JAPAN’S SELF DEFENSE FORCES AFTER THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE: TOWARD A NEW STATUS QUO

by

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# Japan’s Self Defense Forces After the Great East Japan Earthquake: Toward a New Status Quo

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## 13. ABSTRACT

The Great East Japan Earthquake’s unique scope and the actors involved in the ensuing disaster dispatch has the potential to significantly impact four areas influencing the SDF’s trajectory: security interests, economic interests, norms, and actors and institutions. Retrenchment, status quo, and remilitarization are all plausible outcomes for the SDF’s trajectory. Understanding what the disasters changed in these four areas is critical in determining the most probable SDF trajectory.

This thesis finds that the SDF will not likely embark on a retraction or rapid remilitarization trajectory. Japan’s security and economic interests have not fundamentally changed but rather economic trends in place prior to the disasters were aggravated and its security policy was validated. Japan’s norms were the most fundamentally changed as the SDF emerged from the disasters as the most trusted institution in Japan.

Changes will be limited to the fringes of the status quo bordering remilitarization as numerous disincentives restrain the SDF from rapidly moving toward remilitarization. These changes will come about from a growing sense of economic and security pragmatism that results in engaging rather than containing the SDF. Improved civil-military relations, more public support for the SDF’s expanding domestic and international roles, and more deference for the SDF as a useful tool of the state will characterize this new status quo.

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## 14. SUBJECT TERMS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>APEC</th>
<th>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Air Self Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDF</td>
<td>Basic Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRF</td>
<td>Central Readiness Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDF</td>
<td>Dynamic Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPJ</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East Asian Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-X</td>
<td>Next Generation Fighter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Ground Self Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HADR</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCG</td>
<td>Japan Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>Japan Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDA</td>
<td>Japan Defense Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>Japan Socialist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNG</td>
<td>Liquefied Natural Gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METI</td>
<td>Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Maritime Self Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTDP</td>
<td>Mid-Term Defense Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nuclear, Biological, Chemical</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDPG</td>
<td>National Defense Program Guideline</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>National Police Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peace Keeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAGE</td>
<td>Study of Attitudes and Global Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCC</td>
<td>Security Consultative Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDPJ</td>
<td>Socialist Democratic Party of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEPCO</td>
<td>Tokyo Electric Power Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPP</td>
<td>Trans-Pacific Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>United Nations Disengagement Observer Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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Behind these two individuals is a network of people and institutions too great to list that have helped me reach this point and achieve another milestone in life. Any analytical errors made in this thesis can only be attributed to my own shortcomings.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

How has the Great East Japan Earthquake affected the Self Defense Force’s (SDF) trajectory? This question is posed in light of three possible trajectories: retrenchment, status quo, and remilitarization. Retrenchment entails the SDF diminishing its operations surrounding or outside Japan because the disasters have focused Japan on its internal problems. Potential reasons for this trajectory include, but are not limited to, Japan’s focus on economic recovery at the expense of its international security activities or a sense that the SDF is better utilized for domestic rather than international purposes. Status quo involves maintaining the types of operations currently conducted by the SDF such as United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKO), anti-piracy operations, and humanitarian aid disaster relief (HADR). The SDF would continue to face restrictions on the use of force in international security activities. This trajectory may result because the disasters simply do not affect the SDF’s trajectory or they just reinforce the status quo. Remilitarization is defined as the SDF expanding its international security activity contributions and acting more like a “normal” nation’s military that is not so heavily restricted in its use of force. This trajectory could possibly result from increased public appreciation for the SDF because of the SDF’s proven utility as a tool of the state in its disaster dispatch.

B. IMPORTANCE

The answer to this major research question is significant on numerous fronts. Most of the areas affected are represented in the inner workings of Japan’s security policy. First, the SDF’s involvement in international security activities provides analysts a sense of Japan’s security policy direction. Understanding the SDF’s role in the Great East Japan Earthquake will highlight changes in Japan’s security policy with perhaps long-term implications.
Second, the SDF’s employment also gauges the public’s willingness or lack thereof to support operations abroad or even at home. The effects on Japan’s pacifist norms as a result of the SDF’s disaster dispatch will signal shifts in these norm paradigms. Significant changes in this spectrum of norms will have a direct spillover effect on Japan’s security policy, as public opinion is believed to be a prominent intervening variable.

Third, the economic impacts from the natural disasters have the potential to affect the SDF’s ability to counter regional security threats such as China and North Korea. If the SDF gains public support and maintains or increases its portion of the defense budget, it is likely to sustain counter-measures against regional threats. If Japan retrenches its security policy and focuses on a domestic role for the SDF, China’s military expansion and North Korean missile programs may go unchecked by the SDF.

Fourth, changes in the SDF’s status will directly affect the U.S.-Japan security alliance. As the United States is engaged in an overseas war, contends with international threats such as terrorism, and shifts its overseas military footprint to that of an expeditionary force, this causes U.S. security policy to place pressure on the SDF to expand its regional responsibilities. Shifting norms affecting the SDF may also have a spillover affect on U.S. military forces in Japan and the U.S.-Japan security alliance in general.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Introduction

The literature on Japan’s security policy has grown in the last decade signaling that there indeed exists a security policy within Japan to write about. The SDF inevitably becomes the default weathervane used to determine the status and trajectory of Japan’s security policy. The SDF provides the most concrete measurement of Japan’s willingness to embark on security related operations outside its borders. SDF operations therefore tend to represent the political and social environment of the times and indicate major shifts or gradual trends in Japan’s security policy.
Most of the literature regarding the SDF’s trajectory agrees that the SDF does not operate in a completely “normal” manner. The SDF has not embarked on any overseas security operations in which it has been allowed the unrestricted use of force. It has been severely limited in its arms exports and its legitimacy according to Japan’s constitution and article 9 has been called into question. The restricted nature of the SDF’s operations contributes to its lack of normalcy and can be considered the status quo under which it has operated since its inception. The point of contention amongst the literature lies in interpreting the nature of the SDF’s status quo and how quickly the restrictions surrounding the SDF are eroding. The result is a debate between two main camps of academia. On one end, a growing role and use of the SDF is seen as a road to remilitarization. This interpretation of the SDF’s trajectory states that numerous restrictions impeding the SDF’s “normal” military status are quickly eroding and are facing fundamental changes in the near future. The other end of the spectrum interprets Japan’s security policy as coming short of “normal” nation status. In this argument, pacifist norms provide a serious constraint on the scope of Japan’s security policy and limit the emphasis on national interests abroad compared to other major economic powers. This viewpoint generally reinforces the SDF’s status quo of continued restrictions on its operations.

The following sections conduct an analytic survey of the two opposing sides of the SDF trajectory debate: remilitarization and status quo. The final section illustrates how the status quo can be viewed as dynamic rather than static.

2. Camp One: Remilitarization

In the last decade, several books have been written about Japan’s resurgence as a “normal” nation. Although this trend is given different names by various authors, remilitarization of Japan’s security policy tends to occupy a large portion of the literature.

Michael Green was one of the first to identify this trend at length in his 2003 book. He recognized that the world was changing around Japan with the rise of China,
economic globalization, and an unrivaled United States dominating world politics.\textsuperscript{1} These changes forced Japan to reexamine its security policy along several lines. A balance of power was necessary to remain competitive with China. Idealism took a backseat to realism as national interests overtook international obligations as the method for justifying Japan’s security policy. Perceived threats from China after the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis and North Korea’s 1998 Taepodong missile launch caused a heightened sensitivity to security. A new generation of political leaders also prompted Japan to seek an independent foreign policy. These trends translate into a greater role for the SDF as threats to Japan emerge in the region. Green calls this development Japan’s reluctant realism.\textsuperscript{2}

In 2007, Richard Samuels contributed to the growing literature on Japan’s military resurgence. He describes Japan’s historical approach to forming security policy as a series of periods of mainstream versus anti-mainstream political factions eventually coalescing into a period of consensus. Samuels states the last period of consensus was the Yoshida doctrine during the Cold War. The Yoshida doctrine simultaneously satisfied the major political factions by promising pacifism, providing economic benefits through liberal internationalism, and providing for its national security by allying with the United States and maintaining a limited defense posture.\textsuperscript{3} Samuels illustrates how the Yoshida doctrine is being incrementally transformed through the emergence of Japan’s security policy, largely during the administration of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro from 2001–2006. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, the Diet approved measures allowing the Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF) to conduct coalition-refueling operations in the Indian Ocean. In 2004, the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) was dispatched to southern Iraq in a non-combat role to support civil engineering projects. The Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) was subsequently deployed to

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1} Michael J. Green, \textit{Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power} (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 1.

\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., 6–8.

\end{footnotesize}
Baghdad in 2006 to provide air transportation.\textsuperscript{4} Japan agreed to jointly develop a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system with the United States in 2004, which facilitated the elimination of Japan’s self-imposed arms exports ban.\textsuperscript{5} The elevation of Japan’s Defense Agency to full ministry status in 2007 also indicated the Yoshida doctrine was eroding.\textsuperscript{6} Samuels concludes that a new consensus is perhaps forming characterized as a dual hedging strategy between the United States and China. This would allow Japan to strengthen the SDF and its alliance with the United States without threatening China.\textsuperscript{7}

Christopher Hughes most recently wrote a book on Japan’s remilitarization in 2009. He focuses on several areas in the era after Koizumi deemed to be self-imposed limitations on Japan’s security apparatus. These areas include size and capabilities of the SDF, international and alliance military commitments, and domestic norm constraints on the military. The 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) defined Japan’s long-term commitment towards developing a more mobile force capable of dealing with regional threats and participating in multinational operations. Although the SDF has quantitatively diminished in the last decade, the 2004 NDPG enabled the SDF to qualitatively improve its power projection capabilities within the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF.\textsuperscript{8} Hughes notes that despite the short-lived missions supporting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, these experiences with coalition forces allow the SDF to expand its overseas footprint in other areas such as HADR operations in the Indian Ocean, UN PKO, and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.\textsuperscript{9} Hughes points out increased domestic support for the SDF shown in opinion polls, the continued reinterpretation of Japan’s peace constitution, and patriotic education programs as examples of domestic norm erosion.\textsuperscript{10} By illustrating the erosion of these self-constraints in the short-term, he concludes that Japan is indeed on a path toward remilitarization.

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., 96–98.
  \item\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., 104–106.
  \item\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., 93.
  \item\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 198.
  \item\textsuperscript{8} Christopher W. Hughes, \textit{Japan’s Remilitarisation} (London: Routledge, 2010), 35–36, 40–47.
  \item\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., 83–87.
  \item\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 99.
\end{itemize}
3. Camp Two: Status Quo

On the other end of the Japan security policy debate are those that believe Japan is not remilitarizing. Instead, this area of literature tends to see the changes in Japan’s security policy and use of the SDF as generally insignificant compared to those of “normal” nations. Pacifist norms play a key role in creating the rather trivial operations conducted by the SDF.

Andrew Oros is one of several authors to recently challenge Japan’s “normal” nation status. He states Japan’s security policy remains driven by a policy of antimilitarism as evidenced in its three R’s policy of reach, reconcile, and reassure.\(^{11}\) He illustrates the power of domestic norms through a case study of the BMD program, which finds that the program is responsible for bringing the issue of collective self defense to the forefront. He determines from this that pacifist norms drive the BMD program’s policy course.\(^{12}\) He concludes that new threats presented to Japan since the end of the Cold War are not causing dramatic shifts in its security policy but are rather dealt with through old principles of pacifism through the three R’s policy approach.\(^ {13}\)

Yasuo Takao also questions re-militarization theories about Japan’s security policy. Instead of focusing on the end results such as the types of operations conducted by the SDF, he insists that the path toward these outcomes is necessary to develop a complete understanding of Japan’s security policy. He focuses on two types of policy constraints: domestic and policy choices based on the regional environment and foreign pressures. Analysis of these constraints illustrates how non-physical forces such as norms are translated into physical policy decisions. Therefore, the emphasis of his work is on social norms and the causal mechanisms that transform these domestic constraints into security policy decisions.\(^ {14}\)

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\(^{12}\) Ibid., 150.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., 171.

Takao’s analysis of four areas generally accepted as key indicators of a “normal” nation shows that pacifist norms continue to affect these areas. First, Japan’s defense budget remains at the self-imposed level of 1% of GDP and has not increased despite growing regional threats. Second, even though Japan has made qualitative improvements in its defense spending, Japan has avoided overtly offensive weapons capabilities like intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range strategic bombers, and aircraft carriers. Japan’s reluctance to become a nuclear power also illustrates domestic pressures of pacifism. Third, public opinion polls indicate more support for SDF involvement in UN PKO than combat operations. Even under the right-wing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government led by Koizumi, SDF deployments to Iraq were limited to non-combat roles. This minimalist approach illustrates the government was contending with domestic norms. Fourth, the public’s aversion to combat-related operations is also evidenced in the legalization of overseas deployments only for non-combat purposes as seen in the 1999 Regional Crisis Law and the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.

Paul Midford also challenges the notion of Japan’s re-militarization toward a “normal” nation status and goes further to change the way Japanese public opinion is interpreted within the norms-based arguments. He illustrates that public opinion has been relatively stable and consistent since the end of World War II and therefore influences Japan’s security policy. He determines that in the elitist versus pluralist debates regarding public opinion control, elites cannot exclusively mold public opinion as evidenced in the decreasing support for Koizumi’s ambitious SDF deployment plans in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. The public dealt a final blow to the LDP-led government in the 2009 Lower House election, which put the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in  

15 Ibid., 135–137.  
16 Ibid., 137–139.  
17 Ibid., 139–140.  
18 Ibid., 140–142.  
power after five decades of LDP rule. Midford describes Japan’s security policy as defensive realism. Despite the growing literature on Japan’s sudden transition from pacifism to realism, he argues that Japanese public opinion has never renounced the utility of military force regarding the protection of national territory, and has consistently disapproved of military force for offensive strategic operations. What has changed has been the erosion of anti-militarist distrust of the state to control the military. This has allowed the state to utilize the SDF in new security roles and explains the expansion of SDF missions in the past two decades.

4. Dynamic Status Quo

The term status quo suggests a static environment where change is not possible. Indeed, the literature review of status quo interpretations illustrates that the SDF still faces numerous restrictions on its operations. These restrictions do not necessarily mean the nature of SDF operations cannot change within its constrained environment. Take Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines as an example of the SDF’s dynamic status quo. Its sole purpose is to define the roles and composition of the SDF based on its current security environment. Historically, this document has been revised at strategic crossroads such as after the Cold War (1995) and post-9/11 (2004). The most recent revision was adopted on December 17, 2010. The 2010 NDPG provides recent insight into the SDF’s changing role despite the persistent restrictions on its operations. The following section will describe Japan’s security policy as laid out in the 2010 NDPG and note any trends or departures from previous NDPG revisions.

Figure 1 provides an overview of the basic elements of the 2010 NDPG. The 2010 NDPG is structured around three security objectives that each translates into three correlating roles for the SDF. The three SDF roles serve the purpose of distinguishing

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20 Ibid., 122–123, 144–145.
21 Ibid., 48.
22 Ibid., 67.
between internal, regional, and international policy areas. Two categories, posture and organization, help identify the capabilities needed to fulfill each of the SDF’s three roles.23

Security environment surrounding Japan

Near Japan: Nearby nations are modernizing their militaries, and stepping up activity by their militaries and related institutions.
Asia-Pacific: Concrete cooperation in nontraditional areas of security is evolving.
Global: The potential for turmoil in a single country to immediately impact the rest of the world is becoming a greater risk.

Figure 1. Overview of 2010 NDPG (From East Asian Strategic Review, 2011)

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Three changes in the 2010 NDPG are noteworthy. The first is the introduction of the term gray zones. This term recognizes the trend that there are increasingly more potential areas for conflict that will not necessarily escalate into full-scale war. These conflicts over territory, sovereignty, and economic interests do not necessarily fall within a strictly peacetime or wartime construct and are so complex that they require a diverse network of bilateral and multilateral cooperation initiatives to address. As the focus on gray zone conflicts gains momentum, the 2010 NDPG also places less emphasis on defending against a full-scale invasion by advocating the retention of minimal knowledge in this area.24

The second change is the departure from a Basic Defense Force (BDF) to a Dynamic Defense Force (DDF). A BDF is a Cold War-era term and is primarily concerned with building a defense force designed to deter simply by the existence of its forces. A DDF focuses on how to operate forces in a changing security environment where security problems in gray zones are increasingly diverse and require a constant state of readiness. The shift from a BDF to a DDF began in the 2004 NDPG when it retained the fundamental tenants of the BDF concept but introduced the need for a multi-functional and flexible defense force. The 2010 NDPG directly disavows the BDF concept and further reinforces the trend initiated in the 2004 NDPG toward a DDF. The DDF concept serves to drastically change the nature of SDF operations in the future. It calls for increased surveillance and reconnaissance activities specifically and raised operational tempo in general. The DDF concept opens up the opportunity for increased cooperation with other nations, as complex security issues need to be addressed in bilateral or multi-lateral frameworks.25

The third change is the application of dynamic deterrence. Traditional concepts of deterrence such as deterrence by punishment or denial cannot adequately deter the types of conflicts in gray zones. Therefore, dynamic deterrence is necessary to handle the two most probable situations in this environment: a probing or fait accompli action.

24 Ibid., 2–4.
Dynamic deterrence is accomplished through demonstrated readiness and continual operations that deny a gap in geographical or time coverage.26

Although Japan’s strategists have vowed their policies remain defense-oriented, the introduction of concepts such as gray zones, dynamic defense force, and dynamic deterrence, and increased attention placed on conducting operations to maintain regional and international security suggests that Japan’s security policy is increasingly blurring the line between offensive and defensive terms. This type of security policy at first appears to be an indication of remilitarization. The SDF must, however, execute its new roles in an environment that continues to restrict its operations. Thus, the 2010 NDPG illustrates the SDF’s status quo is capable of change and can be aptly labeled a dynamic status quo.

5. Conclusion

The literature review illustrates a spectrum of interpretation on Japan’s security policy status. It indicates that ones adherence to a particular worldview weighs heavily on the conclusion reached. A realist will treat Japan as a black box, ignoring the impact of norms, and determine Japan’s security policy trajectory based on incremental policy changes. In this case, Japan is on an unmistakable path to “normal” nation status. A constructivist will look inside the black box and pay less attention to Japan’s evolving position within the international environment and relation to perceived threats. In this light, pacifist norms are unchanging and triumph over realism, resulting in maintenance of the status quo. Both academia camps provide a warning against teleological approaches to the interpretation of the Great East Japan Earthquake’s impact on the SDF’s trajectory. Furthermore, the SDF’s status quo must be viewed in a dynamic sense, capable of change while restrictions on its operations endure. Consideration must be given to all influences on the Japan security policy debate in order to arrive at well-rounded conclusions.

26 Ibid., 255–256.
D. METHODS AND SOURCES

One of the challenges facing this research topic is the lack of scholarly writing about the Great East Japan Earthquake. This is because of its recent occurrence within the last year and limited primary source translations from Japanese to English. For information on the Great East Japan Earthquake and subsequent events, primary Japanese sources are needed to provide a sense of the disaster’s effect on the SDF’s trajectory. Major Japanese editorial newspapers such as the Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, and Yomiuri Shimbun provide English versions of their newspapers. These sources are helpful in understanding the various positions taken by the major media outlets toward the SDF in the aftermath of the disasters. They also provide Japanese public opinion polls on various areas related to Japan’s security policy and the SDF. Although the English versions are used as source material throughout this thesis, they are generally representative of their larger Japanese versions. Japanese ministry websites, specifically the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, contain English translations of important statistical information, policy, official government statements, and assessments related to the Great East Japan Earthquake. These sources give a solid indication of the SDF’s role in and after the disaster dispatch and the SDF’s trajectory. Japanese sources that are not independent from the subject matter, such as the Ministry of Defense, may be biased in its portrayal of the SDF. Independent scholarly sources or Japanese sources from various organizations are used to mitigate the chance of biased evidence when non-biased sources are available.

The primary research method to be used is a case study. The case is the Great East Japan Earthquake and approximately one year of subsequent events. This will allow the research to be focused on a particular event and time period.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis is organized thematically. Chapter I has laid out the major research question, its significance, the status of the SDF’s trajectory debate, and the methods and sources to be used in answering the research question. Chapter II describes the disasters and the SDF’s response in detail in order to provide a foundation for analysis in the
following chapter. Chapter III analyzes the four main areas that are likely to affect the SDF’s trajectory: security interests, economic interests, norms, and actors and institutions. The concluding chapter synthesizes the previous chapters’ information and answers the major research question.
II. THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE: THE EVENTS AND MANIFESTATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

In order to analyze the affects of the Great East Japan Earthquake on the SDF, a basic understanding of the events and facts surrounding the disasters is necessary. This chapter begins by describing the scope of the disasters in order to provide a glimpse into their catalytic nature. The remainder of the chapter provides a series of manifestations. These manifestations encompass several themes related to the SDF’s disaster dispatch after the Great East Japan Earthquake. The manifestations serve three purposes. First, in the course of their description, they place the SDF’s disaster dispatch in context by covering a wide range of topics that attempts to avoid overemphasis on any particular element, which may lead to inaccurate or inflated conclusions. Second, the manifestations highlight pre-existing characteristics that may not have been obvious prior to the disasters. Third, they function as assumptions for subsequent chapters. The manifestations are as follows:

- The SDF is a competent HADR force:
  - Decisive
  - Versatile
  - Joint

- The SDF is the most capable HADR force within Japan.

- The domestic political environment is conducive to the SDF’s effective domestic application and integration of international assistance.

- The SDF’s HADR capabilities demonstrate ability for other operations.
B. SCOPE OF THE DISASTERS

The official title given to the disasters is the Great East Japan Earthquake. This encompasses the earthquake, subsequent tsunami, and nuclear power plant disaster. The following sections describe the depth and breadth of these three disasters.

1. The Earthquake

On March 11, 2011, at 2:46PM, a 9.0 earthquake struck Japan. The nearest land to the hypocenter was Oshika Peninsula at 130 km off the eastern coast of Japan’s main island of Honshu. The closest city with over 1 million people, Sendai, was 180 km from the hypocenter and Japan’s most populous city, Tokyo, was 390 km away (see Figure 2). The earthquake was the largest recorded in Japan and the fifth largest ever recorded in the world. The Japan Coast Guard reported that the seabed near the hypocenter shifted 24 m and the Oshika Peninsula moved 5.3 m during the earthquake.28


Figure 2. Distribution of Seismic Activity from Great East Japan Earthquake (From “The 2011 Off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake,” 2011)
The damage caused by the earthquake was minor compared to that of the ensuing tsunami, yet its destruction reached further inland (see Table 1).\textsuperscript{29} Significant infrastructure damage caused by the earthquake included the destruction of 347 out of 675 km of the Tohoku Expressway, the main transportation route for commercial industry connecting the Tohoku region to the Kanto region, which includes Tokyo.\textsuperscript{30}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Type & Location & Number of Casualties & Number of Injuries & Direct Material Damage & Direct Property Damage & Direct Business Damage & Total Damage & Total Property Damage & Total Business Damage & Total Damage Value (in万元) \\
\hline
Earthquake & Tohoku & 18 & 307 & 107 & 3,293 & 1,021,195 & 1,021,195 & 1,021,195 & 1,021,195 & 1,021,195 \\
\hline
Tsunami & Tohoku & 545 & 32 & 1,021,195 & 1,021,195 & 1,021,195 & 1,021,195 & 1,021,195 & 1,021,195 & 1,021,195 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Great East Japan Earthquake Damage Situation as of October 7, 2011 (From Damage Situation and Police Countermeasures, 2011)}
\end{table}

2. The Tsunami

The 9.0 earthquake triggered a series of massive tsunami waves. Within minutes after 2:46PM, the smaller first waves began to hit Japan’s eastern coast. The waves continued to grow and in less than an hour the tsunami waves reached their maximum observed height in several locations, giving residents less than 30 minutes in some cases to make the decision to evacuate low lying areas. The three hardest hit prefectures were from North to South: Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima. The highest recorded tsunami height was 9.3m in Soma, Fukushima Prefecture at 3:51PM (see Figure 3).\textsuperscript{31} It was

\textsuperscript{29} Eighteen fatalities, presumably from the earthquake, occurred in prefectures not directly hit by the tsunami, Tokyo (7), Kanagawa (4), Yamagata (2), Tochigi (4), and Gunma (1). These same prefectures also suffered minor property and infrastructure damage compared to the coastal prefectures. “Damage Situation and Police Countermeasures,” Japan National Police Agency, http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo_e.pdf (accessed October 7, 2011).

\textsuperscript{30} Road to Recovery (Tokyo: Government of Japan, 2011), 11.

\textsuperscript{31} “The 2011 Off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake.”
believed the tsunami reached much higher in numerous areas.\footnote{Japan’s Port and Airport Research Institute estimated the wave heights reached 15m at the moment of impact with Japan’s Sanriku coast in Iwate and Miyagi Prefectures. The mountainous and jagged coastline is believed to have pushed the tsunami waves up to 20m in some places once they reached land. The forces behind the tsunami were truly devastating. In the three hardest hit prefectures, tsunami waves rushed inland, destroying everything in their path. The tsunami devastated coastal towns and swept through low-lying areas as far as 5 km inland near Sendai and Ishinomaki Bays in Miyagi Prefecture.” Tsunami Topped 15 Meters on Sanriku Coast,” \textit{The Daily Yomiuri}, March 18, 2011, \url{http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110318004192.htm}.} When the waves reached their maximum heights and lost their momentum, the waters receded back into the ocean with the same devastating force. The tsunami submerged an estimated total of 326 square km in Miyagi Prefecture, 67 square km in Fukushima Prefecture, and 49 square km in Iwate Prefecture.\footnote{“Tsunami Flooding Hit Miyagi Pref. Areas Hardest,” \textit{The Daily Yomiuri}, March 31, 2011, \url{http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110330005586.htm}.} The total amount represents an area seven times larger than Manhattan. Figure 4 provides a visual approximation of the tsunami’s impact along Japan’s eastern coast.\footnote{\textit{USG Humanitarian Assistance to Japan for the Earthquake and Tsunami: April 2011} United States Agency International Development, [2011]).}
The damage caused by the tsunami accounts for an overwhelming majority of the damage inflicted. The most devastating of these is the loss of human life. As of October
7, 2011, 15,822 people were reported killed and 3,926 people remained missing. Ninety-nine percent of the killed or missing were from Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures. The missing are not likely to be recovered, which makes 19,748 the likely total number of people killed by the disaster. Another 5,942 people were reported as injured (see Table 1). The toll taken from the Japanese population is substantial, but the way in which it occurred adds to the devastating narrative left behind. In the weeks following the tsunami, the Japanese news media began reporting on countless tragic stories from those that lost loved ones often by their side.35 36 37

Property and infrastructure was badly damaged along Japan’s eastern coast. Japan Railway East discovered 23 stations and portions of 7 lines damaged in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures.38 Sendai’s airport lies close to the coast and was inundated by the tsunami.39 Property damage was most prevalent in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures, which accounted for 96% of the 118,516 buildings completely destroyed and 82% of the 180,700 buildings half collapsed (see Table 1). As a testament to the strength of the tsunami, it demolished the world’s deepest breakwater.40 The outcome was much the same in numerous other coastal cities that had spent decades fortifying their towns against tsunamis after experiencing similarly devastating tsunamis in 1896 and 1960.41

The economic impact of the tsunami was extensive. Japan’s Cabinet Office estimated the total economic damage done in the affected areas to be 16.9 trillion yen, nearly 220 billion dollars based on a 77 yen / 1 dollar ratio. A majority of the costs, 10.4 trillion yen, are attributed to property damage (see Table 2).\footnote{Road to Recovery, 10.} This figure makes the Great East Japan Earthquake the costliest natural disaster in the world’s history.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Damaged Stocks in Disaster Areas</th>
<th>The Great East Japan Earthquake</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buildings, etc. (housing, offices, plants, machinery, etc.)</td>
<td>approx. 10.4 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifeline utilities (water service, gas, electricity, and communication and broadcasting facilities)</td>
<td>approx. 1.3 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social infrastructure (river, road, harbors, drainage, and airport, etc.)</td>
<td>approx. 2.2 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (including agriculture, forestry and fisheries)</td>
<td>approx. 3.0 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>approx. 16.9 trillion yen</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Estimated Economic Damage (From “Road to Recovery,” 2011)

3. The Nuclear Power Station Disaster

Four stations with a total of 14 nuclear power plants were in the immediate area affected by the earthquake and tsunami.\footnote{These stations were Onagawa, Fukushima Dai-ichi, Fukushima Dai-ni, and Tokai Dai-ni. All plants at Onagawa, Fukushima Dai-ni, and Tokai Dai-ni had no serious damage and were shutdown automatically when the earthquake hit.} Plants 4, 5, and 6 at Fukushima Dai-ichi were under periodic inspection outage at the time of the earthquake and plants 1, 2, and 3 were automatically shutdown. External power at the station was cut-off due to the earthquake.

