

The Changing Requirements of Extended Deterrence

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The Changing Requirements of Assurance and Extended Deterrence

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Executive Summary

Security assurances involve promises, commitments, pledges, and similar illocutionary acts. Government officials can make them publicly or secretly (or through some combination of the two). Security assurances can be formal or informal, reduced to writing or given verbally (or even inferred from gestures), made among a few parties or many. They can be given sincerely or deceptively. They can be clear or equivocal. They may prove to be durable or withdrawn on short notice.

Their credibility depends, partly, on the perceived capability to carry through, but also on elements of a relationship involving overlapping interests, shared memories and experiences, compatible values, appreciation of institutional processes, and the ever-changing vagaries of personality and circumstance – things that help determine confidence and trust in the will of governments to deliver on their promises. History is filled with instances of broken promises. But there also are success stories (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) comes to mind). Whatever one's perspective, security assurances are an important tool of statecraft. They are especially important in the nuclear age when a uniquely demanding form of security assurance – extended *nuclear* deterrence – addresses the highest end of the threat spectrum.

This paper draws on the summaries of discussions at a series of workshops that were conducted from August 2007 to February 2009. The workshops brought together regional specialists and deterrence experts to discuss what requirements are changing, if any, for security assurances and extended deterrence. The analysis in the paper draws on the author's research and reflections as well.

American security assurances are reviewed in three regions of the world: Europe, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific. The analysis shows that different regions (and often different countries within each region) require different assurance strategies because of geopolitical and cultural circumstances. This is discussed in more detail in Chapters Four, Five, and Six.

The basic conclusions of the paper are fourfold. First, while many of the underlying principles and modes of extending nuclear deterrence have not changed significantly since the Cold War, the United States must pay greater attention to adjusting its engagement strategies with security partners to whom the assurance commitments are extended, to ensure that the assurances remain positive and strong. This reflects the

realities of a changing and more interconnected world in which more actors exert power and influence.

Second, America's ability to extend deterrence is wider than its nuclear component. This is an important message driven home by the recent Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Missile defense is an especially important component in the new security equation. Conventional military capabilities also are part of the equation. Equally important, the NPR stresses that the nuclear component remains vital as long as others have nuclear weapons.

Third, and perhaps the most underappreciated and least developed from the standpoint of stability analysis, the prospect for success of American assurances often depends as much on America's ability to conduct successful campaigns of coercive diplomacy as it does on traditional deterrence practices. This is being tested in practice today in the cases of North Korea and Iran. It could be tested elsewhere in the future.

And fourth, the prospect for success of America's use of security assurances cannot be separated from wider perceptions of America's relative power in the world. Unless the United States is seen as successfully adapting to shifting power alignments in ways that security partners find acceptable, the strength of America's security assurances will suffer.

Although the workshops for this study were completed well before the results of the most recent NPR were announced in April 2010 (and the National Security Strategy the following month), the changing requirements for assurance and extended deterrence emerging from the workshop discussions pointed to things the NPR championed, e.g., extensive consultations with alliance partners, attention to their changing circumstances, technical and geopolitical hedges, and use of the full range of military power as a means of underwriting the credibility of the American assurances.

Cross-cutting insights from the project are discussed in detail in Chapter Seven. A number of those insights point to continuity in the fundamentals and principles of assurance and extended deterrence, such as the importance of managing expectations concerning the nature of assurance relationships, understanding the abiding features of deterrence, and pragmatically adapting to evolving security environments. As for the changing requirements of assurance and extended deterrence, the most important are:

- Effective missile defenses (developed and deployed to stay ahead of the threat) are an increasingly important part of the assurance package for dealing with countries like North Korea and Iran.
- Reinvigorating nuclear defense consultation in NATO in terms relevant to today's security environment is needed, as well as finding new modes for deeper defense consultation with security partners like Japan and South Korea

- The United States needs a new framework for stability analysis that takes account of the complex interplay between strategies of deterrence and coercive diplomacy in a multi-party regional and global context, to help form a strategic vision for the way ahead.
- Finally, as nuclear arsenals are drawn down and constrained through arms control agreements, strong technical and geopolitical hedges should be in place, coupled with processes for assessing risks and generating the consensus needed to move quickly to address risks that are becoming especially dangerous. Allies who depend on America's extended nuclear deterrent should be made aware of (and hopefully reassured by) American actions in this regard.

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1. Introduction

Origins of this project. In fiscal year 2007, the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) asked the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to organize a series of workshops that would bring country and regional specialists together with experts from the deterrence community to explore the requirements of assurance and extended deterrence in a changing world. IDA was asked specifically what the changing requirements of assurance and extended deterrence (if any) might be.

Project leadership. The IDA task leader at the start of this project was Brad Roberts. He organized five workshops from August 2007 to February 2009, addressing case studies for Turkey (August 2007), Japan (February 2008), Australia (September 2008), the Middle East (January 2009), and Europe (February 2009). Each workshop followed the format of a one-day meeting with panel discussions, except for the workshop on Australia which involved a shorter, more informal seminar with a visiting Australian security specialist.

Brad Roberts departed IDA in 2009 to accept an appointment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Upon his departure, ASCO agreed that an additional workshop should be convened to address lessons from the past and challenges for the future and that a final report should be prepared. The lessons and challenges workshop was held in September 2009. Summaries of the workshops are appended to this paper.¹

What this paper does. This paper draws upon the summaries of the workshops in order to take an analytic look across three regions – Europe, the Middle East, Asia-Pacific – to examine American assurance and extended deterrence strategies and their requirements. Much that is relevant to the world of security assurances has happened geopolitically since this project began. The analysis in this paper takes these developments into account, including events through the end of June, 2010.

Finally, while the paper discusses assurance strategies in general, the emphasis is on extended nuclear deterrence as a tool of American national security policy. Extended nuclear deterrence will be discussed both as an abstract concept and as a concrete reality in different national and regional settings.

¹ Brad Roberts is the author of the appended summaries of the workshops on Turkey, Japan, Australia, the Middle East, and Europe. Thomas Mahnken is the author of the summary of the lessons and challenges workshop.

2. The Basic Concepts

Background. One of the oldest practices of statecraft is for political leaders to seek or give assistance in resisting aggression and coercion. Before beginning a detailed discussion of the case studies and their regional settings, an explanation of the basic concepts underlying assurance strategies is in order.

Assurance. The broadest of the concepts is assurance, that is to say, giving security assurances and convincing allies and friends that the United States (U.S.) will honor its obligations to help defend them and will be a reliable and effective security partner. David Yost, a long-time student of the topic, has noted that the phrase ‘reassurance’ was popularized by Michael Howard in the early 1980s. Yost also concluded that today’s concept of assurance, as understood by American officials and security elites, is much the same as what was meant by reassurance during the Cold War.²

Another meaning of assurance embraces both positive and negative security assurances. These concepts are applied primarily in the context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but they can also be found in discussions of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs). A negative security assurance is a promise from a nuclear weapons state to a non-nuclear-weapons state not to use – or threaten to use -- nuclear weapons against it. A positive security assurance is a promise to come to the aid of a non-nuclear weapons state if nuclear weapons are used against it, or if it is subjected to nuclear coercion. The institutional mechanisms for NPT-related security assurances are unilateral statements by the nuclear powers and two United Nations Security Council Resolutions - UNSCR 255 (1968) and 984 (1995). Though seemingly straight-forward, these concepts are enormously complicated. An on-going debate continues, for instance, regarding whether negative security assurances are or should be legally binding.³

Deterrence. Although there are many variations on the theme of deterrence, they all converge on the idea that deterrence involves convincing one’s opponent that the costs

² David S. Yost, “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,” *International Affairs*, 85:4 (2009), 755.

³ See Michael Wheeler, *Positive and Negative Security Assurances*, Project on Rethinking Arms Control (PRAC) Paper No. 9 (College Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 1994), and Daniel H. Joyner, *International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

and/or risks of a given course of action outweigh its benefits.⁴ When nuclear weapons are part of the threat environment, it is sound strategy not to let the margins for calculation be drawn too narrowly. The preferred situation is one where the assessment of costs and risks widely exceeds any perception of possible benefits.

Extended deterrence. Extended deterrence is a situation where a state commits itself to use its deterrent capabilities to protect other states or, as it is commonly described, to spread its deterrent umbrella over another party. Deterrence can be extended by non-nuclear as well as nuclear means. Extended nuclear deterrence denotes a commitment by a nuclear-weapons state to use nuclear weapons, if necessary, as part of the deterrent umbrella.

Compellance and coercive diplomacy. Finally, it is important to highlight a distinction that the nobel-prize winning strategist, Thomas Schelling, first introduced in the 1960s – the distinction between deterrence and compellance.⁵ Deterrence depends upon the threat of coercion to prevent something from happening. Compellance involves the use of coercion to reverse something that is already happening or to force someone to do something not already being done.

In a more recent refinement of these concepts, Patrick Morgan argues that “we should put less emphasis on the distinction between deterrence and compellance and instead treat them as interrelated components of *coercive diplomacy*, the use of force or threat of force by a state (or other actor) to get its own way.”⁶ Alexander George conceived of coercive diplomacy as compellance backed by limited force but also allowing for persuasion, accommodation, and compromise.⁷ For purposes of this paper, deterrence will not be considered a subset of coercive diplomacy. This allows the analysis to more sharply draw out important features of the current security environment.

Security assurances can involve commitments to apply effective coercive diplomacy. As will be described later in this paper, the United States has followed security assurance strategies of both deterrence and coercive diplomacy, often in the same region at the same time. Whether deterrence or coercive diplomacy receives priority is largely dependent on circumstances. At the start of the Cold War, for instance, America’s allies in Western Europe were much less interested in America’s ability to

⁴ Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke use this basic definition in their classic *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 11.

⁵ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 69-78.

⁶ Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence Now* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3.

⁷ See Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Alexander George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1991); and Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics,” in Alexander L. George & William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).

compel the Kremlin to give up territory already occupied than they were in America's commitment to prevent the Soviets from occupying new territory.⁸ Post-Cold War security problems are not phrased in quite those terms. The first Gulf War began with deterrence (i.e., keep Iraq from extending the invasion to Saudi Arabia) but quickly changed to coercive diplomacy and then to coercion (i.e., get Iraq out of Kuwait). Achieving a reversal of the North Korean nuclear program through coercive diplomacy and redirecting Iran's nuclear ambitions are among today's highest security assurance challenges.

⁸ As French Prime Minister Henri Queuille put it in the 1940s: "We know that once Western Europe was occupied America would again come to our aid [as it did in World War II]. . . . But the next time you would probably be liberating a corpse." Quoted in Alastair Buchan, "Problems of an Alliance Policy: An Essay in Hindsight," in Michael Howard, ed., *The Theory and Practice of War* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1965), 299.

3. The Policy Environment

Background. When this project began in 2007, it was not common practice to encounter American officials publicly discussing assurance and extended deterrence. In fact, as nuclear security became less of a central feature of great power relations after the Cold War, it was unusual to encounter much discussion of any nuclear deterrence issues at high levels of government. Today, however, the nuclear dimension of extended deterrence is a much more highly visible part of the security debate, and figures prominently in statements by cabinet officials and, indeed, by the Vice President and President. The following elements of the evolving policy environment since the project began are especially relevant to this paper.

The Schlesinger Task Force. An unauthorized transfer of nuclear weapons by the Air Force in 2007 and the subsequent discovery that intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) components had been shipped to Taiwan by mistake a year earlier, triggered a series of investigations and reports. In June 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates appointed the Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management chaired by James R. Schlesinger to recommend improvements and measures to enhance deterrence and international confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

The Schlesinger task force produced two reports.⁹ Among other things, the task force concluded that U.S. nuclear capabilities in Europe, although modest in numbers, remain a “pillar of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] unity.”¹⁰ The task force also stressed the importance of extended nuclear deterrence as a non-proliferation tool. In a press conference at the Pentagon in January 2008, Dr. Schlesinger stated that,

the United States is obligated to provide a nuclear umbrella for 30-plus nations, and that number may increase. Thus, those 30 nations must retain confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella. If they fail to do so, some five or six of those nations are quite capable of beginning to produce nuclear weapons on their own, and the consequence is to add to proliferation. The

⁹ The Phase I report addressed the Air Force’s nuclear mission and was released in September 2008. The Phase II report addressed the nuclear mission for the entire Defense Department and was released in December 2008.

¹⁰ Report of the Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase II, *Review of DoD Nuclear Mission* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 2008), 14.

strength of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the credibility of that umbrella, is a principal barrier to proliferation.¹¹

This has become a standard, non-partisan theme in the contemporary American security policy debate.

The Perry-Schlesinger Commission. Under the chairmanship of two former Secretaries of Defense, William J. Perry and James R. Schlesinger, the Strategic Posture Commission (also known as the Perry-Schlesinger Commission) was chartered by Congress in 2008 to examine and make recommendations on the long-term strategic posture of the United States. In their final report, released in early 2009, the Posture Commission provided a broad and comprehensive analysis of the international nuclear order. The Commission concluded *inter alia* that assuring allies remains a principal function of the U.S. nuclear posture and that the United States should expand consultations with allies regarding such assurances.¹² The Commission also found that “assurance that extended deterrence remains credible and effective may require that the United States retain numbers or types of nuclear capabilities that it might not deem necessary if it were concerned only with its own defense.”¹³ Finally, relevant to this discussion, the Commission also concluded that the United States “should adapt its strategic posture to the evolving requirements of deterrence, extended deterrence, and assurance.”¹⁴

The Perry-Scowcroft Task Force. In 2008, the Council on Foreign Relations convened an independent task force chaired by William J. Perry and Brent Scowcroft to examine U.S. nuclear weapons policy. In their consensus report released in 2009, the Perry-Scowcroft task force concluded *inter alia*:

The United States does not need nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional military inferiority and has no reason to fear a conventionally armed foe. ***But U.S. allies, including members of the NATO alliance, Australia, Japan, and South Korea, depend on security assurances from the United States. A component of these assurances is protection against nuclear attack.*** U.S. nuclear weapons represent one facet of multilayered defenses—including diplomacy, economic support, and conventional military forces—that deter attacks and defend allies in the event of an attack. Without the nuclear aspect of these assurances, some U.S. allies may decide in the future to acquire nuclear weapons. ***The Task Force***

¹¹ OSD (Public Affairs), News Transcript, DoD Press Briefing with the Secretary’s Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management, January 8, 2009, 2.

¹² *America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 98.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 98.

strongly supports maintaining and enhancing, where necessary, U.S. security assurances to allies (emphasis added).¹⁵

The Nuclear Abolition Debate. The current nuclear abolition debate was launched by a group of retired American statesmen in January 2007.¹⁶ Unlike nuclear disarmament campaigns of previous eras, the current campaign not only embraces a wide number of serious mainstream former statesmen and experts, but also has prominently moved to the heart of the foreign policy agenda of the Barack H. Obama administration. The President seeks to reconcile a long-term nuclear disarmament vision with practical steps in the shorter term, while maintaining a strong deterrent so long as others have nuclear weapons.¹⁷

A growing critique of the requirements of extended nuclear deterrence is a subtheme of the current nuclear disarmament debate, questioning the wisdom of (1) maintaining an extended nuclear deterrent to cover non-nuclear as well as nuclear threats, and (2) continuing to deploy American theater nuclear forces in Europe.

The Ballistic Missile Defense Review. In March 2009, the first-ever Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) was launched, mandated by Congress and guided by a Presidential directive. The review's findings related to Europe were announced on September 17, 2009, when President Obama, on the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and with the support of the senior military leadership, discarded a plan to base ten ground-based interceptors and an advanced radar in Central Europe, in favor of phased deployment of SM-3 interceptor missiles oriented against a nearer-term Iranian threat profile. The BMDR was completed and published in February 2010. It stressed that while defense of the United States remains the highest priority, the evolution of the threat and the nature of missile defense capabilities already in place puts a premium on countering near-term regional missile threats of shorter range. Senior administration spokespersons have emphasized that the BMD component of the U.S. defense strategy

¹⁵ See the section on extended deterrence in Independent Task Force Report No. 62, *U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy* (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2009), 90-91.

¹⁶ George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," *Wall Street Journal* (January 4, 2007), 13. See also the papers from the October 2007 Hoover Institution Conference, published as *Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2008).

¹⁷ President Obama placed the nuclear agenda at the heart of his foreign policy when he spoke in Prague on April 5, 2009, committing the prestige of the presidency to accomplishing the goals laid out in his Prague speech. This is reminiscent of President Kennedy's American University speech in 1963 which preceded finally reaching an initial agreement on nuclear testing, and President Johnson's decisions following the Chinese nuclear test in late 1964 to commit the prestige of his presidency to achieving a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Moreover, the Prague speech was not a one-off event. It has been followed by a number of activities involving the President, Vice President, and senior administration officials.

looks to the metrics of effectiveness, affordability, and adaptability as the program proceeds.¹⁸

The Nuclear Posture Review. On April 6, 2010, the Obama administration released the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). This is the third such review since the end of the Cold War. This 2010 NPR acknowledges that “By maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforcing regional security architecture with missile defense and other conventional military capabilities, we can reassure our non-nuclear allies and partners worldwide of our security commitments to them and confirm they do not need nuclear weapons capabilities of their own.”¹⁹ During preparation of the NPR, extensive consultations were undertaken with U.S. allies and their concerns appear to have been reflected in the final report. For example, the NPR stressed that any change in NATO’s nuclear posture, including forward deployed U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, would be taken only after a review within (and decision by) the alliance itself. NATO is crafting a new strategic concept to be ready by the start of the Lisbon summit in November 2010. This will be discussed in greater detail in the section on Europe.

Two issues reportedly important to Japanese officials in the past – retaining the capability to deploy the Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile - Nuclear (TLAM-N) and U.S. declaratory policy on use of nuclear weapons – apparently were handled satisfactorily. Although the NPR opted to retire the TLAM-N from the force posture, American officials stressed that a number of options remained (including bombers in theater with nuclear weapons), as well as strengthened conventional capabilities and missile defense, to underwrite extended deterrence. As for declaratory policy, by adopting the position that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations, all options were reserved for dealing with North Korea and Iran.

The New START Treaty. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) treaty negotiated at the end of the Cold War expired on December 5, 2009. Although negotiation of a new treaty was underway at the time, it took longer than Washington had anticipated to complete. On April 8, 2010, after extensive consultation with allies, Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev of Russia signed the New START Treaty at a summit in Prague. Although U.S. Senate hearings have begun, the treaty has not yet been ratified. The Administration has emphasized that the treaty will set the stage for further cuts, and that the U.S. plans, once this treaty is ratified, to pursue discussions with Russia on reducing both strategic and tactical weapons, including non-deployed weapons. The United States will also pursue various forms of stability talks with the

¹⁸ See, for instance, Michelle Flournoy and Ashton B. Carter, “The Way Forward on Missile Defense,” *Wall Street Journal* (June 17, 2010), 19.

¹⁹ Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (April 2010), vi.

Russian Federation. All of this is part of the broader American agenda to reset U.S.-Russian relations.

The Nuclear Security Summit. On April 12-13, 2010, President Obama hosted the first-ever Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC, the largest international meeting of Heads of State and Government in the United States since the San Francisco meeting that led to creation of the United Nations at the end of World War II. The Nuclear Security Summit focused narrowly on the issue of how to better secure nuclear materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) and prevent acts of nuclear terrorism and trafficking. A follow-on summit is scheduled to be hosted in South Korea in two years.

The NPT Review Conference. The 2010 NPT Review Conference ended on May 28, 2010 with a final consensus document. That fact alone was viewed as a modest success since the objection of any one of the 189 states participating could have blocked the final report. In her opening remarks to the conference on May 3, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton repeated the NPR policy that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. She also announced that the administration will submit protocols to the U.S. Senate to ratify U.S. participation in the nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and the South Pacific, and noted that upon ratification, parties to those agreements will have a legally binding assurance that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.²⁰

The Permanent [United Nations Security Council] 5 (P-5) nuclear powers submitted a joint statement to the conference, stating *inter alia* that:

In 1995 we issued separate statements on security assurances as noted in United Nations Security Council Resolution 984 (1995). Some of us have subsequently issued statements about their assurances. We note the importance attached by non-nuclear-weapon States to security assurances and their role in strengthening the non-proliferation regime. We stand ready to engage in substantive discussions on security assurances in the Conference on Disarmament.²¹

As expected, China submitted a working paper to the conference that repeated its position that a universal, unconditional, and legally binding international legal instrument on security assurances should be concluded as soon as possible.

The National Security Strategy. On May 22, 2010, President Obama used his graduation address at West Point to preview the National Security Strategy (NSS) that

²⁰ Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks at the Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, The United Nations, New York City, May 3, 2010.

²¹ Paragraph 15 of Joint Statement to the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference by the Five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council, May 5, 2010.

was released by the White House the following week. Not surprisingly, the 2010 National Security Strategy drew on the previous reviews and presidential speeches, and experts continue to debate the nuanced changes it might involve. For purposes of this analysis two themes in the NSS are especially relevant: The President’s statement that the United States “will maintain superior capabilities to deter and defeat adaptive enemies and to ensure the credibility of security partnerships that are fundamental to regional and global security.”²² And his pledge that the United States, “will continue to reassure our allies and partners by retaining our ability to bring precise, sustained, and effective capabilities to bear against a wide range of military threats and decisively defeat the forces of hostile regional powers.”²³

Concluding Observations on the Policy Environment. Although much of the Obama administration’s national security strategy now appears to be in place, obviously the policy environment will continue to evolve. Additional changes in the security environment since the workshops (such as the fourth round of sanctions on Iran, adopted by the Security Council on June 9, 2010) will be discussed in the regional sections of this paper.

