

COIN Modeling: An MDMP Technique for Planning Counter-Insurgency Campaigns

**A Monograph
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AY 04-05

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 074-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 052605	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Monograph	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE COIN Modeling: An MDMP Technique for Planning Counter-Insurgency Campaigns			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ Samuel E. Hales				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) US Army Command and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies 250 Gibbon Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words) This monograph argues that the UEX planner must broaden the MDMP in order to make it an effective COIN planning process. The MDMP was designed as a planning process for conventional operations. It is, therefore, focused on planning conventional operations leading to the defeat of the enemy in battle. Successful COIN operations do not necessarily lead to a decisive battle, but successfully isolate the insurgent from his sources of power. Therefore, an effective COIN planning process must be comprehensive enough to address the military and non-military conditions that sustain the insurgency. This requires the planners to understand the critical aspects of the overall society and its key participants while developing logical lines of operations to achieve the desired endstate. This monograph recommends a modification to the MDMP in order to make it compatible with the realities of counter-insurgency warfare. The term coined here for the new planning technique is COIN Modeling.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Counter-Insurgency Planning, MDMP, COIN			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 52	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT U	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE U	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT U	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT none	

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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Title of Monograph: COIN Modeling: An MDMP Technique for Planning Counter-Insurgency Campaigns

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ABSTRACT

COIN MODELING: AN MDMP TECHNIQUE FOR PLANNING COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS by MAJ Samuel E. Hales, United States Army, 52 pages.

In the summer of 2003, the United States Army was ill prepared to wage an effective counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq. The lack of institutional readiness can be seen in many areas, but one of the most glaring was its utter lack of doctrine concerning planning counter-insurgency operations and campaigns. Despite having built one of the most effective conventional warfare tactical training systems in the world, the Army had little focus on counter-insurgency training or doctrine.

This monograph argues that the UEX planner must broaden the MDMP in order to make it an effective COIN planning process. The MDMP was designed as a planning process for conventional operations. It is, therefore, focused on planning conventional operations leading to the defeat of the enemy in battle. Successful COIN operations do not necessarily lead to a decisive battle, but successfully isolate the insurgent from his sources of power. Therefore, an effective COIN planning process must be comprehensive enough to address the military and non-military conditions that sustain the insurgency. This requires the planners to understand the critical aspects of the overall society and its key participants while developing logical lines of operations to achieve the desired endstate. This monograph recommends a modification to the MDMP in order to make it compatible with the realities of counter-insurgency warfare. The term coined here for the new planning technique is COIN Modeling.

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INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 2003, the United States Army was ill prepared to wage an effective counter-insurgency in Iraq. The lack of institutional readiness can be seen in many areas, but one of the most glaring was in the utter lack of doctrine concerning planning counter-insurgency operations and campaigns. Despite having built one of the most effective conventional warfare tactical training systems in world, the Army had little focus on counter-insurgency training or doctrine. Much of this lack of preparation for counter-insurgency operations is attributable to the actions taken by the emerging Army leadership of the 1980's and 1990's. Their personal experience with the Army during and directly after Vietnam caused them to de-emphasize counter-insurgency and small wars and focus on the conventional war against the Soviets.

The Vietnam War had a deep and lasting impact on the Army as an institution. Many of the officers who served in Vietnam came out of that experience with a calling to rebuild the Army that they saw as not ready for combat and with poor morale. They perceived that their Army of the late 1970's had lost its warfighting focus and its way. They believed that the long years of counter-insurgency and nation building in Vietnam had taken its toll on the Army. As part of examining what had gone wrong, some of the key leaders seized on the idea that the US Army shouldn't do "nation building."¹ Vietnam seemed to prove to them that the Army needed to get back to focusing on conventional warfighting. They saw military force as well suited for defeating enemy armies and not for nation building and counter-insurgency operations. There were many good reasons why these men who rebuilt our Army after Vietnam came to these conclusions, but none of them were based on an appreciation of the U.S. Army's extensive history with small wars or the nature of the world that would arise after the end of the Cold War.

¹ Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of Vietnam* (New York: The Bantam Doubleday Publishing Group, Inc., 1984), 245.

The senior leaders looked at the threat of the Soviet Red Army and made fighting them the Army's primary focus. Training, manning, and equipping units for victory in the Fulda Gap became the Army's mantra. This resulted in an Army that by the end of the 1990's was without a peer at conventional operations. It did not lead to an Army that was well trained or equipped for counter-insurgency operations. While focusing on conventional operations, the Army unlearned much of the counter-insurgency lessons from Vietnam and before. By the end of the 1990's, much of the Army accepted that it should focus solely on conventional warfare and that small wars of nation building and counter-insurgencies were not valid missions for the Army. Despite years in the Balkans and frequent operations in places like Haiti and Somalia the Army clung to its big war focus. It was not until the summer of 2003 after the invasion of Iraq that the Army began to accept counter-insurgency operations as a truly valid military mission.

Authors such as Max Boot² and Andrew Birtle³ have shown that throughout U.S. history the President has frequently directed the Army to conduct small wars across the globe. These small wars have generally consisted in one way or another of nation building and counter-insurgency operations. There are few decades in American history when the Army was not involved in nation building of one type or another. In addition to nation building, the Army has a long history of conducting counter-insurgency operations. Small wars are integral to understanding the Army's proud history.

During the rebirth of the Army after Vietnam, there was a re-emphasis on training and preparing units below division for combat. As a part of this training, the Army focused among other things on developing an effective military planning process. This resulted in the field manual FM 101-5 *Staff Organization and Operations* and subsequently FM 5-0 *Army Planning*

² Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2003).

³ Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counter-Insurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941* (Washington: Center of Military History, 2001).

and Orders Production. These manuals prescribe an overarching planning process to develop military orders. The focus of the military decision making process (MDMP) and these manuals is on conventional warfare. The MDMP was well suited to the type of conventional warfare that the combat training centers portrayed throughout the 1980's and 1990's. The MDMP reflected the Army leadership's post-Vietnam vision of how and when the Army should fight. That vision was a battle centric view of Army operations and the planning as laid out in these field manuals reflected that vision. In addition to these planning manuals, the Army produced FM 3-07 *Stability Operations and Support Operations.* This was the Army's first post Vietnam attempt to address the potential need for a manual for operations other than war. As a very small part of those operations it touched on counter-insurgency doctrine. Instead of having a separate counter-insurgency chapter or field manual, the Army lumped counter-insurgency under the term Foreign Internal Defense. With the rise of a clear insurgency in Iraq in the summer and fall of 2003, the Army realized that its current counter-insurgency doctrine was insufficient. In reaction to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan it started on a new counter-insurgency manual, FM 3-07.22 *Counter-Insurgency.* Even with the publication of this manual the Army has yet to develop an adequate planning process for counter-insurgency campaigns that either augments or replaces the MDMP.

The purpose of this monograph is to convince the UEX planner that he must broaden the MDMP in order to make it an effective COIN planning process. The MDMP was designed as a planning process for conventional operations. It is, therefore, focused on planning conventional operations leading to the defeat of the enemy in battle. Successful COIN operations do not necessarily lead to a decisive battle, but successfully isolate the insurgent from his sources of power. Therefore, an effective COIN planning process must be comprehensive enough to address the military and non-military conditions that sustain the insurgency. This requires the planners to understand the critical aspects of the overall society and its key variables while developing logical lines of operations to achieve the desired endstate. This monograph suggests an adaptation to the

MDMP in order to make it compatible with the realities of counter-insurgency warfare. The term coined here for this new adaptation is COIN Modeling.

To fully understand the rationale behind COIN Modeling, it is important to have a common understanding of counter-insurgency warfare on which this technique is built. The monograph will therefore begin with a discussion on counter-insurgency warfare and some of the historical trends of successful counter-insurgency campaigns. This section will also review some of the well known insurgencies of the 20th century and discuss some lessons that can be gleaned from them. In addition to understanding the nature of 20th century insurgencies, the monograph will briefly discuss the nature of the rising Arab Islamist insurgency headed by Al Qaeda. All of this is done with an eye on developing a shared understanding of the nature of counter-insurgency warfare in order to fully understand the reasoning behind the COIN Modeling planning technique.

After setting the stage with an understanding of counter-insurgency warfare, the monograph will develop the COIN Modeling technique. This section will start with a discussion of planning in complex environments. From there, it will provide a technique for approaching mission analysis, course of action development, and course of action analysis. The monograph will conclude with some final thoughts on counter-insurgency planning and operations.

THE NATURE OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY WARFARE

Before going into a discussion on the nature of counter-insurgency warfare it is important to explain why this discussion is critical to presenting and understanding the COIN Modeling technique. All planning processes are based on set of stated and unstated assumptions about the nature of the problem the process is trying to solve. The MDMP is no different. It was designed with the Fulda Gap in mind. It was designed for force on force battles of conventional combined arms armies. Though the designers of this process did not explicitly state any of the assumptions on which they built this process those assumptions are still there. The kind of warfare they were facing was very different than the warfare that the Army is facing in Iraq in 2004. Their warfare

was a war between two Superpowers with massive conventional armies on a battlefield that could spread over hundreds if not thousands of kilometers. The challenge they faced was to mass fire power and effects faster than the enemy in order to impose their will and a single adversary. This was a warfare that fit neatly into the world described by Clausewitz and Jomini and their ideas of center of gravity and lines of operations. This is not the form of warfare that the Army confronts today in Iraq. The nature of counter-insurgent warfare or small wars is very different. There is no massed army for the U.S. military to go after. If the United States military can find a massed enemy there is no doubt that the U.S. can defeat it on the battlefield. The challenge is not in massing and synchronizing forces faster than the enemy, it is understanding who the enemy is and severing him from the people. These are very different types of warfare and therefore require different approaches to planning. With that in mind, it is essential to discuss in some detail the nature of counter-insurgency warfare before moving directly to the COIN Modeling planning process.