\footnote{Road to Recovery, 10.}
An estimated 14 m tsunami wave washed over the 5.7 m breakwater at the station and inundated the emergency diesel power generator and the cooling pumps, making them inoperable at 3:41PM (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station Damage (From “Great East Japan Earthquake and the Seismic Damage to the NPSs,” 2011)

The lack of any cooling system set off a chain reaction of events that led to one of the worst nuclear disasters. Prime Minister Kan Naoto ordered citizens to evacuate within a 20 km radius of Fukushima Dai-ichi and a 10 km radius of Fukushima Dai-ni on March 12. That same day, a hydrogen explosion occurred in the upper part of plant 1’s building after the primary containment vessel was vented. Similar hydrogen explosions

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occurred at plant 3 on March 14 and at plant 2 on March 15. In the first week after the earthquake, SDF, police, and fire department forces desperately tried to cool the plants and prevent further radiation leaks using helicopters and fire pump trucks. As a result of low water levels in reactor pressure vessels due to disabled cooling systems, damage to plant structures from the explosions, and cooling attempts using seawater and freshwater, the plants emitted higher than normal doses of radiation into the atmosphere and surrounding water and soil.46–47 On April 12, Japan’s Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency raised the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale level to a 7, the highest position representing a major accident.48 This put the incident on par with the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident.49

In the several months following the nuclear accident, cooling systems were restored, contaminated water was contained, and radiation emission was brought down to acceptable levels. Loss of life was averted and TEPCO was on track toward a cold shutdown by the end of 2011.50

C. MANIFESTATIONS

1. The SDF Is a Competent HADR Force

HADR as a source of legitimacy means nothing for the SDF if they do not perform well. Furthermore, performance must be demonstrated to a large audience in order to have any significant impact on the SDF’s public perception. The SDF’s role in

46 Great East Japan Earthquake and the Seismic Damage to the NPSs: July 2011, 2–4.
49 The two disasters differed in that the amount of radiation emitted by Fukushima Dai-ichi in 30 days was only 10% of the amount leaked in the first 10 days at Chernobyl. No one died from Fukushima Dai-ichi’s radiation as opposed to the 28 acute radiation sickness deaths at Chernobyl. Also, the Japanese government quickly ordered citizens to evacuate before radiation doses became potentially dangerous whereas Soviet officials did not order evacuations until residents had been exposed to large amounts of radiation. Major Differences Between the Chernobyl Accident and the Accident at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Station: April 2011 (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, [2011]).
50 Great East Japan Earthquake and the Seismic Damage to the NPSs: July 2011, 2–4.
domestic HADR is typically on a much smaller scale commensurate to the size of the disaster. Nonetheless, the SDF is involved in a considerable amount of HADR operations within Japan each year. In FY2010, the SDF participated in 529 different disaster relief operations of which 15 were in direct response to a natural disaster. The average contingent of SDF personnel involved in the 15 natural disasters averages approximately 390 (see Table 3). These smaller operations provide limited experience to the SDF and do not get the attention as one might expect from a large disaster. The Great East Japan Earthquake provided the SDF an opportunity to demonstrate that it was a competent HADR force to a much larger domestic and international audience. The SDF exhibited three characteristics as a competent HADR force: decisiveness, versatility, and jointness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number of dispatches</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Vehicles</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Vessels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responses to storm, flood, and earthquake disasters</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5,790</td>
<td>1,164</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transporting emergency patients</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>2,069</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and rescue</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2,767</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assisting firefighting</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1,868</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27,149</td>
<td>4,876</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>529</strong></td>
<td><strong>39,646</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,637</strong></td>
<td><strong>649</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. SDF Disaster Relief Dispatches, FY2010 (From “Defense of Japan,” 2011)

**a. Decisive**

The SDF can be characterized as decisive due to their rapid and effective response to the Great East Japan Earthquake. Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi immediately established the SDF Disaster Response Headquarters at 2:50 PM. A total of 11 SDF aircraft including two Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) UH-1 helicopters, two

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Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) P-3C patrol aircraft and one UH-60 helicopter and six Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) F-15 fighter aircraft responded within 30 minutes of the earthquake. Kitazawa then ordered large-scale disaster relief dispatch at 6:00PM followed by nuclear disaster dispatch at 7:30PM on March 11. Approximately 8,400 personnel and 190 aircraft were immediately mobilized as a result of these orders.

The SDF quickly adapted to its first challenge as it had relatively little information about what areas needed search and rescue assistance. The tsunami wiped out entire villages, leaving some survivors stranded on rooftops, and cut off other towns and villages entirely. The disaster relief exercise Michinoku Alert in 2008 operated on the assumption that the SDF and other rescue participants would receive information from local municipalities affected by the disaster. In most cases, even these facilities were destroyed leaving the SDF with no on the ground perspective. The GSDF adapted to this situation by immediately deploying roughly 20 CH-47 and UH-60 helicopters from Kisarazu Air Field in Chiba Prefecture, Somabara Air Field in Gunma Prefecture, and Camp Kasuminome near Sendai in Miyagi Prefecture. These helicopters performed some of the first rescues and reconnoitered the affected areas. The ASDF also launched RF-4 reconnaissance planes from Hyakuri Air Field in Ibaraki Prefecture in order to assess the extent of damages. The information gathered helped the GSDF begin large-scale mobilization of its forces into the affected areas at dawn on March 12.

The MSDF also quickly sprang into action. The Commanding Admiral of the Yokosuka District, which has responsibility for the seas adjacent to the affected areas, established his headquarters at the Self Defense Fleet’s Headquarters in Yokosuka and ordered ships to sortie immediately. JDS HARUSAME (DD102) was the first ship to get

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52 Road to Recovery, 4.
54 As a testament to the SDF’s rapid response, the GSDF’s 21st infantry regiment based in Akita Prefecture arrived in Kamaishi City, Iwate Prefecture to provide aid to a completely isolated town by 7:30AM on March 12. Road to Recovery, 37.
underway on March 11. By 10:00AM the next morning, 17 ships were underway from Yokosuka en route to areas in vicinity of Oshika Peninsula. The first ships arrived off the coast at 5:00PM on March 12.\textsuperscript{55}

Kan ordered Kitazawa to increase SDF personnel numbers to 100,000. The number of deployed personnel reached 50,000 by March 13 and 100,000 by March 18. At the peak of their operations the SDF forces numbered approximately 107,000 personnel, 540 aircraft, and 60 ships. This represents approximately 40\% of the SDF’s 240,000 personnel. It was the largest mobilization of forces in the SDF’s 57-year history.\textsuperscript{56} The GSDF deployed the most forces with 70,000 troops. The ASDF deployed 21,600 personnel and the MSDF sent 15,000.\textsuperscript{57}

The large-scale disaster relief operations prompted another decisive response when Kitazawa called up reserve and ready reserve personnel on March 16 for the first time in SDF history to serve in the disaster relief effort.\textsuperscript{58,59}

The SDF’s rapid deployment displays competence not just because they were following procedure but also because the speed and degree to which the SDF responded was their choice. After the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the primary method of requesting SDF assistance for disaster relief operations remained with the prefectural governor. The discretionary dispatch method was expanded to allow unit

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Defense of Japan 2011}, 3.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Record of Dispatch Activity of the Great East Japan Earthquake by the Self Defense Forces and Other Foreign Countries} (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Defense, [2011]).
\textsuperscript{59} Initially, only GSDF reserve personnel were called up and then MSDF and ASDF reserves were activated on April 15. A total of 2,210 ready reserves and 309 reserves participated in disaster relief operations, 26\% and 1\% of each category of reserve personnel respectively. Most reserve personnel were activated for 1 to 2 weeks. \textit{Defense of Japan 2011}, 17.
commanders three circumstances under which they could deploy their forces. Numerous SDF unit commanders made the decision to initiate discretionary dispatches based on these guidelines.

b. Versatile

The SDF executed a wide variety of operations during their disaster relief efforts including search and rescue, rescue operations for missing persons, transport assistance, livelihood assistance (water supply, food, fuel, bathing, medical), and debris removal.

The mission priority immediately after the disaster was the search and rescue of survivors. All elements of the SDF began search and rescue operations immediately. As a result of the massive and rapid deployment to the affected areas, the SDF played the most prominent role in search and rescue operations. The SDF rescued 19,286 people, which is approximately 70% of all those rescued. Of this total, 14,933 are attributed to the GSDF, 3,453 to the ASDF, and 900 to the MSDF. The SDF was responsible for two of the highest profile rescues seen throughout Japan and the world.

As the days passed by, the focus of the operation shifted to recovering missing persons. The GSDF conducted numerous concentrated search operations with other rescue forces in the coastal regions of the most affected prefectures. The MSDF

60 First, SDF assets must be deployed to gather information from the affected region in order to pass on to relevant organizations. Second, it is determined that the prefectural governor cannot make a request and immediate assistance is needed. Third, life-saving operations are needed. Ibid., 241.

61 The GSDF took the main lead in rescue operations on the ground while the MSDF did so from the sea. All services contributed their air assets in search operations as well. Ibid., 4.

62 Record of Dispatch Activity of the Great East Japan Earthquake by the Self Defense Forces and Other Foreign Countries.


65 GSDF personnel rescued a 4-month old girl from the rubble in Ishinomaki City and JDS CHOKAI (DDG 176) rescued a man adrift in the ocean on a roof for two days. Defense of Japan 2011, 4.

66 Ibid., 5.
distributed their approximately 60 ships for search and logistics operations along a vast portion of Japan’s northeastern coast (see Figure 6).\textsuperscript{67}

![Image of MSDF Dispatch Units (Right After The Disaster)](image)

**Figure 6.** MSDF Dispatch Units, Right After the Disaster (After “Situation of Disaster Dispatch Activity of the Great East Japan Earthquake,” 2011)

Of all the bodies recovered, the SDF accommodated 9,505, which accounts for roughly 60\% of the total fatalities. SDF personnel also personally carried the bodies of 1,004 individuals.\textsuperscript{68} Because of the high fatality rates, the SDF conducted transportation of bodies to burial sites and helped receive them at mortuaries.

Along with search and rescue operations the SDF began transport assistance operations to get disaster relief personnel and supplies into the affected areas.

\textsuperscript{67} Situation of Disaster Dispatch Activity of the Great East Japan Earthquake.

\textsuperscript{68} Record of Dispatch Activity of the Great East Japan Earthquake by the Self Defense Forces and Other Foreign Countries.
The SDF transported a total of 175 patients and 20,240 people from Disaster Assistance Medical Teams and rescue units. The transportation of supplies facilitated the delivery of roughly 13,906 tons of supplies.69

The MSDF’s role in the disaster relief operations was primarily transportation assistance. Ships delivered supplies to the mainland via Landing Craft Air Cushion and helicopter. The MSDF was also suited to deliver aid to isolated islands.70 Of note for the MSDF, JDS HYUGA (DDH-181) proved its utility as a multi-mission platform.71 During the disaster relief operations, it served as a command center for other vessels in the area and helped coordinate efforts with the U.S. military. Its flight deck was used as a relay station for all of the SDF services and U.S. military aircraft that were transporting personnel and delivering aid. Its compliment of medical and dental technicians and ample bathing facilities were used to support a number of citizens from the disaster areas.72 The second DDH, JDS ISE (DDH-182), was recently commissioned on March 16, 2011. As these ships are very new, it can be expected that they will play a vital role in HADR operations within Japan for years to come. The successful deployment of JDS HYUGA in a HADR operation may continue to distract outsiders to the DDH’s primary missions of anti-submarine warfare and command and control.

As supplies and personnel began to flow into the disaster areas and bases of operation were established, the SDF conducted livelihood assistance activities by providing water, food, fuel, bathing facilities, and medical care. GSDF personnel delivered water via water tank vehicles and trailers to shelters and established water stations in other areas. A total of 32,985 tons of water was distributed in approximately 200 places. The GSDF also provided canned foods, emergency meals, bread, rice, and

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69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 JDS HYUGA was commissioned in 2009. Although it is capable of conducting multiple missions, it was designed to be an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platform and flotilla commander flagship with a robust communications suite. Missions other than these including HADR are considered secondary missions for JDS HYUGA. Nonetheless, its large flight deck with four helicopter pads and extensive command and control equipment make it one of the most capable HADR platforms in the MSDF fleet. Yoji Koda, “A New Carrier Race?” Naval War College Review 64, no. 3 (Summer, 2011), 31, 48–55.
other food items at outdoor cooking stations. The MSDF transported disaster victims from isolated islands to their ships and opened up their dining facilities to feed them. The SDF provided a staggering 5,005,484 meals in approximately 100 places. Kerosene for heating and fuel for livelihood and emergency vehicles was also distributed throughout the disaster area. Approximately 368,784 gallons of fuel was provided. The GSDF set up outdoor bathing facilities while the ASDF opened Matsushima Air Base for public use. The MSDF also allowed citizens to use its bathing facilities on Hachinohe Base and opened its bathing facilities on ships. A total of 1,084,132 baths in nearly 35 places were provided to local citizens. Mobile medical units traveled around the disaster area providing examinations and medical care to victims. The SDF also utilized its medical facilities at the SDF Sendai Hospital and MSDF Hachinohe Base. Roughly 23,370 people received treatment from SDF medical personnel.73 74

The SDF also involved itself in reconstruction operations from the beginning of the disaster. Priority was given to clearing roads in support of search and rescue operations. Key infrastructure was cleared of rubble and restored to working order. These areas included Sendai Airport, Hachinohe Airport, Miyako Port, and Kesennuma Port. The SDF constructed temporary bridges where needed to connect isolated communities.75 In all, 322 km of road was cleared of obstacles.76

The nuclear disaster dispatch force conducted a wide variety of missions in vicinity of Fukushima Dai-ni and the crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power stations such as water supply and pumping to cool reactors, decontamination, monitoring operations, assistance to the local community, and search operations in areas near the nuclear power station.77

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73 Ibid., 9–11.
74 Record of Dispatch Activity of the Great East Japan Earthquake by the Self Defense Forces and Other Foreign Countries.
75 Defense of Japan 2011, 12.
76 Record of Dispatch Activity of the Great East Japan Earthquake by the Self Defense Forces and Other Foreign Countries.
77 Defense of Japan 2011, 14–17.
The nuclear disaster dispatch mobilized quickly after the earthquake. ASDF water supply vehicles pumped water onto reactors at Fukushima Dai-ni on March 13 and 14. The major effort concentrated on Fukushima Dai-ichi as it sustained the most damage. As the situation intensified, the GSDF made its first attempt to cool plant 3. On March 17, two CH-47J helicopters carrying firefighting water buckets dumped 30 tons of water over four trips on plant 3. In conjunction with the police and fire departments, the SDF used its fire trucks to pump water onto plant 3 from March 17–18 and on plant 4 from March 20–21. Altogether the SDF used 44 fire trucks and pumped 340 tons of water on the reactors. Numerous SDF air assets monitored the status of Fukushima Dai-ichi throughout the crisis by measuring levels of radiation. GSDF personnel conducted decontamination operations at eight stations along major roads for local residents and rescue personnel. As Kan established evacuation zones around the nuclear power stations, SDF personnel assisted the elderly and hospitalized citizens evacuate from the area. When evacuated persons were allowed to temporarily revisit their homes from May 11, the SDF assisted these residents through measurement and decontamination operations. As the radiation threat decreased in April and May, the SDF conducted a series of searches near Fukushima Dai-ichi.

The immense scope and effectiveness of SDF involvement after the Great East Japan Earthquake indicates the SDF is a versatile HADR force.

c. Joint

The scope of the disasters meant that each service would be necessary in the disaster relief efforts. After each service began mobilizing their forces, a joint task force was formed on March 14 to collectively strengthen the disaster relief operations. Kitazawa appointed the GSDF Commanding General of the Northeastern Army,


79 ASDF RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft and GSDF UH-1 helicopters conducted air reconnaissance and GSDF CH-47J helicopters fitted with thermal measuring devices monitored the reactor’s temperature. ASDF T-4 aircraft and SDF helicopters used dosimeter equipment to measure the types of radiation in vicinity of the power station. Defense of Japan 2011, 14–17.
Kimizuka Eiji, to head the joint task force. The joint task force represented the first time ground, naval, and air units conducted large-scale joint operations outside of an exercise (see Figure 7 for geographic reference).  

Figure 7. Location of Principal SDF Units as of March 31, 2011 (From “Defense of Japan,” 2011)

The joint task force encompassed two separate dispatch forces within the command structure. Most of the SDF forces fell under the large-scale earthquake disaster dispatch. The Central Readiness Force (CRF) was the nuclear disaster dispatch force.  

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80 Ibid., 2–3.

81 The CRF was created in 2007 along with the formation of the Ministry of Defense. Its headquarters is in Asaka, Tokyo and its mission is to act as a rapid response force capable of handling a wide range of missions for domestic or international purposes. It is comprised of various and elite SDF units including the 1st Airborne Brigade, 1st Helicopter Brigade, Special Forces Group, and Central NBC Defense Unit. “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment (Japan- Army),” IHS Global Limited, http://search.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/cnasu/japns110.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=Japan%20Army&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=CNAS& (accessed December 22, 2011), 2–3.
The CRF’s Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) unit, mobility, and close proximity to Fukushima Dai-ichi made it an ideal selection to deploy as the nuclear disaster dispatch force (see Figure 8).

Figure 8. MOD and SDF Organization for the Great East Japan Earthquake (From “Defense of Japan,” 2011)

Two central coordination centers were established to facilitate joint task force coordination and incorporate U.S. military assistance. These were located at the Ministry of Defense building in Ichigaya, Tokyo and U.S. Forces Japan Headquarters at Yokota Air Base. A field coordination center was created at the Northeastern Army Headquarters in Sendai where Kimizuka commanded the joint task force.82

The joint task force and coordination centers facilitated concerted efforts at the intra-service level and at the bi-lateral level with the U.S. military. The mass mobilization of personnel and resources and their successful operations seen by the numerous accomplishments across a broad spectrum of HADR missions shows how

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effective the SDF functioned at the intra-service level. The SDF’s relief supply transportation method exemplifies this joint functionality in particular (see Figure 9).

At the bi-lateral level, the SDF and U.S. military demonstrated the effectiveness of their coordinated operations and validated years of joint exercises. The United States provided the largest source of international military assistance to Japan under the name of OPERATION TOMODACHI from March 13 – April 8. At the peak of operations, 16,000 U.S. military service members, 15 ships, and 140 aircraft supported the HADR operation. USS RONALD REAGAN carrier strike group participated in a massive joint search with the SDF comprised of 7,000 U.S. service members and 18,000 SDF personnel. Nearly 339 bodies were found as a result of the operation. U.S. Navy

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83 Prefecture governments delivered donated supplies to local SDF bases in each prefecture. These bases then consolidated supplies at the major air bases in each prefecture. Supplies were sent from these air bases and other prefecture bases via GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF transportation assets to one of three major transfer locations: Hanamaki Airport in Iwate Prefecture, Fukushima Airport, and Matsushima Air Base in Miyagi Prefecture. From these locations, supplies were delivered to evacuation shelters via helicopters and trucks. Ibid., 6.

84 Ibid., 19.

salvage units conducted port clearance operations in Hachinohe, Miyako, and Kesennuma. USS ESSEX amphibious readiness group provided disaster assistance to the isolated Oshima Island.\textsuperscript{86} USS TORTUGA (LSD 46) transported 300 GSDF troops and 100 vehicles from Hokkaido to the disaster area. Logistics aircraft from U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma transported disaster relief supplies to MSDF Iwakuni Air Base, Atsugi Air Facility, and Yokota Air Base. The U.S. Air Force also played a large role in transporting relief supplies primarily through Yokota and Misawa Air Bases.\textsuperscript{87} U.S. soldiers and marines worked with the SDF and civilian contractors to clear debris from the seriously damaged Sendai Airport. The joint effort quickly restored the airport’s functionality on March 28.\textsuperscript{88} Small numbers of U.S. soldiers and marines conducted various livelihood activities in communities throughout the disaster area. These forces cleared debris from schools and train stations, and deployed portable bathing facilities for local residents. For the nuclear accident, the U.S. military provided five water pumps, two large barges and pumps to aid freshwater cooling efforts, and roughly 18 tons of boric acid.\textsuperscript{89}

As the situation became more stable and mass mobilization no longer became necessary, the joint task force disbanded on July 1 and the large-scale disaster dispatch concluded on August 31, 2011.\textsuperscript{90} The joint task force’s 109-day existence proved the SDF could function effectively in a joint environment for a considerable duration.

\textsuperscript{86} During their stay, U.S. military and SDF personnel restored power to the island, delivered 15,000 lbs. of supplies, and cleared debris on several of the island’s beaches. T. D. Flack, “Navy Scales Back Earthquake Relief Efforts in Japan,” Stars and Stripes, April 7, 2011.

\textsuperscript{87} Defense of Japan 2011, 19.


\textsuperscript{89} Defense of Japan 2011, 19, 21.

\textsuperscript{90} Situation of Disaster Dispatch Activity of the Great East Japan Earthquake.
2. **The SDF Is the Most Capable HADR Force Within Japan**

There are those that still advocate a non-military disaster relief organization and wish to de-emphasize the SDF’s HADR role. This section finds that the SDF’s preeminent role in disaster relief operations after the Great East Japan Earthquake will help to further marginalize this line of thinking as it showed it was the most capable HADR force within Japan.

The SDF was certainly not the only participant in the disaster relief operations. The major participants include the police and fire departments, Japan Coast Guard (JCG), non-governmental organizations (NGO), and the international community. The SDF stands out as the preeminent disaster relief organization because it was the best equipped to execute all of the various HADR operations. The other major participants provided valuable services but did not have the SDF’s operational breadth. For instance, the police department supplied 5,600 personnel, about 5% of the SDF forces involved. Police forces rescued approximately 3,750 victims, which is about 20% of the amount rescued by the SDF. The police also conducted a wide variety of other missions such as assistance to the elderly, disaster victim care at shelters, establishing emergency routes, identification of the dead and missing, and collection of recovered valuables. The police, however, lack the capacity to conduct large maritime and air search and rescue operations, and lack the logistical equipment needed to mobilize massive amounts of relief aid.

The JCG used its personnel and maritime and air assets in support of search and rescue operations, port clearance, and identification of hazards to navigation. At the height of the SDF’s deployment on March 18, the JCG deployed 54 ships, 19 aircraft, 14 special search and rescue units, and 14 mobile rescue teams. The JCG’s search and

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93 *Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake: March 18*, Japan Coast Guard, [2011]).
rescue operations resulted in the rescue of 360 personnel, about 2% of the amount rescued by the SDF and only one-third attributed to the MSDF.94

NGOs play a large part in funneling international and domestic relief aid to disaster victims. Their contributions include a variety of livelihood assistance (food, non-food items, health, psychological, wash facilities), logistics assistance, shelter management, telecommunications, education, debris removal, and pest control (see Figures 10, 11, and 12).95 Each NGO’s activities may last anywhere from a few days to months but their assistance is vital to address specific needs that organizations such as the SDF may not be equipped to address or cannot completely handle on its own. NGOs typically outlast military disaster relief efforts, as is the case with Japan Platform, a non-profit organization with 32 NGO members, which signed up for three years of NGO coordination efforts. As of August 31, Japan Platform also collected approximately $88 million in donations and provided 60 million dollars in grants to its member NGOs.96 Nonetheless, NGOs cannot contribute to search and rescue operations and require a great deal of coordination to efficiently allocate their varying resources.

94 These less significant contributions compared to the MSDF are to be expected as the JCG’s personnel numbers and ship sizes are smaller. Search and rescue is also a primary mission for the JCG, which leads to a smaller and more mobile force that cannot contribute toward relief aid transportation like the MSDF. Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake: October 7, Japan Coast Guard, [2011]).


Figure 10. JANIC and Japan Platform NGO Activity in Iwate Prefecture as of May 20, 2011 (From “NGO Activity Map,” 2011)
Figure 11. JANIC and Japan Platform NGO Activity in Miyagi Prefecture as of May 20, 2011 (From “NGO Activity Map,” 2011)
International assistance in the form of rescue teams and military forces provide a valuable augmentation to search and rescue capabilities and transportation assistance but do not come close to matching the SDF’s capabilities. Not counting U.S. military forces, international rescue teams and military forces totaled around 1,200 personnel, about 1% of the amount deployed by the SDF. Most of the international rescue teams were only deployed for a matter of days (see Figure 13). Although the U.S. military supported the disaster relief efforts with a large contingent numbering 16,000 personnel, the bulk of its HADR support was also short in duration, 27 days, compared to the SDF’s 173 days of large-scale disaster dispatch. International assistance is useful and appreciated but cannot be counted on for the obvious reason of lacking direct control over these forces.

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97 Map of Sites Where Rescue Teams from Foreign Countries, Regions, and International Organizations are Operating: August 3 (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [2011]).
Figure 13. Rescue Operations Map of International Assistance (From “Map of Sites Where Rescue Teams from Foreign Countries, Regions, and International Organizations are Operating: August 3,” 2011)
The Great East Japan Earthquake definitively showed the Japanese public that the SDF is the most capable HADR force in Japan and must be relied on in future disasters. The major participants in disaster relief operations provide assistance in some HADR operations but none came close to matching the SDF’s comprehensive HADR capabilities. The SDF’s pool of 240,000 human resources allows it to mobilize a large amount of forces over a widely devastated area. The SDF’s heavy equipment enables it to conduct search and rescue operations in any environment and efficiently deliver a vast amount of relief aid. The SDF therefore provides the government centralized control over the largest and most capable HADR force within Japan. Demonstrating the SDF’s utility as a HADR tool will help dissolve pacifist norms that support less reliance on the SDF.

3. The Domestic Political Environment Is Conducive to the SDF’s Effective Domestic Application and Integration of International Assistance

One of the reasons the SDF was able to deploy its forces so quickly and effectively and operate jointly with the U.S. military was because the domestic political environment did not impede these actions. It seems logical that government officials would expect the SDF to become involved in disaster relief operations after such a large disaster. This has not always been the case. The SDF’s response to the Great East Japan Earthquake is best understood and appreciated when compared to that of its response to the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995. The 1995 earthquake provides the best point of comparison to the 2011 earthquake because it is the most recent large-scale natural disaster classified as a “great” disaster by Japan. This section briefly summarizes the 1995 earthquake and the SDF’s response and identifies differences between the two disasters relating to the SDF.

The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake struck the Kobe area on January 17, 1995 at 5:46AM. Its magnitude was recorded at 7.2 and occurred in an urban area with approximately 4 million people. The city of Kobe was the world’s sixth largest container port at the time but the affected area only represented a little less than 3% of Japan’s
economy. This was slightly larger than the area affected by the 2011 earthquake. About 6,500 people died from the earthquake. Almost 100,000 buildings were completely destroyed and the same amount was partially collapsed. Much of Kobe’s infrastructure was damaged including utilities, railroads, and the primary coastal highway. Nearly 300,000 people were left homeless from the disaster. The 1995 earthquake set the bar as the world’s most costly disaster of the time at 64 billion dollars. It was a major disaster that required extensive disaster relief efforts.

One would think that government officials would have knocked down the SDF’s door requesting their assistance. This was not the case. At the time of the 1995 earthquake, the primary method for deploying the SDF in support of disaster relief operations was via a request from the prefectural governor.

The earthquake occurred in 1995 amidst the only LDP rule interim in its 54-year stretch. Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi was elected the previous year and was a member of the Socialist Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ). The SDPJ was known for its distrust of the SDF and acted in many ways to subvert its influence and role. The Hyogo Prefecture Governor did not make a formal request to the GSDF until four hours after the earthquake at 10:00AM. A similar request for MSDF support was delayed twelve hours until 6:00PM. The distrust between government officials and the SDF is cited as one reason why government officials did not quickly submit a formal request for SDF assistance leading to a slow SDF response.

Another reason for the slow response was that the hostile domestic political environment prevented the SDF from conducting any disaster relief exercises with local authorities. SDF commanders erred on the side of restraint when involving their forces in

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100 The governor is in overall charge of disaster relief operations within the prefecture and best understands the needs of the people and extent of the damage. A municipal mayor could also ask the governor to request assistance from the SDF. SDF commanders could deploy small forces in the event of an emergency but still relied on a formal request from the prefecture governor to deploy large-scale disaster relief forces. Defense of Japan 2011, 241.

the prefecture. Their disaster relief activities prior to formal requests in the past brought cooperation refusals and criticism from local government officials. For example, a MSDF transport vessel and destroyer were initially refused to dock at Kobe’s port in order to deliver relief supplies on the afternoon of January 17.102 The SDPJ’s Secretary General Wataru Kubo even advocated on January 28 that an organization other than the SDF should be established to conduct disaster relief operations and participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations.103

Despite the tense domestic political environment, the SDF did deploy small forces before a formal request was received.104 In the following months, the SDF conducted various HADR operations similar to those after the 2011 earthquake. These operations included search and rescue, accommodating bodies, and transporting patients and relief supplies. Other services were provided such as water and food, medical stations, and bathing facilities.105 At the peak of SDF HADR operations, approximately 26,000 personnel participated.106 The SDF completed its large-scale disaster dispatch on April 27. SDF personnel rescued 165 people, served 730,000 meals, supplied 62,000 tons of water, and provided 480,000 baths for disaster victims.107 108 The SDF force was ultimately the largest disaster relief force to operate in the affected area. The next largest besides the fire department was the police force with a maximum total of 5,500 at the onset of the disaster. In the police department’s 196 days of disaster relief efforts, they

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102 Ibid.
104 At 7:00AM, the GSDF sent a helicopter to conduct reconnaissance and at 8:00AM GSDF personnel began rescue operations near a collapsed train station. The MSDF also flew a helicopter in the affected area early that morning and sent a transport vessel and destroyer from Kure at 9:00AM. After the formal request came at 10:00AM, the first large GSDF disaster relief force of 1,000 personnel reached the area at 3:00PM. Katsumata and Nishida, Delay in Calling Out SDF Rescuers Comes Under Fire.
supplied 426,500 man-days.\textsuperscript{109} In comparison, the SDF provided 2.2 million man-days in just 100 days approximately.\textsuperscript{110} These figures indicate that the SDF had the capacity in 1995 to conduct a similarly effective HADR operation as it did after the Great East Japan Earthquake. A harsh domestic political environment in 1995, however, slowed the SDF’s response and detracted attention from its otherwise successful HADR operation.

