



# **Terrorism Risk Insurance: Issue Analysis and Overview of Current Program**

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## Summary

Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, insurance coverage for losses from such attacks was normally included in general insurance policies without specific cost to the policyholders. Following the attacks, such coverage became very expensive if insurers offered it at all. Because insurance is required for a variety of economic transactions, it was feared that a lack of insurance against terrorism loss would have a wider economic impact. Private terrorism insurance was largely unavailable for most of 2002 and some have argued that this resulted in an adverse impact on parts of the economy.

Congress responded to the disruption in the terrorism insurance market by passing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA, P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322). TRIA created a temporary three-year Terrorism Insurance Program in which the government would share some of the losses with private insurers should a foreign terrorist attack occur. This program was extended in 2005 (P.L. 109-144, 119 Stat. 2660) and 2007 (P.L. 110-160, 121 Stat. 1839). The amount of government loss sharing depends on the size of the insured loss. In general terms, for a relatively small loss, private industry covers the entire loss. For a medium-sized loss, the federal role is to spread the loss over time and over the entire insurance industry; the government assists insurers initially but then recoups the payments through a broad levy on insurers afterwards. For a large loss, the federal government would cover most of the losses, although recoupment was possible in these circumstances as well. Insurers are required to make terrorism coverage available to commercial policyholders, but TRIA does not require policyholders to purchase terrorism coverage. The prospective government share of losses has been reduced over time compared to the initial act, but the 2007 reauthorization expanded the program to cover losses stemming from acts of domestic terrorism. The TRIA program is currently slated to expire at the end of 2014.

The specifics of the current program are as follows: (1) a single terrorist act must cause \$5 million in damage to be certified under TRIA; (2) the aggregate insured loss from terrorism must be \$100 million for the government coverage to begin; and (3) an individual company must meet a deductible of 20% of its premiums for the government coverage to begin. Once these thresholds are passed, the government covers 85% of insured losses due to terrorism. If aggregate insured losses due to terrorism do not exceed \$27.5 billion, the Secretary of the Treasury is required to recoup 133% of the government coverage by the end to 2017 through surcharges on property/casualty insurance policies. If the losses exceed \$27.5 billion, the Secretary has discretion to apply recoupment surcharges, but is not required to do so.

Since TRIA's passage, the private industry's willingness and ability to cover terrorism risk has increased. Prices for terrorism coverage have generally trended downward, and approximately 60% of commercial policyholders have purchased coverage over the past few years. This relative market calm has been under the umbrella of TRIA coverage, and it is unclear how the insurance industry would react to the expiration of the federal program.

Specific legislation addressing TRIA has not been introduced in the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress. An amendment was filed by Senator Roger Wicker during a committee markup that would have moved the expiration date from the end of 2014 to the end of 2013, but this amendment was ultimately not considered. The House Financial Services Subcommittee on Insurance, Housing, and Community Opportunity has scheduled a hearing addressing TRIA on September 11, 2012.

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## Introduction

Prior to the September 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, insurers generally did not exclude or separately charge for coverage of terrorism risks. The events of September 11, 2001, changed this as insurers realized the extent of possible terrorism losses. Estimates of insured losses from the 9/11 attacks are around \$40 billion in current dollars, the largest losses from a non-natural disaster on record. These insured losses were concentrated in business interruption insurance (33% of the losses), property insurance (30%), and liability insurance (23%).<sup>1</sup>

While primary insurance companies, those who actually sell and service the insurance policies bought by consumers, suffered losses from the terrorist attacks, the heaviest insured losses were absorbed by foreign and domestic reinsurers—the insurers of insurance companies. Due to the lack of public data on, or modeling of, the scope and nature of the terrorism risk, reinsurers felt unable to accurately price for such risks and largely withdrew from the market for terrorism risk insurance in the months following September 11, 2001. Once reinsurers stopped offering coverage for terrorism risk, primary insurers, suffering equally from a lack of public data and models, also withdrew, or tried to withdraw, from the market. In most states, state regulators must approve policy form changes. Most state regulators agreed to insurer requests to exclude terrorism risks from commercial policies, just as these policies had long excluded war risks. Terrorism risk insurance was soon unavailable or extremely expensive, and many businesses were no longer able to purchase insurance that would protect them in future terrorist attacks. Although the evidence is largely anecdotal, some were concerned that the lack of coverage posed a threat of serious harm to the real estate, transportation, construction, energy, and utility sectors, in turn threatening the broader economy.

