Terrorist-Related Aircraft Incident Table-Top Exercise (TTX)

Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, California

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BACKGROUND:  
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) was founded in 1998 to integrate and focus the capabilities of the Department of Defense (DoD) that address the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat. To assist the Agency in its primary mission, the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) develops and maintains an evolving analytical vision of necessary and sufficient capabilities to protect United States (U.S.) and Allied forces and citizens from WMD attack. ASCO is charged to identify gaps in these capabilities and initiate programs to fill them. ASCO also provides support to the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC) Federal Advisory Committee, and its supporting Panels, with timely, high-quality research.

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Executive Summary

On Thursday, 20 October 2005, the United States (U.S.) Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) San Diego, California, hosted a daylong table-top exercise (TTX) that explored the role and relationships of military and civilian agencies during the response to a terrorist-initiated crash of a civilian airliner. Focusing primarily on processes, plans and organizational representatives unique to the San Diego Metro area, the TTX was designed both to educate the participants about activities across organizational boundaries and to facilitate subsequent planning for actual mass-casualty cross-jurisdictional events. By establishing person-to-person introductions and interactions, the exercise would foster an environment in which future coordination efforts could be conducted from a confidence-building base of professional familiarity. From a broader perspective, it would prove useful in providing a forum and scenario that would instigate the sort of thought and discussion applicable to crisis response planning and execution in any metropolitan area.

The MCRD San Diego TTX provided a unique opportunity for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (DTRA/ASCO) to directly support the U.S. Marine Corps in assessing continuity of operations issues following a terrorist attack that impacts one of its two recruit depots. In addition, this forum allowed the participants to explore the critical dynamics associated with a reversal of the Defense Support to Civil Authorities paradigm as the success of the incident response and recovery on a Federal installation hinged on critical external civilian assets. This exercise built upon the 28 February 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), “Management of Domestic Incidents”, that requires all Federal departments and agencies to adopt the NIMS (National Incident Management System) for domestic incident management and was particularly timely in view of the subsequent 13 December 2005 Marine Corps Administrative message (MARADMIN) 589/05 titled “USMC Roles and Missions in Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities.”

Participating in this event were over seventy personnel from local, regional and Federal organizations representing the functional responsibilities of incident response and recovery for a mass-casualty terrorist event. The scenario and event-driven discussion were crafted specifically
to foster a dialogue on five themes that have historically caused friction during mass-casualty events:

- Incident Command System / Structure
- Communications
- Emergency Medical Services, Hospital Response and Mortuary Affairs
- Security
- Media and Public Information.

A significant contributing factor for the success of the TTX was a series of planning conferences and meetings that commenced six months earlier. The dedication and professionalism of the San Diego emergency response community was well demonstrated by the valuable time and effort that were committed to these sessions. In addition, the frank manner in which MCRD San Diego expressed its desire to explore the dynamics of initial civilian support and command of an emergency response aboard a military installation provided the foundation for a candid and fruitful discussion.

In many aspects, the operational issues presented and discussed were well understood for a scenario that occurs within the jurisdiction of San Diego County or City. In particular, the participating civilian response organizations demonstrated a well-tuned awareness of incident response and command requirements as well as inter-organizational roles and responsibilities. While the involvement of a Federal installation did not change these functional requirements for incident response, they did raise important issues concerning incident command, mutual aid and inter-jurisdictional coordination. The need to ensure civilian-military coordination measures and processes are in place before an event occurs emerged as the fundamental “take-away” from this TTX.
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Chapter 1: Exercise Overview

On 20 October 2005, a one-day table-top exercise (TTX) was hosted by the Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego (MCRD SD), California, in conjunction with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Fort Belvoir, VA. Exercise participants included broad representation of first responder and support organizations from the City and County of San Diego, key stakeholders, such as the San Diego Airport Authority and the San Diego County Emergency Operations Center, as well as local and regional military commands. Federal representation included the Federal Security Director for San Diego, regional representatives from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and representatives from the FBI’s San Diego Field Office. The MCRD San Diego TTX provided a forum in which DTRA’s Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (DTRA/ASCO) could directly support the U.S. Marine Corps in assessing continuity of operations issues following a mass-casualty terrorist attack incident that impacts one of its two recruit depots. In addition, this forum provided a unique opportunity for DTRA/ASCO to explore the critical dynamics associated with a reversal of the Defense Support to Civil Authorities paradigm because this scenario involved a military installation as the scene of a significant incident with outside civilian support being critical to incident response and recovery.

This exercise built upon the 28 February 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), “Management of Domestic Incidents”, that requires all Federal departments and agencies to adopt the NIMS (National Incident Management System) for domestic incident management and was particularly timely in view of the subsequent 13 December 2005 Marine Corps Administrative message (MARADMIN) 589/05 titled “USMC Roles and Missions in Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities.” A complete list of attendees and the organizations they represented is included in Appendix A.

Statement of Purpose:
Focusing primarily on processes, plans and organizational representatives unique to the San Diego Metro area, the TTX was designed both to educate the participants about activities across organizational boundaries and to facilitate subsequent planning for actual mass-casualty cross-
jurisdictional events. By establishing person-to-person introductions and interactions, the exercise would foster an environment in which future coordination efforts could be conducted from a confidence-building base of professional familiarity. From a broader perspective, it would prove useful in providing a forum and scenario that would instigate the sort of thought and discussion applicable to crisis response planning and execution in any metropolitan area. It was deliberately designed to highlight issues associated with inter-jurisdiction coordination and incident management within the context of a mass-casualty terrorist event that simultaneously impacted both San Diego International Airport (Lindbergh Field) and Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego (MCRD SD). Through a scenario-driven discussion, critical issues, such as organizational roles, responsibilities and capabilities between MCRD SD, local, state and Federal agencies, were to be explored. Resultant findings and issues discussed in this TTX should positively impact organizational and regional operational readiness through refinement of local response plans and crafting of memoranda of agreement between applicable agencies. Further, these same findings and issues should be extrapolated to, and studied by, other metropolitan areas with a significant military presence.

**Table-Top Objectives:**
The primary objective of the TTX was specifically to address five key theme areas that have historically created friction during the response phase of mass-casualty events: incident command; communications; emergency medical services (EMS), hospital response and mortuary affairs; site security; and public information/media. These topics were explored through a scenario-driven discussion that focused on immediate response actions as well as functional responsibilities and assisted in highlighting continuity of operations requirements for the Depot. More specific objectives are enumerated below.

1. **Incident Command System** - foster a better understanding of the mechanics of the Incident Command System (ICS) and interrelationships involved within a Unified Command System construct.
2. **Communications** – identify communications requirements and current gaps in the ability to meet these requirements.
3. **EMS, Hospital Response and Mortuary Affairs** – enhance the understanding of San Diego’s mass-casualty response plan (Annex D to the San Diego County Emergency Operations Plan) and the roles/responsibilities of the participating organizations in supporting this plan (to include the inter-jurisdictional issues associated with operating on a federal installation such as MCRD San Diego).

4. **Security** – explore the roles and responsibilities of the various local and Federal organizations in establishing and maintaining site security during a mass-casualty terrorist event that simultaneously impacts both a civilian and a Federal jurisdiction.

5. **Public Information / Media** – identify immediate and long-term requirements for public information management during a terrorist/mass-casualty event and the anticipated timeline for addressing these requirements in order to ensure a consistent and adequate information flow to the media and the public.

**Exercise Administration and Logistics**

Funding and overall sponsorship for the TTX were provided by the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Fort Belvoir, VA. As the host for the event, MCRD San Diego provided significant administrative, logistics and intellectual support to the exercise. ASCO representatives coordinated extensively with the Depot Operations Officer and his staff prior to the exercise to ensure Marine Corps and other participants’ goals and objectives would be adequately addressed. Critical to the success of the exercise was the contracted support that enabled the production of exercise materials, coordination of participant information, documentation of exercise proceedings and lessons learned and facilitation of exercise discussions.

The TTX was conducted in Building 622 (PAC-100 classroom) aboard MCRD San Diego. The agenda for the exercise is located in Appendix F.
Chapter 2: Pre-Exercise Planning and Coordination

Critical aspects of this exercise process revolved around a series of pre-exercise coordination meetings and discussions. These sessions allowed the exercise planners to identify, and more fully understand, the critical issues that could arise during a mass-casualty event that simultaneously impacted MCRD San Diego and Lindbergh Field. Through these candid exchanges, participants were able to gain an appreciation for the various operational capabilities and requirements of regional emergency response organizations, as well as identify opportunities for mutual aid and support.

Preliminary Discussions and Planning

The genesis for this exercise was the conduct of an earlier TTX that brought pertinent representatives from the San Diego area together to address issues related to a notional outbreak of an infectious disease and its impact on area organizations. Recognizing a need to conduct exercises that would address greater levels of civilian/military interaction, MCRD San Diego requested DTRA/ASCO to support another TTX focusing on continuity of operations issues and crisis response actions resulting from a mass casualty event aboard the Depot. As the San Diego International Airport shares a common boundary with MCRD San Diego, it was further requested that the scenario consider a civilian airliner crash that would impact several distinct and mission-critical facilities aboard the Depot. This request prompted ASCO to develop a credible scenario in which a civilian airliner, while inbound to Lindbergh Field, was attacked by terrorist-launched man portable air defense system (MANPADS) missiles, precipitating a crash landing that impacted the Depot. In order to achieve the desired level of credibility, ASCO representatives coordinated scenario development with representatives from the Missile and Space Intelligence Center, the San Diego Federal Security Director staff, the Federal Aviation Administration and airline pilots. To further enhance the scenario’s effectiveness, a rich graphics package was developed for presentation with the scenario narration. These visual stimuli served both to focus the audience’s attention and to envelop the participants “in” the scenario and thereby set the stage for a very interactive exercise.
The development of a comprehensive list of pertinent participants was equally critical in ensuring the effectiveness of the exercise was. ASCO representatives coordinated with representatives from MCRD San Diego, the San Diego local first responder community and various other local, state and Federal organizations to ensure that all those who would actually be involved in the incident management of a mass casualty event were represented at the exercise.

Finally, during preparatory activities for the exercise, ASCO representatives conducted a comprehensive document review of Federal and local response plans in order to ensure the event would adequately exercise existing contingency plans.

**Initial Planning Conference (IPC) – 10 March 2005**

On 10 March 2005, an initial planning conference (IPC) for the TTX was held aboard MCRD, San Diego. The purpose of the conference was to familiarize exercise coordinators with Depot facilities (both those that would be affected by the airliner crash and those in which the exercise would be held), discuss the merits of the developing scenario, refine the prospective list of participants, discuss key stakeholder objectives and agree upon a firm exercise time and date. Participants at the IPC included representatives from DTRA/ASCO, MCRD San Diego, the San Diego Federal Security Director staff and the San Diego first responder community. As the primary customer, MCRD San Diego presented their vision for the exercise, thereby setting the stage for an inclusive and collaborative planning process that would ultimately lead to a successful outcome.

**Mid-Point Planning Conference (MPC) – 13 May 2005**

Approximately two months after the initial planning effort, a mid-point planning conference (MPC) was held aboard MCRD, San Diego (see agenda, Appendix B) to assess progress in preparing for the exercise and to discuss emergent issues pertinent to its conduct. After briefly reviewing planning efforts to date the assembled group, which largely consisted of the same participants as in the IPC, began to delve into the details of initial command and control for the incident in the scenario. The purpose of addressing this potentially divisive issue up front was to establish a reasonable understanding among the exercise participants of how command and control would conceivably evolve given an incident of such scope and complexity as described
in the scenario. Rather than take an excessive amount of time during the exercise to address the issue, it was judged prudent to come as close to an understanding as possible on who would do what in the first hours of the incident. While discussions in the MPC did not provide an absolute understanding of the roles of all potential responders, it certainly provided for all present a greater appreciation of how command and control, as presented in the Incident Command System, may evolve.

The remainder of the conference was devoted to determining the details of planning for the final planning conference and in confirming tasks for relevant coordinators and participants in preparation for the exercise itself. The agenda for the MPC is located in Appendix B.

