U.S. AIR FORCE AND REPUBLIC OF KOREA AIR FORCE: 
CAN BOTH FORCES TRAIN TOGETHER 
ON A REGULAR BASIS?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree 
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JOHN R. SWONSON, MAJ, USAF
B.S., Saint Louis University, Missouri, 1984

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This study investigates the feasibility of combining the daily training schedules of United States Air Force units and Republic of Korea Air Force units. The combined Air Component Command's plan for future hostilities in the Korean theater calls for both air forces to work together in combined operations on the very first day of the campaign. The training each air force does to prepare for this eventuality is similar in many respects, but because of long standing beliefs the two have, they rarely trained together. The two training syllabi were compared to highlight the similarities and differences. Staff interviews were conducted to provide service and cultural related perceptions to clarify research questions. This study concludes that near-term combined training is feasible, however, only on a limited basis. In-depth, long-term training programs can be developed as the cultural barriers are broken down, which is what this study promotes.
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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ John R. Swonson

Title of thesis: U.S. Air Force and Republic of Korea Air Force: Can Both Forces Train Together on a Regular Basis?

Approved by:

MAJ Charles C. Floyd, M.M.A.S.

MAJ Keith B. Bartisch, M.A.

SFC John C. Broom, Ph.D.

Accepted this 6th date of June 1997 by:

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


This study investigates the feasibility of combining the daily training schedules of United States Air Force (USAF) units and Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) units. The combined Air Component Command’s plan for future hostilities in the Korean theater call for both air forces to work together in combined operations on the very first day of the campaign. The training each air force does to prepare for this eventuality is similar in many respects, but because of long standing beliefs the two have, they rarely trained together. The two training syllabi were compared to highlight the similarities and differences. Staff interviews were conducted to provide service and cultural related perceptions to clarify research questions. This study concludes that near-term combined training is feasible, however, only on a limited basis. In-depth, long-term training programs can be developed as the cultural barriers are broken down, which is what this study promotes.
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PREFACE

The year prior to attending the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), I was assigned to the 8th Fighter Wing at Kunsan Air Base (AB), Republic of Korea (ROK). As a pilot in the 35th Fighter Squadron flying the F-16, my squadron duties were the Chief of Standards and Evaluations, as well as the Squadron Quality Officer. Everyday, air crews trained and prepared for the next Korean conflict. I became aware of the intense planning and preparations that have already gone into operations plans and that every plan calls for both countries' air forces to work together as soon as hostilities break out.

That, in and of itself, is enough to raise one's interest. But what I could never understand is why the two air forces would never train together, especially at Kunsan AB which bases both USAF and ROKAF fighter squadrons. It only made sense to me that if forces would routinely train together in peace, then when called upon to act in a state of conflict, they would perform much better. This would reduce the amount of noneffective sorties, plus lower casualty counts of friendly forces. It is the thought that by establishing a combined training program for the USAF and ROKAF forces, then American airmen and their Korean counterparts would enjoy a higher combat capability and lower the risk as they fly into the face of danger.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

I am excited and amazed that you are asking me about this. Usually you just tell us what to do!¹

Lieutenant Colonel Nam, Republic Of Korea
Army Liaison Officer, CGSC

War in many ways is like a football game. Both sides come to battle with an objective and a game plan to attain that objective. Winning football teams do not just show up for a game and expect to win. They have a practice schedule, scrimmages, and a preseason to prepare themselves for the game. They use every opportunity to perfect their capabilities and tryout the game plan they intend to employ on the field. If the plan does not work on the practice field, then coaches make changes and improvements before the game. This same reasoning holds true for the military. The military constantly practices and exercises its capabilities, always looking for ways to improve both the skills required and the plans to employ in time of war.

During times of peace, military units train on their individual skills and tasks that they expect to execute on the battlefield. Their training schedules reflect just how hard they work at maintaining the combat capability expected of them. In a flying unit, the air force designs every daily sortie to meet specific objectives and to hone certain skills. Programmed and surprise local training exercises, such as Unit Self-Inspection Exercises used by the 8th Fighter Wing at Kunsan AB in the Republic of Korea (ROK), test the wing team for its wartime missions.² Every unit on the air base executes its missions under simulated combat situations. Sometimes these exercises support wider exercise plans for a numbered air force, or possibly a complete theater of

¹

²
operations. When this happens, the outcome is a joint and/or multinational exercise designed to bring all of the players to the battlefield at the same time.

By having these large force exercises involving all potential players, the actual battlefield environment comes to life. During these intensive sorties, air crews experience firsthand the stress and task saturation of the air battle. All the inter flight communications clutter the radios and radar warning receivers (RWR) constantly squeal. All the while, pilots are expected to maintain position, timing, and situational awareness of the entire area. Then the pilot must employ the aircraft with the utmost lethality. Naturally, after a successful mission, the air force expects pilots to bring their multimillion dollar aircraft home and do it all over again.

