THE RED SCOURGE RETURNS: THE STRATEGIC CHALLENGE OF MAOIST INSURGENCY IN INDIA AND SOUTH ASIA

BY

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# The Red Scourge Returns: The Strategic Challenge of Maoist Insurgency in India and South Asia

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### Abstract

With the US and other powers focused on the struggle against Islamic terrorism and insurgency, the effects of globalization have swelled the ranks of Maoist insurgents in India and the South Asia. The response of some marginalized peoples in these countries, having been abandoned by their national socio-economic and political systems, is to look to the alternative system provided by Maoist insurgents who are creating a counter-state to address societal grievances. A “Red Corridor” now exists in South Asia from Nepal to Sri Lanka and creation of base areas in India is running unchecked. A network of Maoist parties are mobilizing in South Asia and growing rapidly. India is hard pressed to combat this imminent threat and groping blindly for solutions. The Maoists intend to attack India’s high tech and export sectors thwarting foreign investment and threatening to bring India’s economic and political progress to a halt. The burgeoning US-Indian economic and strategic relationship is threatened by India’s Maoist menace. The US is ill-equipped to deal with Maoist insurgency as insurgency studies and counterinsurgency strategies have focused on insurgent approaches from Iraq and Afghanistan. They have largely discounted the Maoist strategic approach as irrelevant and dated yet it is rampaging unchecked in South Asia. This paper demonstrates the looming transnational threat posed to the states of South Asia by Maoist insurgency and provides recommendations to stem its rapid spread.

### Subject Terms

Globalization, Sri Lanka, Red Corridor
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ABSTRACT

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strategic approach as irrelevant and dated yet it is rampaging unchecked in South Asia.

This paper demonstrates the looming transnational threat posed to the states of South Asia by Maoist insurgency and provides recommendations to stem its rapid spread.
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Revolutionary warfare is never confined within the bounds of military action. Because its purpose is to destroy an existing society and its institutions and to replace them with a completely new structure, any revolutionary war is a unity of which the constituent parts, in varying importance, are military, political, economic, social, and psychological.

― Mao Tse-Tung ‘On Guerilla Warfare’

Deep in the impenetrable forests of the remote areas of eastern India, in a swath of territory stretching from the Himalayas to the tip of Tamil Nadu, Maoist cadres are aggressively building a counter-state to challenge the Indian government for power. By addressing the societal grievances of India’s tribal peoples, the multitudinous poor, women, and the lower castes, the Maoists have taken over myriad villages and towns filling the vacuum of governance left by weak local and state authorities. The Indian central government and the world have been fixated by the nuclear standoff with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir and the insurgencies in the Punjab and India’s northeast. Meanwhile with no one watching, the Maoist problem has exploded virtually unnoticed and grown into a figurative communist hydra that threatens the states and stability of the region if decisive action is not taken rapidly to counter it. The governments of South Asia cannot do this alone and require the support of democratic partners to counter this menace. While the battle continues to rage against fundamentalist Islamic terror, a new one is beginning against a Maoist threat that was thought to be virtually extinct. Maoist insurgency never left and is back with a vengeance. In fact it was cited by the journal Foreign Policy as one of the Top 10 Stories You Missed in 2005.¹
The Threat to the US-Indian Strategic Relationship

Maoist insurgency in India and South Asia are seemingly internal problems of little interest to the US. Yet this insurgency and its South Asian partners are rampaging out of control and have the potential to derail the future of India and the region. If left unchecked they could over the course of a few years topple some regimes in South Asia as they have done in Nepal. They threaten economic growth and foreign investment in India and the region at a crucial strategic juncture for the US. Maoism has the potential to make the strategic partnership between the US and India highly problematic.

Economically the US-Indian relationship is growing dramatically. According to the US Department of State, “The United States is India’s largest trading partner. Bilateral trade in 2006 was $32 billion. The growing software sector is boosting service exports and modernizing India's economy. Software exports crossed $28 billion in FY 2006-2007, while business process outsourcing (BPO) revenues hit $8.3 billion in 2006-2007. The United States is also India's largest investment partner, with a 13% share of the market. India's inflow of U.S. direct investment is estimated at more than $9 billion through 2006.”² This mutually beneficial economic relationship is spiraling upward and growing more important. Domestically, US-Indian relations will grow in importance as the Indian-American community grows in political clout in the US due to its strong business and investment ties with India and successes here in the US.³

In the strategic cooperation arena the US is counting on India to be a reliable, stable, democratic partner in South Asia. India is currently an important partner in the War on Terror and a potential Asian counterweight to an aggressive China.⁴ Both Washington and New Delhi have common interest in preventing any single power from
dominating Asia (read China), eliminating the threats posed by insurgency and terrorism and religious extremism, stopping the spread of WMD, and protecting key sea lanes of communication for global commerce in South Asia and energy security. Each also desires to spread democracy and liberal economic development to prevent the spread of harmful ideologies and to increase prosperity by trade in goods, services, and technology.\textsuperscript{5} India can be the jewel in the crown of US foreign policy in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century if it continues to grow.

India: Ripe for Classical Maoist Revolution?

Conventional wisdom says that the era of Maoist insurgency began in China in the 1920s and ended with the demise of the Cold War in 1990 as aid to Maoist insurgents collapsed with China’s turn to market capitalism. Many groups disintegrated without moral and material aid and it appeared that the world was entering a new era with the collapse of world communism. This was hardly the case in many nations as dedicated Maoist groups developed indigenous methods of support. Beneath the veneer of the halcyon days of the end of the Cold War and the beginnings of the globalization era many Maoist groups began an expansion that has continued unabated and unnoticed by the global community to this day.

After the end of the Cold War, globalization arrived and state borders disappeared. Economic liberalization eliminated protectionist policies in most nations and allowed companies access to new markets with unlimited mobility for capital. The South Asian Maoist view of the world situation as outlined in the Declaration of the Conference of Co-ordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) dated August 2002 postulates that globalization is the panacea for
the capitalism marching towards its grave. They highlight the increasing rich-poor gap brought on by globalization and its effect on the poor. They rail against India’s Special Economic Zones (SEZ) awarded to domestic and foreign companies to exploit local resources. While globalization has benefited many South Asians and poverty has been reduced overall, the sheer size of the Indian population has ensured that hundreds of millions of poor live on the edge of existence. The Indian government estimates that 27.5 percent of the population of more than one billion lives below the poverty line officially established at $0.40 per day.