In November 2002, Congress responded to the fears of economic damage due to the absence of commercially available coverage for terrorism with passage of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act<sup>2</sup> (TRIA). TRIA created a three-year Terrorism Risk Insurance Program to provide a government reinsurance backstop in the case of terrorist attack. The TRIA program was amended and extended in 2005<sup>3</sup> and 2007.<sup>4</sup> Following the 2007 amendments, the TRIA program is set to expire at the end of 2014. (A side-by-side of the original law and the two reauthorization acts can be found below in **Table 1**.)

Although the expiration date is not until the end of the 113<sup>th</sup> Congress, the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress has taken notice of the issue. Senator Roger Wicker filed an amendment to change the expiration date of TRIA from 2014 to 2013 during a Senate markup, although he ultimately did not offer this amendment. The House Financial Services Subcommittee on Insurance, Housing, and Community Opportunity has scheduled a hearing for September 11, 2012, entitled “TRIA at Ten Years: The Future of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program.” The insurance industry largely

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<sup>1</sup> Robert P. Hartwig and Claire Wilkinson, “Terrorism Risk: A Reemergent Threat,” April 2011, available on the Insurance Information Institute website at <http://www.insureagainstterrorism.org/TerrorismRisk-ReemergentThreat.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322, codified at 15 U.S.C. 6701 note. For more information see CRS Report RS21444, *The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002: A Summary of Provisions*, by Baird Webel.

<sup>3</sup> P.L. 109-144, 119 Stat. 2660. For more information see CRS Report RL33177, *Terrorism Risk Insurance Legislation in 2005: Issue Summary and Side-by-Side*, by Baird Webel.

<sup>4</sup> P.L. 110-160, 121 Stat 1839. For more information see CRS Report RL34219, *Terrorism Risk Insurance Legislation in 2007: Issue Summary and Side-by-Side*, by Baird Webel.

continues to support TRIA, and legislation to extend the program could be introduced in the future. The executive branch has been skeptical in the past about the TRIA program. Bills to expand TRIA were resisted by President George W. Bush's administration,<sup>5</sup> and previous Presidential budgets under President Obama called for changes in the program that would have had the effect of scaling back the coverage for terrorist attacks. Congress declined to act on these budgetary proposals at the time and no such legislative proposals were contained in the President's FY2013 budget proposal.

## **Specifics of the Current TRIA Program**

The original TRIA legislation's stated goals were to: (1) create a temporary federal program of shared public and private compensation for insured terrorism losses to allow the private market to stabilize; (2) protect consumers by ensuring the availability and affordability of insurance for terrorism risks; and (3) preserve state regulation of insurance. While Congress has amended specific aspects of the original act, the general operation of the program largely follows the original statute. The changes to the program have largely reduced the government coverage for terrorism losses, except that the 2007 amendments expanded coverage to losses due to domestic terrorism, rather than limiting the program to foreign terrorism.

To meet the first goal, the TRIA program creates a mechanism through which the federal government could share insured commercial property/casualty<sup>6</sup> losses with the private insurance market. The role of federal loss sharing depends on the size of the insured loss. For a relatively small loss, there is no federal sharing. For a medium-sized loss, the federal role is to spread the loss over time and over the entire insurance industry, providing assistance up front but then recouping the payments through a broad levy on insurance policies afterwards. For a large loss, the federal government is to pay most of the losses, although recoupment was possible in these circumstances as well.

The precise criteria under the current TRIA program are as follows:

1. An individual act of terrorism must be certified jointly by the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of State, and Attorney General; losses must exceed \$5 million in the United States or to U.S. air carriers or sea vessels for an act of terrorism to be certified.
2. The federal government shares in an insurer's losses only if the insurance industry's aggregate insured losses from certified acts of terrorism exceeds \$100 million;
3. The federal program covers only commercial property and casualty insurance, and excludes several specific lines of insurance named in the statute.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> See, for example, the Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 2761 dated December 11, 2007, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/110-1/hr2761sap-h.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> Commercial insurance is generally that insurance purchased by businesses in contrast to personal lines of insurance, which is purchased by individuals. This means that damage to individual homes and autos would not be covered under the TRIA program. Property/casualty insurance includes most lines of insurance except for life insurance and health insurance.