²² The White House, National Security Strategy, May 2010, 17-18.

²³ Ibid., 41.

4. Assurance and Extended Deterrence in Europe

Background. This project devoted two case-study workshops to discussing NATO Europe. One session in August 2007 was devoted solely to Turkey. The second session, in February 2009, examined the remainder of the European NATO members and prospective members. The following analysis draws on those workshop discussions and provides additional context and updated information on the evolving dynamics of assurance and extended deterrence in the NATO context.

Understanding the evolution of America's role in providing security assurance and extended deterrence in NATO Europe must be done in historical context, since it involves a sea change in American affairs. Although the United States began its existence in a Euro-centric world, America's early leaders were determined that the United States not involve itself in balance-of-power conflicts in the Old World. President George Washington's famous admonition in his farewell address—no entangling alliances—largely defined American security interests for the 19th century. Even though the United States sent large expeditionary forces abroad to fight in World Wars I and II, it was not clear until the early 1950s (when Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower ran for president to deny the nomination to the isolationist wing of the Republican Party), that the United States would remain engaged in security affairs abroad.

NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington D.C. in April 1949. It created for its members a regional self defense and collective security alliance in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The prevailing perception of threat in the late 1940s among the allies that joined the treaty was fear that an expansionist Soviet Union would fill the power vacuum in Europe left after the vast devastation of the Second World War, and that the Red Army, through intimidation or outright occupation, would allow the Kremlin to intimidate and eventually dominate the continent. In this context, war by miscalculation, if not design, was an abiding concern.

The founding members of NATO also worried that Germany might again pose a threat to peace and security as it had twice in living memory. Most policy and military planners realized that the Kremlin's acquisition of nuclear weapons was simply a matter of time (in fact, the Soviets tested their first nuclear weapon a few months after the North

Atlantic Treaty was signed). NATO initially had twelve members.²⁴ It was enlarged to take in Greece and Turkey (1952), West Germany (1955), and, more recently, Spain (1982).

The first era of Cold War NATO enlargement in the 1950s followed the shock of the Korean War. What formerly had been a largely political and security planning organization began to develop an integrated military structure and West Germany was brought into the alliance to help build the military strength seen as necessary for Western security. That Germany's recent victims could contemplate German rearmament so soon was possible, as a German scholar reminds us, because of the American security guarantee.²⁵ The second era of NATO enlargement in the 1980s brought in Spain. Spain had been a key element in the American strategic concept for defense of Europe from the late 1940s onward, but until General Franco died in 1975 and Spain transitioned to a democracy, the legacy of Spanish fascism made Spain's membership in NATO unacceptable to many European politicians.

The heart of the North Atlantic Treaty is Article V, a statement considered by many to be the gold standard of the security assurance world, and thus worth quoting in full:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, *such* action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.²⁶

There is nothing in Article V that automatically commits NATO members to use armed force (much less nuclear weapons) in defense of the alliance. Dean Acheson, American Secretary of State when NATO was founded, describes in his memoirs how

²⁴ The founding members of NATO were Britain and France who had concluded the Dunkirk Treaty of 1947 plus the Benelux countries – Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg – who had joined Britain and France in the Brussels Treaty of 1948, plus the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal.

²⁵ Gustav Schmidt notes that “The Western Europeans benefited throughout the 1949-90 era from the fact that with the Atlantic pact the United States gave the double assurance that it would keep ground troops in Europe as long as a threat to its partners existed and that it would link its nuclear deterrent to securing its allies, especially Germany, against nuclear blackmail. These assurances supported a Western unity strong and big enough not to be afraid of the inclusion of Germany – providing a security guarantee for Germany and against Germany at the same time.” Gustav Schmidt, “50 Years of NATO: Perspectives on the Tasks Ahead,” in Gustav Schmidt, ed., *A History of NATO – The First Fifty Years*, Vol. 1 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 3.

²⁶ The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC, 4 April 1949.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (accessed June 23, 2010).

drafting Article V turned out to be the most difficult part of the negotiations. The continental European partners sought strong and unequivocal commitments for assistance in case of attack but the Americans, British, and Canadians were wary of making such a commitments. Acheson recalled that all knew that “a collective-security agreement should make it clear to potential aggressors that to attack one member of the collectivity was to attack all. This was very resonant and rotund but when one took pencil to draft, one was immediately reminded that ‘clear as day’ must not mean ‘automatic involvement.’”²⁷

The web of shared experiences over six decades—continuous diplomatic and military interaction at many levels, institution building, politico-military command arrangements, military exercises, standardization of militaries, and facing and surmounting numerous crises—gave deep roots to Article V. To adapt a phrase from arms control, the NATO allies established deep habits of cooperation. The process was anchored throughout by American power and the commitment to remain engaged.

The American nuclear umbrella was spread over NATO Europe from the beginning. Defense Committee (DC) 6/1 (1949), the first NATO strategy document to receive ministerial blessing, stated that the alliance should “insure the ability to carry out strategic bombing promptly by all means with all types of weapons, without exception.” It was understood by NATO members who participated in the working groups preparing DC 6/1, and in the political groups reviewing it, that the diplomatic language (“all types of weapons, without exception”) meant the commitment of American nuclear forces to NATO’s defense.²⁸ Since 1949, the American extended nuclear deterrent always has been a backdrop, if not a cornerstone, of NATO security.

The broader requirements in NATO associated with assurance and extended deterrence developed more slowly through eras of East-West confrontation and détente and in the new threat environment after the Cold War. They continue to evolve today. A number of defining episodes since 1990 stand out in shaping NATO’s perceptions of the new threat environment, especially:

- the first Gulf War where forces developed for defense of NATO were shifted quickly to the Gulf, even though the Alliance was not itself formally a member of the coalition that countered Saddam Hussein’s aggression in Kuwait;

²⁷ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969), 280.

²⁸ See Michael O. Wheeler, “NATO Nuclear Strategy, 1949-90,” in Gustav Schmidt, ed., *A History of NATO – The First Fifty Years*, Volume 3 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 123.

- Yugoslavia's disintegration into the Balkan wars where NATO participated as an alliance;²⁹
- the terrorist strikes of 9/11 (initially uniting the allies);³⁰
- the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (highly divisive within the alliance);³¹
- NATO's assumption of command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in April 2003;
- cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007;
- Russia's war with Georgia in 2008.

While the Cold War was still a fresh memory, a new appreciation of the dynamics of nuclear proliferation also emerged. Inspections in Iraq after the first Gulf War revealed how far Saddam Hussein had progressed toward secretly achieving a nuclear capability. With that as a backdrop, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced the Defense Counter-proliferation Initiative (DCI) in December 1993. He contrasted the former nuclear danger of a massive Soviet first strike with the new reality that a few nuclear weapons in the hands of a regional power or terrorists, constituted a growing danger. Counter-proliferation (CP) joined non-proliferation as part of a wider strategy in the United States and, over time, in NATO.

Regional powers like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea would come to be called 'rogues,' 'renegades', or 'states of concern' – not simply because of their WMD programs, but also because of their involvement with terrorism, illicit arms trade, and a general disregard for international norms.

North Korea has always been seen by most Europeans as posing a remote security problem, rather than a direct threat to continental Europe. Iran, while geographically remote, is turning out to be different. Iran's pursuit of ballistic missiles, developed in tandem with its nuclear program, is giving it the ability to threaten European states directly. Its longest range missiles are already capable of reaching southeastern Europe, with longer-range missiles in development.³²

²⁹ NATO took its first military action in February 1994 with the shooting down of Bosnian Serb aircraft violating a UN-mandated no-fly-zone. This foreshadowed NATO's large-scale military engagement in the Kosovo war of 1999.

³⁰ NATO invoked Article V for the first time in its history in coming to the aid of the United States. The appreciation of what a global extremist threat by Al Qaeda and similar terrorist organizations meant for NATO developed more slowly.

³¹ The American-British led invasion of Iraq by an ad hoc coalition was highly controversial among NATO members. Perhaps most relevant to this study, as war appeared close in February 2003, France and Britain vetoed the procedure of silent approval, thus denying protective measures to Turkey in case of war.

³² See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment* (London: IISS, 7 May 2010). Also see Oliver Thränert, "NATO, Missile Defence and Extended Deterrence," *Survival* 51:6 (December 2009-January 2010), 63-75.

The Iranian nuclear program proceeded largely out of sight of American and European security elites until August 2002, when Iranian exiles revealed that Iran had constructed nuclear-related facilities not reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iranian leaders deny that they are pursuing nuclear weapons, but many outside observers believe otherwise, including a number of America's NATO allies.

Although European leaders were, for the most part, slower to acknowledge the growing Iranian missile threat than was the United States, Europe has been deeply involved in the complex negotiations to address the Iranian challenge. At the 2009 NATO summit, NATO members acknowledged that missile proliferation is a growing threat and that missile defenses must be part of the counter to the threat. Some argue that new members of NATO who have expressed interest in hosting U.S. missile defense installations are doing so as much for American military presence on their territory (and what that connotes about commitment) as they are because of the missile threat.

The missile defense debate is complicated, as it also crosses into relations with the Russian Federation. American policy, reaffirmed in the 2010 BMDR, is to help provide a missile defense of Europe to address the evolving threat from countries like Iran, but not sufficient to destabilize relations with Russia. This is a difficult and continuing balancing act, now part of the New START ratification debate. More generally, dealing with nuclear proliferation and terrorism has replaced great-power deterrence as the near-term nuclear policy concern.

At the Riga summit in November 2006, NATO confirmed that "In today's evolving security environment, we confront complex, sometimes inter-related threats such as terrorism, increasingly global in scale and lethal in results, and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction [WMD] and their means of delivery, as well as challenges from instability due to failed or failing states."³³ At Riga, the allies also endorsed political guidance that led to development of a comprehensive NATO policy on proliferation and WMD defense. At the NATO summit in 2009 (held on the occasion of NATO's 60th anniversary), NATO adopted a Comprehensive Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending against CRBN Threats. This document was released publicly in September 2009.³⁴ Currently, NATO is developing a new strategic concept (the last one dates to 1999) that should be ready by the NATO Lisbon summit in late 2010. More will be said about the new strategic concept later.

Turkey. The case-study workshop held on Turkey in August 2007 is a vivid illustration of how shifting circumstances and domestic politics can affect the milieu for

³³ NATO Summit Declaration, Riga, 29 November 2006.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_37920.htm, paragraph 2 (accessed June 23, 2010).

³⁴ NATO Comprehensive Strategic-Level Policy, 01 September 2009,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_57218.htm (accessed June 23, 2010).

security assurances. Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952. It joined because of the Soviet threat. Its security challenges clearly have shifted since then.

When the workshop was held, the basic question being asked was how Turkey might react to a nuclear armed Iran. Some have argued that if Iran goes nuclear, it will trigger a nuclear cascade in the Middle East, potentially stretching to Turkey. Might the NATO security assurance and America's extended nuclear deterrent counter this prospect? According to Leon Fuerth, "Any measures designed to enhance the credibility of NATO, the United States, and the European Union as reliable underwriters of Turkish national security will work to diminish the risk of a Turkish decision to acquire nuclear weapons."³⁵

The 2007 workshop took place one month after Turkey's governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) returned to power in a general election. The AKP was formed in 2001 when a reformist wing of the Islamist Virtue Party split off from the traditionalist wing to create a political movement that portrayed itself as moderate, conservative, religious, and modern.

When the AKP came to power in 2002, its success portended a significant shift in Turkish affairs. Although Turkey is overwhelmingly Muslim, the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, championed a radical program of secularizing Turkey under a Western-oriented constitution and an action program embracing modernity. Turkey had gained its independence after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I—an empire that had ruled the Arab world for four centuries. The Western-oriented governments and strong military establishment that governed Turkey during the Cold War allied with the West and oriented Turkey's foreign affairs in that direction. In 1987 Turkey began formal accession talks to join the European Union (at that time the European Community)—a process that has developed slowly. Anti-Americanism also is high in Turkey. An overwhelming majority of Turks polled (90 percent) opposed the American-British led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

It was with this background that the August 2007 workshop assessed Turkey's view of Iran's nuclear aspirations and discussed how traditional NATO and American security assurances might be strengthened to guard against Turkey perceiving the need to seek nuclear weapons in response to the Iranian problem.

At the time of the August 2007 workshop, the discussion centered around issues such as:

³⁵ Leon Fuerth, "Turkey: Nuclear Choices amongst Dangerous Neighbors," in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., *The Nuclear Tipping Point* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 167.

- Turkey's lingering resentment over the American-led war to topple Saddam Hussein;
- the slow pace of European Union (EU) accession;
- concern about the Kurdish threat.³⁶

The discussion centered on Turkish views on the impact of a regional balance of power shift due to the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran. Israel, of course, was part of the equation, but it did not figure prominently in the discussions.

Were the workshop to be reconvened today, Israel certainly would figure more prominently. Turkey's formerly pragmatic relations with Israel took a sharp turn downward after the Israeli military offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip in December 2008, and appear, after the *Mavi Marmara* incident, to have reached the point of rupture.³⁷ Turkey has taken a highly visible and leading role in sharply condemning Israel's Gaza policies and actions. This poses complications for America's policy toward Turkey and intersects with the question of how to deal with Iran. The United States tries to preserve a balanced and nuanced position on Israel's confrontation with the Arab-Islamic world, but it is seen in the region (and among the Turkish public) as tilting toward Israel. This further inflames anti-American sentiment in Turkey which, even before the *Mavi Marmara* incident, was strong.³⁸

³⁶ There was a resurgence of violence by the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in 2004. An estimated 30 million Kurds live across the broad area encompassing modern Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Armenia. Many aspire to Kurdish independence. Turkish Kurds have revolted against the central government since the 1920s. The PKK emerged as a militant separatist organization in the 1970s, and from 1984 to 1999, the Turkish military waged open warfare against the PKK in much of southeastern Anatolia. The 2003 Iraq war triggered concerns in Turkey that the northern provinces of Iraq (traditionally Kurdish) might secede. The PKK has used bases in the mountains in northern Iraq to carry out cross-border raids. As this paper is being finalized, the press reports that a deadly raid by Kurdish rebels on a Turkish military post on June 19, 2010, resulted in casualties, and that the Turkish military responded with air raids on the border region.

³⁷ Turkey traditionally took a pragmatic view toward Israel, including forms of military cooperation that now appear to have been shattered, perhaps irreversibly. Israel, which had occupied the Gaza Strip since the 1967 war, unilaterally withdrew from Gaza in 2005, although it continued to control the borders. In 2006 Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections, gaining more votes than the Fatah faction—the founder of the Palestinian movement. Saudi Arabia brokered a short-lived unity government between the Fatah and Hamas factions in early 2007, but this quickly collapsed. In June 2007, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip by force, which prompted President Mahmud Abbas to dissolve the Hamas-led government and replace it with a new Palestinian government that administers only the West Bank. Hamas conducts its missile campaign against Israel from Gaza. In December 2008, Israel launched a major military offensive against Gaza, and after the offensive imposed a tighter blockade on the flows of materials into the Gaza Strip. This provided the backdrop for a new phase in the deep downward spiral in Turkish-Israeli relations, made all the more intense by the *Mavi Marmara* incident in May 2010 in which Turkish citizens aboard a Turkish-flagged ship in a flotilla originating in Turkey were killed by Israeli forces enforcing the blockade.

³⁸ In May 2010, America's favorability rating in Turkey had slipped to 14%, an all-time low, compared to 30% in 2004 in the aftermath of the war that deposed Saddam Hussein. *Financial Times* (May 11, 2010), A19.

The Obama administration took office in January 2009 intending to launch a new effort to broker a peace in the Middle East. It also undertook a highly public campaign to improve America's image in the broader Islamic world, while simultaneously pressing the campaign against al-Qaeda, its allies, and spin-offs, and seeking to address the challenges of the Iranian nuclear program via engagement and coercive diplomacy. The conflicting demands of these endeavors come together vividly in America's relations with Turkey.

When President Obama spoke to the Turkish parliament in April 2009 (one day after announcing his ambitious nuclear agenda in Prague), he acknowledged Turkey's security concerns and sought to engage Turkish cooperation in addressing the nuclear proliferation challenge. "As I made clear in Prague yesterday," the President explained, "no one is served by the spread of nuclear weapons, least of all Turkey. You live in a difficult region," he said to the Turkish parliamentarians, "and a nuclear arms race would not serve the security of the country well."³⁹

Prime Minister Erdogan's government has responded in a complicated way. In October 2009, for instance, Erdogan visited Tehran and was accorded the rare honor of meeting with the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. Erdogan criticized international pressure on Iran as unjust and unfair while other states retain nuclear weapons. Presumably the Obama administration's overall nuclear agenda, positing the vision of eventual nuclear abolition, will help undercut the perceived strength of this argument, but that is not evident in the near-term. In May 2010, Turkey joined Brazil in brokering what they characterized as a compromise, in anticipation of an expected UN Security Council vote on further sanctions against Iran, of a uranium exchange.⁴⁰ When the UN Security Council voted on the 4th round of sanctions against Iran in June 2010, Turkey joined Brazil in casting the two votes in opposition (Lebanon abstained).

Thus Turkey is pursuing a strategy toward the Iranian nuclear problem that tends to undercut the strategies of the United States and the European Union. Thoughtful commentators such as Philip Stephens suggest that the message is much more subtle than a sharp tilt toward the east by Turkey. He argues that Turkey remains committed to wanting to join the EU. According to Stephens, Turkey's joining with Brazil in an abortive initiative to broker a deal to constrain Iran's nuclear ambitions was not intended to undercut American policy. Istanbul, while doing more to shape its own foreign policy, is not seeking a break with the West.⁴¹

³⁹ President Obama, Remarks to the Turkish Parliament, April 6, 2009.

⁴⁰ Turkey and Brazil brokered a deal for Iran to deposit lightly enriched uranium in Turkey in exchange for nuclear reactor fuel. Versions of the arrangement had been discussed earlier, albeit at a stage and in amounts that may have served to delay the pace of the Iranian nuclear program.

⁴¹ Philip Stephens, "West must offer Turkey a proper seat," *Financial Times* (June 18, 2010), 11.

On the other hand, Thomas Friedman, is not so sure that Turkey remains as deeply committed to joining the EU. Even before the recent Eurozone crisis (triggered by the economic fragility of Greece), the Turkish economy was stronger than many of the economies in the EU. In today's environment, Friedman writes that "The Turks wanted to get into the European Union and were rebuffed, but I'm not sure Turkish businessmen even care today. The E.U. feels dead next to Turkey, which last year was right behind India and China among the fastest-growing economies in the world – just under 7 percent – and was the fastest-growing economy in Europe."⁴²

The summary of the August 2007 workshop (see Appendix B) suggests how regional and deterrence experts assessed this issue prior to the major changes of the last three years. It is unclear whether the same emphases would emerge were the discussion to take place today. There will be another opportunity later this year, to assess Turkish views in the context of NATO leaders taking up the question of a new strategic concept.

NATO's Strategic Concept. The development of NATO's new strategic concept is a lens to view how all NATO members think about security assurances and extended nuclear deterrence. NATO formally launched the process leading to the new strategic concept at a major security conference in Brussels on July 7, 2009. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen appointed a Group of Experts (also called the 'Eminent Persons'), led by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, to help guide the process. The Group of Experts provided their analysis and recommendations on a new strategic concept on May 17, 2010.⁴³ Their report is being used by the Secretary General and his staff in drafting the strategic concept for the summit.

Nuclear deterrence issues are not at the heart of NATO's security fears today as they were during the Cold War.⁴⁴ If Iran goes nuclear, both the direct threat and what a nuclear-armed Iran might mean for further proliferation are viewed with concern, but not with the urgency of other threats, such as how to proceed in Afghanistan. Members of NATO (the United States included) are less concerned about the risks of general nuclear war, and nuclear issues tend to generate relatively little attention in national capitals. When they do, those relating to nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism are ahead of deterrence.

⁴² Thomas L. Friedman, "Letter from Istanbul, Part 2," *The New York Times, Opinion* (June 19, 2010), 8. See, also, Thomas L. Friedman, "Letter from Istanbul," *The New York Times* (June 16, 2010), A25.

⁴³ NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement – Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 17 May 2010). The report is available on the NATO website: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_63654.htm (accessed June 23, 2010).

⁴⁴ For a comprehensive survey of current thinking in NATO on deterrence concepts and issues, see essays in Karl-Heinz Kamp and David S. Yost, eds., *NATO and 21st Century Deterrence*, NDC Forum Paper 8 (Rome: NATO Defense College, May 2009).

When nuclear issues must be addressed by national governments, one often finds that different ministries hold opposing views. Parliamentary debates on nuclear issues, with the exception of the nuclear-weapons states in NATO (the United States, Britain, and France), tend to focus almost exclusively on diplomatic opportunities to advance a non-proliferation agenda. When asked, national leaders may profess a commitment to nuclear deterrence (adopting the formula of deterrence at the lowest possible numbers), but this does not lead to serious study within the alliance of the requirements that would help define any specific nuclear posture, as was the case, for instance, during the Cold War.⁴⁵

One question that NATO authorities cannot sidestep is the future of nuclear sharing and the presence of forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons and systems in Europe. This is something that most national leaders would prefer to deal with quietly, away from the public, with perhaps the most notable exception of Germany where calling for removal of U.S. forward-deployed nuclear forces is publicly applauded. Privately many European security experts acknowledge that the withdrawal of America's forward-deployed systems could be highly destabilizing and disruptive to alliance cohesion. Few would challenge the thesis that some kind of American extended nuclear guarantee is essential to NATO collective security in a nuclear-armed world.

