

VIVA CHINA...A TIGER BY THE TAIL

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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The history of the Americas community; North, Central, and South, is a contradiction of the stated desire for a mutually beneficial relationship, but a reality that has seen exploitation, insensitivity, and injustice. Today relations between the U.S. and Latin American are arguably at a low ebb. Preoccupied with the Global War on Terror, little attention has been paid to our southern neighbors. This attention vacuum is being filled by other interested parties with their own political and economic agendas.

A current major player in Latin America is China whose influence is growing economically and politically as they continue to expand trade agreements and political ties throughout the region. China brings economic incentives to the table without the demands for a democratic form of government, human rights guarantees, or involvement with private corporations bent on making a quick profit. But is this good for the U.S., and as importantly, is it a good thing for the governments and people of Latin America? There is a disparity of opinions on the motivations, implications, and consequences of China's growing influence in Latin America, but the reality is they are here and their influence, both hard and soft, is growing.

VIVA CHINA...A TIGER BY THE TAIL

It's all about relationships. They require care and feeding, give and take, honesty and communication; they take work. As Jimmy Buffet said, "We all got 'em, we all want 'em. What do we do with 'em?"¹ The United States has a relationship with the Latin American nations: we share the same home; the Western Hemisphere and we are inexorably linked by history, geography, culture, demographics, economics, and mutual interests. The history of the Americas community; North, Central, and South, is a contradiction of the stated desire for a mutually beneficial relationship, but a reality that has seen exploitation, insensitivity, and injustice. Today relations between the U.S. and Latin American are arguably at a low-ebb. Preoccupied with the Global War on Terror, little attention has been paid to our southern neighbors. This attention vacuum is being filled by other interested parties with their own political and economic agendas.²

A current major player in Latin America is China. Their influence is growing economically and politically as they continue to expand trade agreements and political ties throughout the region. China brings economic incentives to the table without the demands for a democratic form of government, human rights guarantees, or involvement with private corporations bent on making a quick profit.³

But is this a good thing for the U.S., and as importantly, is it a good thing for the governments and people of Latin America? There is a disparity of opinions on the motivations, implications, and consequences of China's growing influence in Latin America, but the reality is they are here and their influence, both hard and soft, is growing. The purpose of this paper is to examine the strategic implications of the continued and growing Chinese influence in Latin America, the U.S. response thus far

to China's growing presence in the region, and recommendations for future U.S policy in Latin America.

Where have we been?

From a stated policy of hands off by the rest of the world, to a doctrine of interventions as required to maintain security and further economic interests in the region, to covert support to overthrow elected leaders in favor of repressive dictatorships, and finally to a general security polity of encouraging democracy, privatization, and free trade; the U.S. has not practiced a consistent policy that could be interpreted by the countries in Latin America as benevolent or supportive of their goals, values, and aspirations.

President Monroe, in 1823, articulated a policy that became known as the Monroe Doctrine.⁴ This doctrine established the United States vision of a political order with separate spheres of influence in the Western Hemisphere and in Europe. With agreements from two of the major European powers, Russia and Britain, the Monroe Doctrine stopped further colonization in the Americas and established United States dominance in the Western Hemisphere; in exchange for United States non-involvement in European political affairs. This policy created a clean break between the New and the Old Worlds.⁵ The Big brother policy in the 1880s sought to establish U.S. leadership in the Americas and to open up the Latin American markets to trading. In 1889 then U.S. Secretary of State, James Blaine, began the International Conference of American States which was the first forum for all of the nations of the Western Hemisphere; a first step in the direction of a unified body where all voices could be heard.⁶ With the

conclusion of the Spanish American War in 1898, the last remnant Spanish holdings in the Americas were cast out.⁷

As President (1901-1909), Theodor Roosevelt was the driving force behind the Panama Canal. He believed in the strategic importance of a Central American passage between the Atlantic and the Pacific, a vision that has proven its value both militarily and economically to this day. The Canal is also a good example of U.S. unilateral action at the expense of a nation's sovereignty in the region. When faced with political opposition from Columbia of which Panama was then a part, the U.S. supported a Panamanian independence movement which once successful, gave the U.S. control of the Panama Canal Zone.⁸ This established what amounted to a U.S. colony in the middle of a Central American state which in later years would be a flash point until it was turned over to the Panamanian government in 2000. Theodor Roosevelt also added to the Monroe Doctrine by asserting that the U.S. had the right to intervene in the national affairs of Latin American nations. What ensued was a series of "military interventions" sometimes called the Banana Wars; so named because they were reportedly undertaken to protect the economic interests of large U.S. corporations such as the United Fruit Co. in Latin America.⁹ Direct intervention in support of U.S. interests in Latin America remained the diplomatic tool of choice until the early 1930's.¹⁰