The Korean Peninsula is one of the prime regions of concern for the United States as a potential hot spot. Since the end of the Korean Conflict, both the North and South continue to build up their military forces in preparation for future conflict along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). For the past forty years, both sides have invested a tremendous amount of capital and effort to increase the size and capabilities of their military forces. The People's Democratic Republic of Korea (PDRK) has the fourth largest standing army in the world, most of which is postured along the DMZ. The ROK has invested in a smaller professional force, but with the technological advantage of newer hardware.

**Problem Statement**

Now that South Korean forces have come of age, it is time for the US to help prepare them for a larger part in their own defense. The coalition of forces put together by the United Nations (UN) includes the United States and South Korea as the principal members. The US or ROK alone does not expect to withstand an attack by the North across the DMZ. The planners recognize this fact, and reflect so in the current wartime plans. From the very first wave of coordinated air attacks, the packages are a coalition of forces from both the United States Air
As teammates facing this enemy, the air forces of both countries must be able to work together as a finely tuned machine. Each air force needs to know the strengths and weaknesses of the other and needs to work together to complement each other. In some cases, both air forces position units on the very same air base. However, the two do not train together. The USAF has no precise knowledge of the capabilities of the ROKAF, and vice versa.

Research Question

This thesis investigates the reason or reasons why the USAF and ROKAF do not train together in preparation for the next battle along the DMZ. The research question for this thesis is: Can the USAF and ROKAF units train together on a regular basis? If the answer is a conditional yes, then the thesis will address the conditions or various levels of training that may be feasible.

Supporting Questions

This thesis thoroughly reviews four supporting questions. First, what, if anything, are the USAF and ROKAF currently doing in the area of combined training? The answers should provide some insight into some of the operational, as well as some of the social and cultural problems the two nations must overcome to train together. This will help develop a starting point from which the two air forces can build a combined training program.

Second, what is the compatibility of the USAF’s training requirements and those of the ROKAF? This will require an in-depth analysis of the two air forces’ annual training programs. In addition, it should highlight the strengths and weaknesses of both programs. This thesis investigates areas of similar semiannual training requirements for possible combined training opportunities that would improve the overall combat capability of both air forces.
Third, how would possible consolidation of these training areas benefit each air force? This relates directly to the second question as it applies to the advantages. The thesis investigates all areas, to include increased combat effectiveness for both air forces’ pilots and training efficiencies.

Finally, what are the social, cultural, and political barriers the two nations must overcome to make such a vast change in the training regime possible? This may prove to be the hardest part of this thesis. Each air force has been training separately for so long that there is naturally going to be reluctance to such a change. If not simple inertia, then two very strong and proud nations need to adjust and assimilate some of the other’s training methods. This section examines the attitudes of both military leaderships, as well as those of the Korean government. For effective combined training to occur, all parties must be eager and willing to participate.

Significance of the Study

The way planners currently write wartime plans, both the USAF and ROKAF expect to fly together in combined packages on hour one, day one, of the next Korean War. However, the author feels that the two air forces currently have little desire for combined training. Because of this lack of training, neither party has any idea what the capabilities and limitations are of the other air force. In a broader view, each does not know how the other expects to employ and orchestrate packages into a relatively confined airspace and condensed time frame, against a very challenging enemy. This lack of knowledge about each other will have serious negative effects during any air war. If the USAF and ROKAF implement some form of combined training, each air force increases their combined combat capability and reduces their war time losses, as well as the ineffective sorties.
Background

This subject addresses a very sensitive subject, both militarily and politically. There is a belief held by most USAF pilots, that the reason the two services do not train together is because the USAF pilots would embarrass the ROKAF pilots. They base this belief on the fact that USAF training is superior to the ROKAF. In addition, the majority of the aircraft flown by the USAF are far superior to those of the ROKAF. Even if these beliefs are true, the USAF must acknowledge the fact that the ROKAF has continually improved the quality of both its pilot force and aircraft inventory over the last forty years.

A key word in the above beliefs is “embarrassment.” The Korean people have a history of more than 1,000 years of conquest and oppression by foreign nations. Since the end of the Korean War, the South Koreans have continually improved their standard of living across the board to negate the need for foreign assistance. The South Koreans have built their country up from the devastation of the war and now enjoy an economy rated among the world’s best. Also, they are currently in the middle of a complete infrastructure rebuilding process. The educational system in ROK rivals any in the world, and they now enjoy a higher level of education and literacy than the US. The ROKAF has an order with Lockheed-Martin, in Fort Worth, Texas, for 120 new F-16 Block 52 aircraft, which are better than any US aircraft currently in theater.

