



*Border Patrol Strategic Plan
1994 and Beyond*

National Strategy

Prepared by the
U.S. Border Patrol
July, 1994

Border Patrol Strategic Plan 1994 and Beyond

Preface

Why the Strategy?

The 1994-1995 immigration initiatives included a Border Patrol enhancement as an integral part of the Administration's commitment to reform the immigration system. The Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, recognized the need to address the immigration challenges of asylum, technology, criminal aliens, naturalization, and control of the border in an efficient, comprehensive, coordinated manner. In that context, the Border Patrol has developed a systematic approach to strengthen control of the border with goals and measures of success based on the Administration's and INS' immigration initiatives.

The Border Patrol adopted a strategic planning system that permits planners to prioritize their efforts over time¹. The strategic planning process challenges the organization to focus on the task at hand, to prioritize its efforts by geographic area, to incorporate long term goals, and, most importantly, to define and measure success.

In its strategic planning process, the Border Patrol accepted that absolute sealing of the border is unrealistic. Through the strategic planning process, however, the planners found legitimate reason to believe that the border can be brought under control.

Where does the Strategy Take Us?

A planned strategic approach to enforcing immigration laws along our nation's borders integrates the Border Patrol's vision for the future with a systematic means to achieve that vision. The process prioritizes the use of the organization's resources as it travels along a well defined path leading to effective border control. The strategic planning process sets the entire organization in motion concentrating on the task at hand. The process establishes long-term goals and instills a stronger sense of pride and professionalism. It sharpens the Border Patrol focus, improves public image, employee morale, and facilitates justification for allocation of resources. Our strategic approach strengthens control of the border, restricting the passage of illegal traffic and encouraging legal entry as the preferred method to enter the United States.

Vision

¹ The planners consisted of planning experts from the Department of Defense Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC) and Chief Patrol Agents from all regions and selected Headquarters staff.

The keystone for strategic planning is a vision offering a clear sense of direction for the future. The strategic planning process provided Border Patrol leadership the opportunity to define their vision for the future. Once established, planners concentrated on what direction should be taken to arrive at that vision. Planners found that the organization's traditional goal of controlling the border between the ports of entry remained valid. The importance of this traditional task in the face of massive illegal entry of persons and contraband into the United States has increased. In protecting our borders against unlawful activities, we improve national security and protect the immigration heritage that helped to form the nation's institutions. The Border Patrol's success in achieving control of the border will restore confidence in the integrity of the border and the organizations entrusted with its management.

The Vision: The U.S. Border Patrol will control the borders of the United States between the ports of entry, restoring our Nation's confidence in the integrity of the border. A well-managed border will enhance national security and safeguard our immigration heritage.

Environment

The border environment is diverse. Mountains, deserts, lakes, rivers and valleys form natural barriers to passage. Temperatures ranging from sub-zero along the northern border to the searing heat of the southern border effect illegal entry traffic as well as enforcement efforts. Illegal entrants crossing through remote, uninhabited expanses of land and sea along the border can find themselves in mortal danger.

The demographic profile of the border area has a significant influence on the border environment. Population centers straddling the international boundary have developed all along the southwest land border. These "twin cities," sometimes separated by little more than a line in the dirt, are the areas of greatest risk for illegal entry. These urban areas offer accessibility to roads, rail lines, airports and bus routes to the interior of the country.

Enforcement Challenge²

In FY 93, the Border Patrol apprehended 1,263,490 aliens nationwide of which 97 percent were Mexican nationals, mostly from the interior of Mexico. Typically, an alien arrested by the Border Patrol is under the age of 25. Twenty percent are women and children who are attempting to reach their husbands and/or fathers who are already in the United States.

Most of the aliens encountered are poor, are looking for work and have incurred transport and smugglers fees. Those who are not Mexicans are from Central America and numerous other countries from around the world. In FY-93, 40,754 Other Than Mexicans (OTM'S) aliens were

² Information provided by the INS Intelligence Program contributed to this section.

smugglers fees. Those who are not Mexicans are from Central America and numerous other countries from around the world. In FY-93, 40,754 Other Than Mexicans (OTM'S) aliens were apprehended attempting to enter the United States. A majority of apprehended aliens are destined for the States of California, New York, Florida, Texas, and Illinois.