Stakeholder Meetings and Interviews
During the week of 18-22 July 2005, exercise planners conducted fifteen meetings with various stakeholder organizations in the San Diego region (see Appendices C and D). The goal of these discussions was to gain an appreciation for the roles and responsibilities of these organizations during a mass-casualty aviation incident and also to highlight possible actions they would take within the context of the scenario. A secondary objective of the discussions was to identify any issues the stakeholders would like to have added to the TTX in order to enhance any training requirements or objectives that they might have. These discussions proved to be extremely beneficial and laid the groundwork for the Exercise Playbook (Appendix G).

Final Planning Conference (FPC) – 13 September 2005
One month before the TTX, a final planning conference (FPC) was held aboard MCRD San Diego (see agenda, Appendix E). The initial focus of this meeting involved an overview of the conduct of the TTX and last minute administrative and logistical requirements. The majority of time was dedicated, however, to professional briefs by the various stakeholder organizations that would participate in the exercise. These detailed presentations included an overview of the capabilities and perceived responsibilities of the participating organizations. This session proved to be a significant educational exchange for all of the participants and served to codify much of the pre-exercise planning that had previously taken place.
Chapter 3: Table-Top Exercise (TTX) - 20 October 2005

The morning commenced with opening remarks by BGen. John M. Paxton, Jr., the Commanding General of MCRD San Diego/Western Recruiting Region. BGen. Paxton told the participants that he was particularly interested in the incident command aspects of the scenario since he would have civilian responders coming onto the Depot to lead the initial incident response. From his perspective, there were three questions that should be addressed by all participants in an actual crisis response situation: What do I know? Whom have I told? Who else needs to know? He felt that this exercise would provide the foundation for getting at the right answers to these questions. BGen. Paxton thanked all of the civilian organizations for their participation and emphasized that this was a unique opportunity for the Depot, as well as for the City and County of San Diego, to jointly discuss a plausible event of this scope involving all the assembled participants.

Following BGen. Paxton’s remarks, the participants were given a detailed description of the structure (Appendix F) for the morning and afternoon sessions of the TTX. This was followed by presentation of the actual exercise scenario.

Structure of the Table-Top Exercise (TTX)

The TTX was conducted in two distinct phases using two different methodologies. The morning session took place over a period of three hours and explored the roles and responsibilities of the various local and regional stakeholders for the immediate phase of the incident response. This phase was characterized by an event- and inject-driven framework and mirrored the first three near-real-time hours of an incident response.

The goal of the afternoon session of the TTX was to explore key operational and functional issues that must be addressed during the hours to weeks after a mass-casualty terrorist event occurs. As opposed to the morning session in which numerous organizations were considering a myriad of immediate and simultaneous response actions, the afternoon session explored a single critical issue at a time. This approach allowed the other participating organizations to understand the operational and jurisdictional responsibilities of specific stakeholders and to make the
stakeholders appreciate ongoing requirements of the other organizations, as well as how those organizations might be able to support the stakeholder’s mission.

Six topics were selected as primary themes for the afternoon session:

1. Transitioning Incident Command from Incident Response (SDFD) to Recovery and Investigation
2. Investigative Issues and Requirements (FBI, NTSB and NCIS)
3. Media Relations and Public Information Management
4. Mortuary Affairs and Next of Kin Notifications
5. Counseling Services and Victim Assistance
6. MCRD SD Continuity of Operations Issues and Requirements.

In order to broach these issues in a deliberate and time-conscious manner, a decision-making tool called PKU Analysis (“Presumed, Known and Unknown”) was employed. PKU Analysis involves co-locating a group of decision-makers, stakeholders and supporting organizations and discussing items that are Known, Presumed and Unknown about a particular issue they are trying to resolve. By airing these issues in a group setting, the PKU process allows all participants to achieve a common situational awareness, based on what is known and understood by the other participants. If, for instance, an Incident Action Plan were being crafted, the meeting would end with people and/or organizations tasked to answer any issues identified as Unknown.

The strength of this approach is that it ensures that individual stakeholders actively participate and verbalize their requirements; it clearly highlights the assumptions of the various organizations; and it provides a structured and simple process for a group to think through a particular issue. For the purposes of the table-top discussion, however, the PKU process had mixed results in that it provided a good framework for individual organizations (such as the Medical Examiner and NTSB) to discuss their requirements, but it did not enhance the discussion of inter-organizational relationships and authorities. These issues were still explored in detail, but the use of PKU analysis was more useful for highlighting existing roles and responsibilities than for exploring new ones.
Exercise Scenario – 20 October 2005

0745:
The day begins without a cloud in the sky. Although not yet 8 AM, the two men, dressed to blend into the terrain, have already worked up a sweat as they settle into their tediously-scouted firing positions, three miles apart, in the remote area between San Miguel Mountain and the Sweetwater Reservoir (Figure 1). Soon, each thinks to himself, the detailed planning over the past several months will pay off. The man farthest from San Diego International Airport is the first to see the approaching aircraft, on the well-established path of all flights from the east. As the aircraft passes just to his south, he picks up its track, observes that the guidance system of his SA-7B (man-portable shoulder-fired missile) (MANPADS) (Man-Portable Air Defense System)
has locked onto the IR (infra red) signature of the aircraft’s right wing-mounted engine, expertly applies the appropriate amount of lead and super-elevation in respect to the target, silently prays for success and fully depresses the trigger mechanism. Even as the warhead streaks to intersect its target, the gunner has already dropped his weapon and started to change clothes as he prepares to head to the all-terrain vehicle that will, he is confident, allow him to escape.

0755:

Transglobal Flight 123, an Airbus 300-600 with a complement of 253 passengers and 7 aircrew members, is completing a very routine non-stop flight to San Diego (SAN) from Dallas-Ft. Worth (DFW). At this near-terminal point in the flight, the aircraft is about 4 minutes from touchdown and is descending at an airspeed of 190 knots through an altitude of 5000 feet in the vicinity of San Miguel Mountain, about 15 miles east of San Diego, as it approaches Lindbergh Field. Immediately after checking in with SOCAL approach and lowering his landing gear, the pilot feels a substantial vibration on the right side of the aircraft. He sees the right engine fire warning light and experiences a loss of power in the right engine, followed shortly by the hydraulic warning light. He has no idea what has happened, but he shuts down the right engine and activates the engine fire suppression system. The fire persists (Figure 2). He calls the control tower at Lindbergh Field.

Pilot: “Tower, this is Transglobal 123 on final, Runway 27. I am declaring an emergency. Number two engine on fire and losing hydraulic fluid. Request clearance for emergency landing.”

Tower: “You are cleared to land Runway 27, wind southwest at 225 degrees at 20 knots. Equipment rolling. Advise if you need further assistance and please provide souls on board and fuel in pounds when you can.”
Pilot: “Tower, we have two six zero souls on board and 8,500 pounds of fuel remaining.”

The tower immediately declares an Alert 3 and notifies FAA’s Regional Operations Center at LAX (which, in turn, notifies the Domestic Events Network [DEN]). Tower also notifies SOCAL control of the emergency.

The pilot instructs the crew and passengers to prepare for emergency landing. About 45 seconds after the first impact, at about 12 miles from the airport, now at approximately 4000 feet, the pilot feels a second shudder from the right side of the aircraft, more violent than the first. (Homing on the very significant IR signature of the heat generated by the first missile impact, the second of the two SA-7B’s has impacted the same wing, damaging control and lift-providing surfaces, and producing fragmentation that shreds the tires on the deployed right rear landing gear.) Experiencing increased difficulty in controlling the aircraft due to the damaged control surfaces on the right wing and a reduction in lift due to structural damage to the wing, the pilot increases his airspeed to maintain directional control capability.

As the pilot of Transglobal 123 struggles to land his aircraft safely, the pilot of nearby Rainbow Flight 369 from San Francisco (SFO) to San Diego contacts San Diego tower.

Rainbow 369 Pilot: “Tower, this is Rainbow 369. Approximately three zero seconds ago I observed two separate smoke trails from the ground to Transglobal 123, ending in what appeared to be explosive impacts. There’s fire and smoke now coming from 123’s right wing.”
Tower relays this new information to the local FBI office and the San Diego City Police, then waits for Transglobal 123 to land.

0758:

As Transglobal 123 flies over Balboa Park and continues on its path to Lindbergh Field, residents on the ground notice the crippled airliner and flood 911 with emergency calls (Figure 3).
Transglobal 123 touches down farther along the runway and at a landing speed much greater than normal. Unknown to the flight crew, and unobserved by the tower, the shredded tires on the right rear landing gear expose the bare metal of the landing gear rims to the runway surface. Fighting a 20 knot crosswind, the pilot is forced to “crab” the plane in and thereby puts additional force on the right rear landing gear. The result is that the damaged landing gear, without the shock-absorbing rubber tire, digs into the surface of the runway upon impact. The extreme momentum of the more than 100 tons of aircraft proceeding at nearly 150 knots, coupled with the abrupt deceleration of the right side of the plane, forces the aircraft to veer sharply to the right and slide towards the Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego (MCRD SD) (Figure 4).

As the airliner pierces the fence that separates Lindbergh Field and MCRD SD, it plows through two platoons of Marine recruits and associated staff members standing by to train on the bayonet assault course. As the plane continues to skid, the left wing and tail section break off and strike
the MCRD training pool building (Figure 5), causing the roof to collapse on recruits waiting for their swimming instruction class. The building’s chlorine tank ruptures and the contents vaporize.

![Figure 5: Recruit Training Pool Hazards](image)

Fuel from the left wing fuel tank ignites as it sprays over other recruits and staff members (Figure 6). Vapor from the chlorine tank and smoke from the burning fuel and debris drift towards MCRD buildings. In its continuing path, the main body of the plane destroys multiple vehicles, some occupied, parked in the lot just south of the receiving barracks; the right wing shears off the plane in the parking lot and the fuselage, with the bulk of the passengers and crew, impacts the southeast corner and east side of the barracks, containing Marine staff members in their offices or tending to recruits and recruits undergoing in-processing. As the plane comes to rest in the barracks, smoke from the fires from the parking lot and burning buildings begins to drift over the nearby classrooms and other buildings, including the day-care center. The time is now 0801, six minutes after the initial attack.
Figure 6: Impact Inside the Recruit Training Pool

Figure 7 is the detailed overview map of the incident site / impact area.

After being presented with this detailed scenario and accompanying slides and graphics, the table-top participants were led through a detailed inject-guided discussion on the anticipated immediate response to this event.
Figure 7: Overview of the Incident Site / Impact Area
**Morning Discussion – Immediate Response**

The morning session of the TTX focused on the immediate response and initial actions taken by the Depot and the civilian response organizations throughout the San Diego region. A detailed description of the discussion follows below and is framed within the context of the Event/Inject List (Playbook) that was used (see Appendix G). All actions described are notional and took place strictly within the context of the table-top environment. They are presented in the present tense to give a better representation of the dynamic environment and rapid actions triggered by the scenario among the participants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event / Inject (Discussion items and participant feedback marked by an “-“).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0755</td>
<td>Transglobal Flight 123 receives first impact from SA-7B on right engine. Declares emergency to Lindbergh Tower and requests immediate clearance to land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Lindbergh Tower declares an Alert 3 (During the initial discussion, San Diego Fire Department (SDFD) representatives expressed their initial response as for an “Alert 2,” which is sounded when “an aircraft approaching the airfield or on the ground is experiencing difficulty.” The Lindbergh Tower representative stated that, for this scenario, she would sound an Alert 3, which is used when “an aircraft accident requiring rescue and/or fire fighting has occurred or is imminent on or near the airport.” This difference in perception would have minimal impact in immediate response actions as SDFD would take its cueing from the alert level signaled by the Tower; airfield crash crew assets would be immediately deployed in an Alert 2 or Alert 3 scenario. Further, the actual aircraft crash occurs within a few minutes of the initial notification, which would precipitate an immediate increase in alert level and associated fire fighting resource allocation to the crash site.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Lindbergh ARFF (Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting), located near the base of the Control Tower, receives a crash alert via the airport red phone and immediately pre-positions two fire rigs (3,000 gallons of water each) between the tower and the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
runway and a smaller crash rig (1,500 gallons) at the approach end of the runway. Transglobal 123 is still approximately three minutes out from the airfield at this point.

