Army Force Structure
Considerations in Defense Support
of Civil Authorities

by

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14. ABSTRACT
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The threat to the United States today remains complex and both ambiguous and apparent. Although the nation’s assets have removed portions of the threat over the past ten years, it is by no means removed from the picture. While major strides in planning, preparation, funding and training in support of homeland defense and civil support occurred over the past ten years, there remains significant room for improvement. All strategic documents dealing with national security include the imperative of responding to threats to and within the homeland, whether manmade or natural. The complexity of bringing together local, state, federal and non-governmental organizations into a coherent functioning organization is as daunting as the importance of the mission. The recommendation of this paper incorporates the reality of a shrinking United States military in size and capacity, and with the strong indicators of additional reductions, it is imperative to look at options from a holistic view. When, not if the military is required to respond to a catastrophic incident involving significant amounts of both civilian casualties and property damage it must be prepared to properly respond.
ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE CONSIDERATIONS IN DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Although the national response to Hurricane Katrina was the largest of its kind in US history, the delay of several days in providing large scale assistance to New Orleans — and the initial absence of a unified strategy for dealing with the disaster — contributed to the suffering of the people left in the city and caused considerable anguish throughout the country. When a catastrophic event occurs, the effort required of policemen, firemen, emergency management workers, and other first responders skyrockets. However, at the point of impact these first responders often become victims or lose the capability to effectively respond.

—Hurricane Katrina, National Response to Catastrophic Events

The Department of Defense continues to improve its approach in planning and preparation for defense support of civil authorities by dedicating military forces, across the components, to fulfill the mission. Within the department, the United States Army bears the bulk of response force planning and asset capability. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, coupled with the effects of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 demonstrated a strategic gap in Department of Defense planning, preparation and most importantly resourcing defense support of civil authorities in both disaster planning and response operations.

This focal point of this document is the reshaping of future defense capabilities in response to major disasters in the United States. Major disasters are defined as “any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and
disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.\textsuperscript{2} The recommendation incorporates a review of existing policies and procedures, their interagency relationship and the reality of shrinking national defense budgets. Today, the defense department continues response planning by structuring response capability both regionally and nationally, with geographically fragmented units having limited integrated training opportunities. Through the utilization of existing military unit headquarters and associated subordinate units the defense department organizes for the mission as it would for any mission and the potential exists for reducing existing civil support unit structure. Although response to incidents is primarily the responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense and state National Guard assets play a vitally important role when response requirements exceed local and state capability or capacity.

Although documented prior to, the majority of defense planning and preparatory activities supporting civil emergencies occurred since 2002. Through the dedicated efforts of all supported and supporting agencies, this gap shrunk\textsuperscript{3} considerably and the fine tuning of preparations continues today under a mostly ad-hoc consortium of both organizations and assets. As the Department of Defense continues down the road of completing its mission in Southwest Asia, refocuses publicized efforts on China and Southeast Asia while restructuring the current force, the mission of defense support of civil authorities cannot be degraded. This paper presents an argument for enhancing the current capability by organizing and structuring existing organizations, and prioritizing these forces for this mission.
As directed by President Obama in the May 2010 National Security Strategy, the United States “must apply its strategic approach in pursuit of its primary national interest, the security of the United States and its citizens – to strengthen security and resilience at home.” This strategy demonstrates the overarching requirement for all facets of national power to ensure preparedness. The assets of the Department of Defense, and more specific to this argument, the United States Army, must prepare accordingly. To properly demonstrate the foundation for which national preparedness has grown, a historical perspective is necessary.

The United States Constitution provides the framework of state and federal roles in response to crisis. Whereas, it has always been the primary responsibility of local, state and regional agencies to provide for their own capability in response to crises, the federal government, including the military, supports and reinforces both federal and state capabilities when necessary. While numerous examples of federal support are found throughout United States history, the first modern federal agency created whose sole mission of response management was the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

In 1979, executive order founded the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This new agency merged many of the detached disaster response responsibilities into a single agency. Since inception, FEMA is directed with the mission of helping communities nationwide prepare for, respond to and recover from natural and manmade disasters. This continues to be a tall order to fulfill. A varied and numerous set of capabilities for preparing, certifying, staffing and equipping civil emergency response efforts exists throughout the country. To synchronize these assets, and where
applicable certify a capability, requires extensive planning and coordination for a response to crisis that exceeds local capacity. FEMAs comprehensive approach to these efforts continues today.