Couple the huge numbers of Indians living in poverty with India’s social problems related to caste issues and the Maoists have a virtually unlimited supply of potential recruits. According to Human Rights Watch the Maoists are recruiting strongly in the lowest social castes where the lowest on the societal ladder will reach for any alternative. The Maoists also find fertile recruiting ground in the agricultural sector where sixty percent of the Indian population is tied to farms. The form of agriculture is semi-feudal with most families earning less than $300.00 per year.

The Indian socio-economic political system is a mass of contradictions and the Maoists have a plan to overturn that system. The constitution of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M), spells out the strategic objective clearly, stating, “It is to complete a new democratic revolution in India as part of the world proletarian revolution, the overthrow of the existing system, and the establishment of a communist society.”

This party, also known as the Naxalites, has been organizing the masses for revolutionary war for decades. The CPI-M strategic military approach is spelled out in
the program and constitution of the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army. It calls for a protracted people’s war in the classic Maoist three-phased approach.\textsuperscript{15} They are carving out liberated zones in the countryside to build and train for guerrilla and conventional operations, meanwhile becoming the instrument that protects the alternative societal and political infrastructure.\textsuperscript{16} These parties are using the Maoist strategic approach to accomplish their goal of seizing state power.

The Maoist People’s War strategic approach that the CPI-M is implementing is the classic used by the Chinese communists to achieve victory in 1949. The eminent Dr. Thomas A. Marks, the world’s foremost expert on Maoist insurgency, provides the best description of this strategic approach in his seminal work \textit{Maoist People’s War in Post-Vietnam Asia}. Mao’s five components or lines of operation as described by Marks are Mass line, United front, Violence, Political warfare, and International action.\textsuperscript{17} These lines are well known and do not need to be described in detail but the major lesson upon examining them is that four of the five are focused on mass mobilization and political action, the heart of any insurgency. This strategic approach was used successfully in China and Vietnam to capture state power. Tragically it was successful recently in Nepal because the international community stood impotently by and let it happen. This strategic approach overall has been unsuccessful as insurgents have misjudged the situation in their respective nations or misapplied the approach to local conditions.\textsuperscript{18}

Analysis of the Maoist Insurgency of the CPI-M in India

How bad is the Maoist situation in India currently? The South Asia Terrorism Portal online maps\textsuperscript{19} (Map below) shows a Maoist “Red Corridor”, a continuous swath of
Indian states stretching from the Nepalese border to Sri Lanka. The territory represented by the red corridor encompasses one quarter of India’s land area. The spillover effect from these states has emboldened Maoist parties in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and may reach Myanmar and into Southeast Asia.

The situation has grown more alarming since 2007 as Maoist cadres deftly followed Mao’s lines of operation in half the states across India. Maoist operations are marked by battalion-sized attacks in several states, some with several thousand insurgents, and a growing mass base in rural areas.20 The Maoists have termed these massive assaults “swarming attacks”, copied directly from their brethren in Nepal.21 Mass assaults involving thousands of insurgents would be unprecedented in Iraq or
Afghanistan. The second innovation is the coordinated multi-state strike and blockade. Maoist instigated strikes were local and nothing new but in June 2007 the CPI-M shut down the six worst affected states for a three day period. Estimates of the economic damage and dislocation run as high as one billion rupees.22 The CPI-M can shut down large portions of the country at will for long periods of time if it desires.

This contrasts with the situation a few years ago when experts considered the problem to be minor compared to problems in Kashmir, India’s Northeastern states, and the Punjab.23 The Indian government vastly underestimated the problem as Sahni states, “It is useful to recall, in this context, that when talk of the ‘Red Corridor’ was first heard at the turn of the Millennium, security, intelligence, and political analysts simply scoffed, dismissing the very idea as a pipe dream and a propaganda ploy. Since then the Maoist consolidation has occurred precisely along the axis of the then-projected ‘Red Corridor’.”24

The problem had grown large enough that by April 2006 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told a conference of state chief ministers in New Delhi that, “The Maoist insurgents are drawing strength from deprived and alienated sections of the population and are trying to establish liberation zones to dispense basic state functions. They have seized control of the instruments of state administration and their protracted people’s war is India’s biggest internal security challenge ever.”25 This is verified by Sahni who states,

The Maoist threat appears to be overtaking all other insurgencies in the country on available objective parameters - geographical spread and number of fatalities. At least 165 districts in 14 States, out of a total of 602 districts in the country, were affected by various levels of Maoist
mobilization and violence by the end of year 2005. Terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir affects 12 districts, while the combined influence of the multiple insurgencies in India’s northeast afflicts 51 Districts. Over the past years while fatalities in various other insurgencies have tended to decline consistently, fatalities as a result of the Maoist conflict have continuously augmented, and appear to be fast approaching levels of the high-intensity conflict in J&K.26

India’s federal system consists of 28 states and 602 districts.27 In 2003 the Indian government reported 9 states and 55 districts affected to varying degrees by the Maoist insurgency. In just two years that had risen dramatically by the end of 2005 to 13 states and over 160 districts.28 By 2007 the statistics showed a dramatic increase to include 16 states and over 192 districts (see Map above). The level of activity in each of these states varies but the overall Maoist saturation into the fabric of governance and society is increasing. Casualties from the CPI-M insurgency rivaled those of Kashmir in 2007.29

Maoist recruitment drives are targeting new areas. According to Sahni, “There is further evidence of preliminary activity for the extension of operations to new areas including Gujurat, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, and Meghalaya.”30 Looking at Map 1, successful Maoist penetration of these states listed above would give them a new East-West axis in addition to the existing North-South red corridor. It would also place Maoist cadres, in the case of Meghalaya, in a position to co-opt the separatist insurgencies in the restive region of Northeast India.31

More concerning yet is the Maoist plan to take their organizational skills to India’s urban areas. Since 2004 and the publication of the Urban Perspective: Our Work in Urban Areas, the Maoists have begun to infiltrate unions, and have targeted the unemployed and students.32 Additionally, they have targeted industrial centers and are
laying the groundwork for the urban follow-on to the successful creation of adjacent rural counter-states.

The level of Maoist rural penetration and organization in India’s affected states is startling. The top government official in Dantewada village in Chhattisgarh state admitted that 55,000 tribals had been displaced in recent fighting and 600 of the villages and territory of his 6400 square mile district are Maoist controlled. The Bastar district in Chhattisgarh and its tropical forests are the epicenter of Maoist training and cadres in India, hosting indoctrination and training camps for the surrounding states. This region hosts ten thousand insurgents and 35,000 Naxal sympathizers.