- San Diego Fire Department (SDFD), which also includes Lindbergh ARFF, receives the Alert 3 notice and immediately deploys thirty-six (36) trucks, which include a mix of engine companies, truck companies, heavy rescue assets and emergency medical services (EMS) assets.

- Federal Fires (Fed Fires) Station 15, located aboard MCRD, currently does not receive airfield alert notifications and is therefore not deployed as part of the Alert 3 process. Their first indication of this scenario unfolding is when the aircraft pierces the fence line and crashes through the training facilities and barracks.

- Lindbergh Tower activates “CrashNet”, which is a notification system for all of the principle players and departments within the airfield (airfield operations is also developing a web-based emergency notification system that includes text messaging and can be used by operators, supervisors, assistants, etc. This system was not in place at the time of the TTX).

- Notification of the event is disseminated via the Domestic Events Network (DEN) after the FAA Regional Operations Center at Los Angeles International Airport is notified by Lindbergh Tower. (Created after the events of 9/11, DEN provides an immediate nation-wide alert to the FAA, NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command), DoD, TSA and the White House that an aviation event of potential concern is taking place.)

What are the immediate actions by Lindbergh ARFF?

- The three pre-positioned fire rigs from Lindbergh ARFF have followed Transglobal 123 through the broken fence line and begin to apply water and foam to the closest areas impacted by the crash. (An artificial aspect of this TTX, as with all TTXs, is the tendency to “over-game” the various actions and activities that key players would
conduct during a real crisis. This can create misperceptions among the other participants about what would occur during an actual event. To avoid this tendency, the participants in this exercise were asked to provide examples of operational and functional considerations that would influence their decision-making during a real event. In certain cases, participants were also asked to provide specific operational decisions that are considered representative of a real-world response. The following first responder actions follow this framework.)

- Because a crash has taken place, SDFD sounds a 3rd alarm and possibly a 4th alarm, which will double the number of responding assets and personnel (an Alert 3 is an automatic 2nd alarm for SDFD).

- For the Lindbergh ARFF and other arriving SDFD assets, the first priority is saving lives. The Lindbergh rigs approach the impact site and fires from the upwind (southern/western) side.

0801 What are the immediate actions by Airfield Operations?

- Since Lindbergh Field is a single runway airport, all departures and all arrivals are stopped.

- Aircraft inbound to Lindbergh Field are put into a holding pattern 20-30 miles west of the airfield (over the ocean). (While this location will keep the aircraft safe from any possible follow-on MANPADS attacks from land-based shooters, the low holding altitude (down to 5,000 ft) would make the aircraft vulnerable to any sea-based shooters.) Lindbergh Field may hold aircraft in this area for up to an hour before they divert them to alternate airfields (sooner if aircraft are held at lower altitudes because that results in higher fuel consumption rates).

- Lindbergh Field establishes a temporary 5-mile No Fly Zone (Temporary Flight Restriction) (TFR) around the airport.
The Commanding General walks into the G-3 office and asks for an initial status report.

- The initial action by the G-3 staff is to pull the training schedule in order to get a quick snapshot of who is training and where.

- The G-3 recommends that the Commanding General not go to the incident site.

- MCRD has a mass notification system that can notify critical departments within 2-3 minutes. The G-3 employs this to stand-up an incident cell (the Depot Ops Cell) with 3-4 people).

Fed Fires at MCRD arrives at the incident site. How do they coordinate with Lindbergh ARFF?

- Fed Fires (Station 15) at MCRD is notified of the incident by either their proximity to the crash site or the call out that occurs when SDFD sounds a 3rd alarm after the crash. Fed Fires receives notification of a 3rd alarm directly from SDFD dispatch.

- Station 15’s immediate response is one engine and one BLS (Basic Life Support) vehicle. They arrive on scene with one captain and three firefighters.

- Overall, Fed Fires within San Diego has a larger presence that includes five engine companies and three ambulances. They are directly requested by SDFD and, for this scenario, fall under the incident command structure established by SDFD.

San Diego FD and PD assets on Alert 3 begin arriving.

- Many of the fire assets that are dispatched under the Alert 3 are on scene or arriving as Transglobal 123 crashes. Those assets already on scene will report to the captain from Lindbergh ARFF and begin staging their assets (time permitting). For the initial few minutes of the response, the captain from Lindbergh ARFF is the incident commander, though his immediate focus is on saving lives and putting out the fire. Incident command will be taken over by the first-arriving Battalion Chief from SDFD.
Among the arriving SDFD assets are ten engine companies (20 engines total), four truck companies (8 trucks total), ten EMS units, one communications van, one light/air support vehicle, a heavy rescue unit and a hazmat unit. In addition, Helicopter 1 may be available to provide an overhead perspective.

All arriving fire vehicles need access to the airfield via either Lindbergh Field Gate 2 or Lindbergh Field Gate 4. San Diego Harbor Police (SDHP) is responsible for opening these gates and has roving patrol vehicles available and on-call to do so in a timely manner.

The immediate priority for all of these responding fire units and their commanders is RECEO:

- R – rescue (remove victims)
- E – evacuation/exposures
- C – confine fire
- E – extinguish fire
- O – overhaul fire (ensure no lingering heat sources)

San Diego Harbor Police (SDHP) receives the Alert 3 notification via the CrashNet and immediately sends patrol units to the designated gates in order to facilitate access for the responding fire units. In addition, a patrol vehicle will stage at a pre-designated road (Winship Lane) alongside the commuter terminal in order to meet and escort arriving San Diego Police Department (SDPD) units across the tarmac to the incident site. SDHP will pull in resources from the terminal, existing patrols and admin staff in order to surge their numbers and meet these requirements. SDHP has communications compatible with SDFD and SDPD, but not with MCRD Provost Marshall’s Office (PMO).

SDPD stages five units at a designated road (Winship Lane) alongside the commuter terminal. A Supervisor arrives within five minutes. Once SDHP or a representative from airport facilities arrives, the five SDPD units deploy toward the incident site.
The initial plan for SDPD is to develop and execute a traffic control plan in conjunction with MCRD PMO and SDHP (the incident commander soon requests PD assets for area control and to assist with the evacuation of civilians and Marines from the incident site). Additional units from SDPD Western and Central divisions are requested to assist.

- The PMO has eight MPs (Military Police) on watch and has immediate access to an additional ten ground security force members and twelve back office staff. The initial notification to the PMO of the crash most likely comes from Fed Fires, since they are co-located in the same building. The PMO may receive initial guidance from the G-3 or may deploy towards the incident site in conjunction with Fed Fires.

- To facilitate the arrival of the emergency response vehicles, the PMO opens (for this table-top scenario) MCRD Gates 1, 4 and 6. As a precautionary measure, the PMO will hold normal traffic at the gates and not allow them entrance to the Depot.

- Media representatives are held at the gates and are not permitted access to the Depot.

0806 The Commanding General or designated representative arrives on scene.

- This representative (from the G-3 shop) reports to the incident commander at the incident command post.

0807 During the course of the scene size-up, chlorine fumes are detected in the vicinity of the Receiving Barracks, Pool and South Parking Lot.

- The PMO closes (but does not lock) Gate 5 as this gate is directly under the plume. The PMO uses a vehicle-mounted PA system to warn people about the potential danger.

- The Child Development Center will decide for themselves whether they need to evacuate since PMO resources are already fully taxed. The Child Development Center has an internal evacuation plan, but it will be significantly influenced by the
Center’s own assessment of the particular circumstances, the population of children and the population of attendants. Use of vehicles for evacuation will be on an “as available” basis.

- Emergency personnel will link-up with building managers to ensure that their facilities are evacuated and the occupants moved to safe areas. MCRD buildings should all have evacuation plans.

- If MCRD personnel and the visiting families of recruits are evacuated off of the Depot, a request may go out to the American Red Cross to determine whether a temporary shelter is available for these people.

- SDFD will model the smoke/chemical plume to establish the scope of the release and to estimate where it is going. This is not an immediate process so the initial reliance is on field reports in order to gauge the hazmat release. As a temporary measure, the incident commander assigns control and evacuation from the plume area to SDPD but will add SDFD assets and reprioritize if the release appears to be a significant event (SDPD assets do not have PPD (personal protective devices)).

- Personnel being evacuated from the incident site will be watched/monitored for any possible effects from the chlorine exposure.

- Table-top participants are asked whether they are concerned about hazardous material or cargo that may have been on Transglobal 123 (though not all airline companies permit the shipping of hazardous cargo). SDFD states that they will rely on a report from the airport or airline. All burning aircraft are viewed as hazmat sites, anyway, so the focus remains on saving lives.

0808 MCRD notifications: Who would MCRD initially notify at this early stage?
- Depot Ops Center (DOC) starts to gather its designated personnel and the Council of Colonels is brought together. An initial phone notification to HQ U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC) is made within 30 minutes.

- Recruit Training Regiment (RTR) starts initial accountability actions for their recruits.

0809 The first Battalion Chief from SDFD arrives: describe the evolution of Incident Command.

- The first arriving Battalion Chief establishes an initial incident command post (ICP) out of the back of his red Suburban vehicle. This is initially located out of harms way approximately 100 yards upwind from the incident site (though the location is at the discretion of the incident commander). The location and size of the ICP will change as the event evolves.

- Utilizing the well-established constructs from the Incident Command System, the incident commander starts to give arriving units assignments. Units are broken down into divisions, each of which have a specific area of responsibility within the incident site, and into groups, each of which have specific tasks they must accomplish. The incident commander will select and prioritize these assignments based on reports he receives from the incident site.

- The response to this event involves a mix of civilian and military organizations that do not all have compatible communications, capabilities and plans. The incident commander therefore places heavy emphasis on ensuring that all of these organizations have a representative physically located full-time at the incident command post. These individuals have to be more than just liaison officers; they must have the authority to make decisions on behalf of their organizations. This is especially important for the Depot as they lack communications systems compatible with the responding civilian agencies.
- Information on where to stage fire and EMS resources (separate locations) is relayed to SD Fire Communications. Airport operations will assist, as desired, with making areas within the airfield accessible for staging areas. MCRD San Diego PMO will do likewise for areas within the Depot boundary.

- A Unified Command Post (UCP) that includes all of the key stakeholders will be created within a few hours (after the immediate response to the crash is conducted).

- PD assets (SD Harbor, SD and PMO) are directed by the incident commander to assist with the evacuation of people from the incident site and Depot. Fire fighters will not be pulled off the response to help with evacuation.

0810 Provost Marshall’s Office (PMO) and SD Harbor Police identify the need to ensure a secure perimeter.

- SD Harbor PD does not have communications systems compatible with MCRD PMO. Therefore they establish face-to-face liaison at the ICP. The PMO mobile command post has three UHF, one VHF and one 800 MHz radios, as well as a vehicle-mounted camera system. At the time of the table-top, PMO did not have the 800 MHz frequencies – or authorization to load – for the San Diego response agencies.

- An inner security perimeter must be established around the incident site and the outer perimeter around the Depot must be enhanced. SD Harbor PD establishes security on the airport side of the fence. The PMO “deputizes” every Marine available for assistance and focuses on clearing the incident site from the inside out. The immediate focus is the movement and evacuation of the families who are aboard the Depot attending pre-graduation events.

- To facilitate the movement of over 800 family members, RTR (Recruit Training Regiment) will move their graduating recruit company to the command museum and instruct anxious family members to proceed to the museum in order to see their sons. Once the families are reunited, it will be easier to control the civilians/families and
their emotions/concerns and the decision can be made whether they need to be moved off base. If they remain on base, they can possibly be moved as a group to the Bayview Restaurant at the western end of the Depot.

- The goal is not to impede the arrival of the emergency vehicles, but MPs at the gates are also confronted with unmarked law enforcement vehicles and self-deploying (non-requested) first responders. The MPs can direct these vehicles to the designated staging areas, at which point the staging area officers can make a judgment on what to do with these assets.

- The gates are intentionally designed for security purposes as choke points. If the MPs have to stop and screen every vehicle (and in some cases get bogged down in long discussions with drivers who are demanding access to the Depot), this can block access to the Depot for emergency vehicles. It is recommended that PMO coordinate with SD Harbor PD and SDPD to have all inbound traffic screened several blocks from the designated entry gates in order to ensure there is sufficient room for emergency vehicles to pass those vehicles lined-up requesting access to the Depot.

