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ENLARGEMENT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
Creating a "Wider, Deeper River"

BY

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The security landscape in Europe is under transition. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact created opportunities for former Communist countries to develop democratic forms of government and market-based economies. These newly independent countries in Central and Eastern Europe are embracing pro-Western political, economic, and military orientations. However, threats exist in the form of neo-nationalism and expansionist forces that could derail the reform movement. The US must lead the effort to establish a security architecture in Europe that facilitates the political and economic reforms, and that can respond to present and future threats. In this way the US protects its vital national interest in Europe, which in its simplest form is stability throughout the continent so that no single entity threatens a country's sovereign right to develop a democratic government and open-market economy. The cornerstone to the new security architecture is NATO enlargement. The inclusion of new members into NATO as they meet specific prerequisites, which is somewhat expensive, along with the expansion of other Western institutions provides the stability needed for political, economic, and military reform. In addition, gradual, cautious, and transparent enlargement minimizes Russian concerns regarding the eastward movement of NATO.
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ENLARGEMENT OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Creating a “Wider, Deeper River”

The security landscape in Europe is under transition. Dramatic transformations have occurred since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Changes in the future are likely to be similarly dramatic. The primary changes are occurring in the former countries of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Most of these countries are transitioning to democratic forms of government and market-based economies. At the same time, they court a favorable relationship with Western European nations because the latter embody the principles of democracy and capitalism.

Unfortunately, there are serious threats to the successful transformation of these former Communist countries. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine and analyze the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in dealing with this new European situation. Specifically, this paper will evaluate the current security situation in Europe, the reasons for NATO enlargement (i.e., US national interests), the alternatives to enlargement (i.e., ways), the costs of enlargement (i.e., means), the criteria used for membership, and critical concerns regarding enlargement (i.e., challenges and threats).

As NATO evolves toward enlargement, it is imperative that the alliance invite new members who met specific criteria in accordance with its strategic vision (i.e., ends) so that the organization maintains its Western bedrock principles and values. With formerly
Communist countries internalizing democratic, capitalistic, and humanitarian values in order to gain membership, NATO enlargement creates a "wider, deeper river" in Europe and not just a "wider one".

SECURITY SITUATION

The security situation in Europe changed abruptly when the Berlin Wall collapsed and the Warsaw Pact dissolved. What had been a world centered around bipolar world powers became a world of transition as newly freed countries began to develop independently. As these countries follow their own self-determination, most pursue a more democratic form of government and open-market economy based on capitalism. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union created a power vacuum for those Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries formerly under the security umbrella of the Warsaw Pact. The power vacuum created an unstable security situation, one in which the fragile political institutions in CEE countries may fall victim to "rekindling nationalism and reviving old patterns of geopolitical competition and conflict." These threats could eventually cause the failure of the infant democratic governments, collapse of their open-market economies, and provocative power plays between countries on the European continent.

US NATIONAL INTERESTS

A. Stability. The US vital national interest in Europe is stability through a balance of power. Stability, in its simplest form, is a situation in which no single entity dominates the European continent in a way that threatens any country's sovereign right to develop a democratic form of government and market-based economy. Obviously, it is best for the
US if European stability has a pro-Western orientation politically, economically, and militarily (i.e., the elements of national power). In this way the US is less likely to repeat history which shows US involvement in continental European wars three times in the 20th Century, two hostile world wars and one protracted cold war. From political and military perspectives, many countries have the potential to threaten European stability, but the two historical protagonists are Germany and Russia. Consequently, the US national interest demands a European security architecture that “consolidates Germany in a wider Europe and facilitates a cooperative relationship with the new Russia -- while eliminating any potentially disruptive geopolitical vacuum between the wider Europe and the new Russia.” Economically, US interests call for CEE countries that have stable, open markets which facilitate trade and investments between the US and the former Warsaw Pact countries. Although the balance of power within Europe is undergoing a transition towards a more pro-Western position, success is not guaranteed. Furthermore, Europe still needs US involvement to keep the continent stable. Most experts agree that should the US leave European security in the hands of Europeans, that no viable security architecture would emerge. There are many reasons for the criticality of US involvement, the most cogent ones are: (1) US is needed to stifle rifts between countries, such as Greece and Turkey’s conflicts over Cypress and the Aegean Sea, (2) US is needed to prevent any one country, such as Germany, from dominating Europe, and (3) US is needed to restrain a potentially expansionist Russia.  