In his inaugural address on March 4, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt stated: "In the field of world policy I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor--the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others."¹¹ During World War II the Western Hemisphere stood united against the Axis and in 1947 established a hemispheric defense treaty.¹² In 1948, the Organization

of American States (OAS) was chartered with 21 original members; today it stands at 35 member nations.¹³

A principle goal of the OAS was to fight the spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere, an extension of the U.S policy of containment. However, the policy of non-intervention did not reconcile well with the realities of the Cold War and the doctrine of containment. The first major failure of that policy came with the Cuban revolution in 1959 led by Fidel Castro. In response to nationalization of what is estimated to be over 5,000 U.S. owned businesses in Cuba, the U.S. imposed trade embargos which drove the Cuban government into the arms of the Soviet Union. Several failed U.S. backed attempts to overthrow Castro failed.¹⁴ What followed was a series of small wars, many backed in some measure by the U.S., throughout Central and South America against the perceived spread of communism and in support of the policy of containment. The result was numerous covert operations undertaken by the United States, a series of military dictatorships or juntas throughout Latin America, suspension of democratic rights in those nations, and frequent human rights violations.¹⁵

A final note on past relations with Latin America is the support given by the U.S. to Britain during the 1982 Falkland War against Argentina. Without consulting the OAS or working other diplomatic channels, the U.S. squarely backed the British military operations in the Falklands against Argentina. In addition to alienating the Argentines, it was viewed largely by the region as support to an aggressor nation from outside the hemisphere; a direct contradiction to the Monroe Doctrine and non support to the mutual defense of the Western Hemisphere.¹⁶

This chronology of U.S. relations with Latin America highlights behavioral inconsistencies, not lost on our neighbors to the south. Rather, it can easily be interpreted as a situational policy that puts U.S. national and economic interests first at the expense of the less powerful nations in the region. Although expedient at the time, in the long run these contradictory policies sow the seeds of doubt and are the grist for generations of resentment and anti-American sentiment. The foundation of actions laid by the U.S. over the past 150 years has not been consistent or mutually beneficial when viewed through Latin eyes. Yet there is an affinity and desire for a better tomorrow in the region¹⁷ and the U.S. can be a leader among peers.

Where are we?

There are many conditions such as poverty, inequality, and corruption that foster the threats and challenges faced in the AOR (Latin America). Predominant among these conditions is endemic poverty. High rates of poverty foster regional threats such as radical regimes, criminal activities, and violence. A secure and stable environment is necessary for the sustained improvement of economic growth and prosperity required to reduce poverty in our hemisphere.¹⁸

Political and economic conditions in Latin America today are summed up by Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. Director of the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College as “Latin America today is besieged by a powerful force of resentment engendered by a combination of weak states, social exclusion, criminal violence, and corruption.”¹⁹ As the United States has concentrated on the Global War on Terrorism, our neighbors to the South have slipped from a promising future in the 1950s and 1960s to a region filled with poverty, corruption, crime, unequal distribution of wealth, and social exclusion. Significant indicators of the current social and economic state of the Latin American population are:

- Nearly 40 percent, 222 million people, of Latin America's population are poor.
- Half of those are extremely poor, earning a dollar or less per day. The merely poor earn \$2 a day.²⁰
- Some 130 million Latin Americans do not have access to clean water.²¹
- The percentage of slum dwellers declined marginally from 35.4 percent in 1990 to 31.9 percent in 2001, but grew in absolute terms from 111 million to 127 million.²²
- According to Washington's prestigious Inter-American Dialogue, 50 years ago Latin America's per capita income was higher than that of Spain, Portugal, Eastern Europe, and most East Asian countries, but today it is much lower in each case.²³
- According to the Inter-American Development Bank, per capita income among Latin American countries would be 25 percent higher if the region had a crime rate similar to that of the rest of the world.²⁴
- Violence is the principal cause of death for males between 15 and 45 years of age in Latin America.²⁵

With such conditions in play, loss of confidence in governance, to include democratic, and disenfranchisement are the result. With the downward spiral of U.S. prestige and reputation worldwide, governance, other than "made in the U.S.A. democracy", that is seen as responsive to social and economic needs of the electorate can easily gain traction in a population that believes their condition is the result of U.S. capitalism, exploitation, and indifference.

