INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE: IT’S RELEVANCE IN SUPPORTING THE LONG WAR

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SHELLEY A. CHISHOLM
United States Army Reserve

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2008

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050
**Individual Ready Reserve: It’s Relevance in Supporting the War**

1. REPORT DATE
   15 MAR 2008
2. REPORT TYPE
   Strategy Research Project
3. DATES COVERED
   00-00-2007 to 00-00-2008

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
   Individual Ready Reserve: It’s Relevance in Supporting the War

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)
   Shelley Chisholm

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
   U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA, 17013-5220

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
   Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
   See attached

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
   a. REPORT
      unclassified
   b. ABSTRACT
      unclassified
   c. THIS PAGE
      unclassified

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
   Same as Report (SAR)

18. NUMBER OF PAGES
   30

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

---

*Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)*
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.
INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE: IT’S RELEVANCE IN SUPPORTING THE LONG WAR

by

Lieutenant Colonel Shelley A. Chisholm
United States Army Reserve

Commander Carolyn R. Owens
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Shelley A. Chisholm

TITLE: Individual Ready Reserve: It’s Relevance in Supporting the Long War

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 19 February 2008  WORD COUNT: 5,531  PAGES: 29

KEY TERMS: Mobilization Policy, Reserve Component Management

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

With the Army Reserve’s expanded mission requirements as an operational force, due primarily to its extended use in support of the Global War on Terrorism, the Army Reserve will face challenges in sustaining personnel readiness while supporting on going operations. In response to meeting these personnel readiness concerns, the Army Reserve will require the call-up of Soldiers currently serving in the IRR. With the implementation of the 12 month mobilization policy, which will transfer training tasks from post mobilization to pre-mobilization, it is more critical than ever that Soldiers currently serving in the IRR retain their military skills and care for those issues impacting directly on personnel readiness. Current Reserve Component policy on IRR Soldiers needs to be transformed to support the Army Reserve’s new operational role. The intent is to show a path to better and more intense management of IRR Soldiers designed to increase overall ability of the Army Reserve to continue to make salient and relevant contributions to the overall force structure of today’s Army as it continues to support the long war.
INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE: IT'S RELEVANCE IN SUPPORTING THE LONG WAR

With the Army Reserve's expanded mission requirements as an operational force, due primarily to its extended use in support of the Global War on Terrorism, the Army Reserve will face challenges in sustaining personnel readiness while supporting ongoing operations. The Army Reserve has made significant contributions to the Global War on Terrorism since September 11, 2001. Over time, personnel challenges such as shortfalls in specific military occupational specialties (MOS) in Troop Program Units (TPU), overall numbers of reservists called up, and access to a trained and ready pool of potential replacements and fillers from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) have increased and may have a serious and detrimental impact on future operations. In response to meeting these personnel readiness concerns, the Army Reserve will require the call-up of Soldiers currently serving in the IRR. With the implementation of the 12 month mobilization policy, which will transfer training tasks from post mobilization to pre-mobilization, it is more critical than ever that Soldiers currently serving in the IRR retain their military skills that impact directly on personnel readiness. The current Reserve Component policy on IRR Soldiers needs to be transformed to support the Army Reserve's new operational role. The IRR provides the nation’s immediate surge capability requirement to meet both just in time requirements and extended combat operations. The IRR provides a cushion between Active Duty and Selected Reserve forces and full mobilization.¹ This paper will examine briefly the historical context that led to the current structuring of the Army Reserve, consider contemporary IRR management principles and finally focus on proposing and considering a technique
designed to completely revamp the management of Soldiers currently in the IRR and enhance the overall readiness posture of the IRR. The intent is to show a path to better and more intense management of IRR Soldiers designed to increase the overall ability of the Army Reserve to continue to make salient and relevant contributions to the overall force structure of today’s Army as it continues to fight the long war.