AN INSURGENCY AS A MOVEMENT

The literature on insurgencies tends to focus on their political nature their willingness to use force to achieve their ends. This view is best exemplified by the author Bard O'Neill when he writes,

“Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g. organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.”⁴

⁴ Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Virginia: Brassey's Inc., 1990).

Most definitions of insurgency follow along O'Neill's logic. The problem with this definition is that it focuses too heavily on politics. It does not match the story of insurgencies told by history. It is clear that O'Neill's and the Army's definitions are shaped by Clausewitz's argument that war is an extension of politics. The issue is however, that by using the political perspective, it is hard to understand many of these insurgencies and the people in them. As a model, the primacy of the political perspective is inadequate for explaining why men and women become insurgents. As a result of the inability of the political argument to fully explain insurgencies, some scholars began to look at sociology to better explain insurgency movements.

This study of why men become insurgents is both new and old. Modern authors such as Gurr, Lichbach, and Oberschall have all looked into *Why Men Rebel*. These scholars seem to be focusing more on the social context that shapes the insurgent than the political setting alone. They acknowledge that the political setting is still important, but they are finding importance in religion, a feeling of self-worth, belonging, family ties, and other influences to be as, or even more important, in explaining the success and cohesion of an insurgency. None argue this better than Aristotle did when he gave seven reasons why men overthrow their government. In *The Politics* he argues that men generally rebel for profit, honor, ill-treatment, fear, preponderance (one individual with excessive influence), contemptuous attitudes, and disproportionate increase.⁵ It is obvious that there are a wide variety of complex reasons behind why men join insurgent movements. Simply seeing an insurgency as a violent political movement is not enough. They are complex social movements that are participating violently in the political arena. For this reason I have merged the political and social definitions of insurgency. An insurgency is a social movement that is willing to use force to achieve a socio-political endstate within their perceived community.

⁵ Aristotle, edited by Trevor J. Saunders and translated by T. A. Sinclair, *The Politics* (Sufflok, England: Penguin Books, 1981) 302.

THE 20TH CENTURY INSURGENCY

It is important to understand how the 20th century shaped the collective thinking on revolutionary warfare and insurgencies. In the late 20th century, the American military's collective pre-Iraq understanding of insurgencies was based on Vietnam. The only insurgency most U.S. officers had studied in any detail was insurgency in Vietnam. This meant that the American Army had a very Maoist understanding of insurgencies as expressed by Giap. General Giap saw revolutionary warfare as a long struggle for the support of the people until they could set the conditions for the final conventional offensive against the imperialists.⁶ Mao's three phases of the revolution became the accepted norm for insurgencies. Phase I was when the insurgent organized politically and militarily at the local level and conducted local acts of intimidation and terror. His focus was building a party and gaining the support of the people. Phase II was the guerrilla phase when the insurgency launched guerrilla operations to spread their control and actually started to create insurgent controlled regions. Mao's Phase III was the final phase and it saw the insurgency's guerrilla forces transition into a conventional army and seize control of the country.⁷ Not only was Giap's strategy Maoist, so was his vocabulary. Mao's style of insurgency became to be the accepted baseline for the study of insurgency. Mao had combined Marx's theory of the historical march of communism to the Chinese virtue of patience and created the Maoist form of insurgency.

To the American Cold War counter-insurgent, it appeared that the Maoist form of insurgency was spreading throughout much of the Third World. When he looked in the jungles of South and Central America he saw a Maoist speaking Spanish. And, to a certain extent he was right. The South American revolutionary Che Guevara had come to symbolize the Latin American Guerrilla. Like Mao, he was a committed communist who believed in the inevitability

⁶ Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962) 29-30.

⁷ Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans Samuel B. Griffith (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000) 20-22.

of communist victory. Unlike Mao, he was not willing to wait for all the accepted conditions for revolution to be met. Mao believed strongly in “building the ocean” in which he and his revolutionaries would swim. His focus was on winning the support of the people and building the party. Through land and political reform, military operations, and being good neighbors, Mao’s insurgents won the support of the people. This enabled him to build huge conventional armies of peasants that finally enabled him to win the revolution. Che did not see the need for investing so much time and energy in the protracted development of the party and the relationship with the people. Che did not see the need for patience.

Che believed that Latin America was ripe for revolution. Within the communist vernacular, he believed that the objective conditions were right and that the people were waiting for the subjective conditions to develop in order for the revolution to occur. Based on this assessment, he did not believe in the protracted struggle and thorough building of a party apparatus among the people to create the subjective conditions. He believed that a competent and motivated group, *foco*, could lead the political revolution without developing the extensive political infrastructure called for by Mao.⁸ Che was sure he already had the sympathies of the people. He believed that he could bypass protracted struggle and overthrow the government first and then allow the communist revolution to flow from the top. Despite their differences, they both had a firm faith in the rise of communism.

When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the driving ideology behind the majority of revolutionary warfare in the 20th century also died. Mao and Che had left their mark on the study of insurgencies, but their ideology for revolution was gone. With the passing of the communist ideology and the arrival of Desert Storm, the U.S. Army’s institutional bias against counter-insurgency operations was, in the leadership’s mind, validated. For a few years after Desert Storm, the Army was delighted to train for its “big battle” scenarios and relive the sands of Iraq.

The problem came when the Army slowly began to realize that the world was changing. The wars that Harry Summers had said that the Army should not fight seemed to be the only wars around. The 1990's saw the Army once again very active in small wars and limited actions. The death of the rangers in Somalia, the return to Haiti, and the years without end in the Balkans made the Army start to rethink its big battle focus. After Task Force Hawk, the Army began to realize that it had to change, but it still did not come to the conclusion that it had to accept counter-insurgency as an Army mission. After September 11th and the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army was once again confronted with the need to plan and conduct counter-insurgency operations. This time, the enemy was not Maoist.

TODAY'S GLOBAL ARAB ISLAMIST INSURGENCY

Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda had been waging a global insurgency for years before their attack on 9/11. Bin Laden headed an insurgency that was not based on a political ideology as was Mao's, but was based on a religious ideology.⁹ Though this Islamist ideology appeared new to many Americans it was not new to the French.¹⁰ Though not the same movement, there were striking similarities between this global Al Qaeda insurgency and the radical Islamic insurgency the French faced in Algeria. Unnoticed by most of America during the Cold War, there was another major insurgent ideology growing around the world and this was the radical Islamist ideology presented by Bin Laden and Al Qaeda.

In many ways, this movement grew out of the prisons of Egypt and the hopelessness of the Middle East. At the height of the Cold War, the repressive regimes of the Middle East were not only at war with Israel and the Cold War Super Powers, they were at war with a growing

⁸ Ernesto Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, trans and ed. Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1997) 12-20.

⁹ 9/11 Commission, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004) 50-52.

¹⁰ Paul Aussaresses, *The Battle of the Casbah*, trans Robert L. Miller (New York: Enigma Books, 2002).

portion of their own population. Partially based on their reading of history and the Koran, and the writings of authors like Sayyid Qutb the future leaders of Al Qaeda began to develop a powerful Islamic insurgent ideology.¹¹ They derived this ideology from their lessons from history and culture combined with their frustration and malcontent over their current situation. The lesson they learned was that the West had corrupted the soul of the Arab. The West had created a materialistic and secular culture that corrupted their youth and supported secular dictators who suppressed their religion.¹² The only way left for these men was *jihad*. They began a holy war that started in Afghanistan against the Soviets and began to spread through the Islamic world. Today this insurgency finds itself at war throughout the Middle East and parts of Islamic Asia. It is working along side other insurgencies in Iraq to defeat the West and all who defy their radical form of Islamic ideology. This Islamist Al-Qaeda ideology is also the driving force behind the Global War on Terrorism threat. Bin Laden is not Mao. Al-Qaeda is not the Communist Party. These two movements are very different. They see the world differently and their approach to their insurgency is different. Though it is not the focus of this monograph it is important to understand that no two insurgencies are identical and the lessons learned from fighting one insurgent may not transfer to fighting another. To successfully conduct counter-insurgency operations it is vital to understand the dynamics of the insurgency.

THE DYNAMICS OF AN INSURGENCY

Every insurgency has its own set of unique dynamics. When seeking to understand an insurgency or compare it to another insurgency it is useful to look at these movements in the following areas. Based on my analysis of Mao, Che, Hitler, Giap, and bin Laden and their movements, insurgencies seem to have a core set of six dynamics that accurately depict the

¹¹ 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004) 47-70.

¹² Sayyid Qutb, Social Justice in Islam (Oneonta, New York: Islamic Publications International, 1953) 315-319.

structure of the insurgency. These six dynamics consist of leadership, core issues, ideology, strategy, followers, and sources of support. Though each insurgency is unique, they all face similar organizational challenges and this framework is useful to analyze their structure.

The first major dynamic of an insurgency is the leadership. As with any social or political movement, the leadership colors all aspects of the insurgency. When trying to understand the leadership of an insurgency it is critical to understand how they came to be insurgents. What caused them to rebel? Who were the thinkers who influenced them? One of the common traits of most influential mass leader is that they are well read. Mao had a firm grasp of Chinese and Western literature.¹³ Che was a medical doctor with an eclectic background.¹⁴ Hitler, a high school drop out, was a passionate reader of history.¹⁵ Leaders of insurgencies are frequently bright and motivated men with a clear sense of history. How they came to lead an insurgency says a great deal about how they will lead it. Additionally, few insurgencies are the result of one man. The current Arab Islamist insurgency is a collective group frequently with shared experiences. Many of them experienced the abuse of the Egyptian prison and the struggle of the Mujahidin in Afghanistan. Sayyid Qutb's writings were a staple of their reading. How a leader came to the revolutionary calling shapes how and where they will lead their insurgency.

The next, and possibly the most important dynamic of an insurgency is the core issue or issues from which the insurgency draws its support. All insurgencies gain traction with their followers and potential recruits based on a core issue or a set of core issues. Che covers this succinctly when he writes, "People must see clearly the futility of maintaining the fight for social

¹³ Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans Samuel B. Griffith (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000) 12.

¹⁴ Ernesto Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, trans and ed. Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1997) 51.