The 2010 NPR emphasized that no changes to U.S. extended deterrence capabilities will be made without continued close consultation with allies and partners, and that the United States will consult with its allies regarding the future basing of nuclear weapons in Europe. The report of the NATO Group of Experts which the Secretary General is using to draft a strategic concept for discussion later this year recommends that as long as nuclear weapons remain a reality in international relations, NATO should retain a nuclear element in its deterrent strategy. It also advises that under current security conditions, retention of some American forward-deployed systems in Europe reinforces the principle of extended nuclear deterrence and collective defense.

The new members of NATO that formerly were under Soviet control are deeply suspicious of Russia given their historical experiences and appear to have a stronger need today for American reassurance in the nuclear realm than others in the alliance. They also appear to be more confident of the credibility of American assurances than the older NATO partners. Both Britain and France are committed to maintaining and modernizing their nuclear forces, but the new members of NATO appear to have ruled out counting on Britain or France as extenders of a viable nuclear guarantee.

⁴⁵ For a discussion of past nuclear deliberation within the alliance by one of its most distinguished practitioners, see "Nuclear Deterrence in NATO" in Michael Quinlan, *Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 33-45.

NATO has an institutional history of continuity when it comes to policies. The final communiqué of the December 1996 meeting of the North Atlantic Council (the meeting that launched the NATO post-Cold War enlargement process) said in part:

We reaffirm that the nuclear forces of the Allies will continue to play a unique and essential role in the Alliance's strategy of war prevention. New members, who will be full members of the Alliance in all respects, will be expected to support the concept of deterrence and the essential role nuclear weapons will play in the Alliance's strategy. Enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in NATO's current nuclear posture, and, therefore, NATO countries have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy – and we do not foresee any future need to do so.⁴⁶

The 1999 NATO Strategic Concept had three paragraphs addressing characteristics of nuclear forces. Paragraph 63 read in part:

Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. These forces need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies' strategy in preventing war. They will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and security.⁴⁷

How far the new strategic concept will depart from these statements, if at all, remains to be seen. What can be said at this time is that security assurances and extended deterrence (to include extended nuclear deterrence) have been important for NATO in the past and are important for the foreseeable future. As for extended *nuclear* deterrence, it too remains a key component of the NATO security concept.

⁴⁶ Final Communiqué, North Atlantic Council Meeting, Brussels, 18 December 1996. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-172e.htm> (accessed June 23, 2010).

⁴⁷ The Alliance's Strategic Concept, NATO Summit, Washington DC, 24 April 1999. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed June 23, 2010).

5. Assurance and Extended Deterrence in the Middle East

Background. A workshop in January 2009 was devoted to assurance and deterrence in the Middle East. At the final, cross-cutting concluding workshop in September 2009 on lessons and challenges, Israel was the topic of a special presentation. The following analysis draws upon those workshop discussions and provides additional context and updated information on the evolving dynamics of assurance and extended deterrence in the Middle East.

In July 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made headlines when she told a Thai television program that the United States could extend a ‘defense umbrella’ over the Middle East if Iran succeeds in developing nuclear weapons.⁴⁸ Israeli authorities, who view a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat, reacted sharply to the Secretary’s remarks since it sounded like the United States was reconciled to Iran going nuclear. Others who fear that a nuclear-armed Iran would trigger a new nuclear arms race, or that Israel might, out of desperation, attack Iran in an effort to delay if not destroy the Iranian nuclear program, also expressed concern.

As a candidate during the presidential primaries in 2008, Senator Hillary Clinton had also said that the United States might extend a nuclear deterrent to U.S. allies in the Middle East.⁴⁹ Until the Thai interview her statements as Secretary of State, however, had been more circumspect. The day after her remarks on Thai television, in an interview with a BBC correspondent, Secretary Clinton explained that she had no specific arrangements in mind such as a nuclear umbrella or missile shield for the Middle East, but that she was simply was restating a long-standing American policy “that basically is rooted in our bilateral relationships with many of the countries in the region.” The Secretary added that she was sending a message to Iran that moving toward a nuclear

⁴⁸ Jay Solomon and James Hookway, “Clinton’s ‘Defense Umbrella’ Stirs Tensions,” *The Wall Street Journal*, July 23, 2009. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124826266087471853.html> (accessed June 23, 2010).

⁴⁹ See Joanna Klonsky, Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, updated January 22, 2009, p.1. I am indebted to Victor Utgoff for calling this quotation to my attention.. http://www.cfr.org/publication/17864/hillary_clinton_us_secretary_of_state.html (accessed June 23, 2010)

arsenal would not give Iran significant advantages over its neighbors in the region and would not make Iran more secure.⁵⁰

Secretary Clinton's remarks provide a good introduction to discussing the requirements of reassurance and extended deterrence in the Middle East. The fabric of the Middle East defense umbrella is neither as tightly woven nor as visible as NATO's since it is constructed out of a loose collection of bilateral actions and arrangements, often deliberately kept low-key and out of public view.

The Middle East is a strategically vital region containing two-thirds of the world's known oil reserves. Throughout the Cold War, Moscow competed with the West for influence in the region. Russia's current interests in Middle Eastern affairs are shaped, in part, by the legacies of that competition and, in part, by commercial interests. China, in its quest to gain access to oil and natural gas and to achieve greater influence worldwide, also has a geostrategic stake in the region. The region's modern history has been shaped in many ways by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Zionism, according to a common Arab argument is a modern-day manifestation of European imperialism. Arab, Iranian, and other Middle Eastern populations, the area's security elites, and many of the region's leaders have bitter, emotion-laden memories of European imperialism and they are wary of the return of imperial hegemony whatever its form.

The greater Middle East—a region stretching from North Africa to the borders of South Asia—is one of the most dangerous and unstable regions of the globe. This region has spawned some of the most destructive terrorist movements active today. The greater Middle East is a place where empires clashed with one another for centuries; a place where Arabs always have found it hard to unify, and where the often bloody struggle between Sunni and Shi'a interpretations of the Islam is centered. Iran's nuclear ambitions are merely one of the latest flashpoints in this volatile region.

The United States has been engaged strategically in the Middle East since the Second World War. Historically the British naval presence in the Gulf was a major guarantor of security and stability for the region, but when its eroding power led Britain to withdraw from East of Eden in the late 1960s, the United States took over the role and gradually became the region's guarantor.⁵¹ This has not been a satisfactory state of affairs for either the Russians or Chinese.

⁵⁰ Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Interview with Kim Ghattas of BBC," Phuket, Thailand, July 23, 2009. <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126664.htm> (accessed June 23, 2010).

⁵¹ In 1958, under what became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, Marines were sent to Lebanon to stabilize the country—the only such overt military intervention conducted during the Eisenhower presidency. The Eisenhower Doctrine was aimed not only at countering Soviet incursions into the Middle East but also at preventing Nasser from dominating the Arab world. Henry Kissinger recounts in his memoirs how, in December 1968, the Emir of Kuwait visited President-Elect Nixon at the transition offices in New York to ask what plans the U.S. had for the Gulf after the British vacated the

The exercise of American power in the Middle East has been shaped by the circumstances of the region. During the Cold War, much of American Middle East policy was about coercive diplomacy or outright armed coercion, not simply about deterrence. Prominent episodes of American military engagements in the Middle East, such as Operation Earnest Will,⁵² Operation Desert Storm,⁵³ Operation Enduring Freedom,⁵⁴ and Operation Iraqi Freedom⁵⁵ illustrate this fact at the high end of the coercive diplomacy spectrum, while other actions (e.g., covert arms supplied to the Islamic insurgents resisting Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and intelligence support to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war) have been at the lower end.

The United States also has engaged in classic deterrence operations in the region, such as leading a coalition force into the Gulf in 1990 in Operation Desert Shield to deter Iraq from expanding its aggression beyond the borders of Kuwait. But the United States also has a long history of exercising coercive diplomacy in this region, including coercive diplomacy directed at European powers. The financial pressures Washington brought to bear on London in 1956, for instance, to force a rapid ceasefire and troop withdrawal following the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Suez is one example. And the current

region and, specifically, what America's intentions would be if Iraq attacked Kuwait. In January 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter announced the Carter Doctrine in his State of the Union message. The intent was to lay down a marker that the U.S. would not tolerate hegemony in the Gulf region by the Soviet Union or any other power.

⁵² In 1986 (the sixth year of the Iran-Iraq war), the Kuwaitis discreetly inquired via the American ambassador in Kuwait how the United States might respond to a request to put part of the Kuwaiti tanker fleet under the American flag. Their goal was to obtain American naval escorts for oil shipments threatened by the Iranians. This eventually resulted in Operation Earnest Will, conducted by the U.S. Middle East Force inside the Gulf and a U.S. carrier group outside the Strait of Hormuz – a complex military operation cutting across the jurisdictional boundaries of two unified commands. For a nuanced discussion of these issues (and of the politics of offering assurances in the Gulf region), see Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., with David Chanoff, *The Line of Fire: From Washington to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993). Admiral Crowe was commander of the Middle East Force from 1976-1977 and, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the late 1980s, dealt extensively with Gulf issues.

⁵³ Operation Desert Storm was the offensive phase of the U.S.-led campaign to oust Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait. Desert Shield had been the defensive phase intended to prevent Iraqi forces from extending their aggression beyond Kuwait. The intense air campaign phase of Desert Storm began on January 16, 1991. After 38 days of sustained air attack, a three-day ground offensive forced the Iraqis to begin retreating from Kuwait on February 26. The following day President George H. W. Bush announced that Kuwait had been liberated.

⁵⁴ Operation Enduring Freedom launched the war in Afghanistan—now the longest war in American history and a central concern of American defense planning.

⁵⁵ Operation Iraqi Freedom was the controversial invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003, by a U.S.-British led multinational force, albeit with much of the world disagreeing with the action. Although the major combat operation phase of the war ended quickly, the war developed into an insurgency and terrorist action in Iraq, elements of which persist today. The United States currently is transitioning out of its former roles in Iraq. On January 1, 2010, the Multi-National Forces Iraq command stood down, to be replaced by U.S. Force Iraq on the way to further transition.

international effort, with strong American involvement, to contain Iranian nuclear ambitions via stronger sanctions is another classic case of coercive diplomacy.

The politics of assurance and extended deterrence in the Middle East has not been anchored by multilateral or bilateral defense treaties. For example, the United States refused in the early 1950s to enter into an explicit defense treaty with Israel, yet it, arguably, extends an implicit guarantee to the (presumably) nuclear-armed Israel.⁵⁶ This implicit guarantee is backed by arms sales and military relations in peacetime, defending Israel diplomatically in the Security Council and other international bodies when Israel comes under unjustified political attack, and active support of Israel in times of national emergency (e.g., providing supplies to Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur war, and missile defense in the first Gulf War). Today Israel sees a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat. The Israelis also follow events in North Korea closely, not so much for the threat that North Korea poses in Northeast Asia as for its role as a clandestine supplier of arms, to include missiles and nuclear assistance, that make their way into the greater Middle East.

As for the Arab states in the region, America has provided security assurances for the most part not through highly visible defense treaties (America's support for Israel would make it difficult for Arab leaders to publicly acknowledge such arrangements), but via a complicated web of diplomatic encounters, informal understandings, defense cooperation agreements, and the like that permit U.S. basing in the region, give American aircraft over-flight rights, allow prepositioning of military equipment, provide for exercises, guide the conduct of foreign military sales, allow for training missions, and support other forms of joint security activity. This pattern continues, adapted to the changing threat environment.

For decades the United States has launched a number of high-profile peace initiatives to try to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.⁵⁷ Arab leaders, sensitive to the emotions of the street on any solution short of complete Israeli capitulation or destruction, have chosen on occasion to make concessions privately and to engage with

⁵⁶ The Israeli government does not acknowledge that Israel has nuclear weapons. For a political history of Israeli nuclear weapons policy, see Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

⁵⁷ For a summary of American initiatives prior to the 1967 Six-Day war, see Michael B. Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 1-32. For a summary of American initiatives from 1967 through 2000, see William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967*, revised edition (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2001). From 2001 to 2008, the administration of George W. Bush tended to shy away from launching another high-profile peace initiative in the Middle East. The Obama administration has re-engaged with the appointment of George Mitchell as special envoy.

Israel secretly, while denying in public that they are doing so. Those who have dealt with the issue openly run the risk of assassination or coups.

Iran. This brief background analysis begins to suggest the complexities brought to the table by experts in this study as they discussed the impact of the Iranian nuclear program on the evolving requirements for assurance and extended deterrence in the region.⁵⁸ Iran under the Shah purchased a research reactor from the United States in the 1960s, signed the NPT in 1968, and ratified it in 1970. Iran announced its intention to pursue an ambitious nuclear energy program in 1972, and in 1974 the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) was established under the Shah's direct supervision. The Shah appears to have envisioned enrichment and reprocessing capabilities and may also have entertained thoughts of an eventual nuclear weapons program. Whether he could have achieved this in the face of American resistance is unclear. Declassified documents from the Ford and Carter administrations show that Washington "put concerns over proliferation and the Shah's possible desire to build a nuclear bomb front and center when they approved negotiating positions for a deal to sell nuclear reactors to Iran."⁵⁹

The Shah's nuclear ambitions became a moot point in 1979 when his regime was overthrown by a coalition of dissidents led by Ayatollah Khomeini. Within months, moderate and secular forces in the Iranian revolution had been marginalized, killed, or sent into exile and a radical theocratic regime emerged to create an Islamic Republic.

When he came to power in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini initially suspended Iran's nuclear program, which was seen as a symbol of Iran's subjugation to the West. Limited nuclear training and some experimentation appears to have continued at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center, but many nuclear experts associated with the Shah's nuclear power program fled the country. The brutal Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 rekindled Iran's interest in missiles and nuclear weapons. Iraq employed chemical weapons against Iranian troops, attacked Iranian cities with ballistic missiles, and bombed the unfinished Bushehr nuclear facility on several occasions. The international response was to isolate Tehran, as many nations sided with Iraq, quietly if not openly.

⁵⁸ The description of the Iranian nuclear program in this paper draws on Etel Solingen's chapter on Iran in *Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia & the Middle East* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 164-186; Devin T. Hagerty, "Iran: The Nuclear Quandry," in Muthiah Alagappa, *The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 296-322); the Iran chapter in Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, *Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapon* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); Mark Fitzpatrick, *The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding Worst-Case Outcomes*, Adelphi paper 398 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008); and Paul K. Kerr, *Iran's Nuclear Program: Status* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, November 25, 2009).

⁵⁹ William Burr, "U.S.-Iran Nuclear Negotiations in 1970s Featured Shah's Nationalism and U.S. Weapons Worries," *Passport: The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations*, 40:1 (April 2009), 43.

With North Korean and Chinese assistance, and help from the A. Q. Khan network after 1986, Iran pursued an ambitious nuclear and missile program. Little attention was paid publicly to the Iranian nuclear program until after August 2002 when an Iranian exile group revealed the existence of major Iranian enrichment facilities that had been concealed from the IAEA.

The IAEA began to investigate Iran's nuclear activities at its undisclosed sites in the fall of 2002. A cyclic process has evolved since then of partial Iranian compliance with demands, followed by reversals, followed by new demands—while the Iranian program proceeds. In September 2005 the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution that for the first time found Iran to be noncompliant with its IAEA safeguards agreement. Since then, the international community has pursued the issue through a series of UN Security Council resolutions, several rounds of sanctions, and a number of diplomatic initiatives. This was the situation inherited by the Obama administration.⁶⁰

The latest round of sanctions against Iran adopted in June 2010 by the Security Council, UNSC Resolution 1929, may prove to be more damaging. It is not merely the multilateral sanctions that are at issue, as the legitimacy the resolution provides for additional sanctions by states and other organizations, and for interpretation. Russia, for example, announced that it was freezing a contract to deliver S-300 air defense missiles to Iran after the Security Council vote.

It is unclear whether the diplomatic effort to stop Iran's nuclear program will succeed.⁶¹ Some argue that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it means the end of the NPT regime and that there will be a cascade of nuclear states in the region (and perhaps globally). Others disagree, arguing that Iran can be deterred and that a wave of new proliferation can be avoided, somewhat along the lines of what happened after China went nuclear in 1964. Perhaps the most immediate question is what Israel plans to do. There are two possible futures. One that was not explored by discussants in this project, is what happens if Israel, desperate that Iran will soon have nuclear weapons, launches preemptive strikes on the Iranian nuclear complex as it did on Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981 and the suspected Syrian reactor in 2007. The effects on American assurance and extended deterrence in the Middle East *after* a preemptive Israeli action were not examined.

⁶⁰ An interesting summary of the complex issues can be found in David E. Sanger, *The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power* (New York: Harmony Books, 2009). See also Kenneth Katzman, *Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, December 7, 2009), and Paul K. Kerr, *Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 23, 2009). The CRS reports are updated periodically.

⁶¹ For a good summary of the sanctioning strategies focused on Iran and North Korea, see Brendan Taylor, *Sanctions as Grand Strategy* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2010).

This workshop instead focused on a different set of alternative futures which tended to project the current impasse into a more complicated world. Many thought that if Iran stops short of a nuclear weapons capability, Israel's ambiguous nuclear posture, commonly known in nuclear proliferation literature as a "bomb-in-the-basement," would be unchanged, but that if Iran openly becomes a nuclear power (perhaps by testing as North Korea did), Israel would likely bring its bomb out of the basement and become an open rather than an opaque nuclear-armed state. All appeared to agree that the requirements for American assurance and extended deterrence in a future with declared nuclear powers in the Middle East (leaving aside the issue of Pakistan) would be even more complex than today. There was no consensus, however, on what those requirements might be.

The general context for viewing security assurances in the Middle East, the discussants agreed, was criticism of American performance in the region and doubts about America's ability and wisdom to use its power constructively. Much of that criticism pre-dates the current administration, and it is an avowed goal of the Obama national security team to change such perceptions. It was pointed out by discussants that among American partner countries, it was not uncommon after 2005 to hear the criticism that if the United States does not succeed in keeping Iran from going nuclear, why should they believe it would stand up to a nuclear-armed Iran in defending their interests? Whether this allows one to anticipate the reactions of states in the region to a nuclear-armed Iran, however, is less clear. Experts on the region noted that Arab regimes are adept at 'rationalizing passivity' and thus may absorb Iran's going nuclear without overt response. This is a part of the world where it often is difficult to separate rhetoric and theater from reality.

What all this points to is the complexity of assurance strategies in a region where the United States has and remains deeply engaged, but where much takes place out of public view. The requirements for assurance and extended deterrence in this environment appear to revolve as much around skillful diplomacy and the successful management of long-term problems as they do around any institutional or force posture considerations. A regional, integrated architecture like NATO is not an option for the region. Informal coalitions and a web of often veiled relationships are more important. It also is important that American officials pick their words carefully when speaking about the region, and that the United States appear to be even-handed and constructive in dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. As the American experience shows; however, demonstrated most recently by the *Mavi Marmara* incident, this is easier to say than it is to execute over the long term. It was clear to all involved in the workshop that how the Iranian nuclear challenge is resolved will have a major impact both regionally and globally.

6. Assurance and Extended Deterrence in the Asia-Pacific Region

Background. This project devoted two workshops to discussing the Asia-Pacific region—a session on Japan in February 2008 and an abbreviated session on Australia in September 2008. China, India, and Pakistan also were the topics of special presentations in the concluding workshop in September 2009 on lessons and challenges. As in the preceding regional sections, the following analysis draws upon the workshop discussions and provides additional context and updated information on the evolving dynamics of assurance and extended deterrence in the Asia-Pacific region.

It is commonplace today to note that the epicenter of the world economy is shifting in historic ways. The vast Asia-Pacific region includes the world's two most populous countries and two of the world's three largest economies. The region is responsible for about 60 percent of the world's Gross Domestic Product and 40 percent of its trade, and is home to the world's largest holders of foreign exchange reserves. It is a vibrant and growing region.

The Asia-Pacific region also accounts for about 60 percent of the world's military spending and houses three of the world's five largest militaries.

Three of the P-5 nuclear powers (China, the United States, more remotely Russia) consider themselves Asia-Pacific powers. The two nuclear-armed nations of South Asia (India and Pakistan) are part of the broad regional security equation, and North Korea, which withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and has conducted nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, is a nuclear wild card. American presence in the vast Asia-Pacific region and how it manages its assurance and extended deterrence relationships are an important stabilizing factor not only for the region but for global peace and security.

Although the United States has been an Asia-Pacific nation for much of its existence, the realities of a Euro-centric world were reflected in the past in American grand strategy. The United States fought the Second World War, for instance, with a Europe-first strategy, and Europe was the primary focus of American thinking on the requirements of nuclear deterrence the Cold War. Europe remains important to American policy today, but as a number of official statements acknowledge, engagement in the Asia-Pacific region is increasingly important to American security in the 21st century.

Unlike Europe, where America's well-known security commitments are exercised primarily through the multilateral regional mechanism of NATO, or the Middle East, where less formal and often more veiled bilateral relationships are the rule, America's

defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region primarily are based on highly visible bilateral treaties or, in the special case of Taiwan, the Taiwan Relations Act.⁶² This analysis does not seek to review all of the American security assurances in the region but concentrates instead on two countries – Australia and Japan—which were selected earlier in the project for dedicated workshops.