Today, close to 60 percent of Latin America's total population of 527 million live in countries governed by elected presidents to the left of the political spectrum.²⁶ Eight countries; Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Chili, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Venezuela, have elected governments of the Left.²⁷ The current political environment can be characterized by the following:

Unemployment/underemployment and public insecurity due to crime top the list of public concerns throughout the hemisphere. Thus the rise of the Left would appear to owe much to core problems arising from the quality of democracy as experienced by the average citizen; the persistence of poverty and inequality; the growth of the informal sector (with the concomitant decline of labor unions); desencanto (disenchantment) with the institutions of democratic governance, especially political parties; the difficulty of establishing adequate mechanisms of participation, representation, and accountability; and dislocation related to the domestic effects and foreign policy implications of globalism.²⁸

In addition to Latin America's social and economic conditions, the prevalence of narco-money in the region only serves to further weaken the institutions and perpetuate corruption. Corrupt law enforcement and judiciary officials can become ineffectual or even collusive with the international criminals who profit from drug consumption in the United States, Europe, and Asia, as well as Latin America itself.²⁹

These social, political, and economic conditions are moving the Latin American region away from a strategic partnership with the U.S. Loss of confidence in democracy "American" style; weak nation states that have not met the basic needs of a large portions of their populations, systemic problems with the institutions of law and order, a growing belief that the state can use its power to correct economic and social inequities, coupled with the lack of attention given to the region by the U.S. have created a vacuum and an opportunity.

China on the World Stage

Latin America is a region that needs friends; friends that can enable economic growth, equitable distribution of wealth and resources, judicial reform, and representative democracy throughout the region. China is a country that is looking for relationships on the world stage. It is then natural that China and Latin American nations would establish ties. The danger is that China has not shown an interest in the overall welfare and long term improvement of conditions for the general population of the nations with which they establish trade and technology agreements.³⁰ Engagement with China can strengthen an existing government's hold on their nation, increase military capabilities, and leave the general population no better off than pre-engagement. In the case of a government not favorable to the U.S., this could deny us access to natural resources and strategic areas (such as the Panama Canal). There is a long term danger to both the United States and the peoples of Latin America that can not be ignored. China is engaging Latin America and the U.S must address that engagement.

Americans should always remember, however, that even as China becomes more engaged, it is also growing more adept at using its foreign policy and foreign relations to serve Chinese interests. Today's China is certainly smarter and more sophisticated -- but not necessarily kinder or gentler. Beijing's new skills may at times frustrate Washington's objectives, as China is becoming better positioned to undermine, and potentially challenge, the policies of the United States and its allies.³¹

To understand China's interests and motives in the Latin American region, we must first look at her major foreign policy objectives and how they are pursued through international diplomacy. The bottom line for China is a nation in the process of reclaiming what she sees as a lost status in the region and the world.³² The key question then is how is China pursuing that end? Their leaders have stated that they seek "to foster a stable and peaceful international community environment that is

conducive to building a well-off society in an all around way". Their stated foreign policy themes are "peace, development, and cooperation" in the pursuit of building a "harmonious world".³³

Those major themes play well on the international stage but what is really motivating China's foreign policy and how is it manifested?