B. Threats. The threats to stability are numerous. First, Russia is undergoing a tremendous upheaval as it transforms from a closed society to a more open one. The
changes take time, but many Russian citizens demand more rapid progress. This disconnect between expectations and actual improvements produces an unstable situation which is ripe for nationalistic forces to demand a return to a Cold War-type power position or insurgent forces to lead general unrest within the population toward the current, democratic, form of government. Either consequence has an extremely negative impact on the stability of Europe. Second, political and economic changes within the CEE countries are subject to internal threats from disadvantaged or subversive groups. These groups could instigate internal uprisings which could lead to civil war or demands for neo-national changes that could lead to armed aggression against a neighbor country. Either action would produce unrest within Europe. Third, current members of NATO or CEE countries may pursue separate alliances or agreements for military or economic reasons. These actions could undermine current alliances, such as NATO, and produce provocative power plays that destabilize the region. In sum, “risks to European security remain, which are multi-faceted and multi-directional and thus hard to predict and assess”. These threats demand immediate attention. To ensure stability in Europe, Western countries must construct a new security architecture that is able to respond to these risks as well as future, unforeseen challenges.

C. Successful Transition. Most CEE countries are developing democratic forms of government and open economies. European stability, buttressed by a robust security architecture, increases the likelihood of their success. Numerous institutions exist currently in Western Europe which can contribute to the security framework. Understandably, CEE countries seek integration and membership in these Western
institutions to protect their political and economic transition. They also seek membership
as a guarantee they will not again be subjugated to foreign domination. Stability through
integration is a viable concept, that fosters US interests, provided it occurs within a
security framework that is protected by Western countries. The resultant stable balance
of power creates a climate of confidence that facilitates political and economic reforms.
Clearly, successful transition of the CEE countries is in the national interest of the United
States. Political and economic successes in the former Warsaw Pact countries enhance
US security by increasing the likelihood that these countries will maintain pro-Western
attitudes and decreasing the probability of the emergence of a major threat.

**ALTERNATIVES TO PROTECT US NATIONAL INTERESTS (WAYS)**

**A. General.** Several possible solutions exist to support the reform process in the
newly independent states of CEE. Although each has merit, they all possess distinct
disadvantages as well. It is extremely important to consider carefully each proposal
before pursuing a course of action that will protect US interests in Europe, as well as the
interests of our close allies in NATO.

**B. North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).** The 1991 establishment of the
NACC opened dialogue between former Cold War adversaries on political, military, and
security issues. Its purpose is to assist the post-Communist reform process in CEE
countries. Currently, thirty-eight countries participate in NACC. The NACC generally
involves high-level meetings of foreign ministers and defense ministers from NATO and
the former Warsaw Pact countries. Their discussion focuses on the most pressing
regional security issues in the Euro-Atlantic area. However, most meetings involve
consultation only, with all parties allowed to present their positions and to hear the views of other participants. The NACC is not empowered to enforce implementation of a solution. Although the NACC has a very useful role in the dynamics of European security due to its high-level representation, it does not wield the power to impose or enforce a security framework within Europe that achieves stability.

C. Partnership for Peace (PfP). PfP is a US-sponsored program in which military forces from partner countries join those of NATO countries to improve their interoperability through joint planning, exercises, and training. In 1996, NATO conducted fifteen major exercises and numerous smaller PfP activities. Twenty-seven non-NATO countries participate in PfP, most of which are former Soviet or Warsaw Pact states. Through participation in exercises and activities, former Warsaw Pact, NATO and nonaligned countries build trust and cooperation by developing interoperability and a better understanding of collective defense planning. As a result, PfP has become a pillar of Europe's security architecture in which participants cooperate in crisis management, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations. Further, partnership countries have the authority to consult with NATO if they perceive an external threat to their territorial integrity or political independence. Due to the effectiveness of PfP, even post-World War II neutral countries, like Austria, have joined. PfP also facilitates civilian control of the military; several defense ministries from partnership countries submit their Individual Partnership Programs (IPP) to their respective parliaments for approval. However, PfP alone cannot provide the security framework for stability throughout the European continent. PfP facilitates familiarity and cooperation between militaries; however, it does
not provide collective defense or security. As a result, PfP contributes to a viable security framework in Europe, but it is not the complete solution.

D. Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE includes all European and North American countries. Its purpose is to improve cooperation between the East and West by advancing the principles of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. During its twenty year history the OSCE contributed immeasurably to several important security initiatives, such as the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the Pact on Stability. However, due to its size (current membership includes fifty-four nations) the OSCE process is both cumbersome and time-consuming. Most issues fail to get resolved, or they get deluded to the least common denominator. Nonetheless, a strengthened OSCE can play an important role with other institutions in the overall security framework in Europe.

E. European Union (EU). According to this alternative, CEE countries should pursue membership in EU in order to achieve the stability and security needed for their political and economic reforms. The logic for this course of action argues that the most pressing problems facing the newly independent countries are economic and political, rather than military. Since there is no external threat to their security, these countries should focus on their non-military problems first. The European organization that can best resolve economic and political problems is the EU. The major advantages of this alternative are (1) the focus is on the most critical problems facing CEE countries and (2) it places the burden for stability on members of the EU (i.e., mostly Western Europeans). However, the disadvantages are significant. First, membership in the EU will take years to achieve;
According to some estimates it may take more than ten years. During that period CEE countries will lack a security umbrella. Second, this approach, because the EU comprises only countries in Europe, diminishes the role and influence of the US in European security. Fortunately, the EU shares common strategic interests with the US concerning CEE stability and security along political, economic, environmental, and military dimensions. Enlargement of the EU is clearly in the security interests of the US, but should proceed concurrently with other more timely and robust options.

F. Western European Union (WEU). The WEU is transitioning into the defense component of the European Union. Although the defense requirement is a secondary role to overall functioning of the EU, it is still important for stability in Europe. This is especially true when one realizes that all full members of the WEU are also members of NATO. Consequently, the EU and NATO become inextricably linked through the WEU. The WEU does not wield the power to provide a security umbrella to the CEE countries, but does play a major role in the overall security of Europe due to its linkage to the EU and NATO. As such, the WEU will play an integral part in the European security architecture, but not the leading role.

G. NATO. Under this proposal, NATO approves extending membership to CEE countries when they meet prerequisites. Proponents argue that Europe needs a strong security framework as soon as possible so infant CEE democracies and market-based economies can mature. In addition, NATO enlargement impedes any individual country from establishing its influence in the region through either unilateral neo-nationalistic actions or from negotiating bilateral agreements. The major advantages of this course of
action are (1) it provides near-term stability by filling the security vacuum created by the 
fall of the Soviet Union, (2) NATO, with US leadership, determines criteria and timeline 
for NATO enlargement, and (3) membership is offered to countries based on NATO’s 
strategic priorities. The disadvantages are threefold. First, NATO enlargement risks 
antagonizing Russian leaders and provoking them to reassert their influence in the region. 
Second, this approach may arouse an ultranationalist revolt within Russia that impedes 
political and economic reform. Third, NATO risks alienating those countries not initially 
offered membership and, consequently, the security umbrella of NATO. Although there 
are numerous multinational actions which facilitate CEE stability, NATO enlargement 
will play a large role in providing a European security architecture.

H. Wait for a Threat. Proponents of this approach recommend delaying NATO 
enlargement until a military or political threat, such as Russia, arises against the former 
Warsaw Pact countries. Advocates of this method argue that stabilizing Russia is the 
US’s top priority, and neither NATO nor the US should do anything to provoke Moscow.
Accordingly, “NATO expansion could spark a backlash in Russia that could damage 
European and American security”.

As a result, NATO membership would remain 
unchanged except in the case of an actual threat. The obvious advantage of this approach 
is that it does not alienate or undercut the US relationship with Russia, nor does it create a 
new bipolar confrontation. The disadvantages of this method are numerous. First, the 
CEE countries will not have a security network while they pursue political and economic 
reform. Second, expansionist countries may initiate bilateral agreements that would 
destabilize both the region and NATO. Third, this approach is reactive in nature and may
not be feasible in an ambiguous situation. Finally, if a threat emerges, this method may prove to be escalatory.

