African Security Challenges: Now and Over the Horizon

WORKSHOP REPORT

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January 2009

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Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Advanced Systems and Concepts Office
Report Number ASCO 2009-001

DTRA01-03-D-0017, Task Order 0018-08-03
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The authors gratefully acknowledge the participants in the October 2008 “African Security Challenges: Now and Over the Horizon” workshop in McLean, Virginia, whose presentations and contributions to discussions served as the basis of this report. In addition we thank Colonel Pedro Almeida, AFRICOM Washington Liaison Office; Dr. Meg Flanagan, Defense Threat Reduction Agency; Dr. John Harbeson, Johns Hopkins University; Dr. Igor Khripunov, University of Georgia; Dr. Alan Kuperman, University of Texas; Dr. Carl LeVan, American University; Dr. Peter Pham, James Madison University; and Ms. Rachel Stohl, Center for Defense Information, for their thoughtful review of this report.
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SECTION 1:
BACKGROUND

On February 6, 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush directed the establishment of a new Combatant Command focused on Africa. The announcement of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) kindled a flurry of discussion amongst Africa watchers in Washington, DC and beyond. Debate largely centered on the implications of this announcement, the mission of the new Command, its location, and above all, how AFRICOM actions would reconcile with those of other players in the region and whether the decision signified a militarization of U.S. policy in the region.

Irrespective of this debate, the establishment of the Command reflects several important changes in U.S. Government, particularly U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) perceptions about the importance of Africa to U.S. strategic interests. Previously, three geographic Combatant Commands (COCOMs) shared responsibility for Africa, a situation that sometimes resulted in fragmented action in the region. AFRICOM's almost continent-wide responsibility allows the DoD to assume a comprehensive approach as it addresses security challenges on the continent, suggests an increasing recognition of the commonalities across African states and regions, and serves as an acknowledgement that many security concerns and obstacles, as well as their root causes and effects, transcend these physical boundaries. The Command’s interagency component also suggests a greater recognition of the need for consistent coordination of U.S. activities to address these security challenges. The DoD is but one player in the region and must consistently work with other U.S. Government departments and agencies to support broader activities in the region when appropriate.

With this heightened interest and attention in mind, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (DTRA/ASCO) initiated a fundamental research assessment of African security challenges – what they are today and what they might be over the horizon. This assessment could be used to inform future planning and research for ASCO, and inform those U.S. Government players active in the region, including, but not limited to the newest form of DoD engagement, AFRICOM.

Research Objective and Approach

It is important to note that the vision for this project at the outset was to study AFRICOM’s mission and structure and determine how these would affect the way that the Command addressed security challenges in the region. When it was determined that many conferences, workshops, and publications had already addressed this topic (coupled with the fact that the AFRICOM mission and structure were still being refined as it stood up), the research team realized that a broader and fundamental “challenges-centric” assessment was needed. Indeed, many players were rightly investigating the “nuts and bolts” of AFRICOM and other U.S. engagement in the region (specifically how that might be affected by the stand-up of the new Command), yet few were conducting a comprehensive assessment of what security challenges those players might need to address today and in the future. The research team felt an “over the horizon” aspect was especially important and an area in which our research could inform future planning.
The research objective was to define the major categories of security challenges in Africa today and explore possibilities for what they might be over the horizon. Using fundamental insights from academic and research experts to develop a better understanding of those challenges, the research was intended to explore how the challenges intersect and identify their importance for U.S., especially AFRICOM, activities and engagement on the continent. This research would provide a platform for further study of how the United States can address the identified challenges through various (and ideally coordinated) forms of engagement, including AFRICOM.

To accomplish this objective, the research team performed academic literature and expert reviews to identify a large list of African security challenges with the recognition that there is some debate among experts on the challenge areas and their importance relative to one another. The team also surveyed U.S. Government strategic documents (including AFRICOM mission and vision statements) to obtain a list of those challenges the government identifies as important. Eventually, this list was pared down to three broad categories of challenges and served as a foundation for an academic workshop at which the security challenges were discussed.¹

1. Transnational security issues
   a. Small arms/light weapons
   b. Maritime security
   c. Disease

2. Internal and regional conflict
   a. Border issues, spread of conflict, and peacekeeping
   b. Humanitarian assistance, refugees, and internally-displaced persons
   c. Rebels
   d. Post-conflict reconstruction issues

3. Potential flashpoints/future security challenges
   a. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and R&D developments
   b. Oil and natural resource competition and exploitation
   c. Terrorism and radical Islam
   d. China and other states

While the approach to the challenges selection was not scientific, the research team viewed this research project, and in particular the academic workshop, as a starting point and not an end point in the study. The workshop would provide a foundation for more in-depth and specific discussions and research on major security challenges and their implications.

¹ The list was pared down for both practical and budgetary reasons. That is, the research team needed to conduct a one day workshop with academic experts and therefore tried to select challenges that could be discussed within that timeframe, but also allow for broad participation among many types of experts. It also selected challenges of particular interest to the sponsoring organization (DTRA/ASCO) and incorporated some challenges that might not be viewed as important today, but could dramatically affect the security landscape tomorrow.
Indeed, it was widely understood that one study would not be enough to accurately and comprehensively capture the challenges that make up the African security environment.

The report that follows outlines the results of the first academic workshop on African security challenges described above. As such, this report should be viewed as one element of the research endeavor in this area with complete results and findings still pending.
SECTION 2: WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES, SUCCESSES, AND CHALLENGES

Objectives

DTRA/ASCO invited a group of experts to further refine, discuss, and elaborate on a series of current and future African security challenges and to identify others that should be considered in future phases of research. Special emphasis was placed on understanding the interrelationships between the challenges, how perceptions of the challenges differ (for example, among the U.S. Government, African governments, and Africa specialists), and their importance in shaping the overall security landscape. A secondary objective was to provide a platform or a “launching point” for a future discussion on ways that the United States might address the challenges.

Workshop Structure

Participants

Workshop participants were drawn from U.S. universities, U.S. military education institutions, U.S. research organizations, and the U.S. business sector. Each participant had a publishing record on African issues. The participants did not represent the full spectrum of available African experts, but were selected due to their experience addressing the identified challenge areas. Additional participants represented AFRICOM and DTRA. A concerted effort was made to include a mix of experts who have engaged extensively with the U.S. Government on issues surrounding Africa issues and those who have had little to no engagement with the government on the subject area.

Agenda

The workshop was comprised of both plenary and breakout discussions. Because most Africa specialists have a niche area of research (for example, rebel movements or South Africa), the morning session included overarching presentations on each of the major challenge areas (transnational security issues, internal and regional conflict, and potential flashpoints/future security challenges) to improve prospects for cross-niche area discussions and to assist the team in its assessment of the interaction and relationships between the various challenge areas. Although the focus of this workshop was not on AFRICOM specifically, the research team included a briefing on the Command based on the assumption that the ways in which AFRICOM defines the challenge space would likely be brought up in discussions. This briefing allowed the group to achieve a common understanding among all participants on what AFRICOM is, is not, and how it views the challenges in its area of responsibility (AOR).

Smaller concurrent breakout sessions were conducted in the afternoon, which allowed experts to explore the challenge space in which they had specific expertise and answer a series of questions regarding the current and future states of the challenge, the perceptions
of the challenge among players in the region, and its overall importance in defining the security environment. The research team also asked participants to begin to consider how various players in the region could address these challenges and what research might be needed to further its understanding of the challenge. Each breakout session corresponded with a broad challenge area. The research team pre-determined participants’ assignments in breakout groups, but individual preferences – if expressed – were honored. There was overwhelming interest among the participants to participate in the session on internal and regional conflict, which resulted in some imbalance among the groups. At the close of the breakout session, the group gathered for a final plenary session. Breakout session facilitators or their designated representatives reported the breakout group’s findings to the larger plenary group to allow for a broader discussion of points of agreement and debate among the groups. A discussion then convened on next steps and more generalized issues involving the study of U.S. engagement on the continent.

Meeting the Objectives: Difficulties and Successes

Success #1: The workshop was successful in convening a large group of Africa experts, many of whom had never previously interacted, to discuss core issues surrounding the identified security challenges.

Discussion: The participants’ expertise and related research agendas ranged from the study of rebel movements to weapons of mass destruction to humanitarian issues. By introducing these individuals to one another and spurring dialogue (and sometimes debate), a heightened level of awareness of the various points of intersection among individual research agendas as well as greater situational awareness of the research landscape were achieved. Additionally, this diverse external participation also allowed government participants, including an AFRICOM representative, to become aware of the various research agendas of experts as the government seeks to enhance its understanding of and act on these security challenges. Finally, although ambitious, the broad discussion of an array of challenges solidified the necessity to consider the overall security landscape through comprehensive and integrated analysis. It is clear that one study of one particular challenge cannot provide any definitive answers because the context also needs to be considered.

Although this success is acknowledged, a number of difficulties emerged during the workshop that impacted the proceedings. While a study of the difficulties surrounding the reconciliation of academic and policy discussions was not a stated focus of the project, the workshop experience allowed the research team to identify some of the difficulties associated with this task. By identifying the difficulties enumerated below, further work can be done in structuring future workshops and other events to generate the most useful and targeted inputs from participants in these types discussions. This is especially important in the case of AFRICOM as these types of academic-policy dialogues are likely to continue, if not increase, as new forms of U.S. engagement in the region are emerging.

Difficulty #1: Workshop goals as set out by the research team were too ambitious given the limited timeframe for discussion and the specific expertise of the individuals involved.
Discussion: The research team set out an ambitious goal for this workshop – in essence, to understand a sizeable array of security challenges facing Africa, their points of intersection, and importance to U.S. engagement in a single day. The subject matter of the workshop was broad enough to allow participants to, in some ways, only scratch the surface. Further, a discussion of points of intersection was perhaps too ambitious due to the varying types of expertise and niches of the participants. Some participants could provide detailed analyses of one challenge but could not speak to others. As such, discussion of the points of intersection among the challenges was limited. While involving a broad expert base was intentional, this experience suggests there is some tradeoff between broad and detailed discussions that can hinder productive discussions. Facilitators of future dialogues of this nature should consider what types of inputs are needed to answer their questions, and the effect of this input choice. Participants should be given advance notice of the types of expected inputs to allow them to prepare content to some extent in advance of the event.

Difficulty #2: Additional concept definition was needed to accurately frame the discussion.

Discussion: Because of their varying backgrounds and perspectives on these types of issues, the participants in the workshop came to the table with very different definitions of what the research team – based on its policy-focused background – erroneously assumed were unambiguous terms. For example, a debate arose about the term “security.” Participants questioned whether they should discuss traditional security. Or, should they – as many were predisposed to do – expand the discussion to include human security concepts? The decision to focus on traditional or human security (or both) has a large impact on the nature of the discussion as the former focuses on inter-state issues, while the latter allows for a discussion of individual and community level concerns.

Further, a debate arose on the question of “whose security?” Participants asked whether the focus should be on the challenges that African states and their citizens perceive as important or if it should center on the challenges that the United States has identified as important to achieving its strategic objectives and protecting its interests? Although it was conceded that there can be considerable overlap and alignment in what challenges are deemed important by the players, this delineation was not entirely clear at the outset and did not aid in focusing the discussion. The research team attempted to include both traditional and human security challenges that many Africans perceive to be major challenges (such as many of those related to conflict) and those that the United States does (maritime security, for example) in the workshop agenda, but these definitions should have been clearly laid out to the participants in the introductory remarks or prior to the workshop. As an aside, it might have also been useful for the study team to organize the discussion along these lines (i.e. African and U.S. security challenges) rather than through the chosen method of topically grouping the challenges.

Difficulty #3: Given the variety of participant backgrounds, it was difficult – and important – to defend the research team’s methodology for selecting the challenge areas and the questions to pose about them.
Discussion: Most of the participants hailed from traditional academic backgrounds, and many of the questions that the research team posed were theoretical and policy/program-oriented. As a result, some participants fundamentally questioned the research team’s approach to identifying challenges and capturing inputs about them at the workshop. The participants raised some questions about whether the focus of the discussion should be the causes of the challenges or their effects. That is, the question was whether it was more appropriate to discuss the root causes of the challenges or how they manifest themselves. The conflation of causes and effects (given the high level of discussion) was problematic for many participants, while the research team intentionally mixed these aspects because foreign policy decisions often relate to situations that conflate the two.