From the vantage point of 2007, China is not ideologically driven in a manner that motivates a revolutionary foreign policy that seeks to acquire territory, forge anti-U.S. balancing coalitions, or otherwise dismantle the core elements of the current international system.³⁴

As China develops and executes international policy, its perspective is one of reclaiming its place as a world leader, recovering from an era of exploitation from external powers, and being highly sensitive to current external powers that could pose a threat to their security. Based on those perspectives, China's diplomatic behavior on the international scene has three major priorities: ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity (hence the Taiwan issue), economic development, and international respect and status.³⁵

Understanding that in the near term China is not intent on direct competition with the U.S. or challenging our role as the sole super power, what can we expect in terms of a relationship with an emerging world force? First, as China does flex and extend its world wide influence, there will be occasions of friction and competition. In addition, to the extent that China can win the hearts and minds of nations and peoples, it will be natural that she is then less dependent on friendly relations with the U.S. This then is the paradox, how does the U.S. deal with a competitor driven by an agenda of national interests that are both symmetric (world stability) and asymmetric (control of natural resources) to our national interests? As China continues to reinvent itself, can the

United States influence that process? Engagement in Latin America offers that opportunity.

China in Latin America

China brings significant economic power to the table. Measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, in 2007 China stood as the third -largest economy in the world after the US and EU.³⁶ China is the fourth largest importer of oil in the world.³⁷ In addition China imports natural gas, aluminum, copper and iron, all of which fuel their economic engine.³⁸ In 2007 estimated imports were valued at \$917.4 billion.³⁹ In contrast, China's 2007 exports were valued at \$1.211 trillion; the U.S. being the number one customer of those exports.⁴⁰

To feed their growing economic machine, China must import natural resources such as oil, natural gas, aluminum, copper, nickel, and iron. Latin America has those resources. In addition, Latin America offers the Chinese market opportunities for their manufactured goods. The region has what China needs and China has taken advantage of the opportunity. Latin America's trade with China has grown 528% since 1999. Their two-way trade of \$12.2 billion far surpasses that with other Asian countries.⁴¹

Chinese economic and diplomatic engagement in Latin America is multi faceted. It includes investments and agreements with oil producing nations in the regions, to include Venezuela, Ecuador, Columbia, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Military to military engagements are growing between China and militaries in the region, joint technological ventures are in play, and there are frequent visits throughout Latin America by senior Chinese leaders.⁴²

The sale of oil or other natural resources to China is not in and of itself a threat to the U.S. However, the results of such transactions can produce undesirable results. China makes deals directly with government officials. Without the checks and balances of a board or stockholders, there is no guarantee that the population of the country will see the benefits of the petro-profits. The best example is the partnership China has formed with Venezuela's Hugo Chavez. China is now invested in an oil rich country and is strengthening that foothold while at the same time Chavez can use the profits from his dealings with China to strengthen his hold on Venezuela, increase his military capability, and export his brand of anti-Americanism. In other words, destabilize the region. Petro-dollars are just like narco-dollars; they corrupt and without transparency in government, will end up in the pockets of the politicians making the deals. For China this is not a concern, China is in it for the natural resources, not the equitable distribution of profits within a client nation. The Chinese are here to stay in the oil and natural resource arenas. Not only have they entered into purchasing agreements, they are investing in delivery infrastructure; long term investments from which they will not walk away.⁴³

Military to military engagements began with Latin American in earnest in 1985. Beijing opened the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) National Defense University, which included foreign courses for personnel from the Latin American militaries. China has significantly expanded its military exchange program in the last ten years. Large delegations from the PLA have visited Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, and notably Columbia.⁴⁴ As the United States limits classroom seats in its Senior Staff Colleges because of issues such as a country's refusal to sign up to a Bilateral Immunity

Agreement with the U.S., China is ready to provide the seat at their University. A bonus for the Chinese is that because the U.S. has had close ties to some Latin American militaries over the years, they can now through their engagements with the same militaries, gather intelligence on how the U.S. military trains and operates.⁴⁵

Another interesting development is the military diplomacy being practiced by the PLA in Suriname. For almost ten years the PLA has been providing construction assistance. Although Surinam is a small and often overlook country in the north of South American, the Chinese military are executing a nation building assistance program in the Western Hemisphere.⁴⁶ Once again, China is more than willing to fill the vacuum left by the U.S.