America's early encounters with Australia and Japan are instructive for today's globalized world. They involved engagement at great distances via trade and the export of skilled professional services, long before the United States was a military power. The young Herbert Hoover, who graduated from Stanford with a degree in geology in 1895, went to Australia two years later to work as a geologist and mining engineer, then moved on to China. He returned to Australia to manage a vast mining operation before becoming an independent mining consultant with clients around the globe. Commodore Matthew Perry entered Tokyo harbor in 1853 with a small flotilla, securing access for American vessels to ports of refuge and supply. Perry's visits were followed by America's first permanent envoy to Japan, Townsend Harris, who negotiated America's access to trade with Japan.⁶³

Commodore Perry (in an act that can be interpreted as one of coercive diplomacy) opened up what had been a closed society and galvanized forces of social change that propelled Japan into the modern age. Fifteen years after Perry's first visit, reformist elements of the samurai elite overthrew the Tokugawa dynasty that had ruled Japan since feudal times and had kept Japan a closed society. Following this event—known as the Meiji Restoration—Japan set out to become a great power on Western terms.⁶⁴

Japan's first encounter with the American military took place when Britain was the premier maritime power and the United States was still a very modest player in world affairs. Australia first encountered the American military as British influence was about to fade and be replaced slowly by the United States. In 1907 President Theodore

⁶² The United States supported attempts in the early 1950s to introduce variations of NATO into other regions, specifically, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the Middle East and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in Asia. This arrangement did not prove viable in either region.

⁶³ Perry negotiated a treaty in 1854 that gave American vessels access to ports of refuge and supply in Japan. Townsend Harris arrived shortly after Perry's departure and negotiated a 'treaty port' arrangement with Japan along the lines of the arrangements that Britain and France had forced China to accept. Other Western powers quickly entered Japan as well, and by 1858, Japan had abandoned its centuries-old system of autarky for 'free trade' on Western terms.

⁶⁴ The Meiji Restoration restored the emperor to the center of government (a source of legitimacy for the new system), radically reshaped Japan's domestic institutions in order to compete with the West, imported military technology, built a modern military, and ruthlessly played by the rules of the imperialist game in seeking great power status and an empire. When Japan defeated China (1895) and Russia (1904 -1905) in two wars, Japanese authorities thought they should be recognized as a great power. In some ways they were (e.g., presence at major international conferences), but there was lingering Japanese resentment that the West still appeared to view Japan as a second-rate power.

Roosevelt sent the American battle fleet (the Great White fleet) on a voyage of circumnavigation around the globe, to show the American flag and demonstrate the growing power of the United States. At the invitation of the Australian government, the Great White fleet made port calls in Australia in 1908. This was the first visit by warships other than those of the Royal Navy in Australia's history.⁶⁵

World War I hastened Britain's decline and America's ascent. In December 1918, the *USS George Washington* sailed out of New York harbor with President Woodrow Wilson aboard, bound for the peace conference in Versailles. Wilson's proposals for a radical reshaping of international relations captured the world's imagination. Unfortunately Wilson's idealism was not matched by diplomatic and political skills in Versailles or at home. What transpired at Versailles was much like the traditional great-power politics of earlier eras.

Japan and Australia were represented at Versailles, but played minor roles and had little or no influence on the outcome.⁶⁶ The diplomatic historian Margaret MacMillan writes:

By 1916 the dominions, which had once tiptoed reverentially around the mother country, were growing up. They and their generals had seen too much of what Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian prime minister, called 'incompetence and blundering stupidity of the whiskey and soda British H.Q. Staff.' The dominions knew how important their contribution was [in the Great War], what they had spent in blood. In return, they now expected to be consulted, both on the war and the peace to follow.⁶⁷

The consultation was modest.

When President Wilson returned to the United States, his refusal to compromise with the Senate on key elements of the treaty essentially scuttled American participation in the League of Nations and cast a shadow over internationalist impulses in the American body politic for the next two decades. For the most part, the United States retreated from global responsibility, contributing to a power vacuum that led to World War II. In the early days after Pearl Harbor, Japan's imperial navy and army went from

⁶⁵ In 1770 Britain claimed the eastern half of Australia and, in 1788, transported the first wave of prisoners from Britain to the Crown Colony of New South Wales. More crown colonies in Australia would follow and in January 1901, they joined in federation to form the Commonwealth of Australia.

⁶⁶ Margaret MacMillan gives an excellent account of the roles of the smaller countries at Versailles. Lloyd George reluctantly persuaded Clemenceau and Wilson to allow Australia, Canada, South Africa, India, and New Zealand to have their own plenipotentiaries after leaders in the empire insisted, after contributing to the victory, on being consulted on the peace to follow. Japan had declared war on Germany and had one of the world's largest navies. At Britain's insistence, the Great Powers gave Japan five delegates to the conference, but the Japanese delegates often found themselves ignored if not humiliated. See Margaret MacMillan, *Paris, 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2002).

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 44.

victory to victory. General Douglas MacArthur escaped from the Philippines (about to fall to Japanese forces) in March 1942, to regroup his command in Australia. As Japanese armed forces moved into Southeast Asia, Britain suffered the most humiliating military defeat in its history with the fall of Singapore. With the Japanese advancing steadily toward Australia, the United States took on the role of ultimate guarantor in the region—a role it has since maintained.

The shift in perceptions in Australia that had begun in World War I came to fruition in the Second World War. By the winter of 1941-1942, Australia faced a mortal threat as the Japanese advanced to the south. As Gerhard Weinberg, one of the leading historians of the international history of the Second World War, puts it: “Australia and New Zealand . . . felt deserted by the home country [Britain] in their hour of greatest danger; it may be an exaggeration, but not a completely unjustified one, that a major recent study of Australia’s defense position in World War II is entitled ‘The Great Betrayal.’ Both looked most to the United States for their defense in the face of any future threat.”⁶⁸

Japan lost the war, decisively and unequivocally. On behalf of President Truman, General MacArthur accepted Japan’s formal surrender aboard the battleship *Missouri* in Tokyo harbor in September 1945, and presided over the occupation of the defeated nation. Australia had placed its forces under MacArthur’s command in 1942 and now participated, in a modest way, in the occupation of Japan. When the United States pressed for a formal peace treaty with Japan in 1951, Australia was reluctant, at first, unless the United States would formalize its commitment to Australia’s defense. This was done in early September 1951, one week before the peace treaty with Japan was signed by 49 nations (including Australia) in San Francisco.⁶⁹ The same day the peace treaty was concluded, the United States signed a treaty of mutual cooperation and security with Japan, thus setting the pattern for how it would provide security assurances to the Asia-Pacific region via bilateral instruments. The 1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, replaced by a new bilateral treaty in 1960, forms the legal framework for American’s security assurances and extended deterrent to Japan today.

In Europe, NATO was the means for re-integrating the defeated Germans into the region in a way that did not threaten the rest of Western Europe. NATO made possible the broader reconciliation of Germany with its West European neighbors during the Cold War. NATO also was the mechanism at the end of the Cold War that helped secure a stable German reunification and completed the reconciliation process. The Asia-Pacific

⁶⁸ Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 492.

⁶⁹ The security commitment to Australia was recorded in the Australia, New Zealand, and U.S. Security Treaty (ANZUS). In 1984, in a dispute over visiting rights of U.S. naval vessels armed with nuclear weapons, Washington suspended its commitments to New Zealand. ANZUS remains in force as a bilateral U.S.-Australian and a bilateral Australian-New Zealand treaty.

security environment and the different strategic cultures in Germany and Japan tend to rule out a similar solution for the region, regardless of what security assurances the United States might provide. Another reality is the steady rise of China and what that means for American influence in the Asia-Pacific region over time. This region has seen a number of major geopolitical shifts in the past that have fundamentally realigned power relations and have shaped perceptions of governments and elites on how to best pursue their security requirements. The modern history of the region includes,

- the end of a centuries-old Sino-centric system in Asia in the mid-1800s and the imposition of a Western imperialist order following the Treaty of Nanjing (1842) that ended the Opium War;
- a dramatic weakening of the Western imperialist system after World War I and a hesitant transition to an American-inspired order based on the several treaties negotiated at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922;
- disintegration of this tentative order and emergence of a power vacuum in the 1930s, into which an increasingly militarized Japan inserted itself as it sought to create a Japan-centric order in East Asia;
- Japan's crushing defeat in World War II and America's emergence as leader of a liberal order during the Cold War;
- the end of the Cold War with the disintegration of the Soviet Union;
- the rise of modern China and India.⁷⁰

It is in that context that the analysis turns to the cases of Australia and Japan.

Australia. In May 2009, the Australian defense minister, Joel Fitzgibbon, on the occasion of the release of the latest Australian defense white paper, pointed out that “Since the Second World War, Australia’s strategic outlook and defence planning has been shaped most fundamentally by the global distribution of power, and in particular the strategic primacy of the United States.”⁷¹ The preface of the Australian defense white paper asserted that “the biggest changes to our outlook over the period [from 2000, when the last white paper was issued, to 2009] have been the rise of China, the emergence of India and the beginning of the end of the so-called unipolar moment.”⁷² Australia is not the only country in the region to ponder this trend. Australians in the government and the security elite traditionally viewed nuclear weapons as bringing order and discipline to

⁷⁰ I have adapted the list from Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 28.

⁷¹ The Hon. Joel Fitzgibbon, MP, Minister for Defence, “A New Strategic Environment,” (Canberra: Ministerial Support and Public Affairs, Department of Defence, 2 May 2009). <http://www.defence.gov.au/media> (accessed June 23, 2010).

⁷² Preface to *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030* (2 May 2009). The several hundred page white paper is available at http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf (accessed June 23, 2010).

great power relationships.⁷³ This view began to fade as nuclear weapons took a lower profile in great power relations after the Cold War. The American nuclear umbrella explicitly embraced Australia after September 1951, but even during the coldest days of the Cold War, the nuclear element of the security equation was seen as an abstraction, remote from Australia's immediate security concerns. Australia's sense of security was more influenced by, for example, the perceived lack of threats in their immediate vicinity during President Suharto's long period of rule in Indonesia.⁷⁴

The benefits for Australia of alliance with the United States always went beyond simply receiving security assurances and an extended deterrent. They have included, for example, privileged access to conventional weapons technology, and training and exercise opportunities not available to non-allies. As for security assurances and extended deterrence, the 2009 Australian defense white paper recognizes that “. . . stable nuclear deterrence will continue to be a feature of the international system for the foreseeable future, and in this context extended deterrence will continue to be viable.”⁷⁵ The white paper concludes that “for as long as nuclear weapons exist, we are able to rely on the nuclear forces of the United States to deter nuclear attack.”⁷⁶ In a veiled way it also appears to acknowledge the non-proliferation value of the extended nuclear deterrence when it notes that

Australian defence policy under successive governments has acknowledged the value to Australia of the protection afforded by extended nuclear deterrence under the U.S. alliance. That protection provides a stable and reliable sense of assurance and has over the years removed the need for Australia to consider more significant and expensive defence options.⁷⁷

In fact, the American extended nuclear deterrent allowed Australia to avoid a divisive political debate on whether to pursue its own nuclear option. The record shows that Australian officials and members of the national security elite were seriously concerned about regional stability issues after China tested a nuclear weapon in October 1964. Glenn Seaborg, then chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, recalls that when he visited Australia in January 1967, “At dinner, Sir Leslie Martin (Australian AEC

⁷³ The analysis in this section draws heavily on that of Rod Lyon who was the key participant in the project's workshop on Australia. His views are summarized in his chapter, “Australia: Back to the Future?” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 429-450.

⁷⁴ Suharto, the second president of Indonesia, held office from 1967 until his resignation in 1998.

⁷⁵ Australian Defence White Paper 2009, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030* (May 2, 2009), 39. See http://www.defence.gov.au/wpaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf (accessed June 23, 2010).

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 50.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

member and scientific adviser to the Department of Defense) told me that the government of Australia was struggling with the decision whether to produce a nuclear weapon.”⁷⁸ The United States had not been informed previously of this internal debate. Seaborg found that the topic also came up in discussions he had with parliamentarians responsible for nuclear energy matters, and on his return to the United States, he reported Australia’s concerns to the president. America entered a period of consultation with the Australians, and in February 1970, Australia signed the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state.

Rod Lyons, the Australian defense expert consulted for this project, points out that “The 1970s brought closure to the [Australian] indigenous nuclear option, through signature and ratification of the NPT, the prospect of a more stable Indonesia and more engaged China, and the articulation of a nonnuclear Australian identity.”⁷⁹ In the background was the American security guarantee.

Today, Australia is engaged in international nuclear politics, not simply because of its role as a major nuclear supplier (it has large deposits of uranium), but also because of the active role Australian governments have chosen to play in advancing a nuclear non-proliferation agenda. Most recently, Australia partnered with Japan to sponsor the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament—a group co-chaired by former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans and former Japanese foreign minister Yoriko Kawaguchi. The report of the commission was released on December 15, 2009, in a ceremony at the Japanese prime minister’s residence in Tokyo. Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, who had helped launch the commission, was present at the ceremony and welcomed the report as an important framework for practical discussions on how to proceed with what he called “non-proliferation disarmament.”⁸⁰

With regard to the North Korean nuclear weapons program, the 2009 Australian defense white paper recognizes that states like North Korea that pursue long-range ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons “could pose a direct, *though remote*, risk to our [Australia’s] security (emphasis added).”⁸¹ Before shifting the discussion to Japan, it is useful to briefly review the history of the North Korean nuclear weapons program.

The North Korean nuclear weapons program. The precise origins of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program are unclear.⁸² Some experts believe that Kim Il-sung’s

⁷⁸ Glenn T. Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb, *Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), 252.

⁷⁹ Lyons, “Australia: Back to the Future?” 438.

⁸⁰ Remarks by Prime Minister Rudd, 15 December 2009, available at http://www.icndd.org/transcripts/091215_rudd.html (accessed June 23, 2010).

⁸¹ Australian Defence White Paper 2009, 39.

⁸² The sources used for this description of the North Korean nuclear program are Jacqueline Simon, “North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program,” in Eric A. Croddy, James J. Wirtz, and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds., *Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology, and History*,

interest in obtaining nuclear weapons dates back to the days immediately following the Korean War. What is known is that in the early 1950s, North Korea began sending hundreds of students and scientists to the Soviet Union to be educated in Soviet universities and trained at Soviet nuclear research centers. Moscow provided Pyongyang with a research reactor and helped build nuclear facilities at Yongbyon in the 1960s. North Korea continued to develop nuclear expertise and by the 1970s was ready to begin an indigenous nuclear program. Given the large deposits of natural uranium in North Korea, it was understandable that North Korea would pursue gas-graphite reactors that can be fueled with natural uranium (as opposed to reactor designs that require enriched uranium).

The North Korean program proceeded as North Koreans mastered the requirements of the gas-graphite fuel cycle. Pyongyang also began construction of fuel fabrication facilities and a large reprocessing center. By the early 1980s, American satellites were monitoring the construction, but it wasn't until 1989 that details of the North Korean program were publicized and the international community began to pay attention.

In the early 1980s, North Korea requested that the Soviets build light-water reactors parallel to North Korea's indigenous program. Moscow required North Korea to join the NPT as part of this deal, which Pyongyang did in 1985. However, North Korea refused to negotiate a safeguards agreement with the IAEA until the United States removed its theater nuclear weapons from South Korea.

North Korea's security equation changed dramatically in the late 1980s as the Cold War waned. South Korea established diplomatic relations with Moscow and Beijing. The demise of the Soviet Union resulted in the loss of security guarantees and economic assistance from Moscow that had sustained the North Korean regime since the 1940s.

In 1991, North and South Korea signed a Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and Pyongyang finally concluded its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. In May 1992, international inspectors entered North Korea for the first time to attempt to verify the initial declaration of nuclear materials declared by the North Korean authorities.

The visits by IAEA inspectors in 1992 left many questions unanswered. A pattern emerged of engagement with Pyongyang on nuclear issues. North Korea appears to cooperate on some matters but not on others, leaves questions unanswered, picks opportunities to create a crisis, then appears to make some level of concessions in return

Vol. II (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2005), pp. 244-247; Larry A. Niksch, *North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, September 9, 2009); Mary Beth Nikitin, *North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, December 16, 2009); and Siegfried S. Hecker, "Lessons learned from the North Korean nuclear crises," *Daedalus* (Winter 2010), 44-56.

for greater concessions by its adversaries, engages in negotiations and then withdraws. IAEA Director General Hans Blix reported in 1993 that the IAEA could not conclude that North Korea was not producing nuclear weapons. North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT. The United States and North Korea appeared to be close to war before former President Jimmy Carter brokered a freeze.

President Clinton appointed Robert Gallucci to head a new round of negotiations in Geneva which finally resulted in the Agreed Framework in October 1994.⁸³ This agreement was concluded at a time of considerable turmoil in North Korea. Kim il-sung, who had ruled the country since its creation after World War II, died in July 1994, after the Carter visit. The central government's operations were even more veiled than usual for the next three years as Kim Il-sung's chosen successor, his eldest son Kim Jong-il, went into seclusion. During the same period, North Korea suffered a series of crop failures brought on by severe flooding. Coupled with the collapsing North Korean infrastructure, a famine was triggered in which an estimated five-to-ten percent of the population died of starvation.⁸⁴

The Agreed Framework appeared to some to be a path to satisfactorily resolving the North Korean nuclear weapons challenge, but it too broke down. Meanwhile, North Korea's missile program was expanding and its clandestine exports became a point of increasing concern. In 1996 the United States and North Korea met for their first round of bilateral missile talks. In August 1998, North Korea surprised Washington and Tokyo when it launched a multistage missile that overflew Japan. Pyongyang claimed it had attempted to launch a satellite (South Korea had launched its first satellite in 1993), but Western authorities believed the intent was to test long-range ballistic missile technology and to send a provocative message to Washington and Tokyo.

The month before the North Korean missile test, an American commission chaired by Donald Rumsfeld released its report on long-range missile threats to the United States. This report was commissioned at a particularly important time in the U.S. domestic debate on the future of ballistic missile defense. The Rumsfeld Commission was highly critical of how the U.S. intelligence community assessed foreign missile programs, arguing that the missile threat to the United States was emerging much more quickly than official estimates had predicted. The surprise launch by the North Koreans appeared to validate the commission's concern.

⁸³ Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea froze activity at its 5-megawatt research reactors and reprocessing facilities, and allowed IAEA monitoring. Pyongyang also agreed not to build any other reactors or reprocessing facilities and to remain party to the NPT. In return, North Korea was promised two light-water reactors and a supply of heavy fuel oil annually.

⁸⁴ See Ralph Hassig and Kongdan Oh, *The Hidden People of North Korea: Everyday Life in the Hermit Kingdom* (New York: Rowen & Littlefield, 2009).

Japan. The Japan workshop in February 2008 took place against a decade of events that had resurfaced the question of whether Japan might go nuclear. The provocative North Korean missile launch in 1998 triggered a new security debate in Japan—a debate that intensified in the following years. North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003, leading to the on-again, off-again six-party talks with Japan as a participant.⁸⁵ These talks were suspended by North Korea, and it is unclear whether they will resume.

North Korea's nuclear tests (2006 and 2009) have added to Japan's concerns about North Korea (e.g., the unresolved issue of kidnapping Japanese citizens). Notwithstanding diplomatic engagement strategies and sanctions, the North Korean missile and nuclear programs have continued. So has a pattern of North Korean clandestine arms sales worldwide and provocative behavior. Most recently, the March 2010 *Cheonan* incident has served to remind the Japanese defense establishment of how dangerous the North Korean situation is—especially during a time of likely leadership change in Pyongyang.⁸⁶

As the North Korean nuclear challenge evolved, Japan also saw, in the years after 9/11, that America's attention and priorities appeared to shift to the global confrontation with terrorism, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This shift in attention coincided with a steady growth of China's power. All of this raised questions about whether Japan would reconsider becoming a nuclear weapons power.

Japan has quietly examined the question of a nuclear weapons option on previous occasions when it sensed a change in the strategic environment. Typically, the Japanese government would study the question in private, then orchestrate leaks to remind the world that Japan is capable of producing nuclear weapons should it choose to do so.⁸⁷ The question of whether Japan in fact would choose to go nuclear, however, has always been complicated by a number of factors including:

⁸⁵ The six-party talks involve North and South Korea, China, Russia, the United States, and Japan. North Korea boycotted the talks in 2004-2005, again in 2005-2006, and declared in April 2009, after the Security Council's unanimous decision to condemn North Korea after a failed satellite launch, that it would pull out of the six-party talks for good and resume its nuclear enrichment program.

⁸⁶ On March 26, 2010, the South Korean patrol ship, the *Cheonan*, suffered an explosion and sank near the inter-Korean maritime border under mysterious circumstances, resulting in the deaths of 46 South Korean sailors. Although North Korea denies responsibility, an international forensics team including experts from the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and Sweden have traced the explosion to a North Korean manufactured acoustic-sensored torpedo.

⁸⁷ See Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, "Japan: New Nuclear Realism," in Muthiah Alagappa, *The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University press, 2008), 349.