<sup>7</sup> Named lines of insurance that are not covered are federal crop insurance, private crop or livestock insurance, private mortgage insurance, title insurance, financial guaranty insurance of single-line guaranty insurers, medical malpractice, (continued...)

4. Each insurer is responsible for paying out a certain amount in claims—known as its deductible—before receiving federal coverage. An insurer’s deductible is proportionate to its size, equaling 20% of an insurer’s annual direct earned premiums for TRIA-covered lines of insurance.
5. Once the \$100 million aggregate loss threshold and 20% deductible are passed, the federal government is to cover 85% of each insurer’s losses above its deductible up until the amount of losses totals \$100 billion;
6. After \$100 billion in aggregate losses, there is no federal government coverage and no requirement that insurers provide coverage.
7. In the years following the federal sharing of insurer losses, but prior to September 30, 2017, the Secretary of the Treasury is required to establish surcharges on property/casualty insurers to recoup 133% of the outlays to insurers under the program. This mandatory recoupment will not apply, however, if the insurance industry’s aggregate uncompensated loss exceeds \$27.5 billion, although the Treasury Secretary retains discretionary authority to apply recoupment surcharges.

TRIA addresses the second goal, to protect consumers, by requiring those insurers that offer the lines of insurance covered by TRIA to make terrorism insurance available prospectively to their commercial policyholders. This coverage may not differ materially from coverage for other types of losses. Each terrorism insurance offer must reveal both the premium charged for terrorism insurance and the possible federal share of compensation. Policyholders are not, however, required to purchase coverage. If the policyholder declines to purchase terrorism coverage, its insurer can exclude terrorism losses. The law itself does not limit what insurers can charge for terrorism risk insurance, though state regulators have the authority to modify excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory rates.

TRIA’s third goal, to preserve state regulation of insurance, is expressly accomplished in Section 106(a), which provides: “Nothing in this title shall affect the jurisdiction or regulatory authority of the insurance commissioner [of a state].” The Section 106(a) provision has two exceptions: (1) The federal statute preempts any state definition of an “act of terrorism” in favor of the federal definition; and (2) state rate and form approval laws for terrorism insurance were preempted from enactment to the end of 2003. In addition to these exceptions, Section 105 of the law also preempts state laws with respect to insurance policy exclusions for acts of terrorism.

The administration of the TRIA program was originally left generally to the Secretary of the Treasury. This was changed somewhat in Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.<sup>8</sup> This act created a new Federal Insurance Office (FIO) to be located in the Department of the Treasury. Among the duties specified for the FIO in the legislation was to assist the Secretary in the administration of the Terrorism Insurance Program.<sup>9</sup>

No acts of terrorism have occurred since the passage of TRIA that met the requirements for coverage under the program.

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(...continued)

flood insurance, reinsurance, and all life insurance products.

<sup>8</sup> P.L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.

<sup>9</sup> Section 502 of P.L. 111-203, codified at 31 U.S.C. 313(c)(1)(D).

## **Coverage for Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Terrorism**

A terrorist attack with some form of nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological (NCBR<sup>10</sup>) weapon would generally be considered to be the most likely type of attack to result in large scale losses. The current TRIA statute does not specifically include or exclude NCBR events; thus, the TRIA program in general would cover insured losses from terrorist actions due to NCBR as it would for an attack by conventional means. The term “insured losses,” however, is an important distinction. Most insurance policies that would fall under the TRIA umbrella include exclusions that would likely limit insurer coverage of an NCBR event, whether it was due to terrorism or to some sort of accident, although these exclusions have never been legally tested in the United States after a terrorist event.<sup>11</sup> If these exclusions are invoked and do indeed limit the insurer losses due to NCBR terrorism, they would also limit the TRIA coverage of such losses. Language that would have specifically extended TRIA coverage to NCBR events was offered in the past<sup>12</sup> but was not included in legislation as enacted. In 2007, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) was directed to study the issue and a GAO report was issued in 2008.<sup>13</sup>

## **Background on Terrorism Insurance**

### **Insurability of Terrorism Risk**

Stripped to its most basic elements, insurance is a fairly straightforward operation. An insurer agrees to assume an indefinite future risk in exchange for a definite current premium from a consumer. The insurer pools a large number of risks such that at any given point in time, the ongoing losses will not be larger than the current premiums being paid, plus the residual amount of past premiums that the insurer retains and invests, plus, in a last resort, any borrowing against future profits if that is possible. For the insurer to operate successfully and avoid bankruptcy, it is critical to accurately estimate the probability of a loss and the severity of that loss so that a sufficient premium can be charged. Insurers generally depend upon huge databases of past loss information in setting these rates. Everyday occurrences, such as automobile accidents or natural deaths, can be estimated with great accuracy. Extraordinary events, such as large hurricanes, are more difficult, but insurers have many years of weather data, coupled with sophisticated computer models, with which to make predictions.

