that at least acknowledge the treaty structure from 1992 onwards, which encompasses all of the EU.

B. EUROPEAN UNION NAVAL FORCES SOMALIA

One successful operational naval command that demonstrates the importance of European naval integration is EU NAVFOR Somalia conducting Operation Atalanta. The command was officially established in December 2008, in accordance with a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate, and has been approved through December 2014 with the following strategic objectives:

- (1) Protect vessels of the World Food Programme, humanitarian aid and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) shipping;
- (2) Help deter, prevent, and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery;
- (3) Protect vulnerable shipping; and
- (4) Monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Jolyon Howorth, “Transatlantic Relations,” in *European Politics*, ed. Colin Hay and Anand Menon (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 420.

⁷⁸ EU NAVFOR Somalia, “EU NAVFOR Somalia - Mission,” <http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission> (accessed April 29, 2012).

According to an article in the *New York Times* on May 15, 2012 an EU attack helicopter was launched from an undisclosed location with one objective: to attack and destroy pirate skiffs at one of the Somali pirate bases of operations. The mission was executed flawlessly, by all accounts. This attack operation by EU forces demonstrates the resolve and willingness of European forces to take necessary measures on the high seas to protect international shipping. Also of note, the *New York Times* article mentions that

this year the piracy business seems to have taken a hit. Though Somali pirates are still holding about a dozen vessels and several hundred crew members, that figure is sharply reduced from a few years ago, when the pirates had dozens of captured ships under their control and nearly 1,000 seamen to ransom.⁷⁹

What changed off the coast of Somalia a few years ago? The EU established Operation Atalanta.

The success of Operation Atalanta owes to several factors. The first reason for EU NAVFOR's success is the structure of the command and control (C2) element. The current Operational Commander is Rear Admiral Duncan L. Potts of the United Kingdom; the Deputy Operational Commander is Rear Admiral Rainer Endres of Germany, and the Force Commander is Rear-Admiral Jean-Baptiste Dupuis of France.⁸⁰ By ensuring there are different European countries in positions of leadership there is not the perception that Atalanta is just another operation conducted by one specific country while giving the operation more of an integrated European identity. A country diverse C2 architecture also prevents one country from completely running the operation. Country diverse Command and Control is not a new concept. NATO has been utilizing this structure since its inception.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Jeffrey Gettleman, "Toughening Its Stand, European Union Sends Forces to Strike Somali Pirate Base," *The New York Times*, May 15, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/world/africa/european-forces-strike-pirate-base-in-somalia.html> (accessed May 23, 2012).

⁸⁰ EU NAVFOR Somalia, "EU NAVFOR Somalia – Chain of Command," <http://www.eunavfor.eu/chain-of-command-2> (accessed April 29, 2012).

⁸¹ Article III of NATO deals directly with the concept of burden sharing. The end goal is that everyone is viewed as equal members within NATO which includes sharing the burden equally as well. Burden sharing is discussed in detail in Wallace Thies, *Friendly rivals : Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003).

The composition of the operational forces that comprise Operation Atalanta are just as diverse and just as vital to the success of the mission. EU NAVFOR Somalia usually has anywhere between four and seven surface combatants and three to four maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) assigned with a total manning level of around 1500 personnel.⁸² Currently, the following countries have ships and/or aircraft that are deployed in support of Operation Atalanta: France with three ships and one aircraft, Spain with two ships and one aircraft, Germany with one ship and one aircraft, Netherlands with one ship, Portugal with one ship, Italy with one ship and Luxembourg with two aircraft.⁸³ The multi-state face of the operational units is a testament to Europe's naval forces willingness and capability to effectively work together.

Building further on the concept of diversity within the composition of forces is the differing manner in which countries are able and permitted to contribute. The EU decided that non-member states could contribute, as they so desired allowing for countries such as Norway, Croatia, and Ukraine to contribute staff officers to the operational headquarters despite their lack of membership in the European Union.⁸⁴ Budget contributions are another way that countries are able to contribute aside from forces. The budget

is shared—via the Athena Mechanism⁸⁵—between the EU Member States, based on their GDP, and covers the financing of common costs, such as

⁸² EU NAVFOR Somalia, "EU NAVFOR Somalia - Mission," <http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission> (accessed April 29, 2012).

