

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress

Updated October 3, 2006

Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress

Summary

The Administration has requested \$102.6 million in FY2007 funds for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a multilateral, five-year program with planned U.S. contributions of some \$660 million from FY2005 through FY2009. Its primary purpose is to train and equip 75,000 military troops, a majority of them African, for peacekeeping operations by 2010. GPOI also supports an Italian training center for gendarme (constabulary police) forces in Vicenza, Italy. In addition, GPOI is promoting the development of an international transportation and logistics support system for peacekeepers, and is encouraging an information exchange to improve international coordination of peace operations training and exercises in Africa. In June 2004, G8 leaders pledged to support the goals of the initiative.

GPOI incorporates previous capabilities-building programs for Africa. From FY1997-FY2005, the United States spent just over \$121 million on GPOI's predecessor program that was funded through the State Department Peacekeeping (PKO) account: the Clinton Administration's African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its successor, the Bush Administration's African Crisis Operations Training (ACOTA). (The term ACOTA is now used to refer to GPOI's training program in Africa.) Through mid-2005, the United States trained troops from nine African nations — Benin, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, and Senegal. Subsequently, three African nations were added to the roster: Gabon, South Africa, and Zambia, and a fourth, Nigeria, is scheduled to join the program in 2006. Some \$33 million was provided from FY1998-FY2005 to support classroom training of 31 foreign militaries through the Foreign Military Financing account's Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC).

In mid-2005, the Administration began expanding the geographical scope of GPOI to selected countries in Central America and Europe with supplemental funding in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 (H.R. 4818, P.L. 108-447). It also has established a communications network in Asia.

For FY2007, the Administration requested \$102.6 million for GPOI funding. In its action on the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill for FY2007 (H.R. 5522, passed July 9, 2006), the House provided \$82 million for GPOI. The Senate Appropriations Committee's (SAC) version of the bill contains no GPOI earmark. Senate appropriators expressed discontent with State Department management of the program. They recommended transfer of GPOI funding from the PKO to the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account.

An issue for the second session of the 109th Congress is whether international training efforts through GPOI and its predecessor programs are having the desired effect. Another issue at the close of the session is whether a transfer of funding accounts as proposed by the SAC would be beneficial. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Contents

Background	1
GPOI Purposes and Activities	2
GPOI Goals and Needs	2
Demand for Peacekeepers	3
Need for Gendarme/Constabulary Forces	3
U.S. Peacekeeping Training in Africa through FY2005	4
Development of the “Beyond Africa” Program in 2005	5
Foreign Response and Contributions	6
The Italian Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU)	6
Administration Requests and Congressional Action	8
FY2005 GPOI Funding and Activities	8
Congressional Action on FY2006 Funding	9
FY2007 Administration Program and Funding Request, and Congressional Action	9
House Appropriations Action	10
Senate Appropriations Action	10
Issues for the 109 th Congress	11
Are International Training Efforts Through GPOI and its Predecessor Programs Having the Desired Effect?	11
What Are the Practical Implications of Moving GPOI Funding from the PKO to the FMF Account?	11
What International Contributions Support CoESPU and Should They Be Increased?	13

The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress

Background

The Bush Administration has requested \$102.6 million in FY2007 State Department funding for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). The Administration launched the five-year (FY2005-FY2009) \$660 million initiative in mid-2004 as a means to alleviate the perceived shortage worldwide of trained peacekeepers and “gendarmes” (police with military skills, a.k.a. constabulary police), as well as to increase available resources to transport and sustain them. While the United States has provided considerable support to implement several peace processes and to support peacekeepers in the field from a variety of budget accounts for well over a decade, it has provided relatively little funding to build up foreign military capabilities to perform peacekeeping operations.¹

The United States previously provided peacekeeping capacity-building assistance to foreign militaries primarily under two programs, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA) and its predecessor program, and the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC). Both ACOTA and EIPC have been subsumed under the GPOI budget line. ACOTA is now the term used to refer to the Africa training component of GPOI.