I. Discussion. It is clear that there are many alternatives to protect US interests in Europe. Each possesses advantages and disadvantages. Some do not go far enough in providing the security umbrella for reforms in CEE countries, these include the PfP, OSCE, and NACC options. The final one, “Wait for a Threat”, provides no security umbrella until a threat is present which may be too late or even prove escalatory. Others do not permit US involvement, such as the OSCE, EU, and WEU options. Further, the time frame for the EU option is excessive. The option that best meets the needs of the US and the security requirements for CEE countries is the NATO enlargement alternative. Nonetheless, one cannot minimize the importance of other multinational institutions in Europe, such as NACC, OSCE, EU, and WEU. Since European security embraces political, economic and military components, each of these institutions has a role to play. The new security architecture must be built around integration and cooperation of all these organizations. The expansion of each into CEE countries, although pursued independently, must complement one another. For example, NATO agreed in 1992 to support peacekeeping operations when sanctioned by the authority of the OSCE. However, based on advantages and disadvantages cited above, NATO enlargement is the cornerstone of stability and security in Europe. As a result of this course of action, the US will have a voice in the security architecture in Europe, NATO will determine the timeline for membership, and stability is based on strategic military considerations. An equally important second-order effect of NATO enlargement is the deterrent impact it has
on Russian aggression and expansion provided NATO brings in new members openly and cautiously. Further, the economic rewards gained by the US through a robust, expanded NATO are significant. US exports to current NATO members exceed $850 billion per annum, while European firms in the US employ over 3 million Americans. These economic successes are due in large part to US involvement in European security during the Cold War. With an enlarged NATO one can expect similar long-term mutually beneficial arrangements with CEE countries. On the other hand, NATO enlargement is not inexpensive. An analysis of NATO enlargement must include a review of costs for both current and new members.

COST OF NATO ENLARGEMENT (MEANS)

A. General. NATO enlargement is neither free nor cheap, with the ultimate cost depending on who joins the Alliance. Fortunately, since enlargement is stability-based rather than threat-based, a major build-up of additional military forces is not needed. Consequently, the costs (i.e., means) should be fairly modest. An analysis of costs must focus on monetary resources for such expenditures as military forces, infrastructure, and operations. Estimates of monetary resources to enlarge NATO range from $10 to $110 billion, with a conservative cost of $42 for current and new members. The US’s fair share of this amount is between $420 million and $1.4 billion, annually. The actual US contribution depends on key decisions about stationing and security assistance. Nonetheless, the US fair share of this additional NATO expense is a small percentage of its current obligation to NATO, which is approximately $90 billion. Further, collective defense is always less expensive fiscally than national defense. On the other hand, the
cost associated with not enlarging NATO is the increased risk of conflict and the potential for instability. The US jeopardizes much more than monetary resources if the security umbrella of NATO is not extended over the CEE countries.

B. Military Forces. Prior to enlargement, the US must consider positioning military forces in NATO’s new members. Forward presence is reassuring to countries joining NATO, but would be very costly. The expense could be kept limited by using forces that are currently stationed in Europe, rather than introducing new military units into the area. As a result, additional force structure is unnecessary. On the other hand, the restationing costs, to include bases and family housing, could be significant. The US can reduce restationing costs by rotating units for short duration (e.g., 180 days) without families to the CEE countries admitted into NATO or by keeping restationed forces to a minimum (e.g., one Army brigade and two Air Force wings). Fortunately, the strain of extended temporary duties, increases in operational tempo (optempo), and any costs associated with stationing forces in CEE countries can be overcome at present. Current assessments indicate that stationing forces in Eastern Europe is unnecessary provided these new members develop the infrastructure to receive and deploy forces in the event of an emergency. However, this situation would change if Russia reacted to NATO enlargement by applying pressure on former USSR countries, such as Ukraine. For example, if Russia pursued integration of the Confederation of Independent States (CIS) and deployed military forces in these countries, then NATO may have to station combat forces on the soil of new members. Regardless of the Russian situation, the US can show a visible guarantee of its commitment to collective defense by establishing prepositioned
equipment and supplies in NATO’s new members. This minimal cost alternative is much less provocative to Russia, yet very reassuring to CEE countries.

C. Infrastructure. The majority of the monetary costs to enlarge NATO is for infrastructure expenses. Infrastructure costs include building or improving bases, training areas, and logistics facilities. These upgrades support the rapid deployment and employment of military forces, and focus on improving the road and rail systems, airfields, pipeline distribution systems, and logistics bases. NATO achieves a credible collective defense only if it has the capability to reinforce rapidly any threatened country. Infrastructure upgrades, although expensive, are absolutely essential to acquire the capability to deploy and employ forces in a timely manner.