Technology exchanges and agreements are another avenue that China is using to engage the Latin American region. In Argentina, the Chinese invested heavily in the telecommunications market as the Argentine economy faltered and the U.S. was pulling out. Now the economy has rebounded and China has a commanding position in both the Argentinean telecommunications and space technologies markets; technologies that the Chinese by doctrine use for military purposes.⁴⁷ In Brazil the Chinese have been collaborating on spy satellite technology by trading rocket launch expertise for digital optical technology. This exchange also put China in the position of having access to Brazilian space tracking facilities that in turn could be used to attack U.S. satellites.⁴⁸ Another technological alliance of note is between the Chinese and Cuba. Beginning in 2000, China has occupied a base in Cuba that intercepts U.S. telephone traffic. In 2004 a technical cooperation agreement was reached that has resulted in Radio China

International signals “interfering” with U.S. East Coast radio and air traffic control signals.⁴⁹

Beijing knows the value of state visits. Annually Chinese leaders have been making the rounds in the Latin American region; establishing deep, meaningful political and economic contacts with regional governments.⁵⁰ Such attention, although not always ending in a trade agreement, sends a message that the region and its people are important to a major world player. This frequent contact by a senior Chinese leader stands in contrast to the general perception that the U.S. has not shown interest in Latin America since 9-11 diverted our attention.

Implications

There is no crystal ball to reveal China’s long term strategy relative to the Latin American region. What can be said is China is succeeding at achieving its ends in the Western Hemisphere. China is an economic heavy weight who is establishing long term trade agreements with Latin American nations for their natural resources that are needed to fuel China’s economic engines. In addition China continues to expand markets for its export goods in the region, which is beneficial to China, but directly competes with local manufactures and entrepreneurs and can put them out of business. The military to military diplomacy is garnering both strong ties in the region and intelligence on U.S. military operations. Technological exchanges are also benefiting the Chinese and positioning them to conduct offensive cyber and space operations if the need arises. What differentiates the Chinese from the U.S. is our interest in the well being of Latin America. Despite the inconsistencies and sometimes heavy handed treatment of the region, the U.S. has a genuine concern for the dignity and freedom of

the individual. That is a core American value and it is one of the pillars of our National Security Strategy, even if it is not always apparent.

The existence of a dominant Chinese presence in the Latin American region is not in the best national interests of the United States. However, it would be in China's long term interests to undermine U.S. supremacy in the Western Hemisphere and to establish a coalition strong enough to challenge our national interests. That would present a myriad of tactical, strategic, and economic disadvantages to this country that are unacceptable to our national security. It would also be detrimental to the Latin American region. There is no evidence that China is interested in a stable, democratic region that provides for the welfare of its population. China's interests are China.

Recommendations

The United States must address the growing Chinese influence in Latin America along two wide fronts. First we must renew our commitment and support to the Latin American region through comprehensive economic aid packages, military to military engagements, people to people engagements, and a strategic communications campaign that tells the story of what we are doing in the region and that we are one family. This will require time and treasure, not hollow rhetoric. The U.S. must also pay close attention to the level of Chinese involvement and motives. Proactive and honest diplomatic dialogue must establish what China's intentions are in the region, clearly layout our concerns about the negative results of their adventures, and our intentions to shape a unified and thriving Western Hemisphere.

The U.S. has some fences to mend in its relationship with the nations of Latin American. Although the argument is being made by the current administration that we

continue to be the largest trading partner and highly supportive of the region, perceptions from the region are not so glowing:

According to Latinobarómetro, a comprehensive annual opinion poll conducted throughout Latin America, regional assessments of the U.S. impact in the world, its relations with Latin American nations and Bush's performance have dropped steadily each year since 2001.

After September 11, Latin America all of a sudden found itself alone and started taking care of itself," said Marta Lagos, executive director of Latinobarómetro, which is based in Chile. "Now, this is like a broken marriage: You try to put things back together, and you come calling with a bouquet of flowers and start talking about doing all the things you've been asked to do before. But to the other person, it doesn't sound convincing."⁵¹

The U.S. must reassess its commitments to the Latin American region. A key element in focusing positive engagements in the region should be SOUTHCOM. They have it right in the current Theater Security Cooperation strategy:

The coming decade will see fundamental changes in how we base and employ military forces, and how we weave military power into the diplomatic, informational, and economic facets of our interaction with our partner nations in Latin America and the Caribbean. USSOUTHCOM will be at the forefront of these changes, synchronizing our actions and programs with the other agencies of the U.S. government. We will ensure the forward defense of the United States, establish regional partnerships, and help enhance hemispheric stability and security so that the U.S. and partner nations may extend the benefits of secure democracies and economic prosperity to all of their citizens.⁵²

All the tools of national power need to be used in support of our Southern Hemisphere – Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic. SOUTHCOM should be reorganized to include interagency positions; AFRICOM would be a good template to start with because it is a headquarters that integrates full spectrum interagency capabilities into its force structure. It goes without saying that resourcing SOUTHCOM adequately is essential. That will take the political will and insight to understand the importance of this region, and although not in immediate peril, undesirable outcomes

are certainly foreseeable if the U.S. does not reengage proactively and beneficially in the near term.

