Jurisdiction over Challenges to “Large” Orders Under Federal Contracts

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Summary

In unrelated decisions issued on June 14, 2011, and August 19, 2011, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims found that they have jurisdiction over protests of orders of any size issued under civilian agency contracts. The question arose because the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994, as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008, included a sunset date (i.e., May 27, 2011) that Congress extended as to protests of orders issued under defense contracts (P.L. 111-383), but not as to protests of orders issued under civilian agency contracts.

Before FASA was enacted, GAO, the federal courts, and procuring agencies generally had jurisdiction over protests alleging that agency conduct in the issuance of orders under federal contracts was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. However, FASA limited this jurisdiction, barring all protests regarding the issuance of orders except those alleging that the order increased the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract. Later, the NDAA for FY2008 expanded the grounds upon which the issuance of orders could be protested, authorizing GAO, in particular, to hear protests of orders valued in excess of $10 million that did not increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract. The NDAA for FY2008 also included a sunset provision, specifying that the “subsection” in question expired on May 27, 2011. Executive branch agencies and many commentators construed this language to mean that GAO’s jurisdiction over protests of “large” orders expired on May 27, 2011. However, GAO and, later, the Court of Federal Claims disagreed.

First, in Technatomy Corporation, GAO relied upon the statute’s “plain meaning” to find that “subsection” meant the entirety of FASA’s provisions regarding protests of orders, as amended, and not just the amendments made to these provisions by the NDAA for FY2008. According to GAO, what expired on May 27, 2011, were the limitations on its jurisdiction over protests that do not increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract, as amended by the expansion of its jurisdiction to include protests of “large” orders. Thus, it concluded that it may hear protests of orders of any size issued under civilian agency contracts, regardless of whether the protest alleges that the order increased the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract. Later, in Med Trends, Inc. v. United States, the court similarly relied upon the “plain meaning” of FASA, as amended by the NDAA for FY2008. However, the court also explicitly rejected the government’s argument that the legislative history of the NDAA for FY2008 supported construing “subsection” to mean only those provisions of FASA granting GAO jurisdiction over protests of orders valued in excess of $10 million. While conceding that this legislative history indicated that Congress intended GAO’s exclusive jurisdiction over protests of “large” orders be temporary, the court found that “subsection” unambiguously referred to the entirety of FASA’s protest provisions, not just the 2008 amendments.

These decisions arguably will result in protests of orders under civilian agency contracts being treated differently from protests of similar orders under defense contracts, and also could increase the number of bid protests. In addition, the Federal Acquisition Regulation was amended on July 5, 2011, in a manner that could prompt questions, on the basis that it could be construed to mean that no protests of orders under civilian agency contracts are authorized after May 27, 2011.
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Introduction

This report provides an overview and discussion of two recent decisions by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims finding that they have jurisdiction over protests challenging the issuance of task and delivery orders of any size under civilian agency contracts, even if these orders do not increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract. Prior to these decisions, executive branch agencies and many commentators had construed the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994, as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2008, as authorizing only protests concerning the issuance of orders under civilian agency contracts that (1) increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract or (2) are valued in excess of $10 million, as well as granting GAO temporary exclusive jurisdiction over protests involving the latter. However, GAO and the court rejected this interpretation, finding that what expired on May 27, 2011, were limitations on their jurisdiction imposed by FASA, as amended by the NDAA for FY2008. Thus, they concluded that they and, potentially, procuring agencies have jurisdiction over protests of orders of any size issued under the contracts of civilian agencies, regardless of whether these orders increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract.

These decisions arguably will result in protests of orders under civilian agency contracts being treated differently from protests of similar orders under defense contracts, and also could increase the number of bid protests. In addition, the Federal Acquisition Regulation was amended on July

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1 In so finding, GAO, in particular, assumed, without deciding, that the identity of the agency that awarded the underlying contract, and not that of the agency issuing the challenged order, determines whether the protest is governed by the provisions in Title 10 of the United States Code or those in Title 41 of the United States Code. See Technatomy Corp., Comp. Gen. B-405130, at ¶ 2 n.1 (June 14, 2011). The provisions of Title 10 generally apply to the procurements of defense agencies, while the provisions of Title 41 generally apply to the procurements of civilian agencies. However, given the different treatment of protests of orders under Titles 10 and 41 under the recent decisions by GAO and the court, the question of which provisions apply to the issuance of particular orders could be more fully litigated in the future.