Background and Historical Perspective

The United States (US) Army Reserve (USAR) traces its beginnings to April 23, 1908 when Congress passed Senate Bill 1424. The act authorized the Army to establish a reserve corps of medical officers from which the Secretary of War could order these officers to active duty in a time of emergency. This was the nation’s first federal reserve force. Four years later, a provision of the Army Appropriations Act of 1912 created the Regular Army and a federal reserve outside the Medical Reserve Corps previously authorized in 1908.²

The first call-up of the Army Reserve came in 1916 because of tensions between the US and Mexico. This first mobilization was an important development for the Army Reserve and a great shake down for the reserve component prior to the US entry into World War I.³ Accordingly, Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1916, which created the Officers’ Reserve Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps. ⁴

The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 brought further change and clarification as it identified seven reserve components in the US military. The seven reserve components are the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard, and the Coast
Guard Reserve. In addition, the Act required military members of the Reserve Forces to be placed in one of three categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve or the Retired Reserve. This Act created and formally recognized the IRR as a subset of the Ready Reserve category and placed those members in the same category as the Selected Reserve, the more commonly thought of group of reservists in TPU’s. The Act allowed individual reservists to volunteer for active duty and enabled the armed forces to use them in routine peacetime operations and contingencies without incurring political risks associated with mobilizations. This Act strengthened influence of reserve officers in the military planning process.

In 1950, during the Korean War, more than 240,000 reserve Soldiers were called to active duty. The large number reflected the Army’s need for organized, trained personnel in a short period of time. The Army was reluctant to mobilize the National Guard and the Army activated individual reservists to reinforce under strength regular units.

During Vietnam, thousands of individual Army Reservists served. The first Army Reserve units were ordered to active duty in 1965. Over 5,900 USAR Soldiers, comprising of 42 units, were ordered to active duty.

In 1973, the Department of Defense adopted a Total Force Policy that included structured reserve units. With the end of the draft in the 1970’s, the reserve's strength dropped dramatically. By 1988 though, aggressive recruiting and benefits marked an increase in the IRR strength to 286,000 Soldiers. The Total Force Policy was designed so the nation could not fight a war without a reserve mobilization.
The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait led to the largest call-up of reserve component forces since the Korean War for Operation’s Desert Shield and Desert Storm. More than 20,000 members of the IRR filled vacancies in units and performed other specialized duties. Both the Army and the Army Reserve learned tremendously valuable lessons from this experience. Most importantly, because of a policy called the Mobilization Asset Transfer Program, which allowed commanders to transfer personnel to the IRR who were untrained or unsuitable for military service, a situation was created at the mobilization station in which the same individuals did not meet Army standards when recalled or mobilized. Analysis of this trend showed that, historically, the Army needed to mobilize about 13 IRR Soldiers to get 10 deployable Soldiers. Managing that trend to get better performance and a closer match in the number of reservists called from the IRR and those trained and ready to serve is the central point of this paper.

Since 1991, the USAR has been engaged around the world in contingency operations including over 20,000 Reservists in Bosnia and Kosovo. During 2001-2003 there have been several voluntary and involuntary IRR mobilizations. Approximately 2,533 IRR Soldiers were mobilized in support of the Global War On Terror in which 226 were involuntary.

By 2004, the Army’s IRR contained more than 111,000 Soldiers. In May 2004, the Army’s Human Resources Command-St Louis (HRC-STL), which is the organization currently chartered to manage those Soldiers in the IRR, began identifying IRR Soldiers with a statutory military service obligation remaining for possible assignment to a Reserve unit. These Soldiers would be assigned to a TPU based on the needs of the
On June 30, 2004, the Army announced plans to order 5,600 Soldiers of the IRR for possible deployment. The main purpose of the IRR call-up was to fill personnel shortfalls for Reserve units slated to deploy in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 3 and Operation Enduring Freedom 6 rotations. The actual mobilization requirement was for 4,400 Soldiers, but personnel officers expected to find non-deployable IRR Soldiers, so they increased their requested amount. Again, in April 2005, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld authorized the Army to mobilize up to 6,500 IRR Soldiers. About 550 Soldiers failed to report to duty, some claiming exemptions while others simply ignored their orders. Unlike members of the Selected Reserve, who drill consistently with an organized unit, Soldiers in the IRR are not required to attend training, nor are they attached to a specific unit. In fact, many IRR Soldiers are not even aware they are in the Reserve at all.

In April 2006, the Secretary of the Army, Francis Harvey, endorsed a move to re-set and re-invigorate the IRR. The Army instituted an annual screening and training program. The initial screening program consisted of approximately 5,000 Soldiers in fiscal 2007 with the goal to screen all by fiscal year 2013. While this seems a timely and lofty goal, one may also be led to question whether it represents a truly aggressive strategy designed to meet an ongoing problem in today’s Army Reserve in the most timely and efficient manner.