- Once established, the inner perimeter will be strictly for emergency activities. (Once this event is designated a terrorist event, the inner perimeter will also be significant for investigative and evidence-gathering activities).

0810 Large numbers of San Diego City Fire, EMS and ambulance assets begin to arrive at MCRD gates.

- Separate staging areas are established for fire fighting and EMS assets. For this scenario, fire assets are staged near the bottom of Washington Street (depending on the plume) and EMS assets are staged closer to the impact site, but not to impede traffic flow.

0811 A firefighter in the vicinity of Building 622 (the Receiving Barracks) notices what could be an ammunition bunker.
Fed Fires has pre-fire plans that involve all of the facilities on the Depot. These plans include assessments of any potential hazards associated with material located or stored within a facility. The incident commander therefore requests clarification from the Fed Fires representative at the ICP about the content of the ammunition bunker.

If it is determined that explosives are in the bunker, then a 300 foot barrier may be created around the bunker until more information is available. If it is small arms ammunition and not directly exposed to fire, it may not be considered a hazard.

Should it become necessary to clear the area, a fire truck will sound three long blasts on its air horn and this alarm will be echoed by other trucks. To sound the all clear, units will be notified individually to resume operations.

Local television stations break into regular programming to provide coverage of the crash.

To proactively engage the media, MCRD will send PAOs (Public Affairs Officers) to the airport and ask media to meet them there. The goal is to assemble the media away from the incident site, though it is likely that media will be sending representatives to both the airport and the Depot. (Though the airport can accommodate the media, it is likely that they will want to have live images from the incident site.) PAO will be getting its guidance from the DOC.

The Depot and first responders want to have a clearly established information center, though a formal Joint Information Center (JIC) will not be in place in the first fifteen minutes of an event. The interests of each organization need to be represented to the media but the message going out also needs to be synchronized with the other PIOs (Public Information Officers) / PAOs.

The SD Fire Department PIO responds to the Incident Command Post and can provide initial information about the incident, though the immediate focus for the incident commander at this early stage is responding to the incident. Previous
experience with the Cedar Fire demonstrated that having the media within the ICP is not a good situation and seriously distracts from the incident action planning process.

- Lindbergh Field PIO can provide coordinating media information via its web-site, to include any designated meeting places and times for future press conferences/information dissemination opportunities.

0815 SDPD informs PMO that preliminary information indicates this is a MANPADS incident.

- The “Council of Colonels”, previously collected in the Depot Operations Center (DOC) (advisers to the MCRD Commanding General) will consider this issue and whether it mandates an increase in security procedures on the installation. Since screening is already fairly tight and the initial attack on Transglobal 123 was not specifically directed at MCRD, increased security at the gates is most likely not necessary.

0820 Print and TV reporters and crews start arriving at Depot gates demanding access.

- MCRD asks Lindbergh Tower whether the 5-mile No Fly Zone can be expanded to keep news helicopters away from the incident site. They cannot do this unless a hazard to airborne aircraft is identified; the chlorine plume and uncertain locations of the MANPADS shooters (or other potential shooters) may provide such a justification, however.

- Since it is early in the response and a formal information center is not in place yet, the procedures for handling the media are focused on denying access to the incident site and trying to establish an alternate location for gathering the media. The table-top participants are aware that the media will go elsewhere to develop their stories and get the video shots they desire, but there is no readily available alternative solution that would not impact the immediate focus of incident response.

0821 San Diego Mobile EMS coordination post arrives.
- The SDFD Deputy Chief for EMS arrives most likely within ten minutes of the Alert 3 sounding and begins to set-up the Medical Branch within the Incident Command System (ICS).

- Medical Communications (MedCom) is established.

- Annex D (Mass-Casualty Response) of the San Diego County Emergency Operations Plan is activated.

- The immediate EMS focus is Triage, Treatment and Transportation.

- Triage is conducted by the arriving EMS personnel and involves the separation of all of the victims into those who are walking wounded (“Minor”), those who require Immediate treatment and those who are deceased. An initial call is made across the incident site for all those who are able to move to go to a designated upwind location close by for further evaluation. Most of these victims will be triaged as Minor. The EMS crews then move through the incident site with their triage tags and designate the remaining living victims as Immediate or Delayed. The Immediate victims are moved to a casualty collection point where they are re-assessed and prioritized for transportation.

- Previous drills between San Diego EMS and the MCRD Branch Medical have demonstrated the compatibility of their triage skills. For this scenario, the MCRD corpsmen and doctors will be able to fall under the EMS structure and support their efforts.

- The goal is to have two patients to one ambulance. SD EMS will utilize private ambulance companies from around San Diego. These resources will be activated when the MedCom initiates communications with the designated “base hospital” for this event (UC-San Diego), which, in turn, has the responsibility for initiating a regional hospital bed count and activating ambulance services.
- At this point, all victims are identified strictly by the numeric code on their triage tag. The recruits who are injured on the training fields and in the pool do not have dog tags. The identification and tracing of the victims will have to be worked backwards after they have arrived at the hospitals—some within the county, others outside the county.

- The number of burn victims is at least thirty and will immediately overwhelm the burn capacity of San Diego’s burn centers (eight beds total). Coordination is initiated to transport excess burn victims outside of the San Diego region; this includes the use of medevac helicopters.

0822 Mothers and fathers of children in the Child Development Center arrive at MCRD gates.
- Many of the parents for these children do not work on the Depot and therefore need to get back on in order to pick up their children.

- The Child Development Center will move the children off base to the Lincoln Housing area, which is across the street from the Depot. Parents will be notified via a cell phone recall roster and via the media about where to go. Potential confusion on notifying parents may result since not all children are regular attendees of daycare, but are instead periodic drop-offs.

- The PMO will not allow the parents inside of the base perimeter.

0824 Local and national television stations begin to show footage of casualties and bodies strewn across the incident site.
- The San Diego County Medical Examiner’s office emphasizes that these bodies cannot be moved due to identification and investigative requirements. They can, however, be covered with blankets and tarps. An exception is that bodies can be moved if they impede responder vehicle access for fire fighting.
- SDFD and SDPD state that it is in their training not to move fatalities and instead to focus on the living victims.

- The initial assertion of many MCRD participants is that bodies will not be left out in an open field on display (even if they are covered with a blanket). This point of view was tempered after extensive group discussion that focused on investigatory requirements as a rationale for not immediately removing remains from their post-crash positions. Most players left the TTX with an understanding of why remains could not be moved initially.

- Whether the media would actually show images of bodies on TV was discussed, but recent experience with Hurricane Katrina made most of the participants feel that the media would have no problem crossing this line.

- Nothing should be removed from the bodies since such items assist in the identification process.

0830 The Federal Security Director (FSD) arrives at the incident site.
   - The FSD goes to the ICP for a briefing.

   - A PFO (Principle Federal Official) will not be declared until later, if at all. This assessment is made because it was judged that this event would in all likelihood not overwhelm the capabilities and resources of local assets.

0832 MCRD base operators and other phones around the Depot begin to receive numerous phone calls from relatives of recruits.
   - The Depot will establish a 1-800 information phone line and ask the media to broadcast this number. Because of the large volume of incoming calls, the Depot will ask for assistance from some of the regional phone bank resources (such as San Diego’s 2-11 system).
0835  FBI SAC (Special Agent in Charge) or ASAC (Assistant SAC) for San Diego arrives.

- Due to the initial reports of smoke trails from the ground to the aircraft during its approach, the JTTF (Joint Terrorism Task Force) is already activated and the command post stood-up. The decision on whether to locate the command post in the field or back at the regional office would be made by the SAC, though there would be representation at the ICP.

- Preliminary considerations for the FBI and JTTF are to establish a crime scene once the incident response is over and to interview victims and witnesses. The FBI and SDFD representatives both voiced a balanced understanding of the need to focus initially on the saving of lives while preserving as much evidence as possible.

0845  Transglobal chief of operations at Lindbergh Field, after consulting with corporate headquarters, needs to gain access to the crash site in order to provide situational awareness to headquarters.

- As the Unified Command structure is put into place, Transglobal will have a representative within the UC and can coordinate with PMO for access and escort into the scene. It is understood that this access is strictly for internal airline use and requirements so the participants assess this request as reasonable. For this scenario, the incident commander states that he would welcome an airline representative at the ICP to aid with information flow, so this may facilitate access to the incident site for the airline representative.

- At this point, Transglobal is also pulling the flight manifest down from its electronic system and initiating contact with the American Red Cross for the anticipated family assistance requirements.

- If family members of passengers call Transglobal to confirm whether they were on the flight, Transglobal will provide this confirmation but not any casualty information.
0900  SD County Medical Examiner arrives and commences initial planning and coordination for mortuary affairs.

- The process of “gridding” the impact site is critical since it allows for the careful annotation of where aircraft fragments and bodies/body parts were located. This facilitates the investigative process and the ability of the medical examiner to properly and expeditiously identify body parts. All bodies are considered to be evidence. If bodies have to be moved in order to facilitate the initial life-saving response measures, then records should be made of their original locations within the incident site.

- Because the deaths occurred on the Depot, the Armed Forces Medical Examiner would have exclusive federal jurisdiction for both civilian and military cases. The Armed Forces Medical Examiner has the jurisdictional responsibility to sign the death certificates for the military casualties that occur aboard the Depot. However, the death certificates for the civilian casualties have to be signed by the San Diego County Medical Examiner in California, even if their remains are shipped back to Dover Air Force Base (AFB) to assist with the identification process. Exclusive of legal direction to the contrary, it would be appropriate for the Armed Forces Medical Examiner’s Office (AFMEO) to work with the San Diego Medical Examiner's Office, particularly if the cases were done in San Diego and needed the county's infrastructure. The cases could be done at Dover AFB but would receive a California death certificate. The authority for such decisions would reside with the FBI and Department of Justice given this scenario.

0930  Initial requirements for American Red Cross and volunteer management/support.

- The American Red Cross will send a liaison from its Critical Response Team, which is an organization within the American Red Cross created specifically to assist airlines with the logistical and emotional needs of the families and loved ones of the crash victims. This team comprises different response sections of sheltering, family assistance, mental health and physical health, among others.
Since it has a national presence, there is most likely an American Red Cross office/representative in the towns and cities of all of the victims and this network will be very important for family assistance.

1015 NTSB representative arrives from the Los Angeles office.

- NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) receives immediate notification from the FAA and sends 4-5 people down to the incident site. The primary mission for these individuals is to work with local officials and establish accident scene security/integrity once the fire fighting and rescue operations have ceased. In addition, if the flight data recorder and/or cockpit voice recorder (the “black boxes”) are recovered during the initial response, the NTSB representatives will take control of these items. Finally, the Los Angeles office team will start collecting witness statements and coordinate with the FAA for ATC (air traffic control) audio tapes, radar data and controller statements.

- The NTSB “Go Team” is activated in the National Capitol area and will arrive in San Diego within 24 hours. The Go Team members will join the representatives from the Los Angeles office in collecting witness statements and ATC data. In addition, the Go Team will secure a location for wreckage reconstruction. Upon arrival, the Go Team will assume the lead NTSB role in the investigation.

- The fact that this is a terrorist event does not initially impact the NTSB involvement. Although the FBI will in all likelihood be designated as the lead Federal investigatory agency, they welcome the presence of and assistance from the very capable and experienced NTSB investigation team.
Afternoon Discussion – Response and Recovery Operations

Transitioning Incident Command from Incident Response to Recovery and Investigation

A clear understanding and agreement was demonstrated by the fire and law enforcement participants of the process for transitioning incident command from immediate response to a more deliberate recovery and investigative mode. However, some discussion and disagreement occurred over the question of having the Commanding General of MCRD or the FBI as the follow-on unified commander. Those in favor of the FBI considered that the terrorist nature of this event mandated an FBI lead. Those in favor of the CG MCRD lead believed that he was the primary stakeholder for the recovery phase and therefore should head the recovery effort. The participants stated that a Unified Command structure would be in place at this point and would naturally facilitate the selection of the follow-on commander. Based on the ensuing discussion, the participants seemed to emphasize a lead FBI role due to investigative requirements for the event but a definitive Unified Commander was not named.

