IMPLEMENTING THE 2006 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR) RECOMMENDATIONS TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)

HEARING
BEFORE THE
TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 2006

IMPLEMENTING THE 2006 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR)
RECOMMENDATIONS TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)

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IMPLEMENTING THE 2006 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR) RECOMMENDATIONS TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 5, 2006.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Saxton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. SAXTON. Good afternoon.
The Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities meets in open session to receive testimony on the implications on the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in respect to the role of the Department of Defense in combating weapons of mass destruction.

Additionally, the subcommittee will explore how the recommendations from the QDR will support the recently released National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Today's hearing provides an opportunity for members of the subcommittee to assess the administration's plans and priorities for combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and how the Department of Defense fits into the larger governmentwide effort.

Our witnesses are expected to expand upon the QDR decision, decisions regarding combating WMD.

These decisions include the designation of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), which is the primary combat support agency for the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM); the expansion of the Army's 20th Support Command capabilities to enable it to serve as a joint task force capable of rapid deployment to command and control WMD elimination and site exploration missions by 2007; the expansion of the number of U.S. forces with advanced technical render-safe skills and improvement in their speed of response; the improvement of the expansion of the U.S. forces capabilities to locate, track and tag shipments of WMD missiles and related materials, including the transportation means used to move such items; also, the relocation of funding within the chemical-biological defense program to advance more than $1.5 bil-
lion over the next 5 years to develop broad spectrum medical countermeasures against advanced bio-terrorist threats.

The subcommittee's goal is to understand more fully how the QDR decisions will be implemented. We look forward to hearing about our successes to date and the challenges that remain ahead. In addition, the subcommittee seeks to understand how the QDR decision supports the National Military Strategy to combat WMD which was also released in February 2006. The National Military Strategy provides the guidance for executing the U.S. military WMD-related nonproliferation counter proliferation and consequence management missions.

The strategy assigned roles and responsibilities for the military and carrying out its combating WMD strategies. In particular, the strategy identifies the commander of the United States Strategic Command as the lead combat commander for integrating and synchronizing DOD efforts in combating WMD.

The subcommittee hopes to understand how U.S. STRATCOM commander plans to operationalize the National Military Strategy, particularly in the support of DTRA. For example, what exactly is meant by integrating and synchronizing and how will DTRA enable this mission?

To address these issues, we are very fortunate to have with us today the Honorable Peter Flory, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Internal Security Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and Dr. James Tegnelia, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Director, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Center of the United States Strategic Command.

Gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony.

Before we go there, let me turn to my friend and colleague from Boston for any comments he may wish to make.

Mr. Meehan.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Saxton can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

STATEMENT OF HON. MARTIN T. MEEHAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CapABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you very much for calling this hearing, and I look forward, as well, to the testimony of our panel.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, I am keenly interested in our nation's effort to combat existing and potential weapons of mass destruction. I have long been a strong advocate of strengthening our efforts to respond to such threats.

And, Mr. Chairman, as you noted in your opening statement, preparation to counter WMDs include both defenses and defensive measures. And considerable resources have been allocated in these areas.

But preparation also includes the elimination of potential threats, an area of emphasis called nonproliferation. Cooperative threat reduction and goal-threat reduction initiatives are excellent examples of the nonproliferation programs. I supported vehicles at their inception and continue to advocate their continuation.
Reducing stockpiles of potentially harmful weapons-grade material is, in effect, a counter-counterproliferation effort. It focuses on the front-end of the problem. It offers possible elimination of a threat before it can materialize.

I look forward to the testimony today, especially as it can shed further light on the administration’s budget request to thwart, defend and respond to potential WMDs.

I am most concerned to see the budget request remain basically flat from 2006 funding levels failing to keep up with inflation. I am further concerned to see that some of the promising initiatives that would not grow under the administration’s plan presumably because of new programmatic requirements that have been transferred from other parts of the government.

I am, for instance, specifically disturbed to see that no increase in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. The budget request does not include an increase as projected in last year’s budget cycle. I presume it is because of the cost requirements associated with the efforts to convert U.S. research reactors from highly to lowly enriched uranium fuels, a program transferred from the Department of Energy to the Office of Nuclear Energy.

But, as I noted, I stand firm in my support of efforts to combat both real and potential threat of WMDs, and to be sure, we must fully recognize counterproliferation and consequence management activities.

We also need to emphasize nonproliferation efforts because in an ounce of prevention can potentially lessen the difficult demands placed on the response community.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your time and for your work in putting together this hearing.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

Mr. Flory, I guess we are set to start here.

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER C.W. FLORY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Secretary Flory. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Meehan and members of the subcommittee. It is an honor to appear before you today to describe the Defense Department’s efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or WMD, and our plans to implement the recommendations outlined in the February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review on the subject of WMD.

I apologize for my somewhat raggedy voice at this point, but this is the fourth in several hearings in the last few days, and I think you are getting about the last juice out of this lemon here in terms of my voice.

Mr. Chairman, in my oral statement, I will touch on some of the highlights of the department’s combating WMD efforts. I request that my more detailed prepared statement be included in the record.

Mr. SAXTON. Without objection.

Secretary Flory. The 2006 QDR is the first time that a QDR has devoted such attention to the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring
or using WMD was one of the four priorities identified by the review.

In addition, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, recently issued the first-ever National Military Strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction. The strategy is built on the so-called three pillars of nonproliferation, counterproliferation and consequence management that were identified in the 2002 National Strategy to Combat WMD.

We define these terms as follows: "Nonproliferation" refers to actions to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by dissuading or impeding access to or distribution of sensitive technologies, material and expertise. "Counterproliferation" refers to actions to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, its armed forces, allies or partners. Last, "consequence management" refers to actions taken to mitigate the effects of the WMD attack or WMD event, and to restore essential operations and services at home and abroad.

This new strategic framework divides the broad combating WMD mission into eight definable military activities that can be addressed as existing budget training, doctrine, and policy processes. These areas are offensive operations, elimination, interdiction, active defenses, passive defenses, consequence management, security cooperation and partner activities, and threat reduction.

In addition to this new strategic emphasis, the Department of Defense has transformed its organizational structure to better combat weapons of mass destruction. On January 6, 2005, the secretary of defense designated the United States Strategic Command, or STRATCOM, commanded by General Cartwright—and represented today by Dr. Tegnelia, wearing one of his several hats—as the department's lead for synchronizing and integrating combating WMD operational efforts and support of our combatant commanders.

In this new role, STRATCOM is designated to serve as advocate for developing combating WMD mission requirements to move them through the budget process and to support other combatant commanders as they execute combating WMD operations.

On January 31, 2006, the Secretary of Defense appointed the director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, DTRA, with an additional duty as the director of STRATCOM's Combating WMD Center, or SCC. This is where Dr. Tegnelia got his second or third hat.

This appointment was recommended by the QDR and was designed to enhance STRATCOM's ability to synchronize and integrate the department's combating WMD efforts.

Complementing this reorganization, all DOD components have been directed to realign themselves to improve execution of the combating WMD mission.

In the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, for example, my own office realigned over the past six months to create a near-single point of contact for policy support of the combating WMD mission. My office is now responsible for seven of the eight mission areas identified earlier as part of the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD, specifically the offensive operations, elimination, interdiction, active defense, passive defense, security
cooperation and partner activities, and threat reduction elements of
the strategy.

Organizing our oversight of consequence management capabili-
ties is something that we are still working on.

QDR addresses both the preventive and the responsive dimen-
sions necessary to combat the weapons of mass destruction.

Preventive activities include those that build and expand global
partnerships aimed at preventing proliferation, that stop WMD-re-
lated trafficking, and help friendly governments improve controls
over existing weapons of mass destruction, and that discredit WMD
as an instrument of national power.

If these preventive activities fail, DOD must be prepared to re-

don by locating, securing and destroying WMD. Neither the pre-
ventive nor the responsive dimensions of combating WMD will suc-
ceed without adequate funding for corresponding capabilities, tech-
nologies and activities.

Beginning with the fiscal year 2006 budget submission, we have
added $2 billion to the previous $7.6 billion fiscal year 2006 to 2011
allocation for the chemical-biological defense program and related
infrastructure. That is an increase of almost 20 percent. And I
should point out that account was previously in the preceding 5
years just about doubled in its funding.

While we have made recent advances in this specific area, our ef-
forts in combating WMD funding remains a work in progress.

And we look forward to working with STRATCOM as the com-
mand identifies and defines additional requirements.

With respect to the preventive dimension, we have long viewed
nonproliferation treaties and export control regimes—for example,
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention, and the Missile Technology Control Regime—as integral
elements of our strategy for combating WMD. While these regimes
are a first line of defense however, not all countries are members
of all regimes and many countries that are members, frankly,
cheat.

WMD programs in countries like Iran and North Korea have
highlighted the need for additional measures such as interdiction.
Interdiction is an essential component in our efforts to combat the
proliferation activities of both suppliers and of customers.

As part of this effort, DOD has taken steps to strengthen U.S.
military capabilities to support interdiction. And in addition to U.S.
interdiction efforts, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) has
been a forum for the United States and other countries to collabo-
rate on how we will work together to interdict WMD-related ship-
ments bound to and from states of concern, and to build national
capabilities so that like-minded nations collectively have a more ro-
bust arsenal of WMD interdiction tools. Today, more the 70 coun-
tries have indicated support for the PSI.

With respect to the responsive dimension, we learned from our
military operations in Iraq that DOD needs a well-organized and
trained force that can quickly and systematically locate, seize, se-
cure, disable, and safeguard an adversary’s WMD program, includ-
ing sites, laboratories, materials, and associated scientists, and
other personnel.
The Army’s 20th Support Command was activated in 2004 to provide technically qualified chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives, or CBRNE, response forces to support geographic combatant commanders. In the QDR process, the Defense Department leadership approved a proposal to transform the 20th Support Command into a fully deployable headquarters that could command and control this type of operation.

Another key conclusion of the QDR was the department should focus on new defensive capabilities in anticipation of the continued evolution of WMD threats. In response, DOD has reallocated funding within the chem-bio defense program to invest over $1.5 billion over the next 5 years to develop broad spectrum countermeasures against advanced biological threats.

The QDR also emphasized the need for partners to be prepared for operations with us in the weapons of mass destruction world. In 2002, the department proposed the creation of a CBRN defense battalion for NATO. This U.S. concept was endorsed by NATO defense ministers during the 2002 Prague summit and elements of a fully operational CBRN defense battalion actually supported the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens just over a year later. This battalion has received personnel and capabilities from around 20 NATO nations to date.

We also have or are in the process of establishing bilateral working groups with countries from Europe, the Middle East, and Asia that share our desire to prepare for defense against the WMD threat. A central goal of these bilateral working groups is to ensure that U.S. and potential coalition partners can execute combined operations in the WMD environment.

While the challenge of interoperability is significant in a conventional warfighting environment, WMD situation creates a number of additional challenges and issues.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, I just would like to say that the Department of Defense understands that combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction in a complex and uncertain world, requires a new approach. This new approach is reflected in our strategic direction, our realigned organizational structure, and the changes in our day-to-day activities.

Our commitment to succeed in the endeavor is absolute. Failure is not an option. Congress is an essential partner in this fight and we look forward to both your support in the past and for continuing our work together in the future.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Flory can be found in the Appendix on page 42.]

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Flory.

Dr. Tegnelia.

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES A. TEGNELIA, DIRECTOR, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND CENTER FOR COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, AND DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

Dr. Tegnelia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here this afternoon to testify before you on the subject of QDR and
the recommendations and initiative that were emphasized in the QDR for combating weapons of mass destruction.

I also have a prepared statement, which I would like to submit for the record. And I would like to talk to give you just a brief oral summary.

Mr. Saxton. Thank you.

Dr. Tegnelia. As Secretary Flory mentioned, I am talking to you today from two positions. The first one is the director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and also as the director of the U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. Given those two titles, I thought today that I would cover with you three topics.

The first one is to talk very briefly about the capabilities of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency relative to combating weapons of mass destruction.

The second issue is to talk to you about the STRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. Hopefully, I will shed a little light if you will help me with this on the idea of integrating and synchronizing the elements of the war on combating weapons of mass destruction.

And then the third topic that I would like to turn to briefly are the initiatives which were specified in the QDR relative to combating weapons of mass destruction and give you a little bit of the sense of what we are doing with regard to those five recommendations.

Those are the three topics.

If you would, I would like to turn a review of the DTRA activities. DTRA is an organization of 1,800 military people and civilians whose sole mission is the responsibility for combating weapons of mass destruction. We are not the only organization to combat weapons of mass destruction in the department, but we are the only organization with 100 percent dedication to that particular mission.

We have 32 offices in the United States and worldwide where we work with our partners, our allies, and our combatant commanders solely on the issue of combating weapons of mass destruction. At any one time, we have approximately 30 teams deployed from our headquarters in Fort Belvoir to these various countries to assist our partners in the process of combating weapons of mass destruction.

As Peter mentioned, the National Strategy on Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction has three pillars: nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management. We have programs which support all three of those pillars.