Terrorism risk is seen by many to be so fundamentally different from other risks as to be essentially uninsurable by the private insurance market, and thus requiring a government solution.

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<sup>10</sup> There is some variance in the acronym used for such attacks. The U.S. Department of Defense, for example, uses “CBRN,” rather than NCBR, in its *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*; see p. 86 at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/25603718/The-DOD-Lexicon-JP1-02>.

<sup>11</sup> It should be noted that insurers might have attempted to exclude the September 11, 2001, losses under existing war risk exclusions, but did not generally attempt to do so.

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, H.R. 2761 (110<sup>th</sup> Congress) as passed by the House on September 19, 2007, and H.Rept. 110-318, available at <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-110hrpt318/pdf/CRPT-110hrpt318.pdf>.

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *TERRORISM INSURANCE: Status of Coverage Availability for Attacks Involving Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, or Radiological Weapons*, GAO-09-39, December 12, 2008, at <http://gao.gov/products/GAO-09-39>.

The argument that terrorism risk is uninsurable typically focuses on lack of public data about both the probability and severity of terrorist acts. The reason for the lack of historical data would generally be seen as a good thing—very few terrorist attacks are attempted and fewer have succeeded. This, however, does not assuage the fiduciary duty of an insurance company president not to put a company at risk by insuring against an event that could bankrupt the firm. As a replacement for large amounts of historical data, insurers turn to various forms of models similar to those used to assess future hurricane losses. Even the best model, however, can only partly replace good data, and terrorism models are still relatively new compared to hurricane models.

One prominent insurance textbook identifies four ideal elements of an insurable risk: (1) a sufficiently large number of insureds to make losses reasonably predictable; (2) losses must be definite and measurable; (3) losses must be fortuitous or accidental; and (4) losses must not be catastrophic (i.e., it must be unlikely to produce losses to a large percentage of the risks at the same time).<sup>14</sup> Terrorism risk in the United States would appear to fail the first criterion. It also likely fails the third due to the malevolent human actors behind terrorist attacks, whose motives, means, and targets of attack are constantly in flux. Whether or not it fails the fourth criterion is largely decided by the underwriting actions of insurers themselves (i.e., whether the insurers insure a large number of risks in a single geographic area that would be affected by a terrorist strike). Unsurprisingly, insurers generally have sought to limit their exposures in particular geographic locations with a conceptually higher risk for terrorist attacks, making terrorism insurance more difficult to find in those areas.

## **International Experience with Terrorism Risk Insurance**

Although the U.S. experience with terrorism is relatively limited, other countries have dealt with the issue more extensively and have developed their own responses to the challenges presented by terrorism risk. Spain, which has seen significant terrorist activity by Basque separatist movements, insures against acts of terrorism via a broader government-owned reinsurer that has provided coverage for catastrophes since 1954. The United Kingdom, responding to the Irish Republican Army attacks in the 1980s, created Pool Re, a privately owned mutual insurance company with government backing, specifically to insure terrorism risk. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, many foreign countries reassessed their terrorism risk and created a variety of approaches to deal with the risk. The UK greatly expanded Pool Re, while Germany created a private insurer with government backing to offer terrorism insurance policies. Germany's plan, like TRIA in the United States, was created as a temporary measure. It has been extended since its inception and it is now set to expire at the end of 2013. Not all countries, however, concluded that some sort of government backing for terrorism insurance was necessary. Canada specifically considered, and rejected, creating a government program following September 11, 2001.

## **Previous U.S. Experience with “Uninsurable” Risks**

Terrorism risk post-2001 is not the first time that United States has faced a risk perceived as uninsurable in private markets that Congress chooses to address through government action.

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<sup>14</sup> Emmett J. Vaughan and Therese Vaughan, *Fundamentals of Risk and Insurance* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), p. 41.

During World War II, for example, Congress created a “war damage” insurance program, and there are current programs insuring against aviation war risk<sup>15</sup> and flood losses<sup>16</sup> respectively.