Known:

- Throughout the first several hours of the immediate response for this scenario, the SDFD maintains incident command.
- Meetings are held every hour in order to assess operational requirements and draft Incident Action Plans (IAPs). The IAPs assign tasks to specific individuals and organizations to address and then report upon when the next meeting takes place.
- As the fire is extinguished and the immediate life-saving actions are accomplished, the incident commander prepares to transition the IC lead. To facilitate the transition and associated coordination requirements, meeting frequency is reduced to every 30 minutes until the transition officially occurs.
- Law enforcement agencies concentrate on site security and setting up a Joint Operations Center (JOC). The location of the JOC may be at the incident site or at the regional FBI office. If the JOC is located at the regional office, a liaison from the JOC would be located at the unified command post. The JTTF is also stood-up to facilitate multi-agency evidence recovery efforts.
Presumed:

- The MCRD will try to reestablish normal operations as rapidly as possible.

Unknown:

- While this is a terrorist event involving a MANPADS attack, it is likely the response and recovery efforts will not overwhelm local capabilities and resources. Therefore it is not known whether it will be labeled as an “incident of national significance” under the National Response Plan.

- Who would be the Unified Commander once the transition occurs and does the MCRD have the assets to run a Unified Command post 24/7.

Investigative Issues and Requirements (FBI, NTSB and NCIS)

Known:

- The existing JTTF structure is well suited for the multi-agency investigative and coordination requirements that are necessary for this event.

- The FBI will directly coordinate with the FAA and the NTSB on all investigative matters, to include obtaining radar tapes to assist with debris recovery and the identification of MANPADS shooter sites. The FBI will also interview the pilots of the Rainbow flight who saw the smoke contrails and request passenger manifests from any flights that were in the area at the time so that passengers can be interviewed.

- It will take 2-3 weeks to document the site and move the aircraft wreckage to another location.

- This incident will require 24-hour security around the incident site.

- While the FBI and NTSB can share grid information, the San Diego County Medical Examiner uses a different gridding system for crash sites.

- The FBI has three evidence teams in San Diego.

- Workspace will be required at either the Depot or the airfield in order to support the investigation teams.

Unknown:
- Why was this specific plane targeted? Was there a specific passenger of interest or was this aircraft simply in the right place at the wrong time?
- Where is the location where the aircraft will be reconstructed (Lindbergh Field has limited hanger space for such an activity).
- The FBI has mobile investigation units but the long-term logistical support requirements for these units and FBI teams are uncertain.

**Media Relations and Public Information Management**

**Known:**

- Based on previous experience with aviation crashes, the FAA and airport PIOs have very strict guidance on what information they can and cannot release to the media.
- A Joint Information Center (JIC) needs to be established as soon as possible. The first hour of the event is critical and so the media cannot be completely ignored.
- Though the exact motive for the attack is not yet known, it is known that the terrorists selected this target for a purpose and the message that resonates from this attack will be carried primarily through the media. The media must therefore be engaged in a proactive manner in order to mitigate the indirect but very substantial potential ramifications of the attack.
- The media are an excellent vehicle for reaching out to the families of all of the victims and other affected persons across the country.
- Selected spokespersons need to be credible and honest with the media. If PIO/PAO representatives do not know something (or cannot answer), then they should say so. They should not speculate.

**Unknown:**

- Will the media assume that an FBI-led JIC implies this is a terrorist event?

**Presumed:**

- Until the arrival of the NTSB PIO, and in the absence of a JIC, the PIO for the ICP will serve to coordinate the initial media releases.
- MCRD San Diego and Lindbergh Field have the most at stake for media relations and therefore require a significant presence in all media operations. Because of the terrorist nature of this event, the FBI will eventually have a leading role in public information dissemination and management.
- Individual PIOs generally have prior credibility with the media.
- The media have monitored the control tower frequency and are aware of the Rainbow flight report of ground to aircraft smoke trails and subsequent explosions.
- Ticket counters for the airlines will become a haven for reporters looking for information.

**Mortuary Affairs and Next of Kin Notification**

**Known:**
- The San Diego County Medical Examiner will require a large space for the storage and examination of bodies. This space requires running water, electricity and refrigeration capability and should be local.
- The San Diego County Medical Examiner usually processes 5-20 cases on a typical day-to-day case load. Three hundred bodies can be processed within 2 ½ weeks. The office can leverage mutual aid through the California Coroners’ Association and neighboring jurisdictions in Riverside, San Bernardino, Los Angeles and Orange Counties. In addition, the Armed Forces Medical Examiner from Naval Medical Center San Diego (Balboa Naval Hospital) will provide assistance and can further request aid from other Armed Forces Medical Examiners across the United States.
- The San Diego County Medical Examiner has a mobile command center that contains the supplies for processing 100 bodies.
- Crime labs will be inundated with requirements to run DNA identifications on the remains.
- Bodies should not be moved or modified without documentation.
- Presumptive identification is a visual identification of the victim.
- Positive identification is the San Diego County Medical Examiner’s default requirement and relies on the use of fingerprints, dental records or DNA analysis.
This requires additional support, such as dentists and radiologists, from hospitals as well as from anthropologists.

- Security is required on a continuous basis around a temporary morgue.
- The San Diego County Medical Examiner is responsible for coordinating the next-of-kin notification for the civilian casualties. When a casualty is known to be a Service member, the San Diego County Medical Examiner, in conjunction with the regional Armed Forces Medical Examiner, will notify the appropriate military service so they can conduct the next-of-kin notification.

**Unknown:**

- The actual location(s) for the storage of the bodies/body parts. Requirements are known but an actual site was not determined. (A Salvation Army ice rink was one possibility.)

**Presumed:**

- With 230 casualties from the plane, in excess of 100 casualties on the ground and the ability to process 20-30 cases a day (and an additional 10-20 per day with military assistance), it is anticipated that a week would be required to positively identify all of the victims.

**Counseling Services and Victim Assistance**

**Known:**

- For aviation disasters, the American Red Cross activates one group to establish shelter operations and a second group to head to the airport and provide counseling services. These teams are part of the Critical Response Team (CRT) that comprises different response sections of sheltering, family assistance, mental health and physical health, among others. The CRT group team members take specialized training to allow them to be on this team.
- 400 American Red Cross volunteers in San Diego County are on call for Family Assistance and Mortuary Spiritual Care support. Team members are pre-screened and undergo formal certified training to provide mental health counseling. (It was
noted, however, that Marines may be “volunteered” to support the recovery effort without a formal post-event screening/counseling/evaluation process in place.)

- The American Red Cross will establish canteen services for the incident command post and first responders at the incident site.
- All American Red Cross volunteers are contacted within 48 hours after the initiation of their deployment to undergo evaluation for possible post traumatic stress.
- The American Red Cross arranges for nurses to go to all of the hospitals to collect information and interview the survivors. This service allows the American Red Cross to identify any unique needs or requirements for the victims to include family notification issues, possible mental health counseling needs and the overall identification of which patients are located in the numerous regional medical centers.
- The American Red Cross assists in organizing the memorial ceremony after a major aviation incident.
- MCCS (Marine Corps Community Services) will make contact with the American Red Cross liaison to ensure they are mutually supporting and not inadvertently duplicating the other’s efforts.
- Per the 1996 Family Assistance Act, the affected airline will support the families and survivors and usually arrange to have 1-2 volunteers available per family. In support of the Family Assistance Act requirements, the affected airline will coordinate the transport of family members/relatives of airline victims to San Diego (or to a nearby airfield if San Diego is closed) and will also provide lodging, rental cars and even credit cards.

Unknown:
- Transportation challenges of getting families of Marines and airline victims into San Diego if Lindbergh is closed.

Presumed:
- A large quantity of spontaneous volunteers will arrive at the incident site and airfield asking to help. Affected agencies/organizations should have a plan for managing what may be a very large outpouring of well-intentioned support.
**MCRD Continuity of Operations Issues and Requirements**

**Known:**

- Key immediate issues are the accountability of personnel and the accountability of approximately 300 M-16 weapons that were in the training area.
- MCRD will link recruits up with their families (face-to-face or over the phone) as soon as possible.
- MCRD’s goal is to return to normal Marine development operations as rapidly as possible using whatever training space is available.
- The focus is on meeting the core graduation requirements (which include the swimming qualifications). On a Thursday, most of the recruits training that week have already attained their swimming requirements. Other potential sites for swim training include MCAS (Marine Corps Air Station) Miramar and Camp Pendleton.
- Building 622 (Receiving Barracks) also contains the service records for the recruits and permanent personnel. These records can be recreated via digital records (for the permanent personnel) or from scratch (for the recruits).
- The potential impact on follow-on MOS (military occupational specialty) training schools needs to be considered.
- Any costs that the Depot would incur from the civilian response organizations would be minimal and would most likely be limited to the fee for the private ambulance services to transport military personnel to area hospitals.
- Nothing in the scenario stops the overall ability of MCRD San Diego to continue to make Marines.

**Unknown:**

- It is not known whether this MANPADS event in San Diego will trigger a larger closure of national airspace, thus impacting the shipping of new recruits to San Diego.
- Until the report of the missile launch is substantiated, the FAA will not shut down the airspace because they need credible evidence that a continuing threat exists. Should
they close air space due to a credible threat, it is required that actions are taken to mitigate the threat before the airspace can be reopened.

- The manner in which the mental health of the recruits who are impacted by the event is considered in not currently known.
Chapter 4: Conclusions and Next Steps

Overall Assessment
The 20 October 2005 TTX was the only time that MCRD representatives and their counterparts from San Diego have directly explored the potential impact on the Depot of an airliner crash at neighboring Lindbergh Field. Many of the civilian operational plans that are well rehearsed and understood within San Diego have not previously been incorporated into MCRD contingency plans. The value of this effort rested on the willingness of a broad mix of civilian and military organizations to dedicate their time and manpower to candidly discuss a variety of issues surrounding this scenario. For many participants, the primary benefit gained was through the series of pre-exercise coordination meetings as well as professional briefs that were provided by other participants. These discussions enhanced individual awareness of other organizational plans and highlighted areas where mutual aid and coordination may be appropriate.

The willingness of the MCRD San Diego leadership to request this TTX and candidly discuss their limitations and needs during a scenario of this scope was viewed by the civilian participants as a considerable milestone. This candor contributed significantly to the flow of the discussion as it fostered a relaxed and open atmosphere among the civilian and military stakeholders.

In many aspects, the operational issues presented and discussed were well understood for a scenario that occurs within the jurisdiction of San Diego County or City. In particular, the participating civilian response organizations demonstrated a well-tuned awareness of incident response and command requirements as well as inter-organizational roles and responsibilities. While the involvement of a Federal installation did not change these functional requirements for incident response, they did raise important issues concerning incident command, mutual aid and inter-jurisdictional coordination. The need to ensure civilian-military coordination measures and processes are in place before an event occurs emerged as the fundamental “take-away” from this TTX.

Next Steps
Specific “take-aways” and action items from the participants follow.
MCRD:
- The fact that a Marine command structure may not always be the primary decision making mechanism for a significant incident impacting the Depot is a significant change in perception.
- MCRD must work with the airport to find an early warning process for notifying the Depot when an aircraft in distress is inbound to the airfield in order to enable MCRD to raise the awareness among the Marines and recruits along the perimeter fence areas.
- Controlling the crisis site is critical.
- The PMO must finalize their external communications plan/MOU (memoranda of understanding).
- MCRD needs to pre-plan and coordinate a process for getting first responders in and out of the Depot.
- MCRD, working with San Diego law enforcement resources, must plan to avoid bottlenecks at the gates.
- MCRD should re-evaluate MCRD SOPs (standard operating procedures) on whom to contact in the event of a mass casualty or other significant incident.
- The process for establishing a JIC must be better understood and planned.
- How can MCRD most efficiently and effectively account for, and identify, recruits without ID tags?
- How will MCRD effectively handle thousands of people (concerned individuals and media) contacting the Depot and asking for information?
- What is the default MCRD process for keeping the CG informed for a similarly dynamic event?

Lindbergh Field Operations and Tower:
- Follow-up with MCRD (G-3) on possible options for ensuring rapid notification of evolving scenarios that may impact the Depot.
SDPD and San Diego Harbor PD:
- Coordinate with the MCRD PMO for traffic control and screening of vehicles in a designated area away from the main gates during emergencies on the Depot.
- Finalize coordination of the MOU for authorizing PMO access to pre-set law enforcement frequencies.