¹⁵ Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans Ralph Manheim (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001) 35-37.

goals within the framework of civil debate.”¹⁶ These core issues are different with almost every insurgency and they may even differ within different populations of an insurgency. For example, Mao’s core issue among the peasants was land reform. Hitler’s core issue among his followers was their humiliation and the hopelessness of the future. It is not as relevant that this core issue be material or political. The reason why it is a core issue is that it motivates people to risk their lives and potentially the lives of their families. These core issues are frequently at the root of how the insurgency swells its ranks and receives open or tacit support of the people.

The third dynamic of an insurgency is the natural result of the combination of the leadership and the core issues. This dynamic is the ideology of the insurgency. Every insurgency of size has an ideology. The ideology is more than the political goal for which the insurgency is fighting. The ideology explains how the world came to be in the condition that it is in, and provides a plan and a goal for changing that condition. John Cary, Fort Leavenworth, has developed an excellent model to describe the components and purpose of an ideology. The first part of an ideology is the description of the ideal state. This goal must be tangible and meaningful for it to be of value. The next part is a description of the current state of affairs with an explanation of why things are the way that they are. The natural final step is the development of a general idea or plan for how to move from the current state to the ideal state.¹⁷ For most of the 20th century it was some form of communist ideology that dominated insurgencies around the world. Another important 20th century ideology was the fascist ideology, best exemplified by Nazism in Germany. Whatever the ideology is, it enables the leader to touch the anger and frustration behind the core issues and turn that into commitment among the followers.

¹⁶ Ernesto Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, trans and ed. Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1997) 9.

¹⁷ John Cary’s components of an ideology presented during a Middle East lecture at the Command and General Staff College in the Spring of 2004.

The fourth dynamic is the strategy that the insurgency develops. Bard O'Neill lays out four common strategies that insurgencies have commonly followed. These four common strategies are conspiratorial, protracted popular war, military focused, and urban centric insurgency.¹⁸ The conspiratorial strategy is best exemplified by Lenin and the Russian Revolution. The leadership of this insurgency built a committed core of followers and overthrew the government and replaced it with their own new form. This was a top down revolution. In contrast, Mao's insurgency in China is the quintessential protracted popular insurgency. O'Neill's military insurgency is more diverse than the first two. Under this strategy, he lists the Confederacy in the American Civil War and Che Guevara's *foco* movement. He sees both as being focused on raising an army and attacking the government's forces or leadership directly. In a way, it is a combination of the first two. The insurgency gains enough strength from the people to attack the government's forces immediately instead of waiting for all the protracted revolutionary conditions to be set. O'Neill's last strategy is the urban centric strategy. This strategy differs from the previous ones in that it occurs in an urban setting and includes much more use of terror. Though somewhat vague and possibly not complete, O'Neill's categories of strategies are useful to begin the analysis of the insurgent strategies. There is one other factor that is critical to examine when identifying the insurgent's strategy.

Insurgencies seem to pick a strategy that is uniquely suited to their culture. It is doubtful that Che's *foco* strategy was picked purely based on rational thought. It was undoubtedly influenced by his Latin American culture. Ho and Giap certainly picked Mao's strategy over others specifically because it was a cultural fit. It is unlikely for an insurgency to pick a strategy from a culturally alien revolution. Their strategy may be influenced by outside thoughts and strategies, but in the end, it will be heavily shaped by its culture. That means that when looking at the dynamic of the insurgent strategy it is important to know what their historical precedent or

¹⁸ Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Virginia:

model is that shapes their thoughts on strategy. For example, it is unlikely that the insurgents in Iraq find Mao's protracted strategy culturally acceptable. Each insurgency is based on its own unique cultural environment.

The fifth dynamic, the followers, involves a deep appreciation for sociology and its understanding of mass movements. Every insurgency needs people to carry out the attacks and supporters to assist them. Who the followers are and why they have joined the movement is telling. It is not enough to analyze the political or ideological situation. To understand this dynamic it is important to understand the follower and why he is there. Understanding where the insurgency is drawing its active support from can tell the counter-insurgent which group he needs to influence in order to isolate the insurgency from the people. Once the counter-insurgent has identified who is filling the ranks of the insurgency he can begin to research why this group is joining. Are they peasant farmers looking for social mobility? Are they young men with no other hope? Are they young men who have joined because their families have been threatened by the insurgency? There are complex reasons that would cause someone to give up their current life and join an organization and life style that is inherently violent and risky.

Different authors provide different insights into why men, and now some women, will freely give themselves over to a violent social movement. As pointed out previously, Aristotle believed that there were seven reasons, all somehow dealing with inequality, that might motivate a man to rebel.¹⁹ Eric Hoffer, in *The True Believer*, argues that, "A mass movement attracts and holds a following not because it can satisfy the desire for self-advancement, but because it can satisfy the passion for self-renunciation."²⁰ This is in marked contrast to how Che viewed the driving force behind a guerrilla, "...one who shares the longing of the people for liberation and

Brassey's Inc., 1990).31-47.

¹⁹ Aristotle, edited by Trevor J. Saunders and translated by T. A. Sinclair, *The Politics* (Suffolk, England: Penguin Books, 1981) 302.

²⁰ Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers Inc., 1951) 13.

who, once peaceful means are exhausted, initiates the fight and converts himself into an armed vanguard of the fighting people.”²¹ It is important to state that how the insurgent sees himself may be quite different than how the rest of society views his followers. Hitler’s early Nazi movement is a good example of this. In the early-1920’s he started a right wing insurgency to over throw the Weimar Republic. He saw his followers as patriotic men heeding the call to German greatness. Much of the rest of society saw his muscle as young social thugs who in any time would have been in trouble with the law.²² The insurgent leader will claim it is the cause and the ideology that attracts the followers, but sociology indicates that there is frequently more to it than that.

The sixth and final dynamic of an insurgency involves its physical support. Throughout the writings of many conventional military leaders and historians who have dealt with the topic of insurgencies, the insurgents seem to move about with complete freedom. There seems to be a belief that the insurgents do not have to abide by the same laws of physics that a conventional army does. This is only an illusion. All organizations have physical constraints. Insurgencies are no different. All insurgencies have to somehow deal with the issues of food and water, ammunition and weapons, money, and medical care. Though there are other aspects they must deal with, these aspects are frequently the ones that present insurgencies with the greatest challenge. Every insurgency is different. Che provides an excellent source for how an insurgency deals with these issues. In *Guerrilla Warfare* he writes about the major challenge of his insurgency was the acquisition of weapons and ammunition. This caused them to adjust their fighting style to reduce their ammunition expenditure. They fought to gain these items from the government forces. In his experience they had no problem getting food or water but medical care was another major challenge. They had to develop a network of sympathetic doctors who would

²¹ Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1997) 72.

²² Alan Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964) 82-83.

treat their casualties because they obviously could not take their wounded to government controlled hospitals.²³ For the Vietcong their two main challenges were food and ammunition. They developed a food system that was dependent on “taxation” of the countryside. This made them extremely dependent on the “support” of the people. To fix their weapons and ammunition challenge they used captured supplies from their enemy, but they also had a massive support chain running along the Ho Chi Mihn Trail.²⁴ The example of the VC and North Vietnam leads to the idea of external support.

For a variety of historical reasons, many insurgencies have been blessed with external support. In the case of Vietnam, the VC received supplies and military forces from the North. In the American Revolution it was primarily funding and naval power from France. During Napoleon’s operations in Spain, he faced the additional challenge called compound warfare. “Compound warfare is the simultaneous use of a regular or main force and an irregular or guerrilla force against an enemy.”²⁵ Napoleon faced an even greater challenge than simple compound warfare, in Spain he faced fortified compound warfare. In fortified compound warfare the conventional force supporting the insurgency is beyond the reach of the counter-insurgent. Somehow the supporting conventional force is located in a safe haven that allows him to enter the battle area at his choosing. In Spain, Wellington and his British regulars were protected from the French by the British navy and terrain. If Napoleon dispersed to fight the insurgents, Wellington would leave his safe haven and attack the dispersed French forces. If the French forces massed to try and attack the British, who could always escape, the Spanish insurgents would attack the French supply lines and outposts. Compound and fortified compound support is a critical aspect of understanding the physical forms of support that an insurgency receives. All insurgencies have

²³ Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1997) 103-120.

²⁴ Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York: Penguin Books, 1984) 331-334.

²⁵ Thomas M. Huber, *Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2002) 1.

physical constraints. They have the same challenges that any army faces. They have to be able to sustain themselves and in their early stages they have to do so without that support being detected. How they achieve this sustainment is a critical dynamic that shapes the overall insurgency.

This section focused on the nature of insurgencies and the dynamics that make up an insurgency. It is clear from this overview that insurgencies are more than simply a political or military movement. An insurgency is a violent sociological movement aimed at a socio-political end. Armed with this understanding of insurgencies, it is now important to briefly discuss planning in complex environments prior to explaining the COIN Modeling technique.

PLANNING IN A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT

Before discussing a specific technique for planning a counter-insurgency campaign, it is important to reflect generally upon planning in complex environments and discuss what a complex and adaptive environment is. In the early 1990's a great many books were published within the business and academic community focusing on complex systems and how to successfully plan in this environment. Within this dialogue, there were several truly powerful ideas that came out in regards to planning in complex environments. Of all these ideas there are four complementary ideas that are of particular value to the counter-insurgent planner. They are complex-adaptive systems, systems thinking, self-synchronizing, and modeling.