One result of efforts over the past several years to better manage the IRR is shown in its dwindling numbers. As of September 2007, the total population of the IRR was down to 76,548. Of this number, approximately 41,532 are eligible for mobilization. The difference between the total IRR assigned and those eligible for
mobilization is primarily due to bad addresses, those previously mobilized, those with
dwell time issues, those absent an individual skill or disqualified for character of service,
and those with suspension of favorable personnel actions. In order for the Army
Reserve to retain its mission as an operational force, it is critical the Army Reserve have
the ability to utilize these IRR Soldiers. It is clear that to screen approximately 41,000
over 6 years, the pace must increase to about 7,000 per year and for 75,000 the pace
must be 12,500 per year. Even this fails to recognize the need for positive contact and
interaction with IRR Soldiers to ensure readiness.

Current Composition of IRR Soldiers

Members of the IRR are trained Soldiers who may be called upon to replace
Soldiers in active and reserve units. Many of the Soldiers in the IRR have left the
military recently and still have a military commitment, based on the terms of their
enlistment contract which requires a certain period of active serve and remainder of
their 8 years in a reserve status.

The IRR consists of pre-trained Soldiers assigned to various control groups.

- Control Group (Annual Training). Soldier has not completed their statutory
  military service obligation and has less than three years active duty.
- Control Group (Reinforced) Soldiers who may or may not have a military
  service obligation but has completed three or more years of active duty and
  one year in a reserve component unit.
- Control Group (Officer Active Duty Obligor) Commissioned officer from the
  Reserve Officer Training Corps who is delayed from entry onto active duty.
  This includes officers participating in the Army Medical Department
educational, internship or residency program. Also, officers commissioned in
the Staff Specialist branch as chaplain candidate and officers commissioned
in the Medical Service Corps or Veterinary Corps voluntary active duty
programs.

- Control Group (Dual Component) Consists of Army Reserve commissioned
  officers who are serving on active duty as regular army enlisted Soldiers or
  warrant officers.

**Enlisted Voluntary Assignment to the IRR**

Voluntary reassignment of a TPU or Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA)
Enlisted Soldier to the IRR is authorized under one or more of the following conditions. 24

- There is a confirmed, unresolvable employment conflict.
- The Soldier has a change of address to an area beyond reasonable
  commuting distance of an Army Reserve Training Center.
- For cogent personal reasons.
- On completion of contractual agreement to serve in a TPU.
- The Soldier is a surviving son or daughter.
- Dependency or hardship.
- Pregnancy.
- Not selected for retention by a Qualitative Retention Board and elects
  reassignment to Control Group.
- Enrolls in a Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) basic course
  (nonscholarship) and requests assignment to the IRR.
- Enrolls in a Merchant Marine Academy.
Enlisted Involuntary Assignment to the IRR

Involuntary reassignment of a TPU or IMA Enlisted Soldier to the IRR is authorized under one or more of the following conditions.25

- Unsatisfactory participation.
- Failure to maintain Army body fat standards.
- Inability to perform prescribed duties due to parenthood.
- After a review of a bar to reenlistment.
- Overgrade.
- Failing to report to a TPU or IMA.

Officer and Warrant Officer Voluntary Assignment to the IRR

An officer or warrant officer who is not obligated to serve in a TPU, IMA assignment or on active duty by statute or contract may be reassigned to Control Group (Reinforced) on request. Voluntary reassignment from a TPU or IMA position to Control Group (AT) or Control Group (Reinforcement) of an officer or warrant officer (WO) serving under a statutory or contractual obligation is authorized under any one of the following conditions:26

- When there is a confirmed unresolvable employment conflict.
- When the officer or WO has a change of address to an area beyond reasonable commuting distance of a US Army Reserve training center.
- For cogent personal reasons provided an exception to policy has been approved by the Major US Army Reserve Command commander, or the Active Army commander of the IMA position, as appropriate. This does not apply to ROTC scholarship recipients.
For cogent personnel reasons, when the officer is an ROTC scholarship recipient and provided approval has been granted by the appropriate area commander.

Army Medical Department (AMEDD) officers obligated to serve in the Ready Reserve by statute can request reassignment at any time. However, AMEDD officers obligated to serve in a TPU by contract may not be reassigned until the contractual obligation is completed.

Reassigned from a TPU to accept promotion.