NTSB:
- Integrate the new list of contacts into NTSB plans.
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Appendix B: Mid-Point Planning Conference (MPC) Agenda

Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego Aircraft Incident Table-Top Exercise (TTX)
13 May 2005

1. Introductions

2. Exercise history and MCRD’s objectives
   A. Evolving incident command and control
   B. MCRD internal initial response (fire, rescue, HazMat, medical, security, etc.)
   C. Coordination with other local military and civilian resources and assets, including media/public affairs
   D. Continuity of operations/recruit processing and training
   E. Other MCRD objectives?

3. Other participants—objectives and issues?

4. TTX: 8-hours in real time, or AM devoted to response and PM devoted to MCRD continuity of operations?

5. Scenario stage-setter

6. Dates/times/locations for final planning conference (FPC) and for the TTX

7. Tasks to accomplish before FPC

8. Anything else?
Appendix C: Trip Summary for Pre-Final Planning Conference (FPC)

Coordination Meetings

(18-22 July 2005)

Overview: During the week of 18-22 July 2005, LtCol Jim Gruny, USMC and Mr. Jerry Conley conducted fifteen meetings with various stakeholder organizations in the San Diego region participating in the 20 October 2005 MCRD TTX. An overview of the meeting schedule is attached (sic) in Appendix D. The following discussion is organized according to functional and operational themes (such as security) and not the actual sequence of meetings.

MCRD

1) Continuity of Operations (COOP):
   a) No showstoppers found during our discussions. Swim tank – can find an alternate training site (a hassle, but can be done). The mess hall is a more critical site but can also be compensated for by contracting out or using the staff mess hall (main challenge is being able to sanitize utensils and dishware). Both scenarios have been gamed out before at the staff level. Loss of the Receiving Barracks will also cause some administrative challenges since all of the Marine service records are stored and updated there. Alternate billeting can be found for the newly-arriving recruits, though with one barracks (building 585) currently under renovation, excess billeting is limited.
   b) Currently there are 1-2 platoons of recruits from the training companies living in the Receiving Barracks while renovations are underway (though they should not be in the barracks at 0800 on the day of the TTX).
   c) Loss of key personnel: MCMAP (Marine Corps Martial Arts Program) – loss of some of these instructors is not critical from a COOP perspective since new instructors can be trained relatively quickly. Loss of swimming instructors is more significant, but also not insurmountable. Loss of the head drill instructor (DI) is significant in the short term as it impacts immediate personnel accountability (see below).
   d) Accountability: At any one time, 30-40% of the recruits may be at medical treatment for an injury, at dental for an exam, serving as a gear guard, getting uniforms refit, etc. While the individual recruits should be signed in wherever they go, the only person who knows immediately where all of the recruits in an individual series are is the drill instructor who keeps a continuously updated “count card” in his cover with the names and locations of all of his Marines.
   e) On a Thursday morning in the pool, only a few Marines will be going through training: those who have not achieved CWS-4 basic level yet (most achieve that level on Monday) and those who need to achieve CWS-2 due to their MOS/contract.
   f) Dealing with the civilians on base: At that time (0800) on a Thursday morning, the master DI will be addressing the family members on the steps outside the theater and will be using the PA system/speakers mounted outside the building. Usually there are approximately four civilians for every graduating Marine at the Friday ceremony and three civilians per Marine at the Thursday morning session. This would equate to approximately 1,800 civilians if we used the October 2004 number of 600 graduating
Marines. Chances are that the master DI will direct the family members to go to a location (the gym) and inform them that their sons will be sent over there immediately to stay with them.

i) Green weeks are spent at Camp Pendleton (weeks 5, 6, 7 & 8). May be able to extend to an additional week at Camp Pendleton to include week 9 (swim week). It is mostly an issue of the availability of billeting at Camp Pendleton. However, Camp Pendleton does have a higher heat index and more training would be canceled due to heat index restrictions (though that is much less likely in fall/winter).

ii) There is a lot of concern about the uniform fitting for graduation (T-48/49), but after discussion there are a lot of options to get around this.

iii) During the summer, the recruit companies surge to approximately 600 recruits. During the remainder of the year, they drop to approximately 300 (would expect 300-400 during our TTX, but the numbers need to be verified as they were not readily available).

iv) 51% of all male Marine recruits go through MCRD SD and all female recruits go through MCRD Parris Island.

v) Companies will be made up of 6-8 platoons, depending on the overall company size. When conducting training, the company will be split into two series with each series conducting a different training event in the morning then exchanging their events in the afternoon (this is called a “series track”). During October, it can be expected that there will be one series made up of four platoons and one series made up of three platoons.

vi) Overall, a shift in the training matrix was not desired but was certainly doable. Of prime importance are those events that are graduation requirements (such as being CWS-4 swim qualified) while other events could be dropped from training (such as the obstacle course, which is still a symbolically important event).

h) If it were determined that the Depot had a significant loss of capability, there is the ability to send the next few shipments of inbound recruits to MCRD Parris Island since in late fall both Depots are dealing with much smaller companies and there is flexibility.

**Issues / Questions:**

1. RTR (Recruit Training Regiment) is primarily interested in the continuity of operations issues while the G-3 (Operations) is primarily interested in the ICS challenges and the creation of MOUs (memoranda of understanding), MOAs (memoranda of agreement), etc.

2. An interesting question was raised about whether the Depot would receive a bill from the SDFD and others for the civilian agencies providing emergency response services to the Depot. No one was advocating to not allow the responders on base. This was more a question about expectations. After discussing this topic with several stakeholders, it appears that since the incident actually starts off of the Depot (at the airfield) and then enters the Depot property, the Depot is not responsible for the costs.

**FIRE**

1. Federal Fires (Station 15) on the Depot has one Engine and one BLS (Basic Life Support) vehicle. There are two Fed Fires battalions in the area (Battalion 1 out on Coronado with
North Island, Amphibious base, etc. and Battalion 2 with several stations in the city and Pt Loma area). Battalion 2 Headquarters is at 32nd Street. All Fed Fires personnel have shipboard and ARFF training, which is unique to them.

2. There are four fire apparatus/trucks at the Lindbergh Station and no ambulances or paramedics:
   - Rescue 1: equipment and dash; 1,500 gallons of water. Smallest rig.
   - Rescue 2: 3,000 gallons of water
   - Rescue 3: 3,000 gallons of water
   - Rescue 5: 3,000 gallons of water. Reserve rig; do not usually have a crew available to man.
   - Usually have engineer (driver) and two firefighters per rig.
   - Can actually operate rigs with just a driver who has ability to deliver foam from inside.
   - Rigs carry enough foam for mixing with 6,000 gallons of water (i.e., twice as much foam). Much easier to reload water than foam. This enables two quick runs by each rig.

3. The only recent crash was the 1978 crash of a PSA (Pacific Southwest Airlines Boeing 727) flight into North Park during approach (did not occur within the airfield boundary).

4. For the TTX scenario and expected actions by Lindbergh, San Diego and Fed Fires:
   a. Tower would sound an “Alert 3” if an aircraft accident is imminent on or near the airport or an aircraft fire has started.
   b. The Lindbergh ARFF would immediately pre-position around the airfield (most likely on opposite sides of the runway near the approach end and chase the airplane as it lands. Rescue 1 (dash rig) may be at the far end of the runway.
   c. An Alert 3 results in an automatic second alarm with the San Diego Fire Department (SDFD), which will trigger the immediate deployment of:
      i. Four engine companies (eight engines total)
      ii. Two truck companies (four trucks total)
      iii. Station 26 –EMS station in East San Diego (the other EMS Station is #9 in LaJolla)
      iv. Heavy Rescue 4 (near ballpark). Trenching gear and other special rescue equipment.
      v. Three Battalion Chiefs
      vi. Five ambulances.
   d. First notification Fed Fires would probably have would be hearing/seeing the actual crash. Would immediately respond and attempt to link-up with responding Lindbergh Fire (see Communications section below) and establish a Unified Command (see ICS below).
   e. SDFD assets responding from downtown will arrive within 4-5 minutes (~ time of crash).
   f. SDFD assets responding from further out can be expected in 7-10 minutes.
   g. Expect the first SDFD on scene to trigger a request for Annex D (San Diego County mass-casualty response plan). Annex D was referred to during many of our meetings and is usually used when there are more than five casualties.
h. The first arriving unit on the second alarm, when notifying dispatch that they are on scene, will be told that “You’re the first unit; assume staging officer responsibilities.” Will immediately look for staging location and notify dispatch on where follow-on rigs should stage.

i. Besides the parade deck, another likely staging area would be outside the MCRD gate along Rosecrans Street.

j. Fire assets and ambulances would have completely separate staging areas

k. If there was a need to evacuate the incident site, a fire truck’s horn would be blown numerous times; this signal would be echoed by the other vehicles in the response site.

ICS / Coordination

1. The ICP would be set-up out of the rear of the Suburban of the first arriving Battalion Chief.

2. The location would depend on winds/smoke. The Lindbergh Fire station may be chosen as a good site; or somewhere along the runway.

3. For the MCRD representatives to find out the location of the ICP, they should look for a parked Suburban with a crowd around the back, firefighters wearing vests, or simply ask any firefighter where the ICP is located (they should all know).

4. The PMO would send a representative to the DOC.

5. The DOC would send a representative to the ICP.

6. The location of the ICP, once transition from Response to Recovery/Investigation takes place, is TBD. Possible sites include an Annex across from the FBI office, a command center at the USCG facility (JCCS) and various offices within the Depot.

7. FBI leadership would be an ASAC (Assistant Special Agent in Charge) at the Unified Command and a SSA (Supervisory Special Agent) in the field.

8. Unified Command: Most fire and law enforcement stakeholders considered it likely that a Unified Command would be established. Fed Fires thought it appropriate since it was their jurisdiction, though they expected overall incident command to be SDFD. Lindbergh Fire was split on whether there would be a Unified Command. Law Enforcement (SDPD and FBI) agreed that a Unified Command was likely. Overall, it appears that the Unified Command structure would be composed of all of the stakeholders’ organizations that have a jurisdictional, statutory or operational responsibility in coordinating the incident response. Everyone thought that BGen. Paxton (CG, MCRD SD/WRR) or his designated representative would serve on the Unified Command. Some even thought the San Diego County Medical Examiner may serve on the Unified Command, since he falls under law enforcement (not medical) in California and is a County asset (i.e., would not be subordinate to SDFD). Other potential Unified Command members are TSA, San Diego Harbor Police, FBI, NTSB and FAA. SDFD explained that there is a clear division between emergency operations (the incident commander) and the role of the Unified Command (stakeholders, to include the incident commander) in providing resources, assistance and coordination. The immediate focus during the first 30-60 minutes is the emergency operations and then the Unified Command structure begins to fall into place. The overall topic of Unified Command is a top issue for further clarification among the various players in August (noted below). For the record, the National Response Plan defines Unified Command as:
“Unified Command. An application of ICS used when there is more than one agency with incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross political jurisdictions. Agencies work together through the designated members of the Unified Command to establish their designated Incident Commanders at a single ICP and to establish a common set of objectives and strategies and a single Incident Action Plan.”

9. The key link between SDPD and SDFD is the police Critical Incident Unit, which is located within a fire department and has police personnel who deal with ICS on a daily basis. Officer Lance Dormann (who attended the December 2004 San Diego area quarantine TTX) is a member of this unit.

10. EOC (Emergency Operations Center): San Diego County’s EOC will be activated when Annex D to the San Diego County Emergency Operations Plan is triggered.

Communications

1. SDFD uses the 800-MHz trunk system for communications.

2. Fed Fires also has the 800-MHz system and would go on “Command 1” frequency to find out what frequency SDFD is using for the response.

3. Communications between Fed Fires and the PMO is done through the PMO dispatch office (which is located in the same building as the Fed Fires fire house).

4. The PMO has a mobile command post. It has all Depot frequencies programmed but currently cannot talk with Fed Fires, SDFD or SDPD because they have no MOU/authorization for PMO to know and program in these frequencies (i.e., the capability exists but is not permitted yet). The PMO is currently working on this issue.