An additional concern surrounded the focus level of the analysis (individual, community, society, state, region, or continent or all of the above?). A more concerted attempt to provide a detailed outline of the methodology upfront or prior to the workshop and to explain why particular decisions were made might have alleviated this extended discussion if participants knew to take certain issues as “a given.” Some time could have been specifically provided to discuss the pitfalls of this approach in order to avoid a situation in which discussion of the pitfalls overshadowed other discussions of interest.

Difficulty #4: When attempting to consider a challenge area in a broad and holistic sense, it is difficult to provide concrete insights for use in specific contexts.

Discussion: While the words, “it depends” might not ring positively in policymakers’ ears, for the most part, answers to security problems often depend heavily on specific contexts, and definitive predictions are often impossible to make. These realities need to be addressed when entering into academic and policy debates on what problems are, which questions to ask about them, and how to address them. The role of context then needs to be concretely addressed when identifying problems and determining potential solutions. This fact needs to be acknowledged when structuring academic discussions that are meant to inform government planning.

Difficulty #5: There is an important difference between discussing the mechanics of a problem and suggesting solutions to a problem that needs to be addressed when conducting academic-policy dialogues.

Discussion: While the involvement of external participants, a sizeable portion of whom had little prior interaction with the U.S. Government, brought the team fresh and needed perspectives on issues, it alerted the research team to larger issues surrounding academic and policy dialogues. Specifically, these dialogues required more advance preparation to focus the discussion and identify desired takeaways and to develop strategies in order to achieve the desired end results. For example, a discussion about the literature debates on a particular
problem such as the relationship between democracy and violence is very different then a discussion about how to practically get various players to work together on the continent to achieve some goal. Academic participants may be more comfortable communicating on the former, while policy-oriented experts may focus on the latter. Though the two types of discussion may be necessary to achieve end results, the approach needs to be identified in advance.
SECTION 3: WORKSHOP SUMMARY

(Note: Detailed summaries of individual presentations and breakout discussions can be found in the appendix of this report. This summary is intended to delineate overall trends in the discussion at the workshop.)

Complexities of the Discussion

The participants discussed three major security challenge areas at this workshop: transnational security, internal and regional conflict, and future security challenges/potential flashpoints, with sub-challenges being identified in each of the major categories. Participants focused on the current and future state of the challenges (and to a lesser extent, points of intersection among them and implications for U.S. engagement) and had several discussions about the methodological complexities in considering the broad web of African security challenges. There was agreement that security challenges should not be analyzed in a vacuum and a general awareness of the difficulties of having a broad discussion of security challenges.

The participants reaffirmed that most African security challenges stem from human security concerns, rather than from traditional state-based ones. There was widespread agreement among all participants about the need to consider the human dimension of the security challenge and how each concern relates to or impacts the others. There was less agreement among participants about the value of broadly considering these challenges in the abstract given the perceived need for in-depth local knowledge and a definition of whose security is being analyzed. As discussed in the previous section, this issue was a major point of contention among participants in the workshop, specifically the fact that the list of challenges for discussion combined – with some overlap – U.S. priorities, African interests, and realities on the ground. A general focus on the implications of U.S. engagement was intended to frame the way discussion emerged about the challenges. However, the

2 As stated previously, the discussion centered on the following challenges:

1. Transnational security issues
   a. Small arms/light weapons
   b. Maritime security
   c. Disease
2. Internal and regional conflict
   a. Border issues, spread of conflict, and peacekeeping
   b. Humanitarian assistance, refugees, and internally-displaced persons
   c. Rebels
   d. Post-conflict reconstruction issues
3. Potential flashpoints/future security challenges
   a. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and R&D developments
   b. Oil and natural resource competition and exploitation
   c. Terrorism and radical Islam
   d. China and other states
There was broad recognition that academic expert opinion is essential in assisting the U.S. Government – including AFRICOM as it stands up – in identifying current and future challenges and providing local in-depth knowledge and analysis as the government seeks to further develop plans for engagement in the region. Participants noted adamantly, however, that this transfer of knowledge is most useful when the specific context is known. There are no “one size fits all” solutions to the problems in Africa. Some experts took this one step further. Rather than separating a discussion of what the challenges are (at an academic level) and an engagement strategy (at a policy or programmatic level), a more useful approach is to consider the root causes of a particular security problem, determine possible solutions, and consider policy tradeoffs. In addition to root causes, it is important to consider how the problem manifests itself. However, any analysis should not conflate the two.

**Debate Threads**

Several interesting threads emerged in the discussion of the security challenges, including whether some issues labeled as “challenges” were even “challenges” at all. This section delineates several of the more prominent debates that emerged during the discussion. More detailed discussions of each of these debates as they occurred in the workshop breakout sessions can be found in the appendix of this report.

There was widespread agreement that conflict issues and small arms/light weapons (dubbed the “real” weapon of mass destruction in Africa) were important in shaping the African security environment, though some debate emerged as to whether the small arms/light weapons problem should be analyzed simply in proliferation terms or in a more contextual way to address root causes. However, both of these intertwined issue areas are mainstays in the current environment and will probably continue to be important in shaping the future security environment on the continent.

Debate ensued about some of the other challenge areas that the research team identified for discussion. In particular, the discussion among the participants centered on the question of whether some of the challenges should be viewed through a security lens. One discussion thread related to China. While there was agreement that China is investing heavily in Africa, the experts were of several minds about whether the United States, in particular, should or does consider China’s growing influence in the region to be a security challenge. Participants questioned whether Chinese investment necessarily means a decrease of Western (ideological) influence in the region, and whether this influence poses a security problem for the Africans, the United States, or both. Other participants discussed the security implications more directly and chose to discuss the ways in which Chinese investment, motivated by pure economic or financial reasons, can fuel security problems that concern both Africans and Americans, such as, for example, in the case of the Sudan.

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3 The participants did discuss the newest form of U.S. engagement, AFRICOM, and the complexities of how it will engage in the region and how addressing some challenge areas might fall within its domain (maritime security and peacekeeping, for instance) in either a lead or support role, while others (such as police training/reform) might not.
Participants, however, generally agreed that the Africans themselves recognize the benefits and drawbacks of Chinese investment in the region. While Chinese-sponsored development activities such as building roads and hospitals benefit both the African people and their governments, the long-term African economic benefit of these projects is not high given that the technology and the training associated with infrastructure development are not being transferred to the African states or their people after Chinese work teams finish a project. Along these lines, the participants also discussed the uncertainty of continued Chinese investment in Africa. Given the slowing economic growth rates in China and the general global economic slowdown, some predicted that China may not continue its current pace of investment in the continent. The pitfalls associated with African governments’ heavy reliance on the Chinese for long-term support need to be acknowledged.

Additionally, there was some debate on the potential for traditionally-defined weapons of mass destruction (WMD) problems in the region. Participants generally agreed that the proliferation and/or use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons is not a problem today, despite the fact that there were several state-based development programs on the continent in the past. For various reasons – including the plethora of smuggling networks and naturally present biological agents on the continent – some felt that a WMD problem could emerge in the future. One participant pointed to the lack of African participation in international legal regimes aimed at curtailing or preventing the spread and use of these weapons as a reason for concern.

The terrorist problem was also a source of some discussion. Participants noted that domestic terrorism was a long-standing issue in Africa, if one considers terrorism a tactic of guerilla warfare in which civilians are targeted in the course of combat operations. African rebel movements have historically targeted civilian populations as part of strategies that seek to undermine governments. However, in the current context, the participants noted that many African governments have begun to label political opposition forces as terrorist movements, often in order to gain more resources to suppress this opposition. The current context, therefore, often blurs the distinction between opposition groups and insurgents, with whom African governments should be encouraged to reconcile, and legitimate terrorists. There was also debate about whether international terrorism, particularly of the Islamist variety, was a genuine concern for all players in the region or just one that is viewed as important to the United States for global strategy reasons.

Likewise, the participants cited maritime security issues, including port security, as being current U.S. Government priorities in the region. In particular, efforts like the Africa Partnership Station reinforce this assertion. One expert on this issue felt the challenge needed further study (particularly the possible linkages between piracy and terrorist threats), and there was some general acknowledgement that African governments do not uniformly perceive maritime issues as priorities for ensuring security despite some regions’ financial reliance on fisheries. In discussions of this issue, as well as several others, many experts pointed out the need to consider concerns surrounding political will and governance. Governance issues (both capacity and political will or lack thereof), in particular, underlie many of the security challenges in the region and deserve further attention when analyzing most any challenge. Many of Africa’s security challenges are fundamentally caused by poor
governance, which leads to corruption, nepotism and patronage systems that are fragile and often the target of insurgencies. Insurgencies often begin as protest against unjust and corrupt rulers, creating a delicate security situation. On the other side, because many governments rely on the informal economy to support their political regimes, efforts by the international community that encourage governments to improve security may counter the political interests of leaders. For example, initiatives that aim to strengthen border security, to curtail maritime smuggling and trafficking, and to increase the capacity and honesty of domestic security services may threaten the power-holders’ abilities to finance their patronage networks. A ruler who relies on patronage and corruption to sustain political support may not want capable and honest coast guards and police forces, or border police who cannot be bribed when the ruler’s own goods are passing through the border. In turn, therefore, African power-holders may be less likely to genuinely work on these types of security improvements. Therefore, the domestic issues of governance are critically important drivers of insecurity and can pose challenges to improving the security situation.

**Additional Issues to Consider and Prospects for Follow-on Discussions**

In addition to discussing the security challenges that the research team identified, the participants also identified others that they believed should be included in a discussion of African security. These challenges include urbanization and the youth bulge, climate change and environmentally-based or resource wars, and illicit smuggling/criminal networks. The participants discussed the effects of urbanization and the complex web of smuggling networks at considerable length. In particular, there was general agreement that smuggling issues should be studied more fully.

There was a high degree of expert input and opinion in these discussions, and general agreement about the complexities of discussing security challenges in the region. That said, it is too preliminary to associate the inputs from this workshop with a broader discussion of priorities and ways to address the challenges. Therefore, this workshop will serve as a general foundation for future discussions and analyses that consider ways to further elucidate what is known about particular challenges of interest, as well as the degree to which the challenge can be addressed by the U.S. Government and how this should take place. Specific future discussions will focus on particular challenges and will emphasize ways to bridge the academic and policy gap in such a way that accounts for the analytic complexities.
SECTION 4: RECOMMENDATIONS

Several recommendations on ways to conduct future research emerged from the workshop discussions. They include the following:

- Follow-on research should distinguish between security challenges for the United States and security challenges for Africa. In any analysis of challenges, it is necessary to define whose security is being addressed.

- Further investigations of security challenges in Africa should either focus on the root causes of those challenges or on their effects. Mixing analyses of causes and effects is problematic.

- Additional analyses should be conducted that account for differences in the security challenges at a local level. A one-size-fits-all solution to problems is not conducive, so there needs to be a way to target and use local expertise to identify problems and develop solutions. Scenario approaches may be useful in this endeavor.

- Additional mechanisms need to be developed to encourage academic and policymaker debates. Differences in communication styles, biases, goals, etc. can hinder this interaction. When conducting such dialogues, there needs to be a level of specificity of the problem being discussed, and the desired outcomes for the dialogue need to be stated in advance. Preparation is required, especially in determining ways to extract useful information from both communities.
APPENDIX

Section 1: Detailed Summaries of Presentations

Introductory Remarks

Mr. David Hamon, Deputy Director for Research and Studies, described his own personal history working Africa issues. He also described ASCO’s strategic analysis mission space and noted that within this context, this workshop was meant to serve as a catalyst for a forward-looking analysis of security challenges in Africa. While AFRICOM was currently preoccupied with building its physical foundation, in the near future it would begin doing some forward-looking thinking on ways to address security challenges. As such, this workshop could inform choices of “which voices to listen to” and planning. Warning about the dangers of compartmentalizing the study of African security issues, he expressed his hope that this workshop would help overcome the challenge of doing holistic analysis and foster engagement with not only African experts, but AFRICOM.