In nonproliferation, we are the executor for Secretary Flory on both treaty implementation and cooperative threat reduction Nunn-Lugar funds, we execute those programs for the secretary’s office.

Counterproliferation is creating the capabilities to work with people who might not cooperate with us in doing away with weapons of mass destruction. So activities like interdiction, elimination, location target track, pardon deeply buried targets—all of those programs which are part of counterproliferation are being executed in DTRA.
And then, finally, the consequence management which is the 
ability to respond and restore operations after the use of such a 
weapon, protection of our forces, protection of the forces against 
coming down with an infection associated with a biological weapon, 
decontamination of equipment, restoration of operations—those 
types of things we perform in DTRA. The budget for DTRA this 
year is about $2.9 billion.

What I would like to do now is turn to the Center for Combating 
Weapons of Mass Destruction for STRATCOM and talk briefly 
about that center. In January of 2005, the secretary of defense as-
signed to the commander of STRATCOM the responsibility for be-
coming the lead combatant commander in combating the war on 
weapons of mass destruction.

As you indicated, the primary mission there was to integrate and 
synchronize the responses of the department with regard to weap-
ons of mass destruction. What I mean by that terminology is the 
idea that our regional combatant commanders now have war plans, 
all of which address their particular geographic area of responsibil-
ity.

It is a responsibility of General Cartwright in STRATCOM to 
take those individual war plans and integrate those war plans to-
gether into a single reinforcing plan and the capabilities to address 
those plans so we have an integrated approach to combating weap-
ons of mass destruction.

Synchronization is the idea of getting multiple effects to reinforce 
each other. And I will just give you a simple example of that.

Within General Cartwright’s responsibility is not only the capa-
bility of eliminating weapons of mass destruction, rendering them 
safe, but he also has intelligence assets assigned to him. And it is 
important that the intelligence assets are assigned to reinforce the 
elimination and render safe responsibilities so the people who per-
form those missions have the best intelligence that they have avail-
able to them to be able to perform those missions. That is what is 
meant by synchronizing; getting these various capabilities to work 
together and reinforce each other’s efforts.

With that in mind, in August of 2005, the secretary of defense 
asked the commander of STRATCOM asked DTRA to help him 
support his efforts with regard to weapons of mass destruction and 
we have taken on three responsibilities which I will outline very 
quickly.

I mentioned to you that the presence we have around the world 
with regard to this weapons of mass destruction countering. That 
gives General Cartwright a very good situational awareness of 
what the problems are with regard to weapons of mass destruction 
worldwide.

We work with the intelligence community. We work with the 
other agencies in the Federal Government to understand just what 
the current and the future problems for weapons of mass destruc-
tion are.

The first responsibility is situation awareness. The second re-
ponsibility is the idea of deploying planner to help the regional 
commands who are not experts in combating weapons of mass de-
struction to get the best talent that the department can provide. In
this case, we hope that DTRA is supplying that to those combatant commanders to help them with their planning.

When you have a sense of what the problem is and you understand what their plans are, and you also understand what the gaps are, where do we need capability, and the issue of trying to be able to get to identify those gaps. And to fill those gaps with new capabilities is the topic of advocacy and that advocacy role is also played by General Cartwright.

Those three capabilities we have set out to establish for him.

We created an initial operational capability for him in January of this year, 2006. And sitting behind me is Admiral Bill Laufler. He has been on board now—Bill, where are you?

Admiral LAUFLER. Right here.

Dr. TEGNELIA. He has been on board now for exactly two days. This is part of his introduction into the organization. He will be the senior military person in this center that will help us take the capabilities of DTRA, operationalize them for STRATCOM, and interface them with the STRATCOM responsibilities.

Sir, without any question, I would like to move to the last topic very quickly, and that is the QDR, and just to summarize that very quickly.

The QDR had five initiatives which it suggested that we should undertake. I just talked about the first of those and that is the center for combating weapons of mass destruction in STRATCOM. That center was called out specifically in the QDR.

Four other initiatives, three of which are very closely linked. If you are in the process of trying to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, the first think that you have to be able to do is locate them, target them, and track them. That is the first initiative that the department said that we ought to be able to do.

The second initiative is once you find them, you have to be able to render them safe—and that is the ability to defuse them, to make sure that they are no longer dangerous to either our forces or neutrals or others in the activity. The Department of Energy has had a major responsibility in the render safe issue associated with nuclear weapons. A lot of the work we do is working with them to do that activity.

Once you render them safe, then you have to eliminate them—that is, make them no longer usable as weapons of mass destruction. The department addressed all three of those recommendations and what they suggested was to look at what operational capabilities and location target track are necessary to develop.

There is a joint activity which is now being conducted by the company commander of STRATCOM looking at what our capabilities are there, what we can do to operationalize them, what new capabilities we need, and how to proceed with this important initiative.

DTRA does research in that area, particularly with regards to long-range detection of nuclear and chem-bio weapons, and that is part of this initiative on part of the department.

On the render safe activity, render safe requires explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists, select EOD specialists. In 2007, we are going to start to train an expanded capability with those specialists. And then in 2008, it is to give them the very specialized
and sophisticated equipment that they need to be able to handle weapons of mass destruction.

And as I indicated, this is being done very closely with the Department of Energy because they have very, very excellent expertise with regard to the nuclear problem that has to be brought to bear on this particular activity.

The elimination activity is an activity which Secretary Flory addressed, and that is the 20th Support Command is an activity which was stood up after Iraq to take care of the elimination responsibility in both a permissive and hostile or non-permissive environment. Getting that deployable in fiscal year 2007 is the first objective that the QDR suggested that we meet.

Until they are totally deployable, which is going to be early in the next decade, there is to be a joint standing task force which is capable of doing this elimination activity and that activity is in the process of being stood up.

And that covers four of the initiatives: the standing up of the center, how do you find them, how do you render them safe, and how do you eliminate them.

And the last topic had to do with the very specialized activity and this has to do with future chemical and biological weapons. We all hope and believe that advancing biological sciences will produce a societal good, particularly in the medical environment. But in the hands of the wrong people, biological sciences can produce weapons that we are not prepared to encounter.

So the department has put aside $1.5 billion in the current 5-year plan to look at what in the technical jargon is stated as "multi-spectral or wide-spectrum therapeutics." The example of that would be today, when you have a flu vaccine, it is specifically addressed to the virus which is expected to occur this particular year in the country or the world.

A wide spectrum therapeutic would be one which is able to address multiple strains of the same problem, like multiple strains of virus so you wouldn’t have to re-engineer that virus every time there was a flu virus that entered the world.

And that is important because when one is able to do genetic engineering, it would be possible to tailor these vaccines and your therapeutics would not be able to work against a bio-engineered threat. So the idea is to make the spectrum wide enough so bio-engineering would not invalidate the therapeutics that we have.

And that initiative is one which we have been investigating now in our basic research program for quite a while. There are some very promising approaches to that research and we believe it will be able to produce some examples of therapeutics through this particular program.

So recognizing that problem, going out to address that problem was the last initiative that the QDR suggested that we undertake.

Mr. Chairman, I think I will stop my remarks there. I hope I have covered the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the center for STRATCOM, and the initiatives of the QDR. And I am prepared to try to answer any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Tegnelia can be found in the Appendix on page 50.]

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, Dr. Tegnelia.
A very interesting. I couldn’t help but sit here and smile and feel
good at the last topic that you addressed, because I wore out five
pairs of shoes traipsing around this Hill with Dr. Alibek trying to
get people interested in that subject eight or ten years ago. And to
have it part of the QDR today just is a wonderful thing.

To think of the applications that that concept has going forward,
not only on weapons of mass destruction and related issues, but on
disease generally, is an awesome topic. I am glad that you are in
the right camp.

Dr. TEGNELIA. Sir, you have the experts with us.

Joe, where are you?

Joe Palma is the champion of that program within the depart-
ment, and he also is the resident expert. So if you have any ques-
tions related to that, Colonel Palma will be able to address them
for you.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

Dr. TEGNELIA. I am also pleased that Mr. Alibek is now in the
right camp rather than wandering around the world somewhere
else.

Mr. SAXTON. For people who don’t understand what we are talk-
ing about, Dr. Ken Alibek, whose Ukrainian name was Alibekov,
headed up the offensive biological weapons department in the So-
 viet Union until 1992 when he, I think, realized he had been doing
the wrong work for the wrong team and he defected to this country
in 1992. Through a friend, I met him, and I helped to foster his
efforts to find antidotes for the varied weaponized diseases that he
developed in the Soviet Union.

He later went to George Mason University where he taught and
did research, and he is now capable of infecting small rodents and
rabbits with smallpox and anthrax and then administering the
Treatment, whatever it is, which I don’t understand or need to. And
I think he has 100 percent success rate with rabbits, if I am not
mistaken.

Is that right?

Yes. So a good story.

Let me ask you a couple of questions. You kind of piqued my in-
terest with your areas of responsibility. You mentioned two terms:
nonproliferation and counterproliferation.

I would assume that in terms of nonproliferation, that there are
several aspects that we could identify to nonproliferation, including
convincing our friends and allies and some who may not be our
friends and allies, that it would be a good idea for the world if they
kept what they had to themselves. And we do that through the
process of treaty-making and agreements of various kinds.

And part of nonproliferation would also then be the Nunn-Lugar-
type approach where we try to provide funds for various aspects of
perhaps undoing what some people have done, or other Nunn-
Lugar functions.

Counterproliferation then would take place with respect to some
of our friends and allies and some of our friends and allies who are
not friends and allies, if that makes any sense, who fail to take
part in the agreement-making process, and we need to find ways
to counter their efforts to spread weapons of mass destruction.
My question, I guess, is this: Where do you draw the line between your responsibilities and the responsibilities of others, particularly on nonproliferation?

Dr. TEGNELIA. That is an interesting question.

As you point out, we have a number of mechanisms in place to deal with nonproliferation. Part of it is international regimes, traditional international regimes like the NPT or the NCTR, the CWC, and those have their own mechanisms in place. Now, sometimes the mechanisms we find with experience, are not all we would like them to be.

For example, after we found in 1991 that Iraq at the time had a much more advanced nuclear program than we expected despite having been under full IAEA scrutiny. We developed additional, so-called additional protocol approach which required greater IAEA scrutiny of countries.

With the NPT, we have also found the difficulty of dealing with countries like North Korea or Iran, which are in the NPT which use it as cover to get “legal” civilian nuclear facilities and equipment which they then misuse particularly through misuse of the fuel cycle to either enrich uranium for weapons programs or to reprocess plutonium for weapons programs.

And, frankly, one of the reasons that we have come up with other measures such as the PSI and a lot of the other things we are doing is precisely because some of the traditional nonproliferation regimes did not succeed.

It is like a lot of laws, which is all the people who tend to be law-abiding abide by them anyway. And the people who intend to break them invest a lot of energy and money and duplicity in evading them. So the challenge of enforcing those regimes with the nonproliferation will—sort of the outer-most circle of our protection here is a very great one.

Counterproliferation I see as more what we do after for whatever reason we have failed in that. That is where the—we have to defeat the threat of use or the use of an actual capability, for example, by chemical gear, by chemical-biological protective gear, which is one of the things that the funding increases over the last years have gone into doing is revamping our forces’ chemical and biological protective gear.

In terms of getting it to countries and trying to get them to behave the right way or not go the wrong way, I think one example of the success recently in that is Libya, which is a country that we certainly didn’t put in the friend category before. [Laughter.]

But a country which when faced with—was basically caught doing what it was doing and running an illegal nuclear program—which decided to get out of that business, and since that time, we encouraged them to do that. We helped them do that. And we regard that as a fairly significant success story.

I don’t know if I am getting to the heart of your question there, but just looking at some of the sort of different aspects that you raised there, I am trying to hit some of those. Am I—

Mr. SAXTON. I assume that you work with the Department of State—

Dr. TEGNELIA. Yes.

Mr. SAXTON [continuing]. On a ongoing basis——
Dr. TEGNELIA. Absolutely.
Secretary FLORY. If I could——
Dr. TEGNELIA. Excuse me, Peter.
Secretary FLORY. If I could add something just on the point that
you were mentioning, Mr. Chairman.

This is a small community that is very well-coordinated. We
work through the Department of State, the Department of Energy
and the Department of Defense. The work in the former Soviet
Union is very closely integrated, and we make sure that we don’t
duplicate the work of each other.

We have kind of a rough working relationship. For example, the
Department of Energy is more expert in securing nuclear materials
activities, but the Department of the Defense is better at destroy-
ing weaponry and de-milling weapons, and so they handle the ma-
terial aspects and we handle the weapons aspects of it.

Very often we will do things like border security in former Soviet
Union states and we will coordinate and do the work with the FBI,
the Department of Justice, those types of things. So it is a well-
integrated and coordinated activity.

On the last point on that, in the counterproliferation area, we
have what is called a CPRLC, Counter-Proliferation Review Commit-
tee, which integrates all the programs together. It provides you
with an integrated report of the activities that we are doing in
counterproliferation each year. And it, first of all, deconflicts all the
programs and gives you a summary of the budget activities that we
are pursuing at any one time.