⁸³ EU NAVFOR Somalia, "EU NAVFOR Somalia – Deployed Units," <http://www.eunavfor.eu/press-2/deployed-units/> (accessed April 29, 2012).

⁸⁴ EU NAVFOR Somalia, "EU NAVFOR Somalia - Mission," <http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission> (accessed April 30, 2012).

⁸⁵ Per the EU's Website at <http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/csdp-structures-and-instruments/financing-of-csdp-military-operations.aspx?lang=en>, "ATHENA is a mechanism which administers the financing of common costs of EU operations having military or defence implications. It does so on behalf of EU Member States contributing to the financing of EU military operations. ATHENA was set up by the Council of the European Union on 1st March 2004. ATHENA's legal basis was amended most recently in December 2011."

costs for the Operational Headquarters (Northwood – UK) and the Force Headquarters (onboard the Flagship), as well as medical services and transport.⁸⁶

Operational costs on the other hand associated with supplying “military assets and personnel are shared by the contributing states according to their involvement in the operation, with each state bearing the cost of the resources it deploys.”⁸⁷ The EU realized early that countries in Europe, whether members of the EU or not, have a vested interest in protecting economic shipping while countering piracy on the high seas. The EU NAVFOR structure accommodates such participation and integrates these contributions into a successful strategic undertaking.

C. CONCLUSION

The Franco-British bilateral navy/defense agreement that attempted to spark European integration was flawed from the beginning. Something as big and forward-leaning as a supranational navy cannot be the exclusive project of just two countries, even if they are both major maritime powers. Clearly, France and Britain saw the importance of developing a navy that could combine forces and specialties, spread burdens and costs, and simultaneously encourage further European integration. The larger ideas and themes associated with the treaty between France and Britain simply need to be applied at the European Union level.

EU NAVFOR Somalia has already established itself as a success, proving that European countries’ navies can operate together. EU NAVFOR has succeeded in provided security in and around the Horn of Africa while simultaneously combating piracy. Specific accomplishments include having a 100 percent success rate while providing escorts to World Food Programme (WFP) vessels delivering humanitarian aid to Somali people, providing protection to African Union Mission on Somalia (AMISOM) shipments, has ensured the protection of other vulnerable shipping within the

⁸⁶ EU NAVFOR Somalia, “EU NAVFOR Somalia - Mission,” <http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission> (accessed April 30, 2012).

⁸⁷ EU NAVFOR Somalia, “EU NAVFOR Somalia - Mission,” <http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission> (accessed April 30, 2012).

Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) all the while providing over 280 million euro in financial assistance to Somalia's governance, education and economic development.⁸⁸ Operations conducted by the European Union in the Horn of Africa have given Europe's naval forces legitimacy on the international stage. Europe now must take the next step and not just operate together but rather create a supranational navy because they can ill afford to fall behind rival powers such as North Korea and China who are actively pursuing a larger navy.

⁸⁸ EU NAVFOR Somalia, "EU NAVFOR Somalia - Mission," <http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission> (accessed April 30, 2012).

V. EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY AS A MODEL— INSTITUTIONALIZING THE GOOD

How can such an ambitious and complicated endeavor as a European Navy, be accomplished? This institutionalization of the good is arguably the primary concern for people who subscribe to the one-world view or the uncertain view of Europe. Both views would contend that such an ambitious endeavor could not be accomplished because of the persistence of the nation state—and the belief that individual nation-states would not be willing to give up the sovereignty of their respective military assets. Also both views would contend that Europe’s history is too complicated to truly integrate because of the numerous wars and conflicts that have been conducted on the continent between various countries. In addition, the one-world view would see a European Navy as a duplicative effort because of the existence and effectiveness of NATO and the United States.