Mexico's government institutions and economy are under significant stress from its lower socio-economic strata. Some of the major causes for increasing instances of social unrest and illegal immigration include:

- o Rapid population growth in Mexico's lower socio-economic groups
- o Great disparity in the standard of living and chances for upward mobility in Mexico versus the United States
- o Significant population of unemployed and underemployed in Mexico

The passage of The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) should reduce illegal immigration as the Mexican economy improves. The NAFTA agreement lifts commercial barriers among its members: the United States, Mexico and Canada. In the spirit of NAFTA, the United States and Mexico are cooperating in efforts to resolve the issues of illegal migration of Mexican workers into the United States, border environmental issues, narcotics and dangerous drug traffic into the United States.

The Governments of Mexico and the United States have been intensifying cooperative efforts to jointly resolve enforcement concerns along both sides of the border. In addition to the passage of NAFTA, other initiatives include jointly naming areas on both sides to reduce response times for law enforcement officials and focusing on reduction of border violence. INS will continue to seek stronger cooperative ties between the two governments to facilitate legal immigration while strengthening control of the U.S. border.

INS' immigration enforcement role is more complex and challenging than at any time in its history. INS officers at the border, at the ports-of-entry, and in the interior are uncovering increasingly sophisticated methods used by aliens and smugglers of aliens to enter the United States and to avoid detection and apprehension. Document fraud is widespread. One of the most recent concerns is a new trend in which a rising number of Mexican citizens attempt to enter illegally and secure work authorization in the United States by requesting asylum. Also, a pattern of Mexicans posing as Guatemalans claiming political asylum has developed. This method of obtaining Guatemalan birth certificates is occurring along the Southern Border and Gulf coast states. Illegal entrants from Mexico claim Guatemalan citizenship in the belief that the asylum claims of Guatemalans are processed faster and are more likely to be approved than claims from citizens of Mexico.

Another area of concern involves the Nationals from the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) who have become the third largest group of Other Than Mexicans (OTMs) apprehended

along the Southern Border. Once PRC aliens arrive in Latin America, often by boat, smugglers easily lead them by land through Mexico into the United States.

Similarly, citizens of Cuba are entering Mexico to take advantage of Mexico's diplomatic mechanisms to gain entry into the United States. Many Cubans are also being smuggled to Mona Island, an uninhabited island between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. The Cuban immigrants are dropped off by the smugglers who know that the Border Patrol will rescue them. Once processed they are released to continue their exodus from Cuba to the Miami, Florida area. Many illegal Haitians are doing the same as the Cubans and requesting political asylum.

The forces that cause legal and illegal migration are powerful. Without positive, long term changes in the root causes that prompt illegal migration such as improvements in the Mexican economy, NAFTA, effective employer sanctions restrictions, or closing the loopholes that allow illegal aliens to gain equities in the United States, the "push" and "pull" factors will remain strong.

* Those attempting to illegally enter the United States in large numbers do so in part because of the weak controls we have exercised over the southwest land border in the recent past. Strengthening border control is a critical component of improved border management and will provide the U.S. Government the opportunity to deal with powerful global immigration pressures in a reasoned, systematic manner.

INS can meet the challenge of controlling illegal immigration to the United States through a coordinated enforcement effort. Controlling the border must be supported with such efforts as effective employer sanctions, back-up enforcement in the interior of the United States, reducing document fraud, providing detention and deportation for eligible illegal aliens and expeditious removal of criminal aliens.

Assumptions

In developing the 1994 Border Patrol Strategic Plan, Border Patrol planners relied on a number of key assumptions:

- o Alien apprehensions will decrease as Border Patrol increases control of the border.
- o Influx will adjust to U.S. Border Patrol changing tactics.
- o Violence will increase as effects of strategy are felt.
- o Rapid increase in personnel/equipment (resources) will reduce time required to achieve control of the border.

- o Valid measures of effectiveness of border control mechanisms/systems are needed to adjust enforcement efforts and reach the strategy objectives.
- o A strong interior enforcement posture works well for border control.
- o The INS must maintain a multi-program perspective that includes but is not limited to strengthening control of the southwest border.
- o Improvements in technology will make border control strategies more effective and less resource intensive.
- o Control of the border will reduce INS cost and produce more efficiency.
- o || Success of the strategy depends on continued Congressional support throughout its duration.