The Robert T. Stafford Act became law in 1988 and formalized the process by which states request preparation and response support from the federal government. This act has undergone numerous changes and updates to arrive at its current 2007 version. Prior to establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency chaired the process of supporting the implementation of this act. This act provided planning guidance and integration of effort until the attack on 11 September 2001. Figure 1 below prescribes how the partnership works, and remains consistent with today's Department of Homeland Security and supporting Department of Defense planning and coordination efforts.

Figure 1. National Response Framework: Stafford Act Support to States
Just eleven days following the events of 11 September 2001 (commonly referred to as 9/11), the Director of the Office of Homeland Security was established with former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge appointed as the first Director. Subsequently, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 brought together 22 separate federal agencies under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security. The department's mission is to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure and resilient against terrorism and other hazards. This department is supported by a continuously expanding set of local through federal partners with the common bond of unity of effort during disaster response. These partners are comprised of a significant list of overlapping federal, state, and local agencies with responsibilities and jurisdictions that create a significant challenge to planning military and support operations inside the United States.

In November 2002, legislation established the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission. Its guidance, "to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 attacks, including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks." The details of this report, the majority of which became law in 2007 (9/11 Commission Act of 2007), are the driving influences of both the homeland defense and civil support national strategy documents and together form the basis of the thesis for a dedicated military structure consistent with the existing military organization.

Due to the ever increasing requests for federal support via disaster declaration (Table 1 below), the significance of civil support is a priority of national security policy and justifies the increase in budget appropriations for existing programs. If the United States government is willing to spend significant amounts of tax dollars in the conduct of
response operations, all agencies involved should seek to spend this money as efficiently as possible including reorganization or streamlining.

![Graph of National Disaster Declarations from 2000 through 2011]

Table 1. National Disaster Declarations from 2000 through 2011

The volume of Presidential Decision Directives supporting both homeland security and civil support continue to increase. Following 9/11, President George W. Bush signed 25 individual directives directly attributable to homeland security and civil support concerns; there were none prior to 9/11. The applicability to the Department of Defense is correspondingly evident. If the preponderance of presidential directives falls within the auspices of homeland security and civil support, the efforts of the various departments, and specifically the Department of Defense should correspondingly increase. The most significant application of Department of Defense prioritization to both homeland defense and civil support was the creation of United States Northern Command. This transitions context from overarching national homeland policy and procedures into the military specific guidance, capabilities and development.

The United States Northern Command is the Defense Departments’ unified command for executing homeland defense and civil support missions.
Command, established 1 October 2002, provides command and control of Department of Defense homeland defense efforts and coordinates defense support of civil authorities. United States Northern Command is composed of the following joint task forces, each with a specific, and often overlapping, mission: Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region, Joint Task Force-Civil Support, Joint Task Force Alaska, and Joint Task Force North. Additionally, United States Northern Command retains the service components of United States Fifth Army/Army North, United States First Air Force/Air Force North, United States Fleet Forces Command and the United States Marine Forces Northern Command. Since its inception, United States Northern Command has responded to a wide variety of disasters including the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The command coordinates with and directly supports the agencies operating under the direction of the Department of Homeland Security in all aspects of disaster response. Northern Command’s subordinate task forces, upon receipt of national approval, receive and direct a wide assortment of military organizations, across all services, in support of the lead agency. These military organizations, when tasked for operational planning in support of civil response, are aligned both regionally and nationally. How the organizations operate is prescribed in military policy, directives, regulations and manuals that, when examined, underscore the importance of correctly aligning forces to the mission. This is succinctly stated in numerous locations, but most recently in the December 2011, Association of the United States Army, Torchbearer Issue Paper: “There is only one chance to successfully mitigate a crisis; any response must be swift, agile and an appropriate compliment to civilian-led authorities.” The combatant commands, including United States Northern
Command, are directed by guidance contained within the national policies and more specifically, those pertaining to national defense.