- Japan's catastrophic defeat in World War II and the resulting anti-military backlash in Japanese society, reinforced by Article 9 of Japan's 'peace' constitution which helped shape the current strategic culture in Japan;⁸⁸
- Japan's 'nuclear allergy' rooted in its unique history;⁸⁹
- the Yoshida doctrine which from the 1950s onward aligned Japanese security with American power while Japan concentrated on growing strong economically—a vision that continues to have a powerful influence on many in Japan today;
- Japan's embrace of the role of being a world leader in non-proliferation and nuclear abolition causes.

There is an argument to be made that Japan appears to be entering a new era.⁹⁰ Japan has been re-evaluating its defense options more publicly than before. It has taken on new missions for the Japanese Self-Defense Force and, in 2006, elevated the Defense Agency to ministry status. Experts continue to point to Japan's ability to address its security concerns with its own nuclear option, if it chooses to do so. And some make the argument that international relations theory supports the thesis that Japan will, eventually, go nuclear, or as Michael Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa have written, "The possibility of Japan's nuclear armament has been a subject of widespread international attention for many decades. Structural realists since Herman Kahn and Henry Kissinger have found it difficult to accept that Japan's post-World War II pacifist stance would not yield eventually to full-fledged military power commensurate with its economic strength."⁹¹

From a technical standpoint, all experts who study the issue appear to agree that Japan has the expertise and infrastructure needed to proceed to nuclear weapons relatively quickly, should it choose to do so. Japan has relied on nuclear power plants for a significant portion of its energy consumption since the 1960s, and has developed a large civilian nuclear sector. Japan has world-class nuclear scientists, large stocks of separated plutonium (estimated as sufficient to make over 1,000 nuclear weapons), and is completing work on a commercial reprocessing facility.⁹² As early as 1997, proliferation

⁸⁸ See John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: The New Press, 1999).

⁸⁹ Japan has a large public diplomacy campaign to keep alive the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In 1954, a Japanese tuna trawler, the Lucky Dragon, also was showered with radiation from an American thermonuclear test in the Bikini atoll. All 23 members of the crew suffered severe radiation illness and one subsequently died. This event galvanized the international community in a quest for a nuclear test ban.

⁹⁰ See Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007); and Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power*, Adelphi Paper 368-9 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004).

⁹¹ Green and Furukawa, "Japan: New Nuclear Realism," 347.

⁹² See Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, *Japan's Nuclear Future: Public Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, February 19, 2009), 3-6; and

experts were pointing out that Japan “has very strong latent capabilities; indeed, its nuclear weapons capability is often characterized as robust to the point of being virtual or nearly extant.”⁹³ As discussants in this project noted, however, having the technical capability to produce a nuclear device is a long way from fielding an operationally effective nuclear deterrent force.

To summarize, Japan views its security environment differently today than it did during the Cold War or even in the 1990s. The North Korean nuclear and missile programs contribute to this change, as does the steady growth of Chinese power and influence. Japan also has seen America’s attention shift from the Asia-Pacific region in the years following 9/11. As a result of these and other factors, there is greater acceptance in Japan today of open discussion of nuclear issues, including discussion of America’s ability to provide an effective extended nuclear deterrent. The political stalemate in Washington on the future of America’s nuclear weapons infrastructure and program has been visible in Japan, as were the nuclear incidents with unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons and the misdirected shipment of nuclear-related parts.

Some experts involved in this project conclude that in its security relationship with the United States, Japan seeks a greater role in defense planning and new mechanisms for consultation on security issues, and that this is the intended message of the public nuclear dialogue in Japan. Others see the current situation as one where the United States needs to vigorously reaffirm its security commitment to Japan, and to make American force posture decisions with an eye to the requirements of extended deterrence in Northeast Asia, to keep Japan from going nuclear.

When North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice immediately made a trip to the region to reaffirm American defense commitments to Japan and South Korea. On repeated occasions during the visit, she stressed publicly that “we consider an attack on Japan or a threat to attack Japan as a direct threat to the United States. And so it’s the firmest of commitments.” She also emphasized that “no one in North Korea should doubt that the United States will defend Japan, and no one in Japan should doubt that the United States will defend Japan, because the Mutual Defense Treaty, in effect, means that our security and that of Japan are interlinked.”⁹⁴

Kurt M. Campbell and Tusuyoshi Sunohara, “Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable,” in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds, *The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 218-253.

⁹³ Brad Roberts, “VNAs [Virtual Nuclear Arsenals] and the Contemporary Latent Weapon State,” in Michael J. Mazarr, ed., *Nuclear Weapons in a Transformed World: The Challenge of Virtual Nuclear Arsenals* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 265.

⁹⁴ Roundtable With Japanese Press, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Tokyo, Japan, October 19, 2006. <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/74750.htm> (accessed June 23, 2010).

Coinciding with Secretary Rice's trip to Northeast Asia, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was hosting his South Korean counterpart, Minister of National Defense Yoon Kwang-Ung, at the Pentagon for the 38th U.S.-ROK security consultative meeting. In the press conference following the meeting, Secretary Rumsfeld said that "The United States reaffirms the firm commitment to the Republic of Korea, including continuation of the extended deterrence offered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella."⁹⁵

This pattern of reassurance has continued into the Obama administration. In his remarks at the May 2009 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, for instance, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said:

The goal of the United States has not changed: Our goal is complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. We will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. North Korea's nuclear program and actions constitute a threat to regional peace and security. We unequivocally reaffirm our commitment to the defense of our allies in the region. The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States and our allies. And we would hold North Korea fully accountable for the consequences of such action.⁹⁶

In his trip to Tokyo in November 2009, President Obama said in prepared remarks: "So long as these [nuclear] weapons exist, the United States will maintain a strong and effective nuclear deterrent that guarantees the defense of our allies—including South Korea and Japan."⁹⁷

Consultations with Japanese officials leading up to the 2010 NPR, and the explicit wording of the negative security assurance to exclude North Korea and Iran, appear to have been reassuring to Japan.

Another factor since the workshop on Japan was held in February 2008 has been the change in Japanese domestic politics. In August 2009, the center-left Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won a landslide victory, unseating the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that has dominated Japanese politics since it regained sovereignty following the Second World War. The new government of Prime Minister Yuki Hatoyama pledged during the campaign to change the relationship between the politicians and the bureaucrats in favor

⁹⁵ DoD News Briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld and South Korean Minister of National Defense Yoon Kwang-Ung at the Pentagon, October 20, 2006. <http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3763> (accessed June 23, 2010).

⁹⁶ Speech as delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Singapore, Saturday, May 30, 2009. <http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1357> (accessed June 23, 2010).

⁹⁷ Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall, Tokyo, Japan, November 14, 2009, 4. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-suntory-hall> (accessed June 23, 2010).

of the political leadership, and appeared initially to be following through on that promise.⁹⁸ His government sought to reduce the power of bureaucrats in the ministries who traditionally watch over alliance politics to manage affairs largely independent of political oversight. Perhaps more important over the long run, Japanese voters appear to have joined in orchestrating a political revolution from below—something new for Japan.

The 2009 election was not about foreign policy (polls showed that 75 percent of the public supported the U.S.-Japan alliance), but the Hatoyam government did seek (to use its campaign language) “more equal” relations with the United States, which translated into such efforts as reopening the issue of relocation of the U.S. Marine facility on Okinawa. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama resigned after just nine months in office, in part because of the perception that he was weakening relations with Washington at a time of increased tension in Northeast Asia. His successor, Prime Minister Naoto Kan, is seeking to redress this image.

Concluding comments on Asia. This project did not directly address America’s other critical security partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region, such as the long-standing security relationship with the Republic of Korea, the realities of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, or (except for brief discussion) the nuclear issues associated with South Asia. It is worth noting in this analysis one final point on extended deterrence. After his presentation at the 9th Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June 5, 2010, Secretary Gates was asked whether he could give “a layman’s” explanation of what extended deterrence involves. The answer, quoted in full, was as follows:

Well, for us allies and our partners here in Asia, extended deterrents are in essence through both conventional and nuclear capabilities we will extend an umbrella of protection over our allies. I would say that it is an umbrella that is also intended to avoid further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As long as our extended deterrents are reliable and believed in by our allies and partners, then there is no need for additional nations to develop nuclear weapons. We think that is a positive good. We intend to continue those extended deterrents. We are investing billions of dollars in our nuclear infrastructure to ensure that our stockpile is safe and reliable and effective. Our new F-35 fighter will be a dual [sp] capable aircraft. Therefore, I believe that we are making the appropriate investments to ensure that that extended deterrents is sustained far into the future.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ See Michael J. Green, “Japan’s Confused Revolution,” *The Washington Quarterly*, 33:1 (January 2010), 3-19.

⁹⁹ Provisional Transcript, Q&A, First Plenary Session, The 9th IISS Asian Security Summit, The Shangri-La Dialogue, Saturday, 05 June 2010. <http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2010/plenary-session-speeches/first-plenary-session/robert-gates/qa/> (accessed June 23, 2010).

7. Conclusions and Cross-Cutting Insights

The basic conclusions of this paper are fourfold. First, while many of the underlying principles and modes of extending nuclear deterrence have not changed significantly since the Cold War, the United States must pay greater attention to adjusting its engagement strategies with security partners to whom the assurance commitments are extended, to ensure that the assurances remain positive and strong. This reflects the realities of a changing and more interconnected world in which more actors exercise power and influence.

Second, America's ability to extend deterrence is wider than its nuclear component. This is an important message driven home by the recent Nuclear Posture Review. Missile defense is an especially important component in the new security equation. Conventional military capabilities also are part of the equation. Equally important, the NPR stresses that the nuclear component remains vital as long as others have nuclear weapons. Third, and perhaps most underappreciated and least developed from the standpoint of stability analysis, the credibility of American assurances in regional settings draws as much on America's ability to conduct successful campaigns of coercive diplomacy as it does on traditional deterrence practices. This is being tested in practice today in both North Korea and Iran. It could be tested elsewhere in the future. And fourth, the success of America's use of security assurances cannot be separated from wider perceptions of America's relative power in the world. Unless the United States is seen as successfully adapting to shifting power alignments in ways that security partners find acceptable, the strength of America's security assurances will suffer.

As the analysis illustrates, the United States has pursued a number of security assurance strategies since the end of the Second World War and it has extended a nuclear deterrent umbrella to over thirty countries. The assurance strategies did not develop from a single, overarching strategic design, but instead evolved in response to circumstances and challenges. The United States found that regional and sometimes local circumstances made a difference. There is no single security assurance formula that applies to all regions and all countries.

What the analysis suggests is that the following insights apply to security assurance and extended deterrence regardless of region:

A. Fundamentals and Principles of Assurance and Extended Deterrence

- America is a world leader. It has a history of extending security assurances and deterrence under adverse circumstances to manage great power nuclear relations. Nobody can claim a comparable record.
- America has also, traditionally, been a world leader in nuclear threat reduction, ranging from efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons to strategies for dealing with nuclear terrorism. This is increasingly important and cannot be separated from the wider issue of security assurances.
- There is no single security assurance formula that applies to all regions and all countries. What works in one place may not work in another. It is a matter of skillful strategy and statesmanship to identify what works best and where at any particular time.
- Security relationships are first and foremost political relationships. If the overall political relationship is not healthy, it is unlikely that the security relationship can remain durable and strong. Conversely, if the basic political relationship is strong, security relationships can better weather short-term challenges.
- Never take a security relationship for granted. Anticipate change—change in domestic politics, change in the threat environment, change in the geopolitical configuration of forces, even change in strategic cultures. The United States must be prepared to adapt the security assurances it extends to changing circumstances. Never let a security assurance run on autopilot. Don't place faith in the status quo.
- The strongest security relationships are built over time. They are built on shared institutions, patterns of engagement, shared experiences in facing up to and surmounting crises, shared risks and sacrifices.
- Success matters. At the same time, there have been and will be failures and mistakes. The ability to recognize and recover from mistakes is a key part of a successful assurance strategy. It also is a strength of a healthy democracy.
- Consultation is critical. Security partners want frequent and genuine consultation, not after-the-fact briefings on matters of importance to their security. They need to believe that their views are taken seriously.
- Understanding how others see their world is important. Appreciate the threat environment as your security partner sees it.

B. Expect Tensions and Problems – Prepare to Work Through Them

- Security partners, regardless of how deep their mutual interests might be, will have different priorities and goals, different threat perceptions, different degrees of willingness to share risks and burdens, different domestic concerns. Healthy

- Foreign audiences cannot be shielded from messy U.S. domestic debates on national security issues. Skillful diplomacy is required to help foreign officials and security elites sort through the superheated hyperbole and public debate that often takes place when a democracy decides on its security posture and its foreign policy priorities. Foreign audiences frequently have trouble understanding the nature of American civic culture with its separation of powers, the exercise of a free press, and the realities of academic freedom. All of this reinforces the need for strong diplomacy and broad engagement strategies to help foreign audiences understand the United States better.
- Public statements addressed to the needs of security assurances and extended deterrence in one part of the world will be read and interpreted in all parts of the world. Public officials occasionally will misspeak, especially in unrehearsed responses to questions from the media or in congressional testimony. Even the wisest democracy chooses courses of action that are later found to be wrong. As noted above, the strength of a democracy is the ability to recover from mistakes. Security assurances and extended deterrence relationships cannot be isolated from these realities.

C. Understand the Abiding Features of Deterrence and Extended Deterrence

- The credibility of a deterrent depends upon perceived capability and political will.
- Capability will involve non-nuclear as well as nuclear options.
- It almost always takes more capability and demonstration of will to sustain the credibility of extended deterrence than it does of basic deterrence.
- All deterrence strategies are multi-dimensional.
 - The operational dimension involves organizing, training, equipping, exercising, posturing, planning, and employing force.
 - The technical dimension involves pursuing state-of-the-art technologies and fielding weapons and systems that are at least equal, if not superior, to those of an adversary. It also involves avoiding technological surprise.
 - The political dimension involves the willingness of a nation to make the sacrifices necessary to support deterrence strategies, the skills of the nation's leaders in devising and explaining deterrence strategies, and meeting the demands of strong deterrence diplomacy.
- Of the several dimensions, the political carries the most weight in sustaining extended deterrence over time. Allies pay less attention to the shifting details of a nation's capability than they do to its confidence that the capabilities are enough to underwrite deterrence and to their being consulted in the process.

- Deterrence and extended deterrence are legitimate instruments under international law and are likely to remain so.

D. Start with Where We Are Today

- Concerns about the threats posed by nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism have risen to the level once reserved for nuclear deterrence of great powers.
- Concerns about climate change and dwindling resources support a renewed interest in civilian nuclear power, which introduces the possibility that more nations will hedge against developing future nuclear options.
- Although nuclear deterrence no longer dominates great power politics, it cannot be assumed that such a situation will remain in perpetuity.
- Successful strategies for dealing with nuclear proliferation and terrorism require broad partnerships.
- Deterrence may fail in regional settings; limited use of nuclear weapons is a possibility, and generates different choices than was the case with the Cold War threat of apocalyptic arsenal exchange.
- The United States extends a nuclear deterrent to over 30 countries. Nobody can replace the United States in this role. If the United States were to remove this extended nuclear deterrent, the prospects of more nuclear proliferation would increase.
- For the most part, security partners are less influenced by the technical details of the underlying nuclear capabilities than they are by overall perceptions of America's nuclear posture and of the political will to maintain and use it if necessary.
- Security partners want American forward military presence.
- Security partners watch geopolitical configurations of power carefully, particularly the resolve and ability of the United States to shape the evolution of the world order in a stabilizing fashion, especially with the rise of China.

E. What are The Changing Requirements of Assurance and Extended Deterrence?

- Effective missile defense, developed and deployed to stay ahead of the threat, are increasingly important for dealing with countries like North Korea and Iran.
- Reinvigorating nuclear defense consultation in NATO is needed, as well as finding new modes for deeper defense consultation with security partners like Japan and South Korea.
- The United States needs a new framework for stability analysis that accounts for the complex interplay between strategies of deterrence and coercive diplomacy

- As nuclear arsenals are drawn down and constrained through arms control arrangements, strong technical and geopolitical hedges should be in place, coupled with processes for assessing risks and generating the consensus needed to move quickly to address risks that are becoming especially dangerous. Allies who depend on America's extended nuclear deterrent should be aware of and reassured by American actions in this regard.

Appendix A. Abbreviations

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ABMT	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
AEIO	Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
AKP	Justice and Development Party
ANZUS	America-New Zealand-United States [Treaty]
ASCO	Advanced Systems and Concepts Office
BMDR	Ballistic Missile Defense Review
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CP	Counter-Proliferation
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DC	Defense [Defence] Committee
DoD	Department of Defense
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
END	Extended Nuclear Deterrent
EU	European Union
FMCT	Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IDA	Institute for Defense Analyses
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPR	Nuclear Posture Review

NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
P-5	Permanent [United Nations Security Council] 5
PNI	Presidential Nuclear Initiative
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
ROK	Republic of Korea
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TLAM-N	Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile - Nuclear
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
VNA	Virtual Nuclear Arsenal

Appendix B. **Turkey Workshop¹⁰⁰**

AGENDA

August 27, 2007

8:30 Welcome and Introduction, Brad Roberts, (Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA)

Panel 1: Turkey's Changing Perceptions of its Security Environment

- How have Turkey's perceptions of its security environment evolved since the end of the Cold War? Why?
 - What is the impact of Turkey's changing political demography on these perceptions?
 - How does Turkey's views of its environment differ from and overlap with the views of the United States of that environment?
- How is the security relationship with the United States and NATO perceived in Turkey? Why?
- Speakers:
 - Omer Taspinar (National Defense University)
 - Caroline Ziemke (IDA, commentator)

10:30 *Panel 2: Turkey's Potential Reactions to a Nuclear-armed Iran*

- What might be the impact on Turkish security policies of a continued Iranian progress toward nuclear weapons? Why?
- Speakers:
 - Henri Barkey (Lehigh University)
 - Alex Lennon, (Center for Strategic and International Studies, commentator)

12:30 Buffet lunch

1:00 *Panel 3: Turkey and Extended Deterrence*

- What more can be done to assure Turkey about the viability of the U.S. security guarantee?

¹⁰⁰ Appendices B through G are summaries of discussions from workshop notes.

- How can extended deterrence be sustained and/or strengthened?
 - How have Cold War practices evolved since the end of the Cold War?
 - What can the New Triad, as elaborated in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, contribute to extended deterrence?
 - What are the unique requirements of nuclear weapons to extended deterrence and are they well met, in Turkish eyes?
 - Would new modalities of extended nuclear deterrence be useful? How? Why?
- Speaker:
 - Ian Lesser (German Marshall Fund of the United States)

3:00 *Panel 4: Lessons Learned:*

- What conclusions can be drawn from the discussion about the future of extended nuclear deterrence and Turkey?
- To what extent are these conclusions likely to be applicable to others?
- Presenters:
 - Victor Utgoff (IDA)
 - Lewis Dunn (Science Applications International Corporation, SAIC)
 - Robert Litwak (Woodrow Wilson International Center)

5:00 Close

TURKEY WORKSHOP SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

Key questions:

1. *How are Turkey's perceptions of its security environment changing?*
2. *How might Turkey react to Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons?*
3. *Can U.S. extended deterrence to Turkey be strengthened to help assure Turkey that it does not need an independent nuclear capability of its own?*

How are Turkey's perceptions of its security environment changing?

In the period since the end of Cold War, the changes have been significant.

- Some pre-Cold War problems reemerged:
 - Kurdish question: 200k troops deployed inside Turkey fighting Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK); need to pressure countries helping PKK, especially Syria, and to build strategic relationships with others, especially Israel
 - Political Islam and its potential challenge to the principles of the Turkish Republic and the secular Kemalist vision
- The 1990-91 Gulf War renewed Turkey's concerns with its immediate security environment and the ways in which nearby actors can act helpfully or not on the Kurdish question and political Islam.

- The relationship with Europe continues to be a focus of hope and frustration. Bottom point: 1997 European Union (EU) statements that seemed to settle question (leaving Turkey out). Somewhat more hopeful today. But continued mismatch between Turkish desires and European resistance breeds sense of humiliation.
- New opportunities for rapprochement with some important neighbors:
 - Russia: but depth of rapprochement unclear given 500 years of conflict
 - Iran: neither friend nor foe but rival, mix of cooperation and competition; deep common interest in suppressing PKK (more below)
- Growing controversy about relationship with United States and NATO (more below)

Changing perceptions are driven in part by changes in Turkey's political demography.

- New political forces have emerged that are more conservative and pious. Over decade these forces have become more moderate and pro-EU.
- Many more segments of the political class are involved in discussions of national security strategy and foreign policy than in the past. Public opinion matters more than ever.
- More open Turkish politics have brought out some Turkish political perceptions that have otherwise not been very evident. The public seems not at all informed about Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions, except to the extent that they see U.S. charges as reflections of a more bellicose U.S. strategy more generally.

Security relationship with the United States is increasingly contentious. Indeed, status of bilateral relationship is "grim."

- Iraq war has done significant political damage. 90 percent of Turks polled opposed the war. Turkey now most anti-American of 47 countries surveyed. Very difficult for government to take any pro-American stance.
- Broad perception among security elite: The United States can't be relied on. Iraqi Kurds are main U.S. partner in northern Iraq. Turks are concerned with possibility of an Iraqi "endgame" leading to the emergence of an independent Kurdish state supported by the United States. They are worried also about the renewal of PKK operations against Turkey from inside Iraq. PKK is a Kurdish terrorist group that has waged a guerrilla war in southeast Anatolia that between 1984 and 1999 resulted in 30,000 deaths. In the short term there is the possibility of military action across the border into Iraq and Turkish experts wonder if this would mean direct contact with their ally, the United States.
- Some deep anger about the role cast for Turkey in the Global War on Terror by the neoconservatives: Turkey as the "good Muslims." Notion of "a

- To many Turks, the United States seems uninterested in repairing the relationship in a fit of pique for the parliamentary decision not to support the northern front in Iraq.
- Turkey's leaders have sought rapprochement with Russia, Iran, Syria, and others.