2 Like the cases upon which it is based, the discussion of orders in this report excludes orders issued under the Federal Supply Schedules (FSS). While FSS contracts can be characterized as task and delivery order contracts, GAO and the courts historically found that orders under FSS contracts were protestable, notwithstanding the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008, because their issuance is governed by a different section of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) than that governing orders under non-FSS contracts. See, e.g., Labat-Anderson, Inc. v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 99, 104 (2001). However, it should be noted that, although the Technatomy protest involved an FSS contract, GAO did not address its possible jurisdiction in light of Labat-Anderson and related cases.


4 Procuring agencies had construed the 2008 amendments to FASA to mean that they lacked jurisdiction over protests regarding the issuance of orders valued in excess of $10 million. See, e.g., Memorandum from Al Matera, Chairman, Civilian Agency Acquisition Council, Office of the Chief Acquisition Officer, Gen. Servs. Admin., to Civilian Agencies Other than NASA, Enhanced Competition for Task and Delivery Order Contracts, May 23, 2008 (copy on file with the authors). However, agencies could now potentially find that they have such jurisdiction under the reasoning adopted by GAO and the Court of Federal Claims.

5 For more on bid protests, see CRS Report R40228, GAO Bid Protests: An Overview of Time Frames and Procedures, (continued...)
5, 2011, in a manner that could prompt questions, on the basis that it could be construed to mean that no protests of orders under civilian agency contracts are authorized after May 27, 2011.6

**FASA and Subsequent Amendments**

The recent decisions by GAO and the Court of Federal Claims arose from questions regarding the meaning of certain provisions of FASA7 and amendments made to it by the NDAA for FY20088 and the Ike Skelton NDAA for FY2011.9 For various reasons, including agencies’ use of detailed specifications to restrict competition and difficulties procuring commercial items during the Gulf War, by the early to mid-1990s, many Members of Congress and commentators had become concerned that the federal procurement process was excessively cumbersome and time-consuming for both agencies and contractors.10 FASA represented Congress’s first attempt to respond to these concerns “by greatly streamlining and simplifying [the government’s] buying practices.”11 FASA did so, in part, by explicitly recognizing “task and delivery order contracts,”12 and by limiting contractors’ ability to protest alleged improprieties in agencies’ issuance of orders under task and delivery order (TO/DO) contracts, among other things. TO/DO contracts are contracts for services or goods, respectively, that do not “procure or specify a firm quantity of supplies (other than a minimum or maximum quantity),” but rather “provide[] for the issuance of orders for the delivery of supplies during the period of the contract.”13 Because the time of delivery and the quantity of goods or services to be delivered are not specified (outside of stated maximums or minimums) in TO/DO contracts, such contracts are sometimes referred to as...
indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (ID/IQ) contracts. TO/DO contracts are sometimes also described as single-award or multiple-award contracts, a designation based upon the number of firms—one or more than one, respectively—able to compete for task and delivery orders under the contract. Before FASA was enacted, disappointed bidders and offerors could generally protest agency conduct in the award, or proposed award, of federal contracts that was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” before GAO, the federal courts, or procuring agencies. GAO, in particular, had found that it had jurisdiction over protests regarding the issuance of orders under TO/DO contracts.

Use of TO/DO contracts can greatly simplify the procurement process for federal agencies because agencies can issue orders to contractors holding the underlying TO/DO contract without complying with the requirements of the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984, among other things. This, in itself, can significantly reduce the time necessary for agencies to procure goods or services. However, FASA further simplified the procurement process for federal agencies by limiting the ability of bidders or offerors to protest alleged improprieties or illegalities in the issuance of orders under TO/DO contracts. In identical provisions codified in Titles 10 and 41 of the United States Code, FASA expressly prohibited protests challenging the issuance of orders except on certain narrow grounds:

15 Multiple-award task order contracts are sometimes also referred to as MATOCs. Only firms holding the underlying contract may generally compete for orders issued under the contract.
16 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) generally furnishes the substantive standard used in determining whether agency conduct in the award or proposed award of a government contract is permissible. See 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A) (scope of review under the APA); Superior Helicopter LLC v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 181, 186-87 (2007) (application of APA to agency procurement activities).
18 See P.L. 103-355, §1004, 108 Stat. 3252 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §2304(a)(1)) (“The following actions are not required for issuance of a task or delivery order under a task or delivery order contract: … a competition (or [an approved] waiver of competition…) that is separate from that used for entering into the contract.”); id., at §1054, 198 Stat. 3264 (codified at 41 U.S.C. §4106(b)(2)) (same). However, FASA did establish a general preference for multiple-award contracts and generally requires agencies to give all contractors holding the contract “a fair opportunity to be considered” for each order valued in excess of $3,000. Id., §1004, 108 Stat. 3250-52 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §2304a(d); 10 U.S.C. §2304(c)); id., at §1054, 108 Stat. 3262-64 (codified at 41 U.S.C. §4103(d)(4); 41 U.S.C. §4106(c)). Congress subsequently enacted legislation requiring that the FAR be amended to provide “specific guidance” on the appropriate use of multiple-award TO/DO contracts, as well as the steps that agencies should take to ensure that contractors have a “fair opportunity to be considered” for orders. See NDAA for FY2000, P.L. 106-65, §804, 113 Stat. 704 (Oct. 5, 1999). It also required that “smaller” orders (i.e., those valued in excess of the simplified acquisition threshold (generally $150,000) but below $5 million) issued under defense contracts be awarded on a “competitive basis,” which means that (1) “fair notice” of the intent to make the purchase is provided to all contractors offering that good or service under the contract, and (2) all contractors responding to the notice are afforded a “fair opportunity” to make an offer and have that offer considered by the official making the purchase. NDAA for FY2002, P.L. 107-107, §803, 115 Stat. 1797-79 (Dec. 28, 2001). Similar later requirements were later imposed on “smaller” orders under civilian agency contracts. See infra note 27.
19 See, e.g., Federal Acquisition Trends, Reforms and Challenges: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Mgmt., Info. & Tech. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 106th Cong., 6-7 (2000) (statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller General).
A protest is not authorized in connection with the issuance or proposed issuance of a task or delivery order except for a protest on the ground that the order increases the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract under which the order is issued.21

The provisions codified in Title 10 apply to the procurements of defense agencies, while those codified in Title 41 apply to the procurements of civilian agencies.


By 2008, congressional and public concerns regarding procurement had shifted, largely because of alleged waste, fraud, and abuse in contracts supporting military, diplomatic, and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.22 Rather than viewing the federal procurement process as too burdensome and time-consuming, as they did when FASA was enacted, some Members of Congress and commentators now believed that agencies had used their authority under FASA and similar laws to evade the spirit, if not the letter, of competition and other requirements.23 These concerns persisted notwithstanding a series of judicial and administrative decisions finding that GAO and the federal courts could exercise jurisdiction over certain protests involving the issuance of orders that did not increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract,24 and the Acquisition Advisory Panel, chartered under Section 1423 of the Services Acquisition Reform Act (SARA) of 2003, explicitly recommended that contractors be able to protest the issuance of “large” orders that do not increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract.25

21 P.L. 103-355, §1004, 108 Stat. 3253 (codified, as amended, at 10 U.S.C. §2304c(e)); id. at §1054, 108 Stat. 3261 (codified, as amended, at 41 U.S.C. §4106(f)). In an attempt to provide contractors with additional opportunities to challenge alleged agency misconduct in the issuance of orders, FASA also directed all executive agencies using TO/DO contracts to appoint a task and delivery order ombudsman, who “shall be responsible for reviewing complaints from the contractors on such contracts and ensuring that all of the contractors are afforded a fair opportunity to be considered” for certain orders. Id., §1004, 108 Stat. 3253 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §2304c(f)); id., at §1054, 108 Stat. 3254 (codified at 41 U.S.C. §4106(g)).

22 See, e.g., Does Automatic Mean Automatic?, supra note 3, at 642.

23 See, e.g., Ralph C. Nash, Jr. & John Cibinic, Jr., Taming the Task Order Contract: Congress Tries Again, 22 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 31 (May 2008), at 75 (noting instances of improper use of TO/DO contracts, including “broad contract scopes, 10-year ordering periods, poorly defined task orders with long performance periods, options to extend task order performance for years on end, and open-ended hourly-rate-based pricing schemes that defy meaningful comparative evaluation during source selection”); Michael C. Wong, Current Problems with Multiple Award Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity Contracts: A Primer, The Army Lawyer, Sept. 2006, at 25, 27 (same).