Considering these examples and others not mentioned, the people of South Korea are beginning to feel they are capable of unilaterally defending themselves without to relying on the current amount of foreign intervention. This pride runs so deep, that even in an exercise, if lessons learned are the result of South Korean mistakes or shortfalls, the whole South Korean force will look upon itself as a failure.

This thesis will try to establish a process to shift this paradigm and to prove to USAF pilots that flying with the ROKAF would be a valuable and rewarding experience. Before the
USAF and ROKAF start a combined training program. Both parties must accept the process and value a program offers their combat forces. Then the USAF and ROKAF could devise a "building block" approach to begin combined training. The eventual goal would be to establish a program that has the combined air forces flying sorties and missions together. The flights themselves reflect the wartime tasking they expect to execute together in the skies over the Korean peninsula.

Scope and Limitations

This thesis only addresses USAF and ROKAF flight training beyond entry-level pilot training. Specifically, this thesis looks at the fighter operations of both countries. Although the focus is on USAF training with the ROKAF in the fighter arena, they could take this premise a step further and applied to tactical airlift operations, as well as combined naval and marine forces. This thesis will explore the possibilities and the initial steps required to implement a combined program.

The USAF in Korea currently trains its air crews with whatever joint forces are available in the Korean theater. Many of these opportunities come with restrictions themselves, based on how each of the different American services fly fighter aircraft. Always, the USAF takes a building block approach to prepare the different units for their training. It is from this standpoint that this thesis will begin to investigate the eventual possibility of combined training.

For the purpose of the thesis, some assumptions are in order. First, the USAF and ROKAF fighter pilots have a somewhat standard level of pilot skills. That is to say, all pilots involved in this kind of combined training are fully qualified in their fighter aircraft. Second, training in combined operations will spread over the entire range of fighter operations. The training includes air-to-air operations, as well as air-to-ground operations. The ultimate goal will be to employ in a combined package, with various forces from both air forces.
Presently, there are no exercises held on a regular basis in which both air forces fly together. Historically, COMBAT SPIRIT was a huge exercise held on an annual basis for all forces on the Korean peninsula. For the past few years the USAF canceled this exercise due to political considerations stemming from tensions between the North and the South. The thesis addresses any lessons learned about combined operations from previous exercises. There is one combined exercise in which all forces in the theater participate, namely, ULCHI FOCUS LENS. Even though this exercise involves the whole theater, it is limited to command post exercises (CPX), and no actual flight operations take place. If these exercises offer any pertinent lessons learned about combined training between the two countries, they will be incorporated into the thesis.

Summary

Chapter 1 presents a general overview for this thesis. The remainder of the study will try to answer the questions laid out in this chapter. Chapter 2 presents a literature review for the study. Chapter 3 lays the foundation for the research and analysis of the study. The comparative analysis of the two air force’s training programs, and their compatibility is in chapter 4. Chapter 5, the final chapter, will contain the evaluation, conclusion, recommendation, and areas for further study.

1During the author’s first interview with Lieutenant Colonel Nam on 15 August, 1996, he made this remark about the topic of the thesis.

2The 8th Fighter Wing’s annual training calendar includes all of the scheduled exercises and inspection. The Wing Commander still reserves the right to call a “No Notice” exercise at his discretion. 8th FW/DOX/CVI -- Wing Plans and Wing Self Inspection.

37th Air Force staff tabulated the data for the Air Component Commander’s briefing, June 1996.

4A package is a large formation of aircraft, separated into flights of either two ships or four ships. Each flight is of the same type of aircraft from the same squadron, and have the same
specific mission in the package. By putting a package together of twenty or so aircraft, the planners can mass a great force against a specific target array in a very short time. In many cases, the aircraft will come from different squadrons, wings, and even different countries in the case of Korea. An example of a package would be:

1 flight of 4 F-15Cs (stationed at Kadena AB, Japan) for package protection against enemy aircraft;
2 flights of 4 F-16s (8 total, stationed at Kunsan AB, Korea) for target attack;
2 flights of 2 F-5s (4 total, ROKAF aircraft stationed at Kunsan AB) for target attack; and
1 flight of 2 F-16s (stationed at Kunsan AB) for suppression of enemy air defense.

Personal experience while assigned to the 8th Fighter Wing at Kunsan AB, ROK. At every level of leadership, this was the reason stated as to why combined training was not performed.

F-16s are far superior to the F-4 and F-5 in speed, range, turning capability, and technology. Reference F-16 Dash 1, Aircraft Instruction Manual, 27 November 1995.

