Summary

The central government’s limited writ and its perceived corruption are helping sustain a Taliban insurgency and painting President Hamid Karzai as a weak leader. However, factional and ethnic differences have remained confined to political debate, regional strongmen have been marginalized, and Karzai is focused on improving coordination with international donors and force contributors in the runup to his re-election bid in the fall of 2009. See CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.

Post-Conflict Political Transition and Political Landscape

U.S. policy has been to support and extend the authority of Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai and his central government, predicated on the assumption that it is weak or absent governance that cause some in the population to tolerate Taliban insurgents as a source of stability and justice. It is the first fully elected government in Afghan history, although there were parliamentary elections during the reign of King Zahir Shah (the last were in 1969). Presidential, parliamentary, and provincial elections, and adoption of a constitution were part of a post-Taliban transition roadmap established by a United Nations-sponsored agreement of major Afghan factions signed in Bonn, Germany on December 5, 2001, (“Bonn Agreement”),1 after the Taliban had fallen. (The subsequent political transition process is described in the table at the end of this paper.) The elected Afghan parliament integrates all the various ethnicities and sects into governance, and they often express local and parochial preferences as parliamentary opposition to Karzai. In an attempt to stabilize Afghanistan, a 53,000 troop NATO-led peacekeeping coalition there, to which the United States provides about 23,000 forces (another 11,000 U.S. troops are under direct U.S. command), sometimes works with local leaders who may buck central government authority, although substantial local autonomy is a typical pattern of Afghan governance.

1 For text, see [http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm].
Many seats in parliament, particularly the elected lower house (Wolesi Jirga), are held by personalities and factions prominent in Afghanistan’s recent wars. The lower house appears to be divided into pro-Karzai, opposition and “independent” deputies that are loosely organized and not organized according to Afghanistan’s 90 registered political parties. Karzai opposes forming his own party, but his support base in the Wolesi Jirga includes former members of the hardline conservative Pashtun-based Hizb-e-Islam party; supporters of Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, a prominent Islamic conservative mujahedin party leader who was defeated for the speakership; and several Karzai clan members including elder brother Qayyum, cousin Jamil Karzai, and relative by marriage, Aref Nurzai. Also pro-Karzai are former militia and Taliban leaders, including Hazrat Ali (Nangarhar Province), who had gained fame for directing the Afghan assault on the Al Qaeda redoubt at Tora Bora during the U.S.-led war; Pacha Khan Zadran (Paktia) who, by some accounts, helped Osama bin Laden escape Tora Bora; Mullah Abdul Salam (“Mullah Rocketi”), from Zabol; and Mohammad Islam Mohammadi, who ran Bamiyan Province during the Taliban’s destruction of the large Buddha statues there in March 2001 (he was assassinated on January 27, 2007). The Taliban-era Foreign Minister, Wakil Mutawwakil, ran but was not elected.

The “opposition,” led by ethnic minorities (Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara) of the Taliban-era “Northern Alliance,” remains frustrated at what it sees as Karzai’s refusal to equitably share power but has not to date, and is not likely to, resort to violent opposition. In April 2007, Wolesi Jirga Speaker Yunus Qanooni and former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani, both prominent Northern Alliance figures, organized an opposition bloc called the “National Front.” In it are not only Northern Alliance members, but also both of Karzai’s vice presidents; and some Soviet-era security figures such as Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi (Khost Province) and Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, who chairs parliament’s defense committee. The bloc advocates amending the constitution to give more power to parliament and to institute selection of governors and mayors by the elected provincial councils rather than by the President. Fearing increased Pashtun domination, the bloc opposes Karzai’s repeated offers of negotiations with Taliban members, while at the same time reportedly conducting its own negotiations with Taliban commanders.

The opposition to Karzai first showed its strength in March 2006, following the December 19, 2005 inauguration of parliament by requiring Karzai’s cabinet to be approved individually, rather than en bloc, increasing opposition leverage over nominations. However, Karzai rallied his support and all but 5 of the 25 nominees were confirmed, although three of those achieved only plurality votes and one of those defeated was a female nominee for Minister of Women’s Affairs, a post that had always been held by a female since it was established in 2002. This also left Afghanistan without any women ministers. Replacement nominees were approved on August 7, 2006. In May 2006, the opposition compelled Karzai to change the nine-member Supreme Court, the highest judicial body, including ousting 74-year-old Islamic conservative Fazl Hadi Shinwari as chief justice. Parliament approved his new Court choices in July 2006, all of whom are trained in modern jurisprudence.