Noting that the idea of DTRA hosting an Africa workshop was “counterintuitive” to its weapons of mass destruction mission, he reminded the participants that the security challenges in the Africa of today are not going to be the same tomorrow. DTRA currently has some Congressionally-mandated responsibilities to support the interagency with small arms and light weapons threat reduction. These small arms and light weapons can be considered weapons of mass effect. The use of these weapons impacts the security environment today and will likely to continue to do so in the future. Additionally, it is unknown how other “traditional” mass effect weapons (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) will impact the future African security environment. As such, DTRA brings resources to bear to support AFRICOM in not only these areas of threat reduction over the horizon, as needed, but also in the conduct of exercises and training.

Ms. Jennifer Perry, the research project manager, defined the goals for the workshop and described the workshop’s place within the larger research project being conducted by DTRA/ASCO. She cautioned that the project was analysis-focused, not operationally-focused. The primary emphasis of the workshop should then be on defining the security challenges and exploring how the security challenges interact and intersect with one another. A secondary emphasis should be to begin to delve into the implications of these challenges for U.S. engagement in the region.

U.S. Africa Command Overview

A representative of the Command described the African security environment in which the Command operates, highlighting both its size and diversity. The officer highlighted several opportunities and challenges in Africa. Some opportunities include growing economies, increasing democratization, developing regional and security communities, and growing political will to personally confront challenges and fix problems among leaders. The challenges include terrorism and extremism, piracy and trafficking, non-professional or
irregular militaries, ethnic strife, under-governed areas, and the legitimacy and effectiveness of regimes in relation to their populations. When discussing these challenges, the representative noted the need to have a better understanding of the complexities associated with some of them (ethnic strife, for example) and other challenges relating to different U.S. and African perceptions of the challenge (terrorism and extremism is one example).

Delving further into the discussion of the Command itself, he noted AFRICOM’s mission statement: “AFRICOM, in concert with other U.S. Government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.” He emphasized the sustained and persistent nature of this engagement given that its goal is to build partners’ security capacities; promote strategic security relationships; conduct civil-military activities to foster stability; and provide crisis response – in essence, enable the work of Africans to ensure their own security. He also reminded the participants that AFRICOM does not set policy, but conducts activities, as directed, to support it.

When describing AFRICOM’s theater strategy, the representative noted the mutual interest of the United States and Africa. Over the long-term the United States has no strategic interest in sending troops to intervene in the continent and African leaders do not want long-term intervention. Similarly, both understand that short-term intervention at times might be necessary, because in some cases African governments do not have the capacity to deal with problems. However, there are some strategic ends that AFRICOM plans to achieve in Africa through both direct and indirect means, with more emphasis placed on the indirect actions. Those ends include:

- Defeat Al Qaeda in the area of responsibility (AOR);
- Increase peace support capabilities (increased capacities of local governments);
- Support good governance and security sector reform efforts of other U.S. Government agencies;
- Protect the United States from contagions from Africa;
- Prevent WMD proliferation; and
- Maintain American access to the AOR.

The representative also highlighted current programs that AFRICOM is conducting in support of these ends including: Operation Enduring Freedom: Trans-Sahara, Combined Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa, African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA), and the Africa Partnership Station. These descriptions highlighted the way in which the Command supports interagency programs and activities and the rationale behind a large interagency component within the Command as a means to develop a more comprehensive U.S. strategy in the region.
Introductions to Security Challenges in Africa

(Note: Several participants were asked to provide meta-analyses of the three major security challenge areas the research team identified to serve as a catalyst for discussion in the breakouts and to elicit preliminary thoughts from the participants about points of intersection.)

Security Challenges Overview

Dr. Jessica Piombo, a member of the research team and Assistant Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School provided an introductory presentation to the group which focused on the methodology the research team used for selecting the security challenges to consider and identified the major issues associated with each security challenge area. As there was a last minute cancellation for a speaker to introduce the transnational security issue area, she covered those issues in a more in-depth manner.

Piombo noted the intense debate surrounding the question of where AFRICOM should focus its efforts. Early statements from the Command stressed the necessity of a “holistic” approach to engagement in the region, and this emphasis subsequently generated some negative reactions and fears that this would result in a militarization of overall U.S. policy in the region. Though this debate has subsided to some extent, the very existence of this debate demonstrates the complexity of the security challenges in the region. Piombo cited this recommendation for a “holistic” approach as being grounded in the Command organizers’ awareness that African security issues, at their core, are related to human security (equating security with people rather than territories) and that, therefore, using a traditional and narrow conception of security (state-based) would be problematic for formulating strategies for security engagement as it would not account for complexities. Many security challenges in Africa are created and sustained by a complex web of factors, many of which lay far outside the traditionally conceived domain of “security.”

She cited some examples to elucidate this point. A discussion of rebellion would be incomplete without understanding fundamental patterns of governance and territorial control and the close relationship between state and economic prosperity in many countries. Likewise, issues of maritime or border security would remain unresolved without an appreciation for the complex linkages between illicit trade and patronage systems, as well as the fact that most African countries view threats as internally rather than externally-driven. Also, it would be difficult to help governments create effective systems of border security when planners do not recognize that organic populations are divided by artificial borders that are located far outside of the functional control of the central government; some leaders do not have the ability to govern outside of narrow territorial areas, and even if they can, they may not have the political will to project power into peripheral regions. Additionally, there needs to be awareness that border security efforts might have broader impacts. Good border security might threaten informal economic systems. The objective for this workshop, then, was to consider African security challenges from this broad lens. One needs to consider governance and economic development, for example, as they are often root causes for security issues that need to be addressed.
Piombo reiterated the objective for the workshop as presented by David Hamon and Jennifer Perry and then delved into a discussion of the process the research team used to plan the discussion focal points for the workshop. The team had engaged in a dialogue about what the security challenges are in Africa, but also discussed which ones the DoD (through AFRICOM) should, and feasibly could, address to support U.S. foreign policy goals. How could the DoD work through the new Command to contribute to existing U.S. Government programs rather than compete with them? Put more succinctly, what challenges could the U.S. military address and how? The team also considered those challenges that Africans themselves would have listed if they were asked. Though this workshop focuses more on the challenges than engagements, these questions framed workshop planning given that the workshop was intended to be a foundation for further discussion and analysis.

Piombo then detailed the process by which the team used to distill the list of challenges that, at the end, became the organizing principle for workshop discussion. She noted that the list of challenges was originally much longer and the research team engaged in many dialogues to scale the list down to several overarching areas and sub-areas. (Note: See section 4 of the appendix for a chart describing the evolution of the list.)

An initial list, for example, further reflected the different priorities and complexities in the region, though it was agreed that one workshop could not focus on all of these with even only surface level discussions. This list included challenges that reflected DTRA/ASCO priorities (proliferation); U.S. Government interests in securing maritime passageways and sensitive resources such as oil; realities of war on the continent; realities of fragile states that have recently concluded a war; larger issues that constrain the ability of African countries to take ownership of their futures (brain drain, research and development); and the reality that there may be future issues that we need to anticipate. At the end of the process, most of these challenges were included but at a broader, meta-level. The speaker asked the participants to consider the challenges at this broader level and in less fine-grained detail than if each challenge was being discussed independently; she also asked participants to focus on points of intersection among the challenges. She also urged them to consider what we know about these problems and what we need to know more about; the criticality of the issues; and which issues the U.S. Government (and specifically AFRICOM) could feasibly address either unilaterally or in partnership with other governments. The overall goal was then to consider where further research was needed and bring out those issues and dynamics that create high-order complexes from which critical problems can and do emerge.

Piombo then discussed the three major challenge areas for discussion, focusing more on the transnational security one than internal and regional conflict and future security challenges/potential flashpoints, given that other participants would cover those introductions in subsequent presentations.

**Transnational Security Issues**

Small arms and light weapons (SA/LW), for example, are a transnational security issue because arms flow freely across borders and without border security initiatives there are few ways to influence this. It also exacerbates many of the factors facilitating internal and
regional conflict in Africa, in particular the spread of conflict across borders. This can include pastoral conflicts especially in areas where the nomadic populations transcend state borders and smuggle and traffic weapons. The Tuareg in Niger, for example, have used their access to these weapons and the mere availability of ungoverned areas for operation as a means to both increase the intensity and damage of attacks and evade government action.

Today, in reality, SA/LW may be considered the true “weapons of mass destruction” on the continent. SA/LW challenges are not limited to proliferation, though their trafficking can fuel conflict. Technological advances allow for these weapons, when used, to have increased lethality and to permit ever younger people to enter conflicts as combatants. Likewise the growth of licensed firearms also fuels the challenge as do the loss of weapons by local security forces and the creation of local arms industries. The large-scale presence of the weapons also creates other challenges in post-conflict recovery such as disarmament and repatriation of combatants and higher trends in crime.

Maritime security is another issue to consider and one that has been cited as a concern for the United States. It is often not of great concern, however, to African governments. For example, there is no universal legal maritime framework in any part of Africa though some sub-regions are beginning to discuss the issue. Likewise, many governments lack the capacity and/or political will to enforce maritime laws and create effective controls in this domain. The Africa Partnership Station is one way the United States, through AFRICOM along with the U.S. Navy component command in Naples, Italy, is creating better awareness of this domain and pushes maritime security initiatives. Maritime security threats and vulnerabilities are varied. They can range from smuggling, oil theft, piracy, fishery violations, and environmental degradation. The potential for terrorists to use these resources is also a concern.

Disease is another topic for discussion. It can be viewed as a security threat because it affects the lives of most Africans on a daily basis. Due to its prevalence, disease could ratchet up to a serious capacity problem at a broad level, impacting the ability of Africa to take ownership of its future, both near and far-term. HIV/AIDS and related deaths are one concern, but malaria and tuberculosis also consistently sap valuable and scarce human and other resources in addition to overwhelming the health care system. Further, disease can skew demographics, adversely impact economic growth, prosperity and educational opportunities, and damage agricultural productivity. A more tangible security concern can also be cited; as disease impacts a significant portion of the professional class and military, political instability could result. Much discussion has taken place about the negative impact HIV/AIDS has had on African military readiness and the African nations’ capacity to respond to conflicts and crises, whether internal or regional.

**Internal and Regional Conflict**

The speaker noted that border issues, spread of conflict and peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, refugees and IDPs, rebels, and post conflict reconstruction issues should all be considered when discussing conflict challenges. The United States, for example, has been heavily involved in initiatives to improve in border security. Peacekeeping has also been a point of investment; at any given point in time, approximately half of the United Nations’
peacekeeping missions take place in Africa. The African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance Program (ACOTA) is one way that the U.S. Government is training peacekeepers and supporting both regional peacekeeping organizations and the African Union (whose ability to create effective forces is still in the nascent stage).

Refugees and IDPs are both issues of great concern to African governments; challenges associated with them include the spreading of conflict across borders and further destabilization of countries already in precarious positions given competing demands and large scale movement of people into one area. Humanitarian assistance is also a complex issue as it has been shown to create as many problems as it solves. Rebel movements also make the security situation more complex. So, a question for the group is what does the U.S. Government, including AFRICOM, need to know about these challenges and their complexities? For example, do they need to know what motivates rebels (materials or ideology)? Or how cross-border linkages affect these movements?

Piombo noted that many challenges could be discussed that relate to post-conflict reconstruction such as the reconstitution of governments, reformation of economic systems, and demining. However, within the security pillar, what challenges can the U.S. Government, particularly AFRICOM, focus on? Does increasing the capacity of African militaries help in the wake of conflict?