Law enforcement is a key to positive governance and social stability in the region. Aid in the form of training and mutual cooperation is another dimension of engagement. Ultimately an organization such as INTERPOL for the Western Hemisphere should be established and resourced. Hand in hand is judiciary reform. The U.S. must partner with all the nations of the region, possibly through the OAS to support a viable judiciary throughout Latin America.

The OAS is where the U.S. can begin to deploy its Strategic Communication Campaign. If the United States is serious about regaining lost ground in Latin American, then that must be the message and the OAS is an excellent forum to begin the dialogue.

One of the biggest impediments to increasing the number of Latin American military students at both junior and senior level U.S. services schools is the U.S. position on the Rome Statute or International Criminal Court (ICC). Washington must relook the policy of sanctioning Latin American countries that refuse to sign a BIA. The issue of U.S. non-participation in the ICC cuts even deeper than just the military schools engagement program.

Latin America has experienced human rights violations for hundreds of years. They are highly sensitive to the issue and therefore supportive of the ICC. The U.S. on the other hand has chosen not to participate in the ICC and taken the additional step of penalizing nations supporting the ICC that refuse to sign a BIA with the U.S. Sanctions include reduced or withdrawal of foreign aid. In the case of Latin America, eleven

countries chose to take cuts in foreign aid rather than sign a BIA with the U.S. They do have the option to work aid deals with China.

A comprehensive economic aid strategy must target the region with a vision of developing self sufficiency, export, and services. Aid packages that rejuvenate and jump start local economies must include the technology to stand up industries that provide goods for both the region and export. Partnerships that ensure benefit to the local populations must also enable economic growth and parity with the north. A free market that generates tax revenue must be seen as beneficial by national government vs. leaders making deals with companies or nations that line their own pockets.

The U.S, must lead by example. Democratization of the entire region is our stated goal and is a vital national interest. To that end U.S. policy must be sensitive to and supportive of all democratization movements in the region. The people of Latin America must be made to feel we care. Frequent visits to the region by senior U.S. government, diplomatic, and business leaders with a strategic message of support and sleeves rolled-up involvement must convince the population that a new day of mutual interest and cooperation has dawned.

The National Security Council and its working level committees must re-examine the national commitment to Latin America. They should lead the way in developing and executing a comprehensive policy that focuses the full spectrum of national power and talent on the southern portion of our hemisphere. That policy must also include a strategy for dealing with China in Latin America.

China's reaction to a more aggressive U.S. presence in Latin America will be dependent on how strong they believe their influence is, summed up by economic

holding, political influence, and military presence(proxy and actual). The longer the U.S. stands on the side lines, the stronger the China grip becomes, the greater the danger to the hemisphere. There will be push back and the U.S. has to be the stronger of the two or eventually lose the region.

Conclusion

The U.S. is joined to the Latin American region by geography and history. We are neighbors and should be friends. The U.S. has not done a good job of establishing a mutually beneficial, long term relationship. This has created a vacuum into which China has stepped. China is offering the region cash for resources, military assistance, and attention without strings. What China could accomplish is realignment of the region into a camp that is not friendly to the United States. What China does not offer is growth and prosperity to the general population and more importantly, China does not offer the core values that the Americas share – liberty and justice.

No relationship will grow unless both parties are growing. It is up to the U.S. to re-engage with Latin America. As a hemisphere we are rich in natural resources, human capital, and potential. We have a relationship and potential for an even better one that will benefit all. To assist in the realization of that potential, the United States will have to give money, attention, and priority. Unconditional leadership and support may sound naïve but isn't that how a healthy relationship is achieved? Or shall we sit in the back seat of the car, chaperoning China and Latin America to the dance?