In May 2007, the National Front achieved a majority in parliament to oust Karzai ally Rangin Spanta as Foreign Minister. However, Karzai refused to replace him, instead seeking a Supreme Court ruling that Spanta should remain, on the grounds that his ouster was related to a refugee issue (Iran’s expulsion of 100,000 Afghan refugees back to
Afghanistan), not a foreign policy issue. The Court has, to date, supported Karzai, and some National Front members continue to protest his continuation in office. On November 27, 2007 Qanooni led an opposition “walkout” of parliament, accusing Karzai of ignoring a parliamentary vote to suspend officials in Baghlan Province for allegedly failing to fully investigate the November 6, 2007, suicide bombing in the province that killed 6 parliamentarians and more than 60 others, mostly children. An internal U.N. report said that jittery guards may have caused some of the deaths.

Karzai and the National Front often battle for the support of the many “independent” deputies in the Wolesi Jirga. Among them are several outspoken and newly emergent women, intellectuals, and business leaders, such as 35-year-old Malalai Joya (Farah Province), a leading critic of major war-era faction leaders. In May 2007 parliament voted to suspend her for this criticism for the duration of her term, but she is challenging the expulsion in court. Others in this group include Ms. Fauzia Gailani (Herat Province); Ms. Shukria Barekzai, editor of Woman Mirror magazine; and Mr. Ramazan Bashardost, a former Karzai minister who champions parliamentary powers. U.S.-based International Republican Institute (IRI) is working to organize and train independents; the National Democratic Institute (NDI) has assisted the more established factions.

Karzai has fewer critics in the Meshrano Jirga, partly because of his bloc of 34 appointments. Karzai engineered the appointment of an ally, Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, as its Speaker; he is a noted Islamic scholar who headed the post-Communist mujahedin government for one month (May 1992) and who now heads the effort to reconcile with Taliban figures (Peace and Reconciliation Commission, or “PTSD” program). The deputy speaker is Hamid Gaylani, member of a pro-Karzai family with five members in parliament. Karzai also appointed Northern Alliance military leader Muhammad Fahim, perhaps to compensate for his removal as Defense Minister, although Fahim resigned after only a few months and later joined the National Front. Other Karzai appointments included former Taliban religious affairs deputy minister Arsala Rahmani. There is one Hindu, and 23 women; 17 of the women are Karzai appointees and 6 were selected in their own right. Although this body is considered more conservative than the Wolesi Jirga, it has been vocal; in May 2007, after a spate of civilian casualties caused by U.S. combat, it passed a resolution calling for international forces to coordinate operations with Afghan authorities. International human rights organizations criticized the Meshrano Jirga on February 3, 2008 for issuing a statement supporting a death sentence against 23 year old journalist Sayed Kambaksh for allegedly distributing material critical of Islam; the body subsequently retracted the statement. Kambaksh’s case remains unresolved, and Karzai is reportedly mulling a pardon if the sentence is upheld.

Both houses of parliament, are assisted by a staff of about 275 Afghans, reporting to a “secretariat.” Staff was hired a year before parliament convened, limiting factional influence, and it and the members received training from the U.N. Development Program and the State University of New York (SUNY) under an $8 million USAID contract. There are 18 oversight committees, each with two staffers. There is a small research group and library. The parliament’s budget is controlled by the Ministry of Finance.

On less contentious issues, the executive and the legislature have worked well. Since the end of 2007, the Wolesi Jirga has passed and forwarded to the upper house (Meshrano Jirga) several laws, including a labor law, a mines law, a law on economic cooperatives, and a convention on tobacco control. The Wolesi Jirga also during this time confirmed
Karzai nominees for a new Minister of Refugee Affairs, head of the Central Bank, and the final justice to fill out the Supreme Court.

**Government Performance**

U.S. policy has been to help not only expand Afghan institutions but to establish performance criteria based on merit and technical competence, and not ethnic or factional loyalties. Observers report that Afghan ministries are increasingly capable and technologically well equipped, although still suffer from a low resource and skill base. U.S. officials have generally refrained from criticizing Karzai when, in the interests of political harmony, he has indulged faction leaders with appointments and tolerated corruption. These compromises have helped Karzai keep his government intact without violence against faction leaders (other than the Taliban), and he still reportedly has an estimated 63% approval rating, suggesting he draws support not only from Pashtuns (who are only about 42% of the population). However, partly as a result of these compromises, building government capacity has been slow and there is perception among the international community that Karzai is a weak leader. Some such as former Coordinator for Counter-Narcotics and Justice Reform Thomas Schweich, in a July 27, 2008 *New York Times* article, have gone so far as to assert that Karzai, to build political support, is deliberately tolerating officials in his government who are allegedly involved in the narcotics trade. On the other hand, Karzai reportedly might remove Interior Minister Ahmad Zarrar for failing to act on information about the planned July 7, 2008 suicide attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul, in which 60 were killed.