D. Interoperability. The second largest fiscal outlay is to improve interoperability. This category includes the cost of equipment upgrade and modernization. Most CEE countries are using antiquated Soviet equipment which is in need of repair or overhaul. The greatest shortcoming, and consequently the largest expense, is in C3 equipment. The militaries of current and prospective NATO members must be able to communicate in order to be effective. In addition, combined training exercises, similar to PfP operations, help the new members learn NATO’s tactics, techniques, and procedures. Interoperability expenditures are necessary in order to meet the security requirements associated with NATO membership.

E. Risk. The costs of NATO enlargement are significant, but not prohibitive. However, the cost of not enlarging may be overwhelming. Failure to enlarge creates increased risk. The emergence of a destabilizing influence in Eastern or Central Europe
is more likely without a security umbrella, such as that provided by NATO enlargement. This instability could threaten economic and political reform, and could even lead to armed conflict. US and NATO intervention to prevent or stop hostilities would be much more costly than NATO enlargement. In addition, the governments of the former Warsaw Pact countries have staked their legitimacy on pro-Western ideology. Denying NATO membership, which represents the embodiment of Western principles, may delegitimize and undermine these governments. In addition, expanding the alliance sends a clear message to Russia that NATO is not willing to subordinate its foreign and security policies to Russian wishes and that Moscow no longer can dominate CEE countries.

F. Discussion. It is usually less costly to have collective defense in which expenses are spread across several billpayers. However, the collective defense within NATO is valid only if there are equal commitments to all members, the alliance has the military capability to respond to various contingencies, and the integration of new members includes both benefits and requirements. Current and prospective members can afford a viable collective defense, although it will take time and patience for the fiscal expenditures to achieve their intended objectives. If the current sixteen members of NATO desire to extend their security umbrella over CEE countries, the cost of doing so will not stand in the way. Clearly, the costs are not prohibitive.

CRITERIA.

Membership in NATO brings with it certain obligations. The new member nations are expected to meet specific criteria. At present, NATO intentionally refuses to list the criteria for membership. NATO desires to avoid a “check the block” mentality for
enlargement. Rather, it is important that NATO be able to assess tangible as well as intangible criteria as it considers prospective members. Nonetheless, one cannot evaluate candidates without a general idea of the criteria. A review of the literature indicates a consensus on the following requirements: (a) military forces of new members must be able to operate effectively with NATO forces, (b) new members must be under a democratic form of government, (c) new members must have open-market economies, (d) new members must respect human rights, (e) new members must respect sovereignty of other nations, and (f) their military forces must be controlled by democratic, civilian governments. Prospective members must meet the tangible criteria, but they must also contribute to the Alliance’s effectiveness and cohesion. Enlarging NATO can not be merely providing protection to weaker nations, but it must strengthen the alliance by accepting new members who can make genuine contributions to mutual defense and who demonstrate the values of economic liberty, social justice, and environmental responsibility. In this way NATO becomes a “wider, deeper river” and not just a “wider river.” Also, all members share risks, obligations, benefits, and responsibilities for common security and collective defense. By carefully monitoring admission criteria, NATO can ensure that new members pay their fair share of common budgets, contribute to Alliance missions, and maintain a credible military force. Furthermore, it sends a clear message to Russia that the purpose of NATO enlargement is to strengthen the European security environment, as opposed to merely extending a buffer zone closer to the Russian border. In addition, withholding membership until countries meet entrance criteria accomplishes several purposes. First, it guarantees open, cautious enlargement which
reduces the likelihood of an aggressive, expansionist reaction in Russia. Second, countries who are not initially offered membership receive encouragement to continue internal reforms in order to increase their prospects of membership in the future. Finally, the Alliance remains strong by including only the most deserving nations. At the same time, one must never lose sight of NATO as a military alliance, with its members prepared to defend one another with a capable, credible military force.\textsuperscript{12} The Article 5 guarantee, which states that an attack on one is considered an attack on all, must continue to be driving force behind NATO membership and responsibilities.