Endnotes

¹ Jimmy Buffett, "Fruitcakes," from *Fruitcakes*, MCA Nashville, 24 May 1994, CD.

² Larry Birns, "Off Course: Current U.S. – Latin American Relations," 21 February 2007, linked from the *Council on Hemispheric Affairs Home Page*, available from <http://www.coha.org/2007/02/21/off-course-current-us-latin-american-relations/>; Internet; accessed 27 December 2007.

³ Stephen Johnson, "Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America," *Heritage Foundation: Backgrounders*, no. 1888, 24 October 2005, available from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/bg1888.cfm>; Internet; accessed 27 December 2007.

⁴ James Monroe, *The Monroe Doctrine*, from President James Monroe's seventh annual message to Congress, 2 December 1823, available from <http://www.ushistory.org/documents/monroe.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 January 2008. ". . . At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been made by His Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. . .

It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the results have been so far very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any

European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.

The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none of them more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in hope that other powers will pursue the same course.”

⁵ *Monroe Doctrine, 1823*, available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/jd/16321.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2008.

⁶ Leslie Bethell, ed, *The Cambridge History of Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 89-90.

⁷ David F. Trask, *The War with Spain in 1898* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), 473-486.

⁸ Michael L. Conniff, *Panama and the United States: The Forced Alliance* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991), 63-70.

⁹ Ivan Musicant, *The Banana Wars: A History of United States Military Intervention in Latin America from the Spanish American War to the Invasion of Panama* (New York: MacMillan, 1990), 1-5.

¹⁰ *History of U.S. Interventions in Latin America*, available from <http://www2.truman.edu/~marc/resources/interventions.html>; Internet; accessed 20 December 2007.

¹¹ *U.S. Department of State*, “The Good Neighbor Policy, 1933,” available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/17341.htm>; Internet; accessed 29 December 2007. President Franklin Delano

Roosevelt took office determined to improve relations with the nations of Central and South America. Under his leadership the United States emphasized cooperation and trade rather than military force to maintain stability in the hemisphere. In his inaugural address on March 4, 1933, Roosevelt stated: "In the field of world policy I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor--the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others." Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, participated in the Montevideo Conference of December 1933, where he backed a declaration favored by most nations of the Western Hemisphere: "No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another". In December Roosevelt stated, "The definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention." In 1934 at Roosevelt's direction the 1903 treaty with Cuba (based on the Platt amendment) that gave the United States the right to intervene to preserve internal stability or independence was abrogated. Although domestic economic problems and World War II diverted attention from the Western Hemisphere, Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy represented an attempt to distance the United States from earlier interventionist policies, such as the Roosevelt Corollary and military interventions in the region during the 1910s and 1920s.

¹² Harold Molineu, *U.S. Policy toward Latin America: From Regionalism to Globalism* (New York: West View Press, 1990), 22-26.

¹³ The Organization of American States (OAS) brings together the nations of the Western Hemisphere to strengthen cooperation on democratic values, defend common interests and debate the major issues facing the region and the world. The OAS is the region's principal multilateral forum for strengthening democracy, promoting human rights, and confronting shared problems such as poverty, terrorism, illegal drugs and corruption. It plays a leading role in carrying out mandates established by the hemisphere's leaders through the Summits of the Americas.

With four official languages — English, Spanish, Portuguese and French — the OAS reflects the rich diversity of the hemisphere's peoples and cultures. It is made up of 35 member states: the independent nations of North, Central and South America and the Caribbean. The government of Cuba, a member state, has been suspended from participation since 1962; thus only 34 countries participate actively. Nations from other parts of the world participate as permanent observers, which allows them to closely follow the issues that are critical to the Americas, http://www.oas.org/key%5Fissues/eng/KeyIssue_Detail.asp?kis_sec=20, OAS HOME PAGE, accessed, 22 Dec 07.

¹⁴ Molineu, 8-9.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 55-84.

¹⁶ Jorgan O. Laucirica, "Lessons from Failure: The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict," *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomatic and International Relations Vol I* (Summer/Fall 2000): 87-89.

¹⁷ Peter Hakim, "Is Washington Losing Latin America?" *Foreign Affairs* 85 (January/February 2006): 5-6.