24 See, e.g., Labat-Anderson, 50 Fed. Cl. at 104 (protest of order under FSS contract not barred by FASA because the order was issued under Part 8 of the FAR, not Part 16); Electro-Voice, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-278319; B-278319.2 (Jan. 15, 1998) (finding that FASA’s bar on protests of orders that do not increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract does not apply to “downselections,” or two-step procurement processes wherein the number of potential competitors is first reduced by preliminary screening and then a competition is conducted among the remaining firms); L-3 Comm’ns Corp., ASBCA No. 54920, 06-2 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 33,374, at 165,451 (noting that breach of the contract clause obligating agencies to give contractors a “fair opportunity to be considered” “may theoretically be grounds for both a ‘protest’ seeking to cancel or modify the award and a ‘claim’ for damages”).

Congress responded, in part, to these concerns when it enacted the NDAA for FY2008. This act amended FASA to promote competition for orders under TO/DO contracts by (1) prohibiting agencies from using single-award TO/DO contracts valued in excess of $103 million (including options) unless certain conditions are met,26 and (2) specifying what constitutes a “fair opportunity to be considered” for orders valued in excess of $5 million.27 In addition, the NDAA for FY2008 also expanded protesters’ ability to challenge alleged improprieties or illegalities in the issuance of orders. Specifically, the NDAA for FY2008 amended FASA to read as follows:

A protest is not authorized in connection with the issuance or proposed issuance of a task or delivery order except for—

(A) a protest on the ground that the order increases the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract under which the order is issued; or

(B) a protest of an order valued in excess of $10,000,000.28

The 2008 amendments further specified that GAO was to have exclusive jurisdiction over protests of orders valued in excess of $10 million that did not increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract,29 and that

This subsection shall be in effect for three years, beginning on the date that is 120 days after January 28, 2008.30

26 P.L. 110-181, §843(a), 122 Stat. 236-37 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §2304a(d)(3)(A)); id., at §843(b), 122 Stat. 238-39 (codified at 41 U.S.C. §4103(d)(3)(A)). Single-award TO/DO contracts valued in excess of $100 million may be used only when the agency head determines in writing that (1) the task or delivery orders expected under the contract are so integrally related that only a single source can reasonably perform the work; (2) the contract provides for only firm fixed price task or delivery orders for products for which unit prices are established in the contract, or services for which prices are established in the contract for the specific tasks to be performed; (3) only one source is qualified and capable of performing the work at a reasonable price to the government; and (4) because of exceptional circumstances, it is necessary in the public interest to award the contract to a single source.

27 Id., at §843(a)(2), 122 Stat. 237 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §2304c(d)); id., at §843(b)(2), 122 Stat. 238-39 (codified at 41 U.S.C. §4106(d)). Under the 2008 amendments, contractors have not had a “fair opportunity to be considered” unless they are provided with (1) a notice of the task or delivery order that includes a clear statement of the agency’s requirements; (2) a reasonable period of time to provide a proposal in response to the notice; (3) disclosure of the significant factors and subfactors that the agency expects to consider in evaluating the proposals and their relative importance; (4) in the case of an award that is made on the basis of “best value,” a written statement documenting the basis for the award and the relative importance of quality and price or cost factors; and (5) the opportunity for a post-award debriefing. The 110th Congress later expanded the competition requirements for TO/DO contracts of civilian agencies when it enacted the Duncan Hunter NDAA for FY2009. Among other things, this act requires that orders valued in excess of the simplified acquisition threshold (generally $150,000) and below $5 million be issued on a “competitive basis” unless certain conditions are met. P.L. 110-417, §863, 122 Stat. 4547 (Oct. 14, 2008). In addition, the 2009 act also generally requires that notices related to sole-source task and delivery issues be posted on FedBizOpps (https://www.fbo.gov/) within 14 days of being placed. Id., §863(c), 122 Stat. 4547-48.