Relationship with NATO is also increasingly tense:

- Deep Turkish frustration over NATO's hesitancy in 1991 and 2003 to extend Article V protections to Turkey
- Resentment that it is expected to host some infrastructure for European Missile Defense but is not included in protection footprint.
- Political class tends to take NATO for granted.
- Military leaders tend to be angry that NATO takes Turkey for granted.
- Resentment that Europe is not interested in Turkey's security problems—which Turkey sees as also Europe's security problems.

Assessment:

- Conditions have not come together to alter Turkey's basic grand strategy choices. But there is a broader discussion of alternatives than there has been since the early years of the modern Turkish Republic.

How might Turkey react to Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons?

Too early to tell: will depend significantly on whether Turkey is successful in EU accession and on the endgame in Iraq.

Primary Turkish concerns:

- Impact on regional balance of power of the emergence of a nuclear Iran. Would reinforce perception that Iran is gaining a power advantage. Turkey sees Iran as a revisionist power willing to use the threat of nuclear weapons not just to deter the United States but to advance its own hegemonic ambitions.
- U.S. military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Would implicate Turkey even if it had no role. Expected results: rapid regional radicalization against the United States and Turkey, a further erosion of the security situation in Iraq, and direct military engagements between U.S. and Iranian paramilitaries.
- Regional repercussions: Turkey expects that overt nuclear acquisition by Iran would drive Israel "out of the basement," leading Egypt to seek nuclear weapons—and then Saudi Arabia.

- EU response: Some Turkish experts calculate that the need to protect Turkey from a nuclear-armed Iran would be used as another excuse not to draw Turkey closer to Europe.
- Energy consequences: Turkey's leaders have sought to improve political and economic relations with Iran, not least in service of Turkish energy needs, which would be put at risk by the need to sanction Iran.
- All of these results would undermine the external stability that Turkey requires for its internal economic, political, and social development.
- All this underscores that Turkey's concerns are primarily political, not military. They see Iranian employment or coercive threats against Turkey as very unlikely. The focus, instead, is on use of nuclear threats to create instability in Shia countries.
- Note: Concerns about a nuclear-armed Iran are at the leadership level—primarily among the military—and not among the public more generally.

Notional response options:

1. Rely on multilateral defense, but stronger: Get missile defense on Turkey's own soil and more modern air power projection capabilities while lobbying the United States to declare the presence on Turkish soil of U.S. nuclear weapons
2. Create an independent nuclear force: Give in to forces of nationalism and xenophobia and seek nuclear weapons on the argument that Turkey, like all great powers, should have nuclear weapons, especially as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) collapses. Appropriate, moreover, for Turkey's return to role as regional balancer, a role that Iraq can no longer play and Egypt is deemed incompetent to play. Observation: Would take a long time as it has so far not embraced nuclear energy and would be very difficult to do secretly.
3. Buy time: Unable perhaps to choose 1 or 2, work the diplomatic angle. Isolate Iran, await regime change there (which is not seen as implausible in Turkey), and engage in regional diplomacy.

Other options that some have discussed:

4. Seek a guarantee from Russia. But Russia is seen as somewhat disingenuous in its relationship with Turkey and in any case not capable of safeguarding Turkey's security.
5. Accommodate Iran. Indeed, court it as a potential ally. But Iran is not generally seen as a reliable state and indeed there is deep suspicion that Iran intends to utilize a nuclear deterrent in ways that would destabilize the region to Turkey's disadvantage.

Observations:

- No consensus among the expert community on which option is most likely.
- Options are not mutually exclusive.
- Not clear how long it would take for Turkey to go nuclear and what relationship they would expect with the United States as they proceed down that pathway.
- Barring some major shock, muddling through seems likely. Potential shocks: an Iranian nuclear test, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is thrown out of Iran, the United States preempts, Iranians discuss doctrine for nuclear targeting of Turkey, a military clash with US-backed Kurdish “state” in northern Iraq.
- Might not expect penalties for nuclear acquisition if international community is ineffective in imposing penalties on Iran and North Korea—and in any case, might anticipate collapse of NPT and entire framework for penalizing proliferators.
- Turkey’s need for energy is increasing greatly and it seems likely to seek nuclear power, which could be pursued with an eye toward developing latent weapons production capabilities.
- EU membership would help consolidate relationship with Europe and lend credibility to existing NATO guarantee. And going nuclear would rule out EU membership.
- Possibility that Japan may be much more important than Iran to Turkey’s future nuclear identity. If Japan leaves the NPT to become a “normal” nuclear power, this will deepen debate in Turkey about what club it should belong to—the underlings of the US or the great powers of the 21st century?

Can U.S. extended deterrence to Turkey be strengthened to help assure Turkey that it does not need an independent nuclear capability of its own?

Context:

- Turkey’s security specialists have not been focused on this problem. But it is beginning to do so. It is seriously concerned about the possibility of a nuclear cascade in the Middle East.
- Concern also about the reassertion of nuclear weapons in Russian military doctrine.
- Historically, NATO’s southern flank presented different problems of credibility from the central front (complex and diffuse as opposed to nuclear coupling *per se*).
- Turkey participates in NATO high-level group, which gives it some relatively unique nuclear roles within the alliance.

- Much more focused on the risk exposure that goes with lining up with the United States on some problem than on the benefits of cooperation. Example: U.S. military preemption of Iran's nuclear program. Partnering in U.S. power projection exposes them to a rising number of risks.
- Greater stake in strategic reassurance than extended deterrence. More concerned with U.S. competence than U.S. capability or credibility. The United States is not seen as doing the right things in Iraq, in the region, in NATO, with Russia but most important of all in understanding and defending Turkey's own security interests.
- On extended deterrence, concerned about the risk exposure that would come with a larger or more overt U.S. posture.

Assessment: Possible to renew the extended deterrent relationship and to put it on a more modern footing, but this requires a broader base of agreement and understanding of how this contributes to reduction of nuclear risks.

Value in beginning a dialogue about what is necessary to assure Turkey that it need not choose an independent nuclear capability of its own and about what is necessary to credibly extend deterrence.

- Strategic U.S.-Turkey dialogue is oft promised and long ignored. Neither the United States nor Turkey seems to know how to put together such a dialogue. Iraq has made it even more difficult to look beyond immediate concerns.
- Efforts to begin a dialogue with a focus on the technical requirements of deterrence are a "turn-off" to Turkey because they suggest that the United States is trying to deploy the New Triad there to protect U.S. interests and is not trying to create military capabilities that protect Turkey's interests.
- NATO's forthcoming revision of its Strategic Concept offers an opportunity for dialogue.

Other implications for the United States:

- First, do no harm. Beware the many actions that could undermine assurance and extended deterrence before trying to take steps to strengthen both.
- Turkey is not the only country relying on U.S. protection.
 - Others will measure the United States by what it does for Turkey.
 - Turkey will be keenly interested in what the United States does for others.
- The most direct impacts on Turkey's nuclear future are indirect:
 - Outcome in Iraq.
 - Iran's progress toward nuclear weapons.
- Understand the differences between capability-credibility and commitment-competence. The latter are far more important than the former to Turkey's confidence in the extended U.S. nuclear guarantee.

- Perceived U.S. commitment to the nonproliferation regime will be an important factor in dialogue with Turkey. At present, that commitment is seen as weak and weakening further.

Some propositions following from the discussion:

Good news:

1. Turkey's leadership and security elites are apparently not urgently concerned with the country's nuclear identity or how to cope with the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran. They are not ready to "tip."
2. There are a lot of *realpolitik* barriers to a Turkish decision to "go nuclear." Doing so would close the door on accession to the European Union, end the relationship with NATO, bring unwelcome economic and energy costs.
3. There appears to be no intense military debate about some key U.S. military capability without which extended deterrence is not viable. The potential exception seems to be missile defense.
4. Even if Turkish leaders were to seek to create a nuclear deterrent of their own, it would be impossible to do so in secret because of the nature of Turkish society and the U.S. presence.

Bad news:

1. Failures of assurance as opposed to extended deterrence are the most likely driver of a Turkish decision to move away from the security relationship with the United States, but there is very little understanding of this problem within the U.S. policy community concerned with extended deterrence. Assertions of URES. escalation, dominance, or praise for the virtues of Reliable Replacement Warhead RRW do not redress concerns about US competence in safeguarding Turkish interests.
2. The Iraq war has deeply aggravated Turkish concerns about U.S. credibility, capability, commitment, and competence. The "endgame" may do even more grievous damage, if the result is a Kurdish state or quasi state that creates new security problems for Turkey.
3. There is a debate coming in Turkey about its nuclear identity and little thinking has been done about how to influence it in ways that deepen the US-Turkey security relationship and enhance the desirability of continued Turkish reliance on an extended US nuclear guarantee.

Appendix C Japan Workshop

AGENDA

February 1, 2008

8:30 welcome and introduction, Brad Roberts

Panel 1: Japan's Changing Perceptions of its Security Environment

- How have Japan's perceptions of its security environment evolved since the end of the Cold War? Why?
- Looking to the future, what new security challenges are anticipated?
- How is the security relationship with the United States perceived in Japan? Why?
- Speakers: Mike Green (Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS) and Jim Delaney (IDA)

10:30 *Panel 2: Japan's Views of Nuclear Weapons*

- What are those views? What are their sources? How might they evolve?
- Speakers: Brad Glosserman (Pacific Forum CSIS) and Sheila Smith (Council on Foreign Relations, CFR)

1:00 *Panel 3: Japan and Extended Deterrence*

- What more can be done to assure Japan about the viability of the U.S. security guarantee?
- How an extended deterrence be sustained and/or strengthened?
 - How have Cold War practices evolved since the end of the Cold War?
 - What can the New Triad, as elaborated in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, contribute to extended deterrence?
 - What are the unique requirements of nuclear weapons to extended deterrence and are they well met, in Japanese eyes?
 - Does assurance require anything different of the U.S. nuclear posture?
 - Would new modalities of extended nuclear deterrence be useful? How?
- Speaker: Elaine Bunn (National Defense University, NDU), Bob Einhorn (CSIS), Paul Giarra (SAIC)

3:00 *Panel 4: Lessons Learned*

- What conclusions can be drawn?
- Are there important distinctions between extending deterrence and extending assurance?
- Are the lessons learned uniquely Japanese or are they more broadly applicable in East Asia and beyond?
- Presenters: Mike Mochizuki (George Washington University, GWU), Dick Samuels (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT), Victor Utgoff (IDA)

JAPAN WORKSHOP SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

Key Questions:

1. *How have Japan's perceptions of its security environment changed since the end of the Cold War?*
2. *How does it view nuclear weapons and nuclear security?*
3. *What more can be done to assure Japan about the viability of the U.S. security guarantee?*

How have Japan's perceptions of its security environment changed since the end of the Cold War?

- The end of the Cold War brought expectations of diminished threats to Japan's security, but it also brought an end to a period in which Japan had to do little thinking about its security environment, given its heavy dependence on the United States.
- The 1990s frustrated some of those expectations and brought a sense of mounting instability:
 - war in the Persian Gulf
 - the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis
 - China's rise and increasingly bellicose tone toward the United States and Japan
 - deepening nuclear troubles with North Korea
 - continuing political difficulties in the relationship with South Korea.
 - At the same time, there was also mounting awareness of the weaknesses of the Japanese government in managing foreign and domestic crises.
- Concerns about developments in Japan's security environment have grown more intense in the current decade. Japan's security is now seen as threatened by North Korea's steady progress in acquiring missiles and nuclear warheads. This threat is framed against the backdrop of continued friction in the relationship with China and China's military, political, and economic rise. Japan's concern is not so much with nuclear attack by either North Korea or

- Domestic factors play an important role in Japanese security perceptions. It is important to distinguish between those in the political elite and government interested in security affairs and the Japanese public more generally. The latter is not generally focused on or concerned about Japan's security environment—or it focuses on a single issue at any given moment. Many elected officials are similarly inclined. The security policy agenda is left largely to the main bureaucratic actors. And they are capable of little more than reactive behavior. Strategic thinking about the security environment is rare in Japan.
- There are significant areas of convergence and divergence in the security perceptions of Japan and the United States.
 - They converge on the key challenges within the East Asian security environment—proliferation in North Korea, China's rise, and the potential for war across the Taiwan Strait.
 - They diverge when it comes to more global problems. Indeed, the United States perceives global challenges and instabilities; Japan's view is primarily regional. The United States invites Japan to a stronger global role; Japan invites the United States to be more effective in meeting the problems in East Asia. The United States perceives China as a “rising power at a strategic crossroads” and a “potential near-peer adversary;” Japan tends to view China more as a curiosity than a threat. The United States perceives a significant threat from militant Islamist extremists; Japan does not.
- Japan's security elite continues to see the United States as its most important security partner. This elite does not see Japan as having realistic options other than reliance on the United States. It looks to the United States to define where the relationship needs to go. It shares the U.S. desire to move the alliance onto a more equitable footing. This desire was already evident in the 1990s, with the restructuring of the alliance and the desire of both partners to tie themselves together more tightly and to modernize the alliance.
- As with other U.S. allies, this elite sometimes fears that Japan will be entrapped in U.S. grand plans and other times that it will be abandoned by the United States. The U.S. invasion of Iraq and subsequent insurgency have brought deepening debate about U.S. strategic direction and whether it accords with long-term Japanese interests.
- Japan's security strategy balances efforts to reduce regional threats, largely through diplomatic and economic means, with efforts to raise its capabilities, largely by drawing closer to the United States.

How does Japan view nuclear weapons and nuclear security?

- The anti-nuclear sentiment runs deep in Japan, for historical reasons, obvious and not, (including exposure of fishing vessels to nuclear test fallout in the 1950s).
- This sentiment has not precluded a strong commitment to civilian applications of nuclear technology, especially for power generation (going back to the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955).
- The 3 non-nuclear principles were first elaborated in 1967 and have been reaffirmed by each subsequent government: non-possession, non-production, and non-introduction of nuclear weapons.
- Prime Minister Sato set out the 4 nuclear principles in 1968 that have guided Japanese policy ever since:
 1. the 3 non-nuclear principles
 2. protection of Japan under the U.S. nuclear umbrella
 3. efforts to promote disarmament
 4. promotion of peaceful use of nuclear energy
- Japan's opposition to possession of an independent nuclear force derives from a hard-nosed realism as well as the nuclear taboo. Official studies conducted in conjunction with entry into force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and again with the NPT extension decision in 1995 set out the key *realpolitik* arguments against an independent nuclear deterrent:
 1. Given its small size and high population density, it would be difficult and imprudent to protect Japan by nuclear means.
 2. A Japanese decision to seek a nuclear deterrent of its own would potentially spark a regional arms race.
 3. Such a decision would also harm the prestige of Japan as a champion of nuclear disarmament (Sato was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974 for his non-nuclear stance).
 4. Such a decision would also threaten the nuclear cooperation agreements with fuel suppliers that enable Japan's power industry.
 5. Such a decision could also accelerate the disintegration of the NPT, "which serves Japan's long-term enlightened interests as a major trading nation that is dependent on global security and stability."
 6. Such a decision would likely lead to a disintegration of the alliance with the United States.
- Japan's scientific and technical communities remain unwilling to be enlisted in the national security project generally and in any nuclear weapons project in particular.
- These factors remain central to leadership thinking about Japan's nuclear options. But they do not preclude rising interest in discussing those options and exploring with the United States the evolving requirements of extended nuclear deterrence in the emerging East Asian security landscape.
- Some additional factors are driving this discussion and the internal Japanese debate about nuclear weapons.

1. Party politics are in flux. There is a marked loss of confidence in traditional approaches to Japan's national interests and, in some quarters, a rising nationalism.
 2. Japan's international status is in flux. Nearly two decades of economic and political stagnation have called into question for many Japan's major power potential. Plus, Japan's desire to join the UN Security Council has brought questions about how important nuclear weapons are for major, "normal" powers.
- The Japanese case for an independent nuclear force might be made along the following lines (in the view of some):
 - The nuclear guarantee from Washington was credible in the Cold War when an attack on one was indeed an attack on all—in the context of global Armageddon—but that era is gone and the kind of limited wars for limited ends under the nuclear shadow that might be imagined today could divide the protector from the protected. Globalization has created such compelling economic interests that perhaps the United States would not retaliate against China for a Chinese nuclear attack on Japan. Is the United States still willing to trade Seattle for Tokyo?
 - The U.S. New Triad of strike and defense tools gives the United States the opportunity to opt out of any conflict between China and Japan—it can protect itself but not Japan. Missile defense can't protect Japan.
 - The United States would be no more willing to jeopardize its relations with Japan if Tokyo chooses nuclear weapons than it proved willing to jeopardize its relationships with Israel, India, and Pakistan. The United States needs Japan.
 - All of the countries that Japan invaded in its imperial past are now nuclear armed.
 - Despite rising interest and rising discussion in Japan and with the United States about Japan's nuclear options, there appears to be essentially no prospect of Japan making a decision to acquire nuclear weapons under the current circumstances.
 - Such a decision would require a huge rupture in the U.S.-Japan alliance. This seems possible only as a result of choices made in Washington, not Tokyo.
 - It would also require that Japanese leaders somehow convince themselves that they could manage the transition period successfully. This period could take as long as a decade, if not longer

What more can be done to assure Japan about the viability of the U.S. security guarantee?

- Dialogue about extended deterrence helps. The quality of the bilateral dialogue at the official level has improved measurably over the last couple of years. Japanese participants are better informed and more thoughtful and now help set the agenda.

- Formal consultations about U.S. security policy and strategy in the region also help. Concerns about the credibility of U.S. guarantees spiked with concerns about the George W. Bush administration's alleged "appeasement" of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Dealing with China's economic, political, and military rise is equally important as a focus of bilateral consultations.
- This agenda should be expanded to encompass a broad range of strategic questions in the region and beyond and should be enriched by scenario-based explorations at the cabinet level.
- As a general matter, such political signals are far more important than the technical forms of cooperation on extended deterrence.
 - Re-deployments of nuclear weapons into the region might be helpful for deterrence in crisis but in peacetime probably work against the requirements of assurance of an anti-nuclear Japan.
 - NATO has planned and exercised joint nuclear operations. These would not be helpful in the U.S.-Japan context.
 - NATO also created the Nuclear Planning Group, which plays an important role in enabling consultations while also demonstrating to European publics that their leaders participate in decision-making on these crucial matters. An "NPG-lite" might be helpful in the U.S.-Japan relationship.

At present, there are no Japanese institutions to pick up any such dialogue.
- There is very little evidence that technical attributes of the U.S. nuclear strike force matter to Japan's sense of assurance. There is some evidence, however, that U.S. concerns about the viability and credibility of its own deterrent have been heard in Tokyo and generated Japanese concerns that were not previously articulated.
- There is more evidence that the technical attributes of the missile defense shield matter significantly. Japan wants protection. And it wants full defense integration, even if it may not be entirely clear what that might ultimately involve.
- There is clear evidence of rising Japanese interest in independent non-nuclear strategic strike capabilities. An improved Japanese capability to act unilaterally and preemptively is not self-evidently in the U.S. national interest.
- U.S. assurance strategies must address public perceptions in Japan in addition to governmental concerns expressed behind closed doors. Mounting public unease about the United States as a competent guarantor of Japanese national security interests needs to be addressed.
- Whatever choices the United States makes to strengthen assurance of Japan, it will be setting precedents that other allies and friends will watch carefully.

Some propositions following the discussion:

Good news:

1. Assurance of Japan in the new security environment seems not to require of the United States much that is new and different. Dialogue, formal consultation, and coordinated defense planning are the mainstays of assurance.
2. Japan's emerging dialogue about nuclear weapons is fundamentally a dialogue about nuclear security and the future requirements of stability and about having a dialogue about Japan's nuclear options and it is not fundamentally a dialogue about the nuclear option *per se*.
3. The spike of Japanese anxiety about U.S. competence as a guarantor of its security that followed the autumn 2007 nuclear deal with North Korea (which generated claims of "appeasement" and "sell out") seems to have attenuated rapidly, revealing the bedrock of political commitment underpinning the bilateral relationship.

Bad news:

1. Although the current focus is on how the United States assures Japan, there is a reverse question: how Japan assures the United States. Political divisions in Japan are severe and its political paralysis is deeply rooted, putting its capacity to meet U.S. expectations is into question.
2. U.S. policy is behind the curve. Japan is setting the agenda for dialogue on these matters, as the demandeur. The United States needs to respond effectively and thoroughly. More than that, it needs to claim that assurance agenda as its own, because this relationship is vital to U.S. interests.
3. The evolving U.S. strategic military posture must be tailored for the purposes of assuring Japan, something that requires balancing also with the requirements of dissuading China and deterrence of North Korea and China in the Taiwan Strait. No one seems to know how to do this.
4. The U.S. reputation as a guarantor of Japan's interests is shaped by U.S. global behaviors, not just those in East Asia, and the outcome of the war in Iraq (and Afghanistan) may yet have a significant impact on the desire of Japan to closely align itself with the United States.