¹⁸ *United States Southern Command*, "SOUTHCOM Theater Security Cooperation Statement," updated: 29 June 2007, available from <http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/theaterSecurity.php>; Internet; accessed 27 December 2007.

¹⁹ Douglas C. Lovelace, "Foreward," in *American Grand Strategy for Latin America in the Age of Resentment*, Gabriel Marcella, (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007), iii.

²⁰ Poverty rates in 2004: Brazil, 25 percent; Mexico, 14 percent; Colombia, 12 percent; Venezuela, 22 percent; Ecuador, 8.2 percent; Peru, 33.2 percent; and Bolivia, 37.1 percent. Statistics from Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC), cited in Gabriel Marcella, *American Grand Strategy for Latin America in the Age of Resentment* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007), 8.

²¹ Juan Forero, "Latin America Fails to Deliver on Basic Needs," cited in Gabriel Marcella, *American Grand Strategy for Latin America in the Age of Resentment* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007), 8.

²² Comparative rates: Nicaragua, 90 percent; Venezuela, 40 percent; Colombia, 25 percent; Ecuador, 28 percent; Peru, 72 percent; Bolivia, 65 percent; Brazil, 42 percent; Argentina, 37 percent; and Chile, 15 percent. ECLAC, p. 277.), cited in Gabriel Marcella, *American Grand Strategy for Latin America in the Age of Resentment* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007), 8.

²³ Inter-American Dialogue, "A Break in the Clouds: Latin America and the Caribbean in 2005," cited in Gabriel Marcella, *American Grand Strategy for Latin America in the Age of Resentment* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007), 8.

²⁴ Larry Rohter and Juan Forero, "Unending Graft Is Threatening Latin America,"), cited in Gabriel Marcella, *American Grand Strategy for Latin America in the Age of Resentment* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007), 8.

²⁵ Ibid., 9.

²⁶ Cynthia J. Arnson and Jose Raul Perales, eds. *The "New Left" and Democratic Governance in Latin America*, August 2007, available from http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.publications&group_id=99313&topic_id=1425; Internet; accessed 5 January 2008.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Marcella, 8.

³⁰ Mohan Malik, "China's Growing Involvement in Latin America," 12 June 2006, linked from the *Power and Interest News Report: PINR Home Page*, available from http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=508&language_id=1; Internet; accessed 5 January 2008.

³¹ Evan S Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs* 82 (November/December 2003): 6.

³² Malik.

³³ Evan S. Medeiros, "China's International Behavior, Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification", *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 47 (4th Quarter 2007): 34.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 37.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 35.

³⁶ *Central Intelligence Agency: The World Fact Book*, 2008, available from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2008.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Johnson, 2.

³⁹ *Central Intelligence Agency*.

⁴⁰ *Central Intelligence Agency*.

⁴¹ "Latin America-Asia Trade Agreement Review: July 2006," published by the Americas Society and Council of Americas (AS/COA), available from <http://www.as-coa.org/Newsletter/July/LAC-Asia-Trade-Final.pdf>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2008.

⁴² Johnson, 3-4.

⁴³ Xuan-Trang Ho, "China's Burgeoning Role in Latin America-A Threat to the U.S.?" linked from *Policticalaffairs.net*, *Marxist Thought Online*, <http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/articleview/712/1/78/>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2008.

⁴⁴ Cynthia Watson, "Latin America in Step with China," *Greater China, Asian Times*, 2 November 2007, available <http://atimes01.atimes.com/atimes/China/IK02Ad01.html>; Internet; accessed 22 December 2007.

⁴⁵ Kathleen D. Cole, *The Sleeping Dragon Awakes: Ramifications of Chinese Influence in Latin America*. Strategy Research Project (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 15 March 2006), 9.

⁴⁶ Watson.

⁴⁷ Janie Hulse, *China's Expansion into and U.S. Withdrawal from Argentina's Telecommunications and Space Industries and the Implications for U.S. National Security* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007), 2.

⁴⁸ Johnson, 4.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Ho.

⁵¹ Monte Reel and Peter Baker, "Bush Theme of Doubling Latin Aid Is Seen as Misleading," linked from *Washington Post Foreign Service*, 9 March 2007, available from www.washingtonpost.com; Internet; accessed 22 December 2007.

⁵² *United States Southern Command*.