Another criticism the Japanese government received from the 1995 earthquake was its slow response to receive international aid. Within days of the earthquake, 38 countries and three U.N. organizations offered aid to the Japanese government but only four countries were allowed to send rescue teams within the first five days after the earthquake.\textsuperscript{111} U.S. Forces Japan also comprised an extensive list of assets, supplies, and personnel available to assist in the disaster relief; the scope of which would have been similar to OPERATION TOMODACHI. The Japanese government only accepted minimal supplies and support from the U.S. military. It was suspected that the SDPJ leadership refused such offers because of its anti-militarist sentiments.\textsuperscript{112} About 60 U.S. Marines set up tents in the affected area, which represented the first time U.S. forces assisted Japan in disaster relief operations.\textsuperscript{113} The media eventually blamed the SDPJ government for letting it fall victim to bureaucratic red tape in the time of an emergency.

Because the SDF’s response was slow but ultimately effective, media reports after the 1995 earthquake did not praise the SDF’s actions to the degree that they did after the 2011 earthquake. The media and disaster victims were generally appreciative of their efforts, however. In a January 1995 Yomiuri Shimbun poll, 93% of respondents stated they wanted a rapid SDF dispatch in case of a disaster. Another 32%, the largest percentage, said they wanted to depend on the SDF the most to provide relief support.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{109} Police Measures regarding the Great East Japan Earthquake: October 2011, 3.
\textsuperscript{110} Defense of Japan 1995.
The Daily Yomiuri also advocated for more disaster relief drills between SDF and local governments and better communication amongst all participants in a disaster relief situation. The SDPJ’s views toward the SDF were also changed. On January 28, 1995, Murayama reversed the SDPJ’s long-standing resistance to the SDF by stating he now supported incorporating the SDF into disaster relief programs with local governments.

The SDF’s successful deployment after the Great East Japan Earthquake indicates that the domestic political environment has drastically improved since 1995. Anti-militarist sentiment no longer permeates the government and has facilitated increased civil-military cooperation. For example, the SDF’s largest emergency drill to date called Michinoku Alert 2008 was conducted from October 31 to November 1, 2008. The scenario mirrored the effects of the Great East Japan Earthquake and included 9,839 SDF personnel and 18,000 participants from eight prefectures in Tohoku including Iwate and Miyagi Prefectures. The drill exercised civil-military coordination between SDF and prefecture organizations and followed up with regular meetings with participants. The domestic political environment also does not impede the integration of international assistance. This transition since 1995 is evident by the speed of acceptance and scope of international aid received after the 2011 earthquake. The favorable environment also facilitated the SDF’s joint operations with the U.S. military in the largest show of support between the two allies to date. These developments are significant because in the SDF trajectory debate, the SDF’s ability to conduct operations unimpeded at home is a necessary step to expanding the SDF’s operations outside its borders.

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117 Road to Recovery, 4.
4. The SDF’s HADR Capabilities Demonstrate Ability for Other Operations

The SDF showed the Japanese people and the world that it was a competent HADR force. At the same time it illustrated numerous qualities and capabilities that indicate the SDF is able to conduct other operations. If the 2010 NDPG is used as a framework, it is clear to see how the SDF’s demonstrated HADR capabilities may translate into other operations. Under the SDF’s effective deterrence and response role outlined in the 2010 NDPG, the SDF showed its ability to conduct four of seven priority areas. The SDF’s ability to simultaneously handle the affects from the tsunami and the nuclear disaster illustrates its ability to conduct the first priority area: response to complex contingencies. The SDF’s mass mobilization of personnel and resources shows its high state of readiness and flexibility to conduct the following three priority areas: ensuring security of sea and air space surrounding Japan, response to attacks on offshore islands, and response to attacks by guerillas and special operations forces.

The SDF’s determination to accomplish its mission in a harsh environment also indicates that SDF personnel have the will to execute these priority areas. The SDF endured numerous hardships during its disaster dispatch. Three SDF members died as a result of the disasters. One died when the tsunami hit Miyagi Prefecture as he was leading disaster victims to a shelter. Camp Tagajyou in Miyagi Prefecture, home to 760 GSDF troops, was inundated by the tsunami. More than half of the regiment came from Miyagi Prefecture and many had families in the affected area. Despite the personal hardships experienced, the unit participated on the front lines of the disaster dispatch. Three SDF members that were deployed to help support water supply operations at Fukushima Dai-ichi’s plant three received minor injuries when the building exploded. The explosion was powerful enough that it destroyed all of the SDF vehicles at the site. The SDF personnel involved in the cooling operations via fire pump trucks and

120 Water Dumped on Reactor: GSDF Choppers Attempt to Cool No. 3 Fuel Rod Pool.
helicopters were also under a great deal of stress as the stability of the nuclear plants and the full extent of their radiation leakage was unknown in the immediate aftermath of the disaster.

GSDF troops in the affected prefectures operated in harsh environments for extended periods of time. Large aftershocks made the threat of another tsunami very real and the working conditions were made worse by freezing temperatures and snow, flooded and muddy land, and massive amounts of debris. In a Sankei Shimbun interview with General Kimizuka during the large-scale disaster relief operations, he made several observations from the operation. His policy for the troops was to treat every corpse with extreme dignity and to place the needs of the survivors over themselves. SDF personnel enthusiastically embraced the self-restraint and serving attitude required by Kimizuka. SDF members refrained from drinking and eating a lot in the morning so that they would not need to use the bathroom in the disaster area where bodies may be found. SDF personnel ate canned food for months while citizens ate hot meals. This led to the development of vitamin deficiencies and debilitating mouth ulcers in tens of thousands of SDF personnel, which was rectified by switching to boil-in-bag foods. SDF personnel were allowed to shower only once a week while citizens had access to hot bathing facilities.121 The adverse working conditions and long-term exposure to dead bodies took a toll on many GSDF personnel. Psychological and physical fatigue became a concern as some SDF personnel exhibited signs of acute stress disorder.122

Of course, enduring hardship is an understood part of any military service. This was the first time the SDF was able to demonstrate on a large scale its willingness to undergo such harsh conditions for the betterment of the people. This willingness serves as a foundation for confidence in the SDF’s ability to execute similarly demanding operations. Furthermore, the SDF’s demonstrated HADR capabilities indicate that if the SDF were to follow a remilitarization trajectory and expand its operations, then the SDF has the ability to do so.

D. CONCLUSION

The Great East Japan Earthquake has the potential to serve as a catalytic event for the SDF. It affected almost every aspect of Japanese society and thrust the SDF into full view of the public. Retrenchment, status quo, and remilitarization trajectories are all plausible outcomes. Sorting through these possible trajectories and the forces that may influence a particular trajectory is the next chapter’s goal.

In the process of performing this analysis, the four manifestations detailed in this chapter enable better-informed analysis as they describe what the disasters divulged about the SDF. First, the SDF is a competent HADR force and will need to be relied on in the future, as Japan is constantly under threat from natural disasters. The SDF exemplified this competence through its decisive actions, versatile capabilities, and joint operations. Second, the SDF is the most capable HADR force within Japan. No other organization can match the SDF’s capabilities across a wide spectrum of HADR missions. Third, the domestic political environment is conducive to the SDF’s effective domestic application and integration of international assistance. Civil-military cooperation has improved tremendously since the 1995 earthquake. Fourth, the SDF’s demonstrated HADR capabilities and willingness to operate under harsh conditions suggests the SDF is able to conduct a variety of other operations if called to do so.
III. THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE’S IMPACT ON THE SELF DEFENSE FORCE’S TRAJECTORY

A. INTRODUCTION: THE LOGIC

So far, this thesis has illustrated that the scope of the disasters and the SDF’s unprecedented disaster dispatch have the potential to alter security, economic, and normative interests within Japanese society. This chapter builds on the previous chapter’s description of the disaster’s catalytic nature by focusing on four areas that presumably affect the SDF’s trajectory: security interests, economic interests, norms, and actors and institutions.

Figure 14 illustrates the relationship between the four areas of analysis and how they theoretically lead to one of the three SDF trajectories: retrenchment, status quo, and remilitarization. Security and economic interests serve as two major areas that traditionally affect a military’s application. These areas provide tangible points of analysis as to how the Great East Japan Earthquake has affected these respective interests. In the context of dueling interests, security and economic interests have the potential to evenly impact factors influencing the SDF’s trajectory or unevenly if either security or economic interests dominate the trajectory agenda. Norms is the third area that influences the SDF’s trajectory. Although a certain trajectory may seem logical based on the emphasis of security or economic interests, norms have the ability to shape the perceptions of these interests and create an environment that is either hostile or conducive to a certain trajectory. This area is therefore placed after security and economic interests because it has the ability to trump the balance between the dueling interests. The final area that influences the SDF’s trajectory is actors and institutions. These represent the entities that have the capacity to influence a particular trajectory. If one particular entity becomes more influential as a result of the disasters, then it will have the most direct control over the SDF’s trajectory.
There is one necessary point of clarification needed in the argument’s structure presented thus far. The four areas depicted in Figure 14 do not interact with each other as coherent units influencing a particular trajectory. Instead, within each of the four areas, various elements exist that could potentially lead to any of the three trajectories. Figure 15 portrays these trajectory influences in the left hand column. Each trajectory influence generally has a variation that corresponds to a particular trajectory with those influencing retrenchment on the left, status quo in the middle, and remilitarization on the right.

This chapter is structured according to Figure 15. Each trajectory influence within the four categories is scrutinized for how the disasters affected it along two possible causal chains. First, the disasters themselves directly impact the trajectory influence, which in turn emphasizes a particular trajectory. Second, an actor or institution’s response to the disasters impacts the trajectory influence, which likewise emphasizes a particular trajectory.
B. SECURITY INTERESTS

1. Security Policy Focus

The first trajectory influence to be analyzed is Japan’s security policy focus. Japan’s security policy focus is indicative of the SDF’s trajectory as it steers the SDF toward more or less involvement outside its borders. As previously discussed, the 2010 NDPG provides an overview of what can be considered the status quo in Japan’s security policy. It illustrates that Japan’s security policy focus is a hybrid divided amongst...
domestic, regional, and international roles for the SDF (see Figure 1). The Great East Japan Earthquake has the potential to prompt a reevaluation of Japan’s security policy as laid out in the 2010 NDPG. An emphasis on the SDF’s domestic HADR application may cause an inward-looking focus on Japan’s security policy leading to retrenchment. The experience gained by the SDF from its disaster dispatch may prove as a useful tool and translate into more focus on the SDF’s participation in international security activities. This focus on the international environment could contribute to a remilitarization trajectory as the SDF becomes more involved in operations outside of its borders.

a. Hybrid Focus Reinforced

The most telling shift of Japan’s security policy focus would come from a revision of its NDPG. The 2010 NDPG stipulates that it is subject to revision at any time based on significant changes. If the Great East Japan Earthquake were such a catalytic event that it prompted a major departure in Japan’s security policy, one could expect a revision forthcoming in the short-term. There does not seem to be any indication that this is the case. Instead, the disasters reinforced the hybrid focus already accounted for in the 2010 NDPG. The result is that the status quo in terms of Japan’s security policy focus was merely reinforced.123

Each of the three SDF roles expressed in the 2010 NDPG was reinforced by the SDF’s disaster dispatch. In relation to the first security objective, the SDF demonstrated its effective deterrence and response role through one of the seven priority areas under this role, response to large-scale and nuclear disasters. Many of the missions conducted within the overall disaster dispatch also illustrate the SDF’s ability to effectively and rapidly deploy large amounts of forces in support of other priority areas within the effective deterrence and response role. This also reinforces the dynamic deterrence objective of reducing geographic and time coverage gaps.

In conjunction with the second security objective, the SDF demonstrated its further stabilization of the Asia-Pacific security environment role by building its

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capacity for non-traditional security operations, specifically in the field of HADR operations. The SDF gained valuable experience in every mission area related to HADR such as search and rescue, transport assistance, livelihood assistance, and debris removal. The experience gained by the three services and 40% of SDF personnel will provide a substantial boost to the SDF’s HADR capabilities that can provide a significant advantage when promoting regional cooperation on HADR operations.124

In relation to the third security objective, the SDF showed its improvement of the global security environment role through its successful disaster dispatch in a similar manner as it did within the regional role.

The SDF also demonstrated three of the priority capabilities in the SDF posture. First, the SDF illustrated its high level of readiness through its rapid response of ground, air, and naval assets within minutes of the earthquake. Second, the SDF demonstrated its capacity for conducting joint operations on the intra-service and bilateral levels. Third, the SDF also demonstrated its capability to conduct international peace cooperation, specifically in the area of HADR operations for reasons previously mentioned.

In the SDF organization category, the following capabilities were also exemplified: strengthening of joint operations, strengthening of capabilities for international peace cooperation activities, and efficient and effective buildup of defense forces.

In short, the SDF’s disaster dispatch after the Great East Japan Earthquake is a resounding exclamation point for the 2010 NDPG. Most of its elements are reinforced by the operations conducted and experience gained by the SDF. If any particular element is emphasized more than the others it will likely be the SDF’s HADR capabilities, which could potentially open new doors for cooperation in a natural disaster abundant region. This would simply allow the SDF to continue polishing and validating the policies laid out in the 2010 NDPG.

b. Hybrid Focus Continues

This section examines evidence gathered after the disasters that may illustrate a change in Japan’s security policy focus. Attention is given to several major SDF operations and developments in the months following the disasters. This section finds that Japan’s security policy focus has not significantly increased or decreased its international security activities and remains a hybrid focus.

In the area of international peace cooperation activities, Japan is continuing the trend of more regular participation in UN PKO. As of May 2011, the SDF maintained its pre-disaster SDF levels at 380 personnel: two in the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), 330 in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), two in the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), and 46 in the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in Golan Heights.125

![Figure 16. SDF International Peace Cooperation Activities (From “Defense of Japan,” 2011)](image)

125 See Figure 16 for chronology of SDF participation in UN PKO. Ibid., 348.
The Ministry of Defense (MOD) had the opportunity to cut short the SDF’s participation in MINUSTAH and UNDOF in September and October 2011 as deployed units were due for rotation but opted to maintain troop levels by deploying fresh units. The outgoing SDF unit commander for MINUSTAH even stated that the SDF’s ongoing participation after Japan’s own disaster would serve both Haiti and Japan.\textsuperscript{126} As UNMIS concluded in July 2011, the SDF made a new contribution to the successor mission, UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). In November 2011, Japan’s Cabinet approved the deployment of approximately 300 GSDF engineering troops to UNMISS.\textsuperscript{127}

The SDF’s anti-piracy operations off the Gulf of Aden were also not affected by the disasters. In July 2011, the government extended the anti-piracy patrols for another year as it deemed the mission remained essential. The SDF actually increased their commitment to this mission as it established its first overseas facility since World War II in Djibouti. This new facility provides logistical support for the anti-piracy operations conducted by two P-3C patrol aircraft and two destroyers.\textsuperscript{128, 129}

The SDF has also retained its domestic focus as it participated in disaster relief within its own borders in response to Typhoons number 12 and 15 in September 2011. Of note, the SDF dispatched 28,790 personnel after record-breaking rainfall following Typhoon number 12.\textsuperscript{130} Compared to the SDF’s typical disaster dispatch of 390 personnel in 2010, the Typhoon number 12 deployment represents a dramatic boost in the SDF’s domestic role for natural disasters that are not considered major natural disasters.

\textsuperscript{126} “Transfer of Command of UNDOF Transport Unit in the Golan Heights; Transfer of the Command of the Unit Dispatched to MINUSTAH,” \textit{Japan Defense Focus}, October, 2011, 7.


\textsuperscript{129} On the surface, the SDF’s first overseas facility may seem like a step towards remilitarization. However, the official Japanese name for the base translates to Japanese Facility for Counter-Piracy Mission in Djibouti. The avoidance of the term base suggests the SDF does not see this as a long-term commitment. Yoichi Kato, “SDF’s New Anti-Piracy Base Creates a Dilemma,” \textit{The Asahi Shimbun}, August 5, 2011, \url{http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201108055418}.

\textsuperscript{130} “Disaster Relief in Response to Typhoons No. 12 and No. 15 “ \textit{Japan Defense Focus}, December, 2011, 9.
Although the SDF has not yet had the opportunity to apply its increased HADR experience in regional or international HADR operations, one can expect that the trend toward more participation in HADR operations, especially within the region, will continue as illustrated in Figure 17.

![Figure 17. SDF International Disaster Relief Operations (From “Defense of Japan,” 2011)](image)

The SDF’s domestic role seems to be gaining momentum as evidenced by the large disaster dispatch in response to Typhoon number 12. This does not seem to be affecting the SDF’s international focus on security activities including UN PKO missions and anti-piracy operations at least in the short-term. Instead, Japan’s security policy remains focused on a hybrid mixture of domestic, regional, and international roles for the SDF.
2. **Defense Budget**

The second trajectory influence to be analyzed is Japan’s defense budget. Two aspects of Japan’s defense budget are accounted for in this section: aggregate spending and allocation. The status quo for Japan’s defense budget has been 1% of GDP since 1976. If the SDF were to remilitarize, the SDF might increase defense spending beyond the 1% norm. If it were to retrench, the SDF might decrease defense spending by its own volition to support reconstruction efforts or out of necessity because of impacts to Japan’s GDP growth. In regard to allocation, the defense budget currently mirrors the capability intentions outlined in the 2010 NDPG. The result is a hybrid mix of expenditures on offensive and defensive type equipment and mission areas. If the SDF were on a remilitarization or retrenchment trajectory, one might expect a shift in the balance of overtly offensive and defensive capabilities and missions, respectively.

**a. Aggregate Spending Maintained**

The disasters presented themselves as an unexpected expense to the 2011 defense budget. Two SDF facilities in Miyagi Prefecture suffered serious damage from the tsunami: GSDF Camp Tagajyou and ASDF Matsushima Air Base. Matsushima Air Base suffered extensive equipment and facilities damage with tsunami waters reaching the second level of its buildings. In addition to vehicle, helicopter, and T-4 training aircraft damage, 18 F-2 multi-role fighters were severely damaged.\(^{131}\)

In addition to the damage caused by the tsunami, the SDF accrued additional operational expenses as it mobilized a large portion of its personnel and equipment in support of the disaster dispatch. The additional costs prompted a budget revision that allocated 188.6 billion yen for the 2011 budget and 54.1 billion yen for the 2012 budget.\(^{132}\) The 188.6 billion yen for 2011 was included in the first supplementary

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\(^{131}\) The MOD determined that only 6 of the 18 F-2s could be repaired. Each repairable fighter would require up to 5–6 billion yen in repair costs. The 12 non-repairable F-2s cost 120 billion yen each, which makes this the most significant SDF equipment loss. “A Third of Tsunami-Damaged F2 Fighters Restorable: Repair Cost Equals 5–6 Billion Yen Per Plane,” Translated by James Simpson. *The Sankei Shim bun*, May 19, 2011, [http://newpacificinstitute.org/jsw/?p=6170](http://newpacificinstitute.org/jsw/?p=6170).

\(^{132}\) *Defense of Japan 2011*, 3.
budget and was procured in a zero-sum manner by reallocation and reduction of predetermined expenditures.\textsuperscript{133} It is unclear how or even if these funds were taken from the defense budget but even if it was, the figures represent only 4% of the 2011 defense budget. The unforeseen expenses caused by the earthquake do not represent an insurmountable obstacle.

The FY2012 defense budget request and overall government draft budget indicate that Japan has not significantly deviated from the defense budget’s 1% of GDP norm. The defense budget’s requested amount, 4,690 billion yen, represents only a .6% increase from 2011 (see Figure 18).\textsuperscript{134} The FY2012 overall draft budget indicates the defense budget will be allocated 4,827 billion yen.\textsuperscript{135} These figures suggest that although the defense budget has increased for the first time since at least 2003, there is not a significant deviation in the defense budget level as a function of the percentage of GDP. Aggregate defense spending continues to follow the planned annual allotment set forth in the 2010 Mid-Term Defense Plan (MTDP) with only a slight deviation. The status quo continues to be enforced.

![Figure 18. Japan Defense Budget Trend (From “FY2012 Defense Budget Request,” 2012)](image)

\textsuperscript{133} Outline of the Supplementary Budget for FY2011 (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Finance, [2011]).

\textsuperscript{134} Defense Programs and Budget of Japan: Overview of FY2012 Budget Request (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Defense, [2012]).

\textsuperscript{135} Highlights of the Budget for FY2012 (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Finance, 2011), 5.
b. Hybrid Allocation Maintained

The 2010 MTDP was formulated along with the 2010 NDPG and addresses how the defense budget will pursue the goals set forth in the 2010 NDPG. Therefore, the 2010 MTDP provides clear insight into the types of capabilities the SDF will pursue in the next five years. These capabilities are generally indicative of the SDF’s shift toward a dynamic defense force and represent a hybrid mix of offensive and defensive equipment (see Figure 19).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Equipment</th>
<th>2005 Mid-term Defense Program (Initial)</th>
<th>2005 Mid-term Defense Program (Revised)</th>
<th>New Mid-term Defense Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>49 tanks</td>
<td>49 tanks</td>
<td>68 tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzers and rockets (excluding mortars)</td>
<td>38 vehicles</td>
<td>38 vehicles</td>
<td>32 vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored vehicles</td>
<td>104 pieces</td>
<td>96 pieces</td>
<td>75 pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-surface missile</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>18 pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat helicopters (AH-64D)</td>
<td>7 units</td>
<td>4 units</td>
<td>3 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport helicopters (CH-47J)</td>
<td>11 units</td>
<td>9 units</td>
<td>5 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles</td>
<td>8 companies</td>
<td>7 companies</td>
<td>4 companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve capabilities of Aegis destroyers</td>
<td>3 vessels</td>
<td>3 vessels</td>
<td>2 vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>6 vessels</td>
<td>5 ships</td>
<td>3 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>4 vessels</td>
<td>4 ships</td>
<td>5 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>11 vessels</td>
<td>8 ships</td>
<td>5 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Number of tons)</td>
<td>Approx. 31.000 tons</td>
<td>Approx. 31.000 tons</td>
<td>Approx. 31.000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New fixed-wing patrol aircraft/Fixed-wing patrol aircraft (F-1)</td>
<td>4 units</td>
<td>4 crafts</td>
<td>10 crafts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New fixed-wing patrol aircraft/Fixed-wing patrol aircraft (F-2)</td>
<td>22 units</td>
<td>18 planes</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New fixed-wing patrol aircraft/Fixed-wing patrol aircraft (F-3)</td>
<td>7 units</td>
<td>0 planes</td>
<td>12 planes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New fixed-wing patrol aircraft/Fixed-wing patrol aircraft (F-4)</td>
<td>8 units</td>
<td>0 planes</td>
<td>10 planes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New fixed-wing patrol aircraft/Fixed-wing patrol aircraft (F-5)</td>
<td>4 units</td>
<td>3 units</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New fixed-wing patrol aircraft/Fixed-wing patrol aircraft (F-6)</td>
<td>1 plane</td>
<td>1 plane</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 19. 2010 Mid-Term Defense Program Major SDF Equipment Increases (From “Defense of Japan,” 2011)

The fragility of Japan’s economy in the next five years will make attaining the budget goals set forth in the 2010 MTDP more difficult. The 2010 MTDP provided 23.49 trillion yen for the next five years of the defense budget. The annual

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136 Ibid.
allotment works out to only a .1% budget increase compared to the 2010 defense budget. This illustrates that Japan’s defense budget for the next five years was already planned to remain constant prior to the disasters. The 2010 MTDP states that it will be reviewed after three years and revised if the security environment or fiscal conditions warrant it.\textsuperscript{137} If the reconstruction efforts impede Japan’s GDP growth and make obtaining the budget goals established in the 2010 MTDP difficult, a revision in 2013 or earlier reflecting these changes is likely. If this is the case, allocation will become a greater issue, as equipment acquisition will need to be prioritized.

The disasters will likely have a direct impact on the defense budget’s allocation in the next five years in two areas. First, the defense budget will be stressed by the procurement of a next generation fighter (F-X) at the rate annotated in the 2010 MTDP.\textsuperscript{138} The MOD ultimately decided on the F-35 Lightning II.\textsuperscript{139} Defense officials hinted that the selection was made as a natural option from the viewpoint of the U.S.-Japan security alliance.\textsuperscript{140} The U.S. military’s show of support following the disasters indicated the United States is a dependable alliance partner and can be counted on for the foreseeable future. The strengthened alliance may have influenced the MOD’s decision to select the F-35 even though it was not necessarily the best option on paper. Because the F/A-18 E/F and Eurozone Typhoon have been in production for 20 and 10 years respectively, the production costs are considered to be much lower than the F-35 that is still in joint development. Furthermore, Japan’s domestic industries will not benefit as

\textsuperscript{137} Defense of Japan 2011, 187.

\textsuperscript{138} Japan has been in search for a F-X for several years. Japan attempted to procure F-22 Raptors from the United States but the deal was halted and future hopes were erased once the United States stopped its own production in 2009. “Jane’s World Air Forces (Japan- Air Force),” IHS Global Limited, http://search.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwaf/jwafa143.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=JASDF&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JWAF& (accessed November 12, 2011), 15, 19.

\textsuperscript{139} After the failed F-22 procurement plan, the choice for a F-X was between the F-35 Lightning II jointly developed by 9 countries and led by U.S. defense contractor Lockheed Martin, the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet solely produced by U.S. firm Boeing, and the joint Eurozone Typhoon fighter manufactured by four European nations. “Gov’t to Choose F-35 Fighter/ Next-Generation ASDF Jet to Have Advanced Stealth Capability,” The Daily Yomiuri, December 14, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T111213005424.htm.

much as if it had chosen the other fighters because information on the cutting edge F-35 may not be as readily shared with Japan due to Japan’s lack of participation in the joint development process. This will primarily limit Japan’s industries to assembly functions in the production process. Another driving force for the F-35’s selection appears to be the need for a fifth generation fighter that will assure Japan maintains parity with fifth generation fighter production ongoing in China and Russia. The F/A-18 E/F and Eurozone Typhoon do not provide the cutting edge technology needed to outpace the competition.

Japan’s commitment to the F-35 will be a significant portion of Japan’s defense budget as it attempts to purchase 40 in the next 20 years. The 2010 MTDP plans for 12 of these aircraft to be purchased in the next five years (see Figure 19). The FY2012 defense budget request has already allocated 55.1 billion yen for four F-35 fighters. This represents 12% of the overall FY2012 defense budget request. Although the F-35 is designated as the ASDF’s F-4EJ Phantom replacement, the F-35 will also likely serve the purpose of replacing the ASDF’s aging F-2 and F-15 fighters as it combines the mission capabilities of these three aircraft. The 12 destroyed and six severely damaged F-2s represent 18 of 74 F-2s currently in ASDF service. The capability gap created by this loss will eventually need to be filled by F-35 production since Japan concluded its 55-year history of domestic fighter production as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries delivered its final F-2 to the ASDF on September 27, 2011. Japan’s aging fighters, diminished F-2 capabilities, end to domestic fighter production, and selection of the costly F-35 as a replacement fighter will make the goals set forth in the 2010 MTDP difficult to obtain. As Japan continues to pursue the F-X fighter

143 Defense Programs and Budget of Japan: Overview of FY2012 Budget Request, 4, 29.
procurement plan laid out in the 2010 MTDP, this will have a zero-sum affect on other areas of the defense budget and will make a remilitarization trajectory less likely.

Second, the increased attention on improving the SDF’s CBRN and disaster relief capabilities has led to larger allocations within the defense budget. In an interview with General Oriki Ryoichi, Chief of Staff of the SDF Joint Staff, he explained that the SDF would increase its nuclear capabilities by reviewing its current nuclear contingency doctrine, increasing equipment capabilities, improve coordination with the United States and prefecture governments, and conduct more exercises. The defense budget’s CBRN allocation in 2011 was 6.8 billion yen and its disaster response capability allocation was 105.1 billion yen. The FY2012 defense budget request allocated 247.2 billion yen for its disaster response capabilities. This is nearly a 240% increase but the FY2012 figures include 119 billion yen for 1 DDH, an expense already planned for in the 2010 MTDP. If the DDH’s cost is subtracted from the disaster response capabilities figure, a more representative figure of the disaster’s impact on disaster response spending is realized. This figure, 128.2 billion yen, indicates a 23.1 billion yen increase from the 2011 budget. The CBRN disaster response allocation increased to 9.8 billion yen, a 3 billion yen increase from 2011. The increases in the disaster response and CBRN disaster response categories can be considered moderate but illustrate that more attention is being placed on the SDF’s HADR capabilities.

Despite the addition of the costly F-35 to the FY2012 defense budget request and the increases in the SDF’s disaster response funding, the shift in defense

146 Defense Programs and Budget of Japan: Overview of FY2011 Budget, 7.
147 The DDH is included in the disaster response capabilities category because it proved itself as a valuable asset with enhanced transport capabilities during the disaster dispatch. As previously mentioned, HADR is not the DDH’s primary mission.
148 The increase in funds that are directly related to disaster response are seen in the following areas: 109 additional GSDF personnel to assist in the Fukushima Dai-ichi response, improvement in disaster response functions, disaster response exercises, and development of a disaster response training and research program. The CBRN disaster response increase goes toward prevention, detection, protection, diagnosis, decontamination, and training functions within CBRN disaster response. Ibid., 9.
budget allocation has not been substantial and continues to focus on a hybrid mixture of capabilities and missions outlined in the 2010 MTDP.