In neighboring Jharkhand sources indicate, “That 18 of a total of 24 Districts are affected by varying degrees of CPI-M extremism and violence. Presently, 14 Districts are ‘highly affected’, four Districts ‘moderately affected’ and five ‘marginally affected’. Conservative estimates by intelligence sources in the State indicate that nearly 1,200 of the 4,564 villages in the State are under the complete influence of the Maoists.”

The situation in adjacent Bihar is grave. “According to a March 2007 document, 30 of the State’s 38 Districts are currently affected by Maoist activities. Nine of these have been designated ‘hyper-sensitive’ and a further nine Districts fall into the ‘sensitive’ category.” Bihar state is where the Maoist problem becomes transnational. The state’s border with Nepal has witnessed increased mobilization activities and attacks. CPI-M links with the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), their brethren in the CCOMPOSA, take place in northern Bihar, and are well proven. Weapons, personnel, and expertise freely transit the 1800 kilometer border between the two nations.

Orissa state appeared largely free of Maoist infestation, with the exception of two
additional swarming attacks and the Koraput attack in 2004. But this lower level of activity was deceiving as the Maoists were organizing villages, building militias, and replacing the state and local governments. This became glaringly obvious on 15 February 2008 when four large Maoist groups, over one thousand insurgents, conducted four simultaneous raids on police stations, training schools, and armories across Nayagarh district in Orissa eighty kilometers from the state capital. These bold raids seized over two thousand weapons and hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition.39

The descriptions of Indian state penetration by Maoist cadres in the four states described above are occurring on the same scale in seven other states including Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttaranchal, and West Bengal. Maoist organization and the implementation of their strategic approach will be replicated in nearly all of India’s states, especially rural areas, if they remain unchecked by the central government lacking a focused national approach.

The Looming Threat of Transnational Maoist Insurgency

The bigger threat that this insurgency poses is the looming transnational Maoist threat. As the CPI-M grows in strength in India’s rural areas links to outside Maoist groups and others grows. The linchpin in the spread of Maoism throughout South Asia occurred on 13 April 2008 with the CPN-M election victory in Nepal.40 This was soon followed by the announcement on 20 April that the CPN-M Chairman Prachanda, would fill the position of Prime Minister.41 The CPN-M successful use of political warfare, the united front, and intimidation tactics, has brought the world the first post-Cold War communist state!42 The Maoist Republic in Nepal is highly sympathetic to its Maoist
brethren throughout South Asia if not outright supporters. This electoral victory by the CPN-M will bolster the efforts of South Asia’s Maoist parties.43

With a sympathetic Maoist government in Kathmandu the CPI-M and other CCOMPOSA parties will have a vast sanctuary to spread Maoism throughout India. This was confirmed by the joint creation by both Maoist parties of the Indo-Nepal Border Regional Committee (INBRC) to coordinate activities in Bihar.44 They will work together to create their compact revolutionary zone and export Maoism in South Asia.45 One visit to the CPN-M webpage shows ample propaganda displayed for the Indian Maoists by their Nepali counterparts.46 Mutual support has gone both ways across the border as “Bihar’s Maoists had provided their Nepali colleagues with safe havens following the 14-month crackdown on them by the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) that ended in April, besides giving them arms training and limited financing.”47

In addition to the proven links with the Nepali Maoists there is also strong evidence of cross-border links with other members of CCOMPOSA from Bangladesh and Bhutan. In Bangladesh the Purba Banglar Communist Party has struggled to imitate the CPI-M in Bangladesh and has close links with the Naxalites in West Bengal. It wishes to launch a joint movement with Maoist partners in India, particularly the Naxalites of West Bengal.48 Hundreds are killed annually in its attempt to emulate its Indian neighbors.

In Bhutan the current transition from monarchy to democracy appears to be going well but has been marred by bombs planted at election time by the nascent Bhutan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist). This outlawed party is based in and supported by the CPN-M, and has stated on the CPN-M website49 that they are initiating
a people’s war to topple the monarchy in Bhutan. With a sanctuary in Maoist Nepal
they will no doubt be operating against the Bhutanese government with little fear of
cross-border reprisals. The BCP has links with the other separatist insurgent parties in
India’s restive northeast.\footnote{50}

Sri Lanka’s thirty year old conflict has shown no signs of abating and the LTTE
(Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) insurgency is still strong. This group has links
throughout South Asia and with the CPI-M for training\footnote{51} and its IED work is producing
results for the Maoists.\footnote{52} LTTE has also provided weapons and training in
assassination techniques.\footnote{53} While the Maoists deny that further links exist with the
LTTE the mutual support provided by both continues.\footnote{54} Reports of Indian and Nepali
Maoists conducting training in camps with the LTTE on the Indo-Nepal border
demonstrate how strong this ‘fraternal’ network has become and what an ominous
danger it is to the states of South Asia.\footnote{55}

More threatening to India, Bhutan, and Myanmar, is the linkage between the CPI-
M and the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). ULFA has been fomenting a
separatist insurgency with the government of India since 1948. The ethnic Assamese,
with strong ethnic links across the border in Myanmar, have been fighting for their own
nation in India’s most intractable insurgency. There is strong evidence that ULFA has
been working with the CPI-M in training insurgent cadres, providing sophisticated
weapons and sanctuary.\footnote{56} Bangladesh has been the meeting site for both parties and
Bangladeshi intelligence has supported the ULFA for years. Pakistan’s Inter-services
Intelligence (ISI) has also been active in training the ULFA in Bangladesh and may
support the CPI-M as well.\footnote{57} The growing strength of the CPI-M and the penetration of
its cadres into India’s troubled Northeast region has the potential to create an insurgent ‘perfect storm’ for the Indian government if the CPI-M can co-opt these insurgencies into a larger united front.\textsuperscript{58}

\textbf{Uncoordinated Central Government Response}

The government in Delhi downplayed the threat of the Maoist red corridor running from the Nepalese border to Tamil Nadu. The state governments, told to deal with the threat on their own appeared unwilling to accept the sheer size, seriousness, and popularity, of the insurgency they are facing. The Maoists are popular in the villages, as corrupt government officials and landlords are oppressive and highly unpopular.\textsuperscript{59}