5. The Ground Security Force (see below) has different radios than the PMO.

6. San Diego Tower would notify the TSA, which would notify JTTF of the impending event.

7. SDFD has had trouble in the past getting in touch with San Diego Harbor Police for getting access to the airfield when an Alert 2 is sounded. The access gate is near the Lindbergh Fire station and the key is maintained by the roving San Diego Harbor Police patrol vehicles.

8. San Diego County OEM/EOC (Office of Emergency Management/Emergency Operations Center) is usually notified of events at the airfield through the United States Coast Guard, which has a good relationship with the San Diego County Sheriff’s office.

9. Depot to ICP communications probably will be best served by having a DOC (Depot Operations Center) liaison individual at the ICP.

10. All of the hired security forces that man the military gates in the SD area are tied together with the SDPD through a communications center at SPAWAR. However, this does not apply to MCRD, which uses active duty Marines rather than contracted security forces.

11. There is still no plan in place for providing an audible and visual alarm from the airfield (tower or crash crew) to the Marines on the outer training fields. Within the Depot there are three methods of communicating with the training fields: landline phones that are located throughout the training areas, Motorola radios and the corpsmen’s’ cell phones.

12. There is an overall lack of information flow between the Depot and the airfield (e.g. the bomb squad blew up a suitcase the month before and the Depot did not know until they heard the explosion).
13. MCRD needs a process for notifying parents where the children in the day care center are being taken during an evacuation. Most parents do not work at the Depot and will be trying to come back on base.

14. In order to determine if there is hazmat in the plane’s cargo, responders and investigators would contact the airline since it would have that information immediately available (note, however, that U.S. Airways, formerly AmericaWest Airlines, has a policy to not carry any hazmat).

EMS / Medical / Mortuary Affairs

1) EMS falls under Operations in the ICS structure.

2) Rod Ballard is the Deputy Chief of SDFD (under Chief Bowman) and the head of EMS.

3) EMS operations for this incident would be run by Station 26 (an all-paramedic station).
   a) When Annex D of the San Diego County Emergency Operations Plan is activated, an immediate survey of hospital beds in the region is conducted. For the TTX, UCSD would be the base hospital and would conduct the initial call out to the region’s hospitals for this survey.
   b) The base hospital relays the survey data to the MedCom officer in the ICP (one of the first ICP positions manned on the medical side).
   c) AMR (American Medical Response) is the communications center for all of the area ambulances and will do the initial call out / notification for ambulances.
   d) The immediate priority for arriving SDFD paramedics is to conduct triage across the incident site and bring those Red tags (“Immediate”) to a central casualty collection point (CCP) for re-triage and ambulance transport.
   e) Upon arriving at the scene, fire personnel would also broadcast over the PA “anyone that can move, go to (designated location).” This allows for an immediate triage / identification of those casualties who are Green (“Minor”) and helps clear the incident site.

4) UCSD hospital is the burn center for southern San Diego County (Palomar hospital serves that function for northern San Diego County).

5) Based on previous drills (such as before the Rock & Roll Marathon), San Diego Fire / EMS thought the MCRD branch clinic was excellent at setting up and running casualty collection points and coordinating initial incident actions. Where the MCRD branch clinic is limited is in its ability to get patients off of the base and to the appropriate hospital.

6) MMST (Metropolitan Medical Strike Team) is a regional medical surge capability but takes 60-90 minutes to respond. MMST can provide supplies, trailers, etc., but may not be timely enough for this incident.

7) Bodies are also evidence. If they are determined to be deceased during the immediate triage process, can they be left in place for a short period so as to document their location? SDFD stated that they would not normally want to move deceased anyway.

Mortuary Affairs

a) In California, the medical examiner falls under law enforcement organizations and is a County asset in San Diego.

b) The San Diego County Medical Examiner signs each and every civilian death certificate for cause and manner of death in California. The office would quickly be overloaded for
a mass-casualty. A mutual aid program exists with medical examiners in Riverside and San Bernardino Counties (Region 6). The County Sheriff is the coordinator of this mutual aid (or can go through the State OES – Office of Emergency Services).

c) The San Diego County Medical Examiner can issue a death certificate for civilians who die on a Federal installation and also for military personnel who die in civilian areas. But if military personnel are on the aircraft, did they die “in town” (on the runway) or on the Depot? (inject below)
d) Issuing death certificates without bodies (if incinerated) requires going to court to get a mass/group death certificate using the flight manifest.
e) For a flight on a Thursday morning in October, many of the passengers will be business persons and conventioneers, with a few tourists. So the aircraft manifest will consist mostly of individuals vice groups/families, which greatly increases the workload of the notification of NOK (next of kin) process.
f) There is an Armed Forces Regional Medical Examiner for DoD casualties located at Naval Medical Center San Diego, though the office is really a single pathologist. That office may be able to get additional support from the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. The Armed Forces Medical Examiner would have exclusive federal jurisdiction for both civilian and military cases. The Armed Forces Medical Examiner has the jurisdictional responsibility to sign the death certificates for the military casualties that occur aboard the Depot. However, in California, the death certificates for the civilian casualties have to be signed by the San Diego County Medical Examiner, even if their remains are shipped back to Dover Air Force Base (AFB) to assist with the identification process.
g) Will the Marine recruits have dog tags on while at the pool and training fields?
h) Does NTSB provide a significant contribution to mortuary affairs?
i) The San Diego County Medical Examiner desires to have all bodies in a central location for ID and processing (including returning bodies of those who die enroute and at the hospitals). The Salvation Army has an ice rink and San Diego County Medical Examiner is trying to establish a MOA for its use as a refrigerated storage site for bodies during a mass casualty.

Security / Site Control / Law Enforcement
1. Only the MCRD Commanding General can set FPCON (Force Protection Condition) Delta. It usually takes 72-hours to fully implement all of the FPCON Delta protocol. The PMO stated that while Delta calls for the closing of all gates, they would still give priority to getting the emergency vehicles on base.
2. The PMO is working on a new MOU with the airfield concerning security/perimeter.
3. The PMO has an on-call Ground Security Force (GSF) made up of approximately 170 Marines who work various staff positions around the Depot (Sergeants and below). Not all 170 would be available immediately (probably 60 available right away; then soon more arrive). MCRD expects some of the GSF to be used to increase the manning levels at the gates from 1 to 2 or 3 and the rest to help establish an internal perimeter around the incident site (and possibly help coordinate traffic flow and the movement of the civilians on base).
4. MPs and the GSF can be equipped with orange vests (some MP vests also say “Security”).
5. SDPD often provides mutual aid to San Diego Harbor Police, who have limited assets.
6. SDPD can activate a Mobile Field Force (MFF) of approximately 100 officers to provide “people and containment” during a major incident.

7. SDPD controls the streets and CHP (California Highway Patrol) controls the highways.

8. For investigative purposes, the FBI establishes a perimeter starting 500 yards out from the farthest piece of evidence. This would result in most of the airfield and Depot being a crime scene.

9. If we want to game the issue of the launch sites and the role of law enforcement, this would fall under the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department (could use Sheriff’s representative to the JTTF).

Media / Public Information / Family Assistance

1) SDFD PIO would be expected to be with Chief Bowman or possibly the incident commander.

2) The MCRD PAO has primary/sole responsibility to the CG MCRD SD/WRR, although MCRD PIO is willing to work with the JIC to ensure vetting of messages.

3) Lindbergh Field PIO: “We can only discuss issues related to airfield operations, but we can also mention the airline, type of aircraft and point of origin and destination.” They conduct most of their media briefings curbside outside of the terminal because this provides the easiest access/hook-up for the media’s live feeds.

4) Airlines will each refer all media inquiries to their corporate office.

5) The San Diego County EOC has a designated media briefing room with satellite van parking, hook-ups, etc., but it is away from the incident site and would probably not appeal to the media.

6) Participants seemed pleased to have a JIC stood-up as a central coordination point for the PIOs. However, how quickly the JIC is established is unclear (i.e., will it be during the immediate response period or only when the FBI assumes IC).

7) The PIOs/PAOs can leverage the San Diego Infoline and the American Red Cross to flow accurate information.

8) The NTSB has a requirement to establish a public information number and will provide “reasonable reimbursement” for these services.

9) Family Assistance Centers:
   a) The NTSB has a robust program that works with the local American Red Cross offices.
   b) We were unable to meet with the MCCS representative (who was on leave) but want to see him in August (or have a conference call).
   c) Every six months, U.S. Airways (formerly AmericaWest) (and most airlines) re-assess their nationwide contacts and contracts in the vicinities of airports for hotels, rental cars, etc., in case family support is needed for emergencies. They also have direct liaison with the American Red Cross.
   d) Most airlines have a mutual aid program in which airline representatives from other offices are given basic training and are flown in to serve as individual representatives/assistants to each victim’s family. Airlines’ representatives will try to meet the families when they arrive in town and help them through the entire process. AmericaWest called theirs the “Heart Team Members.”
### Appendix D: Pre-FPC Stakeholder Meetings in San Diego (18-22 July 05)

#### Pre-FPC Stakeholder Meetings / San Diego

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Person/Organization</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 July</td>
<td>0900</td>
<td>Chief Joe Jeffers</td>
<td>Lindberg Field Crash House</td>
<td>Discuss Incident Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 July</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>LtCol Owens (RTR XO) Maj Gerin (S-3A)</td>
<td>RTR HQ's</td>
<td>Continuity of Ops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 July</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>Col Foersch Maj Protzeller</td>
<td>MCRD SD G-3</td>
<td>Overview of exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 July</td>
<td>0930</td>
<td>Chief Tim Kanaski/ Capt Mike Chavarra</td>
<td>Fed Fires / MCRD SD</td>
<td>Discuss Incident Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 July</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>Rich Zee/ Nancy Carroll Charlie Walker Gen. Mike Aguillar</td>
<td>FSD Office</td>
<td>Discuss scenario/injects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 July</td>
<td>1030</td>
<td>Maj Ron Capes/ Mr. Kerry Booker</td>
<td>MCRD</td>
<td>Security and AT/FP measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 July</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>Maj Joe Kleppel</td>
<td>PAO MCRD</td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 July</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>Sgt Art Doherty Officer Jesse Flores</td>
<td>SD Police Department</td>
<td>Discuss scenario/injects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 July</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>Col Sinclair</td>
<td>MCRD SD</td>
<td>RTR Change of Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 July</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Agent Bill Peterson Darryl Foxworth (FBI) Matt Brown (FBI)</td>
<td>FBI Field Office Todd Racuse (Harbor PD) Dave Harrison (Air Marshall)</td>
<td>FBI/JTTF perspective on scenario Two NCIS Agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 July</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>Debbie Steffans/ Rick Poggenmeyer</td>
<td>San Diego EOC</td>
<td>Discuss EOC coordination/ Mortuary Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 July</td>
<td>0900</td>
<td>Mike Pacheco Clif Joralmon</td>
<td>SDFD EMS @ Lindbergh Bill Modeem / Ben Castro</td>
<td>ICS and EMS follow-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 July</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>Diane Lucero Steven Shultz</td>
<td>Lindberg PIO and Ops</td>
<td>Airfield Perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 July</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>Murray Bauer John Duke</td>
<td>Lindberg Airport America West Ops</td>
<td>Airline perspective on scenario</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix E: Final Planning Conference (FPC) Agenda

MCRD San Diego Terrorist-Related Aircraft Incident Table-Top Exercise (TTX)

Location: Building 3, MCRD, Commanding General’s Conference Room
Date/Time: 13 September 2005 from 0800-1430

0800-0830: Welcome Aboard/Administrative Remarks/Introductions – LtCol Jim Gruny
(Description of facilities, comments concerning lunch plans, welcoming remarks by MCRD, self-introduction by participants)

0830-0900: TTX Orientation – LtCol Jim Gruny and Mr. Jerry Conley
- Distribute/Review Statement of Purpose and Objectives for the table-top
- Description of the structure of the TTX (how it will actually be run)
- Review of the TTX scenario

0930-0940: Break

0940-1000: Administrative Details for TTX – Mr. Bruce Wyman
- Review of the participant list (confirm attendance for TTX and numbers each organization will bring to the TTX)
- Discuss pertinent logistics issues for the day of the TTX