Impetus for GPOI came from the Department of Defense (DOD), where officials in the Office of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) worked with the State Department for over a year and a half to develop the proposal. Officials in SO/LIC’s section on peacekeeping developed the plan as a means to expand and improve the ACOTA program - with more and better exercises and more equipment - as well as to extend the program beyond Africa to other parts of the world. Policymakers hoped that the availability of peacekeeping training would encourage more countries to participate in peacekeeping operations, enable current donors to provide a greater number of troops, and increase the number of countries which potentially could serve as lead nations, according to some analysts.

The GPOI budget is part of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Peacekeeping (PKO) account, also known as the “voluntary” Peacekeeping account, under the Military Assistance rubric. The PKO account funds activities carried out

¹ The term “peacekeeping” is used generically here. It covers the range of activities referred to elsewhere as peace operations, stability operations, or stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations.

under Section 551 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA).² Section 551 authorizes the President to provide assistance for peacekeeping operations and other programs to further U.S. national security interests “on such terms and conditions as he may determine.” (This provides some flexibility to the President, but is not tantamount to the discretion that he can exercise when funding is provided “notwithstanding any other provision of law.”)

GPOI Purposes and Activities

In his September 21, 2004 address to the opening meeting of the 59th session of the U.N. General Assembly, President Bush asserted that the world “must create permanent capabilities to respond to future crises.” In particular, he pointed to a need for “more effective means to stabilize regions in turmoil, and to halt religious violence and ethnic cleansing.” A similar rationale prompted the Clinton Administration to formulate the ACRI training program in 1996 and underlies the current search for new strategies and mechanisms to prevent and control conflicts.³

GPOI Goals and Needs

To accomplish these ends, GPOI, has three major goals:

- Train some 75,000 troops worldwide, with an emphasis on Africa, in peacekeeping skills by 2010. (The number is the total to be trained by all participating countries, according to a State Department official.)
- Support Italy in establishing a center to train international gendarme (constabulary) forces to participate in peacekeeping operations (see section below); and
- Foster an international deployment and logistics support system to transport peacekeepers to the field and maintain them there.

Through GPOI, the State Department also promotes the exchange of information among donors on peace operations training and exercises in Africa. This is accomplished through donors meetings which serve as a “clearinghouse” to facilitate

² The State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations account (i.e., PKO, also known as the “voluntary” peacekeeping account) funds U.S. contributions to peacekeeping efforts other than assessed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations. U.N. assessed contributions are funded through the State Department’s Contributions to International Peacekeeping Account (CIPA).

³ For more information on this topic, see CRS Report RL32862, *Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities*, by Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss.

coordination. The first of these State Department meetings was held in Washington, D.C. on October 7-8, 2004.⁴

Demand for Peacekeepers. For many analysts, continued efforts to improve the peacekeeping skills of African and other military forces is an important step towards controlling devastating conflicts, particularly in Africa. In the mid-1990s, several developed nations provided most of the peacekeepers. The perception that developed nations would not be able to sustain the burden indefinitely, as well as the perception that the interests of those nations in Africa were not sufficient to ensure needed troop commitments there, led international capacity-building efforts to focus on Africa.

As of the end of December 2004, shortly after GPOI first started up, almost 25,000 of the nearly 58,000 military personnel who were participating in the current 17 U.N. peacekeeping operations were from the 22 African troop-contributing nations. (African nations provided over half of the military personnel — roughly 24,000 of 47,000 — in the seven U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa.) Africa's military contribution to U.N. peacekeeping at the end of 2004 was over double that at the end of 2000; five of the top ten African contributors, who provided some 98% of the military contribution, received training under the ACRI/ACOTA program. African contributions to the U.N. international civilian police pool (CIVPOL) remained just about the same over those four years: 1,213 in December 2004 (of a total of 6,765 from all nations) compared to 1,088 in December 2000.

African militaries also participate in regional peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU). (The first ECOWAS peacekeeping mission was deployed to Liberia in 1990. Subsequent missions were deployed to Liberia once again, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, and most recently the Côte d'Ivoire. The AU deployed its first peacekeepers to Burundi in 2003 and Sudan in 2004. All missions but Sudan eventually became U.N. operations.) Both organizations are trying to develop an African stand-by peacekeeping force, comprised of contributions from five regional organizations, by 2010. Under GPOI, the United States will work to enhance and support the command structures and multilateral staff of ECOWAS and the AU.