To try to improve local governance, in August 2007 Karzai placed the governor (and district security officials) selection process in a new Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) – and out of the Interior Ministry. Karzai has empowered two key figures to reduce corruption, to instill confidence in the justice sector, and enhance government accountability – Supreme Court chief justice Abdul Salam Azimi and Attorney General Abdul Jabbar Sabit. Karzai also has formed an anti-corruption commission. (Karzai fired Sabit on July 16, 2008 after he declared his intention to run against Karzai in 2009 presidential elections.) In one high profile move at the local level, in March 2008 Karzai removed governor of Helmand Asadullah Wafa for his inability to expand governance or to curb poppy cultivation in that most violent of all provinces; he was replaced by Gulab Mangal, who is from Laghman Province and is considered an effective leader. The IDLG also replaced the governor of Ghazni Province, and four other governors are slated to be changed.

Some have used Karzai’s handling of a prominent member of the National Front, Uzbek leader Abdurrashid Dostam, as evidence of weakness. Dostam is often referred to as a “warlord” because of his command of partisans in his largely Uzbek redoubt in northern Afghanistan (Jowzjan and Balkh provinces), and he is widely accused of human rights abuses of political opponents in the north. To separate him from his militia, in 2005

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Karzai appointed him to the post of chief of staff of the armed forces, requiring him to reside in Kabul. On February 4, 2008, Afghan police surrounded Dostam’s villa in response to reports that his followers attacked and beat an ethnic Turkmen rival. However, Karzai has not ordered his arrest for fear of stirring unrest in Dostam’s political base in northern Afghanistan. On the other hand, Karzai successfully curbed prominent Tajik political leader, former Herat governor Ismail Khan, by appointing him Minister of Energy and Water. Karzai is also trying to divide the National Front by trying to lure back to the cabinet (or as a vice presidential running mate in the 2009 presidential election) former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, a Qanooni ally. In February 2007 both houses passed a law giving amnesty to so-called “warlords,” such as Dostam and Khan. Karzai altered the draft to give victims the right to seek justice for any abuses; Karzai did not sign a modified version in May 2007, leaving the status unclear.

On human rights issues, the overall State Department judgment is that the country’s human rights record remains poor, but primarily because of the continuing insurgency, and the weakness of and corruption in the central government. The security forces are widely cited for abuses and corruption, including torture and abuse of detainees. Karzai dropped a July 2006 proposal to revive, although in a far more circumscribed form, a “Ministry of Supporting Virtue and Discouraging Vice,” a ministry that was used by the Taliban to commit major abuses against women. In debate over a new press law, both houses of parliament have approved a joint version, but Karzai has vetoed it on the grounds that it gives the government too much control over private media. In the absence of a law, Afghanistan’s conservative traditions have been ascendant, and are backed by the advisory Council of Ulema (Islamic scholars). In April 2008 the Ministry of Information and Culture banned five Indian-produced soap operas on the grounds that they are too risque, although some accounts say the minister might be replaced in a future cabinet reshuffle. The banning of the shows came amid a move by conservative parliamentarians to pass legislation to ban loud music, men and women mingling in public, video games, and other behavior common in the West. This reportedly has had a chilling effect on the 40 private radio stations, seven television networks, and 350 independent newspapers that have opened since the Taliban fell.

Minority religions, including Christians, Sikhs, Hindus, and Baha’i’s, often face discrimination; the Supreme Court declared the Baha’i faith to be a form of blasphemy in May 2007. In October 2007, Afghanistan resumed enforcing the death penalty after a four year moratorium, executing 15 criminals. Others note lack of action to prevent sexual trafficking; Afghanistan was again placed in Tier 2 in the State Department’s June 4, 2008 Trafficking in Persons report for 2008 on the grounds that it does not fully comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons. However, the report says it is making significant efforts to do so, including by establishing anti-trafficking offices in the offices of the Attorney General in all 34 provinces.