Most human organizations deal in a world of complex-adaptive systems and there are few systems more complex or adaptive than the system in which the counter-insurgent operations are conducted. A complex system is a system made up of multiple variables that interact with each other. A watch is a good example of a complex system. There are a number of parts (springs, gears, etc.) that all influence other parts. The result of interaction of these parts is a mechanical marvel that we use to measure time. Even the simplest watch is rather complex to the untrained eye. This system, though complex, is still very predictable and not at all adaptive. A complex-

adaptive system goes a significant step further in that the action of the parts, or variables, are no longer certain and the variables frequently have relations with more than one or two other parts. This means that this complex-adaptive system will react to inputs in immensely complicated ways before it somehow achieves an equilibrium. This perceived equilibrium, a state of balance, is frequently only an illusion. Most complex-adaptive systems constantly fluctuate as the variables interact with each other and inputs from the “outside” world. Most systems involving living beings are complex-adaptive. The significance of this is that the system as a whole operates in a manner that is difficult to predict based on the sum interaction of its parts. Both insurgency and counter-insurgencies are complex-adaptive systems. Together, as they wage war, they create an even more complex-adaptive system. Neither organization can be understood without understanding the other. One of the best ways to attempt to understand complex-adaptive systems like revolutionary warfare is to diagram it out and show the key variables and the critical linkages. Below is one such example.




Figure 1-COIN Variable Diagram Example

The diagram above begins to visually show the complexity of the system with all of its inter-connectedness. If it were diagramming a particular counter-insurgency instead of a generic examples it would show specific links between the variables instead of a spider web connection. The idea that warfare and counter-insurgency is complex is nothing new. Clausewitz began to write about this when he wrote about the relationship between the people, the government, and the military.²⁶ His description of the trinity was a 19th century discussion of complexity. The idea of diagramming complex-adaptive systems is just another technique to understand the inherently incomprehensible art of war. Because of the nature of complex-adaptive systems, it is easy to understand why systems thinking in counter-insurgency planning is so important.

Peter Senge made the term systems thinking popular in his book *The Fifth Discipline*. He, however, was not alone in understanding the need for systems thinking. In his book, *The Logic of Failure*, Dietrich Doerner also discussed thinking in what he calls complex systems. They, and others, are all talking about how to think in such a way as to enable people to understand and operate in a complex-adaptive system. There are many different aspects of systems thinking, but the basic concept is to be able to see the entire system and to understand how the variables interact. An example of a systems approach to understanding a system would be to identify and list out the main variables and their linkages. Once all of the variables are listed, develop the rules by which each variable operates. With all of the variables listed and with a set of rules to understand their behavior, then connect each variable to every other variable that it effects or by which it is effected. When this analysis is complete, there is a diagram of a closed complex-adaptive system. A closed system has little to no interaction with the outside world. The next step is to then open the system by connecting it to external inputs. This is one way to diagram systems thinking.

²⁶ Carl Von Clausewitz, ed and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, *On War* (New York: Princeton University Press, 1993) 101.

It is obvious that even a relatively small complex-adaptive system can become very complicated very quickly. Different organizations have reacted to this very differently. In the military realm, an example of how two organizations reacted to this complexity can be seen in the approach that the French and German armies took in the years before World War II. The French saw that to mass effects in this complex system they had to centralize control and synchronize operations from the top.²⁷ This is in contrast to the Germans who developed what Alberts and Hayes calls self-synchronizing systems.²⁸ Instead of trying to slow down the tempo of war and centralize its control they looked at opening up the control to lower elements with the understanding that these sub-systems (divisions, corps, etc.) would synchronize their own operations.²⁹ When operating in a complex-adaptive system where your opponent is trying to out maneuver you the organization that depends on the center to synchronize all operations is at a distinct disadvantage. The Germans understood this and developed plans accordingly with the intent that they would thrive in this chaos and complexity instead of trying to slow it down and control it.

In order to develop self-synchronizing units, there are certain critical components that the relevant units, or systems, must possess. The first is the endstate or goal that the unit is trying to achieve. Whether the word is endstate or effect or aim at this point it is not very important. What is important is for that unit to know what it is trying to achieve. It must clearly understand its purpose. The next step is for all of the effected units (variables) to know who they must key off of. One unit will be the main effort. All other units know what their relationship to that main effort is and who they are supposed to support and how. The commander must also prioritize support in order to have an effective use of shared assets. A proactive Brigade Combat Team that

²⁷ Williamson Murray and Allan Millett, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 32.

²⁸ David Alberts and Richard Hayes, *Power to the Edge* (Washington: DoDCRP, 2004) 27-32.

²⁹ Williamson Murray and Allan Millett, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 43-49.

was not the main effort could easily utilize the UEX's allocation of close air support if the UEX commander were not careful to prioritize. The commander must ensure that his loudest subordinate is not using up all of the UEX's resources at the cost of the main effort. The last requirement for this system to self-synchronize is for all the units to have open and free communication and a common understanding of the situation. With these four elements (endstate, support relationship, resource prioritization, and common understanding through open communication), the system will be able to self-synchronize. This is a vitally important concept when planning counter-insurgency operations where the units must be able to adapt quickly to the changing and unique conditions in their area of responsibility. When the insurgent has the initiative he will attempt to overwhelm the counter-insurgent through a variety of ways and if that unit is dependant on higher headquarters for centralized synchronization it is unlikely that it will be able to react rapidly enough.

The last critical aspect of planning in complex-adaptive systems is the understanding of modeling. Most people have an intuitive understanding of modeling in regards to computer models. To understand the power of this idea it is good to go back to the diagram previously created above to depict the complex-adaptive system. Within the process of diagramming and visualizing, the planner also had to create a set of rules to model the behavior of each variable. Using the idea of modeling the planner then needs to "play-out" his constructed system. He needs to see how his constructed system reacts to inputs and match that with what he knows to be the case. By doing this he is checking to see if he accurately understands how the system works and therefore how best to influence the system. It is important to understand that this modeling is not done by computer simulation, but by humans. Modeling in this manner is best done in a group. It is important to begin to understand how the rules describing the behavior of each variable will effect the outcome of the entire system. In many ways, this becomes a hypothesis for how the system works. Testing of the system will determine whether the hypothesis was correct or in need of adjustment.

By combining the ideas of a complex-adaptive system, systems thinking, self-synchronizing, and modeling a planner can begin to effectively approach planning for complex operations. With this understanding of planning in complex and adaptive systems and the nature of insurgencies and revolutionary war a planner can now begin to look into a technique for counter-insurgency planning.

COIN MODELING; A TECHNIQUE FOR PLANNING COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Within the Army there is a debate as to the relevance and efficacy of the Army's military decision making process (MDMP) as laid out in the appropriate field manuals. There are questions about the process' ability to develop timely orders that can incorporate new information during the process. Other questions focus on the appropriate level of involvement by the commander and his subordinate commanders. An article in Infantry Magazine in September 2003 is a good example of the valid questions being asked of the process. The authors argue that at the battalion level they are not well resourced with time or personnel to execute the MDMP. They go on to present a technique that is a variation on the standard MDMP.³⁰ In another article on the MDMP, this time in Military Review, the authors argue that no matter what level the MDMP is executed at the process itself is does not support how humans make decisions. They argue for a process based more on a recognition primed decision making model that supports how the commander intuitively makes decisions.³¹ Though valid questions and issues for discussion, it is not the purpose of this monograph to enter into this debate. The basic assumption that this monograph makes in regards to the MDMP is that the flow or process is still relevant and effective for organizing a staff to plan. In addition to this assumption, it is important for the

³⁰ Jeffrey S. Buchanan, Todd Wood, Jim Larsen, Battalion MDMP in a time-constrained environment - Training Notes (Infantry Magazine, September 22, 2003)

³¹ Karol G. Ross, Gary A. Klein, Peter Thunholm, John F. Schmitt, Holly C. Baxter, The Recognition-Primed Decision Model (Military Review, July-August, 2004)

counter-insurgency planner to look at the MDMP as a framework for creative thinking and problem solving and not a methodistic approach to creating an order. With that in mind, the following technique focuses on three specific steps in the MDMP. The steps are mission analysis, course of action development, and course of action analysis. As with any endeavor, it is important to start with the end in mind. Therefore, this chapter starts with a brief overview of the course of action analysis and then backs into the mission analysis and course of action development. This will then end where it began with a deeper discussion of course of action analysis.

Before actually getting into this planning process it is important to note why this technique is more appropriate than for counter-insurgency operations than conventional operations. There are two main points that make this technique uniquely appropriate for counter-insurgency planning. The first is the tempo of the two types of warfare. Once modern conventional operations begin, their tempo can become very fast. In many ways, the force that can gain the initiative will have a powerful advantage. That calls for a planning process that is rapid, timely, and efficient. Counter-insurgency operations rarely have the same time pressure. That affords the planning staff more time for greater depth of analysis. The next factor behind the relevance of this technique for counter-insurgency planning is that the main challenge that the counter-insurgent force is going to face is being able to influence the population and find the insurgent. The challenge of counter-insurgency operations is isolating the insurgent from the people. Once isolated rarely from the population it is rarely a difficult military challenge for the counter-insurgent to destroy the insurgent force. The challenge is isolating him. As such, the planning process must facilitate the best possible analysis for the core challenge. These are the two main reasons why the COIN Modeling process is more appropriate for counter-insurgency operations than for conventional operations.

MODELING: AN OVERVIEW

The COIN Modeling technique has one main aim in mind. That aim is to develop a deeper and shared understanding of the problem facing the counter-insurgent. Based on this deeper understanding of the problem and its complexity, the planner will be able to produce an order that facilitates a successful counter-insurgency campaign. It is important to understand the deliberate use of the term campaign. Counter-insurgencies at the UEX level cannot be successfully conducted from one event or battle to another. The insurgents will never allow a decisive battle to occur. This means that the overall plan must focus the unit's operations and engagements on a desired endstate and not on a desired decisive battle. That is the purpose of the COIN Modeling planning technique. Though it still works for individual battles or operations those battles will have little purpose or value without that overall campaign plan.

The previous chapter showed the critical role of modeling in developing a deeper understanding of a complex system. This modeling will take place during the course of action analysis phase of the planning. Therefore, before the planners get to the modeling or wargaming step they must develop an understanding of the system and its variables and their relationships. That is the focus of mission analysis. During the mission analysis step, the planners develop a list of key variables and the rules by which the planners believe these variables operate. From there, the planners must connect the variables to understand their relationship and how they affect each other. With that understanding of the system, the planners will then develop a course of action to achieve their desired endstate. The planners will then run these courses of action through their modeling and examine the results. From this modeling session, the commander will select the appropriate course of action and the planners will produce the order. The whole process is oriented on producing an order and an operation that will be successful and as part of that process the capstone step is the modeling or course of action analysis. The modeling step will be of no

value if the mission analysis lacks the depth required to run an effective model. Successful planning starts with mission analysis.