Need for Gendarme/Constabulary Forces. A second capability in short supply is the specialized units of police with military skills to handle temporary hostile situations such as unruly crowds.⁵ Several countries have such forces, i.e., the

⁴ The United States European Command (EUCOM) held two previous "clearinghouse" meetings in May and December 2004.

⁵ Gendarme/constabulary forces are trained in both military and policing skills, but are less heavily armed than soldiers. According to the Clinton Administration's Presidential Decision Directive 71 (PDD-71), constabulary tasks include the regulation of peoples' movements when necessary to ensure safety; interventions "to stop civil violence, such as vigilante lynchings or other violent public crimes" and to "stop and deter widespread or organized looting, vandalism, riots or other mob-type action;" and the dispersal of "unruly or violent public demonstrations and civil disturbances." (*Text: The Clinton Administration* (continued...))

Italian *carabinieri*, the French *gendarmarie*, and the Spanish *Guardia Civil*, among others. In the United States these are referred to as constabulary forces.

U.S. Peacekeeping Training in Africa through FY2005

Since 1996, the United States has provided field and staff training to develop military capabilities for peacekeeping through the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its successor program, ACOTA, which as of 2005 was subsumed under GPOI. From its inception through FY2005, the United States trained⁶ troops from nine African nations — Benin, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, and Senegal.⁷ (It also trained a small number of gendarmes who received the same training as the others.) The United States also provides non-lethal equipment to the militaries which it trains.⁸ Initially, under ACRI, U.S. soldiers provided field training and oversaw classroom training provided by private contractors.⁹ Because of the demand for U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, private contractors also began to conduct field training.

During FY2005, some 11,000 African troops were trained and a total of 14,000 are expected to be trained with FY2005 funds. This included the training of six battalions from Senegal which were subsequently deployed to specific peacekeeping

⁵ (...continued)

White Paper on Peace Operations, February 24, 2000, pp 9-10.) Constabulary forces often can deploy more rapidly than other international civilian police because they usually deploy as “formed units” (i.e., in previously formed working groups) instead of as individuals. They also are often equipped with their own communication and logistical support. See CRS Report RL32321, *Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions*, by Nina M. Serafino.

⁶ ACRI provided training in traditional peacekeeping skills where there is an existing cease-fire or peace accord. The more muscular ACOTA, initiated in 2002, has also provided training in the skills needed for African troops to perform peacekeeping tasks in more hostile environments, including force protection, light-infantry operations and small-unit tactics. Information from a State Department official and Col. Russell J. Handy, USAF, *Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance: Developing Training Partnerships for the Future of Africa*. Air and Space Power Journal, Fall 2003, as posted online at [<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/fal03/handy.html>]. ACOTA also put greater emphasis on the “train the trainer” aspect. As of 2005, training packages included Command and Staff Operations Skills, Command Post Exercises (i.e., exercises, often computer-bases, of headquarters commanders and staff) and Peace Support Operations Soldier Skills field training, according to a State Department fact sheet.

⁷ Ugandan troops were trained briefly under ACRI. That training was halted because of Ugandan involvement in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

⁸ This includes communications packages, uniforms, boots, generators, mine detectors, Global Positioning Systems (GPS), and medical and water purification equipment.

⁹ MPRI and Northrup Grummon Information Technology (NGIT) are both qualified to bid for State Department contracts. According to a State Department official, many of the trainers provided by the private contractors are military retirees or reservists.

missions,¹⁰ and three battalions from Botswana who anticipated deployment. Training for a 7th Senegalese battalion and a battalion from a new partner, Gabon, began training in FY2005 and continued training into FY2006. Predeployment training began in November 2005 for Mali and Senegal. Also during FY2006, ACOTA will sponsor training for Benin, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and Mozambique, as well as for two new African partners, South Africa and Zambia. Military personnel from a third new partner, Nigeria, will join the program in November 2005 as part of an observation team and later, in March and April 2006, Nigerian personnel will receive “train the trainer” training. Another battalion from Gabon will be trained in February and March 2006.