Mission

As part of the strategy building process, Border Patrol leadership reviewed their traditional mission statement in the context of the Administration's immigration initiatives, the INS goals, and the "vision" for the future. The duties performed by Border Patrol agents have expanded and evolved over the past 70 years. It became clear, however, that the basic concepts of detering, detecting and apprehending illegal entrants into the United States specified in the immigration statutes continued to be the basis of the Border Patrol's mission. Many of the tasks are specified by statutes. Many more are implied tasks inherent in the accomplishment of the mission. Implied tasks include, but are not limited to: processing and removing illegal entrants, pursuing employer sanctions cases, seizing vehicles, facilitating prosecutions, gathering intelligence, maintaining public image, conducting liaison, being prepared for emergency responses, obtaining and providing training, and managing resources.

With the above in mind, the current mission of the Border Patrol is best described as:

* **The mission of the United States Border Patrol is to secure and protect the external boundaries of the United States, preventing illegal entry and detecting, interdicting and apprehending undocumented entrants, smugglers, contraband, and violators of other laws.**

The Border Patrol has significant strengths inherent in its organizational structure. Border Patrol planners have capitalized on those strengths in plotting the course of the strategy.

The Border Patrol has maintained a continuous uniformed presence on the border since 1924. Even today, the Border Patrol is the only uniformed Federal body with a significant patrol function between the ports-of-entry. No other institution has amassed a more

comprehensive knowledge of the border environment. Strategic planners relied on this knowledge in generating the assumptions and predictions incorporated into the strategy.

Virtually all State, local and Federal agencies with a mission that interacts with the immediate border environment have at least a local liaison mechanism with the Border Patrol. The courses of action developed at the national and Sector levels rely on the Border Patrol's liaison network to garner the support the organization needs to communicate and coordinate strategic actions.

Individually and collectively, Border Patrol agents identify very strongly with their organization. The Border Patrol's chain of command is one of the strongest and most direct in uniformed Federal law enforcement. The organization views itself internally as the best in the world at their business. The Border Patrol employs specialized recruitment and stringent training standards, including Spanish language competency. All agents are originally assigned to the southern border, and, as a consequence, build strong ties based on commonality of experience and training. The Border Patrol's strategy relies heavily on the organization's "esprit-de-corps" to implement the course of actions described in the strategy, many of which are significant and challenging changes in the way Sector operations have been conducted.

The Border Patrol is aware that there are significant challenges to be met in the strategic course they have set. The volume of attempted illegal entries is very large by any estimate. Illegal entry trends react quickly to border control initiatives. The public and private sector at the local level expect the Border Patrol to take immediate and decisive action to counter increases in illegal entry traffic. Local expectations can run contrary to the milestones set out in the national strategy. The Border Patrol has limitations on its ability to quickly shift resources. INS' detention and removal capabilities are already heavily committed to the criminal alien and Chinese smuggling initiatives. Fluctuating single-year funding restricts the ability of planners to design effective multi-year strategies.

Concept

The Border Patrol will improve control of the border by implementing a strategy of "prevention through deterrence." The Border Patrol will achieve the goals of its strategy by bringing a decisive number of enforcement resources to bear in each major entry corridor. The Border Patrol will increase the number of agents on the line and make effective use of technology, raising the risk of apprehension high enough to be an effective deterrent. Because the deterrent effect of apprehensions does not become effective in stopping the flow until apprehensions approach 100 percent of those attempting entry, the strategic objective is to maximize the apprehension rate. Although a 100 percent apprehension rate is an unrealistic goal, we believe we can achieve a rate of apprehensions sufficiently high to raise the risk of apprehension to the point that many will consider it futile to continue to attempt illegal entry.

El Paso 's enforcement strategy has been successful in El Paso Station's downtown area. The national strategy builds on El Paso's success through an infusion of permanent resources designed to stabilize their enforcement initiative and extend it throughout the Sector. Likewise, in the San Diego Sector, an infusion of resources is underway, and preliminary indications are that the Sector has begun to achieve a similar level of control.

In FY 1994 and 1995, the Patrol will add up to 1,010 additional agents on the line along the Southwest border. This will be accomplished through a combination of new agent hires, and redirecting agents freed up as a result of increased automation and support.