Many commentators interpreted the word “subsection” here to refer to the provisions regarding GAO’s exclusive jurisdiction over protests of orders valued in excess of $10 million because these provisions were added, along with the sunset clause, in 2008.\(^{31}\) In addition, the legislative history of the 2008 amendments arguably indicated that Congress intended to temporarily authorize protests of “large” orders in order to gauge their effects on the procurement and protest processes before permanently authorizing such protests.\(^{32}\)


Three years and 120 days after the enactment of the NDAA for FY2008 would have been May 27, 2011.\(^{33}\) However, before this date arrived, the 111\(^{th}\) Congress amended FASA’s provisions regarding protests of orders issued under defense contracts to extend the sunset date and clarify that it applies only to GAO’s exclusive jurisdiction over protests of “large” orders. The Ike Skelton NDAA for FY2011 amended those provisions of FASA codified in Title 10 of the United States Code to read as follows:

1. A protest is not authorized in connection with the issuance or proposed issuance of a task or delivery order except for –
   1. a protest on the ground that the order increases the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract under which the order is issued; or
   2. a protest of an order valued in excess of $10,000,000.
2. Notwithstanding section 3556 of title 31, the Comptroller General of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of a protest authorized under paragraph (1)(B).
3. Paragraph (1)(B) and paragraph (2) of this subsection shall not be in effect after September 30, 2016.\(^{34}\)

The 111\(^{th}\) Congress did not make similar changes to the provisions of FASA codified in Title 41 of the United States Code governing protests of orders under civilian agency contracts. Thus, the provisions currently in Title 41 differ slightly from those in Title 10. In particular, subsection (B)(3) in Title 41 states that “This subsection shall be in effect for three years, beginning on the date that is 120 days after January 28, 2008.”\(^{35}\)

Members of the 112\(^{th}\) Congress have introduced several bills that would amend Title 41 so that it parallels Title 10 (H.R. 899; H.R. 1540; S. 498), but none was enacted prior to May 27, 2011.

\(^{31}\) See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
\(^{32}\) See H.R. Rpt. No. 110-477, at 956 (2007) (“The conferees expect that the sunset date will provide Congress with an opportunity to review implementation of the provision and make any necessary adjustments.”).
\(^{33}\) See Technatomy Corp., B-405130, at ¶ 2.
\(^{35}\) 41 U.S.C. §4106(f) (emphasis added).
### Recent GAO and Court Decisions

In its June 14, 2011, decision in *Technatomy Corporation*, GAO found that it had jurisdiction over an order placed under a civilian agency contract that apparently did not expand the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract.\(^{36}\) The Department of Defense (DOD), which had issued the challenged order under a General Services Administration (GSA) contract, argued that because Congress had not extended the sunset date as to the orders of civilian agencies, GAO's jurisdiction to hear protests concerning task and delivery orders valued in excess of $10 million issued under civilian agency contracts expired on May 27, 2011.\(^{37}\) GAO disagreed, because of the “plain meaning” of the relevant provisions of FASA.\(^{38}\) GAO found that the word “subsection” in 41 U.S.C. Section 4106(f)(3) “unambiguously refers” to the entirety of subsection (f), which governs protests of civilian agency orders generally, not just subsection (f)(2), which grants GAO jurisdiction over protests of “large” orders.\(^{39}\) Based upon this interpretation of “subsection,” GAO found that what expired in May 2011 were the limitations on its jurisdiction under FASA, as amended by the expansion of its jurisdiction under the NDAA for FY2008.\(^{40}\) Thus, it concluded that, because of the expiration of these limitations, its jurisdiction “reverts to that originally provided in CICA,”\(^{41}\) and it may hear protests concerning orders of any value under civilian agency contracts, regardless of whether the order increased the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract.\(^{42}\)

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\(^{36}\) GAO assumed, and the parties did not contest, that the order in question did not expand the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract. See *Technatomy Corp.*, Comp. Gen. B-405130, at ¶ 2 n.1. Because GAO is a legislative branch agency, the “separation of powers” doctrine means that its recommendations are not legally binding upon executive branch agencies. See *Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’gs*, 809 F.2d 979, 987 (3d Cir. 1986) (“The doctrine of separation of powers gives each branch of the government constitutional rights. These rights are of tremendous importance, as they insure that our government functions properly. They thereby serve as bulwarks to the freedom which the doctrine of separation of powers is intended to preserve.”). Thus, the executive branch may—and, in fact, recently has—construed statutes in ways that contradict GAO’s recommendations. See CRS Report R40591, *Set-Asides for Small Businesses: Recent Developments in the Law Regarding Precedence Among the Set-Aside Programs and Set-Asides Under Indefinite-Delivery/Indefinite-Quantity Contracts*, by Kate M. Manuel (discussing disagreements in 2008-2010 between GAO and the executive branch as to whether set-asides for Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) small businesses had “precedence” over set-asides for other small businesses under the Small Business Act). Agencies are, however, required by statute to notify GAO when they do not “fully adopt” any recommendations made by GAO in a bid protest. 31 U.S.C. §3554(b)(3). GAO, in turn, is then required to notify four separate congressional committees: the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Senate Committee on Appropriations, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the House Committee on Appropriations. 31 U.S.C. §3554(c)(1)(A)-(B).