Army National Guard (ARNG) of US officer discharged from ARNG and transferred to accept promotion.

An officer or WO not selected for retention in a TPU by a Selective Retention Board and chooses reassignment to Control Group.

Officer and Warrant Officer Involuntary Assignment to the IRR

The involuntary reassignment of an officer or WO to the IRR is authorized under any one of the following conditions:

- Released for cause from assignment.
- Not branch/functional area qualified for an assigned TPU position.
- Chaplain Branch colonel and lieutenant colonel on completion of a 5–year TPU assignment.
- An officer’s or WO’s assigned TPU is inactivated, relocated, or reorganized and another TPU assignment is not available within reasonable commuting distance.
• An officer’s or WO’s IMA position is deleted, relocated, or the requirements have been changed, and there is no other IMA position available.

• Reassignment is a result of TPU reduction in officer or WO strength directed by Headquarters Department of the Army.

• Has not completed an officer basic course (OBC), or is assigned above the maximum allowable strength limits, or has been declared an unsatisfactory participant.

Substandard Performers, Personnel Quality, and Personnel Accountability in the IRR

A quick review, of the reasons for which any Soldier may be transferred involuntarily to the IRR, shows the immediate issue in building and developing a truly useful and beneficial IRR. That is, many of those who are involuntarily transferred are placed there for reasons of substandard performance, or failure to meet the needs and requirements of the Army Reserve TPU unit to which they are assigned. This alone suggests a need to have a separate category or place for those in that category to preclude the IRR from becoming a holding group for those we know will not or cannot meet the standards. For example, if a Soldier has failed to maintain the requisite weight standards, and the Army Reserve unit to which he is assigned has made all the appropriate attempts to assist the Soldier in meeting the standard, the solution must be something other than transferring him into the IRR. When assigned to the IRR, he is then subject to being called for mobilization, only to find again when he arrives at the mobilization station that he is not a good mobilization asset. If the IRR is to be a category of Soldiers who are in fact ready to serve, then there must be some other category or technique to deal with those we know will not or cannot be in that category.
Army Reserve Soldiers, assigned to a TPU, who do not attend required weekend training or annual training, are considered non-participants. Previously, Soldiers that did not attend the required number of battle assemblies or annual training were sometimes transferred out of the unit into the IRR. Now, these non-participating Soldiers may be expeditiously discharged from the Army and could lose their benefits. Under this new initiative and current policy, non-participating Soldiers will be encouraged to resume training with their unit.\(^{27}\) The Chief, Army Reserve’s intent is to retain as many Soldiers as possible in the Selected Reserve and to process for separation only those Soldiers who have been determined to show no future for useful service under mobilization. All IRR transfers, both voluntary and involuntary, must now be approved by the Army Reserve G1.\(^{28}\) This policy ensures Soldiers transferred to the IRR are quality Soldiers and have future useful service for mobilization.

Consistent with applicable laws and regulations, IRR Soldiers failing to comply with a mobilization order to active duty shall be reported as absent without leave to civilian authorities. Such personnel are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice as of their reporting date, whether or not they have reported.\(^{29}\)

Change is required in the management of those being moved into the IRR, and those changes will lead to an overall increase in the quality of Soldiers available. It is essential to continue management processes that allow those with truly valid reasons to transfer to the IRR and further develop processes that manage those who are in the IRR.

The question is whether these initiatives and policy changes are sufficient to meet the Army’s need.
Completion of Contractual Agreement

Soldiers, with time remaining on their military service obligation, transfer to the IRR. All Soldiers have a statutory eight-year military service obligation which is established at the time of entry into military service. Soldier's inactive status is normally performed by assignment to the IRR. This transition from Active Duty to Reserve Component for most Soldiers is sold as a discharge. The installation transition point contracts the Soldiers but do not fully educate, mentor or engage the Soldiers as to their true nature of their Reserve contract commitment.  These Soldiers are already obligated to reserve service based on their initial contract. Unlike new recruits, these are seasoned, experienced Soldiers who can contribute significantly and immediately to Army readiness, if only the terms and conditions of their obligation is fully explained to them.