The third trajectory influence to be analyzed is the U.S.-Japan security alliance. If the alliance was not affected by the disasters, one could assume the status quo in relations would persist. If the alliance were strengthened, there would be less economic incentive to remilitarize as Japan could count on a reliable and capable alliance partner to augment its security needs. This would provide Japan an opportunity to retrench and focus on its economic interests. If the alliance was weakened, Japan may rely more heavily on its own efforts to confront its security threats. This section argues that the U.S.-Japan security alliance was strengthened and that due to Japan’s uncertain economic and security situation, the strengthened alliance will continue to temper any emergent need for remilitarization. Although remilitarization becomes less likely, a strengthened alliance does not necessarily mean Japan will retrench. Instead, the improved security ties will reinforce the status quo as the alliance is portrayed as a useful tool to accomplish the security objectives listed in the 2010 NDPG.

The United States provided the largest source of international military assistance to Japan under the name of OPERATION TOMODACHI from March 13 – April 8. The Japanese government, media, and citizens were very receptive and grateful for the United States’ show of support. In a Mainichi Daily News survey conducted shortly after the disasters and before OPERATION TOMODACHI concluded, support for U.S. bases in Yokosuka from local residents rose to 34.7% from 17.1% in 2008. Local residents assisted during OPERATION TOMODACHI expressed their gratitude to U.S. military forces in many instances. In a PEW Research Center survey, a majority of Japanese

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149 At the peak of operations, 16,000 U.S. military service members, 15 ships, and 140 aircraft supported the HADR operation. Defense of Japan 2011, 19.


surveyed, 57%, felt that the United States provided the most disaster assistance compared to the runner-up European Union at 17%. The Daily Yomiuri also praised U.S. assistance and attributed the operation’s success to prior joint exercises and effective coordination, signaling deeper ties between Japan and the United States for the future.

The most telling sign of a deeper alliance came from the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC 2+2) meeting in June 2011 between the heads of the defense and foreign affairs departments. It was the first SCC 2+2 meeting in four years and happened to occur shortly after the bulk of HADR support during OPERATION TOMODACHI. The issued joint statements reaffirm the strengthened alliance but also indicate that Japan does not intend to retrench in terms of its security policy laid out in the 2010 NDPG. The “Cooperation in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake” statement shows that the joint effort pleased both sides and that it directly contributed to a deeper alliance. The “Toward a Deeper and Broader U.S.-Japan Alliance” statement went on to describe the need to address challenges in an uncertain security environment and emphasized cooperation in many areas analogous to those found in the 2010 NDPG. In particular, the ministers agreed to focus on three areas: “strengthening deterrence and contingency response, alliance cooperation in a regional and global setting, and enhancing alliance foundations.”

It is apparent that the elite have taken this opportunity to show strengthened solidarity in the alliance. A December 2011The Daily Yomiuri poll indicates that there is a possible divide between the elite and the public’s interpretation of the strengthened alliance. Although 94% of Japanese are thankful for the U.S. military’s role in the disasters, a plurality of survey respondents, 41%, believe relations between the United

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154 Cooperation in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (Tokyo: Security Consultative Committee, [2011]).

155 Of note, the alliance cooperation in a regional and global setting focus area strongly emphasized the need for increased HADR capabilities at all levels of cooperation. Toward a Deeper and Broader U.S.-Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership (Tokyo: Security Consultative Committee, [2011]).
States and Japan are poor or very poor. Only 35% believe relations are good or very good. These figures are relatively unchanged from a similar 2010 poll and suggest that the U.S. military’s disaster relief assistance does not equate to improved relations between the allies from the public’s view. A major reason cited for this poor public view of the alliance is the impasse over the Futenma Air Station relocation initiative that 82% of Japanese respondents think is having a negative impact on relations.156

4. Regional Foreign Relations Strengthened

Regional powers affect the SDF’s trajectory by the cooperative or competitive nature of their relations with Japan. Competition in the security realm stimulates the need for Japan to address the resulting security threats whereas cooperation mitigates the same needs. The disasters had the potential to improve relations as it presented an opportunity for unprecedented cooperation. If cooperation was the case and relations were strengthened, this might reduce the SDF’s need to remilitarize or at least slow down the pace along this particular trajectory. This section argues that relations with China and South Korea were strengthened after the earthquake but that serious obstacles remain in their relations.

a. People’s Republic of China

Prior to the disasters, relations between Japan and China were tense.157 Combined with historical interpretation disagreements and a growing anti-Japanese sentiment within China, the security environment has become all the more volatile in recent years. Tensions most recently ignited in September 2010 after a Chinese fishing boat rammed a Japanese Coast Guard vessel while operating within the disputed territorial waters off the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands. The subsequent arrest and detainment


157 Japan has been weary of China’s military modernization since the 1990s but has explicitly expressed its concerns since the release of Japan’s 2004 annual Defense White Paper. China’s continued economic and military rise since then has kept it as one of Japan’s primary security threats due to the perceived lack of military transparency, increasing military budget, threatening military posture, expanding naval activity in vicinity of Japan, and unresolved territorial disputes in the East China Sea. Defense of Japan 2011, 73–84.
of the boat’s captain and crew initiated a wave of diplomatic protest, a ban on rare earth metal exports, and other social, economic, and military forms of protest from China.\footnote{East Asian Strategic Review 2011, 126–129.}

Despite the major setback from the Senkaku incident, the 2010 NDPG illustrated Japan’s desire to engage China in a cooperative manner especially in non-traditional security fields, i.e., HADR. It further stated the desired goal with China is to create a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.”\footnote{National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond, 9.} China’s view toward cooperation with Japan since the Senkaku incident is less transparent. In the PRC’s 2010 Defense White Paper released in March 2011, little is mentioned directly pertaining to cooperation with Japan. Instead, cooperation with Japan is limited primarily to a regional perspective under the auspices of the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) Plus Three. Nonetheless, the white paper places exceptional importance on participation in international disaster relief operations.\footnote{China’s National Defense in 2010 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 2011), 21, 36–37.} It would seem that the Great East Japan Earthquake would provide a substantial opportunity for the two countries to cooperate with each other and break out of the recent setback in relations.

The PRC provided a moderate to large amount of relief aid to Japan despite soured relations in 2010. In material aid, the PRC was one of the largest donors with notable contributions comprised of 10,000 tons of gasoline and diesel oil.\footnote{List of Relief Supplies and Donations from Overseas (August 2011) (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [2011]).} The Chinese Red Cross Society provided 2.3 billion yen, which was the fourth largest Red Cross contributor.\footnote{Japan: Earthquake and Tsunami (6 Month Report) (Tokyo: Japanese Red Cross Society, [2011]).} The PRC also sent a team of 15 rescue personnel (see Figure 13).

Because of the PRC’s positive support in the wake of the disasters, the opportunity for cooperation created a series of positive diplomatic exchanges in the months following the disasters. In March 2011, the foreign ministers of Japan, China, and South Korea met to discuss a wide variety of regional issues. The mood was
markedly improved from the months following the Senkaku incident. In May 2011, the fourth Japan-China-South Korea Leaders Meeting was held in Tokyo. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao started the trip by visiting the affected prefectures. Wen later met individually with Kan and agreed to strengthen bi-lateral cooperation in a number of fields. The trilateral summit was seen as especially productive as the three leaders agreed to deepen regional cooperation, investigate a trilateral free trade agreement, and form a secretariat to facilitate trilateral cooperation. Japanese foreign minister Matsumoto Takeaki met with PRC Vice President Xi Jinping in July 2011 and once again affirmed their intentions to strengthen bi-lateral ties.

In every diplomatic exchange, the Great East Japan Earthquake served as a primary discussion topic and created a positive atmosphere for cooperation. The exchanges also continued to focus on other unresolved issues such as territorial disputes in the East China Sea. The disasters improved the weakened relations since the Senkaku incident but many obstacles impeding further substantive cooperation remain.

b. Republic of Korea

Japan does not consider South Korea a serious security threat as evidenced by the lack of attention it received in the 2011 Defense White Paper compared to China, North Korea, and Russia. According to the 2010 NDPG, Japan is targeting Australia and South Korea specifically for strengthened cooperation as it shares many of the same security interests. South Korea is also optimistic, although more cautiously, over improved relations with Japan. In its 2010 Defense White Paper, South Korea noted

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164 The annual meeting held since 2008 has evolved into an important forum enabling the three leaders to map out various areas of cooperation.


168 National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond, 8–9.
increased defense cooperation with Japan in recent years but stated differences in historical perspectives and territorial disputes over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands remain serious obstacles to further cooperation. Both sides favor cooperation over competition. If the disaster relief cooperation were able to facilitate improved relations then this would enable a concerted effort on one of their primary security threats: North Korea. Cooperation on this issue would likely have an effect on the nature of the SDF’s trajectory, as the manner with which it approaches the North Korea threat would change.

The disasters sparked a burst of goodwill and aid from South Korea. In addition to one of the largest donations of material aid, South Korea sent 107 rescue personnel and two rescue dogs transported via an Air Force C-130 (see Figure 13). The total amount of Korean Red Cross donations at 2.8 billion yen was the largest amount ever given in disaster relief aid and was the second largest overall donor behind the United States. Rumblings of a Japanese middle school textbook’s scheduled release in late March 2011 laying claim to the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima Islands began to emerge. This along with the release of Japan’s Diplomatic White Paper making similar claims created a noticeable drop in donations reported by the Korean Red Cross and the state-backed charity agency Community Chest of Korea.

Despite the rift caused by the renewed territorial tensions, the fourth Japan-China-South Korea Leaders Meeting held in May 2011 was positive from South Korea’s perspective. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visited the affected prefectures to show his support for Japan’s recovery and went as far as tasting local produce in Fukushima Prefecture affected by the nuclear disaster. Discussions regarding

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170 Japan: Earthquake and Tsunami (6 Month Report), 16.


nuclear safety and disaster management were high on the agenda and led to both sides agreeing on enhanced cooperation in numerous areas including joint anti-disaster drills.173

Relations were strengthened in the wake of the disasters as evidenced by the unprecedented outpouring of support from the Korean people and government. The drop in disaster relief support created by the territorial dispute issue illustrates that serious roadblocks remain to improving ties between the two states.

C. ECONOMIC INTERESTS

1. Economic Conditions

As the world’s most costly natural disaster in recorded history, the Great East Japan Earthquake has the real potential to impact several of Japan’s economic conditions: growth, health, and focus. Changes in these three aspects of Japan’s economy will likely influence or inhibit the SDF’s path along a specific trajectory. Decreased GDP growth would directly affect the funds available for the defense budget and cause the SDF to retrench in terms of its stated objectives in the 2010 MTDP. If Japan is able to capitalize on its reconstruction efforts and revive its economy after years of stagnation then remilitarization may become a viable option as the defense budget increases and creates new opportunities to expand SDF operations and equipment. Japan may be able to overcome losses in the short-term and increase GDP growth but do so at the expense of the economy’s health in the medium to long term. If this were the case, successful reconstruction efforts may simply delay the inevitable impact of other issues affecting Japan’s economic health. For this reason, the growth section focuses on the short-term prospects for recovery, and the health section focuses on the medium to long-term impacts on Japan’s economy. As Japan strives to resolve these issues, the focus of its reconstruction efforts may influence the government’s overall attention on or willingness to engage international issues. In this light, a reconstruction effort focused strictly on

Japan’s domestic situation may affect the government’s appetite for utilizing the SDF in international security activities. A reconstruction effort with an international focus would keep Japan’s economic interests externally focused, which would provide justification for increased participation in international security activities, i.e., remilitarization.

a. Growth Maintained

How has the Great East Japan Earthquake impacted Japan’s prospects for GDP growth in the short term? Short term in this case is defined as one year after the disasters. Despite the seemingly overwhelming damage done to Japan’s economy, it has not been completely debilitating. The estimated economic damage, 16.9 trillion yen, is only about 4% of Japan’s total stock approximated at 500 trillion yen (see Table 2). Furthermore, the affected areas did not contain a high concentration of industrial production as it accounts for only 2.5% of Japan’s economic output.174

Japan’s economy has already shown signs of improvement. Many of Japan’s large companies affected by the disaster quickly recovered.175 The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry’s (METI) second industry survey in the affected region portrays a generally positive message for Japan’s economic recovery as of July 1, 2011.176

The Japanese government’s initial estimates after the disasters predicted that GDP would continue to increase in the following year. The impacts from the disasters were less dramatic than the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers during the 2008

175 Large corporations with factories and parts suppliers damaged by the disaster such as Nissan, Toyota, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Hitachi, and Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries (IHI) recovered to pre-earthquake production levels within several months of the disaster by substitute production and finding alternate domestic or international suppliers. Economic Impact of the Great East Japan Earthquake and Current Status of Recovery (August 2011) (Tokyo: Government of Japan, 2011), 11–14.
176 Of 91 production bases surveyed in the manufacturing industry directly affected by the disaster, 93% were restored and 80% were at or exceeded pre-earthquake production levels. Of 52 manufacturing companies surveyed, 30% saw a decline in overseas trade because of the disaster of which 41% was attributed to overreaction from the nuclear power plant accident. Of 13 retail and service industry companies surveyed, 85% stated a decline in sales was due to domestic consumers self-restraint following the disasters. Results of an Emergency Survey on the Actual Status of Industries After the Great East Japan Earthquake (2), Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, 2011), 2, 7, 12.
financial crisis (see Figure 20).\textsuperscript{177} It was not until late 2011 that these positive growth predictions were revised to figures showing a contraction of .2–.7% in FY2011. The reason for the GDP growth reversal was attributed to a strong yen and a weaker European Union economy impacting its exports, not strictly the Great East Japan Earthquake.\textsuperscript{178} The brief survey of GDP growth illustrates that the disasters have had little impact in the short-term and will not dramatically impact the SDF’s trajectory in terms of adverse affects to the defense budget.

\begin{center}
\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure20.png}
\caption{Economic Impact Comparison Between Great East Japan Earthquake and “Lehman Shock” (From “Road to Recovery,” 2011)}
\end{figure}
\end{center}

\textit{b. Health Weakened}

Although Japan’s economy avoided any severe negative impacts in the short term, it does not mean that the crisis is over. Japan still needs to reconstruct the devastated region. This task will be at the forefront of Japan’s economic interests for the medium term. Medium term is defined as the next 10 years.

\textsuperscript{177} Economic Impact of the Great East Japan Earthquake and Current Status of Recovery (August 2011), 9, 21.


73
The responsibility for implementing and overseeing reconstruction policies was assigned to the Reconstruction Headquarters established on June 24, 2011. This organization headed by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet announced its Basic Policy for Reconstruction on July 29. This policy provided a blueprint for government action during the reconstruction process. It established a reconstruction period of 10 years with the first five being a concentrated reconstruction period. The estimated budget scale for reconstruction efforts over the next 10 years is 23 trillion yen, of which 19 trillion yen is expected to be used in the first five years.\footnote{Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (Tokyo: Reconstruction Headquarters, 2011), 3.} To finance such a large reconstruction budget, the government initiated a series of supplementary budgets. As of late 2011, three supplementary budgets were approved. The first totaled 4 trillion yen and was financed in a zero-sum manner by reducing and reallocating predetermined expenditures in the FY2011 budget.\footnote{Outline of the Supplementary Budget for FY2011 (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Finance, [2011]).} This represents a rather minor impact on the government’s original FY2011 budget set at 92.4 trillion yen.\footnote{Highlights of the Budget for FY2012 (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Finance, 2011), 4.} The second came to 2 trillion yen and was also financed using zero-sum tactics, specifically leftover surplus from the FY2010 budget.\footnote{The Outline of the 2nd Supplementary Budget of FY2011 (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Finance, [2011]).} The third provided 11.7 trillion yen for reconstruction efforts related to the Great East Japan Earthquake and was the first supplementary budget to be funded by the issuance of reconstruction bonds.\footnote{The Outline of the 3rd Supplementary Budget of FY2011 (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Finance, [2011]).} The FY2012 draft budget set aside an additional 3.8 trillion yen for reconstruction efforts, which makes the total amount of reconstruction funds provided thus far at approximately 18 trillion yen.\footnote{“Cabinet Agrees to Record 93.56 Trillion Yen FY2012 Budget,” The Mainichi Daily News, December 24, 2011, http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20111224p2g00m0dm010000c.html.}

This figure is significant for two reasons. First, it signals that the majority of the expected 19 trillion yen reconstruction costs in the first five years has already been allocated. This leaves only an additional 4 trillion yen in the next 9 years to complete the
total estimated reconstruction costs of 23 trillion yen. This means the majority of the reconstruction’s fiscal burden is over and that its impacts should only be felt in the medium term.

Second, the total amount of reconstruction funds shows that this is not Japan’s most challenging economic hurdle. Japan’s aging demographics remains the biggest challenge. In the FY2011 budget alone, 28.7 trillion yen was allocated to social security. This figure is 25% larger than all of the expected reconstruction funds over the next 10 years. As the proportion of Japan’s population over 65 increases and the birth rate declines every year, social security expenditures increase while tax revenues decrease due to a smaller tax base. This trend has been in place since 1990 causing an ever-widening gap in total government expenditures and tax revenues. The result is an increased reliance on government bond issuances to cover the gap, which drives Japan deeper into debt every year. For the last four years, bonds have financed the annual budget more than tax revenues (see Figure 21).185

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Figure 21. Trends in Government Expenditures, Tax Revenues, and Government Bonds (From “Highlights of the Budget for FY2012,” 2012)

185 Highlights of the Budget for FY2012, 11.
The reconstruction bonds added to the FY2011 and FY2012 budgets will simply add to the stress already felt by Japan’s budget and contribute to an expansion in long-term debt. These added constraints are apparent in the FY2012 draft budget. The reconstruction funds pushed the total budget to a record 93.6 trillion yen. The budget relies on a record 49% of new debt, driving Japan’s total long-term debt to 937 trillion yen. This represents 195% of Japan’s GDP, which is the highest ratio among developed nations.

The Great East Japan Earthquake has contributed to the weakening of Japan’s economic health in the medium term as a majority of the reconstruction funds have already been allocated. Any impacts on the defense budget in the next several years can be more closely attributed to the Great East Japan Earthquake. Long-term impacts should not be attributed to the disasters entirely since more significant factors such as Japan’s aging demographics have a much larger effect.

c. Hybrid Reconstruction Focus (Domestic and International)

This section argues that Japan is embarking on a hybrid reconstruction effort that provides a balanced focus of Japan’s economic interests from a domestic and international perspective. The reconstruction focus may influence Japan’s desire to engage in international security activities.

The first indication of Japan’s path to reconstruction came from the Reconstruction Design Council established by the Cabinet Office on April 11.\textsuperscript{186} The council released its guiding philosophy on May 11, which included seven principles recommended to guide the overall reconstruction efforts (see Figure 22). Principles 2–4 place great emphasis on the affected regions. It states that the recovery’s foundation is to be community-focused and that the affected region’s socioeconomic potential will be used to lead Japan in the future. Principle 5 recognizes that the affected region’s economy cannot be revived without the entire nation’s economic restoration. It further

\textsuperscript{186} This council was made of various intellectuals and reconstruction experts from the government, business, and academic communities. Their task was to develop reconstruction recommendation guidelines that would not just restore Japan’s economy but use the disaster to propel Japan into a new era of economic and social renaissance. \textit{On the Formation of the Reconstruction Design Council in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake} (Tokyo: Government of Japan, [2011]).
implies that the reconstruction efforts will not focus solely on the affected regions but will do so simultaneously with the entire economy.\textsuperscript{187}

\begin{table}[h]
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\begin{tabular}{|p{2.5in}|p{8in}|}
\hline
\textbf{Seven Principles for the Reconstruction Framework} & \\
\hline
\textbf{Principle One:} & For us, the surviving, there is no other starting point for the path to recovery than to remember and honor the many lives that have been lost. Accordingly, we shall record the disaster for eternity, including through the creation of memorial forests and monuments, and we shall have the disaster scientifically analyzed by a broad range of scholars to draw lessons that will be shared with the world and passed down to posterity. \\
\hline
\textbf{Principle Two:} & Given the vastness and diversity of the disaster region, we shall make community-focused reconstruction the foundation of efforts towards recovery. The national government shall support that reconstruction through general guidelines and institutional design. \\
\hline
\textbf{Principle Three:} & In order to revive disaster-affected Tohoku, we shall pursue forms of recovery and reconstruction that tap into the region's latent strengths and lead to technological innovation. We shall strive to develop this region's socioeconomic potential to lead Japan in the future. \\
\hline
\textbf{Principle Four:} & While preserving the strong bonds of local residents, we shall construct disaster resilient safe and secure communities and natural energy-powered region. \\
\hline
\textbf{Principle Five:} & Japan's economy cannot be restored unless the disaster areas are rebuilt. The disaster areas cannot be truly rebuilt unless Japan's economy is restored. Recognizing these facts, we shall simultaneously pursue reconstruction of the afflicted areas and revitalization of the nation. \\
\hline
\textbf{Principle Six:} & We shall seek an early resolution of the nuclear accidents, and shall devote closer attention to support and recovery efforts for the areas affected by the accidents. \\
\hline
\textbf{Principle Seven:} & All of us living now shall view the disaster as affecting our own lives, and shall pursue reconstruction with a spirit of solidarity and mutual understanding that permeates the entire nation. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Seven Principles for the Reconstruction Framework (From “Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake,” 2011)
\textsuperscript{187} Towards Reconstruction: Hope Beyond the Disaster (Tokyo: Reconstruction Design Council, 2011), 2.}
\end{table}
The council’s final report submitted to the Prime Minister on June 25 reflected the guiding philosophy in more detail. It called for municipalities to be the main actors in the reconstruction process, as they understand each affected communities’ needs. The report also acknowledges the importance of incorporating the international community in its reconstruction efforts by stating the reconstruction is open to the world. It further states that Japan must not be inward-looking as it recovers because of the Japanese economies close linkage with the international community.

The Reconstruction Headquarters based its Basic Policy for Reconstruction partly on the Reconstruction Design Council’s final report. The policy also presents a hybrid approach to Japan’s reconstruction efforts and represents the first substantive reconstruction guideline released by the government. The policy’s basic concept reinforces the Reconstruction Design Council’s recommendation to utilize municipalities as a leading role in the reconstruction and to keep the reconstruction open to the world. Regarding specific measures directly related to the SDF, the policy stated that the equipment capabilities of all disaster relief organizations including the SDF should be improved. SDF information sharing and interoperability with other emergency organizations and local governments should increase. It also expressed the desire for the SDF to participate in more disaster relief exercises with the central and local governments.

Based on the Reconstruction Design Council and Reconstruction Headquarters’ policy recommendations and guidelines, it appears there is a general consensus among the business and academic communities and the government that the recovery should have a hybrid focus. The devastated regions must be revitalized but this cannot be accomplished without engaging the international community in order to restore Japan’s economy as a whole. Japan’s participation in Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) talks surrounding the November 2011 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, illustrates that Japan is following this hybrid focus reconstruction approach.

188 Ibid., 18.
189 Ibid., 42–44.
190 Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 1–3.
The TPP is a multi-lateral free trade agreement (FTA) among several Asia-Pacific countries including the United States that seeks to eliminate all tariffs within 10 years. TPP participation is significant because it illustrates the Japanese government’s break from protectionist policies toward its business and agricultural sectors. Japan’s agricultural sector is highly protected because it cannot compete with cheaper imports due to small inefficient farm sizes in Japan. For instance, a 778 percent tariff is placed on imported rice. Participating in the TPP means that Japan would have to compete with cheaper foreign markets. This would require restructuring Japan’s agricultural sector to make it more efficient, and therefore more competitive. Japan’s participation in TPP talks has met strong resistance by farming communities in the affected regions that would be directly impacted and the politicians that protect the farmers’ interests and conversely depend on their political support. Despite the obvious impact the TPP will have on the affected region, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko continues to press forward on the initiative. This demonstrates that the government is not placing disproportionate deference on the affected regions compared to its engagements with the international community. Although the TPP may hurt local farmers, the move to join the TPP is seen as a means to improve the overall health of Japan’s economy in the long term.  

Japan’s hybrid focus of its economic interests in both domestic and international terms suggests Japan’s focus will not be drastically pulled away from international issues, which will not seriously impact the SDF’s role in international security activities.

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191 Ibid., 33–35.
194 Japan only conducts 18% of its trade with countries it has a FTA compared to 36% for South Korea. Jeffrey W. Hornung, “Japan Needs the TPP,” PacNet Number 63 (November 9, 2011).
2. **International Influence: Official Development Assistance (ODA) Decreased**

One of the main tools used by the Japanese government for international influence purposes is its ODA budget. Japan’s ODA budget has been used for many years as a foreign policy tool to promote peace and prosperity in the developing world. This in turn enables Japan to maintain peace and stability at home. ODA is also seen as a means to improve Japan’s international status, expand its export markets, and garner sympathy from the international community for Japan’s interests.\(^{195}\)

Japan maintained the largest ODA budget throughout the 1990s and utilized this tool disproportionately to the employment of SDF for international influence purposes. This method of international influence came under fire for Japan’s contribution to the 1990–1991 Gulf War. Instead of readily sending a contingent of troops to support the UN coalition, Japan opted to provide fiscal support totaling 13 billion dollars. Although Japan gave the largest financial support to the coalition, the international community scoffed at its contribution and labeled it checkbook diplomacy. After the Cold War, Japan could no longer sit on the sidelines and was expected to participate in international security activities, especially in a region that Japan relied on so heavily for its energy resources. Japan’s Gulf War contribution criticism opened the door for the UN PKO Cooperation Bill in 1992. The legislation ended the SDF’s overseas deployment restriction and paved the way for regular UN PKO participation that endures today.\(^{196}\)

Since the 1990s, the ODA environment has changed both domestically and internationally. The result is that Japan is relying less on ODA as a tool for international influence. Domestically, it is harder for the government to convince the public that ODA is a wise use of taxpayer dollars, especially given Japan’s stagnating economy since the mid-1990s. Younger generations also do not remember the aid that Japan received after World War II and therefore cannot see Japan’s large ODA budget as a means of

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repayment for past support received. Internationally, globalization is causing Japan’s ODA budget to spread more thinly as new regions require aid. Developing countries are also playing a larger role in the international environment and lowering developed countries’ share of ODA throughout the world. These factors have contributed to a steady decline in Japan’s ODA budget over the last decade (see Figure 23). Since the 1990s, Japan has fallen from the largest ODA provider to the world’s fifth largest (see Figure 24).

Figure 23. Trends in Japan’s ODA Budget and Other Major Expenditures (From “Japan’s Official Development Assistance White Paper,” 2010)

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The Great East Japan Earthquake contributed to Japan’s decreased reliance on ODA as a means of international influence. The supplementary budgets funded in a zero-sum manner took 50.1 billion yen from the ODA budget, nearly 10% of its FY2011 budget.\(^\text{198}\) The FY2012 draft budget continued the trend of decreasing Japan’s ODA as it dropped by another 2%.\(^\text{199}\) This is significant because it signals ODA is the target of government expenditure cuts in the wake of the disasters as opposed to the defense budget which actually increased in the FY2012 draft budget. The longer trend since 1997 also shows that defense budget levels have remained relatively constant compared to the ODA budget that has steadily declined (see Figure 23). The disasters’ impact on the ODA budget is another example of how the government is favoring the defense budget over ODA. This will likely change the nature of how Japan seeks to gain international


\(^{199}\) Highlights of the Budget for FY2012, 5.
influence. A decreased ODA budget may prompt Japan to increase its international security activities as another means to influence the international community. Indeed, the SDF has already increased its participation in UN PKO, HADR, and other forms of international security activities such as anti-piracy operations in the last 20 years.

A decreased ODA budget may therefore lead to a remilitarization trajectory, as the SDF becomes the preferred tool to gain international influence. This may be an easier sell to the Japanese public because these operations provide Japan a significant amount of diplomatic and political capital as a responsible participant in the international community at a relatively low financial and personnel cost. Under the SDF’s improving the global security environment role, the 2011 defense budget allocated a mere 5.6 billion yen to cover the operational and maintenance costs for its international security activities.\[^{200}\] This represents only .12% of Japan’s entire 2011 defense budget. This low operational cost is due partly to Japan’s small military contribution, ranking 49th of 114 contributing countries.\[^{201}\] Japan is the second largest financial contributor to UN PKO missions covering nearly 12.53% of an estimated $7.06 billion budget for 2011–2012. This figure, $884 million, is 12 times larger than the operational costs for SDF international security activities in 2011.\[^{202}\] It would seem logical to start cuts from this larger budget as opposed to the defense budget.

3. Energy Dependency Continues

The nuclear power plant accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi highlighted the dangers of nuclear power, as it became the second worst nuclear plant disaster in history. In the accident’s aftermath, it seemed logical that the government might decrease its dependence on nuclear power in the long term and substitute oil or liquefied natural gas (LNG) for its energy needs. Increased usage of these energy sources would make Japan even more dependent on foreign sources for its energy requirements. A more energy


dependent Japan would require added attention on international affairs that might affect Japan’s energy security. A degraded energy security environment would in turn provide more incentive for a remilitarization trajectory, as Japan would need to protect its energy sources if a crisis arose. Conversely, if Japan increased its usage of renewable energy sources and became less dependent for its energy needs then it would remove the incentive for a remilitarization trajectory. This section argues that Japan’s energy policy will not make dramatic changes in Japan’s energy dependency but may in the long term, greater than 20 years, facilitate a more rapid shift toward the use of renewable energy. This will decrease Japan’s energy dependency but it will still remain relatively dependent compared to other developed nations.

Japan is the world’s fourth largest oil importer and the third largest natural gas importer, and consumes the fourth largest amount of electricity in the world.\(^{203}\) Therefore, Japan relies heavily on nuclear power plants to generate a source of domestically produced energy. Nuclear power provides Japan with the second largest power generating capacity source at 20% behind liquefied natural gas at 26%.\(^{204}\) For as much emphasis as it places on nuclear power, Japan is only about 18% energy self-sufficient.\(^{205}\) If Japan reneged on its commitment to nuclear power and relied more on fossil fuels, its self-sufficiency would slide even further making its energy security situation direr.