Appendix D. Australia Workshop

September 22, 2009

[Note: there is no agenda for this workshop. It was conducted as an informal two-hour seminar to take advantage of the fact that Dr. Rod Lyon, program director for strategy at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute of Canberra, was visiting Washington and was available for the discussion.]

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

- Australia generally perceives major changes in its security environment
 - Multiple powers rising and strategic rivalries taking on new forms.
 - Asia becoming less Western.
 - Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) states may emerge that are not status quo powers nor self-deterred.
- Here, as elsewhere, there are a multiplicity of views:
 - Some see U.S. extended deterrence as very important for the security of Australia and the stability of Asia, and see the United States as having the means to extend deterrence credibly.
 - Others see it as important but not particularly credible. “China has it right” – the United States cannot credibly threaten to trade Los Angeles for Taipei.
 - Others see it as not relevant because nuclear weapons are unusable.
- A more broadly shared perception: U.S. extended deterrence is a global factor and what happens anywhere impacts everywhere

Appendix E.

Middle East Workshop

AGENDA

January 23, 2009

8:30 Welcome and Introduction, Brad Roberts (Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA) and Mike Wheeler (Defense Threat Reduction Agency)

8:45 *Panel 1: Changing Security Perceptions in the Region*

- How do key U.S. allies and friends in the region perceive their evolving security environment?
- How might they react to the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran?
- How do they think about the possible future evolution of their security relationship with the United States?

Speakers:

- Egypt: Steve Cook, (Council on Foreign Relations)
- Saudi Arabia: Joe McMillan, (National Defense University)
- Israel: Avner Cohen (United States Institute of Peace)
- Others: Ellen Laipson (Stimson Center)

1:00 *Panel 2: On Strengthening Extended Deterrence*

- What more, if anything, can be done to assure U.S. commitment, credibility, and competence as a guarantor?
 - Are new forms of U.S. extended deterrence possible?
 - Might others seek to extend deterrence into the region?
 - Do regional actors perceive critical gaps in U.S. power projection and other deterrence capabilities?

Speakers: Elbridge Colby (RAND Corporation) and Victor Utgoff (IDA)

3:00 *Panel 3: Lessons Learned*

- What conclusions can be drawn?
- Are there important distinctions between extending deterrence and extending assurance?

Presenter: Robert Litwak (Woodrow Wilson International Center)

5:00 pm Close

MIDDLE EAST WORKSHOP SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

Key question: What more might the United States and its security partners do to utilize security guarantees, political assurances, and the other tools of extended deterrence to help mitigate nuclear proliferation pressures in the Middle East?

Subsidiary questions:

1. What are the security perceptions of states in the region that are or might be the beneficiaries of such guarantees?
 - How do key U.S. allies and friends in the region perceive their evolving security environments?
 - How might they react to the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran?
 - How do they think about the possible future evolution of their security relationship with the United States?
2. How might extended deterrence be strengthened?
 - What more, if anything, can be done to assure U.S. commitment, credibility, and competence as a guarantor?
 - Are new forms of U.S. extended deterrence possible?
 - Might others seek to extend deterrence into the region?
 - Do regional actors perceive critical gaps in U.S. power projection and other deterrence capabilities?

Discussion proceeded on a not for attribution basis and the summaries below are simply snapshots of more complex points made in a long day of discussion.

How do key U.S. allies and friends in the region perceive their evolving security environments?

First, who are we talking about?

- Countries with which the United States has a strong security relationship: Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia—and Iraq. Note that Turkey was the focus of a prior session in this workshop series.
- Countries with which the United States has had more episodic connections: the Gulf states.
- Countries with which new forms of secure relations might become possible: Syria.

Key perceptions of countries with a strong relationship with the United States:

1. The security environment is seen as increasingly dynamic and uncertain, with strong interconnections of domestic and external factors.
2. Iran's rise is a source of anxiety.

3. Doubts about the ability and wisdom of the United States to use its power constructively in the region are on the rise.

On dynamism and uncertainty:

- Egypt: Domestic factors play a central role, with the end of the presidency of Hosni Mubarak looming. Externally, Egypt sees its claim to leadership of Arab cause as increasingly challenged by others and is sensitive to the criticism that it has forsaken this cause for the benefits of relations with the United States and Israel.
- Saudi Arabia: In a “state of nervousness.” Reluctant to be provocative. Unwilling to do what the United States considers “enough” in region. Iran’s rise, Iraq’s weakness, on-going Islamic revolution, doubts about the United States. Internal/external linkages here too.
- Israel: Emergence of a nuclear Iran would erase Israel’s nuclear monopoly and usher in a radically different bipolar order and then perhaps also a multipolar Middle East. This would likely have a direct impact on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and on U. S.-Israeli relations.
- General: The region will be buffeted by changes in the global economy, shifting energy demands, the rise of nuclear energy, and continued competition for leadership of the Arab world and of the Islamic revolution. The United States no longer seen as the leading “shaper” of the forces buffeting the region.

On Iran’s rise:

- Egypt: Describes an “Iranian moment in the region” and is concerned about Iranian influence domestically despite the fact that only 1 percent of its population is Shia.
- Saudi Arabia: Iran as a key rival. Concerned about prospect of Iranian hegemony and also intensified competition for leadership of the Islamic revolution. With 10-15 percent of its population is Shia, worried also about internal Iranian influence. Leadership opposes a nuclear Iran, though public is much more sympathetic to the argument that Muslims are restoring nuclear balance against U.S./Jewish forces.
- Israel: Sees a nuclear Iran as an existential threat. “A distinct and fundamentally different problem.” Iran seen as seeking not simply power, prestige, and hegemony but instead seeking to end the existence of the Jewish state. Overt hostility to legitimacy of Israel.
- General: A widespread perception of rising nuclear danger and deepening anxiety.

On doubts about the United States:

- Egypt: Doubts about U.S. competence in managing its own interests in the region, to say nothing of Egypt’s. Sees the United States as having unleashed

- Saudi Arabia: Fear that U.S. agenda will overwhelm their own and then leave them in the lurch. Sharply criticizes the United States for Iraq war; the United States seen as having unleashed forces it does not understand and promoting sectarianism. Also sees the United States as mishandling Israel and Iran. Like Egypt, rejects use of force by the United States to deal with Iran.
- Israel: Relationship remains strong. It has depended on high-level political statements from the United States, and not on formal treaties, reflecting U.S. positive and negative assurances.
- General: Power in the region is seen as shifting—away from the United States. Mounting criticism of U.S performance in the region, with doubts expressed at high levels about U.S. wisdom and even its rationality. The economic crisis has only magnified the perception of a shifting power balance. Perceptions of both U.S. reliability and capacity “are on the table.” Grievances are deep and the new U.S. administration will not find it easy or perhaps even possible to restore the United States to its prior standing.
- Credibility of U.S. claims about Iran’s nuclear ambitions impaired by the record on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

How might these countries react to the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran?

- Egypt: The answer would depend on how Israel responds. If Israel brings its “bomb out of the basement,” so to speak, then the pressure on Egypt to respond in some fashion would increase. Evidence is ambiguous about the degree to which Egypt actively hedges against this possibility.
- Saudi: Unlikely to seek nuclear weapons of its own and have not hedged against possible need to develop weapons of its own, though the nature of their relationship to the Pakistani weapons program remains uncertain and might be pursued as a “quick fix” in extremis. Any possible interest in nuclear weapons would likely arise not from a desire for prestige but for legitimacy—as the defender of the holy sites amidst a proliferating Middle East.
- Israel: Remains a near taboo subject—concern that talking about it may make it more likely. Key issue would be degree of Iranian opacity. Overt deployment of a small nuclear force would likely lead to modifying its posture, by ending its policy of opacity, and to seeking stronger guarantees from the United States. A more opaque Iranian posture might be even more difficult for Israel to manage, as it would invite questions about how to strengthen deterrence without ending opacity. This is a concern particularly if some “grand bargain” is achieved that leaves Iran with a high degree of latent capability and limited transparency obligations. A nuclear test by Iran could trigger this debate but Israel would not end opacity without international dialogue and especially assurances to Arab neighbors.
- General: Arabs have absorbed a lot of humiliation and are adept at making incremental adjustments and rationalizing passivity. May simply be bracing

How do they think about the possible future evolution of their security relationship with the United States?

- Egypt: Sees no alternative to a security relationship with the United States but often wishes there were one.
- Saudi: Foresees no condition under which U.S. military forces would be redeployed to Saudi territory, as many view the 13-year presence begun in 1991 as a mistake. Cannot lay claim to role as defender of holy places if it need outside help. U.S.-Israeli relationship means U.S.-Saudi relationship cannot become much deeper.
- Israel: Israel has an independent deterrent in part because in an earlier period it could not accept U.S. guarantees as viable. But it also looks to the United States to help strengthen deterrence in the region—especially of a nuclear-armed Iran. Reluctant to discuss prematurely as doing so may make a deal with Iran less likely. “Israeli thinking about extended U.S nuclear deterrence remains primitive.”

What are the security perceptions of other states in the region that might become important from the perspective of extended U.S. deterrence and assurance?

- Syria: As elsewhere in region, security perceptions informed by both external and internal factors, with regime survival closely linked in the elite mind to national security. Desires to be seen as a responsible actor in region and tired of being seen as an Iranian sidekick. Shared fear of Saddam no longer binds Syria and Iran. Also seeks to play a leadership role in Arab world.
- Gulf states: Currently diversifying their security relationships, with new linkages to Pakistan and China among others. See security as closely intertwined with their role in the global economy and only loosely connected to regional factors, although there is deep anxiety about a nuclear Iran. Eager not to be seen as passive. Fear abandonment by the United States as it “falls in love again” with Iran.
- Iraq: Sovereign again, trying to prove it is not a client state. Symmetry but not alignment with the United States. Its future WMD identity is back on the table. Need for U.S.-led dialogue on nuclear security.

Additional question: Who thinks about these questions in these countries?

- In general, national security elites are small and their concerns are closely associated with regime survival. Most elites think little, if at all, about nuclear issues. In rare cases, such as Israel, analytic inputs are made by idea-

What more, if anything, can be done to assure U.S. commitment, credibility, and competence as a guarantor?

- The new administration has a window of opportunity to define a new approach to the region. But that window may not remain open long, and may well close before the end of 2009. Moreover, many of the factors undermining the U.S. role in the region are structural in nature and cannot be un-done simply by bringing in a new leadership team and policy agenda.
- Iraq is central to this question. Untimely withdrawal from Iraq would have significant negative repercussions in the region on perceptions of U.S. commitment and competence.
- Perceptions are also informed by how the United States deals with challenges outside the region. Many inside the region believe it is showing a great deal of deference to North Korea simply because of its nuclear weapons capabilities, and thus anticipate U.S. deference to a nuclear-armed Iran. Repeated U.S. efforts to draw the proverbial line in the sand (“this is unacceptable”) and then to accept that which was deemed unacceptable have greatly undermined U.S. credibility.
- The de-coupling problem will grow more severe as long-range delivery systems proliferate in the region. The United States is not likely to be seen to be willing to trade Chicago for Riyadh, so to speak. Missile defenses may help but may also not eliminate this problem. And indeed, it is difficult to expect that the Congress and American public would warmly embrace the acceptance of new nuclear risks for the defense of interests that seem so far away and murky. In general, the United States is not seen in the region as willing to run significant risks for local regimes.
- Specifically on U.S. credibility in deterring Iran. Views expressed in region:
 - “Iran is winning so why should we side with you?”
 - “If you won’t stand up to a non-nuclear Iran, why would you stand up to a nuclear Iran?”
 - “Iran anticipates U.S. deterrence strategies and obviously doesn’t worry much about them, as they have an asymmetric approach that is working well for them.”

Are new forms of U.S. extended deterrence possible?

- There is a continuum of ways to implement extended deterrence. At one end is NATO, where extended deterrence is built on the foundations of shared capabilities and responsibilities for planning, exercising, and operations. Other forms include commitments without those particulars, for example in East Asia.

- Alliance is one way to extend U.S. guarantees, but only one. U.S. values alliances in confronting nuclear challengers because “it does not want to be the world’s nuclear executor.” In NATO history, all states participated in one way or another in sharing the responsibility for nuclear use.
- Alliances with states with nuclear weapons of their own can present special complications and might be dangerous for the United States.
- Alliances can be explicit or implicit, the latter built simply on shared interests in crisis.
- The United States could try to build an informal coalition of states aimed at the containment of a nuclear Iran. Its foundation would be a commitment by the United States to deny any potential gains to Iran by its use of nuclear weapons. The United States might have to make a promise to Iran to end its efforts to promote regime change, as an assurance aimed at trying to stop their provocative behaviors. Would require a supporting architecture of capabilities and exercises, including both offensive and defensive capabilities (i.e., strike systems and missile defenses). Leading such an effort could help burnish the U.S. reputation for competence.
- Historical formulation of U.S. “assurance:” ‘This is an area of vital concern to the United States and any threat to U.S interests there is of the highest U.S. concern.’ From presidents Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Jimmy Carter.
- As a matter of strategic culture in the Arab world, treaties are not given much credit, as the historical record strongly implies that they are but promises to be broken at a later moment of convenience. Hence the emphasis on relationships and personal commitments rather than formal security structures.
- Not alliances but declaratory policy: recall presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s threat to punish Iran for any nuclear attack.
- Options for strengthening extended deterrence to Israel: a deal like that between the United States and India allowing access to advanced nuclear technologies.
- Israelis very reluctant to discuss modalities, scenarios, etc. But some see the discussion as becoming unavoidable. Key issue would be how the United States can supplement a deterrence strategy built on Israeli opacity and concern that too explicit a U.S. guarantee might undermine the credibility of Israeli strategy.
- As part of a “grand bargain,” the United States may end up making specific assurances to Iran.
- Country experts were generally skeptical of the notion of a regional architecture aimed at containing Iran through extended deterrence commitments.
 - “This whole conversation is bizarre.”
 - “The NATO and East Asian models are simply wrong for this region.”
 - “In this region the proposition that the enemy of our enemy is our friend simply doesn’t hold.”
- Historically the United States has not sought or welcomed the participation of local militaries in U.S. military operations.

- Fundamental underlying question: Is the Iranian leadership deterrable? Two camps: Yes, they are rational and focused on state interests and nuclearization will make them even more deterrable. No, they have a different value structure and are “ignorant miscalculators with a strong risk-taking propensity.”
- Important to speculate about the potential impact of the renewed commitment to nuclear abolition on the ways in which actors in the region may define their options. If the U.S. role as an extender of nuclear deterrence becomes a kind of taboo, states in the region will define other options more aggressively.

Might others seek to extend deterrence into the region?

- Pakistan’s role as a possible extender of deterrence is much debated but very unclear. Some believe that it has already made formal or informal promises to Saudi Arabia; others dispute this assertion. Some in Pakistan speak openly about the value of a Sunni bomb in protecting Sunnis more generally.
- France’s latest white paper intimates a possible role for France in safeguarding the small states in the Persian Gulf.
- The United States may find that it has willing partners rather than contenders for the guarantor role, as for example on the UN Security Council and within NATO.
- NATO allies are in fact U.S. competitors in the region for influence and access.

Do regional actors perceive critical gaps in U.S. power projection and other deterrence capabilities?

- U.S. security partners trust the United States to get the technical aspects of power projection right. They do not pay attention to the concerns of the U.S. expert community about capability gaps.
- It’s not U.S. capability but U.S. will that’s in doubt.

Closing Observations

- Historically speaking, Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons proved not to be catalytic to broader proliferation in the region. This should undermine the ready assumption that we are at a nuclear tipping point in the region, driven this time by Iran.
- The bases of past restraint were both domestic and international. The United States pursued tailored strategies for specific countries in the context of a broad global effort to inhibit proliferation. Such mixed strategies remain relevant.
- At the very least, Iran’s ambitions are fueling much more hedging than in the past. The rise of nuclear energy in the region will be a critical factor. The

- Options for regional actors, generally:
 - Acquiesce to Iranian nuclearization (easier if Iran stops just short)
 - Balance (through reassurances from the United States or others)
 - Bandwagon (cut a deal with Tehran)
 - Create an independent deterrent
- Options for Israel, specifically:
 - Revisit policy of nuclear opacity
 - Prevent Iran from going nuclear (military or diplomatic action)
- The U.S. analytical community is divided over whether extended deterrence and assurance by the United States can make a substantially positive contribution to the mitigation of future proliferation pressures.
 - Some see extended deterrence as remaining highly valuable, but extended nuclear deterrence of limited utility and potentially counterproductive if pursued overtly.
 - Some see extended deterrence as a generally wasting asset, of limited help in a few cases like Israel but of limited and declining utility, given the changing nature of the “target base.”

Some expect that the emergence of a more stark Iranian nuclear threat will affect such assessments, and lead many to face more difficult choices about how to secure their interests. This may lead to significant departures in historical patterns of behavior, perhaps in the direction of closer security relations with the United States but perhaps in other directions.

Appendix F.

Europe Workshop

AGENDA

February 6, 2009

- 8:30 Welcome and Introduction, Brad Roberts (IDA)
- 8:45 *Panel 1: Changing Security Perceptions in the Region*
- *Cold War allies in a new world:* How do NATO's original members perceive the key features of the emerging security environment and with what implications for their views on the requirements of extended deterrence and NATO's nuclear posture?
 - Speaker: Robert Nurick (Monterey Institute of International Studies)
 - *NATO's new members:* How do their perspectives differ? Do they perceive critical or emerging gaps in the U.S. strategic deterrent? What impact has Russia's invasion of Georgia had on these matters?
 - Speaker: David Yost (Naval Postgraduate School)
 - *NATO's prospective members:* How do they assess the viability of existing or prospective security guarantees from the United States and/or NATO? To what extent do they require—or reject—explicit roles for nuclear weapons and missile defense in their protection?
 - Speaker: Steve Pifer (Brookings Institution)
- 1:00 *Panel 2: On Strengthening Extended Deterrence*
- What more, if anything, can be done to assure U.S. commitment, credibility, and competence as a guarantor?
 - Are new forms of U.S. extended deterrence possible?
 - Speakers: J.D. Crouch (National Institute for Public Policy) and Baker Spring (Heritage)
- 3:00 *Panel 3: Lessons Learned*
- What conclusions can be drawn?
 - Are there important distinctions between extending deterrence and extending assurance?
 - Presenters: Lewis Dunn (Science Applications International Corporation, SAIC) and Frank Miller (Cohen Group)
- 5:00 pm Close

EUROPE WORKSHOP SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

Key question: How are the requirements of U.S. extended deterrence and assurance in Europe evolving as NATO expands and as its security environment changes?

Subsidiary questions:

1. How do NATO's original members perceive the key features of the emerging security environment and with what implications for their views of the requirements of extended deterrence and NATO's nuclear posture?
2. How do the perspectives of NATO's new members differ? Do they perceive critical or emerging gaps in the U.S. strategic deterrent? What impact has Russia's invasion of Georgia had on these matters?
3. How do NATO's prospective members assess the viability of existing or prospective security guarantees from the United States and/or NATO? To what extent do they require or reject explicit roles for nuclear weapons and missile defense in their protection?
4. What more, if anything, can be done to assure U.S. commitment, credibility, and competence as a guarantor? Are new forms of U.S. extended deterrence possible?

Discussion proceeded on a not for attribution basis and the summaries reported below are simply snapshots of more complex points made in a long day of discussion.

How do NATO's original members perceive the emerging security environment and with what implications for their views of the requirements of extended deterrence and NATO's nuclear posture?

On general security perceptions:

- As a general matter, all of NATO's members are less concerned about the risks of nuclear war than during the Cold War. Threat perceptions have significantly eased and even those within the alliance concerned about the nuclear modernization program of Russia or the potential nuclear tipping point in the Middle East do not see these as Cold War vintage in character.
- Some of NATO's core original members—and not just Turkey perceive a rising nuclear threat from Iran. There is some debate about whether and to what degree a cascade of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East would present a direct threat to Europe. There is also some debate about whether an attack on one NATO member by a nuclear state in the Middle East could be understood as an attack on all.
- In national capitals—even in Washington, nuclear threats and nuclear strategy generate relatively little interest in comparison to days past. There is little focus on questions of extended deterrence and little strategic thinking.
 - Different ministries sometimes hold starkly different positions.

- Parliamentary discussion of nuclear policy focuses on the opportunities for nonproliferation and disarmament and the upcoming 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference and not on deterrence.
- Leaders profess a commitment to nuclear deterrence at the lowest possible numbers without any specific discussion of the requirements that would lead to a specific posture.
- As a general proposition, there is more emphasis on what to jettison than what to keep.
- Sometimes what is said publicly differs substantially from what is said privately.
- NATO also reflects relatively little strategic thinking, with its focus on operations in Afghanistan. It has made a series of “anodyne” public statements on nuclear policy (in the words of one participant). Looking ahead to the next year or two, NATO will be working to revise its Strategic Concept and this will drive discussion of threat perceptions and deterrence. NATO is an institution with a strong instinct for continuity. The fault-lines within NATO on these matters seem less about nuclear policy than about Russia policy.
- On perceptions of U.S. credibility and competence as a guarantor: the economic crisis has seriously undermined the U.S. leadership reputation just at the moment when some renewal of reputation seemed possible with the political transition in Washington.