MISSION ANALYSIS: VARIABLES, RULES, AND RELATIONSHIPS

The focus for mission analysis is on developing an understanding of the system in which the planners will model their course of action. As such, Sun Tzu provides a good framework on which to build this model. The three areas to look at are the enemy, terrain, and yourself. The approach the planners must take for the mission analysis step is that of a game developer. They look at which pieces need to be developed and the rules and capabilities by which these pieces will interact in the model. Additionally the planners must develop the rules by which the pieces will operate on the board. Once complete, they will be ready to move on to develop their courses of action for testing their model and their course of action.

The first step mentioned by Sun Tzu involves understanding the enemy. Though this is the entire planning staff's responsibility, as with the standard MDMP, the G2 will take the lead on this step. When considering the enemy it is worthwhile to list out the key players and factions within the UEX's area of interest. It is obvious that at the beginning of the operation this knowledge will be highly speculative. At this point, it is more important that the pieces be picked out and the rules and characteristics for each piece be developed. When developing these rules and characteristics it is useful to refer back to the dynamics of an insurgency listed earlier. Those dynamics were leadership, core issues, ideology, strategy, followers, and sources of support. Two other factors to add to this list in order to effectively model are how the insurgent factions are organized and how they operate. Only the most developed insurgencies will be without significant factional division. It is likely that within the UEX's area of responsibility that there will be numerous insurgent factions consisting of subordinate components.

At the end of the analysis of the insurgency the planner should be able to depict the known key leaders and factions of the insurgency. Each element should also have their

characteristics and rules of behavior listed out. Under characteristics, they should cover such areas as size, equipment, organizational structure, and sources of logistical support. Under rules of behavior the G2 should cover desired aim, likely tactics, limitations, and relationship to other variables. At the end of this part of mission analysis each faction and leader should be identified and a set of characteristics and rules of behavior established for them. Rohan Gunaratna provides an excellent example of the type of information and analysis that should be included in this type of mission analysis in his book *Inside Al Qaeda*. As part of the mission analysis of understanding the enemy, his book would be summarized in a format established by the planners for organizing the analysis of different factions.

The next step is the analysis of the terrain. In a counter-insurgency operation, the people are the critical “terrain” to analyze. The usual aspects of terrain should included, but the priority should for analysis should be the civilian population and infrastructure in the area of responsibility or interest. The focus here is on the population that both sides are fighting to influence. This analysis should cover all the major factions (tribes, clans, church congregations, businesses, civic organizations, etc.) and all the appropriate aspects of a complex society. Once again, these organizations should have the same type of characteristics and rules of behavior developed for them that were developed for the insurgents. It is critical to understand and model these organizations as a part of the society. As part of this step, there should be an economic, religious, cultural, and other relevant forms of analysis conducted in order to model how this society runs. Common areas to analyze are basic services like power and water, the major employers, the infrastructure, hospital support, school support and other aspects of society. In addition to developing an understanding of the key variables of the civilian organizations, this step is also building the board on which this model will be run. All of the key cultural sites should be reflected and along with all the support structures listed above. Instead of the G2 conducting this analysis the lead planner on this should be the G5. The reason for the G5

conducting this analysis is that in order for him to effectively manage civil-military relations he must understand the area or responsibility to this level.

The last step in this aspect of mission analysis is understanding ourselves. In addition to the regular aspects of this, the planners should focus on all the “friendly” elements in the Area of Responsibility or Area of Interest as required. This initially focuses on host nation forces such as law enforcement, military forces, local government officials, and other critical elements. Once complete, the focus should shift to non-governmental organizations that may operate in this sector. Just like the variables listed above, at the end of this step each one of these variables should have a “card” made up on them that predicates their desired ends, means, and limitations. It is easy to assume that host nation forces will have identical ends as the UEX, but history shows this to be unlikely. For a variety of reasons, the host nation forces will frequently have divergent ends in comparison to the U.S. forces. It is important to understand those up front. The G3 planner should take the lead on this because it will enable him to better understand the tools he has available to develop courses of action and operations.

It is also important to note that these additional steps listed above do not necessarily replace the mission analysis steps as laid out in FM 5-0. The chief of plans must take these steps and fit them in to the regular MDMP process and adjust the standard steps accordingly. Once the chief of plans believes that the planning staff is ready to conduct a modeling of the system, he is ready for the planning staff to move on to course of action development. It is worth noting that though this has been stated as sequential it is quite possible to develop courses of action prior to completion of the mission analysis.

One more note before moving on to course of action development. It should be obvious that at this point in the process much of this “rule making” is pure speculation based on the best research and intelligence available. This speculation should now begin to be turned in to requests for information from higher and the beginning of a collection matrix with heavy focus on human intelligence. The remainder of the plan will be based on the assumptions that come out of the this

step. The UEX should move as rapidly as possible to change these speculations and assumptions into “facts”. This is the beginning of the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Annex. Additionally, for the COIN Modeling planning technique to be effective the planners must regularly update the information and analysis that they have already done. To get the model to accurately reflect the real world, the variables and connections the planners must regularly update the model.

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

Before beginning the discussion on developing courses of action, it is worthwhile to discuss some historical trends of successful counter-insurgencies. Keeping in mind that all insurgencies are different and that there is no set checklist to follow for the counter-insurgency, there are some trends from history. Research shows that successful counter-insurgencies seem to frequently be focused on the political endstate, unified in their approach, flexible in addressing the core insurgency issue, protective of the people, strengthen the host nation government, and patient.

It is nothing new to say that military operations should focus on the endstate.³² All successful operations, whether they are counter-insurgent or conventional, are based on focusing on an endstate. What makes counter-insurgency operations somewhat unique is the intimacy and level of involvement of the military in understanding the political endstate. Seeking to destroy the insurgency is not a sufficient endstate for military operations in a counter-insurgency. The endstate must include an understanding of the political, economic, military, and sociological endstate. More than once conventional forces have gone out into the countryside and defeated an insurgent force only to realize that they won the battles without winning the war. Vietnam is probably the most visceral modern American experience in failing this step. The American military-political endstate was never clear and the guidance to the military was not nested with

³² FM 3-0 Operations (June 2001) 5-6.

the directions for the political end. This led the US military to win every major battle in Vietnam but unable to declare victory.³³ The endstate for military operations did not result in conflict termination.

An example where military operations were clearly nested with the political endstate was the British counter-insurgency in Malaya. After several years of fighting the communist guerrillas in Malaya with only moderate success, the new British High Commissioner and Director of Operations, General Sir Gerald Templer, stated that the political endstate for the British government in Malaya is “that Malaya should in due course become a fully self-governing nation.”³⁴ This political endstate created a powerful change in the war. No longer could the communist insurgents argue that the Brits were another foreign exploitation force. The British were now committed to developing a fully functioning and independent Malayan state. This set the conditions, where military operations could now be linked to a settlement that was supported by the people. Combined with other non-military operations, military victory could now lead to a stable state that would set the conditions for conflict termination.

The British counter-insurgency operations in Malaya provide another example of a trend from successful counter-insurgencies. This example is the unified approach to counter-insurgency operations. This time, under the command of retired general Sir Henry Briggs, the British government developed in 1950 a unified approach to fighting the communist insurgency. Briggs knew that to truly neutralize the influence of the insurgents the British had to have more than a military approach to the problem. It was not enough to send infantry battalions out into the jungle to look for guerrillas. Briggs formed War Councils that consisted of civil, police, and

³³ Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of Vietnam* (New York: The Bantam Doubleday Publishing Group, Inc., 1984), 21.

³⁴ Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History Volume II* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975) 790.

military representatives that would coordinate policy and operations.³⁵ These were not command cells, but coordination cells. This ensured that the full power of the British and Malayan government was able to address the issues that enabled the insurgency to operate.³⁶ This unified approach, combined with an achievable political endstate enabled some excellent soldiering to facilitate the suppression of the communist insurgency.

There is one more aspect of the unified approach that is particularly important to address for American forces conducting counter-insurgency operations. For a variety of reasons presented at the beginning of this monograph, the U.S. Army has been reluctant to accept counter-insurgency as a primary mission for the U.S. Army. Even among those officers who have accepted this mission, few would argue that the U.S. military should be the lead agency in this inherently interagency process. There are a number of powerful concerns raised against the military accepting this role. To start with, those against it argue that the military is not equipped or trained to do this mission. They argue that the military, and especially the Army, should not be in a position of developing national and strategic policy which is what is required of whatever agency is the lead in the counter-insurgency operation. The idea of the U.S. military taking the lead seems Constitutionally wrong. The perception is that the military serves policy, it does not create it. All of these points are relevant, but in the end they must be balanced against the realities required to accomplish the mission. Many military officers argue that the ideal agency to be the lead is the State Department or someone appointed by the President. Numerous questions arise out of this. Is the State Department resourced for this? Do they have the planning experience and training experience to be the lead agency? Would the military commander in the country be willing to have his chain of command run through this department or individual and bypass the

³⁵ Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History Volume II* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975) 788-789.

³⁶ John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Westport CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002) 71-76.

Combatant Commander and the Secretary of Defense? This restructuring of the chain of command would be required in order to ensure a unified effort. The other argument about the Constitutionality of it is based on a historic concern the Founding Fathers had in regard to the military influencing policy within the United States. There is nothing unconstitutional about the military making policy oversees as long as it is subordinate to the President and in keeping with the standard relationship to Congress. There are numerous historical examples where the military made foreign policy. One key example is MacArthur's rebuilding of Japan.