The National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review and the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review are the overarching policies followed by the Department of Defense when outlining support to homeland response operations. The components of execution are articulated in detail in the National Response Framework. Before an understanding of how the Defense Department's role within the National Response Framework is derived, a concise review of the key strategic documents is necessary to frame the importance and scale. The first priority listed in the National Security Strategy is security and is defined as the security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners.

Although the document does not specify a priority order, Security is listed first and for the purposes of this argument, further described as to strengthen security and resilience at home. Included in the strategy of security is the capability to meet a full range of threats at home, whether initiated by man or mother nature. This guidance provides for long-term planning and support relationships. Relationships are a key component of cohesion in the unity of effort prescribed in the Stafford Act.

The National Defense Strategy, published in 2008, describes the Department of Defense’s role in achieving the objectives of the National Security Strategy. Further strengthening the recommendation is the introductory sentence of the document: “a core responsibility of the United States Government is to protect the American people – in the words of the framers of our Constitution, to ‘provide for the common defense’. As highlighted previously, there is only one chance to get this correct and the people of
America all but demand it occur the first time. The first priority listed in the National Defense Strategy is defend the homeland. Contained within this strategy are the overarching details for supporting civil authorities in both capability and capacity. Stressing the need for relationship building, it is expected that disasters will cross numerous jurisdictions and require simultaneous coordination with local responders through federal government department heads. Specifically, this paragraph directs coordinating with the Department of Homeland Security and brings up the last two strategic level documents for highlight, the Quadrennial Defense Review and one of its sister documents, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.

The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review of 2010, the first of its kind, provides specific (vice overarching) guidance for response partner agencies involved in civil support. The listed missions in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review are:

- Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security
- Securing and Managing Our Borders
- Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws
- Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace
- Ensuring Resilience to Disasters

As listed, a primary mission identified is to ensure resilience to disasters. One example of how resilience is gained is through responders working through a common or unified manner and supporting a unity of effort. The concept of unity of effort is mentioned numerous times for this very reason. This includes familiarity with both the planning staffs and response agencies, and unity of effort is at risk with each new set of disparate military organizations assigned the new or additional task of civil response.
For active component defense organizations, this generally occurs every one to two years and resides at brigade (or service equivalent) and below. The United States Army’s process for this is termed Army Force Generation and detailed later in this document.\textsuperscript{29}

The Quadrennial Defense Review of 2010 also provides specific guidance, to the services, but specifically looks to meet both the current needs and the future outlook for force requirements. Our military force is in a period of rebalancing.\textsuperscript{30} The efforts to rebalance the force continue with the reality that all service components are in the process of reducing some capacity. This has been announced publicly and in the Chairman of the Joint Chief’s guidance.\textsuperscript{31} With respect to defense of the United States and support to civil authorities, the department of defense continues response planning, aligned both regionally and nationally but with geographically fragmented units and limited integrated training opportunities. Prior to detailing this capability, the regulatory and analytical framework of response preparation needs definition to understand the context.


In Department of Defense Directive 3025.18, defense support of civil authorities is defined as:\textsuperscript{32}

\ldots the support provided by UNITED STATES federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and National Guard forces, when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces
in Title 32 United States Code in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities or from qualifying entities for special events.

While this directive is detailed in what support department forces are and are not authorized to provide, it also directs that support be provided within the guidelines established by the Department of Homeland Security. While it recognizes that states retain the authority for response, including the use of National Guard assets under state control, it also specifies that federal military forces will remain under federal control at all times. This includes forces of the National Guard when they are employed under federal command and control. This complexity and vulnerability of these authorities was evident during response operations in support of Hurricane Katrina. Federal and state forces operated under their respective command structures causing increased confusion and hampering initial relief efforts.\textsuperscript{33} While this real experience showed distinct gaps in response planning, it is but one of many scenarios utilized for planning state and federal response actions.