Previously, an individual assigned to the IRR is only required to retain possession of their service uniforms, their military identification card and notify their service branch if they have moved or changed address. Title 10 of the US Code, passed by Congress on January 2, 2006, states a member of the Ready Reserve may be ordered without his consent to muster duty one time each year. As of January 2007, 34,363 personnel have failed to keep an accurate address on file. There has not been a significant decrease in bad addresses since March 2003 when there were over 38,000 bad addresses. This fact alone points to a complete failure at the transition points to educate Soldiers regarding their continuing obligation. Meaningful reform must incorporate a means to address this failure to communicate with active duty Soldiers so they are aware of their ongoing responsibilities.
Reserve Component 12 Month Mobilization Policy

On January 19, 2007, the Secretary of the Defense announced a new policy setting the total mobilization period for Reserve Component units and individuals to 12 months. Previously, deploying Reserve Component Soldiers would spend as much as 18 months on active duty away from their home. This included a 12 month tour in a combat zone, post mobilization/pre-deployment training, and post deployment recovery periods. Under the new policy, the post mobilization and pre-deployment training as well as time the unit spends “boots on the ground” in a combat zone must not be more than 12 months. These 12 months exclude the post deployment and end of tour leave time. The new policy requires units to conduct as much training as possible at their home stations prior to their actual mobilization in order to maximize the amount of time they are available to the combatant commanders. Arguably, this places a heavy burden on Reserve unit commanders to maximize training and personnel readiness while at home station. This new policy places an even heavier burden on the Army Reserve structure to insure those activities are tended to for members of the IRR, who as noted earlier, have no requirement to participate with units or conduct those readiness and training activities under the current system.

First Army, the US Army’s lead organization for training and mobilization of Reserve Component units, has developed new models for both pre and post mobilization training. The new training model shifts many of the individual and squad/platoon collective tasks, formerly conducted after mobilization at the mobilization training centers, to home station training executed throughout the year. These models include weapons qualification, land navigation, unit functional and Mission Essential Task List training, Combat Lifesaver training and medical screening. Earlier alert
(ideally 1 year out) and more intensive pre-mobilization training allow units to build more cohesive teams prior to mobilization. Post mobilization training will focus on the more complex company and higher level collective training and validates unit’s readiness to deploy for combat. This shift from post mobilization to pre-mobilization training will result in considerable time saving on the unit’s mobilization clock.\textsuperscript{37}

**IRR Processing Flow for Mobilization**

Currently, HRC-STL sends IRR Soldiers identified for mobilization to one of the four mobilization training centers. (Fort Benning, Fort Leonardwood, Fort Jackson or Fort Sill) Soldier processing takes approximately forty-five days upon their arrival at the mobilization training center (MTC).

Following administrative processing, the Soldiers receive 7 to 10 days of Warrior Task Training (WTT) in basic Soldier skills, including individual weapons qualification, Nuclear Biological and Chemical training, first aid and law of land warfare. Upon validation of WTT completion, depending on the Soldier’s individual situation and training status, the Soldier will attend approximately 3 to 4 weeks of MOS/ Area of Concentration (AOC) refresher training or MOS reclassification training. The MOS/AOC specific training may be provided at a different installation, therefore the Soldier may be required to transfer to another installation for the follow-on training.\textsuperscript{38}

Just prior to the Soldier’s completion of training, assignment instructions are finalized and forwarded to the installation commander who will publish temporary change of station orders for the Soldier to transfer to their eventual duty/unit of assignment. The intent is to link the IRR Soldier up with the designated unit at the mobilization station for collective training with that unit prior to deployment. Final
assignment is based upon the needs of the Army. Although this mobilization processing does not violate the 12 month mobilization time as directed by the Secretary of Defense, IRR Soldiers are required to go over the 12 month mobilization time to complete individual skill training required for deployment. Unfortunately, some units may have completed some collective training at their home station prior to mobilization and the IRR Soldier will have to make-up training at a later date.

Figure 1. IRR Soldier Processing
First Army Pre and Post Mobilization Training Observations

On November 27, 2007, First Army published observations of the pre and post mobilization training under the new model and policy. Since the January 19, 2007 mobilization policy, Soldiers/units must still deploy at the same training standards and levels. Training and actions previously conducted post mobilization at the MTC must be conducted during pre-mobilization and Reserve Component units must conduct training and perform actions to set conditions to enable post-mobilization training.