1000-1115: Stakeholder information briefs - (15 minutes per brief)
- MCRD SD capabilities – Col. Warren Foersch
- SDFD - ICS overview – Battalion Chief Jon Handley
- EMS/SDFD – Captain Ben Castro
- SDPD / Critical Incident Management Unit – Officer John Autolino
- San Diego County EOC – Ms. Deborah Steffen

1115-1130: Break/Pick up working lunch

1130-1230: Stakeholder information briefs - (15 minutes per brief)
- FBI/JTTF – Agent Jeff Casset
- Harbor Police – Mr. Todd Rakos
- Lindberg Field – Mr. Mark Denari, Mr. Tom Horton
- TSA – BGen. Michael Aguilar

1230-1245: Break

1245-1400: Stakeholder information briefs - (15 minutes per brief)
- NTSB – Mr. Van McKenny
- FAA - Mr. Jim Buckles
- Airline (America West) – Mr. Murray Bauer, Mr. John Duke
- Medical Examiner (County and Armed Forces) – Dr. Glenn Wagner, CDR Stan Adams
- Red Cross – Ms. Suzy Turnbull

1400-1430: Wrap up – LtCol Jim Gruny and Mr. Jerry Conley
Appendix F: Exercise Agenda

MCRD/WRR San Diego Aircraft Incident Table-top Exercise (TTX)

Location: PAC-100 Classroom, MCRD San Diego
Date/Time: 20 Oct 2005 from 0800-1700

0800-0830: Welcome aboard/Administrative Remarks/Introductions – LtCol Jim Gruny
(Description of facilities, comments concerning lunch plans, welcoming remarks by MCRD, self-introduction by participants)

0830-0900: TTX Orientation – LtCol Jim Gruny and Mr. Jerry Conley
- Distribute/Review Statement of Purpose and Objectives for the table-top
- Description of the structure of the TTX (Discuss conduct of morning and afternoon sessions)
- Introduction of the TTX scenario

0900-1200: Conduct of Exercise (Morning Session)
- Introduction of and response to timeline driven injects

1200-1230: Break/Working Lunch Distribution

1230-1645: Conduct of Exercise (Afternoon Session)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Principal Stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1230-1300</td>
<td>Transitioning ICS</td>
<td>SDFD &amp; FBI (&amp; Unified Command)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1330</td>
<td>Investigative Issues</td>
<td>FBI and NTSB</td>
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<tr>
<td>1330-1400</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>JICC</td>
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<tr>
<td>1400-1415</td>
<td>Break</td>
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<tr>
<td>1415-1445</td>
<td>Mortuary Affairs</td>
<td>Medical Examiner(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1445-1515</td>
<td>Counseling/Victim Assistance</td>
<td>Red Cross, Airline, MCCS</td>
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<tr>
<td>1515-1545</td>
<td>MCRD Continuity of Operations</td>
<td>MCRD/WRR San Diego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1545-1600</td>
<td>Break</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1600-1645: Principal Federal Official/Hurricane Katrina Response Brief
BGen (Ret) Mike Aguilar - Federal Security Director for San Diego International Airport to discuss the role of the Principal Federal Official in an Incident of National Significance and relay his impressions on Hurricane Katrina response efforts

1645-1700: Closing Remarks
### Playbook for MCRD Terrorist-Related Aircraft Incident TTX

#### Final draft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Slides</th>
<th>Scenario Time</th>
<th>Event / Inject / Facilitator Guidance</th>
<th>Objective Area</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Morning Session / Immediate Response</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>11:31</td>
<td><strong>Walk Participants through the scenario</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>0900</td>
<td>Question to Lindbergh ARFF/Crash crew: what will your immediate actions be?</td>
<td>ICS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td>Notification to MCRD of possible event?</td>
<td>Comm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td>What actions are taken by Airport Ops, FAA, FSD concerning closing of this airport, regional airspace, other airports?</td>
<td>Comm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>0802</td>
<td>The CG walks into the G-3 office and asks for an initial status report, then leaves with his driver for the scene. If this is not realistic, what are the immediate actions of the HQ group?</td>
<td>Comm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>0803</td>
<td>Fed Fire at MCRD arrives at incident site - how do they coordinate with Lindbergh ARFF? Are communications compatible?</td>
<td>Comm - ICS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td>What tasks are they given i.e. do they become staging area manager for follow on assets, do they fight structural fires, do they perform lifesaving actions with wounded personnel, etc?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>0805</td>
<td>San Diego FD and PD assets on Alert 3 begin arriving: Describe process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
<td>What Fire assets enroute / approx. timeline? How does ICS evolve as higher echelons of command arrive?</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td>What PD assets enroute / approx. timeline?</td>
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<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td>What EMS assets enroute / approx. timeline?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>0906</td>
<td>Commanding General or designated representative arrives on scene:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td>Initial command and civil-military relations during response? Who is MCRD rep that will remain at Incident Command Post?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td>What are his perceived duties?</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>0807</td>
<td>Initial actions taken by PMO - <strong>Not know terrorist event yet</strong> (Force Protection Condition? What are measures and how enforced? Is Ground Security Force (GSF) activated?)</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td>During the course of the scene size-up, chlorine fumes detected in the vicinity of the Receiving Barracks, Pool and South Parking Lot 1. How does SDFD identify source, quantity and assess risk?</td>
<td>Comm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Within the first 10-15 minutes of incident, what HazMat assets on hand?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Any actions taken to assess whether there is hazardous cargo on the plane?</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event/Question</td>
<td>Department</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>3. How are PMO and police assets mobilized to clear downwind zone? Is GSF activated/used?</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>4. Child Care Center (Blldg. 638) and other buildings in area evacuation plan?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>MCRD notifications. Who would you be contacting (and how) (DoD, civilian, etc)?</td>
<td>Comm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>First BN Chief from SDFD arrives:</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>How is the role of Incident Commander determined?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Where are possible locations for the Incident Command Post?</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Where are possible staging areas?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Visual identification of ICP (flag) and IC (rests)?</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>Compatibility of radio assets and flags between SD &amp; MCRD?</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>PMO and Harbor Police identify need to ensure secure perimeter.</td>
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<td>59</td>
<td>How coordinate perimeter security? Compatible comm?</td>
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<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Role of SDPD, USCG, etc? Does SDPD control area outside of gates to facilitate responder traffic flow?</td>
<td>Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>MCRD personnel and PMO initiate procedures for clearing the Depot of civilian visitors, to include friends and relatives present on Parade Deck to watch Recruit Run. (or do they corrail visitors in central location)</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Over 800 family members demand to have information about their loved ones. Are they all with the Master DI at the theater and what does he have available for communication and to control their reactions/movements?</td>
<td>PIO</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>How does security control movement of the civilians on base? Is the ICP informed? How does security control civilians with cell phone cameras?</td>
<td>Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Large numbers of San Diego City Fire, EMS and Ambulance assets begin to arrive at MCRD gates</td>
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<td>65</td>
<td>How does security screen for Requested versus Self-deployed response assets?</td>
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<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>How is security made aware of staging areas and ingress/egress routes?</td>
<td>Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>A firefighter in the vicinity of Blldg 622 notices what could be an ammunition bunker.</td>
<td>What action would be taken?</td>
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<td>68</td>
<td>Who from the MCRD can provide quick information on the bunker?</td>
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<td>69</td>
<td>What is the notification process for sounding an evacuation?</td>
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<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>0812</td>
<td>Local television stations break into regular programming to provide coverage of crash.</td>
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<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td>What preliminary PIO efforts / outreach to media occur during initial response?</td>
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<td>73</td>
<td></td>
<td>How do the various PIO/PAO elements initially coordinate?</td>
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<td>74</td>
<td>0815</td>
<td>SDPD informs PMO that preliminary information indicates this is a MANPAD incident.</td>
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<td>76</td>
<td></td>
<td>Does the incident site now become a crime scene and does this impact the response or overall Incident Action Planning?</td>
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<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>0820</td>
<td>Print and TV reporters and crews start arriving at Depot gates demanding access.</td>
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<td>78</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will the media be given access to the Depot or sent elsewhere?</td>
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<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>0821</td>
<td>San Diego Mobile EMS coordination post arrives</td>
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<td>80</td>
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<td>Note: these are the numbers we will provide - plane 230 dead. Pool: 1 dead, 28 injured (some with severe burns). Barracks: 18 staff and 65 recruits total with 22 dead and 72 injured. Parking lot: 3 vehicles with 4 dead and 3 injured.</td>
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<td>81</td>
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<td>Preliminary reports coming in of some survivors on airplane (30) [but burn victims]</td>
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<td>82</td>
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<td>How are area hospitals notified and EMS/ambulance assets mobilized?</td>
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<td>83</td>
<td></td>
<td>Plans/procedures for ambulance arrival and staging areas?</td>
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<td>84</td>
<td></td>
<td>Is Balboa NMC part of this information network or require separate comms?</td>
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<td>85</td>
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<td>Significant numbers of injured Marines in the training areas. Do we know how many (loss of DIs with their count cards)? 92 recruits, 8 staff - 26 dead, 61 injured</td>
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<td>86</td>
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<td>MCRD Medical Clinic personnel respond. What role will they play?</td>
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<td>87</td>
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<td>How is patient disposition determined and tracked?</td>
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<td>88</td>
<td>0822</td>
<td>Mothers and Fathers of children in the Child Development Center arrive at MCRD gates. (What instructions have been given to gate guards regarding access to base)</td>
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<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>0824</td>
<td>Local and national television stations begin to show footage of casualties and bodies strewn across incident site.</td>
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<td>90</td>
<td>0830</td>
<td>Federal Security Director arrives at incident site. Coord. with local and higher?</td>
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<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>0832</td>
<td>MCRD base operators and other phones around the Depot begin to receive numerous phone calls from relatives of recruits. (What instructions on info release? How have instructions been disseminated?)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time</td>
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<td>92</td>
<td>0835 FEI SAC (or ASAC) for San Diego arrives</td>
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<td>93</td>
<td>Are plans made to establish a JOC? What is relationship with the ICP?</td>
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<td>94</td>
<td>Preliminary issues of crime scene management versus incident response</td>
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<td>95</td>
<td>Are plans made to establish a JIC? (Who is represented in the JIC? Who is in charge? Who clears info for release?)</td>
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<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>0845 Transglobal chief of operations at Lindbergh Field, after consulting with corporate headquarters, needs access to the crash site. Security and Comm</td>
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<td>97</td>
<td>0900 SD County Medical Examiner arrives; initial planning and coordination for mortuary affairs. Will discuss in more detail during the afternoon session.</td>
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<td>98</td>
<td>0930 Red Cross and Volunteer management (How integrated? What do they have to offer?)</td>
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<td>99</td>
<td>1015 NTSB representative arrives from L.A. office</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>1100 First Official Media briefing held</td>
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<td>101</td>
<td>Where conduct? Who attends? Main speakers? Primary content of message to public?</td>
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**Afternoon Session**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1230-1300</td>
<td>Transitioning ICS</td>
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<td>Determine process for transitioning from incident response (fire fighting and rescue) to investigation with larger issue of FBI versus DoD jurisdictions. SDFD &amp; FBI</td>
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<tr>
<td>1300-1330</td>
<td>Investigative Issues</td>
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<td>1339-1400</td>
<td>Media / Public Information</td>
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<td>Break</td>
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<tr>
<td>1415-1445</td>
<td>Mortuary Affairs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1. How are Marine staff and recruits identified?</td>
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<td>2. Is airline flight manifest information available?</td>
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<td>3. Initiation of NOK procedures.</td>
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<td>4. Evidence preservation</td>
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<td>5. Location, transportation and refrigeration reqts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Topic</td>
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<td>1445-1515</td>
<td>Counseling / Victim Assistance</td>
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<td>1515-1545</td>
<td>MCRD Continuity of Operations</td>
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<td>1600-1645</td>
<td>PFO brief</td>
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<td>1645</td>
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</table>
Appendix H: Key References and Resources

Fire Service Field Operations Guide, ICS 420-1

Letter of Instruction for MCRD San Diego Incident Response Table-top Exercise 20 Oct 2005

San Diego County Emergency Operations Plan, Annex D


*Bradley International Airport Triennial Disaster Drill After Action Report* (October 9, 2003).