The prediction is that with traditional entry and smuggling routes disrupted, illegal traffic will be deterred, or forced over more hostile terrain, less suited for crossing and more suited for enforcement. Mobility of enforcement resources will be essential in tracking illegal traffic to prevent local "hot spots" from becoming long-term problem areas.

In order to identify the precise quantity and mix of agents, support personnel and technology needed to "control" the border, our current measures of effectiveness must be made more reliable. The flow of illegal traffic must be measured and relayed to the implementors of the strategy.

Currently, we know how many arrests we are making, but we do not have a reliable assessment of how many are eluding us and how many attempts they must make before succeeding in entering. Despite this weakness, based on our years of experience and knowledge of border dynamics, we have developed a strategy we believe will work to greatly reduce the flow of illegal traffic. Previously, resource allocation strategies have "sprinkled" resources to all Southwest border locations. However, the magnitude of the increase in any given sector has not provided the decisive concentration of resources necessary to increase the "cost" to illegal entrants to the point of deterring repeated attempts. As we reduce the rate of recidivism in the illegal entering population, the number of aliens attempting illegal entry will decrease. Marginal increases in resources will not necessarily achieve a proportionate reduction in illegally entering traffic. These facts compelled Border Patrol planners to implement a new strategic approach to allocating border enforcement resources. || *

We will establish baseline staffing levels for each Sector and ensure no Sector falls below critical operating levels as new resources are directed to each phase. Baseline staffing levels will be maintained by assigning attrition resources or by using a portion of new resources, if available, in order to maintain the baseline level for all sectors. Sectors need to be protected from becoming new "hot spots" that are out of control. We must maintain minimal staffing levels as established and monitor them throughout the strategy implementation.

Courses of Action

To create a deterrent and reduce the illegal entry recidivism rate, we have developed a course of action concentrating a decisive level of resources, in phases (see attached chart, Border Patrol Strategic Plan 1994 and Beyond), to the areas of greatest illegal activity. The main effort

of all phases requires support by all sectors, concentration of resources on the line, maximum utilization of lighting, fencing, and other barriers, redirection of agents not performing enforcement duties back to line activities, and realignment of resources as entries shift.

Strategic planners identified and mapped out the locations of heaviest illegal immigration activity. The areas of heaviest illegal entry were identified as "avenues of approach" (AA) {see attached map, Illegal Entry Corridors}. Planners listed the AA in order beginning with the avenue of approach with the highest illegal entry flow (AA1) through the area with the least traffic (AA12).

- AA1 - Southern California
- AA2 - West Texas and New Mexico
- AA3 - South and South Central Texas
- AA4 - Arizona
- AA5 - South Florida
- AA6 - Puerto Rico
- AA7 - Northeast United States
- AA8 - Northwest United States
- AA9 - Great Lakes

We speculated that as control is gained in the main AAs, there are three areas that are currently not considered heavy avenues of approach, that will likely become the alternate routes. These three areas are:

- AA10 - Gulf Coast
- AA11 - North Central U.S.
- AA12 - Southwest Coast

Border Patrol planners recognized that only a decisive level of resources would increase the "cost" to illegal entrants sufficiently to deter entry. Marginal increases in resources would not result in a proportionate deterrent effect. A phased, multi-year approach that concentrated resources in the areas of most active illegal entry was developed incorporating areas of "Main Effort" and of "Supporting Effort."

Areas of "Main Effort" and of "Supporting Effort" were identified in each of the planned phases. In the geographic areas of "Main Effort," sufficient resources are brought to bear to ensure that near 100% of illegal entries are apprehended. "Supporting Effort" areas support the areas of main effort either directly through loan of resources or indirectly by other actions that support and sustain the main effort, i.e. coordinating enforcement initiatives with main effort initiatives, gathering intelligence to validate the relative success of the main effort, identifying shifts in illegal entry traffic, etc.

Phase I (FY-94 and 95 Immigration Initiative)

CONTROL SAN DIEGO AND EL PASO CORRIDORS (AA1 & AA2)

The majority of illegal entries have historically occurred in San Diego and El Paso. Achieving control of the avenues of approach in San Diego and El Paso is the most effective first step in achieving control of the border. Concentrating a decisive level of resources in these areas is more effective than making only incremental changes in border enforcement across all sectors.