The reality is that a successful and similar model is already in place in the European Space Agency. The ESA makes a useful comparison because space exploration, like a Navy, entails high-cost, high-profile projects that speak to security and economic concerns as well as the prestige and power of the polity that promotes it. For all of these reasons, European states of all sizes have various interests in the undertaking, necessitating a mechanism that allows various levels of participation in a given program (in return for a commensurate share of the glory and/or profit). The R&D that goes with space exploration, as with a navy, ramifies within the society that sponsors it, so this aspect of both undertakings is important, as well. Finally, the ESA is successful as an administrative body and as a system of practices. For all these reasons, the ESA offers a model of participation by which the EU also could fashion and sustain a common Navy that builds on the positive experiences of EU NAVFOR in Somalia.

A. WHO IS IN?

The ESA is a voluntary organization. Only those countries that wish to participate contribute time, materiel, money, and/or expertise to any given project. There are basically two types of members within the ESA, full members and cooperating states. Then there are those countries that simply have observer status within the ESA. Full

members are just as the term implies; they have complete access to all technologies and advancements with a large share of revenue returned to respective state in the form of industrial contracts. Cooperating states on the other hand have access to all technologies and advancements but have less of a percentage returned in industrial contracts. Then there are those who have been granted observer status on ESA's Council. Full and cooperative member states determine ESA's future endeavors while observers are simply there to take note about the direction of the ESA.⁸⁹ For example, all ESA members agree to pay X-percent of their respective individual GDP for the common budget covering things like building operating costs, employee salaries, etc. Then when it comes time actually to build a rocket, France determines that it wants the lead on building the propulsion system (nuclear or otherwise). In return, France is expected to provide the largest portion of money toward the research and development. In the process, a company that builds rocket engines in France would be awarded the contract for building the engine.

Applying the ESA model to creating a European Navy would be fairly straightforward. There can be those states that want to participate as full members and those that want to participate as cooperative members. Then there would be a provision to allow those that just want observer status to understand the future and vision of the European Navy. For example, imagine that the proposed EU Navy decides it wants to build an aircraft carrier. Immediately what comes to mind is that the larger naval powers within the EU, like Britain and France, would want to take the lead. Smaller countries, like Spain, Greece and Italy, could not afford to take the lead but would understand the strategic implications of power projection and presence on the high seas. In turn, Spain, Greece, and Italy would then provide combat aircraft to fill the decks of the new aircraft carriers, while the other EU countries could assist in providing manning.

⁸⁹ Per their website, ESA has effectively included all of Europe and many other important countries that have the same vested interests in space. They have formal agreements with Canada, Russia and Turkey while maintaining informal agreements with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) within the United States.

The main difference here is that this example is an endeavor that has collective buy-in. In keeping the organization voluntary, countries do not feel as though they are excluded from the concept of an integrated European identity. Effectively, everyone in the EU is included—and represented.

B. LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE

According to ESA's website, the space agency's C2 is structured as follows:

The Council is ESA's governing body and provides the basic policy guidelines within which ESA develops the European space programme. Each Member State is represented on the Council and has one vote, regardless of its size or financial contribution. ESA is headed by a Director General who is elected by the Council every four years. Each individual research sector has its own Directorate and reports directly to the Director General.⁹⁰

Then regarding the relationship between the EU and ESA, the website notes:

The European Union ... and ESA share a common aim: to strengthen Europe and benefit its citizens. While they are separate organisations, they are increasingly working together towards common objectives. Some 20 per cent of the funds managed by ESA now originate from the EU budget.

[and]

The legal basis for the EU/ESA cooperation is provided by a Framework Agreement which entered into force in May 2004. Under this agreement the European Commission and ESA coordinate their actions through the Joint Secretariat, a small team of EC's administrators and ESA executive. The Member States of the two organisations meet at ministerial level in the Space Council, which is a concomitant meeting of the EU and ESA Councils, prepared by Member States representatives in the High-level Space Policy Group (HSPG).⁹¹

Applying this same leadership framework for a European Navy would benefit all involved as well. Creating something such as a European Naval Council to administer and focus naval strategic efforts would be very effective. Size of participating country or

⁹⁰ European Space Agency "ESA Space For Europe – All About ESA," http://www.esa.int/SPECIALS/About_ESA/SEMWW16ARR1F_0.html (accessed May 15, 2012).