The closest previous analog to the situation with terrorism risk may be the federal riot reinsurance program created in the late 1960s. Following large scale riots in American cities in the late 1960s, insurers generally pulled back from insuring in those markets, either adding policy exclusions to limit their exposure to damage from riots or ceasing to sell property damage insurance altogether. In response, Congress created a riot reinsurance program as part of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968.<sup>17</sup> The federal riot reinsurance program offered reinsurance contracts similar to commercial excess reinsurance. The government agreed to cover some percentage of an insurance company’s losses above a certain deductible in exchange for a premium paid by that insurance company. Private reinsurers eventually returned to the market and the federal riot reinsurance program was terminated in 1985.

## **The Terrorism Insurance Market**

### **Post-9/11 and Pre-TRIA**

The September 2001 terrorist attacks, and the resulting billions of dollars in insured losses, caused significant upheaval in the insurance market. Even before the attacks, the insurance market was showing signs of a cyclical “hardening” of the market in which prices typically rise and availability is somewhat limited. The unexpectedly large losses caused by terrorist acts exacerbated this trend, especially with respect to the commercial lines of insurance most at risk for terrorism losses. Post-September 11, insurers and reinsurers started including substantial surcharges for terrorism risk, or, more commonly, they excluded coverage for terrorist attacks altogether. Reinsurers could take these steps rapidly because reinsurance contracts and rates are generally unregulated. Primary insurance contracts and rates are more closely regulated by the individual states and the exclusion of terrorism coverage for the individual purchaser of insurance required regulatory approval at the state level in most cases. States acted fairly quickly, and, by early 2002, 45 states had approved insurance policy language prepared by ISO, an insurance consulting firm, excluding terrorism damage in standard commercial policies.<sup>18</sup>

The lack of readily available terrorism insurance caused fears of a larger economic impact, particularly on the real estate market. In most cases, lenders prefer or require that a borrower maintain insurance coverage on a property. Lack of terrorism insurance coverage could lead to defaults on existing loans and a downturn in future lending, causing economic ripple effects as buildings are not built and construction workers remain idle. The 14-month period after the September 2001 terrorist attacks and before the November 2002 passage of TRIA provides some insight into the effects of a lack of terrorism insurance. Some examples in September 2002

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<sup>15</sup> For more information see [http://www.faa.gov/about/office\\_org/headquarters\\_offices/apl/aviation\\_insurance/](http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/aviation_insurance/).

<sup>16</sup> For more information see CRS Report R40650, *National Flood Insurance Program: Background, Challenges, and Financial Status*, by Rawle O. King.

<sup>17</sup> P.L. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476. The act also created state “Fair Access to Insurance Requirements” (FAIR) plans and a Federal Crime Insurance Program.

<sup>18</sup> Jeff Woodward, “The ISO Terrorism Exclusions: Background and Analysis,” *IRMI Insights*, February 2002, available at <http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2002/woodward02.aspx>

include the Real Estate Round Table releasing a survey finding that “\$15.5 billion of real estate projects in 17 states were stalled or cancelled because of a continuing scarcity of terrorism insurance”<sup>19</sup> and Moody’s Investors Service downgrading \$4.5 billion in commercial mortgage-backed securities.<sup>20</sup> This picture, however, was not uniform. For example, in July 2002, the *Wall Street Journal* reported that “despite concerns over landlords’ ability to get terrorism insurance, trophy properties were in demand.”<sup>21</sup> Aside from such anecdotes, there is little hard data to form judgments about what effect the lack of terrorism coverage had on the economy in this time period.

## **After TRIA**

The “make available” provisions of TRIA addressed the availability problem in the terrorism insurance market, as insurers were required by law to offer commercial terrorism coverage. There was significant uncertainty, however, as to how businesses would react, since there was no general requirement to purchase terrorism coverage,<sup>22</sup> and since the pricing of terrorism coverage was initially high. Initial consumer reaction to the terrorism coverage offers was relatively subdued. Marsh, Inc., a large insurance broker, reports that only 27% of their clients bought terrorism insurance in 2003. This take-up rate, however, climbed relatively quickly to 49% in 2004 and 58% in 2005. Since 2005, the take-up rate has stayed near 60%, with Marsh reporting 65% in 2011.<sup>23</sup>