If the military commander accepts that a unified effort is required to defeat an insurgency then he must ensure that it happens. If there is no agency unifying the effort the counter-insurgent effort then he must ensure that all of the aspects of a unified effort are being done. If he decides not to ensure this up front in the planning process, he will certainly do it later when the security situation begins to crumble because the other aspects of the counter-insurgent fight are not done. In the end, all short-comings in a counter-insurgency operation result in security issues which always fall back on the military. It is important to note that this is not an argument for the military to do it all by itself. The best case is when the military can get the other agencies to do what they do best and simply ensure that all the efforts are coordinated as in the Malayan example. Only as a last resort should the military do the planning itself.

The next historical trend of successful counter-insurgencies is a level of flexibility in addressing the core issue that is providing support from the people for the insurgencies. Few, if any, successful insurgencies are solely based on terror. At some point for an insurgency to be successful, it must have some appeal to the people. This appeal is often based on one or more core issues. In the Chinese revolution one key issue was land reform. In the American Revolution one issue was "no taxation without representation." There are plenty of examples where the host nation was not willing to accept the core issue as a valid issue, or was unwilling to show any flexibility in addressing that issue. The British response to the American issue of no taxation without representation is one such example. Another example is the response, or non-

response, of the Latin American governments to their local insurgencies in the 1950s through 1980s. These governments were repressive, exclusive, and offered little hope or support to the vast majority of its population. Latin America was an insurgency waiting to happen. With the arrival of leaders like Castro and Guevara the insurgencies sprang to life. The United States spent billions of dollars helping these authoritarian regimes suppress these insurgencies. Despite the U.S. support in blood and money these insurgencies frequently refused to be defeated. The governments and local elites refused to give up any of their power or wealth and were completely inflexible regarding reform.³⁷ This ensured that the conditions that gave birth to the insurgencies remained and therefore the insurgencies remained. With the end of the Cold War, a wave of democratic leaning reforms swept across Latin America. For the first time in their history, the people of Latin America began to become enfranchised. The governments began to address some of the people's core issues. Many of the core issues (poverty, health, etc.) have not gone away, but what is different now is that much of the population now believes that it can address these issues through legal and legitimate channels. They no longer need to pursue change with a gun. It is not a coincidence that as a result of this change in governmental stance, the insurgencies in most Latin American countries have melted away.

Another historical trend of successful counter-insurgencies is their ability to protect the people. Despite the previous discussion on core issues and the myth of the beloved insurgent, many insurgencies are very comfortable using coercion and terror to derive support from the people. Nearly every insurgency has a history of terrorizing the population that they deem to be enemy's of the revolution. The only issue is the level to which they have gone to terrorize these "traitors". There are numerous examples of insurgencies using terror of the people as a method. Even within the insurgent writings, they talk about the need to remove anti-revolutionary elements from contested areas. Frequently they gloss over how this removal is done, but history

³⁷ Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1997) 24.

clearly shows how they did it. Che's writing is a good example of this, "In this respect the guerrilla band must be drastic. Enemies cannot be permitted to exist within the zone of operation in places that offer no security."³⁸ Both Mao, Giap, and Bin Laden have similar statements in their writings. The use of terror is inherent to most insurgencies. The target of these brutal killings is frequently the people connected in some way with the government. This can include police, local administrators, teachers, etc. As such, if the counter-insurgent wishes to receive the support of the people he must first protect them and their families. The important writings on counter-insurgency operations point to this central tenet.³⁹ A good example of how to provide local security to the people is the U.S. Marine Combined Action Platoon in Vietnam. Despite its lack of operational nesting and lack of unified approach, the program was quite successful at the tactical level. On its own initiative, the Marine Corps put small units in towns that requested support. These platoons and squads would train with local forces and protect the villagers from the Vietcong.⁴⁰ This is a good American example of focusing on protecting the population even when the operational and strategic plan did not support it.⁴¹ A better example of a comprehensive plan is once again the British in Malaya. At first, the British focused on big unit operations and seeking out a decisive battle against the communist insurgents. When that battle never materialized, the British shifted their focus to protecting and supporting the population. They employed a multi-dimensional approach of developing a viable police force and military to provide the population security. While these forces were being created and trained the British Army moved small units into towns to augment and support the local police. They would also

³⁸ Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1997) 70.

³⁹ Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1989) 11-12.

⁴⁰ Curtis L. Williamson, *The U.S. Marine Corps Combined Action Program: A Proposed Alternative Strategy for the Vietnam War* (Quantico, Virginia: USMC Command and General Staff College, 2002).

⁴¹ Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1989) 172-177.

aggressively patrol around these towns in an effort to keep the insurgents from being able to target the people. This proved to be very successful in gaining the support of the people.⁴²

One of the critical lessons from history for foreign forces conducting counter-insurgency operations in a foreign country is the need for their operations to strengthen the host nation government. In the end, if the host nation government is not able or willing to defend itself from the insurgents the counter-insurgency is doomed to failure. With that in mind, the military and other aspects of the operation must always focus on strengthening of the host nation's ability to defend itself from the insurgency. The example of where this was not done is the U.S. in Vietnam. Despite millions of soldiers and billions of dollars the U.S. was never able to develop a South Vietnamese government that could defend itself. The proof of this was that within a few years after the U.S. withdrawal the South Vietnamese government fell. The American reaction to nearly every crisis in Vietnam was to send in more American forces instead of finding a way to develop a functional South Vietnamese government.

The final historical trend of successful counter-insurgent is that they are patient. There is no decisive battle in counter-insurgency operations. It is almost like growing a garden. Even if the gardener kills all the bugs, it still takes time for the plants to grow to the point where they can survive another bug attack. The same is true with insurgencies. Even following all the trends of successful counter-insurgencies, it takes years to create an environment where the government is willing and able to protect itself. In the case where the insurgents are receiving significant external support that cannot be stopped, the counter-insurgency may go on for decades.

As is seen by this review of the historical trends of successful counter-insurgencies, planning counter-insurgency operations is very different than planning conventional operations. This has often led to the myth that counter-insurgency planning is harder or more complicated

⁴² Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History Volume II* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975) 786-794.

than conventional operations. This is simply not true. The reason why it appears more difficult is because the standard Western military officer has very little experience in planning and fighting insurgencies. By studying and reflecting upon history the UEX planner can begin to develop effective plans to combat insurgencies. The first place for developing this plan is in developing a clear, relevant, and comprehensive commander's intent.

COMMANDER'S INTENT IN COUNTER-INSURGENCIES

The first step in developing any course of action begins with the commander's intent. The commander's intent is as critical in counter-insurgencies as it is in conventional operations. It is the real starting and endpoint for all course of action development and operations. Additionally, due to the decentralized nature of counter-insurgency operations, the commander's intent plays an especially critical role in developing that nesting and unifying effect throughout the area of operations. The structure of the commander's intent as described in FM 3-0 *Operations* and FM 6-0 *Command and Control* is absolutely appropriate to counter-insurgency operations. FM 3-0 lays out the commander's intent as a description of the endstate in regards to the enemy, terrain, and friendly forces. Additionally the commander should list any key tasks he sees that are critical to the operation and he can provide additional purpose as required.

In counter-insurgency operations, the commander must consider more than simply military considerations. Based on his level of involvement in the other aspects of the unified plan, he will need to incorporate these into his commander's intent. To start with, the commander must provide a clear vision of the structure or function of the host nation government in the contested areas at the end of the operation. Additionally, the commander should look at the other issues such as basic needs of the people, economic development, and other aspects of supporting the host nation government and especially how he sees his forces participating in the effort. The commander's intent will be a critical step in ensuring the subordinate commands can self-

synchronize in the same unified direction throughout the area of operation. As part of this, the key tasks play an important role.

Based on the commander's understanding of the history of the area, the culture of the inhabitants, an understanding of insurgencies, and his professional experience, the commander must develop a list of key tasks, or key effects, that are essential to accomplishing his desired endstate. History recommends a generic set of key tasks that include protecting the people, building the host nation security force, isolating the insurgents from the population, and developing an intelligence network that will allow the last task which is the defeat of insurgent forces while creating support for the host nation among the population. Each key task here may not apply to every insurgency. Every insurgency, counter-insurgency, and commander is different and requires a unique commander's intent.

THE COURSE OF ACTION: A LOGICAL LINES APPROACH

It should be clear at this point that counter-insurgency operations are fundamentally not about seizing terrain and fighting the decisive battle. Counter-insurgency operations are about setting the conditions for the insurgency to wither and die with the help of many different non-military instruments and the helpful effects of the 500 pound bomb, the 5.56 bullet, and at times the bayonet. FM 3-0 developed the idea of logical lines of operations exactly for this type of situation. Logical lines of operations are critical to successful planning when the operation is vague and not clearly defined like counter-insurgency operations. Logical lines of operations are no longer a new idea among many Army divisions. Logical lines of operations have proven to be a useful tool in developing plans and are particularly relevant to counter-insurgency operations that have so many non-military components.




Figure 2-COIN Logical Lines of Operation Example

The first step in developing the lines of operations is to identify the endstate to which they are all leading. Every logical line of operation is focused on their own specific endstate with is nested with the overall mission endstate. The planner should take this endstate for the mission directly from the commander's intent and as was stated earlier it must be more than the insurgent forces defeated. The endstate should take into account such issues as the state of the host nation government, the economy, the host nation security forces, and others. Once commander clearly articulates this endstate the planning staff should reflect on the situation and develop logical lines of operations that will create a comprehensive approach towards moving the entire society towards the desired endstate. Each line of operation builds a part of the overall endstate. History shows that the following lines would be a good starting point for the planners. These logical lines include an overall concept of the operation, security development, meeting the population's basic needs, host nation governmental development, host nation security force development, economic development, sociological development, and intelligence gathering network.