The F-16 has been in production for almost twenty years, and as new advances in engine and avionics technology have been incorporated into the jet. Lockheed has designated a new “Block” of F-16. The original block was the F-16 Block 5, followed quickly by the Block 10. Currently Lockheed is producing the Block 50 and 52. The difference between these two aircraft is the engine. At the present time, the USAF has Block 30 and 40 aircraft assigned in Korea. The Koreans own Block 32s and are purchasing 120 Block 52s, which are far superior to the Block 30 and 40.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter deals with the literature available concerning the topic of combined training between the two air forces of the US and the ROK. Since the end of the Korean Conflict, the US has had an active force in South Korea. The size of the force has dwindled from more than 302,000 during the Korean War in 1953, to around 60,000 from 1955 to 1990, to its present size of 36,016. Of those, 8,936 are men and women of the USAF. These men and women are stationed at primarily Osan AB or Kunsan AB. At Osan AB, the 51st Fighter Wing flies both the Block 40 F-16 and the A-10. At Kunsan AB, the 8th Fighter Wing flies the Block 30 F-16.

While the USAF has reduced its presence on the peninsula, the ROK has continually increased its force in both size and capability. In particular, the air force has enjoyed incredible growth. At its infancy in 1953, the ROKAF was nonexistent. Today, the ROKAF numbers 53,000 personnel, and flies not only F-5s and F-4s, but they also have 48 Block 30 F-16s. In addition to that, they are building 120 Block 52 F-16s with Lockheed.

Because of the historical differences in capability between the two air forces, there has never been any formal combined training program. Due to this fact, sources concerning this topic are not readily available. In addition, the few printed sources contain limited information concerning combined training. Of the material reviewed, the researcher surveyed most with an eye toward combined training. The research gathered divides into the following areas: air force regulations (both USAF and ROKAF), professional journals, Korean culture and history, and finally, telephone interviews.
USAF Regulations

To begin the research, it only makes sense to establish exactly what the requirements are for the two air forces. What are the training requirements established by each of the respective air forces for their pilots? Can the two air forces combine their training programs in some way that would enhance the overall training program? What are the differences of the two programs that prohibit training in a certain regime? For example, the Block 40 F-16 is a low altitude navigation and targeting infra-red for night (LANTIRN) equipped aircraft. When pilots fly specific LANTIRN missions, these aircraft operate autonomously at night. This mission would have little training value to the ROKAF since their aircraft are not equipped with LANTIRN.

Some specific regulations to be examined are Multi-Command Instruction (MCI) 11-F16, MCI 11-A/OA10, and the Korean counterparts. These regulations describe the semiannual training requirements for all pilots in their particular aircraft. By looking at these, in conjunction with the Korean regulations, an outline of a possible combined program should start coming into focus. The information from these regulations will start to answer the first few supporting questions of this thesis, namely the compatibility of the two training programs and the advantages and disadvantages of a combined program.

The USAF regulations cover in-depth the ground training requirements, simulator requirements, and the flying training requirements. Each pilot is responsible to fulfill these requirements on an annual basis to maintain his or her mission ready (MR) status. The breadths of these requirements cover such matters as general training like the number of sorties to be flown, to specific mission type training such as night vision goggle training. By meeting the requirements laid out in this manual, the USAF can only then count a pilot as MR. The higher commands closely monitor a squadron's MR status to insure manning is maintained at the specified levels.
Much to this researcher's dismay, the ROKAF Chief of Staff refused to allow a review of the Korean counterpart to USAF MCI regulations. After five months of communication through the Korean Embassy in Washington, D. C. with Colonel Yoon, the Air Attaché for the ROKAF, word was finally forwarded that the Chief of Staff feared that this regulation could be used for propaganda against the ROKAF itself. In addition, the author tried three other channels to access this manual: the 7th Air Force commander's office, personnel at the Combined Forced Command (CFC) Headquarters, and individual pilots at Kunsan AB. All three sources were denied access to the requested information by ROKAF leadership.

Due to this fact, the author made some assumptions about the Korean training regime, and will be discussed in further detail in chapter 4. This refusal of cooperation also provides a valuable insight into some of the most basic problems air force leadership must overcome with respect to the military, government, and culture. All of which leadership must answer before installing a combined program. Issues like this are major concerns and are addressed in Chapter 5.