The Indian state and central government response has been uncoordinated, piecemeal, quiet, and focused on police and military action instead of the root causes of the insurgency. The central government view has been characterized by Union Home Minister Patil who posted a paper in parliament on the Naxalite problem on March 13, 2006. This paper is very security focused discussing modernization of the state police, mine protected vehicles, raising security expenditures, long-term paramilitary force deployments, strengthening reserve battalions, and improving border security. The paper vaguely references a backward districts initiative, land reform, and employment opportunities, but is very clear both in the security and development arenas that the states are on their own with regards to defeating the CPI-M in their own states.\textsuperscript{60}

The Indian central government has continued to put the onus for solving the problem on the individual states with little supervision or effect. In the case of Chhattisgarh this resulted in a state-sponsored vigilante group called the Salwa Judum
or “Purification Hunt”. This force is largely composed of tribal peoples in an attempt on the surface to build a grass roots counterinsurgency campaign. This ill-planned attempt at counterinsurgency has seen over 100,000 villagers forced from their homes, 3000 houses burned and the deaths of over 1000 “Maoists” at the hands of the militia. The militia has paid heavily in lives as in their inept attempts to battle the Maoists. Refugee camps created by these operations are holding tens of thousands of displaced villagers in squalid conditions alienating them further from state and local governments.61

In addition to local militias the Indian army published a new counterinsurgency doctrine labeled “Iron fist with a velvet glove”. This new doctrine published one month after FM 3-24 stresses the use of Indian army soldiers to hunt down terrorists using high-tech and intelligence without alienating the civilian populace, preferring to “neutralize” insurgents instead of “eliminating” them. They term this doctrine people-centric and have a list of politically correct rules for soldiers to follow to win their hearts and minds. This doctrine does not mention the root causes of the insurgency nor does it bring in good governance or development. Sandeep Unnithan, in a damning indictment of this doctrine and the Indian army’s view of the CPI-M threat states, “The doctrine’s precept is at variance with the Government which wants to bulk up the paramilitary forces as the weapon of first resort to tackle internal insurgency. While the doctrine says that Communist-inspired insurgencies are on the decline, it forgets to mention the Maoists of South Asia who are on the upswing.”62

Police forces in the states under Maoist siege are ill-equipped to deal with the problem in the rural areas of India. There is a large manpower gap as many positions go unfilled. The ranks are also poorly trained and ill-equipped and police stations are
unfortified. In many cases the Maoists have successfully intimidated the police to the point where they have stopped wearing uniforms.62

What are the prospects for Maoist success in India and South Asia? The signs are ominous for the Indian and other governments. All they need do is look northward to the first red star over South Asia in Kathmandu and look back ten years to see how it was viewed as a minor conflict that had no chance of toppling the government. The explosive growth of the insurgency and the tepid government response has made the problem intractable at this stage. The sheer numbers of insurgents, their village militias, and the large support base in affected states will require massive forces to put it down with a military solution, which in the end could backfire badly. Central India is not Kashmir. The Maoists are the poorest, most marginalized, tribal and ethnic peoples in India. They are Indian citizens and not largely foreign fighters as in Kashmir. Domestic military operations are not likely to solve the problem.

The root causes of Maoist insurgency in India are easy to ascertain but will require decades of growth and investment to repair. What the government of India and its states need to realize is that the only way to solve this insurgency is not with larger military operations but to ensure the effective functioning of governmental institutions to serve the country’s marginalized and poor. India’s infrastructure is crumbling or non-existent in most of the remote parts of the country where the insurgency is most active. Chhattisgarh is a typical example of this problem: 10 out of 16 districts do not have a district hospital, one health care center services 40,000 people, 90% of the population works in the rural farm sector, 68% of households do not have electricity, 49% of households have no access to water at home, 19% of fields are irrigated, 1% of the
population has a telephone, 40% of rural villages are not serviced by roads, and fully 53% of children do not attend primary school.\textsuperscript{54}

It is unlikely that US forces would be directly involved in combating Maoist insurgency in India as it is viewed as an internal security issue. But if the Maoists are successful in carving out base areas, raising large insurgent guerrilla and conventional forces, and creating a broad united front in India to challenge the government for power, that could change as the insurgency would spread to India’s immediate neighbors and threaten much of South Asia as the networks for expansion already exist. As US investment grows in India, US involvement in Indian affairs will grow as well, especially from an economic and security standpoint. The Maoists know that India’s high-technology sector is the capitalist star of the Indian economy and have plans to target it. Damaging that infrastructure and stopping foreign investment is one of their long-term plans that will directly confront US interests. Targeting multi-national corporations and stemming foreign investment is part of modern asymmetrical warfare. The economic ripples will be felt far beyond India.\textsuperscript{65}

US involvement in the short term is problematic as American military literature treats Maoist insurgency as passé. Frank Hoffman rails against the ‘classic’ Maoist model stating, “Today’s insurgent is not the Maoist of yesterday.”\textsuperscript{66} Clearly he has not been observing the Maoists of Nepal and India or the New People’s Army in the Philippines just to name a few. The writings of Steven Metz, one of the preeminent experts on insurgency are constantly challenging us to rethink COIN as our doctrines are based on fighting the classical insurgencies of the past. He desires to shift the focus to the insurgencies of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century yet classical Maoism is raging unchecked in
India, has established a government in Nepal, and is about to explode in South Asia, a place of great US economic and security interest. Current conflict is blinding us to what is to come from the Maoists.

**Recommendations to Prevent Maoist Success in South Asia**

The US needs to revise Joint and Army Doctrine to address the imminent Maoist threat and train US forces to counter Maoist political warfare. Future US involvement in combating Maoist insurgency will face an uphill battle as US doctrine and COIN strategies are focused on Afghanistan and Iraq. A basic student of the Maoist approach need only read FM 3-24 to note that we are unprepared for this type of insurgency. FM 3-24 is a good tactical template for US troops operating in Iraq but it has no viable solutions for conducting political warfare at any level. It dedicates only 1.5 pages to Maoist insurgency largely relegating it to history. It acknowledges that political factors are primary in insurgencies but yet does not discuss how to work for political solutions that solve insurgencies. Alexander Alderson captures the essence of this argument well, quoting British COIN expert Frank Kitson stating, “There can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity.” Alderson continues, “No matter how radical and complex an insurgency may be, and however the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan are interpreted, counterinsurgency is still not a military activity and current doctrine should reflect that.” The US joint community needs to create political warfare training for combating future Maoist insurgencies under the greater umbrella of improving strategic communications from the grand strategic to the tactical level. This can be done by creating new courses in the military education system, new manuals, and doctrine devoted to Maoist insurgency and how to combat it.
Iraq and Afghanistan are not the templates of the future and should not steer future doctrines. Counterinsurgency should be trained by the joint community as much as it trains for conventional warfighting.