**Future Security Challenges/Potential Flashpoints**

To focus discussion, Piombo noted several possible future security challenges. When discussing weapons of mass destruction as a potential challenge she noted widespread agreement that chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons proliferation and use are not a problem today in the region. However, there may be opportunities to exploit security vulnerabilities and traffic weapons and material (such as uranium). Biological agents also naturally exist in many African countries. Piombo then offered some related questions for the group to consider. Will increased African government desires and activities to ratchet up civilian nuclear energy programs as oil prices rise become a concern or should it only be viewed as a positive sign of trying to achieve economic growth? Should research in the chemical and nuclear industries also be analyzed as providing a platform for eventual security problems associated with dual use technologies?

Another potential challenge is competition for natural resources, including oil. One may need to consider how this increased exploration of and competition for these resources might lead to conflict or instability. Also, we should consider what can be done to track these trends.

A third potential challenge, she said, is external state involvement in the region. Much attention has been paid to China’s increasing economic activities and whether the United States should be concerned about this negatively impacting its influence in the region. However, a bigger question is whether the U.S. Government needs to be concerned and if it should be, how can it engage with Africa to compete effectively, not only with China, but also with India, Russia and others? How might it have to deal with perceptions that U.S. attention to this matter is purely strategic, and therefore possibly short-lived?
A final challenge relates to terrorism and radical Islam. There is some debate as to whether this is solely a U.S. concern or whether African governments place significance on this issue. Some experts note the difference between international (mostly anti-western Islamism) and domestic terrorism; while others argued that this is a false dichotomy. In Africa, the latter is usually a label for opposition to governments, especially those that are authoritarian, which confuses the important distinction between opposition and insurgency as expressions of political dissatisfaction and terrorism as a tactic. Though the United States is sensitive to this problem, it continues to be greatly concerned with the potential link between domestic unrest and international terrorism and more broadly, the radicalization of Islam in the region. This begs the question of the genuineness of the trend and its impact on the broader security environment.

Piombo then urged the participants to identify those challenges that were not included in the agenda, but that should be considered, and then to broadly discuss the priorities the U.S. Government should have in addressing challenges (i.e., which challenges and how?) through a whole of government approach, which can include AFRICOM. She noted the major dilemma was that, although these challenges are interconnected, policy responses to them have to be fine-grained and concrete. She offered that the group might consider not only broad engagement, but asked them to consider which multi-dimensional issues might be treated independently in such a way that gains the most leverage? She also asked, in closing, how the divergence in American and African perceptions of the challenges and their priorities might affect the ways in which the United States, including AFRICOM, engages on these issues.

**Introduction to Security Challenges in Africa: Internal and Regional Conflict**

Dr. Carl LeVan, an Assistant Professor at The American University’s School of International Service, noted the importance of examining current U.S. policies on borders and stability in the region to determine their long term impact on reducing and preventing conflict in the region. To understand the possible long-term negative impact, Le Van explained that the United States needs to examine the underlying assumptions of these policies. He described current U.S. policy and outlined underlying assumptions and possible long-term dangers, including the danger of assuming African and U.S. interests will always align in securing borders.

Since 2002, one prominent element of U.S. policy has been countering the threat of weak states to U.S. national security. In 2006, President George W. Bush extended the definition of weak states in the National Security Strategy to include ungoverned spaces because ungoverned spaces could provide havens for terrorists, especially in African countries. LeVan noted three reasons why ungoverned spaces are a prominent focus in U.S. policy and reminded the group that weak states have existed in Africa for a long time long before the argument was made about the possibility of them being used as a haven for terrorists. More broadly, he suggested that the weak states (ungoverned spaces) - terrorism argument is a foundation for current U.S. policy in Africa due to the United States’ overarching goal of fighting terrorism. This focus explains why the United States is interested in strengthening borders and achieving state stability over anything else.
One reason for the emphasis on ungoverned spaces is the U.S. Government’s growing acknowledgement of the importance of non-state actors in international relations. A second relates to the broadness of the failed and weak states (and the government capacity issues associated with them) problem area. Focusing on ungoverned spaces is a way to narrow the framework for analysis and allow for us to concentrate on one measure of government capacity and simplify the problem. We know that not all conflicts and crises in Africa have the same characteristics; to understand all of them, we need to understand the political logic at play in each of them. Understanding this logic may be easier with the narrower framework.

The third reason relates to an emerging border bias in the U.S. Government. During the Clinton administration, expanding commerce and globalization fueled a de-emphasis on borders. However, the Bush administration, particularly after the events of September 11, 2001, has focused on strengthening and fixating borders. This focus reinforces the United States’ reluctance to intervene (in the event of conflict) and interest in addressing the ungoverned spaces problem as part of fighting the war on terrorism. Strengthening borders has both positive and negative consequences. In strong states, strong borders can help reduce conflict, but in weak states, it can provide illegitimate rulers with perceived legitimacy and power. Today, African leaders, especially regional powers, support border strengthening initiatives because it increases their power and legitimacy. This is especially true post-independence. As such, U.S. and African leaders’ interests are currently aligned. However, we should not assume that this will always be true.

LeVan asserts that our efforts to strengthen borders (to eliminate ungoverned states and thereby fight the war on terror) suggest that the United States emphasizes achieving stability over all other goals in Africa. Instead of focusing on developing legitimate institutions and governments, we encourage existing governments to use the terrorism platform to crack down on opposition as long as they fulfill commitments to supporting the war on terrorism. This policy could result in the United States supporting several illiberal regimes over the long-term.

Likewise, U.S. security assistance efforts are generally focused on those states at the forefront of the war on terrorism. Most of these countries are not in Africa. Therefore, we need to ask whether we are rewarding the right countries or just those with whom we currently have common interests. Additionally, are these actions allowing weak states to become weaker over the long-term? LeVan asserts that we are not rewarding the right countries and this policy and related activities will allow weak states to become weaker. He suggested that the United States increase aid to Africa because the benefits of this policy are already apparent. It creates a positive environment in Africa (higher approval ratings of U.S. leadership) which is conducive to long-term engagement. This needs to be sustained over the long-term.

To conclude his presentation, LeVan identified several questions the group should consider as they analyze the current and future trends in conflict in Africa. How do judgments about borders affect debates on intervention, that is, when and how to intervene? Asking this question is particularly critical today because U.S. and African interests align, but this might
not always be true. Additionally, the international community needs to ask another question. It currently embraces power-sharing arrangements as a means to diffuse ethnic tensions and civil violence (though ethnicity itself can be used as a tool for power). However, what are the long-term or residual effects of power-sharing arrangements on governance and accountability? Are we purchasing peace for a price?

Another question relates to ensuring a better understanding of the causes of conflict. LeVan opined that we might be overlooking some causes of conflict, including those which are environmental. Citing climate change as one reason for migration in Darfur, LeVan questioned whether the situation in Darfur is our first environmental war and, more broadly, whether there is a link between global warming and conflict. Lastly, we need to examine how listening to broader African audiences might effect how we help develop institutions in Africa. Noting that African perspectives on security are not always due to paranoia, but may be related to nationalism, LeVan called for a broader analysis of why Africans perceive security issues the way they do. Economic reasons, for example, may have some part in shaping perceptions.

**Introduction to Security Challenges in Africa: Potential Flashpoints/Future Security Challenges**

Dr. Igor Khripunov, an Adjunct Professor at the University of Georgia and the Associate Director of the Center for International Trade and Security, primarily discussed current and possible future trends in weapons of mass destruction proliferation and research and development in Africa. He also briefly touched on the current and future state of natural resource security, terrorism, and radical Islam in the region. Khripunov also considered the possible long-term impacts of other states’ involvement in the region, especially China.

**Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nuclear Power and Radioactive Sources Challenges**

Largely, his presentation focused on why Africa’s lack of participation in international legal regimes aimed at curbing WMD threats was a potential for concern over the long-term. Such legal regimes include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement, the IAEA Additional Protocol Agreement, the International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWTC), and the Treaty of Pelindaba for an African Nuclear Free Zone. He advocated for greater attention to this issue when studying the potential for WMD proliferation in the region. Khripunov noted each states’ participation (or lack thereof) in these legal regimes. Compared to other world regions, fewer African countries are states parties to these and other key international instruments while most of those who have joined have a poor record of compliance. Khripunov noted that these international treaties and arrangements play a vital role in reducing the potential for and/or preventing WMD proliferation and recommended concerted international efforts to get African counties on board with them.

Khripunov also described past nuclear weapons programs in Africa and noted some associated future challenges. While South Africa’s program is now dismantled, he shared his
worry that because the international community did not supervise the country’s dismantling process, the international community is unaware of the level of effort it would take to reconstitute the program if the country so desired. Additionally, the international community is unaware as to where the 1000 people who worked on the program reside today. Khripunov highlighted the opposite experience in the case of Libya, where the international community did supervise; this is a better example of how things should be done. Drawing attention to the situation today, he emphasized the need to encourage the countries that are yet to ratify the Africa-specific Treaty of Pelindaba to do so in order to formalize the nuclear free zone on the continent and help ensure no new programs are put in place.

Turning away from military programs to civilian ones, he cited increased general African interest in civilian nuclear power and research programs that may potentially pose future proliferation problems. South Africa is at the forefront of this research on the continent. Right now it is the only country with two operating nuclear power reactors and its 2008 energy strategy focuses not only on expanding its generation capacity but also on developing a self-sustaining nuclear cycle with uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. It is also serving as an example for others who are also jumping on the bandwagon to build national nuclear power infrastructures. Though they are at different stages in the process of declaring intentions to begin actual work, Nigeria, Egypt, Namibia, Ghana, Tunisia, Libya, Angola, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Algeria, and Morocco are all at different stages of this process ranging from declaration of intent to actual design work. Khripunov noted that any significant breach of safety and security in Africa’s nuclear power infrastructures may pose proliferation problems and have a negative effect on the nuclear renaissance globally and future prospects of energy supply.

Khripunov then described some potential security challenges related to securing radioactive sources, which are widely used in daily African life (medicine, food treatment, oil extraction, and construction). One concern relates to the lack of a security culture to protect the more hazardous Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources on the continent. Without these practices in place, there is a risk of accidents. Likewise, terrorists or their aiders and abettors could steal these sources and use them to conduct radiological terrorist attacks, which is an immediate concern. To make the situation worse, it is quite difficult to account for or track all of the radioactive sources that were imported from or exported to Africa due to incomplete records. He encouraged a concerted effort to get African countries to support and comply with the voluntary IAEA code of conduct to ameliorate the problem. Right now, only half of the African countries support and comply with this code and although it does not have the status of a legal treaty, it is one means to help ensure the security of these sources.

Khripunov then turned his attention away from nuclear matters to chemical and biological ones to discuss past programs and potential future threats from reconstitution. As in the nuclear arena, South Africa unilaterally dismantled its chemical program without international supervision while Libya provided the international community full access to and supervision of its dismantlement process. However, one thing separated the Libyan program from the South African: Libya used some of the weapons it developed or acquired through outside sources in the war against Chad. Khripunov cited the Egyptian program as being the most troubling as it inherited agents from the British and received technical
assistance from the Soviet Union. It is suspected that Egypt used these weapons in conflict against Yemen and transferred weaponized agents to Syria. Further, Egypt is not part of the CWC.

**Securing Natural Resources**

Khripunov highlighted several security risks associated with the presence of uranium in Africa, given that uranium can be used to develop nuclear power. Though an adequate energy supply is necessary for economic development, unsecured uranium can present several security risks. For example, there are a plethora of abandoned mines in the region, many of which are not adequately reported, protected, or inspected. Another issue is weak controls and accounting systems for mining industries that produce uranium as a by-product of mining operations involving other valuable commodities. Additionally, rates of material unaccounted for (MUF) at individual mines usually err generously in favor of surplus making it possible to divert substantial quantities of uranium. The problem is worsened by the level of corruption among African leaders, other officials, and the business community. They may either participate in or turn a blind eye to profiteering or illicit trafficking of uranium. Not addressing these issues today may have a negative impact over the long-term.