On deterrence:

- The most visible commitments to nuclear deterrence as a continuing priority in a changing world are in the United Kingdom and France, which are both modernizing their nuclear forces, while at the same time emphasizing the opportunities for more ambitious nonproliferation and arms control efforts.
- Germany is at the other extreme, where there is broad political and public interest in reducing dependence on nuclear weapons and some high-level political attention to removing U.S. forward-deployed systems.
- Others among NATO’s core original membership are sympathetic to the desire to withdraw forward-deployed systems but resist raising questions about the nature of the U.S. commitment and handing Russia a divisive issue within NATO. Others see U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons as part of the problem and contend that it is important to withdraw whether or not Russia agrees to limits on its tactical weapons.
- Still others among NATO’s core original membership strongly desire to retain forward-deployed systems and quietly debate whether their NATO partners would stand by them in a time of nuclear crisis between, for example, Turkey and Iran.
- Countries that participate in NATO nuclear sharing have so far chosen to lay low in the public discussion of NATO nuclear strategy, on the assumption that they have little to gain and much to lose by engaging publicly.

- On missile defense, NATO and many of its members are supportive in principle. But they are unhappy about many of the details and the lack of adequate consultation.

How do the perspectives of NATO's new members differ? Do they perceive critical or emerging gaps in the U.S. strategic deterrent? What impact has Russia's invasion of Georgia had on these matters?

On security perceptions:

- Over the last decade, 10 countries in Central and Eastern Europe have joined NATO. They exhibit a range of views of the security environment and extended deterrence. But there are also some important agreements among them and these stand in stark contrast to many of the views of the traditional core membership.
- They are largely similar in their view that joining NATO was important because of the collective defense principle. NATO's current focus on operations in Afghanistan and apparent loss of focus on collective defense is disturbing to them. They want to see the alliance doing much more to take their security concerns seriously and to prepare and exercise the capabilities that would be needed if defensive action is ever called for.
- On the gravity of the requirements of security and the necessity for a strong U.S. nuclear guarantee, the most concerned are Poland and the three Baltic states. The least concerned is Slovenia.
- They are also generally more confident in the United States than in other NATO allies. They have ruled out counting on Britain and France as extenders of a viable nuclear guarantee. History informs these views. They remember the sell-out at Munich in 1938 and perceive that they are being condescended to by some in NATO's traditional core. They blame Russia for the war in Georgia last summer, whereas many in NATO's traditional core blame the United States for its mishandling of events leading up to the war.
- They are deeply distrustful of Russia, given the long history of prior conquests, partition, suppression, and communist rule. Over 10 percent of the population of the Baltic states was killed or deported in Soviet times.
- They feel a stronger need for U.S. reassurance than others in the alliance. As one leader has argued, "the reasons for NATO have returned."
- These new allies are willing to take big steps to bolster the U.S. commitment to collective defense. This includes participating in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and hosting NATO and U.S. facilities on their territories. They see such steps as useful for demonstrating their reliability to the United States.
- They seem not at all motivated by the prospect of a nuclear threat from Iran or the feared "nuclear tipping point" in the Middle East. They support the "third site" for missile defense largely in order to demonstrate reliability. They would see a decision by the Obama administration to "trade away" that site in

On nuclear deterrence:

- The views of these new allies are shaped by NATO's promises at the time of the accession of the first group. According to the commitment from the final communiqué of the December 1996 meeting of the North Atlantic Council:
 - We reaffirm that the nuclear forces of the Allies will continue to play a unique and essential role in the Alliance's strategy of war prevention. New members, who will be full members of the Alliance in all respects, will be expected to support the concept of deterrence and the essential role nuclear weapons play in the Alliance's strategy. Enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in NATO's current nuclear posture, and therefore, *NATO countries have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members* nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy—and we do not foresee any future need to do so.
- On NATO's debate about nuclear sharing and the possible withdrawal of forward-deployed U.S. nuclear systems, they tend to see such steps as potentially destabilizing and disruptive to alliance cohesion. They would interpret unilateral steps by the United States to withdraw these forces as signaling U.S. disengagement and a declining political commitment to them. They define the nuclear guarantee as essential to both keeping the United States engaged in Europe and underwriting the principle of collective defense in a nuclear world.
- The Daalder/Lodal *Foreign Affairs* essay on nuclear abolition was poorly received by elites in these states as possibly foreshadowing a weakening of the U.S. commitment to extended nuclear deterrence in the Obama administration.
- On missile defense and the third site, these countries tend to see Russia's opposition as trumped up and political, largely as a symptom of Russia's continued grievance about NATO expansion, and not based in any serious technical appraisal of the threat to Russia's deterrent posed by NATO's missile defense project.

How do NATO's prospective members assess the viability of existing or prospective security guarantees from the United States and/or NATO. To what extent do they require or reject explicit roles for nuclear weapons and missile defense in their protection?

General observation:

- These questions are somewhat less relevant today than a year ago, as the prospects seem to have receded of either Ukraine or Georgia joining NATO anytime soon. This has to do with the vehemence of Russia's objections and with political turmoil in these countries.

Ukraine:

- Ukraine is already a recipient of assurances. As part of its commitment to join the NPT as a non-nuclear state in 1994 (and thereby relinquish nuclear assets of the former Soviet Union), it accepted assurances from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia, as endorsed separately by France and China, in the so-called Budapest Memorandum. In those assurances, they committed themselves formally to the security of Ukraine and promised to seek action by the United Nations Security Council in the event Ukraine is attacked.
- Today there is very little thinking in Ukraine about deterrence or strategic issues more generally, as it is focused on domestic issues and the political and economic relationship with Russia.
- There is a mix of views in Ukraine on NATO. Ironically, cooperative activities with NATO have advanced most clearly at times when Ukraine has been led by individuals opposed to membership. The membership action plan is highly contentious. Internal debate is more about how to engage with the West than about expressing anti-Russian views. The challenge from Russia is seen as mostly political and economic, not military.
- On nuclear issues, most in Ukraine who think about these matters want to see the rest of the world follow Ukraine's lead in abandoning such weapons. Their anti-nuclear views are also shaped by strong memories of the Chernobyl accident. Some want an explicit NATO and U.S. umbrella but others see any steps in that direction as generating conflicts that don't serve Ukraine's interests.
- On missile defense, Ukraine might be willing to participate in a cooperative system but only if Russia also cooperates.

Georgia:

- In Georgia, there is strong public support for NATO largely because Russia is clearly seen as a threat. Georgians widely desire the collective defense commitment and extended deterrence benefits of NATO membership. Like many of NATO's new members, they express more confidence in the United States than in Europe. But the leadership seems not to have thought through the mechanisms and implications of NATO membership.

Additional observations:

- NATO's traditional core members recognize the need to more effectively assure NATO's new members. This is in part because they share some of the concerns about Russia, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. They want to assure those new members without antagonizing Russia and thereby driving Russia further away from partnership with NATO.
- The alliance's success or failure in Afghanistan will have a huge impact on its future cohesion and also on its relationship with Russia. Its credibility is at stake.

- Many Europeans answer American nuclear questions by saying what they think the United States wants to hear. They will reflect back what they perceive to be U.S. priorities. But elites in many countries express private concerns about NATO's future if the nuclear sharing agreements end and U.S. nuclear forces are withdrawn. There is an underlying fear that future crises might show the allies to be un-committed to the principle of collective defense and thus also untrustworthy.
- In the European debate about nuclear abolition, almost no one sees any prospect of Russian agreement to abandon its nuclear deterrent for decades or longer. Russia's perception of inferiority will not be wiped away by a dose of energy-financed military modernization—because factors of demography and economy work against it ever restoring a big conventional military force.
- A U.S.-Russian agreement to much deeper nuclear reductions, say for example to 1000, would raise significant questions within NATO about the continued credibility of extended deterrence. If there were no steps to include Russia's tactical nuclear weapons in that total number, many in NATO would conclude that the United States had in fact abandoned the second-to-none principle. And if the reductions are implemented in a way that removes forward deployed and/or forward-deployable systems, some in NATO would resist them strongly even as they support the principle of nuclear de-emphasis.

What more, if anything, can be done to assure U.S. commitment, credibility, and competence as a guarantor? Are new forms of U.S. extended deterrence possible?

On assurance:

- Extended assurance is the flip side of extended deterrence. The latter involves getting inside the mind of an enemy, whereas the former involves getting inside the mind of a friend and convincing him that you will use all means at your disposal, and even put your own vital interests at risk, to defend him.
- Within the U.S. policy community, there is a sharp divergence over which audience is the most important to address in U.S. policy and public statements—allies or adversaries.
- Accordingly, there is also a sharp divergence about how to signal the commitment to de-emphasis and future abolition. Some interpret that commitment in a positive light and as promising for future nonproliferation. But others interpret it in a negative light and anticipate further U.S., disengagement from Europe, the end of collective defense there, and a return to prior damaging patterns of competition, but this time with a dose of nuclear competition as well.
- The abolition debate is important because it provides an opportunity to reexamine some fundamental questions at a time when NATO is redrafting its Strategic Concept. It will unfold at a time of renewed DoD commitment, following the Schlesinger Panel Report on DoD's performance of its nuclear mission, to show renewed good stewardship of the deterrent.

- Nuclear weapons are something that the United States uses all of the time for signaling—and not merely some “recessed deterrent” that might be re-used in some future crisis. Allies care a lot about alliance and US. nuclear policy, strategy, and capabilities, and changes to them would be heatedly debated because they would bring out a wide variety of strongly held views within the alliance.
- Assurance flows from deterrence and if the deterrent is not credible there can be no assurance. The weapons themselves have an almost talismanic quality and are seen as far more political than military. Advanced conventional weapons cannot substitute for these roles. Nor can French and British nuclear weapons, which are not generally seen in Europe as bound to the principle of collective defense.
- In engaging with Russia in a high-profile and high-priority renewal of arms control, the Obama administration must recognize the ways in which arms control choices will affect European security interests. It should consult closely along the way. This entails much more than prior notification of agreements about to be announced.
- Whatever choices the United States and NATO make in Europe about extended deterrence will have an impact in other regions of the world. This is especially true of Japan, which watches the NATO debate for what it implies about the U.S. commitment to its nuclear umbrella more generally. Whatever choices the United States and NATO make about strategic stability with Russia, Japan and China will both be watching for what this implies about accommodating rising powers.

On strengthening deterrence:

- Missile defenses can play a stronger role in NATO’s overall deterrent posture and there is a moral logic for reducing reliance on deterrence based on the threat of nuclear retaliation. But it may prove more costly than the alliance can bear.
- On the possibility of replacing in theater NATO systems with over-the-horizon U.S. systems: within this alliance (as opposed to East Asia), there is a history that clearly associates the presence of forces with the credibility of the commitment and with the engagement of the United States.

On NATO’s next steps:

- Given the continued political gridlock over nuclear policy issues in NATO, some European leaders have argued that the alliance should pursue “silent maintenance of the status quo” rather than renew broad public debate. They see this as the best means to “do no harm” to NATO’s deterrent.
- The clear need to choose whether and how to modernize the dual capable aircraft and the weapons they deliver will make it impossible to avoid debate. Someone must be prepared to lead it.

- As we enter these debates, it would be useful to reinvigorate the NATO High Level Group and the Nuclear Planning Group, “both now moribund.”
- It is not in the U.S. interest to somehow suggest that its allies would not bear a significant responsibility in making a choice for nuclear war should the need ever arise. Deterrence in being is a shared risk and shared responsibility and that should remain. By pushing for U.S. nuclear withdrawal, some seem to be implying that they are no longer ready to share risks and responsibilities, and this will have significant repercussions within and beyond the alliance.
- But don’t start the dialogue with a focus on modernization. Focus on the Strategic Concept, the place of deterrence in the collective defense construct, and within that the place of the nuclear guarantee.

Appendix G.

Lessons and Challenges Workshop

AGENDA

September 17, 2009

- 8:00 – 8:30 AM Registration and coffee
- 8:30 – 8:45 AM Introduction, Tom Mahnken (Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA)
- 8:45 – 10:15 AM *Panel 1: Lessons from Past Failures to Extend Nuclear Deterrence*
Ari Roth (Johns Hopkins University) on Israel
Timothy Hoyt (U.S. Naval War College) on India and Pakistan
- 10:15 – 10:30 AM Break
- 10:30 – 12:00 PM *Panel 2: Lessons from the Abandonment of Extended Nuclear Deterrence*
Dan Blumenthal (American Enterprise Institute) on China
Justin Vaisse (Brookings Institution) on France
- 12:00 – 1:00 PM Lunch
- 1:00 – 3:30 PM *Panel 3: The Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence*
Robert Nurick (Monterey Institute of International Studies) on Russia
Jackie Newmyer (Long-Term Strategy Group) on China
Leo Michel (National Defense University) on France and Britain
Frank Miller (Cohen Group) on Nuclear Reductions and Extended Nuclear Deterrence
- 3:30 – 4:00 PM Closing Remarks, Vic Utgoff (IDA)

LESSONS AND CHALLENGES WORKSHOP SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

Key question: How can lessons learned from past cases of extended nuclear deterrence (END) inform U.S. nuclear policy?

Subsidiary questions:

1. What accounts for past failures to extend nuclear deterrence? What motivated some states to pursue independent deterrents instead of relying on extended nuclear deterrence guarantees from the United States?
2. What motivated states to pursue independent deterrents in spite of security assurances and alliances? How did domestic politics and leadership drive decisions to pursue independent deterrents?
3. What role may extended nuclear deterrence play in the emerging security environment?

Discussion proceeded on a not-for-attribution basis. The insights summarized below are simply snapshots of more complex points made in a long day of discussion.

What accounts for past failures to extend nuclear deterrence? What motivated some states to pursue independent deterrents instead of relying on END guarantees from the United States?

On security perceptions:

- For END to endure, both the state extending nuclear deterrence and the state to which deterrence is being extended must share a perception of a high priority threat and important interests. Moreover, the END arrangement must be credible to both sides.
- In the past, the United States often chose not to extend formal security assurances because it did not share an ally or a partner's threat perception. For example, whereas Pakistan's primary adversary since Partition has been India, the United States has never seen New Delhi as an adversary, but rather as either a powerful neutral or a potential partner. Because of this divergence of threat perception, Pakistan could never be satisfied with U.S. END guarantees and instead pursued nuclear weapons as the most assured method of countering what Islamabad sees as "an implacable foe."
- Even if there is an alignment of threat perceptions and interests, timing is crucial for establishing END relationships. In the 1950s and early 1960s the United States attempted to establish a security relationship with India based on the mutual interest of containing China. India and China had clashed over Tibet and had fought in 1962. Despite the commonality of security interests

- Some states that have pursued independent deterrents are unlikely to have ever been willing to settle for an END guarantee. At the strategic level, Israel's deterrence posture requires the ability to inflict cataclysmic devastation on an adversary and the ability to inflict quickly and decisively greater damage and loss of life on its enemies than they can inflict on Israel. The Israelis would not have ever settled for extended deterrence because they would not cede a voice in their security to the United States.
- In a number of cases, a war motivated a state to seek nuclear weapons. For example, the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1967 Six Day War led Israel's leadership to believe that Israel must be the sole guarantor of its own security. This belief, in turn, spurred Israel's nuclear program. Similarly, increasing tensions between China and India that culminated in the war with China over Tibet and China's nuclear test prompted India to launch its nuclear program. For Pakistan, the loss of Bangladesh in 1971 and the ongoing confrontation with a nuclear India prompted Islamabad to acquire an independent deterrent.

On perceptions of alliances and security assurances:

- For cultural reasons, even today Israel believes the United States could abandon it. Many Israelis interpret history as teaching that "Gentiles are not reliable allies" because even enlightened non-Jewish states have turned against the Jewish people throughout history. As a result, self-reliance is a cornerstone of Israeli national security policy.
- For its part, Islamabad remains distrustful of alliances with the United States, despite massive amounts of aid over the years and periodic U.S. interest in the region. Based on their experiences in Afghanistan during the Cold War, Pakistanis perceive the United States to be a fickle partner who will be heavily engaged in the region for ten years at a time then withdraw their support and interest.

What motivated states to pursue independent deterrents in spite of security assurances and alliances? How did domestic politics and leadership impact decisions to pursue independent deterrents?

On security perceptions:

- The United States exerts more energy convincing allies than it does adversaries of the credibility of END guarantees.
- Normative values sometimes restrain countries from pursuing independent deterrents. Japan, for example, is constrained by norms along with domestic politics, strategic culture, and a relationship with the United States that is very different from that of France during the Cold War.
- Some states make a conscious strategic decision to pursue a nuclear deterrent; others acquire nuclear weapons as the result of bureaucratic processes and inertia rather than central direction. For example, one speaker argued that Mao Tse-Tung's never made an explicit decision to pursue nuclear weapons. Rather, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the United States and Soviet Union triggered a debate within the People's Liberation Army over whether to develop an independent deterrent or to continue to rely on People's War for security. Mao played to both sides of this debate by downplaying the importance of nuclear weapons while also sending scientists to the USSR to study nuclear technology.
- By contrast, the French government consciously pursued nuclear weapons as a means to enhance its autonomy and leadership within Europe. At the same time, the French nuclear program was driven not only by political and strategic calculations, but also by its science and technology (S&T) establishment.

On national decision-making:

- Strong political leadership played a major role in countries that chose to abandon their security umbrellas for independent deterrents. In France, Charles DeGaulle was interested in an independent deterrent at least in part for the prestige that nuclear weapons would provide. Similarly, Mao Tse-Tung's personality and deteriorating personal relationship with Nikita Khrushchev was a major factor in China's nuclear development.

What role may extended nuclear deterrence play in the emerging security environment?

General observations:

- Fundamentals of END, as identified by participants:
 - END is shaped by history and geography, and as such varies by region.
 - Adversaries can be just as affected by alliance solidarity and commitment as by promises of extended deterrence.
 - Nonproliferation cannot be the sole or even greatest motivation for the United States to provide END guarantees.
 - It is much easier to strengthen existing END relationships than to extend them to new partners.

- The United States is facing a crisis of perception. U.S. strategic policy is currently focused on making security guarantees credible to European and East Asian allies. This is part of the nature of alliance dynamics.
- From the U.S. perspective, END entails significant risks and requires visible commitments and trip wires. Domestically, END is difficult to sell to the American people. The public typically follows Presidential initiatives on these issues, but it is unclear if the public will be on board with any future changes in the nuclear posture.
- Russia has established security agreements with implicit END guarantees, but does not face credibility requirements or security risks similar to those of the United States or its allies. It did extend security agreements through the Collective Security Treaty Organization, but only Armenia faces an external threat. Belarus is a potential case of Russia extending a formal commitment, but there is no clear threat. Central Asia's security problems cannot be solved by END.

Trends in the evolving security environment:

- Russia: Deterrence within the Warsaw Pact was starkly different from that within NATO: the Warsaw Pact was not a voluntary alliance, and the challenge was proving its credibility to the United States as opposed to states within the alliance. Neutralizing U.S. guarantees was therefore the focus of Soviet deterrence.
- Contemporary Russian deterrence is focused on preventing political pressure against Russia rather than guaranteeing the security of other states.
- China: China's strategy is to attack U.S. political will to defend allies in East Asia, or to buy time for sufficient nuclear modernization to intimidate the United States in the future.
- France: Deterrence is the ultimate guarantee of French sovereignty and autonomy. The challenge for France's allies is reconciling Paris's demands for autonomy over its nuclear deterrent with a credible defense relationship with allies. French experts are skeptical that the EU will ever have a collective nuclear security arrangement so long as NATO and the U.S. deterrent exist. Nonetheless, France, in particular, is concerned by talk of deeper strategic arms reductions and the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons.
- NATO: Article 5 still means a great deal to France and other European allies. Withdrawal of U.S. tactical weapons from Europe would sow further doubt about the credibility of the U.S. deterrent and commitment to the defense of Europe, and send shock waves through the alliance, possibly prompting Turkey to pursue an independent deterrent. Nuclear weapons themselves are less important than the broader relationships within NATO. While the United States may believe nuclear weapons should only be used to defend against a nuclear attack, its Eastern European allies are particularly sensitive to conventional threats. U.S. military presence together with the collective commitment of the allies is vital to END.

- Japan: Japan had experienced a generational shift by around 2006. Only a small percentage of the Japanese population now remembers Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Leaders question the U.S. credibility to defend Japan and whether or not it should develop an independent deterrent. Japan wants Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile - Nuclear (TLAM-N) and needs to clarify for the United States why in-theater deterrence is necessary as opposed to an “invisible” force presence.
- Middle East: Although not specifically addressed in any of the presentations, END in the Middle East is a particularly timely nonproliferation issue in light of Secretary Clinton’s comments about a potential U.S. “security umbrella” in the region. It is premature to talk about END in the Gulf because Iran still asserts its nuclear program is for civilian purposes and any major changes in U.S. policy would suggest the United States is purely interested in regime change and willing to undermine the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). There is reluctance in many nuclear circles to discuss a nuclear Iran or END out of fear both may turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Further, some policy-makers and experts prefer to explore non-nuclear means of assurance in the event Iran does develop a nuclear weapon. The best deterrent to Iran could be the threat of a counterbalancing nuclear cascade in the region which would dilute the influence of an Iranian bomb. Israeli air strikes are not considered a realistic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem. Iran’s infrastructure is too developed, and no one is prepared to occupy Iran. If a nuclear Iran is inevitable the United States should be prepared to adopt a model similar to that of China in the 1970’s that resulted in establishing diplomatic relations and a strategic balance.

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