Diplomatically no regional forum exists for the states of South Asia to address the transnational Maoist problem. Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Myanmar are providing sanctuary willingly or unwillingly to the CPI-M and its associated parties. These nations have a vested interest in not allowing these Maoist groups to expand domestically but need to develop a concerted plan to end the red terror. The US Department of State, as lead agency, in partnership with the government of India and regional democracies, must create a forum to assist in developing solutions to the regional threat of Maoist insurgency. India should be the lead regional nation to defeat it. It also needs to emphasize this problem as a greater issue for South Asia and bring Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka into regional discussions to solve this problem before it is truly out of control. Additionally the Department of State should not recognize the new Maoist-led government of Nepal and should encourage Nepal’s neighbors to do the same. Recognizing this government in any capacity legitimizes the Maoist strategic approach and will create unlimited sanctuary for the future Maoist armies of South Asia.

From a financial assistance perspective USAID funding for India is paltry and does not target Maoist infested areas. The CPI-M should not be defeated militarily, but with development and common prosperity. USAID is the key here. USAID spending in India is projected to be 180-220 million per year for the next five years. This is a mere pittance compared to what we are spending to influence Islamic societies. Small
investments in affected districts will create confidence in local governance and undermine anything the Maoists are promising from their counter-state. The USAID India budget should be raised to one billion annually, matched dollar for dollar by the Indian government, and targeted at Maoist affected districts. The US Department of Commerce can also assist by encouraging US and allied corporations to invest in these troubled areas when the security situation is stable and development has begun. This budget should be focused to target Maoist strongholds in remote areas with roads, clean water, education assistance, employment programs, health care, judicial reforms, tribal, women’s and lower caste empowerment, and democracy education; the root causes of this insurgency.

Insufficient CMO forces exist in the USPACOM theater to assist our allies in combating Maoist insurgency. USPACOM does not have any meaningful CMO forces assigned in theater to take on the task of training and assisting allied forces in development activities to counter Maoist influence. By de-emphasizing military operations and building confidence with host nation development bodies, civil and military, the joint community can demonstrate US good will to allies in South Asia. USPACOM should create a Standing Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force to assist these nations in training their military forces in CMO and assist with development and disaster relief as required. USPACOM should also have its theater allocated civil affairs battalion assigned and stationed in theater to begin building those relationships necessary to defeat these insurgencies with our partners at the lowest level. Future force structure design should include a full civil affairs brigade with three battalions to combat the Maoist threat.
Conclusion

The danger to US-Indian economic and security relations from the Maoist parties of South Asia cannot be overstated. The Maoists have a real possibility in the long-term of toppling Indian state governments and eventually challenging the central government for state power if allowed to operate with impunity. They pose a transnational threat to the region with a governmental sanctuary anchored in Nepal. They are working to build a united front with the secular community, the persecuted, Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs, and are coordinating their people’s war with the insurgencies in Kashmir and India’s northeast. Their secret counter-state infrastructure is organizing throughout troubled regions and building mass organizations of workers, peasants, tribals, youth, students, and women. The People’s Guerrilla Army is growing daily as are the village militias. If this nationwide and regional campaign is not addressed and if prevention does not become policy over containment of the problem, there will emerge a point where the Indian national capacity to respond will fail disastrously. This Indian and regional nightmare is the Maoist's dream. The continued myopic focus on Islamic terrorism and insurgency is letting the bright future of South Asia slip away into the grasp of the Maoists.

Endnotes

1“The Top 10 Stories You Missed in 2005,” Foreign Policy December 2005; available from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3315&page=1; Internet; accessed 21 June 2008. With the total focus of the US and Worlds’ media on the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan it is no wonder that Maoism in India slipped below view. It is significant that the foreign policy establishment noted the Maoist conflict in India and how large it has become. Attacks of 1000 or more insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan would be enormous. It is becoming routine in India.


5Ashley J. Tellis, “What Should We Expect From India As A Strategic Partner?”, in Gauging U.S.- Indian Strategic Cooperation, ed. Henry Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2007) 231-258.

6Declaration of the Conference of Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), August 2002; available from http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/documents/papers/partyconstitution.htm; Internet; accessed 30 January 2008. The exact quote states, “The Present day world is marked by ever deepening crisis of imperialism and advancing world revolution. The imperialists are implementing ‘globalization’ and ‘liberalization’ as the panacea for their ailing imperialist system marching towards its grave. But ultimately it is bound to herald its final demise. The so-called ‘globalization’ and ‘liberalization’ policies propagated through the imperialist institutions of World Bank and IMF have sharpened the gap between handful of rich countries and vast number of poor countries in such a scale that this gap which was 31 times during the sixties has reached to the level of 74 times by the late nineties, and it is aggravating every passing day.” Maoist parties labeled globalization as a more heinous exploitative version of capitalism. The parties that are members of this committee include Purba Bangala Sarbahara Party (PBSP) (CC) [Bangladesh], Purba Bangala Sarbahara Party (PBSP) (MPK)[Bangladesh], Bangladesh Sanyabadi Dal (BSD) (ML) [Bangladesh], Communist Party of East Bangal CPEB (ML) [Bangladesh], Ceylon Communist Party (Maoist), Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) [Naxalbari], Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist (PW)*, Maoist Communist Centre India, Revolutionary Communist Centre RCCI (Maoist) [India], Revolutionary Communist Centre RCCI (MLM) [India], Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), Bhutan Communist Party (MLM), Purba Bangala Sarbahara Party PBSP (MBRM). The parties that attended as observers in the third conference of CCOMPOSA were the PBSB (MBRM) from Bangladesh and the newly formed party from Bhutan, the Bhutan Communist Party (MLM). CPI ML PW and MCC united in 2004 and became Communist Party of India (Maoist). RCCIM had earlier joined with MCC and had forged MCCI. This network of parties is spreading Maoist insurgency throughout South Asia.