So it is a small, fairly well-coordinated community dedicated to
this work.

Dr. TEGNELIA. If you counted all the bodies, I am not sure it is
actually all that small. But it is a lot of people in a lot of agencies,
as Jim says, and a great deal of work is going into integrating
these activities. We work closely with State, for example, on PSI.
As Jim described, in the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) pro-
gram, Department of Energy (DOE) handles the nuclear materials;
we handle warheads and chemicals and things.

There is an awful lot going on there, but it is well tied together.
Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much.

I have a number of other questions, but I am going to save them
for a little later.
Mr. Meehan.
Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Flory, you recently made a statement at the Senate Armed
Services Committee hearing that the chemical weapons destruction
project at Shchuchye, Russia, will be delayed for up to 14 months.
Yet the budget request, Shchuchye is almost $66 million lower
than the fiscal year 2006 appropriation amount.

It would seem that Russia will have a hard time meeting the
Chemical Weapons Convention deadline at the 100 percent destruc-
tion by 2012 without the money it needs. It seems that this could
have grave political consequences as Russia is likely to point a fin-
ger at the United States, saying we are not holding up our end of
the bargain.

I have two questions regarding this. What is the specific time pe-
riod of delay? My recollection was 14 months.
And what has caused the delay? A lot of experts seem to believe that the change-over of all U.S. personnel working on the project has been a significant factor and may have been unnecessary. And I am wondering were these experts right, and are there any other factors that may have contributed to the delay?

Secretary Flory. Mr. Meehan, I think you are right on the delay. I think 14 months is about correct.

What happened is this: We had a fairly significant subcontract that involved installing the equipment that basically that became de-mill equipment in one of the main buildings there. We had one bid for the subcontract. It is an American contractor. A Russian subcontractor bid for it. The price they wanted was very, very high, way beyond what we thought was appropriate. As a result of that, we have rebid the contract.

I don't know if it is still open for bidding now, but we rebid the contract and we are hoping——

Dr. Tegnelia. It just went out.

Secretary Flory. The bid just went out. Okay.

So what we are trying to do here was get the work done within a more reasonable ceiling. Our overall budget for the Shchuchye project is actually tapped under a ceiling. What we are trying to do is to get the best value for our taxpayers here as well as get the job done, but it does involve a delay.

If I could add with respect to your earlier question about why the CTR budget took a dip, it was because when the budget was put together—and given the lead time of some of these things, it was probably about a year ago—at that point, the projection for funding on Shchuchye was going to go down and the budget request took that into account.

The contracting issue that we are dealing with now is not something we assume is necessarily going to be dealt with by spending more money but what we need to do is get the bids in and see where we are.

Mr. Meehan. Okay.

On that issue, but are we spending all this money—you put up fences to secure WMDs, but how are we going to guarantee that we are going to have guards to man the fences and the money for the upkeep for the future, given what the budget projections look like?

Secretary Flory. Well, my expectation is that future budgets will probably come back up somewhat.

Now, in terms of guaranteeing, I don't know. That is difficult to do. And one of the things we need to remember is that we are not the only or the main partner in this. I mean, the Russian government is the main partner in this and they have responsibilities, too.

But my expectation is, while the budget, as I have said, has dipped down, this year my expectation is the budget request may well go up in the future to provide an adequate amount for these activities.

Dr. Tegnelia. Congressman, when we perform one of these tasks in Russia, we have an implementing agreement with the government and that implementing agreement specifies the responsibilities of the parties in the process of performing that program.
This thing about guaranteeing that they uphold their parts of the agreement is something we inspect to make sure that they do. And so far, we have the expectation that they will follow through with their requirements on that program.

Mr. Meehan. What can we read into the fact that the budget request is $66 million lower than the fiscal year 2006 appropriated amount? Is that because it is going to up in the future, or what do we read into that?

Secretary Flory. What we should read into that is the expectation was that we could get the work done that we needed to do for the amount we requested the money for, and because that involved a ramping down in the Shchuchye project, which was not a surprise. It wasn’t anything new. It was just part of the schedule that the budget took that ramping down into account.

I don’t know if you have any more you want to add on that?

Dr. Tegnelia. The only thing that I would suggest is, I wouldn’t make the assumption that this problem is the responsibility of the United States government. The problem was with a Russian subcontractor and their quotations were significantly higher than we believed and expected they should be.

And so one of the things we have to do is go back to them and see what their responsibilities are and see what our responsibility is and then determine how to proceed. So I wouldn’t start with the assumption we are going to come in for a request for the full budget shortfall that we saw on this particular contract.

Mr. Meehan. Okay.

And how long will that process likely take?

Dr. Tegnelia. Sir, we went out with bids this morning, as a matter of fact. I just say that because we are also concerned about—

Mr. Meehan [continuing]. Of this hearing?

Dr. Tegnelia. No, sir. In the anticipation of getting it done as quickly as we can. And we expect a response in 60 days.

And we have prequalified the contractor so we know they are competent to do this. And we expect in some reasonable amount of time after that, we will have a better understanding what the impact is both in scheduling and cost.

And then we have to go into this important issue of assigning how much responsibility we have and how much the Russian government has.

Mr. Meehan. Great. Thank you, Doctor.

Mr. Saxton. Thank you.

Ms. Tauscher.

Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, it is good to see you again.

I want to continue this conversation about Shchuchye because I want to understand what the impact of this contracting snafu—whatever you want to call it—has on the construction deadlines that we have that are a part of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). We have deadlines that we have to meet. We now have a contracting problem but we can’t actually begin to do the work that we expected to do.

And then potentially we have a budget issue because as you understand that once you ramp down, ramping up is twice as hard.
And we are going to have to recover a sizable amount into your budget in order to kind of get us to where we are going to go.

Could you talk a little bit about what our contractual obligations are in the CWC and what the impact of not having this contract and beginning to work is going to be?

Dr. TEGNELIA. First of all, I am afraid it is a little bit premature to answer your questions, but let me just give you a sense of how we are looking at it.

We have a responsibility to build a facility, to do what are called system tests which means to get the facility to work. And then it is the responsibility of the Russian government to destroy those weapons. It is not a U.S. Government responsibility.

We have a date——

Ms. TAUSCHER. That is the outcome we are looking for. I mean, we have——

Dr. TEGNELIA. Yes.

Ms. TAUSCHER [continuing]. That we are doing and it is the Dance of the Seven Veils. But in the end, all of this is about destroying this——

Dr. TEGNELIA. Yes, ma'am. And our milestones for establishing that facility were to be able to do the systems test in fiscal year 2008 which would give them enough time to finish their destruction and for them to take the responsibility for meeting the convention.

We are in the process of trying to assess whether we can still complete those system test in that time. And this 60-day turnaround in trying to understand that is trying to get a handle on just what our schedule implications are.

It is going to be tight to get that done in 2008, and we are looking at work around plants so I don't want to tell you there is no schedule and there is no cost. In fact, I think Congressman—Secretary Flory's——

Secretary FLORY. I just got promoted.

Dr. TEGNELIA [continuing]. Assessment that you should be aware of the fact that we are having a problem here is important. But we are looking at the implications now.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Because I think in the end what we would perhaps want to determine is assuming that we could get this contract, this RFC out on the street, get them back, do a good analysis, let a contract. I mean, that all can happen, and apparently that has already happened once, so that may be a tough thing to achieve.

But if we can get that done, what I don’t want to do is find that we actually conveniently let the Russians off the hook that we want them to do, which is this end product of actually doing the de-mill.

Dr. TEGNELIA. We certainly share that objective, and we will be consulting with you as we understand what is happening here.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Because from my point of view, it seems to me that what we want to eventually get to evaluate—give us our information—is there a cost still to hear of actually getting it done on time?

For instance, there are costs to letting it slip. So, I mean, at some level we may decide that we want you to actually encourage
you to come to us for a budget request that includes what these hidden costs are for not doing this work, which are significant because they are security costs, versus coming and asking us for extra money to get it done on time.

One is that we don't let the Russians off the hook; two, because there are hidden costs. And that is the second piece. We need to understand what those hidden costs are so that when we get the decision on what this contract is, assuming that there is going to be some increase between what you didn't expect and what you want to spend, you know, that is the way you work with the Russians.

When we understand that, we also have to know what this other number is so that we can make a decision on whether that is the real number and maybe that is the cost of doing business and that we go ahead and help you get that, that we can actually get these things done on time as opposed to Federal slip.

Dr. Tegnelia. I guess the perspective I would leave you is we are in fact sensitive to the issues that you are talking about. We will generate options.

My sense is we will understand much better where we are this summer and be able to address them more appropriately at that time. We invite your patience for that.

Ms. Tauscher. And maybe Secretary Flory has a response.

But, Mr. Chairman, if I could ask that we get a written response when we have actually unwound all of this and have a sense for if this contract is actually going to get let and what it all means, what this other number is that we are going to have to spend anyhow to secure the facilities and to secure these weapons, add them together and decide whether that is the real cost of getting this done and how we facilitate that.

If we can get an answer this summer without having to ask for it again, I would appreciate that.

Mr. Saxton. If you would forward us a written reply to that question, we would appreciate it.

Secretary Flory. If I could just briefly add, just to give an idea of what we are talking about here.

The bid we received is we estimate it is inflated by, you know, four to five times. So it is a very substantial, it is a Russian state-owned company. You know, we are trying to get this done right.

We do understand, and Jim says, there are other equities at play here, but we also—although it is not an ungenerous budget we have—money we spend in one place is money we can't spend in another.

Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Saxton. Thank you.

Mr. Gibbons.

Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And, gentlemen, thanks for being here today.

I have sat here and listened to your testimony, looked through your written comments. Which part of the WMD picture are your agencies responsible for on a domestic basis? In other words, from a terrorist basis in the country? Do you have any part of your jurisdiction covering WMD for the internal part of the United States?
Secretary FLORY. Within Policy, not in my office, but within Policy, we have the assistant secretary of defense, Paul McHale—actually a former member of this body—is assistant secretary for homeland defense, and he is the main adviser for the secretary of defense for that aspect of what the Defense Department does.

And with respect to WMD, one of the things we are resolving right now is the question of where consequence management, domestic consequence management, would reside as part of the trying to get to a single point of contact.

But in terms of most DOD activities, at least within my part of the building within Policy relating to homeland security, the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense is the—do you want to add something?

Dr. TEGNELIA. General Cartwright, as the lead commander, is required to support NORTHCOM in its activities for domestic security, and to the degree that NORTHCOM would ask for assistance, DTRA helps NORTHCOM in combating weapons of mass destruction. And we work with agencies like Homeland Security and the Department of Energy—but to help NORTHCOM in its responsibilities to handle domestic issues.

Secretary FLORY. And Assistant Secretary McHale works with the Homeland Security Council and with the Department of Homeland Security and all the other actors in that field.

Mr. GIBBONS. So what I hear you saying is there is an agency or department within the Department of Defense—Secretary McHale’s portion that is looking at and concerned with all of the applications of WMD domestically?

From your standpoint, from looking at the international picture and then looking back retrospectively in the United States, what type of WMD do you feel we are most vulnerable in this country?

From what you see going on in your view looking outward, dealing with nations, helping them downsize their WMD capabilities, looking from that perspective, with the knowledge you have, what are we most susceptible to in this country?

Secretary FLORY. In this business there are actually a number of things that keep us awake at night. But the threat of a nuclear device is clearly the single greatest concern we have.

Now, in terms of susceptibility, there are ways in which the nuclear challenge is—it is certainly not easy. And one of the things we talk about in the QDR and that we are working on is the challenge of being able to locate and detect, find nuclear materials and nuclear devices as part of our efforts to keep them out of the country.

However, biological weapons, chemical weapons from a technical viewpoint are in many ways even harder because they use—creating them does not create the same signature. You don’t need a uranium enrichment or a plutonium facility. You don’t need some of the same large infrastructure in most of what you need.

In fact, I would say all of what you need can be done through dual-use equipment and can hypothetically be transported relatively easily from place to place.

Now, this is not—creating anthrax, for example, is more complex than one might have gotten the impression of eight or ten years ago when there was a lot of concern that basically any high school
chemistry student could do it in the bathtub. It is not quite that easy. But it is, nevertheless, something that we have to be concerned about.

We know that al Qaeda, for example, has worked on this. We know that other terrorist groups, ranging from the Aum Shinri Kyo to some others, have expressed—in the case of Aum Shinri Kyo, have actually developed—sarin and used it on the Tokyo subway.

The one we are most concerned about right now is al Qaeda. Again, we know that they have invested a lot of time and energy in trying to develop chemical and biological capabilities. We know that Bin Laden has said that it is the—this is a paraphrase of a quote, but it is sort of the duty of all Muslims to support the development of weapons of mass destruction of this type in order to defend the Muslim nation.

And both of those are things that we are deeply concerned about. Joe, I don’t know if you want to add anything on that?

Colonel PALMA. First of all, I would second the two threats that Secretary Flory mentioned.

I personally believe that while the probability of a nuclear event in this country might be small, the consequences are so high that it is just extremely important that we put a lot of our effort into that particular problem, particularly today.