⁹¹ European Space Agency, "ESA Space For Europe – ESA and the EU," http://www.esa.int/SPECIALS/About_ESA/SEMFEPPYV1SD_0.html (accessed May 15, 2012).

the amount of money that is contributed should not be a factor in determining voting rights. Every full member that contributes gets one equal vote in the direction, deployment of naval forces and budget expenditures.

C. BUDGET

In space-faring and sea-faring alike, the budget is usually one of the biggest points of contention whenever any type of joint or multinational project is attempted. It is also the single greatest obstacle to entry for many states, particularly the smaller ones. ESA's website puts the agency's 2012 budget is a little over four billion Euros, compared to NASA's budget of just over 15 billion Euros and Russia's space budget of approximately 3 billion Euros. While ESA is lagging behind the United States monetarily, its funding is ahead of the Russian Space Agency that has been around at least as long as NASA. The relatively young ESA finds itself right in the middle.

ESA has developed a rather simple approach to determine how much each member state is required to contribute. In order to keep contributions relatively equal, they are based on percentage of gross domestic product. The budget of ESA is broken down as follows:

'Mandatory' and 'Optional'. Programmes carried out under the General Budget and the Science Programme budget are 'mandatory'; they include the agency's basic activities (studies on future projects, technology research, shared technical investments, information systems and training programmes). All Member States contribute to these programmes on a scale based on their Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The other programmes, known as 'optional', are only of interest to some Member States, who are free to decide on their level of involvement. Optional programmes cover areas such as Earth observation, telecommunications, satellite navigation and space transportation. Similarly, the International Space Station and microgravity research are financed by optional contributions.⁹²

By dividing programs up between mandatory and optional, ESA ensures a base of common level interest items that pertain to everything ESA does. Providing facilities,

⁹² European Space Agency, "ESA Space For Europe – Funding," http://www.esa.int/SPECIALS/About_ESA/SEMNQ4FVL2F_0.html (accessed May 15, 2012).

paying its personnel, maintaining the facilities, and building launchers would fall under the mandatory pot of money. Since all full members pay a flat percentage based on their respective individual GDP, the mandatory costs are relatively split equally. ESA's budget process alleviates one country from incurring the majority of the financial burden. Using ESA's budget as a model, creating a Navy might look something like the following: Mandatory programs would involve areas such as hull design and general shipboard systems such as damage control communications. Optional systems would include anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare and anti-surface warfare systems. These lists are by no means all inclusive but just illustrative in the sense that all ships have common systems and then there are specialty systems that require additional research and development. The ESA model applied to the Navy would solve the problem because those that want to develop more complex systems for the EU would therefore volunteer and take the lead.

D. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D)

Last but not least is how the money is to be spent. A collective strategy will foster and develop technology and capabilities as countries share technology. As with everything else the ESA has devised a method to keep things fair between all countries financially involved within the organization. The concept used is referred to as "fair return." The ESA policy is as follows:

Member states invest a little under €3 billion annually through ESA, and a similar amount in national programmes. ESA programmes are governed by the industrial policy principles established in the ESA Convention, in particular by exploiting competitive bidding while distributing industrial contracts in proportion to funding from Member States ("fair return"). This provided governments an incentive to invest in European R&D space programmes and may contribute to maintaining competing suppliers within Europe, limiting the risk associated with the emergence of monopolies. It has enabled the leveraging of funds, competitive industries and the convergence of national priorities. It has, however, limited rationalization of facilities within prime contractors and limited specialization among suppliers of subsystems. With the objective to improve further the efficiency, specialization and competitiveness of European industry and after an assessment of the most recent reform, the process of introducing additional flexibility into the ESA rules should

continue to develop, taking into account in particular the anticipated expansion of ESA's membership.⁹³

Essentially the concept of "fair return" rewards those countries that invest more money in a given technology by giving that respective country the industrial contract to build and develop the corresponding technology. Applying these R&D concepts to developing a European Navy would allow for economic growth and return on investment through industrial contracts as illustrated earlier with the aircraft carrier example.