The Department of Homeland Security national planning scenarios utilize a process developed by the Department of Defense in contingency planning. This process includes presenting enemy forces (in civil support this includes major disasters) and planning for the required capability and capacity to complete an assigned mission. Developed via the interagency process and under the guidance of the Homeland Security Council, fifteen, all-hazards, planning scenarios provide local, state and federal agencies the “enemy forces” for which to develop response plans.\textsuperscript{34} It should also be noted these scenarios are not static; they are periodically updated based upon emerging or developed threat capabilities. The defense support of civil authorities and
National Planning Scenarios are ultimately integrated in operational plans for mission execution within the guidance of the National Response Framework.

The National Response Framework provides the implementation plan for all levels of response, community through federal, and includes non-governmental organizations. Although labeled as a national framework it does not supplant the authority of the affected state or states. In recognizing that a disaster may exceed state capability, it provides the operational and tactical framework for how the responding agencies will together provide for unity of effort while retaining respective agency authorities. The document is organized by:

- Roles and Responsibilities: sharpens the focus on who is involved with emergency management activities at the local, tribal, state, and federal levels and with the private sector and NGOs.
- Response Actions: describes what we as a Nation collectively do to respond to incidents.
- Response Organization: explains how we as a Nation are organized to implement response actions.
- Planning: A Critical Element of Effective Response: emphasizes the importance of planning and summarizes the elements of national planning structures.
- Additional Resources: summarizes the content and plan for the online NRF Resource Center, a new, actively managed DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency Web site that will deliver state-of-the-art support for the
Framework with additional support tools shaped by and addressed to the response community.

This framework requires a detailed understanding by supporting military organizations in order to rapidly integrate into the response structure. Without delving into the specifics of how local through non-Department of Defense federal agencies operate, figure 2 below diagrams the Joint Field Office and highlights where Department of Defense forces operate in conjunction with the unified agencies during civil response.

![Diagram of Joint Field Office and its key components](image)

Figure 2. The Joint Field Office and its key components.

It is relevant to highlight the different purposes of the Department of Defense representative/defense coordinating officer and the joint task force. The defense coordinating officer and supporting defense coordinating element assigned to each of the federal emergency management regions and tasked with receiving requested

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military missions from the joint field office and processing them with the appropriate state and/or federal joint task force for execution. While in most cases the defense coordinating officer is of lesser military rank than the military force commander, he is never replaced by the joint task force commander. Conversely, the joint task force commander (or commanders if National Guard forces remain under control of the state) is responsible for mission execution and retains control of all respective military forces. The separate control of military forces requires close coordination to ensure all missions are completed without duplicative efforts.

The current method to reduce the friction between state and federal military forces is through the use of dual status commanders.\textsuperscript{38} When called upon, dual status commanders exercise command authority over both state and federal forces in support of declared disasters but the authorities and control of each force is respectfully retained. While overcoming the complexities of two chains of command, this adds another layer of command and control, requiring staffing personnel from United States Northern Command and adds additional force structure to the military while it is trying to rebalance. Additionally, this does not address the ad-hoc nature of federal response forces nor does it account for the potential conflicts that arise when a disaster encompasses multiple states. Apportioned federal forces are currently tasked from across the United States. These units, both active and Reserve, deploy from the various locations and report to a commander with whom they may never have interacted. If the disaster crosses multiple state boundaries, the dual status commander has, by statute, multiple state governors as his superiors vying for resource support. This would not be the case if a federal forces commander was in charge.
The recommendation establishes dedicated and integral force structure, within the existing reserve and active component organizations, with the specified mission of defense support of civil authorities. The significance of inherent relationships within cogent organizations is the basis for recommending that both command and control and mission support forces will execute assigned missions with greater effectiveness. Dedicated and integral active and reserve component forces, locally organized, provide the optimal capability when a response to civil support request occurs. This force, when operating with or enhanced by existing National Guard forces, provides the full range of emergency response capabilities with the significantly reduced requirement to cobble together federal forces from numerous locations. An example supporting this recommendation is the utilization of an active component Army division, including all subordinate maneuver and support forces, augmented by the nearest geographically located reserve component forces, completing the required capability package, performing the Joint Task Force mission.