There are many ways to approach the overall concept of the operations. This line of operation sets the orientation for all the other lines of operation. This is the basic concept of the operation that would be understood out of any operation order. David Galula created one of the most compelling generic approaches to the counter-insurgent concept of in his brilliant book, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Galula starts by describing the level of insurgency control within the different areas in the area of operations as red, pink, and white. The insurgents control the red areas. The pink areas are areas into which the insurgent is attempting to expand and the white areas have shown no insurgent activity.⁴³ Next, the commander decides if he has sufficient force to cover all of the areas or if he must prioritize. If he has to prioritize, he then has the choice of going “difficult to easy or easy to difficult.” In the difficult to easy plan the counter-insurgent goes straight to the red areas and then goes back and expands into the pink areas. In the other plan, the counter-insurgent strengthens his hold on the pink and then pushes into the red.⁴⁴ Each strategy has its advantages and disadvantages, but those are the two basic options. Whatever concept is developed, it should be articulated in this line of operation in such a way so that it provides the basic direction that all of the other lines of operation can reference for direction en route to the endstate.

The next logical line of operations is the security of the population line of operations. Once again, Galula provides an excellent example. Once the overall strategy is developed and laid out in the concept of the operation, Galula argues that the security development should follow a general path that goes as follows:⁴⁵

⁴³ David Galula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Garden City, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964) 70.

⁴⁴ David Galula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Garden City, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964) 96-98.

⁴⁵ David Galula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Garden City, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964) 80.

1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents.
2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent's comeback in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives.
3. Establish contact with the local population, control its movement in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas.
4. Destroy the local insurgent political organizations.
5. Set up, by means of election, new provisional local authorities.
6. Test these authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units.
7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement.
8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants.

This list is not presented as *the* solution, but as an example of a thoughtful approach developed by a French officer with significant experience in Indochina and Algeria. He uses establishing the security of the people to set the conditions for the other logical lines of operations. Whatever security plan is developed, it must be focused on the endstate and securing the people.

The next logical line of operations is meeting the population's basic needs. This is essential in order to win the support of the people. In all but the worst cases, this line of operation should include the host nation government and other governmental and non-governmental agencies. Ideally, the military is simply providing the security for the humanitarian assistance. In the event that this ideal situation is not going to happen, the UEX must develop a plan to address the basic needs of the people. It is important to remember that it should somehow balance supporting the host nation government and winning the support of the people. Going back to the previous discussion on planning in complex-adaptive systems it is important to reflect upon how to build caring for the population into a self-synchronizing system. The first question in

developing that system is to address the problem of establishing who is going to be responsible for this in each area of responsibility. Then the supporting elements need to be aligned in such a manner to work for whoever is responsible for accomplishing this mission. Lastly, the communications need to be developed to ensure that the units, NGOs, and other agencies share a common understanding.

The next logical line of operation is the development of the host nation government. This line of operation will be dependent on a wide variety of issues. The two most important factors are the status of the current host nation government and the endstate desired by the President. Each situation will be different and will require different steps by the counter-insurgent. In every case in order for the counter-insurgent to develop some form of long-term solution his actions must strengthen the host nation government and its legitimacy with the people. Galula argues that this is a bottom up process where the counter-insurgent is creating governments at the local level as he is controlling more and more area. Of all the logical lines of operations in many ways this one requires the most thought because it requires nearly immediate action after the counter-insurgent controls a new area. The counter-insurgent must ensure that a local government comes into existence quickly or it will default to being the counter-insurgent. This can have very negative effects on nationalist populations. Many parts of the world are not only nationalistic but have a long and painful history struggling against colonialism. Additionally it is important that this form of government is consistent throughout the UEX area of operation. In one village, the 1st BCT should not put the local Shaman in charge and in the next one hold an election. Yes, each village and population center will be slightly different, but wide differences may cause problems as populations become aware of the situation in the neighboring village. The last part of this is that the local form of government has to be consistent with the final national government desired by U.S. national policy. Once again, the State Department may have the expertise and local knowledge, but it is unlikely that they will have a comprehensive plan. The UEX cannot wish away this mission. If the planning and coordination is not being done by

another agency the UEX must do it itself. These local governments are going to be the key “go-to” people for the UEX forces when issues arise in the villages and the cities.

In conjunction with the host nation government line of operation goes the host nation security force development. Time and again history shows that this may be the most immediate successful step that the UEX can take in creating security among the population. As with the other lines of operations this will be dependent on the situation. Questions will arise as to whether to retain the current security force and put it through a vetting process or whether a completely new force will have to be built. Obviously, this will lead to the natural question of who is going to develop the plan and who is going to resource it with equipment and trainers. Once again, history shows that in most U.S. counter-insurgencies the U.S. military will become the primary trainers of the security forces.⁴⁶ Though soldiers are not policemen, they have a long history of training them whether it is in Haiti, the Philippines, or Iraq.

The development of the security force will likely be a top-down and bottom-up combination. The issue is, that in order to create a truly long term effective police and military force there must be a supporting legal superstructure. It does the local population no good to arrest terrorists if the judges simply release them for fear for their lives. On the other hand, it is not helpful in the long term if the police and military are corrupt and act with immunity and terrorize the population because there is no check on their power. This will almost always require a great deal of effort because rarely does a country that has an insurgency have an effective police force and legal system. The lack of an effective security force and judicial system is frequently part of the reason why the insurgency has developed.

In recent interventions such as Haiti, Bosnia, and Iraq the military has looked to outside agencies to take the lead in building the security forces. Though there has sometimes been a

⁴⁶ Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2003).

name or an agency assigned that mission they have never had the resources or people to conduct the mission without military support. The military has always played a critical role in the development of the local police and the military. In addition to creating these security forces, a supporting legal and incarceration system must be developed. This cannot be an after thought in the planning. Units with the correct capabilities should be assigned this mission and then they must be properly resourced. If there is not unit with the appropriate capability and no outside unit is available then the UEX must designate a unit and provide it with time and resources to develop the capability. The UEX should not allow itself or its subordinate units to look upon the development of a host nation security force as distraction from their main mission.

The economic development logical line of operation is now accepted by most military officers as critical to the success of most stability operations, to include counter-insurgency operations. As with all of the other lines of operations, it must be nested with the overall endstate and it has to be focused. The commander must decide who the economic development is meant to influence. It is not simply enough to have “economic growth”. This growth must have a purpose. The UEX must set of the flow of funding and resources so subordinate commanders have the flexibility to meet local demands. This goes back to developing self-synchronizing systems.

The most nebulous and possibly the most difficult but import logical line of operation is the sociological. This is the line of operation where the commander is working to create the sociological conditions in his area of operation that supports the destruction of the insurgency and supports the counter-insurgents. Of all the lines of operations, this is the line that requires the deepest understanding of culture and people. All communities and people act and react for a variety of reasons that cannot be explained through Adam Smith’s rational actor model. As such, each sociological line of operation must fit the culture of the community in which it will take place. The commander must then develop a plan to influence the critical parts of the community to support his campaign against the insurgents. This will naturally require the plan to be sensitive

to the history of the area and the people, the religion, the family structures, and a myriad of other factors that will shape what the people in this area value and why they act the way they do. Tools for this sociological line are information operations, rules of engagement for dealing with the people, developing feedback lines from the influential elements within the society, and many other steps. As with almost all of the lines of operations, it is important to empower the lowest level command to create locally tailored solutions. This decentralization once again raises the question of nesting efforts and resources. The commander must ensure that the actions in one sector do not retard the actions in another.

The last suggested line of operation is intelligence gathering. Intelligence is critical in all forms of warfare, but especially in counter-insurgency warfare. To effectively target the insurgents the counter-insurgent must first identify them and this requires intelligence. To effectively influence the critical leaders of a community the UEX must know who those leaders are and what their motivation is. As the counter-insurgent force stays in the area of operation, he must develop a comprehensive plan for developing his intelligence gathering system. For the counter-insurgent to maximize his opportunity for success his intelligence gathering must be deliberate yet flexible. In counter-insurgency operations human intelligence is always vitally important. The other forms of intelligence can be helpful, but the decisive form of intelligence is human intelligence. As part of this, there are several key issues that must be addressed. They include the role of interrogation of known and suspected insurgents and insurgent sympathizers, development of an informant network, infiltrating the insurgency, monitoring key neutral organizations and polling the general population. To successfully develop this intelligence network and system requires the UEX to be closely linked with other governmental organizations and the host nation. This last one obviously requires a great deal of awareness in regards to operational security in determining what information can and cannot be shared.

To develop a successful counter-insurgency plan it is essential that the plan address multiple lines of operations. These lines are presented as recommendations, but every counter-

insurgency is different and requires different areas of focus and emphasis. It is critical for the commander to create a comprehensive vision of the endstate that is more than simply military. From his desired endstate, the staff develops the lines of operation that support creating the commander's vision. Every line of operation is focused on its own endstate that is nested with the commander's overall endstate for the operation. Whether or not the UEX is taking the lead on a particular line of operation it must ensure that all of the relevant lines are developed. If no other agency is taking the lead than the UEX must assume the responsibility for fully developing and executing that line of operation.

COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS: MODELING NOT SYNCHRONIZING

FM 5-0 says that "COA analysis allows the staff to synchronize the BOS for each COA and identify which COA best accomplishes the mission."⁴⁷ FM 5-0 also talks about the wargaming process as enabling the staff to maximize combat power and develop a similar vision of the fight among the staff. All of these are important results of wargaming, but synchronization is the obvious focus. For many operations, synchronization should be the critical focus for planning, but focusing on synchronization at the UEX level is inadequate when dealing with counter-insurgency operations.

The planners' goal for the wargame must be developing a deeper understanding of the operation and the environment by testing their model. The planners must look at the "final" wargame as their playing out of their understanding of their area of operation and their course of action. The standard idea of action-reaction, counter-action will not develop the depth of understanding that the commander and the planners must have to conduct successful operations. As such, the planners must move away from seeing the wargame as a synch drill and understanding it as a modeling session. Doerner describes it perfectly when he writes, "If we

⁴⁷ FM 5-0 Army Planning and Orders Production (Final draft) (15 July 2002) 3-33.

want to operate within a complex and adaptive system, we have to know not only what its current status is, but what the status will be or could be in the future, and we have to know how certain actions we take will influence the situation.”⁴⁸ Understanding this complex and adaptive system and the impact of our actions is the focus of our modeling or wargaming.