Our strategies really are to prevent that from occurring just as far away from the United States shores as possible. That is why we put so much emphasis in the nonproliferation-related activity.

So today the problem is nuclear. I think tomorrow the future biological problem could become—the calculations that we run, the assessments that we run—biological problem in the future could be as serious as the nuclear problem. And so that is the reason why the QDR puts such emphasis on that particular problem and why we are putting so much effort into that particular activity.

Mr. GIBBONS. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, for taking an extra minute, but I wanted to follow up with this, because my concern is—and I don’t know how you interact with this—the rogue nation which does not invite us in, does not allow for us to have access to their capability, their interactions with groups like al Qaeda—how do you build that barrier between a rogue nation and it proliferates out than a terrorist organization like al Qaeda?

Secretary FLORY. It is very difficult. One of the reasons that we are concerned about both the threats posed by North Korea and its nuclear program, and Iran and its nuclear program is the risk they could possible share something with a terrorist group.

The Iranian government has long been the world’s number-one state sponsor of terrorism, and terrorism has been a weapon in its arsenal for decades now. Before 9/11, Iranian-backed groups like Hezbollah had killed more Americans than any other terrorist group.

So the concern that a government in Iran might see an advantage to itself in sharing material of this kind is one of the greatest concerns. And, of course, our ability to police that issue as you implied in your question, is very limited; likewise in the case of North Korea.

Now we do have things like the Proliferation Security Initiative that are designed to catch and prevent transfers of WMD or WMD
materials of any kind. That is one of the things we try to exploit, is the need to get things from the supplier to the buyer or receiver, but particularly when you are talking about small quantities of things, that becomes much harder. It is almost impossible to do.

Dr. TEGNELIA. The only thing that I would add is not only is the Department of Defense looking at those kinds of things, but Commerce and the Department of Energy are also doing programs like Megaports, which is aimed at trying to stop the migration of either material or weapons through normal commerce into the United States, part of the strategy of securing boarders and securing ports and the like as far forward of the United States as we can do it.

Secretary FLORY. And we should probably make clear here. We have at the Department of Defense, we have a big piece of this mission, but the Department of Energy and the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Health and Human Services, EPA—there are a lot of other agencies in the government who are working this, particularly with respect to nuclear materials which is primarily the DOE, and the events of the homeland which is, of course, the DHS’s lead responsibility.

Dr. TEGNELIA. I might add just one thing. This problem was a topic that was important enough the Department of Homeland Security has just stood up what is called the DNDO, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, the DNDO, which is concerned with the problem that you are talking about. This was a topic of a Defense Science Board study of two or three years ago related to exactly the problem that you are addressing.

So they are now in the process of working throughout the Federal Government. The Department of Defense is helping them with people and expertise as well, aimed at standing up both and R&D and an operational capability to address exactly the kind of problem that you are talking about.

So there is action. There is a lot of activity going on.

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Gibbons.

For fear of sounding like an alarmist, I would just say that you talked about the current ongoings and recent ongoings and past ongoings and activities that are taken by Iran. I was recently reminded that Stalin told the world what he was going to do and everybody thought he was crazy, and he did it. Hitler told the world what he was going to do, and everybody thought he was crazy, and he did it. Ahmadinejad is saying things and now I oftentimes hear how he is crazy.

Secretary FLORY. If I could just respond to that. You are absolutely right.

I was pleased at the recent Wehrkunde conference in Munich in February and a number of speakers including, I believe—I think I am right in saying Chancellor Merkel made this point—that we can’t hear somebody making statements like he is making, which are really, completely outlandish, outrageous statements which evoke, as you say, the things that Hitler said he was going to do in “Mein Kampf” and that everybody sort of dismissed at the time.

There is a tendency, after reading things like that, for people to try and discount it or say either “He is crazy” or “He must have meant something else” or “He is just bluffing.” And I think it is
very important sometimes for somebody to get up and say, you know, sometimes these people mean exactly what they say.

Mr. SAXTON. Elie Wiesel wrote in his book, “Night,”—he lived in Hungary—he said we saw what Hitler was doing in other parts of the country and we knew he would never come here. And we heard on London radio his progress in other parts of Europe, and we thought the United States will stop him before he comes here. The German soldiers came, and at first they were friendly because they were getting organized or whatever, and so everything seemed pretty normal, and then they rounded up Jews and loaded them on trains and took them to concentration camps, and the rest is history.

So, again, I am not trying to be an alarmist, but I think we should keep this bit of history in mind.

Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You raise an important point. I agree.

Mr. Gibbons raised some of the issues, touched on some of issues I want to discuss. Right now, I want to give you the opportunity to operate on DOD’s role with Homeland Security.

I also sit on the Homeland Security Committee, and it is an issue that we are constantly dealing with, the possibility of a terrorist WMD attack. And I have certainly been a strong advocate of installation of things such as radiation portal monitors to prevent WMD from getting across our borders.

But we also face the possibility of terrorists using materials that may already be here. Groups could launch attacks on chemical facilities. They could obtain unsecured radiological material to conduct a WMD attack on U.S. soil.

I wanted to give you the opportunity to further elaborate on the extent to which DOD is coordinating with the Department of Homeland Security to identify vulnerabilities within the Nation in preparing a response to mitigate those claims.

Secretary FLORY. Congressman, for my part, Assistant Secretary McHale, who is my colleague, who is the assistant secretary for homeland defense, is someone who would be in a better position to answer that. I know that he works very closely with the Department of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Committee at the White House and those.

I would be glad to take any questions for the record or anything like that you would like, and we, as a department, will pleased to get back to you. But that is not something that is in my responsibilities.

Now, Dr. Tegnelia, you provide technology support for a lot of these across the board, so you may be able to be more helpful here.

Dr. TEGNELIA. We work frequently with DHS to apply whatever competencies we have with DHS to help with these kinds of things. You are probably familiar with the Civil Support Teams (CSTs) in the National Guard which are set up to try to help these kinds of situations. We work with them to equip them and train them.

We developed sensors in our chem-bio defense program that have application to homeland security. We make sure that they are involved with that. Homeland Security did an exercise in San Diego called BioNet, where the Department of Defense and the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security looked at the integration of both the civil side of San Diego and the military side of San Diego and how we would prepare for those kinds of things.

So there is a vigorous exchange of not only technology but exercises to make sure that we are doing everything we can to prevent these kinds of activities here and also being able to respond to the consequences should we fail and something like this happens.

There is a very aggressive coordination and co-prosecution of this problem between the department and DHS.

Secretary FLORY. And I think, a related point—and I apologize for giving you a bureaucratic answer from my perspective—but the people working the technology like Dr. Tegnelia and his organization, that technology is sloshing around between all the relevant agencies. It is not sitting bottled up over in DOD or in some other agency. It is being shared and made available to all the people who might have a need for it.

Dr. TEGNELIA. If this would be helpful, I can give you one example which I think is kind of important, and it shows how the organizations work together.

This has to do with the issue of nuclear forensics. If you happen to capture a nuclear device or, Lord forbid, one went off, you would like to know who was the one responsible for that particular activity. That business of attribution of forensics is an activity which is being worked by the Homeland Security Council, coordinated through the Homeland Security Council.

The lead agency in performing it is the Department of Homeland Security. Both the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy and the Department of Homeland Security are coordinating that program to try to make sure that it gets prosecuted accurately and quickly.

And that is because the people who are expert in that area—where they reside isn’t important. It is important to get the particular job done. And I think the cooperation within the organizations is pretty good.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Let me turn back to a question that maybe Jim was touching on about Iran. One of the complexities of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is that it grants nations the right to use nuclear technology to keep both civilian energy purposes. However, we have seen, for example, in the case of Iran, that it is also difficult to verify that such nuclear programs don’t have a military component.

How can we ensure the nations are not using civilian energy programs as a front for proliferation? And is the existing inspections regimen sufficient to meet the nonproliferation goal?

Secretary FLORY. You raise a very good point and a very difficult challenge. And the Iranian and North Korean examples are prime cases. Also I mentioned earlier Iraq pre-1991 when it was under full, at the time, IAEA scrutiny and yet was able to come within a much closer time of having nuclear weapons that any of our intelligence agencies knew at the time.

The President has actually proposed a specific initiative that is designed to address this loophole, the fact that countries can under the guise of peaceful programs can develop nuclear weapons capabilities. And it is designed to limit uranium enrichment and pluto-
nium production, the two routes to disarm materials for a weapon
to those states who already have a full complete fuel process—in
other words, those countries that already have the full fuel cycle.
And that is something inevitable with a country like Iran that
would allow you to say, "Look, you can have your civilian program,
but you are not going to make your own fuel."

And it includes initiatives that the Department of Energy has
something, a program called the Global Nuclear Energy Part-ner-
ship. And I am not an expert on it and I would defer to the DOD,
but the basic goal of it is to allow countries to develop, help coun-
tries to develop civilian nuclear programs while facilitating for
them being able to get the fuel they need so that they don't have
the concern that they are going to have to invest all this money in
a program, a nuclear reactor, or a new civilian nuclear program
and then not be able to actually operate and produce electricity.

Mr. Langevin. Okay.

Mr. Saxton. Thank you, gentlemen.

The gentleman from Texas, who incidentally has had a long his-
story of interest in work on these subjects and related subjects, par-
ticularly the Department of Energy, Mr. Thornberry?

Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I couldn't help but reflecting, as you and Mr. Gibbons were talk-
ing, that when faced with the potential catastrophe, one reaction
is to stick your head in the sand. Another reaction is to create a
bunch of programs all over and pretend a lot of activity is really
going to make a difference. And I think that is a little bit of what
our government struggles with, to tell you the truth.

In the Intelligence Reform Act we passed more than a year ago,
it was encouraged, and now the President has set up a national
counterproliferation center (NCPC), and yet I haven't heard you all
mention and the law passed them with coordinating government-
wide strategies for dealing with trying to stop the proliferation
weapons of mass destruction—approaches to it.

Have you had no—and I realize they are young, just getting up
and started—but have you had no contact with them?

Secretary Flory. Actually, I met with Ambassador Brill before
he took over his job as the director of the agency, and I actually
was in a meeting yesterday where they were represented working
on a number of the issues here.

I think it is fair to say that it is a relatively newly stood-up orga-
nization, and my dealing with them have tended to focus on some
fairly specific areas, for example, intelligence, interdiction, and
other things.

We didn't mention them, but maybe that was an oversight. But
I don't think that should be read to imply that they are not getting
up and getting active and getting operational and not doing many
of things they have been charged to do.

Mr. Thornberry. I understand.

You all have talked a lot about various organizations all over and
various things and what you are trying to do is very hard. And I
think we all appreciate that.

Some would say that if a country like Iran believes its national
interest is to have a nuclear weapon, we are not going to be able
to stop it, and we better have a Plan B for dealing with it.
Dr. TEGNELIA. Sir, can I talk——

Mr. THORNBERY. But I hope what we don’t have is just a bunch of meetings around town without some sort of clear strategies to try to do whatever we can to try to limit the spread of such things.

Yes, sir, briefly, but I want to ask you another question before my time limit.

Dr. TEGNELIA [continuing]. Very quickly about NCPC.

One of things that we mentioned that we are trying to do for this STRATCOM responsibility is to give the commander of STRATCOM the situation where in he is working with the intelligence community. NCPC is a part of that activity. We, in fact, consult with them and have a person there who we coordinate with so they are very much involved with providing General Cartwright his situational awareness——

Mr. THORNBERY. I have to get back and I don’t have the language in front of me, but the summary provided by the staff and as I recall it, too, is they were charged in the law with coordinating counterproliferation plans and activities of various departments to prevent and halt proliferation.

It is not just the situational awareness that is their job. Their job is to make sure that everybody is singing off the same page and working together and trying to do something. And, of course, everybody is going to have to play for that to be successful.

If I can get down to a little more mundane questions, Doctor. At the time of the initial invasion in Iraq, there were all sorts of stories about how we had chem-bio suits that weren’t worth anything and that we were potentially exposing our soldiers to a situation where they were not going to be adequately protected.

Now, it seems to me that helping make sure that protection is adequate for our military is in your bailiwick and tell me, what our situation is today and how much are we spending to try to make sure that we detect—and then detect and then protect our folks?

Secretary FLORY. First of all, sir, I appreciate your understanding of the problem.

We actually had people in behind the forward line of troops trying to look for weapons of mass destruction, chem-bio activity and we were concerned about their vulnerability, so I appreciate your problem.

The department’s chem-bio defense activity is approximately $1.5 billion. Protection is an important element to that. There are significant strides being made in regard to protective garments and their ability to be worn comfortably—worn for long periods of time, something that has been a shortfall of those suits for a long time—and to give the soldier the protection that he needs.

So your point is not lost on us. We are in fact, investing in those kinds of activities and we are making progress in those activities.

Mr. THORNBERY. But today, if something happened in Iraq, would they be adequately protected?

What we heard is that the suits were so old that they wouldn’t even hold together.

Secretary FLORY. My view of it is we have the suits that will do the job.