Funding for ACRI, which like ACOTA was provided under the State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, totaled \$83.6 million during its six fiscal years (FY1997-FY2002). (Additional support for ACRI was provided through the Foreign Military Financing program.) ACOTA was funded at \$8 million in FY2003, \$15 million in FY2004, and \$14.88 million for FY2005.

Other support for classroom training of foreign militaries was provided through the EIPC, a “train the trainer” program which began in FY1998 and was subsumed under the GPOI rubric. EIPC provided assistance to selected countries — some 31 as of early 2005 — by designing and implementing a comprehensive, country-specific peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance training and education program to enhance a nation’s institutional structure to train and deploy peacekeepers. EIPC funding, provided under the Foreign Military Financing Program, has totaled about \$33.3 million, including an estimated \$1.79 million in spending in FY2005.

Development of the “Beyond Africa” Program in 2005

The State Department initiated the “Beyond Africa” training and equipping program in mid-July 2005¹¹ in order to extend GPOI training to three new regions: Latin America, Europe, and Asia. (As in Africa, some equipment is provided during training, but only that needed for the training itself. Trained troops are not provided with equipment needed for operations until they deploy.)

In Central America, GPOI funds were to be used to train and equip soldiers from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, as well as to upgrade an existing facility in order to establish a peacekeeping training center in Guatemala. The intention is to stand up a battalion of about 600 Central American troops.

In Europe, the first countries whose troops were offered training under GPOI were Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Ukraine. GPOI funds were also to be used to provide pre-deployment training for a “South East Europe Brigade”

¹⁰ The Senegalese have been trained to participate in missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Darfur.

¹¹ The Department of Defense transferred the \$80 million in P.L. 108-447 (Division J Section 117) supplemental appropriations to be used for GPOI programs in June 2005. Funds became available for obligation in mid-July, 15 days after the State Department notified Congress of its spending plans.

(SEEBRIG) of soldiers from Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Macedonia in preparation for their participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the NATO peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan.

In Asia, the first countries to be extended train-and-equip assistance and provided some logistical support were Bangladesh, Malaysia, Mongolia, and Thailand. GPOI funds were also used to expand the Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN) communications capabilities by installing software and hardware in the peacekeeping centers of these four countries.

Foreign Response and Contributions

G8 leaders¹² endorsed the GPOI goals (above) at their June 2004 summit meeting at Sea Island, GA, adopting an “Action Plan on Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations.”¹³ (This was actually the third G8 Action Plan concerning peacekeeping in Africa. In June 2002, the G8 Summit at Kananaskis, Canada, adopted a broad Africa Action Plan that contained sections on conflict resolution and peace-building efforts. The more specific Joint Africa /G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations was developed over the next year and presented at the June 2003 Summit at Evian-les-bains, France.¹⁴) As indicated by the GPOI “clearinghouse” concept, several G8 countries already have significant programs in Africa. In addition to the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) conduct bilateral training programs with African militaries. Germany and the UK provided the assistance necessary to launch the regional Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana, which opened in 2004; the European Union and other countries, most prominently Canada, Italy, France and the Netherlands, have also assisted the Center.

The Italian Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU).

In his September 2004 speech to the United Nations, President Bush referred to Italy as a joint sponsor of GPOI, because it co-sponsored with the United States the Sea Island G8 peacekeeping action plan. Italy also had moved to establish a school for training gendarme forces even before the United States Congress had provided funding for U.S. support for the school. Italian *carabinieri*, who are widely viewed as a leading model and have played a prominent role in providing constabulary forces to peacekeeping and stabilization operations,¹⁵ established the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) as an international training center at Vicenza in March 2005. Italy is providing not only the facility, but also most of 130-plus person

¹² G8 refers to the “Group of 8” major industrialized democracies: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. G8 heads of state, plus representatives from the European Union, meet at annual summits.

¹³ Text available at [http://www.g8usa.gov/d_061004c.htm].

¹⁴ Texts available at [<http://www.g8.gc.ca/2002Kananaskis/kananaskis/afraction-en.pdf>] and [<http://www.g8.gc.ca/AFRIQUE-01june-en.asp>].