The other option is more reliance on renewable forms of energy. This is the approach that the government intends to take. The Reconstruction Headquarters’ Basic Policy for Reconstruction advocates the promotion of renewable energy and energy conservation measures.\(^{206}\) The prospect for renewable energy to supplant nuclear power in the short and medium term is not likely, however. Nuclear power is the cheapest form


\(^{205}\) This low level is due in part to Japan’s promotion of nuclear power in the 1980s after its severe energy dependency on Middle East sources was exposed in the 1970s. Japan’s Energy White Paper 2010: Outline (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, [2010]), 4.

\(^{206}\) Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 30.
of energy in Japan at 5–6 yen per kilowatt. Other forms of renewable energy are 2 to 9 times more expensive than nuclear power. In Japan’s restrained fiscal environment, a rapid shift to renewable energy does not seem likely. The FY2012 draft budget illustrates the energy dilemma facing the government. Despite a lack of support for nuclear power, the budget made only slight decreases totaling about 13 billion yen in nuclear power funding.

The alternatives to safer forms of energy than nuclear power present an energy dilemma for Japan that is not likely to result in a dramatic shift in Japan’s energy dependency in the short and medium terms. It will take long-term commitment to the government’s renewable energy initiatives spelled out in its reconstruction policy before any significant shift is seen. Japan’s continued lack of energy self-sufficiency will provide incentive for Japan’s remilitarization as the rise of developing nations stresses the energy market.

D. NORMS

1. Security Norms

The SDF trajectory debate boiled down to its most simple element is a question of whether or not the SDF will use military force to secure its interests overseas, i.e., remilitarization. Paul Midford argues that Japanese public opinion is an important intervening variable because it can influence this trajectory as evidenced by the thwarted attempts under Koizumi to become more active in the Iraq War. This represents the power that Japan’s pacifist norms have over the elite. Andrew Oros defines the three central tenets of Japan’s domestic anti-militarism as follows: “no traditional armed forces involved in domestic policymaking, no use of force by Japan to resolve international

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208 *Highlights of the Budget for FY2012*, 8.
209 Rajaram Panda, *Japan’s Energy Dilemma* (New Delhi, India: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, [2011]).
disputes except in self defense, and no Japanese participation in foreign wars.”

Considering the nature of anti-militarist norms outlined by Oros and their power illustrated by Midford, it can be assumed that in order to see any deviation in the SDF’s trajectory a change in Japan’s anti-militarist norms must occur. Oros identified three scenarios in which it is plausible to imagine a change in Japan’s security practice given the limitations posed by domestic anti-militarism. The Great East Japan Earthquake is an event that could spark change in line with the final two scenarios. The first of these represents a sudden shift: “new security identity practices resulting from an unexpected shock that discredits the security identity of domestic anti-militarism.” The second scenario signifies a gradual change: “new security practices resulting from a growing irrelevance and subsequent abandonment of the security identity of domestic anti-militarism.”

The following sections will analyze several security norms embodied in the central tenets of domestic anti-militarism identified by Oros. These include public trust of the SDF, utility of force, and utility of non-military force such as HADR.

a. Public Trust of SDF

Anti-militarist distrust of the SDF is best understood in the context of Japan’s utter defeat in World War II. In a matter of a few generations, Japan went from relative isolation and technological inferiority before the Meiji Restoration in the 1860’s to becoming the first non-western power to defeat a western power during the Russo-Japanese War from 1904–1905. Japan’s economic and military power rose tremendously in the following decades until it obtained relative parity in international status with other major western powers. The erosion of civilian control over the military in the years leading up to World War II facilitated the rise of ultra-nationalism with the military dominating the domestic political arena. In 1941, the military thrust the country into war with a larger and more resource rich nation, the United States. The U.S. military victory

212 Ibid., 187.
213 Ibid., 187.
over Japan ended with dozens of fire-bombed cities, two nuclear-bombed cities, nearly three million dead, and a loss of 25% of Japan’s national wealth.\textsuperscript{214} The result of the military’s failed foreign and security policy in the wake of World War II left an intense distrust toward the government’s ability to maintain civilian control over the military. It also led to distrust of the state’s ability to responsibly employ the military without obtaining disastrous consequences.\textsuperscript{215}

The Great East Japan Earthquake provided an opportunity to demonstrate the state’s ability to effectively utilize the SDF. If public trust were increased as a result of the SDF’s disaster dispatch, it would help break down a major normative barrier to remilitarization. If public trust were maintained the status quo would persist. If public trust were decreased then retrenchment would become more likely. Because of the historical distrust toward the SDF, the public’s reaction after the SDF’s unprecedented mobilization was uncertain. The disaster’s recent occurrence has also added to the ambiguity in determining the public’s response.\textsuperscript{216} Analysis during the disaster dispatch suggested the media and public were reacting very positively to the SDF and were treating them with unprecedented respect.\textsuperscript{217, 218} This section analyzes the public’s reaction to the SDF’s disaster dispatch as seen through the eyes of the media. It finds that the public’s trust of the SDF has noticeably increased because of its disaster dispatch.

1) Positive Media Portrayal. Japan’s major newspapers provide the best representation of how the media portrayed the SDF during its disaster dispatch for two reasons. First, Japanese receive a majority of their news from newspapers. The ranking of major newspapers according to daily circulation is as follows: \textit{Yomiuri Shimbun} (10 million), \textit{Asahi Shimbun} (7.9 million), \textit{Mainichi Shimbun} (3 million), and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{214} John W. Dower, “The Useful War,” \textit{Daedalus}, 119, no. 3 (Summer, 1990), 49.
  \item \textsuperscript{215} Midford, \textit{Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism?}, 51.
  \item \textsuperscript{216} David Fouse, “Japan Unlikely to Redirect Defense Policy,” \textit{PacNet Number 26} (May 5, 2011).
  \item \textsuperscript{217} Kazuyo Kato, \textit{The Response to Japan’s March 11 Disaster: When the Going Gets Tough}, Center for Strategic and International Studies, [2011]).
  \item \textsuperscript{218} Alex Martin, “Military Flexes Relief Might, Gains Newfound Esteem,” \textit{Japan Times}, April 15, 2011, \url{http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110415f1.html}.
\end{itemize}
Second, Japanese found the information in newspapers more reliable than any other form of media after the disasters. Newspapers were also the most credible source of media beating out the second most credible source, television, by three times the amount.

Thomas Berger wrote in 1998 that the Asahi Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun were on the left regarding security issues as they generally opposed the SDF’s overseas dispatch. The Yomiuri Shimbun and Sankei Shimbun were on the right as evidenced by their support of a more active SDF in the international community. In the last approximately 10 years, major newspapers traditionally reluctant to report on the SDF began increasing the frequency of reports on the SDF as their profile increased due to international events such as North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and China’s military modernization. In the aftermath of the disasters, the major newspapers generally reflected these two characteristics.

The SDF benefited from widespread coverage of their participation in the disaster relief efforts among all the major newspapers. This was due to the media’s decreased aversion to reporting on the SDF in recent years and because it was hard for newspapers to avoid the SDF’s actions, as they were involved across the full spectrum of HADR missions. The media did, however, focus disproportionately on the nuclear disasters compared to the devastation and loss of life suffered from the tsunami elsewhere. This detracted some attention away from the SDF’s large-scale disaster dispatch force totaling around 107,000 personnel as opposed to the 500 CRF personnel.

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assigned to the nuclear disaster dispatch. Despite the lopsided reporting, the SDF remained a key fixture of reports as they significantly contributed to the nuclear disaster response.\footnote{223} \footnote{224} \footnote{225} \footnote{226} \footnote{227}

Coverage amongst the major newspapers generally fell in line with the security viewpoints identified by Berger. None of the major newspapers placed blame on the SDF for any problems encountered during the disaster dispatch, even when it came to the nuclear power station disaster. The \textit{Sankei Shimbun}, being the most conservative newspaper and supportive of the SDF, clearly supported the SDF’s efforts as seen in its lengthy interview with the SDF’s joint task force commander.\footnote{228} \textit{The Daily Yomiuri} also painted a very positive picture of the SDF. Amidst the nuclear power station disaster, aThe Daily Yomiuri editorial described the SDF and other organization’s efforts to cool the reactors as herculean showing their respect for such a dangerous and crucial responsibility.\footnote{229} Many other The Daily Yomiuri articles praised the SDF’s

\footnote{223} “Japan Had to Show U.S. It Took Nuclear Accident Seriously,” \textit{The Asahi Shimbun}, May 21, 2011.


\footnote{225} “Cooling Operations Continue; SDF Sprays Water on No. 3 Reactor, Hyper Rescue Squad Sent,” \textit{The Daily Yomiuri}, March 19, 2011, \url{http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110318005332.htm}.


\footnote{227} “SDF to Decontaminate No-Entry Zone,” \textit{The Asahi Shimbun}, November 17, 2011, \url{http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201111170008}.


disaster dispatch.\textsuperscript{230} \textsuperscript{231} \textsuperscript{232} \textsuperscript{233} Even when \textit{The Daily Yomiuri} addressed the SDF’s trial and error approach in handling the nuclear power station disaster, it did so from the perspective of implementing lessons learned from the SDF’s shortfalls in dealing with the nuclear disaster. The newspaper continued to applaud the SDF for achieving remarkable results despite the difficulties faced during the nuclear crisis.\textsuperscript{234} The \textit{Yomiuri Shimbun} and \textit{Sankei Shimbun} command over half of Japan’s newspaper reading audience, which means that most Japanese saw an overwhelmingly positive image of the SDF during the disaster relief efforts.

The more traditionally liberal newspapers, \textit{Asahi Shimbun} and \textit{Mainichi Shimbun}, were not as outspoken in their support of the SDF. These newspapers, however, did not take a critical view toward the SDF and generally portrayed the SDF positively to a lesser degree than their conservative counterparts. For instance, a couple of days after the disasters, an \textit{Asahi Shimbun} editorial called for a swift response by disaster relief organizations. Emphasis was placed on disaster relief organizations other than the SDF but cooperation with the SDF was mentioned as a necessary component to the response and it supported the SDF’s large-scale

\textsuperscript{230} \textit{The Daily Yomiuri} lauded SDF members from the devastated GSDF Camp Tagajyou. The newspaper praised their rapid response to the disasters even when their families were in the affected region. It further detailed the SDF members’ determination in helping the local residents and revealed the deep respect with which they handled the recovered victims. Kohei Tsujisaka, Akio Oikawa and Yasuo Matsubara, “SDF Rescuers Work in Their “Hometown,”” \textit{The Daily Yomiuri}, March 29, 2011.

\textsuperscript{231} Another \textit{Daily Yomiuri} editorial called for increased SDF ties with local government officials during disaster relief operations and described the SDF as capable of performing painstaking missions because it was a well trained, and well-equipped organization. “Editorial: SDF Should Enhance Disaster Relief Role,” \textit{The Daily Yomiuri}, March 23, 2011, \texttt{http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/T110322003707.htm}.

\textsuperscript{232} As the SDF’s large-scale disaster dispatch continued into April 2011, \textit{The Daily Yomiuri} once again showed its deference to the SDF for conducting such a difficult mission as it outlined the psychological impact the disaster relief operations were having on SDF members. Shingo Hashitani and Yuichi Sato, “Sharing Disaster-Area Workers’ Emotional, Mental Load,” \textit{The Daily Yomiuri}, April 25, 2011, \texttt{http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110424001718.htm}.

\textsuperscript{233} Another \textit{Daily Yomiuri} editorial proclaimed the SDF’s disaster relief operations as remarkable and called for Japan to fulfill its global responsibility by supporting the SDF’s participation in UN PKO. “Editorial: Japan Should Fulfill Global Responsibility,” \textit{The Daily Yomiuri}, April 23, 2011, \texttt{http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/T110422003480.htm}.

mobilization. The Mainichi Shimbun conducted an interview with the nuclear disaster dispatch’s commander, General Toshinobu Miyajima, in December 2011. The focus of the interview was the SDF’s desperate situation surrounding the nuclear disaster. It highlighted the SDF’s unpreparedness in handling the nuclear disaster but did so without being critical of the SDF itself. These examples are representative of the stance taken by Japan’s major liberal newspapers toward the SDF. When combined with the unmistakably positive image portrayed by the conservative newspapers, the SDF enjoyed a large majority of positive media coverage with almost no critical viewpoints.

2) Public Trust of SDF Increased. Given the widespread notion of the public’s distrust of the SDF in terms of the government’s ability to effectively and appropriately utilize the SDF, the positive media portrayal could very well alter the public’s trust in the SDF to carry out its duties. If public trust of the SDF is increased, a remilitarization trajectory could be supported as the public becomes more comfortable in the SDF’s ability to responsibly execute its missions overseas. This may lead to an expanded role overseas and the relaxation of restrictions on the use of force. If public trust is decreased, the public may have less appetite for the SDF’s participation in international security affairs. This section provides evidence illustrating public trust in the SDF has increased considerably after its disaster dispatch.

One measure of public trust in the SDF and possibly the most fundamental is the acceptance of the SDF’s role in the disaster relief operations. Newspaper interviews with disaster victims were filled with praise for the SDF and often children stated they would like to become a SDF member when they grow up.


Improved civil-military relations are another indicator of increased public trust of the SDF. After the SDF’s large-scale disaster dispatch ended on August 31, 2011, the Fukushima governor requested members of the CRF to stay and assist with the ongoing response to the nuclear disaster. In November 2011, the SDF’s footprint in the no-entry zone increased by 300 GSDF personnel as the governor requested the SDF to spearhead the decontamination efforts in several Fukushima municipalities.\(^{239}\)\(^{240}\)\(^{241}\) The large-scale deployment of SDF personnel after Typhoon number 12 shows improved civil-military relations as well. Prefectural governors in Wakayama, Mie, and Nara requested a higher than average number of SDF personnel, primarily from the GSDF Middle Army, to assist in the disaster relief efforts. Although the typhoon did usher in record-breaking rainfall, the natural disaster was of considerable smaller scale, less than 100 casualties, than the Great East Japan Earthquake yet it received a dispatch of 28,790 SDF personnel.\(^{242}\) The SDF’s central and more active role in domestic disaster relief indicates improved civil-military relations and increased public trust of the SDF.

The most compelling evidence of increased public trust of the SDF after the Great East Japan Earthquake comes from polling data released since the earthquake. In a *Mainichi Daily News* survey conducted shortly after the disasters and while the SDF’s disaster dispatch was at the height of its operations, support from local citizens for the SDF stationed in Yokosuka rose 15.6 points to 54.1%. Of the 54.1%, 35.5% said they supported the SDF because they would feel safer in the event of a

\(^{239}\) This served to pave the way for private organizations to establish base areas from which to continue decontamination. The SDF was chosen over private organizations because it provided the most expedient method to initiate the decontamination work. The Fukushima governor did not request that SDF personnel leave the prefecture until the base areas had been established for private organizations to continue the decontamination efforts and when the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station was stabilized in December 2011. “Fukushima to Ask SDF on Tuesday to End Relief Ops After Cold Shutdown,” *The Mainichi Daily News*, December 20, 2011, [http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20111220p2g00m0dm033000c.html](http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20111220p2g00m0dm033000c.html).

\(^{240}\) “Gov’t to Dispatch GSDF to No-Entry Zone,” *The Daily Yomiuri*, November 18, 2011, [http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T111117005750.htm](http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T111117005750.htm).

\(^{241}\) *SDF to Decontaminate No-Entry Zone.*

\(^{242}\) The Typhoon number 12 dispatch was one quarter of the dispatch size for the Great East Japan Earthquake. “Disaster Relief in Response to Typhoons No. 12 and No. 15 “ *Japan Defense Focus*, December, 2011, 9.
disaster. The PEW Research Center found that an astounding 95% of Japanese surveyed felt the SDF did a good job and 62% believed they did a very good job. A The Daily Yomiuri public opinion poll conducted in December 2011 asked respondents to identify the domestic institutions that they trust the most from a list of over 10 organizations. The SDF topped the list with 75% stating it is the most reliable institution. This figure rose 12 percentage points from the same 2010 poll and signaled the first time the SDF commanded the top position. A cabinet office poll conducted in March 2012 also found that 97.7% of those surveyed praised the SDF’s disaster dispatch and 91.7% stated they had a good impression of the SDF. The SDF’s public image levels were the highest ever since the survey began in 1969. The public’s response to the SDF after its disaster dispatch shows a noticeable increase in the public’s trust of the SDF.

It has been established that the Japanese public trusts the SDF more after the Great East Japan Earthquake. What does this increased trust mean in relation to the SDF trajectory debate? Does the public now think that the SDF’s use of force in overseas operations is acceptable or does the public still prefer non-military approaches to resolving conflicts? The evidence available to answer these questions is less obvious and requires an analysis of prior trends in Japanese public opinion to provide the most likely interpretation of this heightened trust. The following two sections address this problem by analyzing two public opinion areas related to the perceived role of the SDF: utility of force, and utility of non-military force.


244 The closest competitor was news organizations with only 54% stating they did a good job responding to the disasters. The national government received a paltry 20% good approval rating for its response. Japanese Resilient, But See Economic Challenges Ahead (Washington D.C.: PEW Research Center, [2011]).


246 Of those that praised the SDF’s disaster dispatch, 79.8% highly praised it and 17.9% praised it. Only 5.3% of respondents have a bad impression of the SDF. “SDF’s Disaster Dispatch Praised at 97.7% and 91.7%, the Highest Ever, Have a Good Impression of the SDF,” Translated by Shimizu Yuko. The Sankei Shimbun, March 11, 2012, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/120311/plc12031101020000-n1.htm.
b. Utility of Non-Military Force: Useful for Domestic and International Purposes

Non-military force refers to the SDF’s participation in non-traditional security activities such as UN PKO and HADR. Previous trends in Japanese public opinion indicate that the increased public trust of the SDF as a result of its disaster dispatch will have the most impact on the public’s perception of non-military force’s utility, especially regarding HADR. Although the SDF’s response after the Great Hanshin Earthquake in 1995 was criticized for its lack of timeliness, the SDF ultimately played a major role in the disaster relief efforts and the public was appreciative of their participation. The result was a 40% increase from 1994–1997 in the public’s perception that disaster dispatch is the SDF’s main function. The SDF’s new primary perceived role even replaced that of ensuring national security. The Japanese public still perceive disaster dispatch as the SDF’s main function as recent as 2006 (see Figure 25). Regarding the SDF’s future role, disaster dispatch jumped almost 20% from 1994–1997 as well. In 2003, the SDF’s most effective role remained disaster dispatch at 85% compared to ensuring national security at 29% (see Figure 26). The SDF’s perceived future role also changed dramatically after the 1995 earthquake. From 1994–1997, the SDF’s future role of disaster dispatch remained the primary role and dramatically increased from 35% to 70%. In 2006, the SDF’s disaster dispatch future role at 69% continued to beat out its ensuring national security role at 55% (see Figure 27).247

247 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation (London: Routledge, 2010), 158–159.
Figure 25. Japanese Public Opinion Regarding the Main Function of the JSDF 1965–2006 (From “Japan’s Remilitarisation,” 2010)

Figure 26. Japanese Public Opinion Regarding the Most Effective Role of the JSDF 1961–2003 (From “Japan’s Remilitarisation,” 2010)
The preeminence of the SDF’s disaster dispatch role in public opinion regarding its primary, most effective, and future role indicate that the Great East Japan Earthquake will likely have a similar effect on public opinion. Furthermore, the high levels of public opinion maintained in these three areas since 1995 suggest that disaster dispatch after the 2011 disasters will continue to be of primary importance in the public’s eyes. These hypotheses held true after the most recent cabinet office poll conducted in 2012. The SDF’s highest perceived role continued to be disaster dispatch at 82.9%.

These trends indicate that HADR conducted by the SDF will continue to be viewed as a useful tool. This eliminates the possibility that non-military force is

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248 This cabinet office poll has been conducted every 3 years since 1969. Figures 25–27 are comprised of data from these polls. Disaster dispatch was also the highest perceived role in the 2009 poll. “SDF’s Disaster Dispatch Praised at 97.7% and 91.7%, the Highest Ever, Have a Good Impression of the SDF,” Translated by Shimizu Yuko. *The Sankei Shimbun*, March 11, 2012, [http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/120311/plc12031101020000-n1.htm](http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/120311/plc12031101020000-n1.htm).
viewed as never useful and therefore the use of force is a preferred tool, which may lead to remilitarization. The question then becomes how the SDF’s HADR capabilities will be applied in the future. If the utility of non-military force is seen as useful for domestic purposes only then retrenchment can be expected. The most likely outcome is that the SDF’s HADR capabilities will be used for domestic and international purposes. As the SDF improved its HADR capabilities after the 1995 earthquake and enacted new laws permitting SDF participation in international security activities, the SDF participated in more HADR operations starting in 1998. The trend since 1998 has been that of more regular participation in international HADR operations (see Figure 17).

c. Utility of Force: Defensive Force Useful

The previous section illustrated that the Japanese public sees non-military force as the SDF’s primary, most effective, and future role. Figures 25–27 do not provide any data showing the public’s willingness for the SDF to engage in offensive force, however. Instead, most of the alternative roles provided in Figures 25–27 only show roles supporting defensive force. Is there any situation in which the Japanese public might find it useful for the SDF to engage in offensive force? According to a Study of Attitudes and Global Engagement (SAGE) public opinion poll conducted in 2004, most Japanese are skeptical of offensive force. A majority of Japanese surveyed believes that offensive force is not legitimate for preventing human rights abuse or when a country is suspected of harboring terrorists. Only a slight majority believes that it is legitimate for preventing genocide. A super-majority of 78.1%, however, believes that defensive force is legitimate if a country is attacked (see Table 4). Midford found in a series of other Japanese public opinion polls relating to the use of force and the United States’ role in Iraq that the SAGE report’s findings of a public aversion to offensive force holds true.249 Based on these findings, it is highly problematic to link an increase in the public’s trust of the SDF to the Japanese seeing an increased utility in offensive force. Therefore, remilitarization is not likely in this regard.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Legitimate</th>
<th>Somewhat legitimate</th>
<th>Not very legitimate</th>
<th>Not legitimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prevent human rights abuses in other countries</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevent genocide in another country</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When another country is suspected of harboring terrorists</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When attacked</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As stated earlier, Japanese do find defensive force quite legitimate. Figures 25–27 indicate that ensuring national security is considered a very credible role for the SDF, although not the most significant. Connecting the public’s increased trust of the SDF with an increase in utility of defensive force seems more plausible. Despite the lack of data illustrating these linkages, there seems to be a logical connection between the two. Figures 25–27 show that from 1994–1997 the SDF’s ensuring national security role increased with its disaster dispatch role more than any other three-year period. These figures could be a result of other threatening factors that occurred during this time such as the 1995–1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. Little else happened that might have warranted such large increases in these public opinion figures, however. A more likely explanation is that the SDF’s disaster dispatch after the 1995 earthquake increased its profile and the public became more aware of the SDF’s other roles. As SDF participation in domestic disaster relief increased in the following years, this only added to the public’s awareness of the SDF’s roles.

The SDF’s disaster dispatch for the Great East Japan Earthquake seems to have had a similar effect on public opinion. The 2012 cabinet office poll found that 78.6% of those surveyed, the second highest number, believe ensuring national security is the SDF’s primary function. This figure rose 8.6% from the 2009 poll. The primary
reason given for this increase are the threats posed by China and North Korea.\textsuperscript{250} It is reasonable to believe, however, that the SDF’s successful disaster dispatch is also aiding these figures by increasing the SDF’s profile and showing the public that the SDF can be trusted to execute defensive roles. Therefore, the SDF’s successful disaster dispatch is likely to increase public support for defensive force. This is especially true now that the SDF did such an incredible job, the media portrayed their performance as exceptional, the public reacted positively, and more clear security threats exist such as China’s military expansion and North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile program. These factors will help marginalize pacifists that believe the use of force is never useful. The result is that the SDF’s disaster dispatch emphasizes the utility of defensive force, which will maintain the status quo.

2. **Legal Norms: Arms Export Ban (Less Restriction)**

Japan operates its security policy through a web of legal norms that significantly restricts its security activities at home and abroad. Some of these legal norms are clearly codified and others are informal policy statements that are perpetually followed. The following is a list of several legal norms that have come to characterize Japan’s security identity of domestic anti-militarism: Article 9 of Japan’s constitution, “Three Principles for Restricting Arms Exports,” five PKO principles, three non-nuclear principles, and

\textsuperscript{250} For those that answered ensuring national security is the SDF’s primary role, 72.3% stated they believe so because of the threats posed by China and North Korea. “SDF’s Disaster Dispatch Praised at 97.7% and 91.7%, the Highest Ever, Have a Good Impression of the SDF,” Translated by Shimizu Yuko. *The Sankei Shimbun*, March 11, 2012, [http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/120311/plc12031101020000-n1.htm](http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/120311/plc12031101020000-n1.htm).
defense budget limits at 1% of GDP. These legal norms are not impenetrable as many have been modified and reinterpreted over the years. Taken as a whole, however, these legal norms limit the speed at which a remilitarization trajectory can be achieved, as they need to be addressed when considering making changes to Japan’s security practices.

Continuing the logic discussed under the previous security norms section, if public trust of the SDF increased because of their superb performance during its disaster dispatch then it might allow for some of the legal norms restricting the SDF’s activities to be relaxed. This may call the legal norms into question as the SDF is seen as a responsible institution capable of conducting itself honorably certainly at home and reasonably abroad. The disasters’ economic impact may also call some of these legal norms into question as Japan’s heightened sense of economic vulnerability stemming from the disasters prompts a more pragmatic approach to making Japan’s defense industries more competitive. The Great East Japan Earthquake’s recent occurrence limits the sample data available to evaluate all of the legal norms mentioned. The following section analyzes the arms export ban as actual changes have been the most apparent in this area after the disasters.

Oros recognizes that changes to Japan’s arms export ban in 1983 and 2004 were relatively small but states that a move toward unrestricted weapons exports would signify

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251 Article 9 of Japan’s constitution renounces war as a sovereign right of the state, and prohibits the maintenance of military forces and the use of force to settle international disputes. The “Three Principles for Restricting Arms Exports” codified in 1967 states that Japan would not export arms to communist nations, countries subject to a UN Security Council arms embargo, and countries where the risk of international conflict is high. This ban was later extended to all countries in 1976. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice, 106.

252 The International Peace Cooperation Law passed in 1992 allowed the overseas dispatch of SDF troops in order to participate in UN PKO. However, it severely limited their use of force by limiting the use of weapons for the minimum necessary for self-defense and allowed for SDF troop withdrawal in the event hostilities erupted. Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 197, 322.

253 Japan’s three non-nuclear principles declared in 1967 state that Japan will not “produce, possess, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons.” Japan has also informally limited its defense budget to 1% of GDP since 1976. Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2007), 43, 56.
a fundamental shift in Japan’s security identity of domestic anti-militarism.\textsuperscript{254} It appears that a large step toward this has occurred due in part to the disasters. In December 2011, the DPJ government announced that it was easing the restrictions on Japan’s existing arms export bans. Up to then, revisions occurred on a case-by-case basis. The new regulations represent a more comprehensive change that will allow fundamental changes in the way Japan approaches arms exports. The new regulations are comprised of two main elements. First, Japan will be allowed to participate in joint development of military equipment and technology with the United States, European nations, specifically those belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other friendly nations. Second, Japan will be allowed to export defense-related equipment to enable PKO and HADR. These two areas will require government approval and strict administrative procedures will be in place to ensure defense equipment is properly transferred to third-party nations. The DPJ government announced that the previous three principles guiding Japan’s arms export ban remain in effect.\textsuperscript{255}

These fundamental changes can be partially credited to the economic pressure placed on Japan after the disasters but also stem from hollowing out fears in Japanese industries prior to the disasters. After the 2010 NDPG’s release and before the disasters, attempts were made to revise the arms export ban but were eventually thwarted by strong opposition from the Social Democratic Party. Senior vice ministers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), METI, and MOD met in November 2011 to reopen the issue.\textsuperscript{256} Japan’s exacerbated economic health due to the disasters seems to have provided the added rationale to enact the new regulations. The first element increases the defense industry’s production base and will help increase their capabilities as they

\textsuperscript{254} Japan’s arms export ban codified in 1967 and 1976 has been subject to slight revisions over the years. The first came in 1983 when Japanese defense technology transfers to the United States were approved. The second occurred in 2004 as the United States and Japan agreed to jointly develop a ballistic missile defense program. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice, 92.


become involved in more joint development projects.\textsuperscript{257} This will lower its defense costs in the future. The previous arms export ban kept Japan out of the F-35’s joint development process, which will increase the fighter’s cost.

The economic rationale for the new regulations and maintenance of the previous three principles suggests that Japan is not going to embark on an unrestricted weapons export policy. It will enable Japan to become much more active in its development and procurement of defense equipment. The less restrictive nature of the new regulations will therefore emphasize remilitarization.

The changes in Japan’s arms export ban illustrate how Japan’s changing economic situation can affect the rationale for its legal norms that are most directly connected to Japan’s economic interests. Other legal norms more closely related to normative constraints than economic interests have not shown as much movement since the disasters. The one exception is the SDF’s five PKO principles, which was called into question because of the SDF’s deployment to UNMISS and South Sudan’s potentially unstable condition.\textsuperscript{258, 259, 260} This type of sentiment best represents what might occur if the public’s increased trust in the SDF makes changes to legal norms more palatable.