Of the few documents located during the research process, the professional journals tended to be the most rewarding source of information on the subject. In the July 1993 issue of *U.S. Army Aviation Digest*, Lieutenant Colonel Garry McNiesh discussed a combined training program that the US Army (USA) established between itself and the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA). The program began development in 1982 and then tested and evaluated in 1984. As a result of these tests, the USA and ROKA established the Combined Aviation Force (CAF).
In the article, Lieutenant Colonel McNiesh describes the CAF as a “Combined Forces Team.” The CAF consists of two organizations: one ROK Army (ROKA) Aviation Command, and the other the US 17th Aviation Brigade. The CAF only forms during exercises and war, however, the CAF learned many lessons during these exercises and has evolved continually over its first nine years.

When formed, the CAF is the largest combined aviation unit of its kind. As a group, they represent an aviation division, organized into 14 battalions with 340 aircraft and more than 4,500 personnel. Command of the unit rests with a ROKA Aviation Command commander, a ROKA major general. The USA provides the deputy commander, who is the 17th Aviation Brigade commander with the rank of colonel. The 17th Aviation Brigade executive officer is “dual-hatted” as the CAF Chief of Staff. The CAF assigns the remainder of the staff with ROK and US personnel throughout the organization.

The primary mission of the CAF is killing tanks, but it also conducts the complete gamut of army aviation missions. The CAF receives its tasking from the CFC Ground Component Commander (GCC). The CAF evaluates and analyses the missions and then organizes units into task force structures. The key here is that they are centrally controlled, but decentrally executed. The CAF practices this process on a weekly basis through standardized air assault and Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) training. USA and ROKA units alternate duties as the air mission commander. It is important to realize that with the complexity of the situation during a war, and given the scope of the theater, it is not unreasonable to have seven CAF task forces operating at the same time, anywhere in Korea.

This level of integration would never have been possible without the forethought and vision to implement a combined program more than fourteen years ago. Through all these years, they learned lessons from each other, shared ideas, and trust between allies became a reality. The
CAF trains as if it is going to fight -- combined. If the air forces are going to face the same situation of flying together, then maybe the air forces can observe their army counterparts and can follow their lead. Over the years, helicopter pilots overcame many of the hurdles facing fighter pilots today. As a result, the CAF is a critical element of the CINC’s combat team.4

The same issue of U.S. Army Aviation Digest contains another article on combined aviation in Korea. Captain Anthony S. Pelczynski and Captain Cho, Choon Ho wrote specifically about their experiences in “Attack Helicopter Operation in the Combined Environment.” At that time Captain Pelczynski commanded an attack helicopter company, and Captain Cho was an attack helicopter company operations officer. Together they worked to develop a combined team of attack aviation.

One of the key issues raised in the article is that “interoperability between the two nations armed forces is essential to successful military operations on the peninsula. Preparing our two great armies to fight ‘side-by-side’ in the region of the world where the last vestige of the cold war still looms over the ROK is a continuing challenge.” This sentiment is as true for the air forces as it is for the armies in the region. The situation is the same, if not worse, than three years ago, and commanders expect both air forces to perform combined operations.

Some of the lessons learned reflect many of the same problems the air forces can expect to face if they elect to establish a combined training program. These range from command issues and technology differences to employment and language barriers. By developing a habitual relationship with each other, over time these problems ceased to be a continual stumbling block. The bottom line is that the pilots were willing to work together, remain flexible, and achieve their ultimate goal of maximizing their combined combat power.6

Both of these articles describe many of the problems that the two air forces are now facing. However, by working together over a period of years they overcame the problems. The
air forces cannot afford to ignore lessons learned by the army. The CAF may prove to be an excellent example of what the air forces must do to begin working together.

In the July and August 1991 issue of Defense, General Robert W. RisCassi provided an insight about the alliance between the US and ROK. Even though the article “America’s ROK-Solid Alliance” is now five years’ old, it still represents valid concerns for the region. Most of the article deals with the impact that the Gulf War had on the soldiers and personnel in Korea at the time. However, there are pertinent points to made about the status of forces and the quality of soldier in both countries’ armed forces.

One insight of the general’s, that is of particular interest concerning this thesis is the impact the American reduction of forces will have on the commitment to Korea. General RisCassi answers this question by stating that the American forces do not operate in a vacuum, but in a combined coalition with the Republic of Korea. Any reduction made took into consideration the combined strength of the two countries. It was because of the increased capabilities of the Korean forces that the Americans could withdraw.

A common thread throughout the article was his respect for the Korean forces. General RisCassi recognized their capability and the combined strength of the two forces. He closed the article with: “it is an absolute honor to serve with members of both our armed forces, and it is a continuing challenge for all leaders to provide the quality of leadership, training and care that our forces deserve.”

Korean Culture and History

Several books that deal with the past of the Korean people and their nation are available in the US Army Combined Arms Research Library. Many of the events from their past have had a lasting impact on their outlook toward the world and on their place in it. Of specific interest is their cultural development. How have foreign invasions affected their opinions toward the US as
Americans continue to base military forces on their soil? Another key concept to be studied is how their views toward the US have changed over the last decade as their military has grown to the point of possible unilateral defense against the North Koreans.