¹⁵ According to *Carabinieri* officials interviewed by the author, as of mid-November 2004, some 1,300 *carabinieri* were deployed in missions to Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Albania, and Palestine.

staff for the “train the trainer” program. The U.S. contribution of \$10 million for the school’s operation and training programs was transferred to Italy in late September 2005. (According to CoESPU officials, the U.S. contribution covers about one-third the cost of running the school.)¹⁶ CoESPU’s goal, by 2010, is to train 3,000 mid-to-high ranking personnel at Vicenza and an additional 4,000 in formed units in their home countries.¹⁷

The first CoESPU high-level class graduated on December 7, 2005. About 29 senior officers (staff officers ranking from Lt. Colonels to Colonels and their civilian equivalents) attended the four-and-a-half week course (approximately 150 classroom hours) for training in international organizations, international law (including international humanitarian law), military arts in peace support operations, tactical doctrine, operating in mixed international environments with hybrid chains of command, and the selection, training, and organization of police units for international peace support operations. The first class consisted of officers from Cameroon, India, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, and Senegal. CoESPU intends to offer four high-level courses per year.

A pilot course to train about 100 junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers (sergeant majors to captains and the civilian equivalents) began on January 13, 2006, and was completed seven weeks later. Students for this course were drawn from the same six countries as those at the first-high level course. This seven-week course covered the materials taught in the high-level course with an emphasis on training in the more practical aspects, including check point procedures, VIP security and escorts, high-risk arrests, border control, riot control, election security, and police self-defense techniques. CoESPU intends to offer five such middle management courses per year.

Many more countries have indicated that they would like to send students to the CoESPU courses. As of mid-2006, 18 other countries expressed interest in sending students, according to CoESPU. These were Bangladesh, Benin, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Gabon, Ghana, Indonesia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Serbia, South Africa, Tunisia, Turkey, and the Ukraine.

CoESPU is also developing a lessons-learned and doctrine writing capability in order to serve as an interactive resource for SPUs. It intends to develop a coherent and comprehensive SPU doctrine to promote interoperability in the field, to ensure that doctrine is the basis of training standards and methods, and to respond to questions from SPU commanders in the field, as well as to support pre-mission and in-theater training exercises.

¹⁶ Author’s interviews at CoESPU, June 2006.

¹⁷ The data in this sentence and the following three paragraphs was provided by CoESPU officials in October 2005, except for the list of countries participating in the course beginning in January 2006, which was taken from a dispatch of the Italian news agency, ANSA, “Esercito: Ufficiali PS Paesi Afroasiatici a Lezione di Pace,” posted on the Carabinieri website, [<http://www.carabinieri.it>].

Administration Requests and Congressional Action

FY2005 GPOI Funding and Activities

Although the initiative had long been in the works, President Bush approved GPOI in April 2004, two months after the FY2005 budget request was submitted to Congress. To fund the initiative at \$100 million in FY2005, the Administration proposed that 80% be contained in the DOD budget and the remaining 20% be ACOTA funds in the State Department budget. The Armed Services committees did not back GPOI, because of concerns that its inclusion in the DOD budget would divert funds from U.S. troops. GPOI's strongest support seemed to come from Senate foreign affairs authorizers and appropriators.

Of the \$96.7 million in GPOI funding that Congress provided for FY2005,¹⁸ State Department plans called for over a third (about \$35 million) to be spent on Africa programs (i.e., for training African troops in peacekeeping and for support to headquarters of African organizations) and about one-fifth (\$20 million) for "Beyond Africa" training. (Training expenditures include the cost of equipment used during training.) A little under a third (\$29 million) was to be spent on the acquisition and storage of equipment for distribution to trained troops when they deploy to missions and for other deployment support, and the remainder for other purposes. The following chart provides a breakdown of plans, by region and function, as of August 2005. (Total does not add due to rounding.)