\(^{37}\) *Technatomy Corp.*, Comp. Gen. B-405130, at ¶ 2 n.1. GAO agreed with DOD’s argument that the law governing protests of orders issued by civilian agencies should apply here because the order in question was issued under a multiple-award contract awarded by GSA. *Id.* at ¶ 2 n.1. However, it rejected DOD’s argument that the decision should be based upon the law in effect at the time when the protest was heard, as opposed to the time when the protest was filed. *Id.* at ¶ 12-14.

\(^{38}\) *Id.* at ¶ 8 (“Where, as here, the language of a statute is clear on its face, its plain meaning will be given effect.”) (citing *Carcieri v. Salazar*, 555 U.S. 379, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1063-64 (2009)).

\(^{39}\) *Id.* at ¶ 9.

\(^{40}\) *Id.* at ¶ 8-9.

\(^{41}\) *Id.* at ¶ 7. In addition to establishing the competition requirements for federal contracts, CICA expressly authorized GAO to hear bid protests. However, GAO had heard protests prior to CICA on the theory that its authority to settle and adjust “all claims and demands” against the United States encompassed bid protests. See *Bid Protests*, supra note 5.

\(^{42}\) B-405130, at ¶ 10.
More recently, in its August 19, 2011, decision in *Med Trends, Inc. v. United States*, the Court of Federal Claims also found that it has jurisdiction over protests of orders of any value issued under civilian agency contracts. In so finding, the court rejected the government’s argument that, “notwithstanding the clear language of the statute, the legislative history associated with the 2008 amendment makes clear that the grant of jurisdiction to GAO in 2008 was a short-term experiment.” The court did so, in part, because it, like GAO, found that the word “subsection” referred to the entirety of FASA’s provisions regarding protests of task and delivery orders issued under civilian agency contracts, not just those provisions regarding GAO’s jurisdiction over “large” orders issued under civilian agency contracts. Because it viewed this statutory text as “unambiguous,” the court accorded no weight to a 2007 conference report expressing the conferees’ view that the expiration of GAO’s jurisdiction over “large” orders would provide “Congress with an opportunity to review the implementation of the provision and make any necessary adjustments.” It similarly declined to rely upon legislation introduced in the 112th Congress and accompanying committee reports that purportedly evidenced Congress’s intent that the sunset date apply only to GAO’s exclusive jurisdiction over protests of orders valued in excess of $10 million.

### Issues for Congress

These decisions may be of interest to Congress for several reasons, including because they will arguably result in protests of orders issued under civilian agency contracts being treated differently from protests of similar orders under defense contracts, and could increase the number of bid protests. As Table 1 illustrates, under the GAO and Court of Federal Claims decisions, protesters have greater opportunities to protest the issuance of orders under civilian agency contracts than under defense agency contracts, particularly after September 30, 2016. When civilian agency contracts are involved, contractors are able to challenge orders of any size (regardless of whether these orders increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract) before GAO, the Court of Federal Claims, and, potentially, the procuring agencies. However, when defense contracts are involved, contractors are able to challenge “large” orders that do not increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract only before GAO, and only through September 30, 2016. Moreover, absent congressional action, GAO’s jurisdiction over “large” defense orders will expire on September 30, 2016, and contractors will be able to challenge only defense orders that increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract under which they are issued. This expansion of the grounds upon which and the forums before which the issuance of civilian agency orders may be protested is further significant because it could increase

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43 Previously, the court had found that GAO had exclusive jurisdiction over such protests because of the amendments made to FASA by the NDAA for FY2008. See, e.g., DataMill, Inc. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 740 (Mar. 5, 2010).
45 Id. at *14-15.
46 Id. at *14.
47 Id. at *15. According to the court, “[t]he proposed legislation demonstrates two things. First, the perceived need for it suggests that Congress understands that the existing sunset provision does not accomplish the same result. Second, the proposals demonstrate that Congress can legislate with precision when it chooses to do so. Both observations reinforce our reluctance to follow the government’s invitation to tell Congress what we think it really intended in 2008.” Id.
48 See, e.g., Daniel J. Kelly, David Himelfarb, and Bonnie A. Vanzler, GAO Opens the Door to Protests of All Civilian Agency Task Orders … But for How Long?, 96 Fed. Cont. Rep. 259 (Sept. 13, 2011) (suggesting that GAO’s decision “opens the floodgates to many protests that were previously barred”).
the number of bid protests filed. The number of protests filed annually, particularly with GAO, had been increasing prior to the decisions in Technatomy and Med Trends, and some Members of Congress and agencies have expressed concerns about the effects of protests upon agency operations.