**Terrorism and Radical Islam**

The speaker briefly touched on current and future trends in terrorism and radical Islam in the region. Arguing that terrorism has long-standing roots in Africa, Khripunov surmised that terrorism was a strategy used during the 1960s and 1970s in secessionist and liberation movements to bring popular leaders to power. However, due to poor governance issues in many areas, Africa is also becoming a breeding ground for new forms of terrorism, most of which is domestic and not internationally focused – though the forms it takes are very diverse. This problem has had a great economic impact. Khripunov noted that although international (or transnational) terrorism in the name of radical Islam is less of a problem today, there is a potential for synergy between domestic and transnational forms of terrorism over the horizon. Along these lines he cited Islam’s dominance in northern and central Africa (where, according to public opinion polls, more people have positive feelings toward al Qaeda) and noted that high mortality rates in the southern region of the continent could increase South-bound migration from Africa’s North and further Islam’s reach into that region. As such, these trends need to be watched over the long-term.

**External State Involvement**

Khripunov then turned his attention to one final possible security challenge for the group to consider: those challenges associated with external state involvement in the region. Though there are no challenges today, we need to consider what activities may lead to security challenges in the future.

China, as many experts have noted, has the most influence in the region, specifically focused in the commercial, trade, and development arenas. Khripunov expects this influence to continue and probably grow. India, though lagging behind China, is also increasingly interested in Africa. India accounts for 4% of Africa’s exports. In 2008, India hosted a
summit for African leaders (though participation in this summit was far less than a similar summit hosted by China). Russia, though interested, also lags behind both China and India. Russia’s trade with Africa is negligible, but it continues to sell weapons to former client states of the Soviet Union and is looking to assist African states in building their nuclear power infrastructures.

Khripunov noted that none of these activities pose a current security risk to Africa today, but that nevertheless the West, in particular, needs to watch these trends. China, India, and Russia have joined some multilateral mechanisms (IBSA and BRIC Alliances) that are designed to counter Western influence in Africa. Though this is not a security threat in and of itself, decreased Western influence could potentially lead to other problems relating to stability and governance on the continent.
Section 2: Detailed Summaries of Breakout Sessions

While each breakout session facilitator was given the same set of questions for their group to consider and desired outcomes, the direction of the discussions took vastly different forms. In some cases, the questions were not answered or the approach to answering the questions took a different form than that which was originally intended by the research team. The form the discussion took was largely dependent on the members of the groups and their interests/biases/background, and in some cases, the interests of the group facilitators. As such, these summaries of those sessions should be read with that caveat in mind.

The questions included:
- What is the current state of the challenge? What are the prospects for the future and what factors should be considered when thinking about future trends?
- What issues must be considered when understanding how different entities perceive the challenge?
- What role does this challenge play in shaping the overall security landscape?
- What are some points of intersection among the challenges?
- Why is addressing this challenge area important?
- What are some issues to consider when developing plans to address them? Who might play? What role? (Briefly touch on AFRICOM’s role.)
- What research might be necessary to gain a better understanding of this challenge area?

Breakout Discussion 1: Transnational Security Issues

The discussion in this group was largely based on responses to facilitator driven questions surrounding transnational security issues on the continent. The vast majority of the group’s discussion focused on small arms/light weapons and maritime security. Additionally, the participants engaged in brief conversations about public health and disease and discussed the overall implications of the perception of the militarization of aid and the growing influence of China.

(Note: This summary addresses all of the topics which were considered in the session. It is organized topically. In a majority of cases, the discussion points are not presented in chronological order as participants jumped from topic to topic.)

Issues Surrounding Small Arms/Light Weapons (SA/LW)

One participant stated concern over how the SA/LW threat is defined given its complexity. According to this participant, proliferation is not the only issue of concern, though it is the one that is usually cited (including by members of this breakout session). For example, while there are 30 million weapons in circulation in Africa today, this number is smaller than the number of weapons in circulation in Europe. The participant noted that a large number of the weapons sold in the region are legally imported from China to Sudan and are legally sold to countries in Africa that use child soldiers. The problem with SA/LW, then, is not the
number of weapons in circulation but that most of the weapons in circulation are in civilian hands. Another important issue is how the weapons are being used. One concern focuses on the states that do not have laws governing the use of weapons and those that do have laws, but whose laws are ineffective. According to the participant, because of the complexity of this issue, there are multiple entry points to address the problem. Specifically, one does not necessarily need to address proliferation in order to stem the issues associated with SA/LW threats. Other participants disagreed with the comments above and expressed that proliferation was indeed the most important issue.

When discussing options to address the SA/LW issue in Africa, a few participants noted that certain programs, for example DTRA’s SA/LW Threat Reduction Program focused on physical security and stockpile management, were attempting to address the issue of use and ownership. These participants further noted that this represented another instance of the need for the U.S. government to reinvent itself to allow a more integrated, need-driven way of addressing SA/LW security challenges. More specifically, under current SA/LW financing rules, financial support is apportioned for very specific tasks associated to specific types of SA/LW and cannot be used for other tasks. For example, a funding cite reserved for landmine detection and demilitarization cannot be used, if needed, to address issues associated with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). The participants called for Congress to revisit the funding for SA/LW threat reduction with the goal of eliminating some compartments and providing more flexibility to program managers to use the funds where they are needed most. The participants noted that recent attempts to consolidate SA/LW program funding have been successful and expressed the need for these efforts to continue.

The participants stated additional issues with the fact that policies for combating SA/LW proliferation and use emanate directly from Washington, DC and fail to take into account the regional idiosyncrasies on the ground. The perceived desire for a “one-size-fits-all” solution to this issue has driven policy efforts, and according to these participants, a “one-size-fits-all” solution does not exist for these issues with regard to Africa.

In a brief concluding discussion of the issue, participants advocated for a renewed focus on addressing the issue of drug trafficking within the African continent due to its growing importance and malicious effect on West African security. It was observed that drug networks do not merely allow for the supply of one commodity; these networks traffic not only drugs, but also weapons, health supplies, and engage in many extemporaneous illicit activities.

**The Question of Maritime Security**

A participant argued that genuine solutions to many maritime security problems, especially piracy, are local. The participant stated that this realization has only recently come to the forefront, as international interdiction efforts in the maritime world have increased. Addressing the question of whether piracy is a bigger issue now than it has been historically, the participant noted that it really depends on the geographic region. Some regions have historically had more organized and hierarchical piracy organizations, whereas others are experiencing piracy for purely opportunistic reasons. The opportunistic pirates evolve
because they are often ex-fisherman in regions where the fisheries have been over fished and their source of livelihood has essentially been eliminated. While fisherman, these individuals gained experience chasing away poachers, and thus the progression to piracy is a natural one, meant only as a method to earn a living for one’s family. Furthermore, these individuals resort to piracy because their governments do not want to or do not have the resources available to address the situation. Unfortunately, the international community does not have a good handle on how to address this issue either.

According to the participant, the evolution of piracy needs to be studied further and a few major questions need to be addressed. Specifically:

1. Is there a link between piracy and terrorism?
2. As pirates develop their skills, might they adjust their scope and mission? Could they develop into terrorists?
3. How does piracy affect overall international and regional security?
4. How does maritime security (security on the high seas) affect port security and vice versa?
5. How should the international community address these two separate, yet largely interrelated issues?

The participant that offered these questions also provided some context for them. With respect to questions one and two, it was stated that – to this point – there has not been evidence of a link between piracy and terrorism. The participant noted, however, that the individuals involved in piracy, however, are gaining expertise and additional skills, and as their skill levels increase, the question of a link between piracy and terrorism becomes less a question of capability and more a question of intent. With respect to question three, the participant noted that Africa was the “poster child” for complex maritime security issues. The participant stated that all of these issues are interlinked; for example, part of the problem with the relief effort for the humanitarian crisis in Somalia – potentially an issue driving piracy in the region – is that pirates are attacking the ships delivering humanitarian aid. In addressing the context of question four, the participant suggested that, although a premium is placed on port security, it may be more valuable – in the short term – to direct more resources towards broader maritime measures. Port security is a very complex endeavor and is not normally a function handled by the military.

The participants discussed establishing an infrastructure to combat maritime security issues as there was agreement that this was a key question. The participants agreed that a major initiative was needed, but this would also require discussion and coordinated action among major players. It was noted that the current ad hoc methodology for protecting United Nations ships delivering humanitarian aid is relatively successful, and perhaps this could provide some sort of model or organizing principle for developing other solutions.

Some Important Issues Regarding Public Health and Disease

The facilitator posed a question about the importance of health to African security and asked whether the issues surrounding public health and disease should be considered security issues. A participant noted that a major threat to public health today is that posed by
emerging infectious diseases, whether naturally occurring or engineered. Africa remains a hotbed for emerging infectious disease. This is in part due to the “fuzzy borders” between human and animal population interactions on the continent, which can potentially cause higher rates of mutation and increase the likelihood that highly-virulent diseases will emerge.

The participant posited that public health issues posed security issues for Africa for two main reasons:

1. Public health crises (for example, HIV/AIDS) have had disastrous effects on African populations.
2. African public health emergencies (for example, Ebola) can pose a threat to the rest of the world.

Participants discussed the ravaging effects of HIV/AIDS on the continent and the manner in which this disease has created a large population of orphans. These orphans, with few resources and options, become dependent on state support or turn to other means for livelihood, which includes becoming child soldiers. Participants agreed that the HIV/AIDS epidemic has had important security effects on the African continent.

Reflecting the human security emphasis of the workshop, participants also discussed the belief that the population, or the ability to control a population as well as the diseases that are prevalent in a population, forms the bottom of the pyramid in security issues. Given this statement, participants spent some time discussing the importance of women’s health and reproductive rights as an important piece of the ability to maintain population control. Participants noted that this could further expand to a discussion of general women’s empowerment as most individuals generally accept the link between women’s empowerment and broad security issues. Participants briefly discussed methods to nurture these situations which included the provision of micro-credit, education, and other female empowerment means.

The Perception of the “Militarization of Aid” and its Impact on AFRICOM’s Potential Success

The facilitator turned the discussion away from transnational security issues specifically and asked the participants to consider how perceptions of the militarization of aid associated with the standup of AFRICOM, and the effect that this perception might have on broader United States Government activities in the region and the subsequent ability of AFRICOM to have a positive effect in the security arena.

One participant theorized that part of the blowback to the creation of AFRICOM was a reflection of a larger ongoing discussion in the international community over civilian vs. military involvement in geo-political affairs worldwide. According to this participant, many of AFRICOM’s stated goals are merely continuations of actions that the United States was performing before the creation of the Command. However, with its stand up, AFRICOM became the embodiment of this discussion and drew criticism as such – it was created with a “bull’s eye” on its back. This participant posited that the Command has been able to overcome the fears of many of its skeptics through its willingness to scale back on some of its initially stated goals and put people on the ground with the ability to work out any initial
organizational difficulties. The ability of AFRICOM to have a positive effect in the overarching security arena will depend, however, on how well the interagency coordination structure works within the Command. In order to further allay the fears of the skeptics, the participant stated that AFRICOM must demonstrate some quantifiable progress on the ground.

Another participant, while agreeing with the above statements, was positive about the prospects for the eventual success of the Command. First, the leadership of the Command has made it clear that there is a political will to deal with the issues facing both the Command and Africa engagement in general. Second, ten years prior to the standup of the Command, there was great support for its creation in both government and academia. The participant believes that this support will begin to regenerate once some of the initial problems – e.g., organization and staffing – are addressed.

Other participants argued that these problems are not only related to the Command. Instead, in order to effectively address these issues and reinvent the Department of Defense’s approach to security, Congress needs to reinvent the Department of Defense. Moreover, Congress needs to address many of the bureaucratic details of these issues, all the way down to the question of the compartmentalization of funding for the Department – a process that greatly restricts DoD’s tactical agility. Other participants agreed with these statements and further noted that addressing these issues may even require a cultural change so that the problems are viewed from a wider, more strategic perspective.

Overall, participants had varying opinions on the effects of AFRICOM on the region, and generally agreed that the first few years of the Command would serve as a trial period in which AFRICOM needed to establish itself and prove its value-added.
The Importance of China’s Influence in the Region

The facilitator noted that China is spending vast resources to aid in the development of Africa, and often this money is provided with no visible strings attached. This is in direct contrast to the United States, which places conditions on the money that it provides to the nations of Africa. He then asked: in the long haul, what will be the effects of Chinese influence in the region, including region security? Should the United States expand its influence in the region because of China’s involvement in the region?