San Diego (AA1) and El Paso (AA2) are the areas of main effort in Phase I. As the strategy in San Diego and El Paso (main effort areas) becomes effective, much of the flow of illegal traffic will shift to other avenues of approach that transform from supporting areas to main effort areas. Some part of the flow will turn to other entry tactics, including legal entry, use of fraudulent documents, and requests for asylum and immigration hearings. Some part of the flow will be deterred from attempting illegal entry.

The current enforcement posture in AA1 and AA2 is to first control the entry of illegal entrants into and through the large urban areas. When urban areas are uncontrolled, they provide illegal entrants an opportunity to assimilate with the population, making it difficult for the Border Patrol to quickly identify and arrest individual illegal entrants. When the Border Patrol controls the urban areas, the illegal traffic is forced to use the rural roads which offer less anonymity and accessibility to public transportation.

Support efforts required include:

- o gather intelligence to validate success of control in AA1 and AA2,
- o identify areas affected by shift in traffic patterns,
- o redirect resources, and
- o increase allocation of resources.

Before moving to Phase II, we will use certain indicators to determine whether Phase I has been successful. These indicators of success - which may also be measures of effectiveness - include:

- o initial increase of arrests and entry attempts
- o eventual reduction of arrests and recidivism in main effort
- o change in traditional traffic pattern
- o reduction of serious accidents involving aliens on highways, trains, drowning, dehydration (main effort)
- o increased instances of more sophisticated methods of smuggling at checkpoints
- o increase in ports of entry activity including more legal admissions and use of fraudulent documents
- o possible increase in complaints (Mexico, interest groups, etc.)

- o shift in flow to other areas in southwest border
- o fee increase by smugglers
- o reduction in criminal aliens entering the country and criminal activity along the borders
- o fewer illegal immigrants in the interior of the U.S.
- o reduction in use of social services and benefits in the U.S.

Likewise, there will be observable **changed conditions** in the main effort areas that will lead us into the Phase II, such as:

- o increased efficiency in main efforts allows for maintenance of control
- o status for AA1 + AA2 clear
- o border stabilized and secured (control)

Phase II (near-term)

CONTROL SOUTH TEXAS AND TUCSON CORRIDORS (AA3 & AA4)

We will closely monitor the progress in controlling the border in AA1 and AA2. These two locations will be top priority before focusing on another corridor. It is believed that as control is gained in AA1 and AA2, the illegal flow will shift to other locations.

As a measure of control is achieved in these corridors, some illegal traffic is expected to shift to AA4 and AA3. In these areas also, the initial focus will be on attaining control of the urban areas first and then the rural areas. AA3 and AA4 will initiate their course of action with existing resources.

Support efforts required include:

- o maintain control in corridors AA1 and AA2
- o gather intelligence to validate success of control in AA1 and AA2
- o identify areas affected by shift in traffic patterns
- o redirect resources

Before moving to Phase III, there will be certain indicators that Phase II has been successful. These indicators of success - which may also be measures of effectiveness - include:

- o reduction of arrests in main effort
- o change in traditional traffic pattern
- o reduction of serious accidents involving aliens on trains, drowning, dehydration (main effort)
- o increased instances of more sophisticated methods of smuggling at checkpoints
- o increase in complaints (Mexico, interest groups, etc.)

- o increase in ports of entry activity including more legal admissions and use of fraudulent documents
- o shift in flow to other areas in Southwest border
- o fee increase by smugglers
- o reduction in criminal aliens
- o fewer illegal immigrants in the interior of the U.S.
- o reduction in use of social services and benefits in the U.S.

The observable **changed conditions** in the main effort areas that will lead us into the Phase III, include:

- o increased efficiency in main efforts allows for maintenance of control
- o status for AA3 + AA4 clear
- o border stabilized and secured (control)

Phase III (mid-term)

CONTROL REMAINDER OF SOUTHWEST BORDER

The Border Patrol will move into Phase III only after valid indicators of success and changed conditions reflect border control has been attained in the Phase II main effort.

Phase III is designed to allow the Patrol to react to the expected shift and expected increase in all other areas of the Southwest. In fact, an expected outcome is a shift of those attempting illegal entries to water boundaries (AA10 & AA11). We anticipate that all along the border there will be shifts and attempted entries in previous main effort areas, therefore, the entire Southwest border must be controlled and that control must be maintained. The Phase III main effort will be to gain control of the remainder of Southwest border by applying adequate resources.