Doerner is absolutely correct, that to successfully plan within complex systems requires an understanding of the relationship and rules of the system’s variables. The rules of the different variables came out of the mission analysis. The planners listed out what the different units, organizations, key leaders, and other critical variables’ rules of behavior were. These rules covered desired aim, likely tactics, limitations, and relationship to other variables in addition to identifying their capabilities. The wargame is where all of this “rule making” is played out.

With the modeling session as the endstate, the chief of plans goes through the wargaming steps as laid out in FM 5-0. He gathers the tools, lists the friendly forces, assumptions, known critical events, decision points, determines evaluation criteria, selects a war-game method and a manner in which to record it and finally wargames (models). All of these steps are still valid and essential even when approaching the wargame as a model and not simply as a synch drill. Within certain steps, there are certain modifications that must occur in order to successfully model.

When the chief of plans goes through the steps where he gathers the tools, lists the friendly forces, assumptions, known critical events, and decision points he is really building the bases for the model. The chief of plans assigns different variables to different planners. They must take the rules of behavior (most likely assumptions at this point) developed out of mission analysis and get inside the character of that variable. They must approach this as something akin to acting or role playing in order to as accurately as possible portray their variable in the coming modeling session. The chief of plans assigns all of the critical variables to the planning staff. He is setting his board for the modeling. He has added his players and now he should graphically

⁴⁸ Dietrich Doerner, *The Logic of Failure* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996) 41.

add the important terrain. This also comes out of the mission analysis and must include more than just the hills and roads and other normal military aspects of terrain. For the model to be successful, it has to set the stage for the other planners to be able to see the world through their variables' eyes. That means the board should include significant cultural sites, social infrastructure like schools, markets, power system, government buildings, etc. The more detailed the board is set and the planners understand their variables, the more accurate and meaningful the modeling will be.

The next step, determining evaluation criteria, is immensely complicated. This should be the planners' first attempt at developing the operation's measures of effectiveness. Like everything else, these measures of effectiveness should be derived from the commander's endstate. When the unit is successful and the UEX achieves its endstate the commander will know this because of these measures of effectiveness. Additionally, the measures of effectiveness should also tell the commander when he is gaining the ability to influence the system. Developing these measures of effectiveness are difficult because it is easy to measure symptoms, but very difficult to measure core indicators. For example, the destruction of the insurgency may be one measure of effectiveness. That raises the problem of how does a commander know when the insurgency is destroyed. It is unlikely that he will have such accurate information on the exact numbers of insurgents. The commander and planners may therefore shift to measuring the number of attacks launched by the insurgency as an indicator of the insurgency's strength. The challenge here is that this may not accurately reflect the true strength of the insurgency. The Tet Offensive in Vietnam is an excellent example of this. Tet gave the American public the impression that there was a huge and successful insurgency in Vietnam. Well, after Tet this was simply not true. The Tet offensive significantly crippled the insurgency in South Vietnam. It took Giap and the others years to repair that damage.⁴⁹ Number of insurgent

⁴⁹ Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam A History* (New York: Penguin Books, 1984) 523-545.

attacks can be a misleading indicator. Measures of effectiveness are probably most accurate when there are multiple supporting measures that look at similar issues with the intent of seeing the whole. In a counter-insurgency the three major areas to measure are the strength of the government, the support of the people, and the strength of the insurgency. By measuring these three areas through a variety of quantifiable measurements, the commander should have a good feel for success. There is one last key point on establishing evaluation criteria. Most the time when planners establish evaluation criteria, they should not allow the results of the wargame to change the evaluation criteria. That is not the case when using measurements of effectiveness. The planners should use the measurements to evaluate the model, but the planner should also use the model to evaluate the measurements. After a successful modeling session, it is very possible that the planners will discover that a certain measurement may give a false reading and that it is not accurate. In that case, the planners must capture this lesson and the measurement changed.

The next big issue is deciding how to record the lessons of the modeling session. The recording method must capture the depth of the lessons that will be gained from the modeling and there must be a method to refine certain critical products. A synch matrix is not sufficient. Each planning group will have to develop their own method for recording, visualizing, and sharing their lessons. There are at least three areas the planners must focus on capturing. The first is the overall system with their new understanding of the relationships between the variables and how one variable affects another. The planners must also be able to capture their new depth of understanding for each of the variables. Based on the modeling session, the planners must update the rules of behavior for each variable. Lastly, they must update the collection matrix. Based on their deeper understanding of the system there will certainly be critical information requirements that arise and the planners must reflect that in the collection matrix.

The last step is the modeling session itself. FM 5-0 talks about action-reaction-counteraction. This works well when units are going through trying to maximize their solutions and synchronizing events, but that is not the focus of the modeling session. The focus of the

COIN Modeling technique is to understand this complex and adaptive system and see how the planners actions effect the system. As such, the chief of plans must develop an approach that he is most comfortable with that facilitates the modeling. There are many different ways to wargame. During the wargame the planner may be allow time to flow and people play through their roles with the chief of plans moderating a dialogue. Another option is that the chief of plans makes it turn based. He decides that each turn will be of a fixed length and allows certain actions to take place in one turn and then allows the other sides to take actions. Within this model, he may divide the variables into three sides so there are three turns in every round. One side is the UEX, one side the host nation and neutral elements, and one side is the insurgency. The chief of plans must decide, based on the system he is modeling, the character of his planning group, and his style of learning, how to run the modeling session. As with the standard FM 5-0 wargaming process, he must also select what he wants to model. The chief of plans must think through how he envisions the modeling session going and then clearly explain to everyone involved the over all concept and the specific guidance to individuals.

There are two critical additional issues pertaining to this form of wargaming. The first is that complex operations require multiple wargames and each one should have a different focus. This modeling session is the capstone wargame prior to writing the order. Prior to this wargame, it is very likely that the planners and staff have conducted smaller wargames to ensure that plans are feasible and to check that they are synchronized to an acceptable level. It is possible that these wargames were done in smaller groups or they may have been done in the larger group. Just because a modeling session occurs does not mean that other forms of wargaming should not have occurred. They should not, however, occur at the same time. Feasibility and synchronization wargames are not compatible with modeling sessions. It is unlikely a planning staff can work through the sequential details of the first two and achieve the depth of understanding of the latter in the same session.

The last issue is the requirement to regularly rerun the modeling session. This is not a one time event. As the operation unfolds and intelligence is gathered, the planners should update the rules of behavior and capabilities for each variable. As the knowledge of the individual variables and the system as a whole is improved the planners will be able to identify how to more effectively influence the system. This planning tool does not stop when the operation order is issued. Modeling is a very effective way of understanding the counter-insurgency system and ongoing operations.

CONCLUSION

The nature of insurgencies and counter-insurgency operations requires that planners approach the problem of counter-insurgency warfare from more than a kinetic combat perspective. As such the military planner at all levels must assess the problem of defeating the insurgency and providing security to the people as a challenge requiring other than a conventional military solution. Planners must keep in mind that there may be no decisive battle. Insurgencies are unique movements that arise for reasons that are dependent on circumstances specific to a particular time, place, and condition. Rarely can the reasons that give rise to an insurgency be dealt with solely by force. History's shows that the most successful way of dealing with an insurgency is by attacking and isolating the insurgency through a comprehensive plan involving more than military operations. A successful plan will include focused military operations to secure the people and defeat the insurgents while addressing the political, economic, and sociological factors that gave rise to the insurgency. This understanding of the military in counter-insurgency operations requires the UEX planners to develop a campaign plan that includes more than the military line of operations.

The Army's term of logical lines of operations is a very useful way to approach dealing with insurgencies. Each counter-insurgency demands a unique set of lines of operations. These lines will run from security to sociological. Military units will sometimes work under a

functioning civilian government that effectively runs the non-military logical lines of operations. The government may hand the military well developed plans for economic, health, governmental and other lines of operations. The past though, shows that this situation rarely occurs. The historical norm is that the military must play a role in developing these lines of operations. Counter-insurgency units that are only looking for the big battle will be beaten by the insurgent who is winning the peoples' hearts and minds house by house and night by night through coercion and inducement. The UEX will successfully defeat the insurgency when it conducts operations along multiple logical lines of operations that attack the insurgent and create the environment that isolates the insurgency from the people.

The planner must take his lines of operation and run them through a modeling session in order to develop a deeper understanding of the relationship between the people, the insurgent, and the counter-insurgent. This modeling session will help the planners and the commander develop a deeper understanding of their area of operations by accurately portraying the relationships between the critical players and groups. The commander and the planners will be able to effectively develop a campaign plan, based off of their deeper understanding, that attacks the insurgency while severing its support from the people.

The COIN Modeling technique is a difficult technique for two primary reasons. The first is that the Army has not trained the majority of its officers to think along more than the military line of operations. Most planners are uncomfortable developing logical lines of operations for non-military operations. The second reason why this technique is difficult is because the Army has not trained its officers to think of the MDMP in this manner. It is hard for planning groups to make the mental shift from the sequential process of the standard MDMP to the more abstract and complex COIN Modeling process. To make the change from the standard MDMP to the COIN Modeling process requires significant training of the planning group. Therefore, the chief of plans may have to identify a select group of planners who will actually go through the COIN Modeling planning process. The remainder of the staff will likely go through the regular MDMP

and provide knowledge and expertise to those planners who are working through the modeling process. This is all dependent on the capability and personalities of the planning staff and the chief of plans.

The purpose of this monograph was to convince the UEX planner that he must broaden the MDMP in order to make it an effective COIN planning process. Successful COIN operations depend on understanding far more than force on force operations. Successful military operations in a counter-insurgency will rarely lead to a decisive battle. Successful operations will far more frequently isolate the insurgent from his source of power which is frequently the people. Therefore, an effective COIN planning process must be comprehensive enough to address the military and non-military sources of power and conditions that sustain the insurgency. This requires the planners to understand the critical aspects of the overall society and its key players while developing logical lines of operations to achieve the desired endstate. The COIN Modeling technique is a good process to achieve this end.

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