The participants generally agreed that it would be imprudent of the United States to abandon its selective approach to aid in favor of trying to “compete” with China on the continent. A few participants posited that China’s activities are really only problematic in those countries that are unstable and unable to reject China’s offers. A participant argued that, as Chinese development programs in the region grow, the implications of the invisible strings attached to Chinese funds will become more apparent, complicated, and burdensome to African nations and will likely result in a blowback. The participant advocated for improved lines of communication and cooperation between China and the United States, but expressed the belief that China was much more likely to listen to market forces emanating from Africa than overtures on the issue from the United States. It was noted, however, that influence in Africa is not a zero-sum issue.

One participant argued that the United States should be more concerned about China’s increasing dominance in maritime trade and impacts on the resource scarcity on the continent – especially with regard to oil. It was noted, however, that Chinese growth rates are slowing and that this slow-down will probably affect Chinese levels of international involvement in the near future.

Breakout Discussion 2: Internal and Regional Conflict

This breakout group did not follow the discussion format as specified by the research team, and instead took the discussion in a wide variety of directions. Part of the reason for this was that the ground to be covered was extremely diverse and the group very large, and part of it was due to the fact that the group spent the first hour questioning the way that the workshop was structured and the issues presented to the breakout group for discussion. The participants debated the basic goals of the workshop and what they were expected to achieve in the breakout session. They felt that the discussion items as proposed by the workshop organizers mixed causes and consequences and were too general to be useful points for academic discussion. Because they took a social science-based theoretical approach rather than a policy approach, these participants rejected the way that the issues had been packaged for the workshop. Instead the group preferred to focus on fundamental causes of internal insecurity.

The group also engaged in significant discussion about whose security they were to be discussing – U.S. national security, African people’s security, or African governments’ security. Participants felt it important to determine the answer to this question before engaging in substantive discussion, as each one would involve discussing different factors and impart different emphases into the discussion, and they may contradict each other. This
overall breakout group spent a significant amount of time on these basic discussions about purpose and orientation. Where the following discussion seems disjointed, that reflects this tension which underlined the entire two-hour breakout session.

The group’s discussion also focused on the tension between general policy prescriptions and country-specific dynamics, repeatedly arguing over which perspective should be advanced. The group did not debate, however, the need for local knowledge to be incorporated into U.S. foreign policy, and especially into AFRICOM planning and programs. They suggested that AFRICOM should reach out more concertedly to the academic community on specific issues, to better tailor its programs to concrete realities and to better anticipate possible counter-productive unanticipated effects of actions.

**Whose Priorities and Security?**

The breakout group began with the facilitator presenting the goals of the breakout session and reviewing the questions that would form the basis for the breakout group discussion. Before discussion on the first of these questions (the state of the art of research on the four sub-categories) could go very far, several participants asked the facilitator about perspective. They wanted to know, from whose perspective should they pursue answers to these questions? Are they restricted to U.S. concerns and priorities? Should they consider African priorities?

This second question – what issues must be considered when understanding how different entities perceive this challenge? – sparked a debate about what “African priorities” meant. Which Africans – the state or the people? The concern here was that the interests of African governments and people are often divergent – and sometimes even at odds, especially in the more predatory states. Strengthening the security apparatus of states could sometimes lead to the oppression of the people. Related to this, pursuing the discussion from the perspective of U.S. interests would lead the participants to discuss issues that perhaps were more relevant to the United States than to the African countries – and lead to effects that strengthen oppressive regimes that were favorable to U.S. interests. Participants felt that these issues should be discussed and resolved before addressing the most important priorities for the region. Another question should also be addressed. That is, what was the objective of this workshop?

Some participants argued that it was important to consider each of these three dimensions, because each group has its own ideas about security. To argue her point, one participant asked rhetorically, “Are we going to be secure if we don’t understand the security threats of our partners?” Taking all of this into account, this participant argued that the most pressing priority for Africa is establishing state legitimacy through its people.

Another participant pointed out that there is an important distinction between the “Africanization of security” and “African ownership of security.” The first of these would empower Africans to do the “dirty work” of the United States, whereas the second would allow Africans to use their own forces to address their own issues. This comment initiated a sub-discussion, in which several participants raised the problem that several African governments have begun to label opposition groups as “terrorists” in their bids to retain
power. Ethiopia was offered as an example and many agreed with this as a problem. The discussion also focused on whether African governments wanted stronger militaries merely to oppress their own people, and was U.S. assistance helping them in this endeavor? These participants felt again that it was important to seriously consider whose priorities to discuss, because U.S. foreign policy had initiated this dynamic. Other participants objected to a characterization of African governments as merely desiring more capability to organize lethal force, and that the realities were much more complex. Out of this discussion, some questioned whether African governments had a clear view of their security problems and how those intersect with larger regional issues, and whether AFRICOM discusses these issues with African governments. Some felt that at the country-level, African governments often do not have a clear sense of their security problems, while others disagreed with these thoughts.

Other aspects of this discussion centered on the fact that, contrary to the Ethiopian and related examples, security problems could lead to political collapse, which would further exacerbate the security situation. Sometimes strengthening the government – if accomplished in a way that promoted effective governance – was a beneficial effect of foreign assistance. Kenya was offered as an example, leading to an insight that in these instances, foreign assistance would not only directly benefit the government, but would also further U.S. security interests. Participants agreed that a solution to many of these problems required political sophistication beyond standard security schema (i.e., state-based security). Many agreed that the core issue here is effective governance. Some questioned, however, whether any military can play a positive role in governance as professionalizing armies sometimes only helps to fuel conflict.

The facilitator attempted to resolve the various perspectives and move the discussion forward by proposing that the group consider all three perspectives. She emphasized that the research team had intended to proceed from the perspective of U.S. national interests and African security considerations for the stability of the continent, rather than from the viewpoint of the African governments or African people. It was important to identify whose security the group was considering, however, because although the policy approach is generally state-focused, the state(s) involved may not have international legitimacy or legitimacy on the ground. As such, she proposed that the group take each issue and consider it from both the U.S. and African perspectives, possibly starting over from the top.

_Governance in Africa and State Legitimacy_

There was agreement that this would be a way to proceed, but before the group could turn to the four sub-issues, another question from the floor raised a substantive debate about governance in Africa and how poor and illegitimate governments were often the cause of many problems. One participant characterized international affairs as interaction between governments to resolve pressing issues. But what if the government is the problem? What if the government has no legitimacy? What if the government is ineffective and corrupt? In a region with large swaths of ungoverned areas and poor government control even in the governed areas, how does the U.S. Government effectively pursue regional security?
The issue was raised in this way because most of the group’s participants felt that any list of regional security issues was moot absent a discussion about good governance. In their minds, of paramount importance – especially for the internal and regional security issues of great import – were the leadership abilities of the officials implementing policies. They could not discuss the specific issues in the realm of internal security without addressing the most significant underlying factor – the “elephant in the room,” as some put it. Therefore, much of the following discussion was motivated from a discomfort with addressing the meta-issues that the workshop presented, because these mixed basic problems with the consequences of those problems, and asked the group to discuss both at the same time.

One participant suggested that illegitimate governments are a big part of the internal security problem and should be specifically addressed. She specifically questioned the efficacy of training the security services in border protection and seemed to suggest that the United States would be better off training African militaries not to physically harm their own citizens. Some remarked that as an outside actor, it is difficult for AFRICOM to help build state legitimacy in the region.

Several participants then asked whether or not AFRICOM discusses its policies with African governments, and the extent to which the U.S. military is connected to the realities on the ground. In response to these queries, the facilitator detailed some facts about the on-the-ground decision making processes in Africa today. Embassy liaisons, Defense Attaches and Offices of Security Cooperation are the primary ways in which AFRICOM can engage with African countries. AFRICOM must work through the embassies – all interaction passes through embassy staff, who route communications through African governments and their military control structures. Moreover, everything must be coordinated with the country Ambassadors. Although there are a lot of internal senior level meetings within AFRICOM, they are mostly conceptual at this point. All plans are developed in conjunction with U.S. Department of State (DOS) staff in country, and the Commanders are careful not to make promises without DOS approval due to the range of civil-military tensions that they are dealing with.

The discussion then refocused on the concept of state legitimacy. One participant reiterated the position that state legitimacy is the fundamental issue that will affect Africa in the future. She expounded upon this by proposing that it is essential not just to security issues, but developmental ones as well. One must think about these larger issues to stave off greater future security problems. Several participants reacted by stating that they disagreed with any rationale that granted the U.S. military a role in programs that dealt with issues of state legitimacy and development, while others argued that the military should and could work in a developmental approach, as long as it coordinated with other U.S. Government agencies that would take a leading role in these initiatives. The United States could use these efforts to build up legitimacy through civil-military affairs and therefore, the U.S. military could play an important role in developing state legitimacy in the region. One participant suggested that the group add legitimacy to the list of regional conflict issues to discuss. He recommended that engaging the established regional trade associations might be an effective means of achieving this goal.
Approaches to Developing Solutions to Security Problems: The Importance of Context and the Impact of Policy Tradeoffs

The discussion then focused on U.S. policy, with many arguing that “one-size-fits-all” solutions to Africa’s problems will not work. As such, how can the international community go about providing country – or even local – level solutions to the many issues on the continent? Some participants argued that solutions to Africa’s most pressing issues need to be country specific, and asked the group to follow-up on to how to go about doing this.

The discussion turned to a debate as to whether the United States should/could productively generate a “toolbox” of solutions to internal problems, or if unique policies need to be created for each and every different situation of a country experiencing internal conflict. One perspective proffered the idea that that the United States should take on single problems, not the whole picture at once. This idea held that some of these problems have “inevitable” solutions, and that the United States could tailor the solutions to the problems. There are some things that can be generalized and policymakers could look at the implications accordingly.

Others found this approach unconstructive; they argued that because the solution to each situation needs to be tailored to a specific country or region, creating a “toolbox” to give to AFRICOM would be of little use. One participant noted that the focus should be on short-term stability issues that have long-term ramifications. At the local level, there are things that can improve, and the U.S. can take a leading role in addressing those issues.

The discussion then evolved into a consideration of tradeoffs. What tradeoffs do we face when we promote certain long-term programs over others? Assuming limited resources, how can we best prioritize these goals and solutions? What are the possible unexpected consequences of these long-term programs? The discussion focused on the fact that there is a pattern of solutions to short-term problems actually creating the next long-term problem. Can we shift this pattern? The military becomes a victim of this process. AFRICOM could be part of the solution but it needs a better view of what the problem is. One participant believed that one of the problems that AFRICOM needs to better understand is that some governments and security forces are the problem.

Many felt that as a way to resolve the disagreement between those who desired country-specific policies and general approaches, and as a way to identify the contours of the unanticipated-effects problem, the group could come up with a list of policies that had been developed as general policy prescriptions and then identify possible counter-intuitive results of those policies in some situations. Certain solutions may undermine other solutions. For example, in order to stabilize a country, we frequently end up undermining democracy, which we are also trying to foster. The group could engage in an exercise that would review the policy “toolbox” as well as a warning against it being applied indiscriminately.

Developing an Alternative Analytic Approach

The group facilitator suggested that the group run through the policy toolkit for the four sub-themes of the panel. This returned the group discussion back to its starting place, as it
re-ignited the discussion about the purpose of the breakout group and the difficulty of the issues as described in the workshop agenda. After significant debate, the group resolved to generate new categories that were much more basic than those presented in the workshop agenda. At this point another participant in the group offered to facilitate the rest of the discussion, and so the discussion was alternately led by the original group facilitator and the volunteer. The volunteer suggested that the group create a new list with three columns: root causes that increase the likelihood of conflict, common solutions, and policy tradeoffs.