Program	Amount
Africa Training	\$29.0 million
Africa Headquarters Support	\$ 6.3 million
Latin America Training	\$ 6.5 million
Asia Training	\$ 8.5 million
European Training	\$ 5.0 million
Equipment Acquisition and Storage	\$26.0 million
Deployment Support	\$ 5.0 million

¹⁸ At the end of 2004, Congress provided GPOI funding in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447). Section 117 of Division J ("Other Matters") provided that "\$80 million may be transferred with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense" to the Department of State Peacekeeping Operations account. The authority was provided notwithstanding any other provision of law, except section 551 of Division D (the Foreign Operations appropriations section of the bill), i.e., the "Leahy Amendment" which prohibits the training of military units credibly accused of gross violations of human rights. (A State Department official said that the "notwithstanding" language was requested to provide an exemption from FAA Section 660, which limits U.S. assistance for the training of foreign police.) Division D of H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447 contains the \$20 million in State Department PKO funding for ACOTA and the nearly \$1.8 million in EPIC funding that are now subsumed under GPOI.

Italian Gendarme School (CoESPU) Support	\$10.0 million
Measuring Effectiveness	\$ 0.3 million

In the end, State Department obligations and expenditures for GPOI in FY2005 appear to have totaled substantially less. According to the State Department's FY2007 budget justification materials, actual GPOI spending in FY2005 was \$80.0 million.

Congressional Action on FY2006 Funding

The Bush Administration requested \$114.4 million for FY2006 funding. The House FY2006 Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 3057 (as reported by the House Appropriations Committee (HAC), H.Rept. 109-152, on June 24 and passed on June 28), contained \$96.4 million for GPOI. In its report, the HAC expressed its support for GPOI as a means for the United States to "reduce the emphasis on the use of military troops for these operations." It explained that it had provided \$18 million less than the request because it did not expect that all \$63 million indicated for equipment and transportation outside of Africa could be obligated and spent in 2006. The Senate version of the bill (as reported June 30 and passed July 20), contained \$114.0 million for GPOI. The conference version of the bill (H.Rept. 109-265, P.L. 109-102, signed into law November 14, 2005) does not earmark funding for GPOI or for any other program contained in the PKO account, but it does fund the full PKO account at \$175.0 million (i.e., the same as the Administration's FY2006 budget request). (The PKO account is subject to the reporting requirement of Section 584, which mandates that the Secretary of State provide the Appropriations Committees a report on the obligation and expenditure of its funds no later than April 1, 2006.) Estimated GPOI spending in FY2006 will be \$100.4 million according to the State Department's FY2007 budget justification document.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee version of the State Department authorization bill for FY2006 and FY2007 (S. 600, S.Rept. 109-35, reported on March 10, 2005, and returned to the calendar on April 26) would authorize \$114.4 million for FY2006 and such sums as may be necessary for FY2007 for GPOI. The House version (H.R. 2601, H.Rept. 109-168, as reported by the House International Relations Committee on July 13, 2005 and passed on July 20) does not mention GPOI and does not detail accounts in such a way as to indicate whether GPOI is funded. There was no further action on the bill before Congress adjourned in December, nor in the second session of the 109th Congress as of the date of this report.

FY2007 Administration Program and Funding Request, and Congressional Action

The State Department contemplates the possible expansion of its GPOI training and equipment to 12 new countries in FY2007. In its FY2007 budget justification document, the State Department signaled its intention to continue assistance to 13 African and 17 non-African countries and stated that the program may also be

expanded to at least two African and ten non-African countries. The 13 African nations listed as continuing recipients through the ACOTA component of GPOI were Benin, Botswana, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Zambia. Possible new African partners were listed as Angola and Namibia. Training will include subregional organizations and the African Union. Elsewhere, GPOI plans call for continued training of four Central American countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua), four Asian countries (Bangladesh, Malaysia, Mongolia, and Thailand), three European countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Ukraine), and member nations of the South East Europe Brigade (i.e., Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Romania, and Turkey) as well as Albania. In addition, the program may be extended to six more Asian states, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka; two Pacific island states, Fiji and Tonga; one Latin American state, Peru; and one Middle Eastern state, Jordan. The budget justification also stated that it would provide “modest” funding to CoESPU, without specifying an amount.