**CRITICAL CONCERNS REGARDING ENLARGEMENT**

A. General. There are three vital concerns regarding NATO enlargement: relations with Russia, impact on reforms in Ukraine, and nuclear weapons policy. First, NATO enlargement must be part of an overall strategy to improve cooperation with Russia and Ukraine. Second, the deployment of nuclear weapons onto the soil of NATO’s new members is a contentious issue for all countries associated with enlargement.

B. Russia. Most of the former Warsaw Pact countries desire NATO membership to validate their European status, protect their political reforms, and facilitate their economic well-being. At the same time, NATO and the US must guard against antagonizing or alienating Russia. Critics argue that NATO enlargement may drive “Russia into an autarchic foreign policy steered by nationalism, defense paranoia, and anti-Western xenophobia.”\textsuperscript{13} Nearly all Russian leaders, even the most reform-minded, warn against NATO enlargement. Their objections center on the belief that NATO is trying to establish a new “buffer zone” that is closer to the Russian border. NATO’s charge is to
convince Russia that it does not desire a new “buffer zone,” but is pursuing stability throughout Europe. In terms of Central and Eastern Europe, both the US and Russia realize that destabilization caused by extreme nationalism, geopolitical competition, or political/economic failure is unwanted; stability is in both countries’ national interests. Therefore, the US and NATO must take several steps to avoid alienating Russia. First, only enlarge to achieve NATO’s strategic security vision, and do so openly and cautiously. Deliberate enlargement actually facilitates several Russian strategic goals: (a) constrains the freedom of action of a powerful post-Cold War Germany, (b) provides stability and order in CEE countries, and (c) advances values of the new and modern Russia. Second, keep Russia informed of NATO’s intentions and actions. Third, include Russia in Europe’s new security environment through either the current “NATO Plus One” relationship or a formal NATO-Russia treaty. Overall, the critical element is to keep Russia engaged in the process in order to prevent another “Cold War-type” confrontation and to encourage Moscow to continue her internal reform. According to the NATO study on enlargement, “A stronger NATO-Russia relationship should form another cornerstone of a new, inclusive, and comprehensive security structure in Europe.”

C. Ukraine. The security position of Ukraine is important to the overall security of Europe. In a tit-for-tat move, NATO enlargement may compel Russia to extend its influence over Ukraine. This destabilizing action sets the conditions for a major military build-up in CEE countries by both NATO and Russia. By following the procedures described above, NATO can offer former ‘USSR satellite countries’, like Poland,
membership in NATO in a way that is not strategically confrontational to Russia. However, offering membership to former ‘USSR countries’, like Ukraine, within the current geostrategic situation would be a significant threat to Russia. As a result, as NATO offers membership to the first group of countries, it should focus on CEE countries who were not part of the USSR and who have historically European ties (e.g., Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia). In addition, NATO must be clear and unswerving in its message that Ukrainian independence is of extreme importance to the West. Since its independence, Ukraine has tried to establish political, economic, and security ties with the West, but officially does not desire membership in NATO. At present, it is in NATO and the US’s best interest that Ukraine remain politically and economically stable and militarily neutral. As a one author points out, “An independent Ukraine acts as a key strategic barrier between Russia and the West”.

C. Nuclear Strategy. Due to the reduced threat as compared to the Cold War era, the reliance on nuclear weapons for European defense is greatly diminished. The changed European landscape calls for a heavier reliance on conventional forces, while decreasing the likelihood of nuclear weapons employment. At the same time, Russia and Ukraine have legitimate concerns about nuclear weapons being moved closer to their borders as CEE countries join NATO; these concerns require NATO and US consideration. Of note, many NATO members did not have nuclear weapons on their soil, but were protected by the nuclear security guarantee. Furthermore, the previous US Secretary of State stated that nuclear weapons will not be deployed to nations joining NATO. As a result, for the foreseeable future countries joining NATO will remain nuclear free. In sum, nuclear
Conclusions