One book with considerable insights into the present Korean psyche is The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea by Se-Jin Kim. In this book, Mr. Kim concentrates on the reasons behind the political and military turmoil within Korea after the Korean War. Many of the underlying grounds for the problems present at that time are still prevalent today.

Mr. Kim brings to light the dramatic impact that long-term occupation has had on the Korean people. Before 1910, Korean rule was much like the early seventh century British Stuart. Considering the legends of Tan-gun, and supported by the old Confucianism, the Koreans held a vague notion of a divine right to rule. The Korean sovereigns traditionally had absolute authority over their subjects. The sovereigns thought of the populace as children of the king. Because of this, the people of Korea had little if any practical experience in their own government and defense.

Japan occupied Korea from 1910 until the end of World War II. During this time the Japanese installed their own government, military, and police force. Again the Korean people learned little of self-government and military control. The Japanese insured complete subjugation of the Korean people. For these thirty-five years, they barred the Koreans from any political and administrative experience.

This situation only enhanced the paternal relationship between the people and the ruling body. For generations, the Koreans had little experience at running a country and government. So after the Korean War when the US tried to hand over the reins to the Koreans, they had to learn what requirements self-rule presented.
More importantly, this extended period of time without self-rule and the loss of the fruits of their labor to others, the Korean people hope never to again lose control of their own destiny. The people hold the government accountable while college students primarily hold the military accountable. In Korea the students are the conscience of the country. If the government fails to fulfill its elected promises or lets the country down, the students throughout Korea hold demonstrations demanding action. Even during these periods of turmoil, the military usually remains neutral and permits the government to take the appropriate action.

Mr. Kim’s book goes into great detail about the turmoil during the military upheaval of the early 1960s. This is a time when the Koreans developed the seeds of self-rule and when they established the relationships between the government, military, and people. From this point in time, one can assume from the lessons as to why the Koreans act toward foreign intervention and aid. They refuse to subjugate themselves to the control of a foreign nation again. Even the American military forces stationed in Korea for the last fifty years present a threat to their self-rule and control.

Now that they have built their nation into a world power both economically and militarily, it might possibly help the US understand exactly why the Koreans act the way they are at this time. They are always courteous and friendly toward the US, but over the past few years there has been a more determined stance. No longer are the Koreans simply accepting what the US tells them, but they are pushing ideas of their own and restricting the control the US has previously enjoyed. Some specific examples of this minor change are their control over the airspace in Korea, as well as the new Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

Another very interesting book is *The Future of the Korean Peninsula*, edited by Young C. Kim and Abraham M. Halpern. Written ten years after the Mr. Se-Jin Kim’s work, this book presents a clearer view of some of the primary functions of the Korean culture. The book itself is
a collection of writings by various writers, on numerous subjects, all pertinent to the Korean
culture. This allows a better focus on some of the differences between the two countries.

In chapter 5 of The Future of the Korean Peninsula, Gari Ledyard presents a clear picture
of the subgroups within Korean society. Mr. Ledyard breaks the society into the following
groups: the military, the intellectuals, the workers and farmers, and the government. Each group
interrelates to the others to insure that the country continues to move forward. It is an interesting
arrangement of checks and balances. The only two formal groups are the military and
government, but that does not mean that the other two do not have a say in the process and
direction the country takes for the future.

The military is one of the most powerful interest groups and the easiest to define. The
military itself is the starting point for many of the political leaders that move on to government or
business. The older and more senior officers in the military tend to have origins in the middle
and lower levels of society, and the military provided the best avenue for upward mobility. This
might be a key insight to the subservient role the military leadership takes toward the government
and business.

As long as the government continues to have a firm commitment to the military, anti-
North and communist sentiments, political and managerial efficiency, public order and discipline,
and finally strong ties with the US and Japan, the military leaders are content. The business class
holds many of these values as well, so the two work hand-in-hand on many issues. Since the
business and managerial class are from a higher part of society, this ties the three classes together
at the higher levels of government.

Of particular interest to the military and business are the strong ties with the US and
Japan. It is through these relationships that both the military and economy learned the skills
necessary to rebuild their country from the ruins of the Korean War. The US and Japan were the
two primary factors in the resurgence of Korea as a world power. Neither group wants to lose that relationship, but as the strength of the Korean armed forces and economy grows, the Koreans seem to be interested in coming to the bargaining table as an equal. Until recently, the US told the Koreans what to do without much thought, whereas now the Koreans are in a position to work together as an equal at the bargaining table.