**Root Causes: Factors that Increase the Likelihood of Conflict**

As with the rest of the process, the discussion of root causes was slightly contentious, with different perspectives about what should be included. The group disagreed as to whether or not the list should include all drivers of conflict, or only those that could be manipulated through policies. The argument was that if there is nothing that can be done about a structural feature, why list it as something to consider in U.S. foreign policy? Others argued that it was still important to know about all the conflict factors, because certain policies could still be designed to mitigate the effects of the factors that seem deeply structural, and not able to be manipulated by policy. There was also a discussion about how the list would change depending on whether it was generated from the American or the African perspective. In the end, the group settled on including some structural/non-manipulable factors, and to list them from the American perspective.

In the end the group was able to agree on a set of drivers for conflict that included the following:

- Bad governance and attendant issues
- Lack of respect for sovereignty/support for insurgents
- Poverty/lack of economic development
- Large populations of young men
- Asymmetry of natural resources/differential resource endowment
- Militant mobilization
- Colonial heritage
- Refugee populations
- Warlordism

At the close of this discussion, one participant pointed out the significance that no one had mentioned religion/Islam as a cause of conflict. While religion may be a component of ethnic conflicts, politicized Islam is not, and this demonstrates that there is a gap between actual policy (focusing on Islam) and what African experts think are important drivers of conflict.

**Potential Policy Solutions and Tradeoffs**

Once the group turned to the task of identifying typical policy responses, the issue arose once more that some felt that creating a toolbox for AFRICOM was not a useful task,
because solutions needed to be country specific. As before, this invited the response that some things were generalizable, and that certain implications can be derived from examining causes.

Ultimately the group arrived at a short list of dilemmas and tradeoffs of specific policy prescriptions (these prescriptions were not being advocated, but merely pointed out as possibilities):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Set</th>
<th>Solution(s)</th>
<th>Tradeoff(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bad governance and attendant issues</td>
<td>Democratization (elections)</td>
<td>When treated as simply the holding of elections, “democratization” can create negative outcomes in societies, especially those with marked cleavages. Holding elections before other conditions are in place to support the electoral process – such as rule of law and stable political institutions – can create conflictual outcomes. Though there is a great deal of research that argues that “democratization” causes violence, in actuality the research focuses on elections – not the full spectrum of what constitutes a democratic system. Therefore, this policy dilemma really revolved around the problem of a policy too focused on elections, and policies that promoted elections before the more fundamental aspects of a democratic government had been instituted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of respect for sovereignty/ support for insurgents</td>
<td>Strengthening country militaries and the ability of governments to monitor their populations more closely Counter-insurgency and surveillance training</td>
<td>Military support and training, especially in surveillance and state strengthening methods, could facilitate oppression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty/lack of economic development</td>
<td>Economic development/post-conflict economic reconstruction programs</td>
<td>Reconstruction may play into local power politics or strengthen unintended actors. There are unintended consequences because foreign aid organizations do not know the region and local warlords are apt take advantage of the system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large populations of young men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues of post-conflict reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee populations</td>
<td>Policing refugee camps</td>
<td>None discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongmen and warlords</td>
<td>Not explicitly discussed</td>
<td>Power sharing governments could create negative incentives in the long-run, as they entrench groups that were powerful at the end of conflict and prevent the rise of more legitimate political players.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetry of natural resources/differential resource endowment</td>
<td>None discussed – non-manipulable</td>
<td>None discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial heritage</td>
<td>None discussed – non-manipulable</td>
<td>None discussed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This analysis was as far as the group was able to progress within the time allotted. The facilitator closed out the session by thanking the group and noting that while the debate had taken many unanticipated turns, the process of the breakout group discussion – both the
Breakout Discussion 3: Potential Flashpoints/ Future Security Challenges

The discussion in this group was largely self-generated and focused more on which future challenges might be important rather than what can be done about them, though the latter was addressed in some circumstances. There was not much general discussion of approaches to identify future challenges and criteria to use to distinguish them from existing challenges, though this issue was raised in the context of discussing several of the challenges. The group focused more on identifying issues of potential interest based on their own research agendas or experience rather than engaging in a cohesive discussion on what the future security environment might look like overall.

The group discussed all of the challenges the research team identified in the list with China and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) receiving the most attention. Oil and natural resource issues received the least amount of attention. The participants also spent some time identifying challenges which were not in the original list of topics to cover. Several of those challenges were discussed at length, including the impact of the global financial crisis. The participants did not address the points of intersection among all of the challenges overtly, though some points of intersections were raised, with the relationship between economic challenges and violence receiving the most attention.

(Note: This summary addresses all of the topics which were considered in the session. It is organized topically. In a majority of cases, the discussion points are not presented in chronological order as participants jumped from topic to topic.)

What Other Challenges to Include?

The participants in this breakout session identified a variety of emerging/future challenges that should be considered that were not included in the project team’s original list. They did not discuss the extent to which these challenges were issues today or the criteria for identifying an issue as a challenge. The variety of inputs demonstrated the lack of consensus of what the challenges could be in the future even among a small group of participants. Some of these challenges were discussed further during the breakout session while others did not receive any further attention.

They included:

- Urbanization
- Youth bulge
- Fluctuation of commodity prices, food insecurity and the impact of the global financial crisis, and reverse migration
- Criminal and other illicit networks
- Water wars
- Climate change
Prevalence of Salafist Islam in some areas and relationship to violence
- Commercial space launch vehicles
- Loss of American influence in Africa
- Expansion of chemical and biological industries and safety, security, and legal compliance concerns
- Increase in number of private security companies
- Availability and spread of shoulder-launch anti-aircraft weapons

**Importance of WMD and China in Shaping the Future Security Landscape**

In addition to identifying other challenges, there was also some discussion of the extent to which some of the challenges the research team included on their list should be studied. Among them, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and China received the most attention and discussion. In particular, the focus was whether they should be included at all. A debate on African vs. U.S. perceptions of threats emerged in this context.

There was some debate as to whether or not Africans care about weapons of mass destruction. Several participants in the plenary noted that the proliferation of WMD is an important security challenge for the United States but not for African governments. In this breakout session, one participant noted that it was important not to generalize the issues about which African governments care. For example, in North Africa (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia especially) the military leaders are concerned about WMD being used, especially by al Qaeda as a means to topple the current governments. The very fact that these countries send observers to WMD consequence management exercises in Europe demonstrates this concern.

Several participants also mentioned the lack of the United States’ attention to some related WMD issues even though it has identified WMD proliferation as a major security challenge. One participant cited African states’ lack of participation in international legal regimes intended to control the proliferation and use of WMD as being the major concern that needs further attention. Several participants highlighted some related research and development concerns. In particular, (civilian) nuclear renaissance and nanotechnology advancements could have possible negative security implications for the continent.

The relative importance of China in shaping the security landscape also emerged as a topic of debate. One participant strongly felt that, although China is heavily investing in the region (using it as a “shopping market”), this investment does not pose any security threat and that discussions of this nature should not focus on a particular state. Labeling China as a threat has to do more with American “economic hysteria” than anything else. He mentioned that any state or group of states (the European Union or a band of Arab states, for example) could try to block the United States’ influence and create instability in the region if it wanted to do so. As such, China should not be singled out and the discussion should focus more broadly on externally-driven instability.
Another participant disagreed and thought China’s presence was driven more by ideology than economics. Although it is not a security threat today, China’s “large scale campaign” for influence in Africa could potentially reduce Western influence in the region which could lead to security concerns. When one participant noted that future leaders of Africa could be studying in places like China, the original discussant retorted that there is no need to worry that Africans are learning communism from the Chinese.

Building on this debate about drivers, the facilitator of this group asked whether the Chinese model of engagement resonated more with Africans than the United States’ model. There was a considerable consensus that the Africans are aware of pitfalls in engaging with the Chinese, but some participants put more emphasis on economic pitfalls while others cited political ones when making this argument.

One participant thought that the model resonates well with government leaders; in some intellectual circles, however, it is important not to generalize across all African states. The more democratic states tend to have less favorable views towards China while the opposite is true for the non-democratic states. It is true that the Chinese are building infrastructure that the Americans do not build in the region, and this does weaken the United States’ influence on encouraging good governance and transparency, both democratic values. Later in the discussion, another participant noted that in some cases, this dichotomy is not always the case. South Africa, for example, is trying to build a sphere of influence in the Southern African region. It views its relationship with China as a means to counter balance U.S. influence and extend its own.

Another participant added that African leaders are well aware of the pitfalls of relying on the Chinese for long-term self-sustaining economic development. Chinese investment in the region is not creating jobs for Africans nor does the country transfer the technology it brings to the Africans. For example, every tractor the Chinese import for a particular development project is exported again when the Chinese leave. Their interests are commercial. Another expert added an additional example to solidify this point. In Liberia, for example, the Chinese sent two battalions – one of engineers and the other comprised of managers – to build a road that led to a copper mine. Once the road was completed, the Chinese negotiated rights to the mine. Thus, there are strings attached to investments. The infrastructure that the Chinese are building is not free; the Chinese government considers them to be loans. Another participant noted that if the United States wanted to counter this influence, it could model its aid after the Millennium Project. Aid without strings is both beneficial and attractive to Africans.

When asked under what conditions Chinese influence could become less benign, the participants offered a variety of responses, but almost everyone focused on the unintended consequences of engagement. One participant offered that because China often has “economic blinders” on, it sometimes takes non-benign actions even if the actions were intended to be benign. One example is the trading of weapons for oil in the Sudan. Another concurred, citing that China does not care who wins a war, only whether it makes a profit. A question to consider is how much of China’s investment is due to entrepreneurialism rather than the achievement of national interests.
Other participants noted the potential for economic destabilization. There was widespread agreement that Chinese practices could have long-term negative impacts on African economies because the economic benefit is self-contained (for example, Chinese industrial parks in Zambia do not afford any benefits to Zambians, because they are self-sustaining). One participant noted that this destabilization was already happening. Small African industries are underselling due to third country quotas; this can be seen in both textiles and in plastics and is due to the flow of equal Chinese goods into the region. Building on this point, another group member mentioned that due to the Chinese flow of goods, it is now difficult to determine where goods are actually made. This allows China to more easily hide dirty elements of their industrial practices.

**Genocide and Implications for U.S. Engagement**

At the urge of the breakout facilitator, the group also had a brief discussion on genocide and ethnic cleansing in Africa. In particular, keeping with the focus on future challenges, they discussed whether there would be future incidents in Africa and the possible implications for U.S. response. One participant noted one way to define genocide is one tribe trying to kill another. Historically, this has been a means of managing power and because there will always be tribes in Africa that would like access to the government and power, there will always be the potential for genocide. Another noted the potential for an ethnic cleansing situation in Guinea when the current leader departs.

Most of the other participants took genocide as a given potential ongoing challenge and focused more on U.S. responses. There was some general discussion of whether the U.S. response (or lack thereof) in the Sudan should be viewed as an indicator of how it will respond to all African genocides in the future. In addition, others cited the challenges of early warning (or lack thereof) and the logistical issues surrounding quickly moving troops to the region. Troops would likely be more involved in aftermath activities rather than preventing the genocide in the first place.

Most of the discussion, however, focused on the need for the United States to prepare African militaries and police to respond and intervene in these crises as needed. Largely the parties focused on what AFRICOM is doing or not doing and could or could not do to support these activities. There was some debate as to whether or not AFRICOM, in particular, had the statutory authority to conduct police training and whether it fell within its military-to military engagement mission space. Noting that the separation of police and military training is not always simple, one participant reminded the group that in the African context, many countries do not distinguish or separate the two entities; they are simply a combined entity dubbed the “security force.” Several other more general challenges involving states training other states were also cited.

Several participants reminded the group that AFRICOM is not the only form of U.S. engagement in the region and does not make any political decisions to act. AFRICOM does not lead all interagency efforts in Africa, but it does provide military assistance to the interagency to execute activities when needed. Further, although the DoD is not involved with police training in Africa, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation has established a law enforcement training academy in Botswana (the International Law Enforcement Academy,
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ILEA). However, there is precedence for a Combatant Command to train police. The Central Command did some police training-related activities in Iraq. Another option to train police forces is for the U.S. Government to work through international organizations or non-governmental organizations.