### Table 1. Differences in Ability to Protest Orders Under Civilian and Defense Agency Contracts Under the GAO and Court of Federal Claims Decisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orders Under Civilian Agency Contracts</th>
<th>Orders Under Defense Agency Contracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Can protest orders of any size, regardless of whether they increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract, with GAO, the Court of Federal Claims, and, potentially, procuring agencies</td>
<td>Between now and September 30, 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Can protest either (1) orders that increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract with GAO, the Court of Federal Claims, or the procuring agency, or (2) orders valued in excess of $10 million that do not increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract with GAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>After September 30, 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Can protest orders that increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract with GAO, the Court of Federal Claims, or the procuring agency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: Congressional Research Service, based on various sources cited in this report.

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51 See, e.g., Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009: Report of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, on H.R. 5658, at 394-95 (2008) (directing GAO to investigate and report on the impact of bid protests on the Department of Defense (DOD); Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense, Aug. 24, 2007, available at http://acquisition.navy.mil/rd/a/content/download/5263/23838/file/enhancing%20competition%201-18-2008.pdf (describing bid protests as “extremely detrimental to the warfighter and taxpayer” and stating that “[t]he Defense Department must take steps in an effort to avoid these protest situations’’). DOD’s concerns about the “detrimental” effects of bid protests are based partly upon the automatic stay of contract award or performance (known as a “CICA stay”) that is generally triggered by the timely filing of a protest with GAO. See 31 U.S.C. §3553(d)(3)-(4). However, even if agencies are not required by law to stay performance under protested orders, as some commentators have suggested, protests of orders can nonetheless disrupt agency operations because agency officials must spend time explaining their conduct to disappointed bidders and offerors and defending their conduct before administrative and/or judicial forums. See, e.g., Does Automatic Mean Automatic?, supra note 3, at 652 (discussing whether protests of orders trigger CICA stays).
Also of potential interest to Congress are amendments to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) made on July 5, 2011, regarding protests of orders. In an interim final regulation promulgated after GAO’s decision in Technatomy, but before the Court of Federal Claims’ decision in Med Trends, the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (FAR Council) revised the FAR to state that

(i) No protest under Subpart 33.1 is authorized in connection with the issuance or proposed issuance of an order under a task-order contract or delivery-order contract, except for—

(A) A protest on the grounds that the order increases the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract; or

(B) A protest of an order valued in excess of $10 million. Protests of orders in excess of $10 million may only be filed with the Government Accountability Office, in accordance with the procedures at 33.104.

(ii) The authority to protest the placement of an order under this subpart expires on September 30, 2016, for DoD, NASA and the Coast Guard (10 U.S.C. 2304a(d) and 2304c(e)), and on May 27, 2011, for other agencies (41 U.S.C. 4103(d) and 4106(f)).

Both the meaning of this provision and the FAR Council’s authority to promulgate such a regulation would appear to be in doubt, particularly after the decision by the Court of Federal Claims. As amended, the regulation could be construed to mean that neither protests of orders that allegedly increased the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract, nor protests of orders valued in excess of $10 million, are now authorized for civilian agency contracts. However, such an interpretation could potentially be found not to be entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Under Chevron, courts generally defer to an agency’s formal interpretation of a statute that the agency administers whenever the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, and the statute has not removed the agency’s discretion by compelling a particular disposition of the matter at issue. Agency interpretations are not granted such deference, though, when “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” and the agency’s interpretation is at variance with the statutory language.

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53 See supra note 36.
54 In particular, the FAR’s reference to “subpart” would appear to encompass protests on both grounds.
56 Id. at 412. See, e.g., Mission Critical Solutions v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 386 (2010) (finding that Small Business Administration regulations providing for “parity” among the set-aside programs was not entitled to deference under Chevron because it did not constitute a reasonable interpretation of the Small Business Act).  

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