The intellectuals comprise the academics, clergy, authors, poets, journalists, students, and artists. Together they are the holders and promoters of South Korean nationalism. Where the government looks at things in political terms and the business community in economic terms, the intellectuals see things in cultural, moral, or even ideological terms. Therefore, the general public sees the intellectuals as the caretakers of the national spirit.

This is a very important part of Korean culture. The Korean people task this group, which is not as cohesive as the others, as the caretakers of Korean culture. Because of this factor, the other groups are very sensitive to the goals of the intellectuals. If the intellectuals uphold a particular belief, the people of Korea will also back this belief. Because of this enormous amount of power, the intellectuals can hold the government, military, and business groups accountable for their actions. Many times the intellectuals organize public demonstrations throughout the country that have the ability to bring the nation to a standstill. This facet of the culture is something very foreign to anything Americans know.

The last major group mentioned is the government itself. This group is further broken down into two groups, the bureaucrats and the presidency. Both have specific duties to run the country and they are not always in support of each other. Because of the dramatic amount of power that the presidency holds, the president can easily sway the bureaucrats toward his support.

The bureaucrats are a significant force nonetheless. South Korean bureaucrats work slowly and ponderously on the issues at hand. Their salaries are so limited that corruption is a
foregone conclusion to the way Koreans complete business and government transactions. Corruption is so widely committed, that it is virtually an institutionalized custom and tradition. This does not mean they excuse it. Many anticorruption campaigns testify to the constant battle to contain the problem. In political terms, the bureaucrats are a moderate, well-educated body that prefers stability, continuity, and regularity. As such, they are a loyal, dependable, and disciplined force easily mobilized to support the governmental policies.

The presidency is very different from the president known in the US. In South Korea the presidency has taken on a life of its own, that has developed into an intricate group of institutions. The president himself is a political force to be reckoned with, but at the same time is clearly dominated by the military and economic elite. He answers to their political and economic interests. Yet, due to the growth and size of his position and the fact that the constitution gives the president the means to stay in power as long as he desires, there is little likelihood that he would be politically responsive to all interest groups. His own vision and the pressures from these outside interest groups will define the future of Korea.

To better understand the presidency and the power he controls, one must know the institutions at his disposal. First there is the Capitol Division, an elite military unit outside the military command structure that is in charge of the defense of the government and capital area. Next is the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). This is a large organization that is not only intelligence, but a political police force. The power of the KCIA reaches into every corner and every sector of the nation. Wherever there is a Korean interest, the KCIA is there, and therefore, also in Japan and the US. Everything they do and learn filters through the presidency. The last group of interest is the Economic Planning Board (EPB). This board devises the economic future of the country. It develops plans, attacks foreign investors, arranges trade agreements, and regulates all import and export activity. The finance ministry, whom Americans
would expect to control such matters, actually answers to this board. It only controls such matters as taxation, currency, and customs. From within the sphere of control that the president surrounds himself, he controls the direction of the government. He is thus insulated from many of the outside pressures Americans associate with the checks and balances of their own government.

Due to this arrangement between the different interest groups in Korea, they guide the entire country into the future. As long as two groups are working together toward the same goal, it is very hard for the other to have a great impact on changing the course. Not only is it hard for an interest group from within Korea to have an impact, foreign intervention must overcome some extremely strong resistance to change the course of Korea.

In chapter 11 of The Future of the Korean Peninsula, Young Hoon Kang writes “US -- Korean Security Relations: A Korean Perspective.”10 This writing reviews the past forty-five years of military relations. From which, one can easily follow the impacts of this relationship on the Korean people, military, and government. As the world situation has changed with the end of the cold war, the US reasons for stopping communist expansion have dwindled in importance. Now it is simply a matter of control over the North Korean threat.

What stands out from this point of view is the drastic change in relationships between both the North and South Korean governments and their allies. The collapse of the Soviet government, and the impact that has had on the North’s power base is 180 degrees out from that of the South and their relationship with the US. While the North Korean military has maintained the same weapons and doctrine for the past forty-five years, the South Koreans have been able to continually upgrade and improve the weapons and doctrine with the help of the US. With this change, the South Koreans are beginning to feel that they have the upper hand over the North.
As such, they feel they are a force to be dealt with on a equal basis with the US and Japan in the region.

On the historic perspective, the Korean Peninsula has been a dividing point between the Chinese and the Japanese. For centuries they have been using Korea as a zone of control in which they have used the Korean people and land against the other. Koreans are now unwilling to allow their country to be used for other’s gains. To which, there is a fear that the US sphere of control and influence has approached the limits of the Korean’s comfort zone. Now that they have developed the power base politically, economically, and militarily, the Korean people are not going to let the US or anyone else determine their future.