The price for terrorism insurance has appeared to decline over the last decade, although available pricing data is based on surveys; thus, the level of pricing may not always be comparable between sources. The 2006 and 2010 reports by the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets show a high of above 7% for the median terrorism premium as a percentage of the total property premium in 2003, with a generally downward trend, and the latest values between 3% and 4%.<sup>24</sup> These values were reported by Aon, another major insurance broker. While the trend may be downward, there has been significant variability, with a rate above 6% reported in the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter of 2006. There is also significant variability across industries. For example, Marsh reported rates in 2009 as high as 24% of the property premium for financial institutions and as low as 2% in the food and beverage industry.<sup>25</sup>

The willingness of insurers to cover terrorism risk, as well as their financial capability to do so, has increased over the past decade. From the late 2001 and 2002 marketplace, where terrorism

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<sup>19</sup> “Terror Insurance Drag on Real Estate Still Climbing,” Real Estate Roundtable, September 19, 2003, available at [http://www.rer.org/media/newsreleases/TRIA\\_Survey\\_15billion\\_Sept19\\_2002.cfm](http://www.rer.org/media/newsreleases/TRIA_Survey_15billion_Sept19_2002.cfm).

<sup>20</sup> “Moody’s Downgrades Securities on Lack of Terrorism Insurance,” *Wall Street Journal*, September 30, 2002, p. C14.

<sup>21</sup> “Office-Building Demand Rises Despite Vacancies,” *Wall Street Journal*, July 24, 2002, p. B6.

<sup>22</sup> While there is no requirement in federal law to purchase terrorism coverage, businesses may be required by state law to purchase the coverage. This is particularly the case in workers compensation insurance. Market forces, such as requirements for commercial loans, may also compel purchase of terrorism coverage.

<sup>23</sup> Marsh, Inc., *The Marsh Report Terrorism Risk Insurance 2010*, p. 10, and *U.S. Insurance Market Report 2012, Property*, available at <http://usa.marsh.com/NewsInsights/GlobalIMR/IMRContent/ID/19468/US-Insurance-Market-Report-2012-Property.aspx>.

<sup>24</sup> President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, *Terrorism Risk Insurance*, September 2006, p. 37, and *Market Conditions for Terrorism Risk Insurance*, 2010, p. 30.

<sup>25</sup> Marsh, Inc., *The Marsh Report Terrorism Risk Insurance 2010*, p. 14.

coverage was essentially unavailable, the latest estimates from the insurance broker Guy Carpenter are that between \$6 billion and \$8 billion in terrorism reinsurance capacity is available in the U.S. market. The combined policyholder surplus among all U.S. property/casualty insurers was \$580.5 billion at the start of 2011, up from \$293.5 billion at the start of 2002.<sup>26</sup> This amount, however, backs all policies in the United States and is subject to depletion in a wide variety of events. Extreme weather losses could particularly draw capital away from the terrorism insurance market, as such weather events share some risk characteristics with large terrorist attacks.

## Evolution of Terrorism Risk Insurance Laws

**Table 1** presents a side-by-side comparison of the original TRIA law along with the reauthorizing laws from 2005 and 2007.

**Table 1. Side-by-Side of Terrorism Risk Insurance Laws**

Provision	15 U.S.C. 6701 note (P.L. 107-297)	P.L. 109-144	P.L. 110-160
Title	Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002	Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005	Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007
Expiration Date	December 31, 2005 (Sec. 108(a))	December 31, 2007 (Sec. 2)	December 31, 2014 (Sec. 3(a))
“Act of Terrorism” Definition	For an act of terrorism to be covered under TRIA, it must be a violent act committed on behalf of a foreign person or interest as part of an effort to coerce the U.S. civilian population or influence U.S. government policy. It must have resulted in damage within the United States or to a U.S. airliner or mission abroad. Terrorist act is to be certified by the Secretary of the Treasury in concurrence with the Attorney General and Secretary of State. (Sec. 102(1)(A))	No Change	Removed requirement that a covered act of terrorism be committed on behalf of a foreign person or interest. (Sec. 2)
Limitation on Act of Terrorism Certification in Case of War	Terrorist act would not be covered in the event of a war, except for workers compensation insurance. (Sec. 102(1)(B)(I))	No Change	No Change

<sup>26</sup> AM Best, *Best’s Aggregates & Averages, Property-Casualty*, 2011 Edition, p. 2, and 2002 Edition, p. 2.