\textsuperscript{258} The UN official in charge of UNMISS stated that Rwandan soldiers would safeguard the SDF troops because use of force is limited to self-defense according to the five PKO principles. Yoshiaki Kasuga, “U.N. Official Says GSDF Troops Will Be Protected in South Sudan,” The Asahi Shimbun, November 8, 2011.

\textsuperscript{259} The unstable situation in South Sudan brought the five PKO principles into question as the SDF would be limited in their ability to provide for their own safety. The Daily Yomiuri released an editorial calling for the relaxation of the weapon use standard. “GSDF’s South Sudan Mission Significant for Nation Building,” The Daily Yomiuri, November 3, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/T111102004580.htm.

\textsuperscript{260} Senior Vice Defense Minister Shu Watanabe also advocated that SDF troops should be allowed to use weapons in the line of duty like other armies and called on the political parties to discuss the matter further. “SDF Troops on Int’l Duty Should Be Allowed to Use Weapons: Vice Minister,” The Mainichi Daily News, December 30, 2011, http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20111230p2g00m0dm014000c.html.

As mentioned previously, the U.S.-Japan security alliance was strengthened due to the utility of the alliance and the interoperability demonstrated through OPERATION TOMODACHI. It was shown that a strengthened alliance combined with Japan’s reconstruction concerns provides less incentive for a remilitarization trajectory. Another result of the shifting strength or lack thereof in a security alliance relationship is the fear of abandonment or entrapment. In the context of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, the result of a strengthened alliance could increase the fear of entrapment in American led wars as Japan comes closer to its ally. The inverse effect is that a weakened alliance may cause Japan to fear abandonment and force Japan to embark on a remilitarization trajectory in order to fulfill its security needs. Fear of abandonment does not seem likely based on the evidence of a strengthened alliance already given. The more possible reaction to a strengthened alliance would be fear of entrapment.

Midford writes that the fear of entrapment in American wars amplifies Japan’s own domestic anti-militarism sentiment and leads to stronger resistance to even small expansions in SDF activities and capabilities.261 He illustrates this point through what he calls the Iraq syndrome. The Iraq syndrome encompasses the Japanese public’s opposition to the Iraq War after hawkish leaders’, Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe Shinzo, aggressive pursuit of a larger role in the conflict. The Japanese public’s support for constitutional revision, the hawkish LDP, and even the SDF’s reconstruction and non-combat missions in Iraq subsequently decreased.262

Although fear of entrapment seems the more likely of the two, a crucial ingredient that would spur an entrapment reaction is becoming less potent: American wars. As of December 2011, the Iraq War is over and Obama has made known his intentions to bring the Afghanistan War to an end in the next couple of years. Furthermore, the Obama administration has not pressured Japan into increasing its role in the Afghanistan War or any other major international security activity for that matter. Instead, Obama announced

262 Ibid., 146–170.
in November 2011 that the United States would shift its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific region as it ends its overseas conflicts, a statement welcomed by Noda. The result is that Japanese and American security interests are merging since both express major concern over China’s expanding military and nuclear weapons armed North Korea. This will likely facilitate greater cooperation in the future between the U.S. military and SDF on mutual strategic objectives. Therefore, the traditional fear of entrapment does not seem a likely reaction by Japan either.

Even though the United States is decreasing its footprint in the Middle East and provided the largest form of international military assistance after the disasters, this does not necessarily mean the Japanese public will automatically be more inclined to trust the United States. Midford found that the Japanese public grew more skeptical than trusting of the United States and its perceived role in the world, especially in the years following the initiation of the Iraq War. Trust levels have improved in the last two years along with the drawdown of U.S. troops in Iraq. A December 2011 The Daily Yomiuri poll indicates 47% of Japanese trust the United States very much or somewhat and 42% do not trust the United States very much or at all. The trust levels decreased 5% and distrust levels increased 5% from the same 2010 poll. A vast majority of Japanese, 94%, is thankful for the U.S. military’s role after the disasters, but the lowered trust levels indicate other factors are limiting the public’s trust in the United States. Although trust levels have shifted against the United States’ favor after the disasters, it does not seem to be driven by the disasters. Furthermore, the changes were slight and can be considered as maintained.

E. ACTORS/INSTITUTIONS

This section examines the various internal and external actors and institutions that impact the SDF’s trajectory. It focuses on several aspects. First, how powerful is that


actor when it comes to their ability to impact the SDF’s trajectory? This aspect becomes problematic to measure empirically so the second aspect provides a better understanding of how much capacity a particular actor or institution has to influence the SDF’s trajectory. Second, what portion of the SDF trajectory does that actor or institution mostly affect? Third, what SDF trajectory is that actor most likely to support?

Because previous sections have addressed how the Japanese public, the United States, and Japan’s neighbors, China and South Korea, were affected by the disasters, this section will go into more detail on how the disasters have affected Japan’s politicians. The concluding chapter takes into account the entire system of actors and institutions discussed hereafter and analyzes where this might take the SDF given the impact to Japan’s security interests, economic interests, and norms. Therefore, the actors and institution section is in some cases about how the disasters impacted those particular entities but more so about how the system in its current state will direct the SDF.

1. Japanese Public: Primed for a Dynamic Status Quo

The norms section demonstrated that public opinion does have an impact on the SDF’s trajectory. Midford outlines the Japanese public’s impact on security policies in Figure 28. This figure illustrates that public opinion impacts elites’ willingness to pursue certain security policies in response to real-world developments.266 He further identifies eight circumstances when public opinion is most likely to be influential on elite security policy formation.267 Figure 28 also implies that elites are able to shape policy outcomes by way of breaking down certain norms such as pacifism through demonstration effects. Demonstration effects are used to influence public opinion through gradual policy


267 These eight circumstances include “when large and stable opinion majorities exist, when there is political competition, when a united Diet opposition has the support of a stable opinion majority, when an election is near, when the public has recently engaged in retrospective voting, when the ruling coalition worries about the consequences of defying a stable opinion majority for other important issues, when a new policy is proposed or an old policy has perceptible costs, when consensus democracy norms and institutions are present.” Ibid., 21–25.
development as opposed to radical departures. Therefore, Midford’s detailed analysis indicates that the Japanese public has considerable power to thwart security policies that run counter to its public opinion especially under the eight circumstance listed, but elites maintain the ability to gradually shape public opinion.

Figure 28. Public Attitudes, Measureable Opinions, and Policy Outcomes (From “Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism?” 2011)

Based on this relationship, what SDF trajectory is the public most likely to support in the aftermath of the disasters? As demonstrated in the norms section, the Japanese public sees the security norms of trust in the SDF and utility of military force and non-military force as distinctly separate. Increased trust in the SDF does not necessarily directly translate into perceived utility of military force. Through demonstration effects, elites have cautiously expanded the SDF’s roles since the end of the Cold War and demonstrated the state’s ability to safely manage the SDF at home and abroad. The SDF’s unprecedented and highly successful disaster dispatch can be considered the capstone event from a demonstration effects perspective in solidifying the
SDF’s domestic role. Public trust in the SDF is at an all-time high but as was previously discussed, this will likely serve to boost the SDF’s profile and make the public more aware of the SDF’s other roles. The utility of defensive force will likely gain support but the public’s aversion for offensive force will continue to slow attempts to remilitarize. Now that the public is almost completely accepting of the SDF’s domestic role, elites have more room to test the waters on the fringes of a remilitarization trajectory without facing dramatic public resistance. The result is that the public is primed for changes within the status quo.

2. SDF: A More Confident Force

The SDF was formed in an environment of severe distrust of the military following World War II. Civil-military relations evolved with the focus on protecting the people from the SDF vice the protection provided by the SDF. The resulting civil-military structure subjugated the SDF to civilian institutions in numerous areas. Despite changes in the international environment after the Cold War, the theme of civilian control over the SDF has remained largely in place. This fact is evident in the MOD’s structure (see Figure 29).268 The Internal Bureau, comprised of approximately 22,000 civilian personnel, exerts the most influence over security policy within the MOD. Uniformed SDF officers are not included in the Internal Bureau and are limited to the Joint Staff Office and the three services (GSDF, MSDF, ASDF). The Chief of Staff for each service is primarily concerned with equipping and training its forces as a force provider and the Chairman of the Joint Staff aided by the Joint Staff Office acts as a force user.269

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269 Andrew L. Oros and Yuki Tatsumi, Global Security Watch: Japan (Santa Barbara, Denver, Oxford: Praeger, 2010), 48, 57.
Figure 29. Japan MOD Organization Chart (From Japan MOD website, 2012)
This does not mean that the SDF was completely powerless to control any aspect of its trajectory. Throughout the Cold War, politicians delegated authority to bureaucrats to control the SDF because it was seen as relatively risk or cost free. The rationale behind this was that the SDF’s use in the Cold War was deemed much less likely and the numerous legal norms in place to control the SDF’s remilitarization facilitated a hands-off approach to control the SDF.\textsuperscript{270} SDF officers could take advantage of the delegation relationship when the bureaucracy threatened SDF interests. For instance, SDF officers could appeal to politicians if the SDF faced budget cuts for bases in a district. The SDF could also appeal to outside actors such as the United States to further their interests.\textsuperscript{271} Because of their taboo nature, the SDF also enjoyed relative autonomy on areas requiring military expertise such as procurement, recruitment, public relations, military education, and training.\textsuperscript{272}

Even though the structure for civilian control over the SDF remains in place, the SDF is becoming more influential within the MOD. After a series of SDF scandals in 2007, reforms were adopted to address accountability issues in the SDF. Containing the SDF even further was seen as a counterproductive measure. Instead, it was decided to engage the SDF in the policymaking process. This will allow for SDF officers to work more closely with civilian bureaucrats in the MOD. Although these reforms will not produce dramatic results in the short term, it shows that there is a growing trend to grant the SDF more influence as they are seen as a necessary tool of the state.\textsuperscript{273} The SDF’s notable disaster dispatch will serve as more incentive to continue this trend.

The SDF’s disaster dispatch will also aid the SDF’s trajectory in two areas: SDF’s public image and the SDF’s confidence. Japan realized after its checkbook diplomacy during the Gulf War was berated that the international community would demand more


\textsuperscript{271} The MSDF is best known for using this tactic with the U.S. Navy. Ibid., 250–251.


\textsuperscript{273} Ibid., 24.
SDF participation in international security activities. Along with the rise of security threats within the region, China and North Korea, the likelihood of the SDF being used at home and abroad became much more likely. These factors created the need to shape the SDF’s public image as the SDF became more visible in a society with deep pacifist roots.\textsuperscript{274} One of the methods aimed at creating a positive SDF image is equating the SDF’s roles with those for the collective good. These roles are comprised of three elements that emphasize the SDF’s unique bond with the public, contact with local communities, and the SDF’s indispensable capabilities that are used for non-violent missions.\textsuperscript{275} Disaster relief is at the heart of this initiative as it satisfies all three elements. The SDF sees HADR as a means to gain legitimacy at home and in the international community. The SDF’s disaster dispatch in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake has provided an enormous source of material to improve its public image. The SDF has taken advantage of its successful operation and used its disaster dispatch for numerous public relations materials.\textsuperscript{276}

HADR also serves the purpose of building morale and confidence within the SDF’s ranks. Because the SDF contributes most regularly to domestic disaster relief and international security activities, these are the things that provide satisfaction to SDF personnel. SDF personnel look back at their involvement in the Great Hanshin Earthquake as an incredibly positive experience and see it as a significant boost to their public image. Stories of rescuing victims and receiving gratitude for their efforts are what motivate SDF personnel. The impact on SDF morale after the Great East Japan Earthquake can be considered even more profound since 40% of SDF


\textsuperscript{276} The \textit{Defense of Japan 2011} included a lengthy special feature in its front pages highlighting the SDF’s disaster dispatch. The SDF also included prominent articles on its disaster dispatch in the \textit{Japan Defense Focus} and other smaller pamphlets. Each SDF service website also highlights their contributions to the disaster dispatch.
personnel participated in the disaster dispatch and the public recognized their efforts in almost exclusively positive terms.277

Given the SDF’s boosted confidence and the trend to more SDF involvement in the policy formation process, is there any need to worry that the SDF will embark on a remilitarization trajectory? In 2008, fears that the SDF represented a force for remilitarization were rekindled when ASDF Chief of Staff General Tamogami Toshio published an essay questioning Japan’s role as an aggressor nation in World War II. He further stoked the public’s fears by stating 99% of SDF officers held views similar to his. On the other hand, a survey conducted amongst SDF officers in 2003 found that the SDF is only moderately conservative.278 It has also been noted that SDF officers are less concerned about making the SDF stronger and increasing its influence over civilian authorities than they are with managing the SDF’s role in society and becoming accepted by the public as a legitimate asset for the nation.279 Although the SDF is likely to attract those that have a more conservative mindset, it does not seem apparent that the SDF would push for radical remilitarization as Tamogami suggested but rather seek a more fitting role for the SDF in society within the grey area between the status quo and remilitarization.

3. Bureaucrats: Shifting Control Over Security Policy

The bureaucracy has traditionally been the most influential actor in Japan’s security policymaking process because of the post World War II desire to contain the SDF from embarking on a remilitarization trajectory. This historical legacy of exerting

277 Ibid., 33.

278 They support the U.S.-Japan alliance but not unconditionally. A request from the United States to participate in UN PKO was not as good of a reason to send troops as humanitarian needs or national interests. 58% believe that the SDF should be a role model for society but 64% also believe that the SDF and the public should interact more in order to introduce civilian values into the SDF. More than 50% indicated only less than 100 casualties would be acceptable in operations surrounding Japan. This shows the SDF’s aversion to causalities as a similar survey given to the U.S. military showed more than 83% would find more than 500 causalities acceptable if defending South Korea. 70% also stated officers should not criticize the government or society. Hikotani, Japan’s Changing Civil-Military Relations: From Containment to Re-Engagement?, 25–26.

279 Fruhstuck, Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army, 6.
civilian control over the SDF embedded itself in the bureaucratic structure that still exists in many aspects today. The MOFA emerged during the Cold War as the most powerful actor influencing security policy. Three of the MOFA’s bureaus continue to hold considerable influence over security policy formation: Foreign Policy Bureau, North American Affairs Bureau, and International Legal Affairs Bureau (see Figure 30).280 281

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**Figure 30.** Japan MOFA Organization Chart (From Japan MOFA website, 2012)

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281 The Foreign Policy Bureau and specifically the National Security Policy Division within this bureau is considered the most important bureaucratic actor influencing Japan’s security policy. Its position was elevated even higher as the lead division shaping Japan’s security policy after MOFA reorganization efforts in 2004. The MOFA also highlighted the prominence of the Foreign Policy Bureau by appointing its most talented bureaucrats to senior positions within this bureau. The North American Affairs Bureau, specifically the U.S. – Japan Security Treaty Division and Status of U.S. Forces Agreement Division, also hold significant influence over alliance relations with the United States. The International Legal Affairs Bureau is another significant actor that is involved with reconciling Japan’s international agreements with its domestic laws and ensures they are in keeping with Japan’s peace constitution. Oros and Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch: Japan*, 28–30.
The preeminent role that the MOFA plays in determining Japan’s security policy is significant for two reasons. First, as one of Japan’s oldest ministries, it has the stature, talent, and capacity to sustain its control over other ministries such as the MOD and particularly the SDF. Any attempts to erode the MOFA’s control face many obstacles. Second, the MOFA’s disproportionate control of security policy over the MOD distances SDF interests from security policy as the MOFA does not deal directly with the SDF.

The other bureaucratic institution that plays an important but subordinate role in Japan’s security policy formation is the MOD. Prior to 2007, the MOD was only an agency known as the Japan Defense Agency (JDA). Throughout the Cold War, the JDA served primarily as a management agency for the SDF rather than a policy agency. This historical legacy is still manifest in the MOD’s structure even though its status was raised to that of a full ministry in 2007. Many of its roles continue to revolve around managing relations between the U.S. military, SDF, and local governments where those forces are located.282

The MOD’s two most important bureaus regarding security policy formation are the Operational Policy Bureau and the Defense Policy Bureau. The Strategic Planning Office was created in 2007 under the Defense Policy Division in this bureau. It is tasked with handling long-term strategy planning issues like the NDPG. The Defense Policy Bureau also expanded its strategic planning capacity in 2007 by adding the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Division and the International Policy Division. These additions illustrate a gradual reorientation of the MOD’s responsibilities from a purely domestic standpoint to a broader focus on international issues and more responsibility in areas traditionally handled by the MOFA. The elevation of the MOD to full ministry status

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282 For example, many of these responsibilities that were held by the Defense Facilities Administration Agency under the JDA were folded into the newly established Bureau of Local Cooperation, Bureau of Finance and Equipment, and the eight Regional Defense Bureaus. The Ministry of Defense Reorganized (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Defense, 2007), 4–5.
also suggests it will have more negotiating influence in areas such as the defense budget and it can theoretically demand a more equal say in Japan’s security policy formation with the MOFA.  

Despite the MOD’s status elevation and reorganization geared toward increasing its policy planning capacity, its security policy planning capacity compared to the MOFA remains relatively low due to understaffed divisions and the MOFA’s higher status among the ministries. The National Police Agency (NPA) also continues to hold significant influence over areas concerning Japan’s domestic security and numerous NPA officials hold senior government positions affecting security policy formation (see Figure 31). Given these limitations on the MOD’s influence over security policymaking, the trend since the end of the Cold War has been greater MOD involvement in security policymaking. This is coming about because of the increased demand for the SDF to participate in international security activities and the increased likelihood of the SDF’s involvement in other roles in and out of Japan. The MOD can no longer be avoided, as it is the only ministry that commands the SDF.

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283 The Operational Policy Bureau is charged with employing the SDF’s capabilities for the purposes of securing Japan’s national interests. The Defense Policy Bureau is primarily tasked with developing a defense strategy that accounts for Japan’s national security policy and interests. Oros and Tatsumi, Global Security Watch: Japan, 33–35.

284 The Commissioner General’s Secretariat, Criminal Investigation Bureau, and Security Bureau are the three bureaus that exert the most influence over Japan’s domestic security within the NPA. Police of Japan 2011 (Tokyo: Japan National Police Agency, 2011), 3.

285 Oros and Tatsumi, Global Security Watch: Japan, 30–32, 35.

286 Ibid., 41.
Considering the slow inclusion of the MOD in the security policymaking process along with the powerhouses MOFA and NPA, what trajectory is likely to be influenced by the bureaucracy? Since the MOFA and NPA will remain very influential in the short to medium term, the SDF will remain isolated from the security policymaking process. Therefore, emphasis on including the SDF in activities that resemble remilitarization will likely continue to be a slow process. Nonetheless, the MOD’s increasing bureaucratic influence trend suggests that the MOD and SDF will not be the outlier in the long term, which will aid the “normalization” of bureaucratic control over the SDF. This will make remilitarization more likely in the long term. The MOD’s successful deployment of the SDF after the Great East Japan Earthquake will serve as an incentive to continue this trend.
4. Politicians

a. Gaining Influence Over the Bureaucracy

Politicians in general have been gaining influence in the security policy realm since the 1990s. This is evident in the growing capacity and stature of two institutions at the Prime Minister’s disposal. First, the Prime Minister’s Office expanded from 582 in 1999 to 2,200 after administrative reorganizations were implemented in 2001. Second, the Cabinet Secretariat had a staff of only 184 in 1999 but it has dramatically increased to 716 as of 2008. Even though it is comprised of a mix of politicians, bureaucrats and retired NPA officials, this institution bolsters the Prime Minister’s ability to initiate and coordinate important policy issues amongst various ministries. This organization contains several positions with considerable control over Japan’s security policy: Chief Cabinet Secretary, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Administration, and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management. The Cabinet Secretariat’s structural changes suggest politicians, namely the Prime Minister and Chief Cabinet Secretary, are gaining influence over the bureaucracy especially in its crisis management capacity. Its policymaking capacity is still considered in its nascent stage, however.

As previously mentioned, this trend is occurring due to the perceived high political costs of delegating authority to the bureaucracy. The end of the Cold War created a demand for the SDF to participate in international security activities, which raised the need for politicians to be able to quickly influence policy in a crisis.


288 The Chief Cabinet Secretary stands out as the most powerful of these as this position has become second to the Prime Minister and critical in pushing through the Cabinet’s policies. The Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Administration is also the highest-ranking bureaucrat and therefore commands much power over interagency policy coordination. The Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management assists the Chief Cabinet Secretary during national emergencies and the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for National Security and Crisis Management focuses on the daily management of national security policy. The latter position has become increasingly important in Japan’s security policymaking process. For instance, the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for National Security and Crisis Management played a large role in key legislation such as the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, the 2003 Iraq Reconstruction Law, and the 2004 NDPG revision. Oroš and Tatsumi, Global Security Watch: Japan, 35–40.
management situation. The 1993 electoral reforms created the structural incentives for a shift to a two-party system. Politicians then became more vocal on defense issues as differences between party security policies became more important. Politicians have therefore begun to take back control of security policy formation from bureaucrats, as the cost of not doing so could be potentially disastrous for their electoral survival or during a national emergency.\(^{289}\) Although the political leadership was criticized for its handling of the nuclear power station disaster, it was able to rapidly and effectively deploy the SDF and other national assets to the disaster-stricken regions. This shows the fruits of more political control during crisis management situations and will likely provide added incentive to continue this trend.

The DPJ has taken this trend to another level. The DPJ began a campaign to break from old patterns of bureaucratic-led governance after its historical majority win in the 2009 Lower House election. The DPJ formed in the mid to late 1990s under the guise of a progressive party aimed at countering the pork-barrel tactics of the ruling LDP. The LDP was able to use these tactics along with other factors throughout its 54-year reign of electoral dominance to cement its position in Japanese politics. This built a close working relationship between the LDP and bureaucracy.\(^{290}\) Once in office, the DPJ began dismantling this relationship.\(^{291}\) As an example in the security policymaking process, the DPJ postponed the release of the new NDPG for a year until it could fully


\(^{291}\) Meetings between administrative vice-ministers held before cabinet meetings were cancelled. The practice of retired high-ranking bureaucrats gaining influential positions in government institutions was targeted. Bureaucratic agencies came under more oversight from the DPJ and those with close ties to the LDP on government advisory committees were removed. Pempel, *Between Pork and Productivity: The Collapse of the Liberal Democratic Party*, 230.
review the policy because its revision was initiated under the LDP government. In this light, the DPJ’s personal vendetta against the bureaucracy will aid the growing trend to increase the political leadership’s role over the bureaucracy as long as the DPJ is in power.

b. A Political System in Flux

Even prior to the Great East Japan Earthquake, Japan’s political system was in flux. The end of the Cold War and the 1993 electoral reforms provided less ideological and structural incentives for the LDP’s main opposition party, the JSP, to thrive. At the same time, Japan’s stagnating economy that began in the early 1990s called into question the LDP’s pork barrel political tactics, as it could no longer rely on positive socioeconomic conditions to sustain its power. With the decline of the JSP, increasing pressure on the LDP to produce economic results, numerous factions split from the LDP, JSP, and New Frontier Party and eventually coalesced into the DPJ in the late 1990s. Koizumi kept the LDP alive and the DPJ out of power from 2001–2006 by embarking on a progressive campaign to break the status quo by “changing the LDP or destroying it.” His popularity kept the LDP in power but after his administration ended, the following three LDP prime ministers reverted to the old style of LDP governance and found themselves unable to manage Japan’s worsening economy. The DPJ found itself in a position to carry on the reform banner and provided voters the most credible alternative to the LDP, a choice voters resoundingly supported in the 2009 Lower House election. Once in power, however, the DPJ’s own factional makeup and inexperience made a concerted effort at governance difficult to obtain. The inability to handle issues such as the Futenma U.S. military base relocation contributed significantly to Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio’s drop in public support and ultimately to his resignation in 2010. His successor, Kan, also came under fire for his handling of the Senkaku incident in late 2010.

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Given this backdrop, the political system was already in flux prior to the Great East Japan Earthquake. The disasters merely added to the difficulties facing the DPJ administration. Kan’s disapproval ratings after the disasters continued to be high (see Figure 32). In April 2011, 60% of survey respondents stated they did not appreciate the Kan cabinet’s response to the earthquake and 67% did not appreciate the cabinet’s response to the nuclear power station disaster. Amid Kan’s continuing unpopularity, the LDP called for a no-confidence vote in the Diet in June 2011. Before the vote, Kan announced his plans to resign once the situation surrounding the nuclear disaster had been stabilized and other crucial steps had been taken in the reconstruction process. The no-confidence motion was rejected with 293 votes to 152. It highlighted not only the failed governance of another DPJ prime minister but also the intense factional rivalries within the DPJ itself. Prior to the vote, the Hatoyama and Ozawa Ichiro factions within the DPJ indicated they would side with the LDP in the no-confidence vote. The factional infighting that ensued threatened to break apart the party. Hatoyama went as far as saying, “Kan couldn’t be a worse human being.” Hatoyama eventually changed his mind and voted against the no-confidence vote, as he feared Ozawa’s siding with the LDP and New Komeito would break up the DPJ. The public became dissatisfied with the events surrounding the vote as 65% believed the no-confidence motion was improper and 73% could not understand why so many in the DPJ, including Hatoyama and Ozawa, initially supported the no-confidence motion. The DPJ’s infighting caused 60% to have a worsened view of the DPJ.


Voter confidence in the DPJ remained low even after Kan stated his intention to step down. In June 2011, 61% of survey responders stated they did not think the situations surrounding the disaster areas would improve with a new prime minister. Over half, 55%, stated they believed the DPJ should split up and 78% felt the Diet was not fulfilling its duty to handle the reconstruction efforts. Voters preferred that the LDP and DPJ work together to deal with the situation. In another June 2011 survey, 84% believed the DPJ and LDP should cooperate more in the Diet. A plurality, 42%, supported the forming of a grand coalition between the DPJ and LDP. Surveys before and after also showed majority figures supporting a coalition. Despite voter desire for

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political cooperation to pull the nation through this disaster, the LDP refused to form a
grand coalition with the DPJ because it saw the DPJ request as an attempt to build its
support.\textsuperscript{301}

Kan eventually stepped down in late August 2011 once the situation
surrounding the nuclear disaster was under control. The race for the next prime minister
showed once again the divide amongst DPJ factions, specifically the pro-Ozawa versus
anti-Ozawa factions. Ozawa’s support of METI Minister Kaieda Banri in the final race
united the anti-Ozawa factions to support MOF Minister Noda who won the race with
215 of 392 votes. The results show that the DPJ continued to suffer from intense
factional divides.\textsuperscript{302}

Noda enjoyed public support at the beginning of his administration, but
faced with the difficulty of dealing with the reconstruction efforts in a hostile political
environment, his public support decreased in December 2011 due to perceived inability
to get things done and unpopular policies (see Figures 32 and 33).\textsuperscript{303} In order to fund the
reconstruction supplementary budgets, the DPJ originally proposed a tobacco tax along
with a combination of increases in income, corporate and individual residential taxes.

\textsuperscript{301} The LDP did state it would do all it could for supporting disaster countermeasures. “LDP Resists
“Grand Coalition”: Party Willing to Help With Disaster Efforts But Not Within Cabinet,” \textit{Daily Yomiuri},
March 21, 2011, \url{http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110320003127.htm}.

\textsuperscript{302} The first round of voting did not produce a majority winner so a runoff election was held between
the top two contenders: Kaieda supported by the Hatoyama and Ozawa faction and Noda supported by his
and the Kan faction. “Noda Elected DPJ President/ 1st Round Leader Undone By Support From Ozawa

\textsuperscript{303} This figure is comprised of data collected from a series of \textit{Asahi Shimbun} public opinion polls

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The public supported including the tobacco tax with a 63% approval rating.\textsuperscript{304, 305} The DPJ had to compromise on the means to finance the budget since the LDP and New Komeito did not support the inclusion of the tobacco tax, a stance reminiscent of their pork barrel tactics. In order to reach a compromise, the DPJ was forced to remove the tobacco tax and place the full burden of reconstruction funding on income, corporate, and individual residential taxes.\textsuperscript{306} The compromise proved to be unpopular as 56% did not support the revised funding sources.\textsuperscript{307}

![Poll Question: For Those Who Do Not Support the Current Cabinet, Why Do You Not Support the Current Cabinet?](image)


\textsuperscript{305} “Govt May Sell All JT Shares to Lower Tax Hike,” \textit{Daily Yomiuri}, September 29, 2011, \url{http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110928006084.htm}.


c. Voter Uncertainty

Given the dissatisfaction that voters have shown toward the Kan and Noda cabinets as a result of their unpopular policies and inability to lead the government, let alone their own party, towards effective reconstruction legislation, is the voting public ready to retaliate against the DPJ in upcoming elections? Polling data from January 2011–January 2012 indicates voters are uncertain about their party loyalties. When asked what party they support, both the DPJ and LDP received about 20% support with the DPJ leading in most opinion polls. The largest majority, about 45%, consistently stated they support no particular party, however (see Figure 34).\(^{308}\) When asked what party they would vote for on the proportional representation ballot if a general election were held, the DPJ and LDP received around 25% support ratings with the LDP in the lead in most polls. Those who did not know what party they would vote for represented a majority in all polls with figures around 35% (see Figure 35).\(^{309}\) New parties hoping to gain the support of this large group of disenfranchised voters are emerging, signaling more party shuffling in the future.\(^{310}\) The DPJ’s minor coalition partner, New People’s Party, is also threatening to split from the DPJ and form a party with Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro.\(^{311}\) The LDP stands to benefit most from churning within the DPJ, but it does not appear voters are swinging enthusiastically back to the LDP. This may afford the LDP the opportunity to win back some Lower House

\(^{308}\) This figure is comprised of data collected from a series of *Asahi Shimbun* public opinion polls taken from January 2011–January 2012. *Asian Opinion Poll Database: 2011 Polls.*

\(^{309}\) This figure is comprised of data collected from a series of *Asahi Shimbun* public opinion polls taken from January 2011–January 2012. Ibid.


seats in the 2013 election. Because parties other than the DPJ and LDP have yet to solidify into a formidable third force, voter decision will likely come down to the lesser of two evils.