9Government of India Press Information Bureau, Poverty Estimates for 2004-05 (New Delhi, March, 2007), 2. Without referencing any slighter higher income figure this places 275 million plus people in abject poverty in India alone. According to USAID, if the figure of two dollars per day is added to this equation the number nearly triples to over 700 million people. For more
information see the USAID India country page at

Smita Narula, Broken People: Caste Violence Against India's “Untouchables” (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999) More than one-sixth of India's population, some 160 million people, live a precarious existence, shunned by much of society because of their rank as “untouchables” or Dalits—literally meaning “broken” people—at the bottom of India's caste system. Dalits are discriminated against, denied access to land, forced to work in degrading conditions, and routinely abused at the hands of the police and of higher-caste groups that enjoy the state's protection. In what has been called India's “hidden apartheid,” entire villages in many Indian states remain completely segregated by caste. National legislation and constitutional protections serve only to mask the social realities of discrimination and violence faced by those living below the “pollution line.”

Ibid. In some states, notably Bihar, guerrilla organizations advocating the use of violence to achieve land redistribution have attracted Dalit support. “Naxalites,” have carried out attacks on higher-caste groups, killing landlords, village officials and their families and seizing property. The Maoists have made even greater inroads into the untouchable populations in the last decade.

Scott Baldauf, “Soft spot in India's boom: the 60 percent tied to farms,” The Christian Science Monitor, 27 June 2006, p. 1. More than 110 million Indians are farmers, and an estimated 500 million more make a living primarily off the agricultural sector as laborers, seed and fertilizer traders, tractor mechanics, and so on. The much touted Indian high-tech industry, by contrast, employs only 1.2 million people, and no matter how fast it grows, the new information economy cannot hope to employ the majority of the country's people especially the millions who are uneducated. If the country wishes to sustain its economic boom, it must broaden the benefits of economic reform to the 60 percent of its citizens and a quarter of the economy linked to agriculture.

Central Committee of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), Party Constitution, 21 September 2004; available from <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/documents/papers/partyconstitution.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2008. The exact text states, “The Communist Party of India (Maoist) is the consolidated political vanguard of the Indian proletarian. Marxism-Leninism-Maoism is the ideological basis guiding its thinking in all the spheres of its activities. The Immediate aim or program of the Communist Party is to carry on and complete the new democratic revolution in India as a part of the world proletarian revolution by overthrowing the semi-colonial, semi-feudal system under neo-colonial form of indirect rule, exploitation and control and the three targets of our revolution—imperialism, feudalism and comprador big bourgeoisie. The ultimate aim or maximum programme of the party is the establishment of communist society.” This document comes from the impressive South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). SATP is the largest website on terrorism and low intensity warfare in South Asia, and creates the database and analytic context for research and analysis of all extremist movements in the region. SATP has been set up to counter the progressive distortions regarding, and the international community's neglect of, the wide range of terrorist movements within South Asia, and particularly in India. It is sponsored by the Institute for Conflict Management in New Dehli. Interestingly the party constitution was not available from the CPI-Maoist website as the Indian government shut it down. Indian security agencies stopped Maoist attempts to get worldwide publicity for the revolutionary movement through the website.
The site was blocked by the web hosting company at the request of the Indian Government in June 2006. The site, peoplesmarch.com had articles and statements from the Communist Party of India (Maoist). Monthly updates on the site provided international publicity to the Indian Maoists for three years. The site was hosted on a server traced to Colorado. The print edition of the monthly People’s March is available in various Indian states including Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Orissa. Maoist organizations based in other countries posted messages asking for support for the Indian movement by subscriptions to the magazine. For more information see http://focus.blogsome.com/2006/06/19/website-of-indian-cpimaoist-blocked/.

14 Lt Col Vivek Chadha, *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), 396-400. Chadha provides a good narrative and description of the events that gave the naxalites their name that transpired in village of Naxalbari in Gorkhaland near the Nepalese border in 1967. In summation a peasant conflict with landlords in a land dispute was exploited by Maoist cadres who assisted the peasants declaring the zone a liberated area in a 52 day uprising that ended in the arrest of 250 peasants. Interestingly the Chinese government openly supported the “Naxalites” in their struggle with the Indian government.


The CPI-M adheres to the classic three-stage insurgency strategy advocated in Mao’s theory of people’s war. In the first stage, the rural peasantry are indoctrinated and mobilised through subversive political activity conducted by underground cells. While establishing itself in an area, the movement seeks not to provoke the authorities by unnecessarily drawing attention to itself, and instead concentrates on propagating its ideology and building the support networks on which it will later depend. While most Maoist-affected regions in India have moved beyond this stage, such processes are currently evident in the southern state of Kerala, previously untouched by the insurgency, and in some urban areas of already affected states, where the group is seeking to develop its presence. In the second stage, highly mobile groups of cadres conduct guerrilla operations against symbols and instruments of government authority, with the aim of establishing and expanding secure base areas in which parallel administrations may be developed free from government influence. This stage typically begins with assassinations, which in India are directed at landlords - almost universally unpopular - and corrupt bureaucrats, police, and politicians. Hit-and-run attacks are then directed at small, vulnerable police and military targets, with the dual aim of confining security forces to barracks in the major towns, and seizing weapons to equip new guerrillas. Such attacks are routine throughout all Maoist-affected regions of the country. In addition, ‘enemies of the people’, those who side with landlords and the authorities, or inform on Maoist activities and members, are targeted. This is particularly evident in Chhattisgarh, where the state-sponsored *Salwa Judum* civilian militias are routinely targeted, as are those civilians who allow themselves to be relocated from the villages to supposedly secure government-run compounds. This stage concludes when the insurgents have *de facto* control over the countryside, as in much of Bihar state,
where rural travel by government representatives has become increasingly hazardous. In the third stage, individual guerrilla units coalesce into larger, conventional military formations and attack the major towns and cities, seeking to decisively defeat government forces. This is traditionally the most challenging step-change in the Maoist model, and has not yet been achieved on any consistent level by the CPI-M. However, while unable to regularly confront the Indian military in conventional warfare, in recent times there have been a number of individual incidents in which the Maoists have been able to amass sizeable forces to conduct co-ordinated assaults on well-defended security force installations in urban centres. Several attacks in 2006-2007 are thought to have involved hundreds of rebels. In March 2007 a large number of CPI-M insurgents overran a security post in Bijapur in the Dantewada area of Chhattisgarh state which was manned by 75 policemen as well as soldiers and militiamen. Fifty security personnel were killed and a large cache of weapons seized. On 28 February, CPI-M rebels attacked three police positions in the Latehar district of Jharkhand. A police spokesman said around 500 militants attacked the positions in an attempt to loot arms and ammunition, and that around 800 rounds were fired on police personnel. There were no reported casualties of the assault. In addition to conventional Maoist insurgent tactics, the CPI-M has made extensive use of tactics aimed at creating system disruptions that will undermine government economic and development initiatives, and highlight to locals and to potential investors that the government is unable to govern effectively in a particular region. These tactics include the use of bandhs, or general strikes called by the insurgents, designed to temporarily paralyse economic and other activity in a region. Such strikes are also used to demonstrate that the insurgents have widespread support in a region, although often participation in the strikes is motivated more by fear of reprisals than by genuine solidarity. Disruptions are also generated through regular sabotage operations directed against transport and infrastructure networks, particularly against trains and rail infrastructure.