Provision	15 U.S.C. 6701 note (P.L. 107-297)	P.L. 109-144	P.L. 110-160
Minimum Damage To Be Certified	Terrorist act must cause more than \$5 million in property and casualty insurance losses to be covered. (Sec. 102(1)(B)(ii))	No Change	No Change
Aggregate Industry Loss Requirement/Program Trigger	No Provision	Created a “program trigger” that would prevent coverage under the program unless aggregate industry losses exceed \$50,000,000 in 2006 and \$100,000,000 for 2007. (Sec. 6)	No Change. Program trigger remains at \$100,000,000 until 2014. (Sec. 3 (c))
Insurer Deductible	7% of earned premium for 2003, 10% of earned premium for 2004, 15% of earned premium for 2005. (Sec. 102(7))	Raised deductible to 17.5% for 2006 and 20% for 2007. (Sec. 3)	No Change. Deductible remains at 20% until 2014. (Sec. 3(c))
Covered Lines of Insurance	Commercial property/casualty insurance, including excess insurance, workers’ compensation, and surety but excluding crop insurance, private mortgage insurance, title insurance, financial guaranty insurance, medical malpractice insurance, health or life insurance, flood insurance, or reinsurance. (Sec. 102(12))	Excluded commercial auto, burglary and theft, professional liability (except for directors and officers liability), and farm owners multiple peril from coverage. (Sec. 3)	No change from P.L. 109-144
Mandatory Availability	Every insurer must make terrorism coverage that does not differ materially from coverage applicable to losses other than terrorism. (Sec. 103(c))	No Change. Mandatory availability extended through 2007. (Sec. 2(b))	No Change. Mandatory availability extended through 2014. (Sec. 3(c))
Insured Shared Loss Compensation	Federal share of losses will be 90% for insured losses that exceed the applicable insurer deductible. (Sec. 103(e))	Reduced federal share of losses to 85% for 2007. (Sec. 4)	No Change. Federal share remains at 85% through 2014.
Cap on Annual Liability	Federal share of compensation paid under the program will not exceed \$100,000,000 and insurers are not liable for any portion of losses that exceed \$100,000,000 unless Congress acts otherwise to cover these losses. (Sec. 103(e))	No Change	Removed the possibility that a future Congress could require insurers to cover some share of losses above \$100,000,000,000 if the insurer has met its individual deductible. Requires insurers to clearly disclose this to policy holders. (Sec. 4(a) and Sec. 4(d))

Provision	15 U.S.C. 6701 note (P.L. 107-297)	P.L. 109-144	P.L. 110-160
Payment Procedures if Losses Exceed \$100,000,000,000	After notice by the Secretary of the Treasury, Congress determines the procedures for payments if losses exceed \$100,000,000,000. (Sec. 103(e)(3))	No Change	Required Secretary of the Treasury to publish regulations within 240 days of passage regarding payments if losses exceed \$100,000,000,000. (Sec. 4(c))
Aggregate Retention Amount Maximum	\$10,000,000,000 for 2002-3, \$12,500,000,000 for 2004, \$15,000,000,000 for 2005 (Sec. 103(6))	Raises amount to \$25,000,000,000 for 2006 and \$27,500,000,000 for 2007. (Sec. 5)	No Change. Aggregate retention remains at \$27,500,000,000 through 2014.
Mandatory Recoupment of Federal Share	If insurer losses are under the aggregate retention amount, a mandatory recoupment of the federal share of the loss will be imposed. If insurer losses are over the aggregate retention amount, such recoupment is at the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury. (Sec. 103(e)(7))	No Change	Increases total recoupment amount to be collected by the premium surcharges to 133% of the previously defined mandatory recoupment amount. (Sec. 4(e)(1)(A))
Recoupment Surcharge	Surcharge is limited to 3% of property-casualty insurance premium and may be adjusted by the Secretary to take into account the economic impact of the surcharge on urban commercial centers, the differential risk factors related to rural areas and smaller commercial centers, and the various exposures to terrorism risk across lines of insurance. (Sec. 103(8))	No Change	Removes 3% limit for mandatory surcharge. (Sec. 4(e)(2)(A))

**Source:** Congressional Research Service, using Public Laws obtained from the Government Printing Office through <http://www.congress.gov>.

**Notes:** Section numbers for the initial TRIA law are as codified in 15 U.S.C 6701 note. Section numbers for P.L. 109-144 and P.L. 110-160 are from the legislation as enacted.

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