Figure 34. Poll Question: What Political Party Do You Currently Support?

Figure 35. Poll Question: If a General Election Were to be Held, Which Party Would You Vote For in the Proportional Representation Vote?
d. **DPJ and LDP Here To Stay: What Do They Stand For?**

Unless a snap election is held and the DPJ loses, the DPJ will be in power until the next scheduled Lower House elections in 2013 and they will likely remain a strong force in the government even if they do lose. In that case, what SDF trajectory are they likely to support? Because the DPJ was formed of former conservative LDP and less liberal socialists in the late 1990s, their security policy views do not dramatically differ from those of the LDP. On the liberal-conservative spectrum, they are generally considered a centrist or slightly right of center party. Therefore, the ends of the DPJ’s security policy do not significantly diverge from the LDP’s but the means do in several areas.

First, the DPJ emphasizes the importance of the U.S.-Japan security alliance but seeks a more equal relationship with the United States in the alliance and more autonomy in its security policy in general. This translates into a desire to reduce the burden of U.S. military bases in Japan, an initiative proving difficult particularly in Okinawa.\(^{312}\)

Second, and related to the first, the DPJ places less emphasis on the primacy of the U.S.-Japan alliance and seeks regional solutions to its security interests. The result is that DPJ leaders are more accommodating to its neighbor’s interests. This is seen in the desire to create an East Asian Community (EAC) and solidify Japan’s identity in Asia. The DPJ also takes a less hardline approach toward China but still expresses their concern over China’s growing power. They also seek to engage Japan’s neighbors over historical issues.\(^{313}\)

Third, the DPJ believes that Japan’s international security activities should be done through UN auspices rather than solely based on support for the United States. This was evident in the DPJ’s opposition to the Iraq War and their ending of the MSDF’s

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\(^{313}\) Ibid., 110–112, 115–117.
Indian Ocean mission in 2009. This clearly distinguishes the DPJ from the LDP after Koizumi’s emphatic support for the U.S. war in Iraq.\footnote{Ibid., 107–108.} \footnote{Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani and Aki Mori, “Electing a New Japanese Security Policy? Examining Foreign Policy Visions within the Democratic Party of Japan,” \textit{Asia Policy}, no. 9 (January, 2010), 55–56.}

Although the DPJ generally reflects these three elements in its security policy, the DPJ’s factional makeup and its relatively short existence has hindered the solidifying of its security policy foundation. Different DPJ factions can therefore embark on different methods to obtain its security policy goals. For instance, Maehara is one of the leading proponents of realist views in the DPJ and takes a more alliance-centric approach in dealing with China’s rise.\footnote{Sneider, \textit{The New Asianism: Japanese Foreign Policy Under the Democratic Party of Japan}, 99–107.} Noda has also stated he will not seek an EAC originally proposed by Hatoyama.\footnote{“Noda Steps Back From “East Asian Community,” \textit{Daily Yomiuri}, September 8, 2011, \url{http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110907004831.htm}.}

The DPJ’s security policy characteristics suggest that it will be less provocative in its application of the SDF after the disasters. Rather than capitalizing on the public’s increased trust in the SDF, the DPJ is less likely to push for a more active SDF international role as it understands this may be provocative to its Northeast Asia neighbors. Instead, the DPJ may seek more opportunities to cooperate with its neighbors, specifically South Korea. The DPJ’s preoccupation on Japan’s economic issues and keeping itself together before the next round of Lower House elections will further decrease the likelihood of any dramatic changes in the way it employs the SDF.

The LDP is also likely to remain a credible force in Japanese politics for the foreseeable future. With the churn among the DPJ since it took office in 2009 and the legitimacy blow from the disasters, the LDP is positioned to perhaps reclaim seats at the next Lower House elections. It has already done so in the 2010 Upper House elections. It behooves those concerned with the SDF trajectory debate to not forget what the LDP stands for in terms of its security policy.
The LDP’s 54-year governance connotes the idea that it is a relatively homogenous party. On the contrary, it stayed in power for so long in part because of its ability to unite various factions against the communists and socialists on the ideological left. So labeling the LDP under one identity is problematic but considering the decades worth of LDP security analysis compared to the DPJ’s short time in office, it is somewhat easier to identify the LDP’s security policy mainstream positions. Richard Samuels attributes the LDP mainstream to the normal nationalists identity. As the name suggests, these individuals support Japan’s remilitarization as a “normal” nation. Therefore, the LDP can be considered a strictly conservative party. This identity takes on several characteristics.

First, normal nationalists advocate a global perspective that states Japan should contribute to international security activities commensurate to its economic status. The SDF must therefore be strengthened to fulfill these roles. Stemming from this stance, the LDP supports constitutional revision and the exercise of collective self defense.\[318\]

Second, normal nationalists also contain two views that diverge in interpretation but converge on purpose. Both the revisionists and the realists believe that Japan should be a “normal” nation and should not be weighed down by its past. The revisionists, however, support a nostalgic view of the past and are less apologetic and more provocative in their stance with historical issues as seen in their support for visits to Yasukuni Shrine. Realists see this sentiment as unnecessarily provocative and advocate a focus on Japan’s post-war democratic status.\[319\]

Third, the normal nationalists proclaim the efficacy of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. In this regard, the LDP is less supportive of regional security initiatives and is more likely to build up the SDF’s joint capabilities with the U.S. military. Like the DPJ, the LDP also pushes for a more equal alliance relationship.\[320\]

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319 Ibid., 124–125.
320 Ibid., 125.
Fourth, the normal nationalists take a more realist approach toward China and are wearier of its military rise and are more vocal about China as a potential threat. Combined with their less apologetic stance toward historical issues, this makes conflict rather than cooperation more likely between Japan and China.\textsuperscript{321}

The LDP’s security policy characteristics suggest that if given the chance it will push for a remilitarization trajectory as it did under the last four LDP prime ministers, especially Koizumi. Its stance on historical issues and the efficacy it places on the U.S.-Japan alliance will impede any opportunity for regional security cooperation. The LDP may also be more likely to take advantage of opportunities to increase the SDF’s international role as it did during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. The LDP’s fall from power after its unpopular security policies may temper any strong attempts to push for remilitarization.

5. Japan’s Precarious Position

In terms of Japan’s geostrategic position between the United States and its Northeast Asian neighbors, Japan is caught between diametrically opposed opinions regarding the SDF’s trajectory.

a. Northeast Asia: Pro-containment

Japan’s Northeast Asian neighbors, particularly China, North Korea, and South Korea, generally represent forces that desire to contain Japan’s military potential. Having endured Japan’s occupation in the early to mid-20th century, it is no surprise Japan’s Northeast Asian neighbors are skeptical of a remilitarized SDF. Continued isolation between North Korea and Japan, growing anti-Japanese nationalism in China, and China and South Korea’s improving economic situation relative to Japan only embolden these actors to exert more pressure on Japan to remain militarily subjugated in the region.

\textsuperscript{321} Ibid., 126.
Because the North Korean threat, minus the ballistic missile threat, is primarily contained on the Korean peninsula, North Korea exerts less of an influence on the SDF’s trajectory than China. South Korea is also heavily invested in the North Korean threat and shares a common ally with Japan in the United States. The hub and spoke security alliance structure between the United States, Japan, and South Korea also prevents security interests between Japan and South Korea from escalating into conflict but also creates a situation where they are developed independently from each other and allows historical grievances to fester. For these reasons, the two Koreas represent a potent but contained force against SDF remilitarization.

China is therefore left as the actor with the most direct influence over containing Japan’s military resurgence. The power they exert in this regard is seen in two areas. First, China’s rhetoric against any sign of rising Japanese nationalism or remilitarization serves as a means to express its desire to contain Japan. This rhetoric has only increased since the 1990s partially because of a patriotic education program initiated after the Tiananmen crisis, which serves as a useful tool to deflect attention away from China’s own domestic problems. The anti-Japanese sentiment that is making deeper roots in Chinese society provides a powerful means to show its growing suspicion toward Japan. For instance, Koizumi’s Yasukuni Shrine visits sparked large anti-Japanese protests in 2004 and 2005.322

Second, China’s growing military capability and operational expansion into waters surrounding Japan provides a direct means of containing the SDF’s own expanding roles in the region. China’s demonstrated capability to rapidly modernize and grow its military strength serves as an indirect check on Japan’s remilitarization in the sense that it would provide less incentive for Japan to begin an arms race with an opponent that has much less limiting its ability to do so. The historical legacies of the Yoshida doctrine such as Japan’s security and legal norms have boxed Japan into a corner in this regard. If it breaks from these precedents rapidly, Japan threatens to initiate a disastrous escalatory response from China. On the other hand, Japan cannot ignore the

new threats that a growing China presents and must approach them within a structure that severely limits Japan’s ability to remilitarize.

b. The United States: Pro-remilitarization

The United States takes a polar opposite approach to the SDF trajectory from the rest of Northeast Asia. Although the U.S.-Japan security alliance was formed with the partial intent to contain Japan, the United States has consistently placed pressure on Japan to increase its military contributions within the alliance. This only intensified after the end of the Cold War when it seemed that America’s formal alliances could be replaced by coalitions of the willing. This elevated Washington’s expectations for Japan’s international security contributions as the key elements to alliance structures became how much one was willing to risk. Decades of operating under the Yoshida doctrine left Japan ill-prepared to meet Washington’s new expectations. This growing trend is best exemplified in Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage’s spurring statement to Japan to “show the flag” after the September 11, 2001, attacks.323

Considering the U.S.-Japan security alliance has been embedded and institutionalized in the ways that the United States and Japan interact with each other in regard to their security issues, it is safe to say that the United States has the capacity to exert strong pressure on the SDF’s trajectory and is most likely to support a remilitarization trajectory. The means by which the United States goes about exerting its influence are likely to take place within a hub and spoke mentality. The U.S. military’s successful OPERATION TOMODACHI will likely increase the United States’ influence over the rest of Northeast Asia. Furthermore, the successful joint operations conducted between the U.S. military and SDF may also embolden the U.S. military to pressure SDF forces along a remilitarization trajectory. Controlling the United States’ expectations for the SDF is a crucial concern addressed further in the conclusion chapter.

Between the pro-containment forces of Northeast Asia and the United States’ pro-remilitarization stance, Japan is stuck in the middle. Considering Japan’s

323 Ibid., 82–84, 95.
close economic ties with both entities, it is essential to understand the predicament Japan faces in order to avoid pushing Japan in a direction that are harmful for its own interests and may in turn be counterproductive for American interests.

F. CONCLUSION

This chapter analyzed four key areas that affect the SDF’s trajectory: security interests, economic interests, norms, and actors and institutions. The following chapter provides a comprehensive conclusion based on the analysis of these four areas.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter concludes the analysis conducted thus far in the previous chapters. The first section provides a brief summary of the analysis conducted on the four areas affecting the SDF’s trajectory in the previous chapter: security interests, economic interests, norms, and actors and institutions. Themes within these four areas are highlighted in order to identify the key findings of this research.

Figure 36 illustrates what trajectory influence aspect was emphasized or altered by highlighting that particular element in green. Based on this analysis, the second section details the most likely SDF trajectory according to the trajectory formation process outlined in Figure 14.

The three possible trajectories considered are retrenchment, status quo, and remilitarization; all of which address two key elements of the SDF trajectory debate: capacity and will. Retrenchment is defined as a decrease in the SDF’s capacity to conduct international security activities because the defense budget may be reduced. The will to use the SDF in these international roles may also diminish because Japan becomes internally focused as domestic HADR is emphasized at the expense of international security activities. The status quo means that the SDF’s capacity and will to conduct the types of international security activities it is currently conducting is not significantly altered. In this case, the SDF would see little change in Japan’s will to expand or retrench from these roles. Remilitarization is defined as the increased capacity and will to use force as a coercive tool of the state. An increased defense budget and shift to more offensive oriented capabilities would increase the SDF’s capacity to remilitarize. Removal of legal norms restricting the SDF’s use of force and application of the SDF in offensive roles would signify an increased will for remilitarization. Increased trust in the SDF generated by a successful HADR operation may also translate into more deference for the SDF to expand its roles and become more externally focused. This thesis finds
that the SDF is most likely to move toward a new status quo defined by economic pragmatism and inclusion of SDF interests in domestic policy formation.

The third section gives several policy recommendations based on this thesis’ findings. The recommendations are intended for those that directly influence U.S. security policy in the Asia-Pacific region in general and specifically those that manage various aspects of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. It is also applicable for those that indirectly participate in the U.S. security policy formation process in order for them to understand how their actions influence the various forces that affect the SDF’s trajectory.

The final section provides a short synopsis of the significance and shortfalls of this research, and areas for future research.

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Figure 36. Most Likely SDF Trajectory Post 3/11
B. ANALYSIS SUMMARY: KEY FINDINGS

1. Security Interests

Japan’s security policy focus and defense budget was not severely altered primarily because they were not discredited. The 2010 NDPG provided an appropriate framework of security objectives, roles, posture characteristics, and organization attributes, which allowed the SDF to carry out a highly successful domestic HADR operation. The SDF continues to stress a hybrid focus on its domestic and international roles as seen in its enduring commitment to UN PKO and anti-piracy missions abroad. Notably, the SDF continues to engage in domestic HADR and seems to have boosted its profile in this mission area, as seen in its large-scale disaster dispatch for Typhoon number 12.

Japan’s defense budget weathered the fiscal burdens created by the disasters and has not dramatically changed in terms of its aggregate level and allocation between defensive and offensive equipment and missions. The SDF did, however, make minor adjustments in these two areas. First, the 2012 defense budget broke a decade long decline in defense spending but the increase does not represent a fundamental change in the 1% of GDP defense spending norm. Second, allocation for the SDF’s disaster response and CBRN capabilities received minor budget increases. Japan’s aggravated economic health after the disasters create uncertainty in its ability to maintain the goals spelled out in the 2010 MTDP. If economic conditions decline in the medium term, a

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324 The finalized 2012 defense budget sheds more light on the nature of the defense budget increases. The increase in the 2012 defense budget is attributed to expenses related to restoration and reconstruction activities. If these figures are included, the defense budget grew 2.1% from the 2011 defense budget. If excluded, these figures represent what the defense budget would have looked like if the Great East Japan Earthquake had not occurred. The result would have been a .4% decrease in the defense budget from 2011. This would have continued the decade long trend of a smaller defense budget. These cuts are not significant, however, and represent only a slight decrease in defense spending levels. This indicates the defense budget goals laid out in the 2010 MTDP remain achievable. The ODA budget continues to take a bigger hit than the defense budget. Plan for Defense Programs and Budget of Japan: Overview of FY2012 Budget. Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Defense, 2012, 32–33, 39.
revision of the MTDP can be expected in the next several years. Furthermore, Japan’s selection of the F-35 as its F-X will place added stress on these goals if its cost continues to rise.

The U.S.-Japan security alliance was strengthened following the disasters. The U.S. military’s OPERATION TOMODACHI illustrated a functional alliance relationship and validated years of joint training between the SDF and U.S. military. Evidence of a strengthened alliance emerged primarily at the elite level in such forums as the SCC 2+2. A strengthened alliance does not preclude a closer step toward remilitarization. The fiscal constraints and governance issues facing Japan’s leadership provide less incentive for this trajectory and make retrenchment or at least maintaining the status quo more favorable as Japan recovers from the disasters.

The disasters provided numerous opportunities to strengthen relations with its Northeast Asian neighbors, particularly China and South Korea. Both provided considerable levels of support to Japan. High-level government official visits, specifically the Japan-China-South Korea Leaders Meeting, took advantage of the goodwill generated by the disasters and marked a more positive mood in the region. This was a significant improvement especially with China after the Senkaku incident in late 2010. Despite the improved relations, a foundation for sustained cooperation does not exist, which will allow heated issues between Japan and its neighbors to quickly squander any goodwill generated. Territorial disputes and historical interpretations continue to plague their relations.325

2. Economic Interests

Japan’s economic conditions were the most susceptible to change by the disasters. Serious impacts to GDP growth in the short term, however, were averted because the affected areas only represented a little less than 3% of Japan’s economy. Furthermore, many industries in the affected region were able to avert disruptions in supply chains and

recovered to pre-disaster production levels. GDP decline since the disasters is more the result of multiple factors affecting Japan’s economy than the disasters themselves.

Although severe immediate impacts to Japan’s economy were averted, Japan’s economic health defined in the medium to long term was worsened. In order to finance the third and fourth supplementary budgets that provided funding for Japan’s reconstruction efforts, reconstruction bonds were issued that increased reliance on long-term debt to finance its budget. As most of the expected 23 trillion yen in reconstruction funds has already been allocated, the impact on Japan’s economy from the disasters will likely be felt in the medium term. Long-term impacts can be better attributed to the larger stress on Japan’s budget: social security. If these added fiscal burdens manifest themselves in the medium-term, the 2010 MTDP and defense budget in general may require re-evaluation, which could lead to retrenchment in terms of more drastic defense budget cuts.

Japan is placing great emphasis on its reconstruction agenda. The idea that this might lead to a redefinition of Japan’s economic interests in internal or domestic terms rather than external or international terms does not seem likely based on reconstruction guidelines released by the Reconstruction Design Council and the Reconstruction Headquarters. The Japanese leadership understands that Japan’s economy cannot be revived through domestic measures only and is advocating a hybrid reconstruction effort focused on domestic and international elements. The DPJ’s closer leaning toward the TPP illustrates less deference toward domestic economic issues that are perceived as detrimental to a revival in Japan’s economy.

In the battle between guns (defense budget) and goodwill (ODA), guns continue to win. Japan’s traditional source of international influence has been economic aid in the form of ODA. Since 1997, the ODA budget has declined in comparison to the defense budget that has remained relatively constant. This trend continued in the 2012 draft budget and illustrates a growing deference of defense spending over ODA. This is significant because it indicates the public and government see defense spending as more
justifiable than ODA. More reliance on defense spending as a means for international influence through its international security activities indicates a shift toward remilitarization.

Despite the controversy surrounding nuclear power after the disasters, Japan’s energy dependency will likely continue into the long-term because of Japan’s energy dilemma. Japan needs a significant source of domestically produced energy provided by nuclear power because it lacks energy resources. Even with nuclear power it remains highly energy dependent in several aspects. Switching to less risky forms of energy such as renewable energy would become costly as nuclear power is the cheapest form of energy currently available. Making a dramatic shift to renewable energy is not feasible in the short and medium term. With or without nuclear power, Japan will remain dependent on foreign energy sources and will require close attention to the changing international environment and its impact on energy resources. This will continue to provide incentive for Japan to exert its influence in the international system.

3. Norms

The SDF’s central and successful role in the disasters has helped break through a foundational security norm: public trust of the SDF. The large-scale disaster dispatch and nuclear dispatch thrust the SDF into the media spotlight, which rewarded the SDF’s role in the disasters with a positive portrayal. Public opinion regarding trust in the SDF has never been higher as a result. This is significant as the SDF has a reputation as an outsider in its own country and calls into question the meaning of domestic antimilitarism. Civil-military relations regarding domestic HADR seem the most likely area to improve as a result.

Translating gains in public trust for the SDF into utility for non-military force in the form of non-traditional security activities such as HADR is another likely outcome. The public’s perception after the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake regarding the SDF’s primary, most effective, and future role significantly boosted the SDF’s HADR role in each category. The SDF’s perceived HADR role has received a similar boost after the recent disaster, which will maintain high levels for at least the medium term. As the SDF’s non-traditional international security activities increased after the 1995
earthquake, a similar trend can be expected in the future. These past trends signal that the utility of non-military force will be seen as useful for domestic and international purposes.

Public opinion did not peg the SDF as a strictly HADR force after the 1995 earthquake. Instead, the SDF’s role of ensuring national security also increased exponentially with its HADR role. This is most likely due to the SDF’s increased profile from the disasters. The SDF’s defensive role also received a boost in support after the recent disasters. A 2004 SAGE report found that the public remains averse to the use of offensive force, but mostly supportive of defense force. The Iraq syndrome detailed by Midford illustrates a skeptical public toward the use of offensive force. Therefore, it does not seem probable that increased public trust in the SDF will directly translate into the utility of offensive force. These linkages are addressed more explicitly in the next section.

Numerous procedural limitations, legal norms, still exist that would slow a remilitarization trajectory: five PKO principles, Article 9 of the Constitution, and the three non-nuclear principles. One of Japan’s long-standing legal norms has changed since the disasters, however. Legislation passed in December 2011 now allows Japan to freely engage in joint weapons development with the United States, European Union, and other friendly nations. This represents a fundamental shift from taking a case-by-case approach to arms exports in the past to now having blanket authority to embark on joint weapons development. The fact that this legal norm was the first to change after the disasters is significant because it is one that is most directly linked to Japan’s economic conditions rather than pacifist norms such as the three non-nuclear principles. This suggests that a degree of economic pragmatism is driving changes to Japan’s legal norms since the arms export ban was revised in order to improve Japan’s industry competitiveness and keep defense costs down.

The U.S.-Japan alliance norms of entrapment and abandonment and trust in the United States were not significantly affected. Abandonment fears do not seem probable because of the U.S. military’s demonstration as a reliable alliance partner through OPERATION TOMODACHI. Entrapment fears are also not likely to be triggered since
the United States has recently ended the Iraq War. Obama has also stated his intention to end the Afghanistan War by 2014 and redirected his defense strategy focus toward the Asia-Pacific. A merging of security interests between Japan and the United States is taking place that would mitigate entrapment fears. The United States’ foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific may still trigger entrapment fears if a hardline approach is taken in the region. This method of engagement will become critical to U.S.-Japan relations depending on the outcome of the 2012 U.S. presidential election. Another aspect of the alliance norms is surprising. Despite the public’s explicit appreciation of the U.S. military’s assistance after the disasters, it has not had any major impact on trust levels between the Japanese public and the United States. The perceived impasse over the Futenma relocation issue is a critical variable in this dynamic. It is worthy to note that there seems to be a gap between elite and public opinion regarding the U.S.-Japan security alliance.

4. Actors and Institutions

The analysis regarding the actors and institutions affecting the SDF trajectory examines two areas. First, what structure of actors and institutions that affect the SDF trajectory existed prior to the disasters and what trends were already in motion? This will describe the filter in which the SDF trajectory is formed after the disasters. Second, how have the disasters altered the makeup of this structure?

The public exerts indirect control over the SDF trajectory in the sense that it cannot actively manipulate the SDF’s application within the confines of Japan’s security policy. Instead, the public’s power is felt in an indirect manner in relation to politicians and the security policy to which they subscribe. This provides them substantial leverage over politicians when the SDF is applied in ways that run counter to public opinion. These beliefs include a strong aversion to anything that resembles the offensive use of force. This explains the Iraq syndrome developed by the public as this war became increasingly unpopular due to its perceived illegitimacy and is one of many reasons the public voted against the LDP leaders in support of this war in the 2009 Lower House elections. Furthermore, as the SDF’s roles changed after the Cold War from a BDF to a more active force in the domestic and international arenas, the public has had more to
discuss regarding security policy and has therefore become more powerful in relation to politicians by addressing SDF activities that it does not support.

The same increase in SDF activity after the Cold War is affecting the dynamics of bureaucratic control over the SDF. The likelihood of SDF activity at home and abroad is causing the bureaucracy to lose some control over security policy to politicians as they need to be more involved in the formation process for their own political survival as security matters become more relevant topics in every day political discourse. The bureaucracy’s capacity and talent to craft security policy remains intact as a result of the delegation relationship between the bureaucracy and politicians, LDP, during the Cold War. Changes are also taking place within the bureaucracy between the MOFA and MOD. Because of the SDF’s increasing domestic and international roles, the need to include SDF interests in the security policy formation process is becoming more important. The MOFA continues to have a majority of control over areas affecting the SDF as opposed to the MOD. The MOD’s elevated status in 2007 and restructuring to allow for more security policy formation capacity shows the trend of including SDF interests in security policy, however. This process is slow as the MOD is in the nascent stage of being able to significantly impact security policy.

The political system is also changing the nature of the SDF’s application. As politicians become more assertive in security policy and crisis management in particular, the SDF is subjected to a political system in flux. The power of the ideological left, communists and socialists, which supported the containment of the SDF and characterized the main political opposition party during the Cold War, has diminished significantly in the last two decades. Today, the two largest political parties, DPJ and LDP, support engaging the SDF and increasingly rely on the SDF as a tool of the state to manage domestic crisis such as natural disasters, and growing potential threats in the region such as China and North Korea. The disasters have complicated this changing political system even further as the public is dissatisfied with the DPJ’s crisis management. This may serve to once again shift the balance of power away from the ruling party in the next Lower House elections. Although the LDP may benefit from the DPJ’s poor performance because it is the only credible alternative, voters do not seem
enthusiastic about returning to LDP-style governance. Voter dissatisfaction is creating more opportunities for third parties to present a valid alternative to DPJ or LDP rule that may further complicate the SDF’s trajectory if these parties gain any significant representation.

Despite the evolving internal structure of actors and institutions affecting the SDF’s trajectory, Japan remains stuck between Northeast Asia and the United States. Northeast Asia continues to advocate containing the SDF. China’s distanced relationship with the United States and Japan in terms of security interests, its rapid military modernization, and economic growth present an increasingly strong force against SDF remilitarization. The United States continues to be an external force for remilitarization. The U.S. military’s OPERATION TOMODACHI will likely embolden the United States to place added pressure on the SDF to expand its joint interoperability and in doing so fuse their security interests.

C. ANSWER: TOWARD A NEW STATUS QUO

1. Security Interests: Staying the Course

Japan’s security interests remain relatively unchanged after the disasters. The only trajectory influence within the security interests category that seems to have been altered in any significance was the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Yet, the implications of this still seem to be limited within the confines of the status quo. Japan’s security relationship with the United States remains based on a hub and spoke alliance structure originally designed to allow the United States to build strong bi-lateral relations with Northeast Asian states with the desire to balance against a well-defined threat, the Soviet Union and its communist ideals.

Japan’s security policy and defense budget were not severely affected because they proved relatively successful in handling the disasters. Only minor changes in these areas have occurred as the SDF incorporates lessons learned from the disasters.
2. Economic Interests: No Cause for Alarm … Yet

Changes in Japan’s economic interests have not been radically different with most changes exacerbating trends already in place. Japan averted catastrophic economic effects because the widespread destruction was limited to a fairly limited portion of Japan’s economy in the less industrialized and populated Tohoku region. The devastation in this region has caused some industries and businesses to relocate elsewhere, especially in large industrial centers such as Tokyo. This will make Japan’s economy more susceptible to disasters in the future in these areas with dense industry and population concentrations. Another “great” disaster striking an area like Tokyo in the medium term is considered likely and in the long term deemed inevitable. A disaster of the Great East Japan Earthquake’s magnitude in these areas will have a much greater impact on Japan’s economy and subsequently its defense budget.

The disasters did, however, aggravate several trends already in motion that may have a medium-term affect on the SDF trajectory. Japan’s budget is increasingly reliant on new debt as its social security costs climb. Significant restructuring of Japan’s tax system to alleviate this financial burden is required and is taking place at a heightened pace as a result of the fiscal pressure from the disasters. Japan’s inability to weather this economic storm may continue to place pressure on Japan’s defense budget and further complicate the political system affecting the SDF trajectory, as voters become dissatisfied with a lack of economic progress. Japan’s increased deference to the defense budget over ODA for a source of international influence signals a degree of economic pragmatism is infiltrating Japan’s security interests. Because the international community demands participation in international security activities more so than financial contribution, the SDF is becoming a more attractive and justifiable tool to legitimize Japan’s position in the international community.

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326 The authoritative Earthquake Research Institute in Japan placed the likelihood of a 7.0 magnitude earthquake hitting Tokyo in the next 4 years at 70%. “Anxiety and Inattention Over Tokyo’s Next Big One,” Mainichi Daily News, January 30, 2012, http://mdn.mainichi.jp/perspectives/pulse/news/20120130p2a00m0na002000c.html.
3. **Dueling Interests: Economic Interests Win**

In Figure 14, it was suggested that economic and security interests are positioned in a manner that could allow one to become more influential than the other. In the course of analysis regarding security and economic interests, Japan’s economic interests have received the most attention following the disasters. Japan’s economic conditions, reconstruction agenda, and Japan’s energy situation has received the most attention in particular. The Japanese media since the disasters has been saturated with stories related to these three economic interests. Japan’s politicians have spent a heavy dose of political capital on managing Japan’s economic interests as well. This economic preoccupation does not suggest that changes in Japan’s security interests are inconsequential but that a heightened awareness of Japan’s economic interests will make changes in these areas more likely.

The result is that the direction of the SDF’s trajectory will be driven primarily in terms of its impact to Japan’s economic interests. That is likely a partial explanation as to why Japan’s arms export ban was the first legal norm to change after the disasters, as politicians and the bureaucracy saw it as detrimental to Japan’s economy in the long-term. In a sense, Japan’s weakened economic situation is facilitating a transition in the SDF’s trajectory from ideological dogmatism based on a security identity of domestic anti-militarism to economic pragmatism.