Observations of the pre and post mobilization training included notable deficiencies. Deficiencies included Soldiers not arriving medically and dentally ready,
units arriving at the MTC with basic tasks and requirements not complete, units conducting pre-mobilization collective training before completing required individual training, not achieving the “contract” agreed upon during the 180 day joint assessment, failure to identify non-deployers early which required last minute backfills, and task organization that was not set early enough to build teams/stabilize crews. 

Because of this valuable feedback, further refinements have been ordered. Effective November 30, 2007, alerted Reserve Component units are required to complete the following tasks and actions prior to their mobilization date: Soldier Readiness Processing, Soldier Qualification (MOSQ), mission critical function training and individual security clearances. Second priority goes to the following pre-mobilization tasks: mandatory briefings and warrior task training, biometrics, media awareness, combat lifesaver, driver’s training, individual weapons qualification, combative training and crew served weapons qualification. Third priority goes to new equipment training, rapid fielding initiative and equipment inspections.

IRR Soldiers processing through the current mobilization model will not have all the required tasks completed that First Army has directed units to complete prior to mobilization. The intent is to have the IRR Soldier link up with the designated unit at the mobilization station for collective training with unit prior to deployment. The IRR Soldier will not have the time to complete the all the required tasks prior to unit deployment due to the shortened mobilization time.

Maintaining Ready Soldiers; A Road Ahead for IRR Soldier Management

With the increased demand for ready Soldiers, HRC-STL has failed to track and assess the Soldiers that are assigned to the IRR pool. As evidenced in the last four
years, HRC-STL has not made any significant headway in decreasing something as simple as the number of bad addresses of the Soldiers assigned to the IRR. With the involuntary mobilizations of Reserve Component Soldiers for a maximum of one year at any one time, and an ever increasing reliance on fillers from the IRR it is critical to have a ready and trained pool of Soldiers to draw from. Equally critical is a new way to think of these Soldiers, and a new way to manage them at a local level.

Trainees, Transient, Holdee and Student (TTHS) Account

The Army Reserve’s TTHS account currently affords the local commander visibility over only their unit’s trainees (those Soldiers who have not completed their Initial Military Training (Basic Combat Training or Officer Basic Course)), and those Soldiers who are required to undergo a MOS Medical Retention Board. The development of a TTHS account for the Army Reserve is a relatively new occurrence, having only come into being in the last 5 years. The intent of this Army Reserve TTHS account was to mirror that of the Active Component’s TTHS accounts. That is, to give the Army Reserve a place to slot Soldiers while in various states of training so that unit readiness would not be adversely affected by the transitional nature of these Soldiers. Once completed with their transitional tasks, the Soldiers could then be moved back into appropriate units as an enhancer to that units readiness by providing not just a soldier, but a qualified soldier. Shifts in Army Reserve policy, though, have resulted in changes to the way that the TTHS account is being used. Specifically, the other Soldiers previously assigned to the TTHS account have been transferred back to their projected gaining units. The TTHS Management Division, located at the Regional Readiness Command’s (RRC) Headquarters, now has fewer Soldiers to manage and can be
utilized to support other requirements. The question of which other requirements to support forms the central theme in creating a way forward to more effectively manage IRR Soldiers. Alternatively, failure to use these members of the TTHS Management Division appropriately would waste assets at a time when each resource is critical.

The Paradigm Shift: A Recommendation

The challenge of properly managing the assets of the IRR is daunting, as has been discussed to this point. The entire system is currently structured on our old Cold War way of thinking. That is, a system in which numbers alone were seen as the answer to rapidly building a force designed to go into ground war on the European Continent. As has been the case too often, our focus on being ready to fight the last war has resulted in a hamstrung, administratively archaic and bureaucratic structure that is over centralized and incapable of getting the job done. A bold shift is needed, and one which focuses on decentralization, development of specific and meaningful training goals and objectives, and a battle handoff of IRR Soldiers from managers to units at a critical point in time that will allow them to make a difference immediately in the units to which they become assigned.

To that end, the Army Reserve can utilize components of a system already in place. Reassign IRR Soldiers to the RRC, and specifically to the TTHS accounts, thereby relinquishing HRC-St Louis’s responsibilities. Assets are in place at the RRC TTHS Management office that are underutilized, and at the same time any additional requirements needed as a result of this effort can be made by shifting now unnecessary management assets from HRC- STL to the affected RRC’s. The RRC’s, in concert with the Command Retention Office, will track readiness and training of IRR Soldiers. IRR
Soldiers will be assigned to the TTHS account of each RRC’s geographical area, and most importantly, the RRC’s will be able to generate support from all units in their structure to manage the myriad tasks they will be asked to accomplish for these members of the IRR which are not currently being done.