For FY2007, the Administration requested \$102.6 million for GPOI funding. The House is disinclined to provide full funding and Senate appropriators have expressed discontent with State Department management of the program.

House Appropriations Action. The House version of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill for FY2007 (H.R. 5522, passed July 9, 2006), contains \$82 million for GPOI. This is \$20.6 million below the request and \$18.4 below the FY2006 level. No explanation is provided in the House Appropriations Committee’s explanatory report (H.Rept. 109-486) for the reduction. The report does state the committee’s expectation that the FY2008 budget request for GPOI “include a detailed summary of the achievements of GPOI to date and specific information linking the budget request to fiscal year 2008 performance objectives.” The committee also “strongly” encourages the Secretary of State “to consider sending GPOI participants to common educational programs in the United States, including the Naval Postgraduate School.” It notes that the recommendation did not include authorization for GPOI funds to be used notwithstanding section 660 of the Foreign Assistance act, which had been requested to provide support for CoESPU. Although the committee report expresses support for “the proposed program,” it states that it either expected other G8 nations to support the program or for the Administration to use funding from other accounts with the necessary authority to provide funds to CoESPU, such as the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account.

Senate Appropriations Action. In the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) version of H.R. 5522, the State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Bill for FY2007 (S.Rept. 109-277), approved by SAC on June 29, 2006, funding for GPOI would be transferred from the PKO account to a new program under the Foreign Military Financing Program. S.Rept. 109-277 states that the State Department “has failed to demonstrate a requisite level of commitment to the program, instead viewing funds provided for GPOI as a funding source for other activities. The report also scores the State Department for ignoring committee

guidance on GPOI and for its inability “to articulate any plan for the use of fiscal year 2005 funding until calendar year 2006.”¹⁹

As a result, the SAC recommended in its report that a Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund be created under FMF, the purpose of which “is identical to GPOI, namely, to identify the critical shortfalls in the training, equipment, and capabilities of our allies to serve in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.” To decide on the allocation fund, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military [Pol-Mil] Affairs would consult with commanders of the U.S. regional military commands (U.S., Pacific, Central, European, and Southern) to identify “the most critical training and equipment shortfalls of our peacekeeping partners and regional allies” in order to develop a three year plan and program to address those needs. The Pol-Mil Assistant Secretary is to present the plan and program to SAC by October 15, 2006.²⁰

Issues for the 109th Congress

With some Members expressing reservations about the management of the GPOI program, three issues may be of greatest concern.

Are International Training Efforts Through GPOI and its Predecessor Programs Having the Desired Effect? Members wonder whether the GPOI program is meeting its goal of providing well-trained peacekeepers for U.N. and other operations. There are two aspects of particular concern: (1) is the training provided sufficient to enable soldiers (or police in the case of COESPU training) to handle the necessary range of peacekeeping tasks effectively, and (2) are the soldiers (and police) trained under GPOI actually deployed to international peacekeeping operations? In an effort to measure results, the State Department awarded in September 2005 a contract to DFI International to develop a system to evaluate GPOI and to monitor its results against that “metrics” system.

What Are the Practical Implications of Moving GPOI Funding from the PKO to the FMF Account? Although both the PKO and FMF accounts fall under the rubric of Military Assistance in the State Department budget, these accounts are governed by different authorities. As mentioned earlier, the PKO account is conducted under the authority of Part II, Chapter 6 (Section 551) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA). The State Department is entirely responsible for programs conducted under that authority. FMF programs — which can be either grants or loans but are now virtually all grants — are subject to the provisions of FAA Part II, Chapter 2 (Military Assistance, Section 503-517), as well as the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).²¹ FMF programs are also State Department programs, for which the State Department sets the policy

¹⁹ S.Rept. 109-277, p. 92.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 91.

²¹ The Arms Export Control Act was developed to legislate foreign military sales (FMS). Congress places grant assistance under the provisions of the act by reference in annual FMF appropriations.

direction, including the final selection of the countries that will participate, and exercises oversight. Day-to-day implementation of FMF programs, however, is carried out by DOD personnel through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which is charged with the on-the-ground administration and supervision of programs and their coordination among government agencies.