And, Jim, do you want to second that or tell me whether I am wrong?
Mr. Thornberry. If you all would like provide a written response on it, that is fine, too. It is just——

Secretary Flory. Okay.

Mr. Thornberry [continuing]. Something that we need to know where we are now and——

Dr. Tegnelia. Why don't we provide you for the record, but that is an area of active pursuit. That is what the QDR was addressing was this issue of chem-bio defense.

Mr. Thornberry. Yes. That is fine.

Secretary Flory. If we can get back to you for the record.

Mr. Thornberry. Thanks.

Mr. Saxton. Thank you.

The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen.

Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Tegnelia, in your testimony on page four, number three in terms of your objectives: “expand the number of U.S. forces with advanced technical render safe skills and increase their speed of response.” Can you just put that into English for me, “advanced technical render safe skills”?

Dr. Tegnelia. “Render safe” is the ability to take over responsibility for a weapon, defuse it, and make sure that that weapon is safe for final demilitarization, de-weaponizing.

Mr. Larsen. And one of your roles under the QDR will expand the number of personnel that we have available to do that?

Dr. Tegnelia. Right now, that capability is a very specialized capability. Most of the activity is R&D related activities. A very small group of people that is capable of doing that technically. The idea now is to train up the DOD specialists, explosive ordinance disposal——

Mr. Larsen. Right.

Dr. Tegnelia [continuing]. Experts, get them trained to be able to perform this activity, get them the specialized equipment that they need and make sure they are deployed so that they are able to do this particular job.

Mr. Larsen. Will they all be DOD specialists within one service or will they be cross-services, or will it be a STRATCOM mission?

Dr. Tegnelia. It looks right now like the Navy DOD community is going to take the lead in this, but there are DOD specialists in all of the services, but the way I understand it right now, the Navy is taking the lead in establishing this capability.

Mr. Larsen. Yes. Okay.

Secretary Flory, in your answer to Mr. Gibbons’s question, you said something about domestic consequence management, and then sort of left it hanging. And it was something along the lines of, we are yet looking into responsibility, or is there a change in—who is going to get domestic consequence management?

Secretary Flory. What we are doing, we have consolidated—in the process of trying to come up with as close as we can to a single point of contact within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and this is something that has been done in the Under Secretary for Acquisitions Office and other parts of DOD. We have been consolidating functions, many of which were already in my area of responsibility.
One issue is the question of domestic consequence management, which has resided with the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense. And, right now, we are looking at the moving responsibility, at how we would move the resources, we are working out how we would actually operationalize a solution there.

Mr. Larsen. Where would you move the responsibility that wasn't in homeland defense?

Secretary Flory. Well, the question is this. As we try to come up with a single point of contact for WMD, there is—consequence management is one of the eight mission areas for WMD in the National Military Strategy for Combating WMD. On the other hand, there is also an obvious homeland defense aspect to it.

Mr. Larsen. Yes.

Secretary Flory. So what we are trying to do is come up with the right answer as to how we do that, how we allocate that.

Mr. Larsen. Okay.

I have some further questions on that, so I want to follow up with you on that, if I may. Not now.

Secretary Flory. Okay. Sure.

Mr. Larsen. As I think through this, Dr. Tegnelia, I note as well in your testimony, you discussed you are making progress on the advanced technical render safe skills development, that there might be a better setting, so to get a briefing on that?

Dr. Tegnelia. Yes, sir.

Mr. Larsen. If we can either do that or if I can just make a request. However you want to do it, Mr. Chairman, if we don't do it in committee, I will follow up, just have something done in 101.

Mr. Saxton. Sure. Whichever you desire.

Mr. Larsen. Okay, thanks.

Secretary Flory, regarding PSI, I was in China in January, and one of our country's efforts is trying to get China a little more interested in being a little more active, a little more interested in being active on proliferation treaty initiative. And we had a chance to talk with some of their folks and the National People's Congress, and they politely said, "Thanks, but no thanks" in so many words.

Secretary Flory. Thank you for raising it with them.

Mr. Larsen. Well, I will continue to do that, and I wanted to ask you again to answer my question here. Do you think China ought to be participating? And I guess more importantly, with the summit coming up, do you think this ought to be an issue we always raise when we talk military security issues with them? Is that something that you are working up your chain?

Secretary Flory. We are—

Mr. Larsen. And by the way, it is not very far up for you, but given your position, it is apparently more—

Secretary Flory. Me and the President, it is a pretty long way.

There are a number of issues including issues relating to proliferation that will be—I can't say will be because these are all determinations the President and the staff will make at the time—

Mr. Larsen. Sure.

Secretary Flory. These are all things that I think are likely to be on the agenda.

In terms of China being helpful, what we would like—and this is part of our overall policy—is for China to understand that its in-
terest is in being part of the rule-based, part of the modern world that does not proliferate weapons, in particular, weapons of mass destruction.

We have a number of outstanding issues with China regarding Chinese proliferation or proliferation of missiles and other materials, some of which going back a long way. These are the subject of frequent discussions with the Chinese. I would say we have made progress in some areas but we would like to accomplish more. Having China assist on PSI would be a great step forward. We would also want to make sure that other troublesome aspects of Chinese behavior in terms of China's own shipments and proliferation were also part of the equation.

Mr. Larsen. Absolutely. And just to say that old credit card commercial about membership has their privileges, and I think that message for the Chinese is membership has its responsibilities. And that is kind of the basic message we are to continue to communicate on a variety of fronts.

Secretary Flory. That is absolutely right. China is one of the countries that in the QDR we have to identify as power that are— I forget the direct phrase—that are at a strategic crossroads.

And, as I say, there are a number of areas in which China is— China is obviously an important country and important regional power, arguably a great power, and it is a country that has a lot of potential to do good both in the world and for its own population.

On the other hand, there are a number of troublesome aspects of its behavior and a lot of our defense policy with respect to China is designed to encourage China to go in one direction rather than the other.

Mr. Larsen. Right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A couple of questions here. Maybe the answer is no, and make my questions short.

First thing is cyber-warfare. Is that included in your thinking, in terms of weapons of mass destruction or not?

You know, we have obviously, the bio and the nuclear things, but we also have the unconventional use of things like jet planes and things like that that can be used to in an asymmetric kind of way.

Is cyber something you deal with or consider?

Secretary Flory. If I can answer the airplanes part of that first.

As we all learned only too well on September 11th, either airplanes, chemical shipments, railroad cars, things like that, have the potential of being used as weapons of mass destruction. And most of that kind of thing is within the purview, at least in terms of what happens in the United States, is within the purview of Homeland Security, which includes now FAA. Some of it is in the Department of Transportation.

There are a lot of different potential scenarios. There are attacks against nuclear plants. But those are generally things that are done domestically rather than by the DOD.

In terms of cyber-warfare, you raise a good question because you can imagine cyber-warfare as being used as something that would,
in effect, create a weapon of mass destruction. We have considerable resources devoted to both the Department of Homeland Security and also by the Department of Defense, and other departments, Department of Justice, with respect to improving cyber-security within the country.

In my organization, we don't do cyber-security. There are other parts of DOD—the assistant secretary for Network Integration and other parts of our building—who do that.

I confess, you stunned me with the question as to whether we view that as a WMD. I can see the scenarios in which it could be used as such. And know that we have a lot of people within both DOD who are working on this issue as well as with the Department of Homeland Security, FBI, and other places.

First let me see if Dr. Tegnelia has anything he wants to add, but if I could get back to you on the record with a more complete answer, I would appreciate it.

Dr. Tegnelia. Just to add two things.

First of all, DTRA does not do anything in cyber-warfare. However, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, we do work for General Cartwright at STRATCOM. STRATCOM does have cyber-defense and defense responsibilities as part of his operational responsibilities. And I would suggest if you want to understand that point of view, the relationship between WMD and cyber-warfare, you might want to have him as a witness and discuss that with him.

Mr. Akin. I asked the question from several points of view. Obviously, if you were to do some sort of strong magnetic pulse type of thing, you could shut down many things that have computer chips in them within some given area. And if it were expanded a little bit more, you would take out the stock exchange and different things. That is a possible scenario.

Of course, another one is, as we took a look at a lot of unconventional things, one of the potential axes of attacks was through our supply chain to the Department of Defense to completely mess with the computer system. And they said that basically the test dummy we heard was, “We are pretty good at getting into somebody else's database, but we are not so good at keeping them out of ours.”

And it might not be just a simple matter of putting a virus in to scramble them and mess them up or to erase something. It might be actually and active type of attack where you are sending the wrong thing to the wrong place and you are actually manipulating.

And they said that through, particularly, the supply chain in the Department of Defense, leaves all of these ports that are very easy to get into and mess with that system. So that is where the question was coming from.

Dr. Tegnelia. The issue of an electro-magnetic pulse, whether it be nuclear-generated, is a topic which we do address here. You are probably aware there have been several commissions—Congressman Bartlett has sponsored quite a bit a work in that particular area. And the department is responding to keep current its capabilities with regard to EMP against its command and control networks. It is a very difficult problem and an expensive problem.

Mr. Akin. But you are considering that actively as part of your—
Dr. Tegnelia. Yes, sir. The secretary forwarded his plan for addressing that problem. We have certain responsibilities, and we are out actively pursuing his plan for responding to that commission report.

Mr. Akin. My time is about done here. A quick question. Who do you know that has small pox? Do we know if anybody has it?

Colonel Palma. I am Joe Palma, the medical director for the chem-bio defensive program and its deputy.

There are two declared sites, one in Russia and one in the United States.

Your question, however, eludes to whether there are some clandestine sites. And we would probably be willing to discuss that in closed session.

I think that answers the question.

Mr. Akin. I was afraid you might say that. Okay.

Yes, I was aware of the two, but I just wondered is it classified to even say there is more than the two?

Mr. Saxton. Colonel Palma, why don’t you pull your chair up there by Dr. Tegnelia for a minute.

Colonel Palma. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Saxton. Could you talk to us about the counter-bio measures that are new and in development?

We talked a little bit about Ken Alibek earlier, and that concept, I understand, is now a concept that is getting wide examination and maybe wide experimentation. Could you tell us where we are?

First of all, explain to us, if you would, the concept and where we are in terms of our successes in developing it.

Colonel Palma. Well, let me first try to frame for you kind of a simplified cartoon, if you will, to try to articulate what the concept is and how we came to that position.

We were faced with a potentially increasing number of biological threats. As we looked at the threat lists, we would also recognize the technologies that we had to address them were primarily vaccines and antibiotics. And we recognized in addition to that, with the explosion of biotechnology over the past many, many years now, and the decoding of the human genome that it was certainly very possible to modify any of those agents which would make our countermeasure development, expenditures, and timelines unachievable.

So we looked at the list of threats and threat effects—and I say threat effects because these agents have effects on the human body. And those effects over time have been identified to be relatively conserved, meaning the body responds in certain ways to certain exposures and often will respond in similar ways to different exposures.

With that knowledge from the biotechnology explosion of knowledge over the past several decades, we recognize that there were methodologies that the cells used and the human body used to respond to these things. And they were common in many cases, which opened in the question as to whether or not we could use that knowledge to develop countermeasures against those commonalities of bad effects.

And so we studied the problem, of course, as we often do, to try to look at the science of it. We spent a better part of a year doing
that with some pretty senior scientists, some of which had Nobels behind their names, to try to actually find the answer.

And we came up with multiple technologies currently in development and in many cases, tested, some already in humans actually, that had some of the effects.

We also had the benefit of actually a plus-up that one of the companies got, and it will remain nameless because I think there are contractual issues ongoing I don't want to step on. But we decided, okay, there are some technologies out there that we know that are being used by applying the knowledge on genes that we now have. And we went ahead and tested some of that.

To give you just a short summary of it, if you expose monkeys to ebola virus, they will die. We created some nucleotide therapies, some ways of stopping the expression of genes as a result of ebola exposure. And by blocking the expression of the genes, the ebola virus was unable to reproduce. And we got two bonuses.

One of them, the monkeys didn't die. One of the monkeys did die. She had her period and we couldn't stop the bleeding in time. But the monkeys did not die otherwise after their exposure.

And in addition to that, they were actually vaccinated to—they had become vaccinated by that exposure through which they had been protected by this new chemical.

We also identified with Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) six different viruses that cannot emerge from in their budding process out of the cell by essentially putting an antibiotic against one of the proteins that is essential for the bud in the cell to form. So you begin to recognize now that there is an entirely new category of pharmaceuticals that can be developed.

By the way, as a side bar, one of the budding viruses that we tested against was Human Immunedeficiency Virus (HIV). Another one was influenza A. And in both cases, the budding did not occur.

So what we have is some proofs of concepts already in hand of some known technologies that we hope to accelerate through the expenditure of that $1.5 billion into production, into further development so that we can eventually have licensed products that would apply broadly across viruses and bacteria that get where our military personnel may be exposed to them.

But in addition to that, the bonus being that it would also likely apply to the medical side of the house, which I am. I am a physician by training.

So I hope that answers the question.

Mr. SAXTON. Yes, sir, it was a great explanation.

And how does Dr. Alibek fit into this scheme of what is going on?