E. CONCLUSION

If Europe wants to establish itself on the international stage as a superpower then now is the time to invest in the creation of a European navy. In doing so, Europe would benefit by developing Sea Control through blue water capabilities that could potentially support an overall European Maritime Strategy. Europe's Maritime Strategy in turn would include concepts that impact the continent as whole such as Expeditionary Operations and the development and sharing of capabilities and technologies among European countries. The ESA has proven that Europe can accomplish integration via an organization that has established membership criteria, complex command and control, established budget criteria and effective research and development that supports future expansion. The ESA has also illustrated Europe's willingness to establish formal and informal agreements as needed in keeping with the best interests of Europe as a whole. Now is the time for Europe to act.

⁹³ Jean-Jacques Dordain, *Resolution on the European Space Policy: ESA Director General's Proposal for the European Space Policy*, (The Netherlands: ESA Communications, 2007), 30.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Opinions differ about what the future holds for Europe, specifically European integration. Whether someone subscribes to the two-world view where Europe and the United States develop as separate and equal partners, the one-world view where Europe and the United States work together to achieve Western security and defense together or the uncertain-view where Europe must provide for its own security but are unsure if it can is irrelevant. Given the current austerity measures that are a result of the ongoing financial crisis European countries will have to pool their resources. Whether or not individual countries in Europe will admit their dependence on each other does not matter.

The truth is they are all very interconnected and have various supporting and supported type relationships with each other. Today

self-sufficiency is not a [condition] to which nations can reasonably aspire in the modern world...[where] economic interdependence is the norm...[and] the new world order is governed by transnationalism and globalization, two factors which lead to a much greater mutual interdependence...measures of wealth, or rank, of nations.⁹⁴

There are currently twenty-seven different countries that comprise the EU each with their own philosophy on defense spending as it pertains to their respective individual budgets. The total combined 2011 defense budget of all twenty-seven individual EU countries was roughly \$326 billion compared to \$711 billion for the United States.⁹⁵ By combining their respective defense budgets, the states of Europe could enjoy a vast potential to developing a European integrated defense plan centered on the creation of a European Navy.

While in the past political and economic organizations attempted to lead the way toward European integration, they inevitably lost their momentum. Political integration efforts were undermined by the persistence of the nation state. European countries were

⁹⁴ Peter Hore, "The Strategy of Choice," in *Dimensions of Seapower: Strategic choice in the Modern World*, ed. Eric Grove and Peter Hore (Hull, UK: The University of Hull Press, 1998), 3.

⁹⁵ Data was taken from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute at <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex>, (accessed May 19, 2012).

not ready to give up any portion of their individual sovereignty. Politics essentially created more division as opposed to integration within Europe. Economic integration had just as many problems because while the French supported and encouraged economic integration, they would not sign on to the concept of supranationalism. Defense integration efforts, on the other hand, have been steady driving force since the early 1950s founded on the concept of supranationalism. Looking back at the problems of burden sharing, West German rearmament and integrating West Germany back into Western Europe defense integration was the logical answer.

The recent attempt by France and Britain to build two aircraft carriers illustrates that countries still today believe in the concepts embodied within defense integration. Unfortunately, while France and Britain had good intentions, the manner in which they attempted to implement their idea was flawed. First and foremost, France and Britain were using old-style thinking that was prevalent in Europe after WWII. Basically larger countries essentially dictated policy to the smaller countries. In addition, too many issues were left unresolved, such as the type of propulsion plant to be used or how and when would they be used during times of conflict.

Countries are less willing to give up their individual naval assets to another country but, instead, would rather release them to a higher authority for the greater good. Operation Atalanta off the coast of Somalia illustrates the willingness of European countries to allocate forces in support of Europe's strategic interests. The multi-country composition of Operation Atalanta's forces and leadership prove that Europe is able to agree on how to allocate and command forces from different countries while falling under a higher authority. A supranational navy would essentially have a similar command and force structure.