16 Program and Constitution of the People’s Guerrilla Army, 2004, available from <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/documents/papers/PGA-Constitution.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 June 2007. The direct quote from the PGA constitution states, “The line of protracted people’s war is our military strategy. That means encircling the cities from the countryside and ultimately capturing state power. Towards the achievement of that aim, the people’s army will fight under party leadership developing its forces to the extent possible, consolidating them, wiping out the enemy forces to the extent possible and building guerrilla zones with the aim of establishment of Liberated Areas. In accordance with the changing war conditions the PGA has to acquire expertise in guerrilla and mobile warfare and the People’s Liberation Army has to acquire expertise in positional warfare.”

17 Dr. Thomas A. Marks, Maoist People’s War in Post-Vietnam Asia (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2007), 7-8. Mao recognized that he needed to create a counter state or alternative societal infrastructure to mobilize the populace and defeat the sitting government. What Mao did was to combine the phases into a systematic whole with doctrine in a manner that would place virtually any state at risk. His winning emphasis and the crux of all insurgent struggles was the political struggle through the mass line, united front, international action, and political warfare. Violence was used sparingly and targeted to achieve a desired political effect. Mao’s lines of operation as described by Marks are:
1. Mass line: organizing an alternative society through the construction of clandestine infrastructure, that is, a counter-state. Local socio-economic grievances and aspirations are to be addressed by cadre, who then connect solutions to the party’s political mechanism. As with all political action, appeal to perceived needs seeks to win allegiance for the purpose of target mobilization. The approach seeks a mass base.

2. United front: making common cause with those, individuals and groups, who share concerns but not necessarily party goals. That an armed political movement is able to address perceived needs does not necessarily carry with it enough momentum to overcome natural fear of participation in what, after all, is an illegal, underground, dangerous endeavor. “Fellow traveler” status offers an alternative route and may, in fact, provide some benefits to the insurgency in the form of advancing legal, open organizations that swell the mass base.

3. Violence: The new alternative society, existing as it does illegally and clandestinely, necessarily relies upon armed action to maintain its security within and without. The “liberation” struggle progresses through three strategic phases, which are quite logical. Initially, the revolutionary movement will be on the defensive, then achieve stalemate, finally go on the offensive. During each phase, a particular form of warfare will drive the dynamic, although not necessarily quantitatively. During the strategic defensive, terror and guerrilla actions will lead. During the strategic stalemate, mobile warfare (maneuver warfare) will dominate. This will see insurgent “main force” units, equivalents of government formations, take the field but not seek to hold territory. The final phase, the strategic offensive, will see such seizure of ground, the so called “war of position”.

4. Political warfare: using nonviolent methods, such as participation undermining the morale of enemy forces or offering to engage in negotiations, as an adjunct to violence. These methods could be implemented at all three levels of war: strategic, operational, or tactical. Unlike the united front, Mao conceived of political warfare means as those specifically intended to force-multiply. The united front was a line of operation unto itself.

5. International action: Although not as prominent an element during Mao’s struggle as it was to become later in the hands of pupils, international pressure upon the state, or in favor of the insurgents, was recognized as an important element in the equation.

These five lines of operation are continuous throughout three non-contiguous, overlapping phases, the strategic defensive (guerrilla operations), then strategic stalemate (mobile warfare), then strategic offensive (war of position or maneuver warfare).

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Ibid. Dr. Marks demonstrates aptly in six cases that the Maoist strategic approach if misapplied to national conditions can prove disastrous. This was clearly the case with the Communist Party of Thailand, and the Peruvian Shining Path whose insurgencies were disastrous failures. The New People’s Army of the Philippines and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka have been able to endure after major defeats but have no real chance of mobilizing a politicized mass base to bring down the state. Only in Nepal have the Maoists been successful, forming a United Front with large sectors of the disaffected in society to challenge the state for power. If trends there continue it is likely there will be a red star over Nepal while the world stands by and watches.
This map is available from the South Asia Terrorism Portal at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/conflictmap.htm, and is updated annually. The website posts the map from 2005 as well to show the extent of Maoist growth in the past two years.

P.V. Ramana, “The Maoist Movement in India,” Defense & Security Analysis, 22 (December 2006): 438. The ability of the Maoists to mobilize, arm, plan, and execute battalion and larger sized operations is alarming and should be a dire concern to the Indian central government in New Delhi. Since this attack in late 2005 battalion sized and greater operations have become commonplace with no solution in sight.

Ajai Sahni, “Maoists: Creeping Malignancy,” South Asia Intelligence Review Volume 5, No. 51, 2 July 2007; available from <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/5_51.htm#assessment1>; Internet; accessed 3 April 2008. Ajai Sahni describes the alarming growth and operational innovation in Maoist large scale military operations stating, “The first of these was the introduction of swarming attacks, the first of which occurred in Koraput in Orissa, where the District headquarters was overrun by up to a thousand People's War Group (PWG) cadres on February 6, 2004. This was clearly a pattern borrowed from a model that had secured extraordinary successes in Nepal, and has since recurred with increasing frequency. Thus, while year 2004, the year of the introduction of this tactic in India, saw just one such attack, 2005 witnessed three, 2006, nine, and, by the end of June 2007, there had already been at least 12 such attacks. Indeed, in his interview released by the CPI-Maoist on April 24, 2007, Ganapathi (CPI-Maoist General Secretary) boasted, “hundreds of people, and at times even more than a thousand, are involved in the attacks”.

Ibid.

Chadha, 390-401. In Chadha’s book, completed in September 2003, he treats the Naxalites as a “minor conflict,” that was worthy of little more than 10 pages in his extensive study. Yet in the four and a half years since he completed his work the CPI-M has seriously infected nearly half the states of India with Maoist insurgency. Chadha’s assessment of the future of “Naxalism” in 2003 stated, “Though the chances of any of these movements snowballing into a full-fledged insurgency are remote, these struggles, emanating from disgruntled elements, can certainly play host to anti-national elements in their quest to destabilize the country.” Chadha at the time did not see how well organized the CPI-M was in each state and that it would be conducting battalion sized operations only a few short years later. They are certainly full-fledged insurgencies now.