Colonel PALMA. Well, I have met Ken several times, and although I doubt he would remember me—because they were rather short meetings—but he hasn't been part of the discussion.

When we were trying to do this, we were very, very careful to try to get just people that were scientists and didn't have any other strings to the discussion. No particular reason, just——

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Larsen, anything further?

Mr. LARSEN. Just a quick point, and I will have more follow-ups for Secretary Flory on the domestic consequence management.

It might be more of a parochial thing, but we have been working a lot with Homeland Defense on the—and we will really start kick-
ing in now—with the Olympics being in Vancouver, British Columbia, 20 miles across the border from my district.

And I guess the concern I have is that we are still trying to figure out which box in the organizational chart go where that as we are preparing for that on our side of the border. And there are a lot of security issues obviously on our side of the border that were not getting so far afield that maybe we are getting in the way of preparing on the security side of things.

That is probably the line of questioning when I formulate these questions I will probably be getting back to you, or should we be talking to Secretary McHale directly?

Secretary FLORY. It might be. I would like to help you set up whatever will be helpful for you and maybe to have, to actually sit down and talk with Secretary McHale or some of his folks or someone from Homeland Security. But why don’t we take back your interest in this subject, and I will have somebody get back to you and set up whatever is the right thing, whether it is a letter or a meeting or whatever.

Mr. Larsen. Yes, that is great.

And then, Doctor, you are located down in Fort Belvoir?

Dr. Tegnelia. Yes, sir.

Mr. Larsen. You take visitors?

Dr. Tegnelia. Yes, sir.

Mr. Larsen. You have things to show us?

Dr. Tegnelia. Yes, sir.

Mr. Larsen. That is great.

Dr. Tegnelia. I would be happy to do that.

Mr. Larsen. It is not too long of a drive so——

Dr. Tegnelia. I would be happy to arrange anything you would like to do to come down and see what we are doing.

Mr. Larsen. Great, I appreciate that.

Thanks a lot.

Mr. Saxton. One final question, Dr. Tegnelia.

Dr. Tegnelia. Yes, sir.

Mr. Saxton. In the last three weeks I have had——first of all, I am one of the guys in Congress who——someone has a widget that will help, they will bring it and show me——

Dr. Tegnelia. Yes, sir.

Mr. Saxton. In the last three weeks, I have seen three different individuals whose technologies can detect through the neutron simulation—that is probably not the right word, but——three different people have come to see with their technologies. And we try to forward it on to the right people.

Do they come to see you, too?

Dr. Tegnelia. Yes, sir. I would encourage you if you have some ideas there that you would like to have pursued, we would be happy to do that. We can do everything from test them, get them out with the operational forces. If it takes some R&D, we are prepared to do the R&D to get them ready to do that. We have the wherewithal to go from R&D to production to get them into the field and get them tried. So we would be happy to talk with them.

Mr. Saxton. Okay.
Listen, thank you for being with us today. This has been a very interesting session, and we look forward to working with you in the future.

Thank you very much.
Secretary FLORY. Thank you, sir.
Dr. TEGNELIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

APRIL 5, 2006
Opening Statement of Congressman Jim Saxton
Chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities
House Armed Services Committee

Hearing on Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
April 5, 2006

Today, the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities meets in open session to receive testimony on the implications of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, with respect to the role of the Department of Defense in combating weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, the subcommittee will explore how the recommendations from the QDR support the recently released National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. Today’s hearing provides an opportunity for the members of the subcommittee to assess the Administration’s plans and priorities for combating WMD, and how the Department of Defense fits into the larger government-wide effort.
Our witnesses are expected to expand upon the QDR decisions regarding combating WMD. These decisions include:

- The designation of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency as the primary Combat Support Agency for U.S. Strategic Command.

- The expansion of the Army's 20th Support Command capabilities to enable it to serve as a Joint Task Force capable of rapid deployment to command and control WMD elimination and site exploitation missions by 2007.

- The expansion of the number of U.S. forces with advanced technical render-safe skills and an improvement in their speed of response.

- The improvement and expansion of U.S. forces' capabilities to locate, track and tag shipments of WMD, missiles and related materials, including the transportation means used to move such items.

- The reallocation of funding within the Chemical Biological Defense Program to invest more than $1.5
billion over the next five years to develop broad-spectrum medical countermeasures against advanced bio-terror threats.

The subcommittee's goal is to understand more fully how the QDR decisions will be implemented. We look forward to hearing about successes to date and the challenges that remain.

In addition, the subcommittee seeks to understand how the QDR decisions support the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD, which was also released in February, 2006. The National Military Strategy provides the guidance for executing the U.S. military WMD-related nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence-management missions. The strategy assigns roles and responsibilities for the military in carrying out its combating WMD strategy. In particular, the strategy identifies the Commander, United States Strategic Command as the lead combatant commander for integrating and synchronizing DOD efforts in combating WMD. The subcommittee hopes to understand how the USSTRATCOM Commander plans to
operationalize the National Military Strategy, particularly with the support of DTRA. For example, what exactly is meant by integrating and synchronizing and how will DTRA enable this mission?

To address these issues we have two distinguished witnesses from the Department of Defense:

**Hon. Peter Flory**  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

**Dr. James A. Tegnalia**  
Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Director, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Center, United States Strategic Command

Gentlemen, we welcome you and look forward to your testimony.

Before we proceed, I yield to my friend Marty Meehan, the Ranking Member of the subcommittee for any opening remarks he would like to make. Mr. Meehan?
Thank you, Mr. Meehan. Gentlemen, again our welcome.

Mr. Flory, you may proceed with your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF

PETER C.W. FLORY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

APRIL 5, 2006

Chairman Saxton, Congressman Meehan, Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to describe the Defense Department’s efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and our plan to implement recommendations outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) regarding WMD.

My goal today is to share with you many of the Department’s new approaches to stopping the proliferation of WMD, preventing its use, and enabling our warfighters to accomplish their missions in a WMD environment if necessary. This is not a new mission. Since December 2002, when the President set forth the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Department has taken a number of measures to enable us better to carry out this mission. At the same time, while adapting at the strategic level, we have been carrying out the day-to-day activities – some ongoing, some new, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) – to implement our policies in the face of the global WMD challenge.

**Strategic Guidance**

Our approach builds on the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. In particular, it states:

*Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – nuclear, biological, and chemical – in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States. We must pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat in all of its dimensions. An effective strategy for countering WMD, including their use and further proliferation, is an integral component of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America.*

The goal of this strategy was reinforced by President Bush in his January 20, 2004, State of the Union address when he stated, “America is committed to keeping the world’s most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the most dangerous regimes.”
Consistent with the President's guidance, preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD was one of the four priorities the Department identified in the QDR just issued by the Secretary. This is the first time a QDR has devoted such attention to the threat of WMD. Additionally, Joint Chiefs Chairman Peter Pace issued the first-ever National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction on February 13, 2006. Our strategic approach is built on the "three pillars" of combating WMD identified in the 2002 National Strategy to Combat WMD: nonproliferation, counterproliferation and consequence management. We define these terms as follows:

- **Nonproliferation** - Actions to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by dissuading or impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and expertise.

- **Counterproliferation** - Actions to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, U.S. Armed Forces, its allies, and partners.

- **WMD Consequence Management** - Actions taken to mitigate the effects of a WMD attack, or event, and to restore essential operations and services at home and abroad.

At the next level, the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD identifies eight military mission areas that support the pillars in the National Strategy: offensive operations, elimination operations, interdiction operations, active defense, passive defense, WMD consequence management, security cooperation and partner activities, and threat reduction cooperation. This new strategic framework is the Department's vehicle for dividing the broad "combating WMD" mission into specific, definable military activities that we can address with better focus in the budget, training, doctrine and policy processes.

**Organizing for the Combating WMD Mission**

In addition to this new strategic framework, the Department of Defense has transformed our organizational structure to better combat WMD. On January 6, 2005, the Secretary of Defense designated the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) – commanded by General Cartwright – as the Department’s lead for synchronizing and integrating combating WMD operational efforts in support of our Combatant Commanders. In this new role, STRATCOM supports other Combatant Commanders as they execute combating WMD operations. On January 31, 2006, the Secretary of Defense appointed the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) with an additional duty as the Director of STRATCOM's Combating WMD Center (SCC). This appointment was recommended by the QDR and designed to enhance STRATCOM's ability to synchronize and integrate the Department's combating WMD efforts. General Cartwright and his team, including Dr. Jim Tegnelia of DTRA, identify
and advocate new combating WMD requirements and shepherd them through the budget process. The first two missions to be addressed in this manner are WMD elimination and interdiction, areas where we need to increase our capacities substantially.

Complementing this reorganization, all DoD components have been directed to realign themselves to improve execution of the combating WMD mission. Within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, for example, my own office realigned over the past six months to create a near-single point of contact for policy support of the combating WMD mission. My office is now responsible for seven of eight mission areas identified in the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD: offensive operations, elimination operations, interdiction operations, active defense, passive defense, security cooperation and partner activities and threat reduction cooperation. Organizing Policy’s oversight of consequence management capabilities is something we are still working on.

To fulfill the President's commitment, the QDR directs that “national efforts to counter the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction must incorporate both preventive and responsive dimensions.” Preventive activities include those that: build and expand global partnerships aimed at preventing proliferation; stop WMD-related trafficking; help friendly governments improve controls over existing WMD; and discredit WMD as an instrument of national power. If these preventive activities fail, DoD must be prepared to respond by locating, securing and destroying WMD.

**Preventive Dimension of Combating WMD**

*The Toolkit for Preventive Activities.* With respect to the preventive dimension, we have long viewed nonproliferation treaties and export control regimes as integral elements of our strategy for combating WMD. These treaties and regimes include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Missile Technology Control Regime. DoD brings significant policy and technical expertise to bear on enforcement of these regimes through the Office of Negotiations Policy and the Defense Technology Security Administration.

**Interdiction.** While these regimes are a first line of defense, not all countries are members of all regimes, and many countries that are members cheat. WMD programs in countries like Iran and North Korea have highlighted the need for additional measures such as interdiction. Interdiction is an essential component in our efforts to counter the proliferation activities of both suppliers and customers. Interdictions raise the costs for proliferators, but also can deter some suppliers from even getting in the business of proliferation. As part of this effort, DoD has taken steps to strengthen U.S. military capabilities to support interdiction. For example, in October 2005, the Naval War College organized the first government-wide, classified gaming exercise for all U.S. agencies involved in interdiction. In addition, the U.S. Navy has improved shipboarding
and cargo assessment by validating its new Visit Board Search and Seizure team capability. Finally, the Defense Intelligence Agency established a new division for interdiction support to DoD policy makers.

**The Proliferation Security Initiative.** In addition to U.S. domestic efforts, we have worked closely with other governments since President Bush launched the PSI in May 2003. The PSI has been a forum for the United States and other countries to collaborate on how we will work together to interdict WMD-related shipments bound to and from states of concern, and to build national capabilities so that like-minded nations collectively have a more robust arsenal of WMD interdiction tools.

PSI partners define interdiction broadly to include military, law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts to impede and stop proliferation-related shipments, and it can involve sea, air, land, or trans-modal shipments. Today more than 70 countries have indicated support for the PSI, and we continue to discuss the initiative with states that could contribute to PSI’s mission.

**PSI Builds National Capabilities.** PSI partners are working together in the PSI Operational Experts Group (OEG) to improve their national interdiction capabilities. The OEG is an expanding network of military, law enforcement, intelligence, legal, and diplomatic experts. They develop new operational concepts for interdiction, organize a program of interdiction exercises, share information about national legal authorities, and pursue cooperation with industry sectors that can be helpful to the interdiction mission. Through these efforts, OEG participants raise the level of collective and national interdiction capabilities. The November 2005 OEG meeting was the first regionally focused OEG meeting and provided a venue for all European PSI participants to develop national and regional capabilities. The United States will host the next OEG meeting in April 2006, which for the first time will involve a South American participant, Argentina.

DoD is responsible for leading the Operational Experts Group process, the locus of operational aspects of PSI. To date, nineteen PSI exercises involving a wide range of operational assets have been held. These have included air, maritime and ground assets and have been hosted by a range of countries. Table-top games and simulations in particular have helped participants work through interdiction scenarios, and have, in many cases, improved the way participating governments organize to conduct interdictions.

**Cooperative Threat Reduction.** Mr. Chairman, the Subcommittee is already familiar with the history and details of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. CTR supports another two of the mission areas identified by the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD: threat reduction cooperation, and security cooperation/partner activities. The program continues to help eliminate WMD material and enhance security for WMD, particularly the legacy WMD of the former Soviet Union. I would like to touch on recent developments in CTR.
Fiscal years 2005 and 2006-to-date saw continued progress for CTR. This was the case both with respect to CTR’s substantive mission, as well as with respect to the revised business practices implemented after problems arose several years ago. As the subcommittee knows, these new practices extended to both policy and implementation. They included changes in personnel, application of DoD acquisition processes, extensive reviews by the DoD Inspector General and GAO, conversion of informal understandings to binding legal agreements, and establishment of a formal “executive review” process, in which implementation and policy experts review all aspects of major projects semi-annually with their Russian counterparts.