Supporting the recommendation includes the reduction of deployment locations, the established command and control capability residing within a division headquarters, the cohesion of a unit that works together on a daily basis. The required augmenting Reserve forces allocated from geographically close units allows for increased integrated training opportunities from a reduced budget and travel cost.

A readily apparent argument against this recommendation is the degraded capacity of active component forces for world-wide response contingencies. In countering this argument, the army force generation model is again cited. This model allows for the apportionment of forces to a designated mission for planning, equipping
and training, over a designated time period and if required, to deploy. This is the current model used successfully in support of United States operations in Afghanistan, and previously Iraq. Today, federal forces are provided by mostly geographically dispersed forces with little to no cogent training opportunity and no unit cohesion. For example, the Army aviation medical, casualty evacuation and lift forces allocated to just the current Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTFCS) defense chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear response force (DCRF) shown in figure 3 below, must be brought together from units in Washington, Kentucky, Florida, Colorado and Virginia.40

![Figure 3. Joint Task Force Civil Support, Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Response Force](image)

The command and control of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear consequence response element (C2CRE) structure occurs much the same. With the exception of a few unique and specially trained personnel for search and extraction and
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear missions, most of the remaining structure resides within the current Army division headquarters and associated maneuver, maneuver support and service support organization structures.

The National Guard/state response capability, supporting the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRNE) enhanced response force package (CERFP) and homeland response force (HRF) comprised of state and regional units is readily agreed upon as the most efficient and capable for supporting small scale contingencies managed by state authorities. The first response capability in Figure 3 is the weapons of mass destruction-civil support teams (WMD-CST), a highly technical and rapid response capability to detect and identify the spectrum of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats and, although capable today in all states and several territories, has very limited capacity. If federalization of these forces is necessary, the capabilities that reside in an Army division can easily accept and incorporate them into the team.

Defending the homeland includes supporting civil authorities in both small and large disaster response. Through consequence management planning and coordination, establishing relationships with partners throughout their hierarchy and most importantly exercising with those partners to establish working relationships, in times of crisis and under great stress. Currently, the United States Northern Command assigned joint task force headquarters’ (multiple) and the state response packages in Figure 3 provide the only dedicated and non-rotational assets to the civil support mission. Working relationships are a key facilitator in working with civilian agencies. They are built upon time, trust and repetition. The recurring swapping out of non-cogent
tactical – operational level organizations breaks this trust with each newly assigned unit entering the structure.

The strategic risk associated with the recommended option is the lack of availability of the dedicated civil support force for world-wide deployment. Based upon the rotational priority placed upon both the military and non-military assets of the federal government, this risk is deemed acceptable. Acceptability is gained through the refinement of the army force generation cycle. Short of total war, forces are allocated for theater contingencies based upon specific timelines. In the event it becomes necessary to deploy units dedicated to civil support missions, those units would deploy later in the timeline. This provides for sufficient fielding, equipping and train-up, just as it occurs today. Furthermore, civil support to the homeland is remarkably similar to foreign stability operations. These same organizations, through dedicated and recurring training, become immediately credible forces for foreign consequence management support with recent examples including Lessons and Observations Report, Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Response, (Operation TOMODACHI, Operation PACIFIC PASSAGE).

When applying the elements of the feasibility, acceptability and suitability analysis to the recommendation, two distinct differences are readily apparent. First, are the military preparations for homeland defense and civil support meeting the spirit and intent outlined in the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy? Support to the homeland is a priority mission with the bulk of Department of Defense assets coming from the National Guard. With active component divisions stationed on or very near rapid deployment capable locations, the supporting Reserve forces can
capitalize on the existing, well planned deployment support due to their and collocated nature. This enhances their capability in both training preparation and deployment capability.