31 Chadha, 221-372. Chadha’s work provides the best available description and analysis of these long running insurgencies that have been ongoing in all of the northeast Indian states since partition in 1948. These states, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, and Tripura are home to large non-Indian populations that want separate homelands outside of the Indian federal system. These intractable insurgencies have shown no signs of abating. They are all ethnic in origin and have few signs of Maoist co-option at this point. The major insurgent movements include The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland, in Assam; The National Socialist Council of Nagaland in Nagaland; The All Tripura Tiger Force and the National Liberation Front in Tripura; Manipur and Mizoram have a large variety of diverse groups as well.


35 Nitin Mahajan, “Bastar is new Maoist epicentre: DGP says it’s training ground for cadres from across India,” The Indian Express 28 January 2008; available from <http://www.indianexpress.com/story/266150.html>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2008. The Bastar forest region is the classic geographical sanctuary area sought by Maoist insurgents. The areas are remote tropical jungles where the state and local government presence is miniscule or non-existent. This is typical across all of India’s infected states.


Bibhu Prasad Routray, “Orissa: Maoists Swarming Ahead,” South Asia Intelligence Review Volume 6, No.33, 25 February 2008; available from <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/index.htm>; accessed 25 February 2008. Hundreds of Maoist insurgents took part in these attacks and were augmented by hundreds of people’s militia from Maoist villages in the remote forest regions. The Maoists have been organizing their counter-state virtually unchecked across these remote areas. This attack was so bold and confident that the Maoists even stopped at local stalls to have tea with onlookers and chat.


“Prachanda to Head New Government”, Himalayan Times, 20 April 2008, available from http://www.thehimalayantimes.com/fullstory.asp?filename=aFanata0wkzpcaxa1aa8a.axamal&folder=aHaoamW&Name=Home&dtSiteDate=20080420>; Internet; accessed 20 April 2008. Even if the Prachanda government does not overtly encourage its counterparts in India or Bhutan, all they have to do is turn a blind eye to the respective Maoist sanctuaries that are established in Nepal by both parties. Doing nothing in this case equates to strong support.

Dr. Marks, 324-330. Dr. Marks carefully describes how the Maoists created their united front in April of 2006. In classic Maoist fashion they never had any intent of relinquishing their strategic goal to work toward a common end with other parties. If the united front did not produce electoral victory the Maoists were well prepared to resort to violence to achieve the strategic end of achieving state power.


Ramana, 442-3.
Maoist insurgency spreads in India: Case study Bihar.


Praveen Swami, “The View from New Dehli,” Frontline 21, no. 1 (January 3-16, 2004). This article also gives a good overview of the Bhutanese Army’s offensive against the base camps of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland both of whom are fighting the Indian government for separate homeland in northeast India. After the offensive these groups were removed from Bhutan but have said they will return to more remote regions.


Ramana, 443-4.

Ibid, 443-4. Ramana also does not believe that Maoist and LTTE denials of any further relationship holds water. Mutual logistical and moral support are far too synergistic in this regard to abandon and both of these organizations proclamations can hardly be taken as genuine.


Ramana, 443.

Chadha, 252-3. Bangladesh and Pakistani intelligence have supported India’s Northeastern insurgencies for decades, fomenting problems toshift India’s focus from Jammu and Kashmir. Likely links have also been forged with the CPI-M as well. If they do not exist both agencies will no doubt soon cultivate these links as the Maoists continue to grow in strength.
involvement with these varied ethnic insurgencies but the tremendous potential for co-option and the creation of a united front is compelling.


61 Sundar, 2. This paper presented at Yale by Sundar is damning in its condemnation of COIN efforts in Chhattisgarh state. Police and paramilitary actions are similar in other states. Vigilante actions like this will no doubt push more dislocated villagers into the ranks of the Maoists by default. At the time of the writing of this paper the state is shutting down the operations of its local vigilante militias.

62 Sandeep Unnithan, “Guns And Roses; Small-team operations, drones, dogs and hi-tech equipment, but with a humane touch. Why the Indian Army's new doctrine to counter terror is all about winning hearts and minds”, India Today, 22 January 2007, p. 42. The publication of this doctrine is more proof that the Indian army and government are in denial about the scale and threat of their Maoist problem. It is stunning that they actually state in official doctrine that communist insurgency is on the decline while the CPI-M rampages in the hinterlands and the CPN is elected successfully just to the North in Nepal.

63 Routray, “Orissa: Maoists Swarming Ahead”. This portrayal of the police forces in Orissa is typical across the country in Naxalite affected states. In nearly every press article, Indian or foreign, the local and state police forces are characterized as lacking training, equipment, arms, and the will to enforce laws in the rural villages. Many times they are absent or non-existent as are their local government apparati. Also see B. Raman, “From Green Revolution to Red Revolution--Part IV & Last - International Terrorism Monitor--Paper No. 344”, South Asia Analysis Group, 3 January 2008, available from <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%25Cpapers26%25Cpaper2534.html>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2008. The site states, “According to a briefing of the media given by Mr.V.K.Duggal, the then Home Secretary of the Government of India, on March 31, 2006, ("The Hindu" of April 1, 2006), there were 17,000 vacancies of Constables in the State of Bihar, 6,000 in Andhra Pradesh and 1,000 in Jharkhand. He did not explain to what extent these vacancies were due to the non-availability of candidates with the required minimum qualifications and to what extent due to the reluctance of the people to serve in the Maoism-affected areas. Fear caused by the ruthlessness of the methods used by the Maoists and the reluctance to operate against them caused by the fact that they are products of the same milieu as the Maoists should at least partly explain the hesitation of the people of the affected areas to come forward to join the police force in the required numbers. This is despite the prevalence of large-scale unemployment in these areas and the attractive emoluments offered to the police personnel volunteering for duty in the insurgency-affected rural areas.”


67 Steven Metz, “New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency,” Parameters, 37 (Winter 2007-08) 20-32. In terms of pure numbers Maoist insurgencies are larger, more protracted, and more dangerous to the states that have to combat them than the Islamist insurgencies US forces currently face.


71 Sahni, “Maoists’ dream can become India’s nightmare.”