Supporting efforts will include maintaining control while monitoring and sustaining baseline staffing levels for remainder of Border Patrol.

The indicators of success for Phase III include:

- o fewer entry attempts on Southwest border control
- o increased seacoast entries
- o political pressure to loosen border
- o fewer returnees
- o potential for more protests against immigration policy
- o increased alien smuggling fees
- o more document fraud
- o inquiries from U.S. employers of undocumented workers
- o further reduction of social services
- o further reduction in criminal aliens

- o more violence at attempted entries
- o improved public perception
- o fewer aliens staging in Mexico

The changed conditions will be:

- o control of Southwest border
- o air/sea entry attempts increase
- o increase in entries outside of Southwest border
- o change in smugglers tactics
- o increased ports of entry traffic
- o Mexico will enhance border control of their Southern border (OTM's who until now had entered their country, traversed, and then crossed the U.S. border will be forced to stay in Mexico)
- o pressure for another "Bracero program" (temporary worker program)
- o economic changes in U.S.

Phase IV (mid to long-term)

CONTROL ALL THE UNITED STATES BORDERS/ADJUST TO FLOW (All AAs)

The Phase IV main effort will be to gain control of all other areas outside the Southwest border, continually monitor the flow of illegal entrants, and adjust by shifting resources to new areas of activity. As this happens, we anticipate increased entries along the Northern border and in water avenues along the Gulf Coast and Pacific Coasts (AA5, AA6, AA10, & AA12). As the inevitable increase of illegal activity along the Northern border comes to fruition, resource enhancements (i.e. personnel, technology, and equipment) will be key to maintaining control.

Supporting efforts will include maintaining control achieved in Phases I, II and III. We will ensure adequate resources remain in those areas where we have gained control.

The indicators of success and changed conditions will mirror those of the previous phases. As the borders become more and more controlled, the tendency may be to revert back to traditional ways of operating which may result in loosening control. Some changed conditions such as reduction in the cheap labor force may create unrest and resistance. The most desperate of those aliens seeking entry will attempt illegal entry. Special Interest Groups may tighten pressure on Congress to remove entry controls once border control is achieved and maintained.

Coordination

The Border Patrol's strategic approach includes all sectors, concentrates on the border, is easily understood and implemented, and takes advantage of current resource initiatives.

As control is gained and maintained in the immediate border areas, the Service will adjust resources at land border ports of entry and in the interior enforcement locations. The Border Patrol will emphasize gaining control of the transit points, improving coordination for investigations in the border area, increasing sanctions, increasing pressure on fraudulent document vendors, increasing jail checks, increasing D&D support and controlling employment centers. These activities are to be coordinated with other Service programs.

In order to achieve the level of border control that we determine to be acceptable to the INS and the American public, we must maintain our vision, focus on our strengths, be aware of our vulnerabilities, and ensure that support and coordination with other INS programs and outside agencies are maintained. Some of these coordinated actions include:

- o barriers including fencing, lighting, bollards (work with Department of Defense and INS's Information Resource Management and International Affairs)
- o increase visibility to promote public awareness
- o improve technology to maximize personnel and enhance mobility flexibility
- o increase joint operations (and share equipment) with Customs, Drug Enforcement Administration, Local Law Enforcement Agencies
- o back-up border effort and improve control by maintaining and establishing checkpoints
- o use short term details to test control
- o monitor activity in Mexico - intelligence
- o develop statistically valid measures of effectiveness
- o de-emphasize non-Border Patrol functions
- o examine interior repatriation
- o consistent pressure on INS to maintain effort as Patrol demonstrates success through valid measures

Conclusion

The Border Patrol's strategic plan is multi-phased and requires multi-year implementation. The plan directs intense enforcement efforts in the areas of greatest illegal activity to gain maximum control of the border. As control is gained in these main effort areas, it is anticipated the illegal traffic will shift to other entry corridors.

Traditional measures of effectiveness in which control of the border was principally measured by number of apprehensions will be examined. Innovative methods are being researched to measure the flow of entry and ways to monitor those we miss, as well as recidivism rates. A common concern among all law enforcement is trying to measure deterrence

as an indicator of success. Some measurement methodologies may prove less valid than others. We are confident that with experimentation we will be able to identify valid measures.