The Army Reserve Retention and Transition Division (ARRTD) personnel will track IRR Soldiers assigned to the TTHS account and sponsor an annual muster for the IRR Soldiers. During the muster, the ARRTD personnel will ensure positive contact, administer refresher training and verify Soldiers’ readiness. A Chief, Army Reserve directed document would direct clear and concise tasks that are designated to be performed or checked in regard to each member of the IRR present. Further, in order to better assimilate Soldiers as they transition from their Active commitment into the Army Reserve, the ARRTD team will make contact with the installation transition point and sponsor Soldiers that are coming off of active duty. This is the point of action where the old sales job of “Discharge” is put to rest, and these Soldiers are provided with specific information regarding expectations about their time in the IRR and ramifications of failures to meet ongoing obligations. This step alone will go far in providing a trained and ready force ready of immediate contributions to the Army Reserve. This educational and meaningful step treats transition from Active to Reserve duty not as just some nebulous idea, but more as a transfer from one type of unit to another, just as the Soldier has seen during his active duty time.

IRR Soldiers identified for cross-level, a common technique used to transfer Soldiers from one unit to another to alleviate personnel shortfalls, and mobilization will be attached to a unit within the Soldier’s geographical area. At the time of the unit alert,
the RRC will attach the Soldier to a unit to complete individual training. Units will have access to records from the IRR Soldier’s attendance at past annual musters, and will have a firm expectation of tasks that have been accomplished prior to their arrival in the unit. Pre-mobilization training tasks will be provided by the unit and completed in the allocated 39 training days per year. Priorities for individual training are duty military occupational skill qualification, critical functional training and professional military education.

The unit command, that the Soldier is attached to, will conduct the pre-mobilization screening and certification to verify Soldier’s deployability. As part of the overall system, this verification should be simplified given attendance at an annual muster by the IRR Soldier. The IRR Soldiers should have accomplished certain specific tasks related to personal readiness. Soldiers will also be offered the opportunity to transfer to a TPU. In accordance with US Army Reserve Command memorandum, dated May 24, 2007, Revision of Implementing Guidance for Mobilized IRR Soldiers Transferring to a TPU, mobilized Soldiers are afforded the opportunity to transfer to a unit while mobilized. This is important to IRR members because it is at this point that Soldiers may then be entitled to the Army Reserve Incentive Program and eligible to receive a bonus.43

Summary

With the Army Reserve’s expanded mission requirements as an operational force, due primarily to its extended use in support of the Global War on Terrorism, the Army Reserve will face challenges in sustaining personnel readiness while supporting on going operations. The state of the IRR, as it is structured and managed now,
requires a simplified, decentralized management structure designed to enhance overall readiness of IRR Soldiers. This structure, with the combined team effort of the TTHS Management Division, ARRTD and unit command team, will foster a positive command climate, build team cohesion, and enable the Army Reserve to minimize IRR attrition and maximize IRR readiness. This, then, must be our goal as we look ahead at ways to keep the Army Reserve both ready and relevant and a key member of the team as the Army moves forward. Nowhere is there an opportunity for us to be able to hold on to the old systems, which fritter away valuable resources through mismanagement. The new road ahead will assure that trained and ready Soldiers are the backbone of the IRR and are the forefront of our efforts. The wasted management assets and ineffective bureaucracy of HRC- STL will be swept away in favor of a new, decentralized process that focuses on specific tasks to keep us in the fight, anytime, anywhere. In the end, the needs of the Army, the Army Reserve and our nation are best served by this bold shift.

Endnotes


3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.


10 Ibid.

11 Harford.


14 Harford.


16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.


19 Brendan I. Koerner, “You’re in the Army Now (and Forever) How Long do you have to be all you can be?” available from http://www.slate.com/id/2103118; Internet; accessed 3 November 2007.

20 “Army to transform IRR,” Army News Service, 4 April 2006.


23 Department of Defense, Army Regulation 140-10, Assignments, Attachments, Details and Transfers, 15 August 2005, 21.

24 Ibid., 24.

25 Ibid., 25.

26 Ibid., 22.


Bentley.


Chu.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.