**Impact of the Global Economic Crisis, Food Insecurity, Poverty, and Violence**

Several of the participants noted that the impact of the current global economic crisis should be considered when discussing future challenges. Given that we do not yet know the magnitude of the current crisis, we do not know the impact it will have on world markets, let alone Africa specifically. Others speculated that the crisis might require reductions in aid to Africa, not only from the United States, but also Europe, which provides more aid and development assistance. Just as Africa was the “greatest loser” in the commodity crisis in the 1970s, it might also be the region most adversely affected by this crisis. This is not only because of possible aid reductions, but also because of the possibility that countries such as the United States and China might recede and stop buying African goods resulting in a loss of markets for Africa.

This discussion on financial crises then paved the way for a more detailed discussion on the relationship between poverty and violence in Africa. Many of the participants cited food security, or rather insecurity, as one of the major challenges in Africa, though one participant was quick to point out that this is an ongoing challenge, not necessarily one that might emerge over the horizon. In particular, the relationship of this insecurity to patterns of violence might be studied further. This study might also need to consider the role of migration in changing this relationship.

One participant used the example of cooking oil to make this point. In Africa, cooking oil is sold at state subsidized prices. Given the global financial crisis, African governments may have to raise these prices. Many people would be directly affected by this change because they would no longer be able to afford to buy it and could therefore starve. Given that most Africans now live in cities, there is greater proximity between the hungry people. When most Africans lived in rural areas, these situations would result in many starving to death in silence. Now there is a potential for hungry people to band together out of anger and potentially engage in large-scale violence.

Another participant wondered whether this situation might also cause mass reverse migration. That is, the impoverished in the cities might move back to rural areas creating a further strain on refugee camps. New leaders, many of whom the United States is not aware, could rise in the countryside. There was some disagreement on this point. Another participant noted that reverse migration would not largely impact where leaders come from. Future leaders, even if this situation occurs, would still come from the same family lines as current leaders. These leaders would likely be educated oversees, studying in the United States, Europe, or China.
Emergence of Radical Forms of Islam in Africa

The discussion of how Islam is practiced in Africa, in particular possible future directions, proceeded along several lines. The degree to which Africans are attracted to various forms of Islam was the primary focus of discussion, though the relationship between the practice of Islam and violence was also discussed. The participants did not reach a consensus about future directions in the practice of Islam on the continent, but they all cautioned against making sweeping generalizations about Islam in Africa due to the complexities involved.

Several participants noted that one cannot generalize how Islam is practiced in Africa at the state level, let alone at the regional level. Citing Nigeria as an example of the complex religious situation, several pointed out that one cannot generalize about the religious situation at a state level due to differences between the various sub-regions. The ways in which Islam is practiced and the extent to which it is practiced (and by whom) is due to both religious and tribal/ethnic factors. One participant also noted the need to consider the historical context when analyzing northern parts of Africa (and Nigeria in particular). Muslims settled in these areas during their hajj to Mecca because they were too tired to return home. The historical role of British colonialism also needs to be considered.

Several participants also noted the importance of considering how the entry of external radicals acting in the name of Islam into Africa can have security implications. One cited how the war in Iraq was pushing more radical Muslims into Africa while another described the situation in Algeria to reiterate this point. People are returning from Iraq to Algeria and implementing tactics they learned there. As a result, the number of car bombs and the use of improvised explosive devices have increased in recent years. Likewise, there had never been a car bomb in Somalia until a few years ago. Last year, there were 37 car bombs. These patterns need further attention.

Another participant connected these examples to a larger point. There are many security implications linked with the failure to understand “who is traveling where” on the continent and failure of the ability to track those movements. Citing the illicit and hidden trafficking of WMD, related materials, and technical know-how as one of those possible security issues which can arise, the participant urged further attention to development of ways to track movements, not only of terrorists but also students of science (knowing where they studied). In a comment that tied the discussion back to the original one on religion, another participant noted an even bigger issue. A lack of knowledge of religious issues in country on the ground, particularly which religious leaders are influential, can hinder the United States’ ability to understand these complexities. Yet another participant noted that American business entrepreneurs in the region can be an excellent source of information about who is influential in a particular area.

American Access to Business in Africa

A detailed discussion emerged on ways in which the United States could facilitate more American business entrepreneurship and promote long-term economic development in Africa in the future. Some also discussed AFRICOM’s role in securing American access to
business in the continent. In this context, the participants also discussed the interrelationship between business, corruption, and instability.

One participant noted the benefits of ensuring access of American businessmen to Africa. More engagement could facilitate a better understanding of on-the-ground considerations and promote adherence to Western values. While the United States is currently mostly focused on the selling of goods, the country needs to build more partnerships with Africans in the business sector. American businessmen bring Western values and an understanding of good ways to do business with them when they go to Africa. Thus, to help Africa develop economically over the long-term and promote U.S. values, we need to have more businesses on the ground so that these businessmen can meet the right people and build long-term partnerships where there is a mutual benefit. This is easier said than done, however, because of the challenges associated with setting up businesses in the region (money and time).

Another participant questioned whether there would be an additional benefit to promoting entrepreneurship in Africa. Given that some African governments do not have the capacity to govern or provide for their citizens, and corruption continues to be a problem, might we look to businesses (African) to conduct social responsibility activities to fill in some of these deficiencies? That is, is it possible to require these companies to invest extra profits into the country’s infrastructure? A business expert in the group noted that many large companies already uphold their end of social responsibility contracts. However, a problem is determining what the African governments can do (and how) to uphold their end of the contract. The intersection between business and government is complex.

Bringing the discussion back to what the United States can do to ensure long-term African development, one participant reminded the group that the U.S. Department of Commerce is still conducting activities on the continent, including the implementing the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). AFRICOM did not absorb this activity or any other interagency activity, but assuring interagency access to these activities is part of its mission space. Others pointed to a deficiency in the number of (and resources for) American foreign commercial officers to go to Africa to support these activities as being one challenge to consider. One participant noted that this lack of attention could have security implications. We need to consider how the interagency is addressing illicit trading and trafficking problems in all of their complexities. For example, traditional drug routes can be used to transport humans. If an organization can transport humans illicitly, it can transport most anything. One participant noted that human trafficking is an issue which concerns AFRICOM.

**Which Challenges are the Greatest Ones?**

At the end of the session, the participants discussed overall which challenges they thought were the “greatest security challenges.” Though they were asked to answer this from both an American and African perspective, they largely concentrated on the American perspective. Duplicative answers are not identified.
- Weapons of mass destruction and nuclear research and development (the nuclear renaissance)
- Proxy wars related to resource competition
- Terrorism and the radicalization of Islam; the rise of other religious-inspired movements
- Inability of African governments to cope with societal transformations such as urbanization and demographic changes
- Coping with external phenomena out of African control such as climate change and the global financial crisis
- Lack of African compliance with the international legal protocols
- Economic underdevelopment
- The capacity of the United States to deal with African security problems at a political level
- U.S. commercial engagement
Section 3: Detailed Summaries of Plenary Discussions

**Reports from Breakout Sessions**

Representatives from each of the three breakout sessions reported the group findings back to the larger group. While all of these reports took different forms, largely due to differences in the direction of discussion in the breakouts, they highlighted the diversity of views on what African security challenges are and how they should be analyzed.

The spokesperson for breakout session three highlighted those potential flashpoints that should be considered that were not included in the original list and those challenges that the members considered to be priorities to address (see the discussion of breakout session three for further details). The identification of youth bulge as a security challenge resulted in some debate among the broader group. One person cautioned against labeling overpopulation as a security challenge. Another argued that a youth bulge is not problematic in and of itself; it only becomes a security issue when there are no job opportunities for the young.

The spokesperson for breakout session two took a different path and shared with the plenary session some concerns his breakout group had raised regarding how it was being asked to analyze the conflict challenges. One question it had related to whose security challenges are being analyzed. Challenges for the United States or challenges for Africa? Another was the need for local level, on the ground knowledge to analyze these challenges. A third related to the need for country-specific solutions. One cannot talk about solving security challenges on a general level because there is no one size fits all approach. As such, AFRICOM will need to regularly call on experts, including academics, to achieve goals. Lastly, the taxonomy that the research team came up with for the conflict challenge area was problematic because it was a mix of causes and solutions.

The group chose to focus on this last challenge and develop a new taxonomy. This included factors that increase the risk for violence, U.S. policy solutions to address those factors, and the various policy tradeoffs that need to be considered when analyzing these policy prescriptions (see the discussion of breakout session two for further details). The group spokesman cautioned that the policy options the group came up with were not recommendations, but rather a list of all options to consider. A discussion then ensued between several participants in the group which highlighted a major source of debate in the breakout session on factors that increase the risk for violence. That is the sequential relationship between the promotion of rule of law and violence, which is a larger source of academic debate.

The participants discussed military training, one of the policy tradeoffs the group identified. There was widespread agreement on the need to consider second and third order effects when making policy prescriptions and implementing them. In particular, internal repression and external wars cannot serve as reasons for not proving training as repression will happen with or without training. In essence, if the United States does not provide training, then some other entity will. There was also agreement that human rights and professionalism should be included in any military training curriculum, given the prominence of these issues today.
The spokesperson for breakout group one noted the need to consider the small arms and light weapons threat more broadly. We should not focus just on proliferation, but also misuse of weapons, and issues associated with the legal trade of these weapons. There was also widespread agreement in the group that disease should be analyzed as a security issue given that the presence of disease undermines stability and Africa-unique diseases pose a threat to the broader international community. Additionally, chronic diseases should be analyzed and issues associated with an increased number of orphans due to high rates of these diseases. The group highlighted increased attention to maritime security issues, especially piracy, within the international community. However, further research needs to be done on the degree to which there is a link between piracy and terrorism. A larger debate in the plenary ensued about the positive and negative aspects of using private security companies to protect commercial vessels. Another participant raised the need to consider the links between piracy security challenges and corruption (in the case of Somalia, for instance, the president is entwined with pirates). The group also highlighted narcotic and drug trafficking as one additional challenge that should be considered.

**Closing Remarks**

Mr. David Hamon of DTRA/ASCO reiterated the need for interagency coordination in U.S. engagement in Africa. The development of a coherent strategy has been underway for a decade and AFRICOM should be viewed as a signal the government realizes that it cannot compartmentalize its attention to Africa issues over the long-term. He reinforced that this workshop is the beginning of a process to better understand the security challenges in Africa and how they intersect. ASCO will convene follow-on efforts to better understand implications of these challenges for U.S. engagement. These inputs can be used to inform long-range planning at AFRICOM, but also for DTRA as it considers how to develop strategic plans for activities in this region.
## Section 4: Evolution of Content from Initial Planning to Final Workshop Agenda

<table>
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<tr>
<th>First Cut</th>
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| 1. Proliferation Challenges  
   a. Weapons of Mass Destruction  
   b. Infectious Disease  
2. Border Security  
3. Regional Conflict and Instability  
   a. Democratization and Governance Issues  
   b. Role of Rebel Force  
   c. Role for Military Forces  
   d. Military Force Issues  
   e. Post-conflict, DDR and Security Challenges  
   f. Ethnicity  
   g. Migration and Refugees  
   h. Peacekeeping Issues  
   i. Civil Wars/Peace Issues  
4. Science and Technology Issues  
   a. Biotechnology  
   b. Brain drain  
   c. Energy security  
5. Emerging Challenges  
   a. Oil, Resources  
   b. China or other foreign influences in Africa  
   c. Economics  
6. Potential Flashpoints / Future Issues  
   a. Oil & Resource Competition  
   b. Nuclear Energy & Exploitation of Uranium  
   c. China & Other International Actors  
   d. Land and Environmental Pressures  
   e. Terrorism/Radical Islam  
1. Transnational security issues  
   a. Small arms/light weapons  
   b. Maritime security  
   c. Disease  
2. Internal and regional conflict  
   a. Border issues, spread of conflict and peacekeeping  
   b. Humanitarian assistance, refugees, and IDPs  
   c. Rebels  
   d. Post-conflict reconstruction issues  
3. Potential flashpoints/future security challenges  
   a. WMD and R&D developments  
   b. Oil and natural resource competition and exploration  
   c. Terrorism and radical Islam  
   d. China and other states |