The US has an important national interest in the stability of Europe, and specifically the CEE region. Of utmost importance is the stability of the newly independent countries in CEE. A stable Europe reduces the likelihood that US military forces will be engaged in armed conflict, increases the markets for US products and investments, and maintains politically-friendly nations in the region. As a result of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the entire area of Europe is undergoing a significant transition. As Western Europe considers consolidation and integration issues for all of Europe, the CEE countries are transitioning from state-controlled economies and autocratic governments to open-market economies and democratic governments. This period of transition contains dangers from both internal forces (e.g., neo-nationalism and extremism) and external forces (e.g., reemergence of a Russian threat or destabilizing bilateral alliances). It is imperative that the CEE countries be provided a security network which enhances their political and economic reforms. CEE countries consider themselves European, and as such wish to participate in Western institutions. There are a number of institutions which offer integration and stability to CEE countries, including NACC, PfP, OSCE, EU, WEU, and NATO. All are important and each has a role to play in overall European stability. However, the cornerstone to a security architecture throughout Europe is including CEE countries, as they meet prerequisites, into an expanded NATO. NATO enlargement is the key because it follows a shorter timeline,
contains collective defense guarantees, and keeps the US engaged. Further, NATO enlargement is cost effective because it is stability-based, rather than threat-based. Although the cost of enlargement may approximate $42 billion over a 10-15 year period for all members, collective defense is less expensive than national defense. However, the major drawback to NATO enlargement is its impact in Russia. Russian leaders have opposed any effort to bring its former allies under the security protection of the West. Their rationale invariably centers on a new NATO buffer zone moved closer to the Russian frontier. To overcome their concerns, the West must clearly demonstrate the importance of Russia in any new security framework in Europe by negotiating a revised NATO Plus One relationship or by signing a formal treaty with Russia. Interestingly, integration of CEE countries into NATO serves Russia's national interest by improving general European stability. In sum, NATO's enlargement must be economically feasible for current and new members, politically stabilizing throughout the CEE region, and strategically acceptable to Russia. Finally, NATO enlargement must be part of a broader strategy of integration and consolidation of CEE countries into Western European institutions. The broader strategy envisions a democratic, stable, free-market Europe (i.e., ends) that is thoroughly integrated in NATO, PfP, NACC, EU, WEU, and OSCE (i.e., ways) in a transparent and cost effective manner (i.e., means).

RECOMMENDATIONS

NATO, with US leadership, should admit new members from CEE countries. As part of an overall security architecture, NATO enlargement should provide the cornerstone for stability throughout Europe. However, enlargement must not come with hollow
guarantees or encompass countries with internal crises. Consequently, prospective
member nations must meet stringent prerequisites so that they are viable, contributing
members of an enlarged NATO. In this way NATO becomes a “wider, deeper river” in
Europe, rather than just a “wider one”. NATO enlargement serves US national interests,
promotes a stronger and more stable Europe, and strengthens the Alliance.
APPENDIX A

Sixteen Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Belgium                      Luxembourg
Canada                       Netherlands
Denmark                      Norway
France                       Portugal
Germany                      Spain
Greece                       Turkey
Iceland                      United Kingdom
Italy                        United States
APPENDIX B

Twenty-Seven Members of Partnership for Peace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>Georgia</th>
<th>Poland</th>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>Uzbekistan</td>
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</table>


APPENDIX C

Fifteen Members of the European Union

Austria          Italy
Belgium          Luxembourg
Denmark          Netherlands
Finland          Portugal
France           Spain
Germany          Sweden
Greece           United Kingdom
Ireland
APPENDIX D

Ten Members of the Western European Union*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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</table>

* Observers: Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Finland, and Sweden

Associate Members: Iceland, Norway, and Turkey

Associate Partners: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia
APPENDIX E

Fifty-Four Members of the Organization for Security and Coordination in Europe

<table>
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<th>Portugal</th>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENDNOTES

11 William Perry, Secretary of Defense, Speech given at seminar sponsored by Supreme Allied Commander for the Atlantic, 27 June 1996, Norfolk, VA.
15 Since the dissolution of the USSR, NATO and Russia have a direct and open relationship which involves consultation on a wide variety of subjects. This relationship is called unofficially “NATO Plus One.” Discussions range from peacekeeping operations to security arrangements. A formal NATO-Russia treaty is an option due to its significant support both inside and outside of NATO. However, treaties involve legal entanglements and guarantees which may be undesirable considering Russia’s current situation. As a result, a formal treaty with Russia may be the long term solution, but not feasible in the foreseeable future.
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Perry, William J. Annual Report to the President and the Congress. Prepared to fulfill requirements of Sect 113(c) and (e) of Title 10 of the USC and Section 405 of the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986. Washington: US Government Printing Office, March 1996.

________Speech given to seminar sponsored by Supreme Allied Commander for the Atlantic in Norfolk, 27 June 1996.