Valid statistical measurements in combination with subjective indicators will allow us to determine our success in closing the revolving door of illegal immigration on the border while keeping the door open for legal immigration. For example, in San Diego, an automated fingerprinting identification system (AFIS) is operational. We will now be able to track an apprehended illegal alien and establish an historical record of attempted entries. In other sectors different systems are being developed and used to gauge those who are getting away allowing us to measure the flow and our effectiveness in controlling the border. Incorporating external measurements by other agencies and immigration specialists will validate our success.

INS must be committed to dedicating adequate resources to fully equip, train, and support Border Patrol agent personnel as well as monitor resource requirements to adjust to shifts in illegal traffic. This strategy can be accomplished through a combination of staffing efficiencies and targeting new resources for agents, support staff, and technology. The Border Patrol must continually assess the appropriate mix of technology and personnel. Also, we must closely monitor established measures of effectiveness.


To date, nine Southwest Border Patrol Sectors have developed, with the assistance of consultants with planning expertise, their individual strategic plans consistent with the national plan. All sector strategies focus first on the urban areas, concentrate resources on the line and checkpoints and maintain a baseline staffing level. The sector strategies address the unique enforcement environment and challenges within their areas of responsibility. Each sector plan is flexible to allow for adjustments and continual assessment of the resource needs and the impact of new technology. As the sectors refine and implement valid measures of effectiveness, utilize new and/or expanded technology, and observe changing or shifting illegal migration patterns, resource adjustments will be necessary. This measured, flexible long-term, phased method of border control will prove to be efficient, cost effective, and more resource productive than previous approaches to border control.

The Border Patrol strategy provides a clear sense of direction and facilitates opportunities for employees to succeed as they achieve program goals and gain a broader perspective of the INS challenges. It promotes a professional work environment that encompasses a sense of pride and accomplishment, the highest ethical standards, and upholds public trust and international respect for the United States immigration laws.

BORDER PATROL STRATEGIC PLAN 1994 AND BEYOND

SECTOR	PHASE I		PHASE II		PHASE III		PHASE IV
	JUNE 1994	TRANSITION		TRANSITION		TRANSITION	
ALL SECTORS	Develop Strategy	Determine Measures of Effectiveness <i>(Reviewed by National Institute of Justice)</i> Focus on Urban Areas, Concentrate on "the Line" Maintain Baseline Levels	Reassess Strategy		Reassess Strategy		Reassess Strategy
SAN DIEGO EL PASO	MAIN EFFORT FY 94 Initiative – Gain Control "Hold the Line" – Gain Control		Indicators of Success	Maintain Control		Maintain Control	Maintain Control
TUCSON DEL RIO LAREDO MCALLEN	Shift in Flow – Increase in Apprehensions	Assess Resource Requirements	MAIN EFFORT Gain Control		Indicators of Success	Maintain Control	Maintain Control
EL CENTRO YUMA MARFA			Shift in Flow – Increase in Apprehensions	Assess Resource Requirements	MAIN EFFORT Gain Control		Indicators of Success Maintain Control
REST OF BORDER	MAINTAIN BASELINE DEVELOP SECTOR STRATEGIES		MAINTAIN BASELINE DEVELOP SECTOR STRATEGIES		Shift in Flow	Assess Resource Requirements	MAIN EFFORT Adjust to Flow, Gain and Maintain Control

ILLEGAL ENTRY CORRIDORS



APPROVED:

Doris Meissner
Doris Meissner
Commissioner

DATE:

AUG - 8 1994

**ENFORCE (PHASE I)
San Diego Border Patrol Pilot
Status Report
December 9, 1994**

The Enforce (Phase I) System Pilot at San Diego was implemented at the Border Patrol Sector (4 sites) on June 1.

As of December 9, 1994, 645 agents in the San Diego Sector have processed:

151,961	Voluntary Deportations to Mexico
2,385	Administrative Imm. Violation Cases (Other Than Mexicans)
1,226	Smuggling Cases (Aliens and/or Contraband)

Included in the 1,226 Smuggling cases were the following types of individuals:

190	Deportable Aliens
682	Non-Deportable Aliens (Legal Permanent Residents)
11	Parolees
160	U. S. Citizens