4. **Norms: Conducive Environment for a Dynamic Status Quo**

Of all the areas analyzed, norms seem to be the most profoundly impacted by the disasters. It is not necessarily the area where the most aggregate changes were realized but where the most significant change occurred. This significant change occurred at the foundation of Japan’s security identity of domestic anti-militarism. The three central tenets of domestic anti-militarism defined by Oros all hinge on the public’s trust in the SDF. If the public does not trust the SDF or the state’s ability to maintain adequate control over the SDF, then they will certainly not tolerate the SDF’s involvement in domestic policymaking (first tenet), the use of force to resolve international disputes (second tenet), or the SDF’s participation in foreign wars (third tenet). The SDF’s
successful disaster dispatch demonstrated to all of the internal actors and institutions that affect the SDF’s trajectory that the three central tenets of domestic anti-militarism are partially flawed.

The way in which this has occurred can be thought of in two ways identified by Oros. The first scenario is part of a long-term trend that was set in motion from the early 1990s. The SDF’s role as an effective domestic tool became elevated after a series of significant natural and man-made disasters: Mount Unzen’s eruption in the early 1990s, the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, and the 1995 Tokyo subway sarin gas attacks. Increased SDF participation in domestic HADR since then has been a long-term trend that makes the first central tenet increasingly irrelevant. The SDF’s disaster dispatch after the Great East Japan Earthquake provided a significant shock to domestic anti-militarism in line with the second scenario. The long-term trend initiated in the 1990s culminated in the SDF’s response to the Great East Japan Earthquake. Thus, two different scenarios, one long-term and the other sudden, show the irrelevance of the first central tenet of domestic anti-militarism. The trends in increased deference toward the defense budget, public trust in the SDF, and more inclusion of SDF interests in the security policymaking process show this lesson has been learned.

The environment in which the SDF trajectory is forming is therefore more conducive to a remilitarization trajectory. The changes in legal norms since the disasters suggest the nature of this environment is more conducive to changes in legal norms that are more related to economic interests than pacifist norms. This is manifest in the relaxation of Japan’s arms export ban. Other legal norms that are rooted primarily in pacifist norms remain intact. This suggests that sufficient will still exists to prevent more overt forms of remilitarization from emerging like revising Japan’s peace constitution. The result is that the SDF’s trajectory is more likely to see changes between the status quo and remilitarization that benefit Japan’s economic interests. This will lead to a dynamic status quo.

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328 Ibid., 72.
5. **Actors/ Institutions: Pushing The Envelope toward Remilitarization**

The survey of actors and institutions shows that most are in favor of something between the status quo and remilitarization. The opposition to this trajectory is limited to Japan’s Northeast Asian neighbors, which are growing increasingly powerful in their ability to contain the SDF, specifically China. The JCP and SDP have lost significant power since the 1990s leaving the DPJ and LDP to guide the SDF’s application, both of which are pushing the SDF in a dynamic status quo or remilitarization direction. The third political parties that are forming from the recent churn in Japan’s domestic politics do not want to contain the SDF but actually support security policies that resemble remilitarization. The trends in the majority of internal actors and institutions that influence the SDF’s trajectory are twofold.

First, the SDF is increasingly included rather than excluded in matters related to domestic security. The public relies on the SDF for its HADR and ensuring national security roles and shows more deference to the SDF in these areas through public opinion polls and more civil-military cooperation. The MOD’s growing influence in the bureaucracy ensures SDF interests are included in security policy. Politicians cannot ignore the SDF and must employ them effectively in crisis situations in order to maintain their party’s validity. The SDF is able to capitalize on this trend by creating an image of itself within the public of contributing to the collective good; a marketing tool made all the more powerful by its successful disaster dispatch.

Second, actors and institutions are replacing or being forced to replace ideological dogmatism with economic pragmatism. The defense budget is winning over the ODA budget in part because the SDF is an easier sell to the public in terms of preserving Japan’s well-being at the lowest price possible. Legal norms based on domestic anti-militarism that impede economic growth cannot survive this transition either, as seen in the collapse of the arms export ban. The SDF stands to benefit from this transition as well, since it is able to increase its operational tempo in areas surrounding Japan and internationally without creating significant pressure on the defense budget. This is being
manifest in the switch from a BDF to a DDF, where capabilities are eliminated in some areas, concentrated in others, and replaced overall with more flexibility and operational capacity.

6. The New Status Quo: A Brief Summary

In light of the two key elements that define the SDF trajectory debate, the new status quo that is forming has several implications for Japan’s capacity and will.

In regard to capacity, major changes in defense budget levels or allocation will not occur and will be geared toward maintaining the status quo in terms of the capabilities laid out in the 2010 MTDP in accordance with the 2010 NDPG. This represents a dynamic rather than static status quo that increases the policy space allowing for a more active SDF in domestic, regional, and international roles. Although the defense budget will not change dramatically, it continues to survive fiscal austerity measures that are targeting Japan’s more traditional source of international influence: ODA.

In regard to will, the SDF will not significantly depart from a focus on domestic or international roles. The SDF stands to become more utilized within the roles identified in the 2010 NDPG. The SDF will become more active in its domestic role as civil-military relations improve regarding the SDF’s domestic HADR role. This was exemplified in the SDF’s robust response to Typhoon number 12. The SDF’s increased activity in the domestic arena will not come at the expense of its regional and international roles either. The new SDF facility in Djibouti, continued anti-piracy mission, and participation in UNMISS attests to this. The public’s increased trust in the SDF and its proven utility as a tool of the state will allow for more public and elite support of the SDF’s roles already defined in the 2010 NDPG. The SDF’s elevated status will also create a more conducive environment that allows a re-evaluation of legal and security norms that limit the SDF along a remilitarization trajectory. Economic pragmatism will be the most influential driving force when these norms are addressed given the prominence of economic issues after the disasters.
D. NATURAL DISASTERS AS AGENTS FOR CHANGE

Natural disasters will be a persistent threat to Japan and the SDF will play a larger role in domestic HADR for the foreseeable future. It behooves those that shape security policy in relation to Japan to understand where these disasters affect change, as another “great” disaster is likely within another generation’s time.

1. Direct Impact

There are several SDF trajectory influences that are most likely to be affected by natural disasters. The first are those areas that the natural disasters directly impact that actors or institutions have no control over. This is primarily related to the economic damage caused by natural disasters. Increasing urbanization, industrial concentration, and the need to remain close to the sea as a source of food and trade will make Japan’s economy more vulnerable to major disasters in these areas. This could have a detrimental impact to Japan’s economy as a whole and subsequently its defense budget if these areas suffer a major disaster.

2. Crisis Management Capacity

All of the other SDF trajectory influences affected by natural disasters can be controlled to some degree and they all fall under the umbrella of crisis management. Crisis management can be further broken down into capacity and competency. Capacity deals with the adequate structure and tools to handle a natural disaster. Pressures on capacity are felt in several areas.

First, Japan’s security policy is tested in this regard as it must provide the SDF with the authority and flexibility to adequately handle natural disasters. No significant changes were realized in Japan’s security policy because it already accounted for natural disasters and promoted certain SDF characteristics that allowed it to react quickly and effectively.

Second, the SDF’s HADR capabilities were also tested. The areas that the SDF found lacking were identified and were targeted for improvement in the 2012 defense
These include the SDF’s disaster response and CBRN disaster response capabilities. With a transition toward a DDF, however, the type of equipment that can be related to HADR is expanding as seen in the inclusion of a DDH under the defense budget’s disaster response capabilities.

Third, the political structure comes under pressure for its capacity to manage crisis and incorporate assistance from the international community. This occurred after the Great Hanshin Earthquake when the public found that bureaucratic red tape hindered a quick reaction and receipt of international assistance and pacifist norms created a hostile environment that limited the SDF’s capacity to immediately react to the disaster. This placed pressure on the political leadership in following years to exert more executive control in crisis management situations and incorporate rather than exclude the SDF in domestic HADR. The public’s dissatisfaction with the DPJ’s handling of the disasters seems to be directed more at their handling of the nuclear disaster and the speed of their reconstruction efforts than their employing of national assets to include the SDF to handle the affected areas. Years of improved civil-military relations were validated in that regard but more pressure will be placed on the political leadership to increase its ability to rapidly respond to natural disasters.

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329 The disasters did highlight the SDF’s lack of transport capabilities as many SDF members and relief goods had to be moved by private ferries. “Revitalizing Japan: Building a Disaster Resistant Nation; How Should We Be Prepared for Calamity in 1,000 Years?” The Daily Yomiuri, January 18, 2012, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120201006982.htm.

330 Changes in the defense budget regarding the SDF’s transport capabilities were not realized because making changing in this area would require a significant rise in the defense budget. The current fiscal constraints are preventing the SDF from addressing this deficiency. The SDF is not completely unable to mobilize, however, and is using contracts with private ferries to augment its transport capabilities in the event the SDF needs to conduct contingency operations in areas surrounding Japan. “Tanks to Reach Oita Exercises by Private Ferry,” The Daily Yomiuri, October 27, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T111026005221.htm.

Pacifist norms that hinder the SDF’s ability to cooperate with local governments were also tested but it seems that there were no major issues since this lesson was learned after the Great Hanshin Earthquake. The recent disasters will help discredit any remaining sentiment along these lines.

Fourth, natural disasters present an opportunity to test the capacity of the U.S.-Japan security alliance to function effectively. The test is less related to the U.S. military’s ability to assist Japan in the event of a large natural disaster since Japan is not reliant on the U.S. military to provide support for natural disasters. The relatively unchanged alliance norms after the disasters show the public did not translate their appreciation for OPERATION TOMODACHI into increased trust in the United States or improve their view of U.S.-Japan relations. This indicates that the U.S. military’s assistance during domestic HADR in Japan should be used as a tool to show the functionality of the alliance and as a simple gesture of goodwill. Attempts to improve relations or trust in the United States through U.S. military assistance does not seem to have any long-term benefit.

3. Crisis Management Competency

Natural disasters in Japan mobilize the actors and institutions that have the most to lose through failure to competently respond. These actors include the SDF, governing party (DPJ), and the U.S. military. The SDF stands to lose legitimacy as a competent tool of the state if it does not respond effectively. The SDF’s effective performance of all HADR missions demonstrated to the public its rightful domestic role. Therefore, domestic HADR is an important tool for the SDF to boost its public image and garner trust. The DPJ needs to maintain its reputation as a competent governing party so a natural disaster will cause its reactions in several areas to be under the spotlight. Its ability to manage Japan’s economic conditions and energy dependency has been subject

332 The recent draft is the first LDP constitution revision draft since 2005 and provides power to the prime minister to declare a state of emergency. The Cabinet can create and enforce ordinances during a state of emergency with the same effect as law. The public is also obligated to obey state and local government instructions during a state of emergency. “LDP Constitution Revision Draft: Expands Govt Power in Emergencies and Calls for Self-Defense Right,” The Daily Yomiuri, March 4, 2012, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120303003947.htm.
to criticism from the public. The DPJ was also forced to examine the utility of ODA and legal norms such as the arms export ban because of the disasters. The U.S.-Japan security alliance stands to lose credibility if the U.S. military does not function effectively with the SDF. OPERATION TOMODACHI served to highlight the U.S. military and SDF’s joint functionality.

In all cases, the performance of the SDF, DPJ, and United States in a domestic HADR situation is key to determining how natural disasters affect change on these entities. Consider what might have happened if these actors’ response was perceived differently. A poor SDF performance could result in less public trust, which would make the public more skeptical of changes to legal norms and the SDF’s international security activities. A proactive response to the nuclear disaster and quick movement on reconstruction efforts might have boosted the DPJ’s popularity with the public and given it a better chance of maintaining power at the next Lower House elections. If major confrontations emerged from OPERATION TOMODACHI between the SDF and U.S. military, it could have seriously damaged Japan’s faith in one of the alliance’s main functions: the U.S. military’s commitment and ability to defend Japan.

4. **Limited But Significant Capacity for Change**

The main takeaway from this is that natural disasters have a limited capacity for change but where change is likely it can create serious shifts in the influences governing the SDF trajectory. The effect on Japan’s economic conditions depends on the location and magnitude of the disaster. Japan’s security policy, SDF capabilities, and political structure are tested in terms of its crisis management capacity. The U.S.-Japan security alliance is also tested but more as a function of the alliance’s broader strength to fulfill its purpose of defending Japan. The three actors and institutions with the most to lose in terms of being found incompetent in crisis management are the SDF, governing party (DPJ), and the U.S. military. These entities are tested more than any other.

Natural disasters do not directly test on any foundational level relations with its Northeast Asian neighbors, the need to remilitarize with offensive capabilities, the utility of force, or legal norms that do not have economic repercussions nor do they place direct
pressure on the bureaucracy, as their competency is predetermined in the policy they formulate. This partially explains why some of these factors did not change. The next section deals with how some of these areas may be affected indirectly based on the nature of the SDF trajectory revealed earlier in this chapter.

E. PROSPECTS FOR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE

1. Economic Pragmatism Leading to Remilitarization

The SDF trajectory debate comes down to two elements: capacity and will. So far, this thesis has indirectly demonstrated that the SDF has the capacity to operate as a “normal” military so long as it breaks down the legal barriers to remilitarization. SDF capabilities are robust as demonstrated by its disaster dispatch and for 20 years it has participated in international security activities. The final step to becoming a “normal” military rests in Japan’s will to wield this type of force. Public opinion polls have demonstrated that the public remains extremely averse to anything that resembles the use of force outside of non-preemptive defense. A fundamental change has come about in its arms export policies, however, that runs counter to the third central tenet of domestic anti-militarism identified by Oros: no participation in foreign wars. It is reasonable to assume that under the new regulations, military equipment developed jointly between Japan and other friendly nations will be used in tomorrow’s foreign wars. If one asked the Japanese public if they should supply the United States with military equipment to be used directly in the Afghanistan War today the likely answer would be no. This does not preclude that this will occur in the future under the new regulations. This change is occurring because of a growing relevance of economic pragmatism over the forces of ideological dogmatism. As Japan becomes more focused on its current economic situation it becomes near-sighted and distracted from thwarting long-term ideological based goals, namely remilitarization. The result is that decisions made to improve Japan’s economic situation now provide the capacity to remilitarize according to the third central tenet of domestic anti-militarism. This growing sense of economic pragmatism will become stronger as long as its economy continues to stagnate and its economic situation vis a vis Northeast Asia continues to decline.
2. Security Pragmatism Leading to Remilitarization

Although it is possible that Japan could find itself in a position that breaks the third central tenet because of growing economic pragmatism, it still does not address Japan’s willingness to directly break any of the three central tenets of domestic anti-militarism.

In regard to the first central tenet, the SDF’s crucial role demonstrated in domestic HADR stands to aid a shift from ideological dogmatism that seeks to contain the SDF at all costs to security pragmatism that increasingly includes the SDF in domestic policymaking. This trend has been in motion at least since the early 1990s and has made significant improvements in the area of civil-military relations and elevation of SDF interests in conjunction with the MOD.

Breaking the second and third central tenets require a more fundamental step toward remilitarization. Once again, Japanese public opinion and SDF employment to date shows a lack of willingness to use force to resolve international disputes or participate directly in foreign wars. Based on the trends in the SDF trajectory identified thus far, there are two plausible scenarios where the second and third central tenet could be broken.

First, creeping remilitarization occurs where inertial forces aided by certain conditions facilitate a gradual change that eventually breaks the second and third central tenet. For instance, the constitutionality of sending SDF troops abroad for the first time after the Gulf War was fiercely contested but 20 years later SDF participation in UN PKO has become the new norm.\(^\text{333}\) 334 Now that the SDF is a routine participant in UN PKO it is more susceptible to international pressure to expand its areas of operation away from safe places. MOD and SDF officials expressed this pressure regarding its


participation in safe areas of UNMISS. The discussion now is not if the SDF’s participation in UN PKO is constitutional but if the five PKO principles governing the SDF’s use of force should be revised. The SDF’s demonstrated competence during its disaster dispatch stands to place indirect pressure on this regard, as the most trusted institution in Japan is subjected to borderline humiliating restrictions on seemingly innocuous activities like UN PKO. Nonetheless, the SDF’s routine involvement in UN PKO today has evolved very slowly since 1991, which suggests numerous conditions exist to limit a remilitarization trajectory. The current conditions influencing the SDF trajectory make fundamental change more likely, however.

Second, bait and switch tactics from more remilitarization minded actors and institutions might allow an expansion of the SDF’s roles or relaxation of legal norms. This could first provide the capacity to execute missions counter to the second and third central tenets without the initial intent of doing so. Actors and institutions that push for remilitarization could then take advantage of these expanded roles or relaxed legal norms. For instance, the government’s perceived inability to react quickly to the disasters has created a desire in Japan to increase the government’s crisis management capacity. The LDP’s new constitutional revision draft takes aim at this sentiment but it also includes several measures that would bring the SDF closer to remilitarization. It reclassifies the SDF as a self defense military, adds the right to self defense to Article 9, clarifies language that would allow the right to collective self defense, and makes it easier to amend the constitution. If the LDP were able to push through this revision, it would provide the LDP with additional legal room to push for direct participation in foreign wars.


336 A March 2012 Daily Yomiuri editorial stated constitutional revision should center around emergencies. It also praised the LDP’s efforts to revise the constitution given the need to address the government’s crisis management capabilities. Editorial: Talks on Revising Constitution Should Focus on Emergencies.

3. **A Dynamic Status Quo Rather than Remilitarization**

Although the factors previously mentioned seem to be leaning toward remilitarization, complete remilitarization in the short or medium term does not seem likely for several reasons. These reasons act as disincentives for a remilitarization trajectory and serve to limit changes to the fringes of the status quo bordering remilitarization.

First, the U.S.-Japan security alliance continues to guarantee Japan’s security from external threats. Call it buck-passing, free riding, or cheap riding; Japan is fulfilling its obligations according to the provisions agreed upon in 1960. Japan provides bases for the U.S. military, which allows the United States to project its power and influence in the region, and in turn the United States guarantees Japan’s safety in the event of an attack. Even though Japan does not believe a large-scale conventional attack is likely according to its 2010 NDPG, the United States continues to reassure Japan of its defense in more likely but smaller scale conflicts over territorial disputes. This was made known by the United States after the 2010 Senkaku incident. The deepening of the alliance after the disasters, and the United States’ refocus on the Asia-Pacific will make dislodging the alliance’s structural limitations against remilitarization more difficult.

Second, a dramatic leap toward remilitarization could prove disastrous with the most volatile threat for pro SDF containment: China. If politicians or the bureaucracy were to push through radical revisions to many legal norms it would signal a clear break from the status quo and may initiate an overt arms race with China.\(^ {338}\)

Third, the nature of Japan’s relations with China also serves to mitigate the need to embark on a remilitarization trajectory in terms of balancing against China. Much skepticism remains between the two nations on security issues but economically the two are highly interdependent. China is Japan’s largest import and export market.\(^ {339}\)


Fourth, two lost decades of economic stagnation compounded by the disasters does not bode well for Japan’s capacity or will to remilitarize. A strong U.S.-Japan alliance and entangling itself economically with China provide a more fiscally sound alternative to remilitarization.

Fifth, a web of legal norms still exist that Japan must overcome before it can even begin to argue that it has remilitarized. Many of these norms such as the constitution have proven to be very difficult to procedurally revise. A great deal of political capital must be spent in order to make these changes and currently Japan’s economy is taking center stage.

Sixth, even though some actors and institutions may push for a remilitarization trajectory, the post World War II environment under which these entities were formed does not support a radical return to a militarist past. For example, the SDF has never used force except one time in 2001 in an act deemed entirely within the scope of self defense. The activities that the SDF find rewarding are those related to international security activities and domestic HADR. The SDF may desire to be accepted by the public but they are not about to embark on a militarist past reminiscent of the 1930s.340

Finally, even though this thesis suggests a transition is occurring between ideological dogmatism and economic pragmatism, elements of Japan’s security identity of domestic anti-militarism still remain. The public remains largely averse to anything resembling the offensive use of force. Japan’s close ties with the United States also make Japan weary of the SDF’s own, even innocuous, international security activities as fears of entanglement are reinforced.

Altogether, these numerous disincentives provide serious limitations to Japan’s capacity and will to rapidly remilitarize. The only plausible path to remilitarization is through a long-term gradual shift brought about by economic and security pragmatism.

340 Fruhstuck indicates that Japan, like many other European states, is in a “post-heroic” cultural phase. This type of environment does not lead states to glorify violence. International security activities and domestic HADR provide more motivation in this type of society. Sabine Fruhstuck, Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007), 181–184.
A significant shock to the system may address some of these disincentives but would need to discredit all in order to facilitate a major change. This is not likely. For instance, a fait accompli action on the Senkaku Islands by China would likely be handled within the U.S.-Japan alliance structure. The public’s aversion to offensive force would not be tested because it would be seen as a defensive action. Such an action on China’s part would seriously jeopardize its economic relations with its two largest trading partners, the United States and Japan, and is likely a reason why the territorial dispute has not escalated into conflict to date.

F. UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Be Skeptical of the Efficacy of HADR

At least in Northeast Asia, the short-term change in relations with China and South Korea shows that HADR is not an effective long-term tool for improving relations. This should not come as a complete surprise given the lack of security cooperation between Japan and its neighbors. HADR is effective in providing a positive environment of cooperation for the political leadership to meet and discuss non-related issues. The short-term gains in this regard may pay off in the long-term but fundamental issues such as historical interpretations and territorial issues will continue to trump these efforts as long as they are not solved. Japan-South Korea relations stand to benefit the most as the 2010 NDPG is targeting South Korea for improved relations and the DPJ is more amenable to non-provocative actions in the region.

In regard to U.S.-Japan relations, the efficacy of HADR is somewhat surprising. At the elite level, OPERATION TOMODACHI proved to be an effective tool for strengthening the alliance. The SCC 2+2 statements made this very clear and Japan has in many ways come closer to the United States in the year following the disasters. For instance, Japan selected the F-35 as its F-X. Noda has leaned closer to the United States-led TPP and has also welcomed the U.S. strategic focus shift to the Asia-Pacific. Surprisingly however, while the Japanese public is extremely thankful for the U.S. military’s support after the disasters, this has not translated into any significant change in
the public’s opinion regarding trust in the United States or positive views of U.S.-Japan relations. In this sense, HADR is not an effective tool to boost the public’s positive perception in these two areas. Public opinion matters because the public is becoming more aware of its security environment and has the ability to punish or reward politicians based on their increasing need to have a distinguishable security platform.

This is not to say the United States or any other state should not do its utmost in supporting countries in times of need, but that expectations should be managed as to how far this goodwill will create change.

2. **Focus on Futenma**

As illustrated in the previous recommendation, Japanese public opinion toward the United States has not improved but actually worsened slightly since the disasters. Those that view U.S.-Japan relations negatively have outnumbered those that see it positively for the last two years. The previous ten years before that were marked by a majority of positive views on U.S.-Japan relations (see Figure 37). This is a curious development given the conditions that should warrant an improved view of the United States. The United States has ended the war in Iraq, not pressured Japan to support the Afghanistan War, aligned its strategic interests more closely with Japan in its focus shift toward the Asia-Pacific, and conducted a significant HADR operation after the Great East Japan Earthquake.

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341 The topic Figure 37 is illustrating is how Americans and Japanese view U.S.–Japan relations. “Feelings About U.S. Are Complex: Disaster Relief Operations Appreciated But Major Ally Not Fully Trusted.”

342 The Obama administration has not pressured Japan to contribute in Afghanistan primarily because international support for the war is decreasing. The conclusion of the MSDF’s Indian Ocean mission was a non-event in U.S.–Japan relations because it was seen from the U.S. perspective that it was no longer needed. Chris Nelson, “Obama Team OK With DPJ,” *The Oriental Economist* 77, no. 9 (September, 2009), 11.
The issue that seems to be driving a wedge between the Japanese public and the United States is Futenma according to a December 2011 poll that revealed 82% of the public feel a lack of progress on the Futenma relocation issue is having a negative effect on U.S.-Japan relations. This should serve as a warning that if progress is not made on the Futenma issue in the eyes of the Japanese public, they are likely to be more skeptical of the United States and its policies in the region. Not having the public’s backing will make the political leadership less inclined to risk loss of power and make a concerted policy effort with Japan in the Asia-Pacific more difficult.

The Futenma relocation issues needs further review to determine whether this is a temporary or permanent feature in U.S.-Japan relations.

3. **Do Not Miscalculate the SDF’s Trajectory**

At first glance, the catastrophic nature of the Great East Japan Earthquake and the SDF’s unprecedented involvement might give significant evidence on the surface to
assume the SDF may rapidly retrench or remilitarize after the disasters. Assuming either can lead to missed opportunities or a setback in relations.

If the United States assumes the SDF is retrenching after the disasters and places pressure on Japan for doing so, it has the potential to create a rift in relations. Furthermore, this assumption will distract policymakers and policy practitioners away from the opportunities available for increased cooperation in two areas. First, the United States and Japan’s security policies have aligned in terms of its focus in the Asia-Pacific and on China and North Korea particularly. Because Japan’s security policy supports an increased SDF operational tempo, the U.S. military stands to benefit in its own effort to monitor areas surrounding Japan. A collaborative effort should be pursued in these areas in order to avoid unnecessary mission overlap and capitalize on the SDF’s robust MSDF and ASDF assets in areas surrounding Japan.

Second, the SDF proved itself as a competent HADR force and Japan’s security policy opens the door wider for more regional and international security activities. Although the opportunity for cooperation in Northeast Asia is limited, the SDF is increasingly participating in international HADR. With the proven utility of the SDF’s DDHs and other MSDF assets for HADR, these assets can be used for more regional HADR in areas such as South and Southeast Asia. A more confident SDF will also embolden their participation in these activities.

If the United States assumes the SDF is rapidly remilitarizing and pressures the SDF for increased international security contributions in a similar manner during the initial stages of the Iraq War, then entrapment fears may be triggered. The ending of the Iraq War and planned withdrawal from Afghanistan make igniting these fears less likely but even the United States’ approach to the Asia-Pacific region has the potential to stoke these fears. A confrontational approach toward China and North Korea by the United States will likely create distrust among the Japanese public and distance the DPJ from the United States in its efforts to be non-provocative in the region. Entrapment fears could seriously setback any efforts on the United States part for the SDF to increase its international security contribution. The alliance norms may be subject to dynamic changes as the United States holds elections in 2012 and Japan is poised for another
Lower House election at least by 2013 that could bring the LDP back into power or further fracture the government as third parties become more influential. Managing the shift in security policy priorities will become essential.

The safest course of action the United States can embark on at this point is to understand a dynamic status quo is in the offing, which means there is some room for increased SDF activity especially in HADR and SDF operations in areas surrounding Japan. Building on the U.S.-Japan’s joint relations in both areas will serve both states’ security interests.

G. RESEARCH OVERVIEW

1. Significance Revisited

The Great East Japan Earthquake will be seared into Japan’s collective conscience for generations. The SDF’s disaster dispatch will also have significant meaning for the SDF, as it was the first time the SDF received on a large-scale the public’s support and gratitude for its role. Understanding what the disasters mean and do not mean for the SDF’s trajectory is a critical factor in the ongoing debate of the SDF’s future application.

The disasters do not mean the SDF will embark on a retrenchment or rapid remilitarization trajectory. Japan’s security and economic interests have not seen fundamental change but rather trends in place prior to the disasters were aggravated or policies were validated. Japan’s norms appear to have been the most fundamentally changed as the SDF came out of the disasters’ aftermath on top in the publics’ eyes. Nonetheless, changes will occur on the fringes of the status quo bordering remilitarization as numerous disincentives keep the SDF from rapidly moving toward remilitarization. These changes will come about from a growing sense of economic and security pragmatism that results in engaging rather than containing the SDF.

2. Research Shortfalls

It has only been one year since the disasters, which has significantly limited the sample size available for this research. This thesis serves as a starting point for future research to focus on certain areas that are most likely to be affected by the disasters such
as norms and the evolving structure of actors and institutions that affect the SDF’s trajectory. More time will also allow researchers to identify more distinguishable departures in these two areas.

Since extensive research has not been conducted on the Great East Japan Earthquake and its impact on the SDF trajectory due primarily to its recent occurrence, this thesis has necessarily focused on a broad range of SDF trajectory influence categories that may have been affected by the disasters: security interests, economic interests, norms, and actors and institutions. Therefore, in depth research in any particular area has been limited but it has helped identify the most likely affected areas as discussed previously.

3. Future Research

This thesis highlights several areas that would be useful for the SDF trajectory debate as more data becomes available. First, the SDF’s domestic HADR involvement has been on the rise since the 1990s and culminated in its disaster dispatch after the Great East Japan Earthquake. How transferable is the public’s increased trust in the SDF because of these activities to other more “normal” military operations? More time may reveal that the SDF never fundamentally changes its international security activities. Why would that be the case?

Second, the trend among actors and institutions that control the SDF trajectory is to engage the SDF. As the SDF becomes more involved in domestic HADR, is this trend defined more by the desire to improve the government’s crisis management capacity or are SDF interests also considered in general security policy formation?

Third, what are the limits of the trend from ideological dogmatism centered around domestic anti-militarism to economic and security pragmatism? As the environment surrounding the SDF changes, how are these factors facilitating or hindering this transition?

Fourth, the U.S.-Japan alliance will likely be tested again in the near future by another “great” natural disaster in Japan. How involved should the U.S. military be in these disaster relief efforts? Japan does not rely on U.S. military forces in any significant capacity to support HADR in Japan. Therefore, the mechanism to involve the United
States in this situation does not exist outside of the relationships already in place for other joint military operations. Too much U.S. military involvement in this case may prove detrimental to the overall relief efforts, as this requires a significant amount of coordination effort on Japan’s part. At the same time, too little of a response may trigger negative views of U.S. military forces stationed in Japan. An appropriate balance must be reached to ensure the U.S. military does not detract from the overall HADR operation and does not trigger negative views of the U.S.-Japan security alliance.
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