Secondly, the capability of Reserve forces to rapidly deploy in support of immediate civil emergencies from various locations throughout the country remains a concern. Regionally co-locating Reserve component forces with supported active component units increases the availability of predeployment training opportunities and capitalizing on existing deployment experience of those military installations.

The threat to the United States today remains complex and both ambiguous and apparent. The combined efforts of the diplomatic, informational, military and economic powers diminished the world wide threat to the nation over the past ten years, but it is by no means removed from the picture. While major strides in planning, preparation, funding and training in support of homeland defense and civil support occurred over the past ten years, their remains significant room for improvement. The importance of the mission to the nation is well documented. All strategic documents dealing with national security include the imperative of responding to threats to and within the homeland, whether manmade or from nature. The sheer size of the combined local, state and federal government agencies is demonstrative of the expectation of the American people to get the mission completed right the first time. The Force Generation process allows for utilization of collocated units working with regionally aligned units for a definitive time period. Mission hand-off to the next organization is predetermined by timing, allowing for the required train-up period prior to assuming the mission.45
The complexity of bringing together local, state, federal and non-governmental organizations into a coherent functioning organization is as daunting as the importance of the mission. The recommendations brought forward in this narrative include the reality of a shrinking United States military in size and capacity, and with the strong indicators of additional reductions,\textsuperscript{46} it is imperative to look at options from holistic views to ensure feasibility. The current planning picture may not fit the force of the future. For military organizations, the natural tendency is to look for the person in charge. Less so in homeland defense but extremely apparent in civil support of large hazard response, there are not only multiple people in charge of various aspects but also multiple layers; local police, state police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are an easy example. The current plan of dual-hatted commanders solved one concern but created additional structure and added another layer of staffing. The concept of utilizing existing organizational structure to provide the core staff is in line with current joint doctrine.\textsuperscript{47} This is reinforced negatively from the comments within the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and the positive comments from the Japanese earthquake and tsunami response.

One of the most important factors aligned throughout is the concept of the cohesive force. The applicability of this is found in almost every writing on military operations that exists.\textsuperscript{48} It is a fact that organizations that work together on a frequent basis will outperform those that are suddenly thrown together. This is even more pronounced in emergency situations where decisions can involve life and death. Even with the requirement for regional Army Reserve units to travel to active component
locations (or vice versa), the regional concept allows for a much more frequent training approach and with a reduced cost burden.

None of these recommendations include any intent to subvert the authority of the state or that of the National Guard. There is a tension that remains between the federal and state components. In recommending that a federal component headquarters and integral units take the lead in a federal response is restricted to federal forces. If warranted, and the forces of the National Guard are federalized, they can easily be integrated into a chain of command that is historically used to task organization changes.

When, not if, the military is required to respond to a catastrophic incident involving significant amounts of both civilian casualties and property damage it must be prepared to properly respond. Military forces at the division level conduct recurring training in deployment, mission execution and redeployment operations but rarely in support of homeland operations. Implementation of this strategy, although radically different from today’s practices, achieves the required effective response.

Endnotes


24 Ibid, 1.


28 Ibid, 19.


31 Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman’s Strategic Direction of the Joint Force, (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 06, 2012), 5.


33 For the first two days of Katrina response operations, USNORTHCOM did not have situational awareness of what forces the National Guard had on the ground. Joint Task Force Katrina (JTF-Katrina) simply could not operate at full efficiency when it lacked visibility of over half the military forces in the disaster area. Neither the Louisiana National Guard nor JTF-Katrina had a good sense for where each other’s forces were located or what they were doing. Archives of President George W. Bush, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons


36 Ibid, 3.

37 Ibid, 63.


48 U.S. Department of the Army, Army Leadership: Competent, Confident and Agile, Field Manual 6-22 (FM 22-100) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 12, 2006), 3-3, 4-12, 7-12.