In this timeframe, CTR continued its WMD infrastructure elimination work in Russia, destroying intercontinental missiles, and continuing the rail- and road-mobile missile project that eliminates SS-24/25 missiles, as well as their launchers. CTR also continued work on the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility at Shchuch’ye. The Shchuch’ye facility will provide Russia a capability to eliminate some 2.1 million artillery shells and rockets loaded with nerve agent—one of Russia’s most dangerous chemical agents weaponized in the most proliferable form.

Also in Russia, CTR has continued its assistance to improve the security of nuclear warheads in storage. With the President’s Bratislava Nuclear Security Cooperation Initiative, we are poised to complete our security work at Russian nuclear warhead storage sites by 2008. These storage sites contain both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. Acceleration of the original schedule from a 2011 completion target to 2008 requires that additional funds be obligated during Fiscal Year 2006, and I want to thank the House for its inclusion of the Administration’s request for $44.5 million in its markup of the FY2006 supplemental.

Let me be clear, the U.S. is not enhancing security of warheads attached to operational nuclear delivery systems; rather, we are supporting Russia in its responsibility to secure its extensive warhead inventory across its vast and often remote array of storage facilities. The U.S. will be able to say by 2008 that we have done all we can to bring security of Russia’s nuclear weapons up to credible standards. That will be a significant achievement.

The past year has seen success in implementation of CTR’s capability to consolidate dangerous pathogen strains in Central Asian and Caucasus states. The U.S. receives samples of each strain which are used to ensure the reagents used in the rapid diagnostic equipment will accurately determine whether a disease outbreak is naturally occurring or a potential bio-terror event. This work has been a key initiative for the Administration, and we believe it helps meet a significant, unfilled requirement for the U.S. to stay abreast of the global bio-terror threat.
During the past year, CTR also saw continued progress in its WMD border security project, known as the WMD-Proliferation Prevention Initiative (PPI). PPI looks beyond the traditional CTR mission of dealing with "WMD-in-place," and address the threat of "WMD-on-the-move." PPI focuses on willing Central Asian countries that lack resources to build detection and interdiction capabilities on their own. We are focusing on Central Asian countries because of their proximity to Russia in order to create a WMD "safety net." We believe WMD border security is an important element of the CTR mission, and we appreciate the interest of Armed Services staff in PPI and WMD border security.

The Department realizes the scope of U.S. international border security activities, and the need to enhance coordination of these border security programs. We can report that, as of January 2006, all international border security assistance related to nuclear detection activities is governed by guidelines promulgated and administered by the NSC's Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee. These guidelines will be expanded to include a process whereby all types of U.S. international border security assistance, from proliferation prevention to counter-narcotics, will be synchronized and deconflicted as effectively in Washington, as they are currently in the field.

**Responsive Dimension of Combating WMD**

*Investing for the Future.* Revising our strategies, restructuring our organizations, and changing our daily activities will not have lasting impact without adequate funding of corresponding capabilities, technologies and mission areas. The Autumn 2005 program/budget review undertook a comprehensive review of combating WMD funding which was carried through the QDR. Beginning with the FY2006 budget submission, we added $2B to the previous $7.6B Fiscal Year 2006-2011 allocation for the Chemical Biological Defense Program and related infrastructure (an increase of almost 20%). While we have made recent advances in this specific area, our effort in combating WMD funding remains a work in progress. We look forward to working with STRATCOM as they identify and define additional requirements.

*Joint Task Force for Elimination.* One of the earliest lessons learned from our military operations in Iraq was that DoD needed a well organized, well trained force to be able to quickly and systematically locate, seize, secure, disable and safeguard an adversary's WMD program, including sites, laboratories, materials, and associated scientists and other personnel.

The Army's 20th Support Command, located north of Baltimore at the Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, was stood up as an Army headquarters tasked to provide technically qualified Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosives (CBRNE) response forces to support geographic Combatant Commanders. This unique organization includes the Army's Technical Escort Battalions as well as an Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Group. While the 20th was not established
until after Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of its units participated in the search for WMD in Iraq.

The 20th Headquarters was activated in 2004. However, while the military units assigned to this headquarters are deployable, the headquarters itself cannot deploy today since nearly two-thirds of the staff is composed of government civilians or contractors. In the QDR process, DoD leadership approved a proposal to assign 20th Support Command the task of becoming a deployable headquarters that could command and control these types of operations. Establishing a joint task force for elimination is a key element of the Department's vision, as articulated by the QDR, to deal with all aspects of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.

**Biodefense Initiative.** Another key conclusion of the QDR was that the Department should focus on new defensive capabilities in anticipation of the continued evolution of WMD threats. In response, DoD has decided to reallocate funding within the Chem-Bio Defense program to invest over $1.5B over the next five years to develop broad-spectrum countermeasures against advanced biological threats. For example, rather than continuing the traditional approach to developing countermeasures -- which in effect results in "one drug, one bug" -- DoD will conduct research to develop drugs that could each counter many pathogens. For example, we are going to conduct research to develop a single pharmaceutical to counter all types of viral hemorrhagic fevers (like Ebola and Marburg) as well as a single pharmaceutical for all "intracellular" pathogens, like the Plague, by leveraging molecular biotechnology cutting edge technologies currently available. While supporting our combating WMD effort, these initiatives also benefit our forces who may well be ordered to deploy to places where these fevers pose a risk. Having one drug that could counter many bugs would improve military effectiveness by getting forces into the theater more quickly, protect our forces more efficiently, and complicate an adversary's military calculus on their effect.

**Building Partner Capacity.** More than ever before, we need partners to be prepared for operations with us in a CBRN world. In 2002, the Department proposed creation of a CBRN Defense Battalion for NATO. This U.S. concept was endorsed by NATO defense ministers during the 2002 Prague Summit, and elements of a fully operational CBRN Defense Battalion supported the 2004 Summer Olympics just over one year later. The battalion includes a CBRN joint assessment team and mobile chemical, biological and radiological laboratories; it has received personnel and capability support from seventeen NATO nations to date. The concept for the Battalion and the way it was quickly institutionalized were unprecedented at NATO. We continue to encourage strengthening of the Battalion's capabilities to help drive member nations to improve their own combating WMD capabilities. The Battalion will be a model for future collaboration as we expand our counterproliferation discussions with other nations.

We continue to develop bilateral discussions with international partners on counterproliferation issues ranging from policy and operational support to detailed
technical cooperation. We have or are establishing such bilateral working groups with countries from Europe, the Middle East, and Asia that share our desire to prepare for defense against the WMD threat. A central goal of the bilateral working groups we establish is to ensure that U.S. and potential coalition partners can execute combined operations in a WMD environment. The challenge of interoperability is significant even in a "mere" conventional warfighting environment. However, a WMD situation raises many additional issues. For example, if our combat or transport aircraft are returning from an area where WMD has been employed, we need to know in advance what decontamination our allies will require in order to ensure ready access to important way stations and forward depots. Similar problems relate to the decontamination of forces – including potentially wounded personnel – who will require immediate evacuation and attention. We have launched discussions with our NATO allies as well as several key potential coalition partners on these and other issues we believe need to be resolved for combined operations in a WMD environment.

Building partner capacity takes many forms and can include building legal capacities. In 2005, Navy, Joint Staff, General Counsel and OSD-Policy representatives completed three years of activity to expand legal authority against maritime trafficking in WMD, and helped secure adoption of amendments to the Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea (SUA) Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. These amendments established the first international criminal standard against shipment of WMD as well as a comprehensive boarding regime. Once the Amendment enters into force after ratification by 12 member-states, we will have a new vehicle to prosecute violators and press for greater vigilance against trafficking in WMD.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, DoD understands that combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction in a complex and uncertain world requires a new approach. This new approach is reflected in our new strategic guidance, realigned organizational structure, and in changes in our day-to-day activities. Our commitment to success in this endeavor is absolute. Failure is not an option. Congress is an essential partner in this fight, and we look forward to continuing our work together. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify.
STATEMENT OF
DR. JAMES TEGNELIA
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UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND CENTER FOR
COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
AND
DIRECTOR,
DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING
COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

APRIL 5, 2006
Dr. James A. Tegnelia is the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Fort Belvoir, VA. DTRA safeguards America and its allies from weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives) by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate and counter the threat, and mitigate its effects.

Tegnelia is also dual-hatted as director of the U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC-WMD). The Center integrates and synchronizes Department of Defense-wide efforts in support of the combating WMD mission.

Prior to his selection to lead DTRA, Dr. Tegnelia was the Vice President, Department of Defense Programs, Sandia National Laboratories. Dr. Tegnelia had been at Sandia since August 1998.

A native of Monessen, PA, Dr. Tegnelia's career began in the United States Army, serving from 1968 to 1971, including a one-year tour in Vietnam. From 1971 to 1976, Dr. Tegnelia worked for the U.S. Army Night Vision Laboratory in various positions progressing from supervisory research physicist to manager. His organization laid the engineering foundation for night vision devices deployed in Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield. In 1976, he transferred to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), serving as a program manager and office director, responsible for programs in smart weapons, radar sensors and stealth technology.

From 1982 to 1985, he served as the Assistant Undersecretary of Defense and Acting Deputy Undersecretary of Defense in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, where he oversaw program manager activity on the JSTARS radar and ATACMS missile. In 1985, he became the Deputy Director and later Acting Director of DARPA.

In 1987, he joined the Martin Marietta Corporation, serving as Vice President of Engineering, and later as the Vice President of Business Development, Electronics Group. In 1993, Dr. Tegnelia became the Executive Vice President and Deputy Director of Sandia National Laboratories. He became the Vice President, Business Development, for the Energy and Environment Sector of Lockheed Martin Corporation in 1995, and later served as the President of Lockheed Martin Advanced Environmental Systems, Inc., from 1996 to 1998.

Dr. Tegnelia earned a Bachelor's Degree in Physics from Georgetown University, a Master's Degree in Engineering from George Washington University, and a Ph.D. in Physics from The Catholic University of America.
His awards and decorations include the Bronze Star Medal, the Civilian Meritorious Service Medal, and the Senior Executive Service Meritorious Service Award. Dr. Tegnelia is a former member of the Executive Council and Board of Directors of the Albuquerque Chamber of Commerce (1994/1995); former member of the Board of Directors of the Anderson School of the University of New Mexico; and the 1996 Campaign Chairman for the United Way of Central New Mexico. Dr. Tegnelia also served as the Chairman for the Greater Albuquerque U.S. Savings Bond Campaign in 1995, and the State of New Mexico Chairman for the U.S. Savings Bond Campaign in 1996.

He has served as Chair of the Army Science Board, a Co-Chair of the Sandia National Laboratories National Security Advisory Panel, and a member of the Society of Sigma Xi. He was also on the Board of Advisors of George Washington University, School of Engineering. Dr. Tegnelia was a member of the Board of Directors for Sandia Science and Technology Park, the Technology Ventures Corporation, and Laguna Industries, Inc.
Introduction

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to be here today to address the recommendations of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) regarding the mission of combating weapons of mass destruction or “WMD.”

I am appearing here today in my dual capacities as the Director of the United States Strategic Command’s Center for Combating WMD, and as the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

As you know from my earlier appearances before this subcommittee, DTRA is the lead DoD agency for reducing the threat posed by WMD. Since its establishment in 1998, the agency has been integrating the execution of the Department’s nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management programs. The agency’s mission spans the complete WMD threat spectrum - chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives; supports all eight Defense Department combating WMD mission areas; and facilitates closer partnerships across the department, the U.S. Government, the private sector, academia, and with our allies and friendly nations.

DTRA is also designated as a “Combat Support Agency” and charged with providing WMD-related technical and operational support to the combatant commanders.

Accordingly, my remarks today will address how the QDR guides and directs WMD-related support to the combatant commanders. First, I will explain the recent change in the Unified Command Plan that has led to this closer relationship between the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and DTRA. Second, I will discuss the implementation of the QDR recommendations from the perspective of General James E. Cartwright, the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.
Combating WMD and the Unified Command Plan

The Quadrennial Defense Review provides strategic specificity for combating WMD. It defines two fundamental imperatives for the Department:

- Continued reorientation of capabilities and forces to be more agile in this time of war, to prepare for wider asymmetric challenges, and to hedge against uncertainty over the next 20 years.
- Implementation of enterprise-wide changes to ensure that organizational structures, processes, and procedures effectively support our strategic direction.

These imperatives strongly influence the organization, planning, readiness, investments, and operations of the combating WMD mission.

On January 6, 2005, the Secretary of Defense modified the Unified Command Plan by designating the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, as the lead combatant commander for integrating and synchronizing efforts to combat WMD. This decision established a single focal point charged with integrating the Department’s efforts for combating WMD in support of the geographic combatant commanders’ operational requirements. In this role, USSTRATCOM supports other combatant commanders as they execute combating WMD missions. General Cartwright is now the key military advocate for developing combating WMD mission requirements and shepherding them through the budget process. His initial assignment is to develop further and energize the WMD elimination and interdiction missions.