**Funding Issues.** USAID has spent about $440 million (FY2002-2007) to build democracy and rule of law, and assist the elections. A revised request for FY2008 supplemental funding included $100 million to assist with the presidential elections planned for 2009. For FY2009, $707 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) has been requested which will be used in part to enable the Karzai government to “extend the reach of good governance....”
# Afghanistan Political Transition Process

## Interim Administration
Formed by Bonn Agreement. Headed by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but key security positions dominated by mostly minority “Northern Alliance.” Karzai reaffirmed as leader by June 2002 “emergency loya jirga.” (A jirga is a traditional Afghan assembly).

## Constitution
Approved by January 2004 “Constitutional Loya Jirga” (CLJ). Set up strong presidency, a rebuke to Northern Alliance that wanted prime ministership to balance presidential power, but gave parliament significant powers to compensate. Gives men and women equal rights under the law, allows for political parties as long as they have no foreign affiliations or are un-Islamic; allows for court rulings according to Hanafi (Sunni) Islam (Chapter 7, Article 15). Set out electoral roadmap for simultaneous (if possible) presidential, provincial, and district elections by June 2004. Named ex-King Zahir Shah to non-hereditary position of “Father of the Nation;” he died July 23, 2007.

## Presidential Election
Elections for President and two vice presidents, for five year term, held October 9, 2004. Turnout was 80% of 10.5 million registered. Karzai and running mates (Ahmad Zia Masud, a Tajik and brother of legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud, who was assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the September 11 attacks, and Karim Khalili, a Hazara) elected with 55% against 16 opponents. Second highest vote getter, Northern Alliance figure (and then Education Minister) Yunus Qanooni (16%). One female ran, who got about 1%. Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqiq got 11.7%; and Uzbek strongman Abdurrashid Dostam won 10% of the vote. Funded with $90 million in international aid, including $40 million from U.S. (FY2004 supplemental, P.L. 108-106).

## Parliamentary Election
Elections held September 18, 2005 on Single Non-Transferable Vote” System; candidates stood as individuals, not part of party list. Parliament consists of a 249 elected lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house (Meshrano Jirga, House of Elder). Voting was for one candidate only, although number of representatives varied by province, ranging from 2 (Panjshir Province) to 33 (Kabul Province). Herat has 17; Nangahar, 14; Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni, 11 seats each. Target quota for lower house is 25% women - top two women vote getters per each of 34 provinces. Upper house appointed by Karzai (34 seats, half of which are to be women), by the provincial councils (34 seats), and district councils (remaining 34 seats). Because district elections (400 district councils) were not held, provincial councils selected 68 to Upper House on interim basis. 2,815 candidates for Wolesi Jirga, including 347 women. Turnout was 57% (6.8 million voters) of 12.5 million registered. Funded by $160 million in international aid, including $45 million from U.S. (FY2005 supplemental appropriation, P.L. 109-13).

## Provincial ELECTIONS/District Elections
Provincial elections held September 18, 2005, simultaneous with parliamentary elections. Exact powers vague, but now taking lead in deciding local reconstruction Provincial councils size range from 9 to the 29 seats on the Kabul provincial council. 3,185 candidates, including 279 women. According to constitution, provincial governors appointed by Karzai, not by the provincial councils. Some criticize the provincial election system as disproportionately weighted toward large districts within each province. District elections have not been held due to complexity and potential tensions of drawing district boundaries.

## Cabinet
Full-term 27 seat cabinet named by Karzai in December 2004. Heavily weighted toward Pashtuns, and created new Ministry of Counter-Narcotics. Rahim Wardak named Defense Minister, replacing Northern Alliance military leader Mohammad Fahim. Qanooni not in cabinet, subsequently was selected Wolesi Jirga Speaker. Northern Alliance figure Dr. Abdullah replaced as Foreign Minister in March 2006 cabinet appointed after parliamentary elections.

## Next Elections
Presidential and provincial elections to be held in fall 2009; parliamentary elections in 2010. Karzai indicated in March 2008 that he would seek reelection; the two-round election virtually assures victory by a Pashtun. Qanooni or Rabbani, both Tajiks, might run, as might Dostam and Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqeq, both of whom ran last time. Other contenders include Ramazan Bashardost, another Hazara, and Sabit (Pashtun), both mentioned above; and former Interior Minister Ali Jalali, a Pashtun, who resigned in 2005 in opposition to Karzai compromises with faction leaders. Possible other Pashtun contenders include monarchist figures Pir Gaylani and Hedayat Arsala Amin. Rumors have abated that U.S. Ambassador to U.N., Afghan-born Zalmay Khalilzad, might himself run. Each election to cost $100 million.