Through various integration efforts Europe has essentially attempted to achieve superpower status. Subscribing to the ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Europe first must invest in seapower. Through the development of a more robust blue water force, Europe would achieve a high level of sea control and presence in and around Europe. Europe would be able to provide security within international shipping lanes ensuring its economic growth while simultaneously providing force presence in European waters. By

default, creating a Navy would also necessitate the creation of a European Maritime Strategy facilitating the idea of unity of effort. Also, development of a maritime strategy would identify areas for improvement and address capability limitations. Unfortunately, by no fault of their own, numerous countries within Europe have very limited naval capabilities and therefore unity of effort is very difficult. While some countries have capable and robust naval forces others struggle with rather simple and somewhat fundamental tasks. As Europe develops blue water forces that are more capable in support of a larger European maritime strategy, expeditionary operations will become routine. Europe will be able to deploy naval forces on short notice for long periods of time to foreign countries at the direction of a supranational authority. Per the ideas and concepts of Mahan, Europe will therefore be recognized as a superpower.

With why established, the only other question was how? The European Space Agency provides a logical and simple template to follow to create a European Navy. The ESA has provided answers to the problems of who is involved, command and control, money and research and development. Modeling a European Navy after ESA would be rather simple: Create a European Naval Council with equal representation from all countries that wish to directly participate. Then offer cooperative membership or observer status to others as needed. Formal and informal agreements can be examined on a case-by-case basis. Because every country within the EU is involved in some form or fashion with the ESA, logic would dictate that all EU countries would be involved in some way with a European Navy. Budget and R&D would follow the same principle of “fair return” as developed in the ESA. All countries involved would provide funding for standard budget expenses such as fuel, food, port services and universal shipboard systems. Those willing to invest more money would do more elaborate systems and research and in return they would be awarded the corresponding industrial contracts.

Also there are additional political and economic benefits as well. The potential economic boost to all European economies in the form of military contracts is exponential. The more a country invests, the more return on investment it achieves. Benefits will be in the form of jobs and industry that supports the building and maintenance of ships. From a political standpoint as ships operate in and around Europe,

they will conduct port visits assisting in European integration. As more of Europe is involved in the creation, maintenance and support of a European Navy people will start to identify with it. As more ships fly the EU flag, other nations will take note of Europe's presence giving rise to Europe's legitimacy as a superpower.

Whether or not the EU fulfills its potential as a superpower in every respect, it remains our [the United States'] natural and indispensable partner...Europe and America constitute a community of interests and values, which it is our challenge to transform into a community of action.⁹⁶

The contention here is that the EU is capable of achieving legitimacy as a superpower. Today is a new day and circumstances have changed for Europe.

Operational (the lessons from Libya), structural (austerity and the challenges arising from a multi-polar world) and the strategic pressures (re-orientation of US strategic interests towards the Asia-Pacific region) force European allies to upgrade and maintain hard security capacities without impacting on wobbly national budgets.⁹⁷

The logical, economic and realistic method for Europe to achieve these hard security capacities is through the concept of pooling and sharing. The current term that is used for the idea of pooling and sharing is Smart Defence. The logic is sound and the framework is established, now is the time for Europe and the EU to act. The successes of the European Space Agency and the gaining momentum of Smart Defence proves that the question that needs to be asked now is not "Why a European Navy?" but rather "Why not a European Navy?"

⁹⁶ Rockwell Schnabel and Francis Rocca, *The next superpower?: The rise of Europe and its challenge to the United States* (Lanham, MD: Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 144.

⁹⁷ Giovanni Faleg and Alessandro Giovannini, "EU Defence Policy after Chicago: Going Smart?," *Centre for European Policy Studies*, May 19, 2012, <http://www.ceps.eu/book/eu-defence-policy-after-chicago-going-smart> (accessed June 4, 2012).

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