Last fall, as part of the Committee Defense Review undertaken by this committee, I was invited as the DTRA director to brief several of the gap panels. At that time, I informed the Committee that General Cartwright had turned to DTRA for its combating WMD expertise. I also informed the Committee that DTRA had been directed to establish and host the USSTRATCOM’s Center for Combating WMD or “SCC-WMD.”

Since that time, the center has been formally established. I have been designated by the Secretary of Defense as the Director for that Center, while continuing my responsibilities as the Director of DTRA. The SCC-WMD is the equivalent of the other Joint Functional Component
Commands that support USSTRATCOM in Integrated Missile Defense; Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Space and Global Strike; and Network Warfare.

The Combating WMD Center will support USSTRATCOM by:

- Anticipating potential WMD-related events that may necessitate a DoD, interagency, and/or international coordinated response;
- Developing potential courses of action through a knowledgeable Joint Interagency Group to reduce reaction time to threats; and
- Providing an understanding of DoD, interagency, and international capabilities; identifying needs and requirements; and recommending solutions for synchronizing and integrating combating WMD capabilities.

It is important to note that, although USSTRATCOM has overall responsibility for integrating and synchronizing the mission, responsibility for individual program execution remains with the cognizant DoD components, including DTRA, the Military Departments and Services, and other DoD organizations.

Implementation of QDR Recommendations

I will now turn to the implementation of QDR recommendations regarding the combating WMD mission.

In addition to providing guidance on how the combating WMD mission fits within the Department’s total responsibilities, the QDR made five specific decisions to achieve the future joint force and build on progress to date.

1. Designate the Defense Threat Reduction Agency as the primary Combat Support Agency for U.S. Strategic Command in its role as the lead Combatant Commander for integrating and synchronizing combating WMD efforts.

   DTRA has been formally assigned this responsibility and the agency is working closely with USSTRATCOM in developing the center’s concept of operations; establishing a common operating picture and formalized information sharing process with our partners; and supporting
combatant commander course of action development. Our goal is to achieve Full Operational Capability by the end of this calendar year.

2. **Expand the Army's 20th Support Command (CBRNE) capabilities to enable it to serve as a Joint Task Force capable of rapid deployment to command and control WMD elimination and site exploitation missions by 2007.**

   DTRA has provided assistance on the design and structure of the headquarters of the 20th Support Command so that it may provide enhanced command and control for WMD elimination and site exploitation. In addition, DTRA will provide operational and technical support for training, exercises, and operational missions. The Joint Staff is expected to provide more guidance on requirements for this capability, and the geographic combatant commanders will also update their respective plans to meet these requirements.

3. **Expand the number of U.S. forces with advanced technical render-safe skills and increase their speed of response. The Department will develop further recommendations to improve render-safe capabilities for the Fiscal Year 2008 budget.**

   The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders including Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, the Services, DTRA, and the Department of Energy are assessing render-safe requirements, current and needed capabilities, and the path ahead in a coordinated, comprehensive effort. We are making progress that is best addressed in a classified forum. As we continue this effort, we appreciate that each of the geographic combatant commanders may have unique requirements that must be considered in our planning. In Fiscal Year 2007 (FY07), we intend to increase overall DoD Explosive Ordnance Disposal capabilities and airlift priority for movement of assets to counter WMD threats. For Fiscal Year 2008 (FY08), our intention is to expand DoD technical capabilities to locate WMD threats, particularly nuclear and radiological threats.

4. **Improve and expand U.S. forces' capabilities to locate, track, and tag shipments of WMD, missiles, and related materials, including the transportation means used to move such items.**
DTRA has several efforts currently planned in this area. We have proposed a Smart Threads Integrated Radiation Sensors Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration of a modular radiation detection system in FY07. This system is intended to operate in man-portable ground, aerial, and maritime vehicle versions that can be seamlessly integrated into a sensor network. DTRA has requested a $15M core radiological/nuclear detection RDT&E budget for FY07. Efforts have begun on a scanning system to detect hidden and shielded nuclear material from an extended distance and we anticipate a prototype test in FY08.

The nuclear detection development efforts being executed by DTRA are fully coordinated with the Departments of Energy and Homeland Security. These DTRA programs leverage the expertise of these and others, but are focused on unique DoD applications.

DTRA, as the executive agent for the Science and Technology portion of the Department’s Chemical/Biological Defense Program, is also assisting that program’s Joint Program Execution Office for Chemical and Biological Defense in rapidly transitioning systems to the Joint Warfighter.

In addition, DTRA is also supporting the combatant commanders by identifying critical nodes within the counter-proliferation terrorist pathway. We intend to integrate existing/emerging tagging, tracking, locating techniques and sensor network systems to conduct operations against chemical, biological, and nuclear production, storage, and weaponization facilities.

Lastly, DTRA is leveraging a sensor product developed and demonstrated under the Counterproliferation 2 Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration, to provide integrated chemical, biological, and radiological combat assessment capabilities on unmanned air vehicle (UAV) and expendable mini-UAV platforms. We intend to demonstrate this capability for airborne biological sample collection starting in FY07 for the United States Pacific Command.

5. **Reallocate funding within the CBDP to invest more than $1.5 billion over the next five years to develop broad-spectrum medical countermeasures against advanced bio-terror threats, including genetically engineered intracellular bacterial pathogens and hemorrhagic fevers.**

The Chemical and Biological Defense program, for which DTRA serves as the Science and Technology executive agent, has the responsibility for managing and executing this critical research program. The pace of current approaches for specific known bio-threats could leave us
vulnerable and may not protect against genetically engineered threats. Recent advances in science have led to a revolution in our understanding of the molecular mechanisms of disease and the complex interplay of host/pathogen interactions. Progress in genomics, proteomics, immunology, high throughput screening, and computational chemistry has revealed new cellular mechanisms, produced new biological targets, and identified new candidate countermeasures.

Although the initiative entails risk, the Department has determined that the best approach to achieving the revolutionary advances necessary to treat advanced bioterror threats is to reap the synergy from combining these component achievements into a systems approach. The underlying concept is to leverage and accelerate highly promising technologies and approaches already in the developmental pipeline by infusing a major investment. The initiative has begun by an aggressive solicitation and evaluation of the best ideas from private and governmental research and development organizations.

Consistent with QDR direction to assume greater risk in traditional threat areas, funding for this initiative was taken from efforts that would have produced helpful, but only evolutionary improvements in capabilities.

Conclusion

The Department has focused on the WMD challenge for many years now. We have been making steady progress in expanding our capabilities to combat WMD and in strengthening essential interagency partnerships. The QDR continues this momentum by providing specific near-term direction and longer-term guidance on capabilities and the required investments. We appreciate the assistance that this Subcommittee has provided to this critical mission, and we ask for your continued support.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I would be pleased to respond to your questions.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ANDREWS

Mr. ANDREWS. I would like to ask both of you, as much as you are able to in this open session, to discuss the consolidation effort and the benefits it brings. Can you describe to the committee some activities that have been pursued differently because of the organizing policy? How does the single-point strategy affect DOD's interactions with these other agencies? And how will USSTRATCOM and DTRA interact in the face of this consolidation?

Secretary FLORY. Over the past year, the Department has made strides in improving our combating WMD capability. The National Military Strategy to Combat WMD divided the broad combating WMD mission into eight definable mission areas that can now be addressed through existing budget, training, doctrine and policy processes. In addition, the appointment of USSTRATCOM as the lead combatant command for integrating and synchronizing combating WMD focused the Department's operational and planning efforts. Also, the recommendation resulting from the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to streamline operations and improve organizational effectiveness resulted in improved coordination of combating WMD activities.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense now has a near single point of contact for policy support of the combating WMD mission. Similarly, Commander, USSTRATCOM established the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating WMD (SCC) that, when fully operational, will develop and maintain global situational awareness of WMD activities, advocate for necessary combating WMD capabilities, and assist with combating WMD planning. DOD has designated DTRA as the primary combat support agency for USSTRATCOM. In 2006, the Secretary of Defense assigned an additional responsibility to the Director, DTRA to also serve as the Director, USSTRATCOM Center for Combating WMD (SCC), under the authority, direction and control of the Commander, USSTRATCOM.

These organizational changes improve Department of Defense cooperation with other agencies by streamlining the regular coordination process led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.

Mr. ANDREWS. I would like to ask both of you [Mr. Peter Flory, Dr. James Tegnelia] as much as you are able to describe in this open sessions, to discuss the consolidation effort and the benefits it brings. Can you describe to the committee some activities that have been pursued differently because of the organizing policy? How does the single point strategy affect DOD's interactions with these other agencies? And how will USSTRATCOM and DTRA interact in the face of this consolidation?

Dr. TEGNELIA. The designation of the Commander, United States Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) as the lead combatant commander for integrating and synchronizing the Department's Combating WMD (CWMD) mission provides greater situational awareness across the Department and our interagency partners; permits more rapid assessment of potential courses of action; establishes a military advocate within the unified command structure for the CWMD mission; and makes it easier to apply the full national expertise and capability to this challenging mission.

My designation as both the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and as the Director of the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating WMD better associates DTRA, the core of the Department's CWMD expertise, to the lead Combatant Commander for this mission. Because DTRA has well-established relationships with CWMD partners across the U.S. Government (USG), academia, the private sector, and friendly nation states, CDRUSSTRATCOM will be able to access the full national and international CWMD capability. In addition, as the Department's CWMD Combat Support Agency, DTRA is uniquely suited to supporting CDRUSSTRATCOM in integrating and synchronizing CWMD efforts.

I believe that the greatest benefits are yet to come as the relationship between DTRA and CDRUSSTRATCOM matures. However, we have already demonstrated that this approach will yield more robust, integrated USG approaches as opposed to DOD-centric solutions to WMD challenges. For example, DOD now has stronger relationships with the National Counter Proliferation Center, the National Security Council Interdiction-sub Policy Coordination Committee (PCC), the Maritime Oper-
ational Threat Response Group, and other CWMD-focused interagency bodies and processes. DTRA will continue to participate in the Tri-Department (DOD, Department of Energy, and Intelligence Community) Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) to review, assess, and report on organizations’ CWMD technologies, capabilities, near-term funding, and primary capability gaps.

Mr. ANDREWS. I have been in contact with officials of the NNSA in the Department of Energy, whose major task is to prevent the transport of nuclear material. How does the DOD interact with this particular effort? How confident are you of the measures in place, at the various points of contact and agencies to prevent the transport of WMD, particularly nuclear material? Where do you think are the greatest vulnerabilities, and what steps need to be taken to shore up our defenses?

Secretary FLORY. In addition to DOD’s formal interagency communications with DOE officials, the Department participates in several national offices and centers designed to develop appropriate and effective national responses to nuclear trafficking. These include the National Counter Terrorism Center, National Counterproliferation Center, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and the Nuclear Trafficking Response Group. In addition, DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program plays an integral role in the global nuclear detection architecture.

In order to prevent the transport of nuclear material, our forces must be able to tag, track, and locate these items, using all national capabilities. The Department continues to develop and improve our interagency cooperation in this area. The Proliferation Security Initiative, the Maritime Operations and Threat Response process, and the DNDO all contribute to improved collaboration. In addition, the Department continues to support international negotiations to secure fissile material.

Despite these ongoing efforts, we acknowledge that there are still holes in the global nuclear detection architecture. Fortunately, our nation has plans for the most likely paths—commercial cargo shipments, attended land crossings, and standard ports of entry.

Mr. ANDREWS. My second question, and again I’d like to hear from both Mr. Flory and Dr. Tegnelia goes to the heart of the counterproliferation effort. I have been in contact with officials of the NNSA in the Department of Energy, whose major task is to prevent the transport of nuclear material. How does the DOD interact with this particular effort? How confident are you of the measures in place, at the various points of contact and agencies, to prevent the transport of WMD, particularly nuclear material. Where do you think are the greatest vulnerabilities, and what steps need to be taken to shore up our defenses? For Dr. Tegnelia in particular, how do the efforts of DTRA at detection mesh with efforts to stop the material from becoming mobile in the first place?

Dr. TEGNELIA. DTRA interacts with the DOE/NNSA and other agencies to prevent transport of nuclear material on multiple levels.

Through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, DTRA assists Russia in safeguarding the storage and transportation of its nuclear weapons, making these weapons less vulnerable to terrorists. We are also an important player in the International Counterproliferation Program where, in coordination with others across the USG, we provide equipment, technical assistance, training, and exercise support to partner states seeking to prevent the illicit transfer of nuclear or radioactive materials. We maintain the capability to deploy teams of military, scientific, and technical personnel to search and locate WMD in coordination with DOE/NNSA and other agencies. DTRA’s 24/7 Operations Center also provides another tool for all our customers and partners to reach back to WMD knowledge and expertise. We are partnered with DOE/NNSA and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and complement their radiation detection programs and support the implementation of the DOD components of the global nuclear detection architecture, particularly the unique applications of common technology for specific-DOD mission purposes.

In addition, DTRA initiated and, with the support of our DOE/NNSA and other USG partners, has demonstrated the initial operational capability for post-detonation attribution. I believe that this capability can discourage the acquisition and use of nuclear devices.