The placement of GPOI in the FMF account would impose new restrictions, among them a limitation regarding recipients. Some 10 countries that are current recipients or potential recipients for FY2007 would not be eligible to receive GPOI funding because of provisions of the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA).²² Exempting these countries would require a presidential waiver on national interest grounds.

FMF programs are subject to more extensive prohibitions on the acquisition abroad of articles and services than are PKO activities. Because GPOI acquires some articles and services through local contracting, some costs would increase and some projects would be more difficult to implement under FMF unless an offshore procurement waiver were obtained, according to the State Department.

FMF processes are cumbersome and lack the flexibility needed for GPOI activities that PKO authority provides, according to some experts. According to the State Department, "the vast majority" of GPOI equipment and training would have to be purchased through the DSCA process. In addition, organizing multilateral exercises and activities would be greatly complicated by AECA provisions that limit transfers of funds, in effect requiring each participating country to be funded directly. In some cases, these provisions would prevent the execution of such programs, according to the State Department.

FMF authorities contain several other restrictions that could have implications for GPOI if its funds were merged into the far larger FMF account. These restrictions include a spending cap and a limit on the number of military personnel who could be assigned to a foreign country for FMF programs.

The transfer of GPOI from the PKO to the FMF account would prevent the funding of some existing contracts and disrupt those programs, according to the State

²² FMF funding is subject to ASPA (Title II of the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, H.R. 4775, signed into law August 2, 2002, as P.L. 107-206). In order to avoid a cutoff of assistance under section 2007 of that act, each country which has ratified the international treaty establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) must sign a bilateral immunity agreement (BIA) with the United States pledging that it will not seek to surrender U.S. personnel present in that country to the ICC. Among the countries not on the list maintained on a public website as having signed BIAs are eight current recipients (Guatemala, Kenya, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, South Africa, Zambia, and the Ukraine) and two potential recipients for FY2007 (Indonesia and Peru). (The source for the list is: the Coalition for the International Criminal Court. Fact Sheet. *Status of US Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs)*. August 28, 2006. Accessible through [<http://www.iccnw.org>].) For more information on ASPA provisions on military assistance, see CRS Report RL31495, *U.S. Policy Regarding the International Criminal Court*, pp.12-13.

Department. The State Department cites the ACOTA program and the ECOWAS Regional Information Exchange System as two of the programs that would be affected.

On the other hand, greater DOD involvement could be beneficial, according to proponents. One of the main criticisms of the GPOI program as currently run is that the State Department has not devoted adequate personnel and attention to the program. Some critics specifically point to a lack of long-term plans, as in the Senate Appropriation Committee report discussed above. Some feel that there has been a lack of appropriate attention and oversight; two areas cited are 1) lack of an accounting of the number of troops actually participating in peacekeeping operations after training (as mentioned above), and 2) proper safeguards for equipment. Some believe that DOD might be able to devote more personnel to the management and oversight of the program than the State Department currently does.

Those skeptical of DOD's ability to devote the necessary personnel to the program point out that DOD ceased providing military trainers to the program, as originally intended, because of demands of military commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to the State Department, it already cooperates extensively with DOD on many GPOI activities. For instance, the DSCA already implements "a substantial portion" of GPOI activities through a special process that permits the State Department "substantial" oversight of the PKO funds.

What International Contributions Support CoESPU and Should They Be Increased? The Italian government provides 70% of CoESPU's annual budget, covering such costs as infrastructure, equipment, salaries, vehicles, and fuel, according to CoESPU officials in mid-2006. The United States provides the remaining 30%, which covers the direct cost of conducting the training. Italy and the United States have made efforts to involve other G-8 countries in financially supporting CoESPU, particularly in providing or financing equipment for attendees.

The school is staffed almost exclusively by Italian carabinieri. As of mid-2006, some 145 carabinieri were attached to CoESPU, of which about 25 were instructors and training staff. Two U.S. military servicemembers are attached to the center. One serves as the Deputy Director, although DOD has made no commitment to permanently fill the slot. CoESPU would like a commitment of five U.S. military servicemembers, one as Deputy Director, and others to assist with information, training, and studies and research efforts, including the development of doctrine.