In The Korean Road to Modernization and Development, Norman Jacobs does a wonderful job analyzing the Korean culture and people. Every sector of the society is covered and then related to other sectors within society. All of this is done in a manner that lays out the past, so that one can understand the how and why life is the way it is in Korea today.

Of particular interest to this study is the section on the US’s contribution to the modernization of the political environment after World War II and after the Korean War. Mr. Jacobs points out eight distinct errors the US made when it began the occupation of the Korean peninsula after the war. First, the US treated Korea as a second class problem after World War II. The first priority was the occupation and control of Japan, and only after that was Korea considered. Because of that point of view, the US sent very few of the best and brightest to Korea to help establish a new order. Those who did serve in Korea considered it a peripheral concern.

Second, after the years of Japanese rule in Korea, the Koreans did not have trained administrators to run a country. So the Americans in charge fell back on the standards left behind by the Japanese and in many cases forced the Japanese administrators to remain in Korea.
to run things. By doing this, the Koreans became extremely angered at the US for forcing continued Japanese controls over them and much of this was happening without the American's knowledge. They did not understand or know the difference between the Japanese and the Korean systems. The American administrators thought they were helping the Koreans adapt to traditional Korean structures of government, not the Japanese remnants.

A third problem closely related to the previous, is the fact the Americans let the existing Korean bureaucracies maintain their position. This made the initial establishment of government easier, but these were the same people who had collaborated with the Japanese during their rule. By allowing them to remain in positions of power, the Korean people thought the American administrators were sanctioning past practices. All of this angered and bewildered the Korean people across all political persuasions. By the time the Americans had learned of their mistake, the existing bureaucrats had already selected replacements who were friends and of the same mind. The damage had already been done.

Fourth, the US supported anyone who was against the communist threat to the North. At the height of the cold war, the Soviet threat was real and because of this, the US was willing to back any leader who preached anti-communist politics. Many times this was to the detriment of good government, because these people were not always democratic or competent.

The fifth problem pointed out by Mr. Jacobs is one that still plagues Americans in country today. They did not understand the impacts of their system on the average person in Korea. The Americans only operated within the close confines of the cities and bases. They had little understanding about the country, the people, and the language. Due to this fact, they relied on interpreters or English speakers. Most of these people were the same ones who worked with the Japanese and were eager to maintain their own standard of living at the expense of their countrymen. Because of this, the average Korean suffered under the poor decisions being made
by the American administrators and the Korean government, only worsening their outlook toward the US held by the average Korean peasant.

Because this was an US occupation of the Korean peninsula, the US military backed the government installed. At first, all of the educational programs left by the Japanese continued and grow in power. The newspapers and education system were mouthpieces of propaganda in support of the new government. As a result a paramilitary culture began to grow under the US military’s guise. The Korean police force put into power by the Americans again perpetuated the problems the Japanese system left behind. Again the Korean people had reason to distrust the Americans due to their lack of understanding of the situation.

All of these problems led to wide spread corruption within the Korean government. The people who were able to prosper under the Japanese occupation continued to run the country to their liking. By employing some of bureaucracy techniques the Americans taught the Koreans, their centralized body was able to exercise its control over the rest of Korea. Because the Americans limited their visits to the major cities and bases, they never fully came to understand the impacts of the system on the Korean people.

As Mr. Jacobs said, the American administrators only improved upon the Japanese system of government that was in place and allowed the Koreans in charge to gather more control. From the Korean point of view they got the worst of both systems. The US believed they were building a society and government based on their own and thought they were helping matters. Now some forty years later, the history of those early mistakes still lingers in the minds of the Koreans. There is an inherent distrust toward any US ideas.

Park Chung Hee, an ex-president of South Korea, wrote the book Korea Reborn for his people, and not for a foreign audience. So the information is straight to the heart of Korea’s past and future concerns. In this book, his special point of view about Korea’s recent history since the
end of the Korean War gives the reader a true insight on how the Koreans feel about themselves, their country, their history, and their future.

One point that this researcher found from the reading was that over the past 5000 years, Korea was never able to establish its own future. Either China or Japan overran Korea, and the Korean people paid the price. They were never able to move beyond the small agricultural holdings of individual families and establish any form of business. Only after the US took control of their country and allowed them the freedoms to govern themselves, were the Korean people free to reap the rewards of their labor.12

This is a key point to take away from this book. For all of the shortcomings of the US the other books have pointed out, here the president of the nation reminds everyone that it is the freedom to govern themselves that the Americans insured, that has allowed Korea to grow and prosper beyond anyone’s imagination. In the three short decades after the Korean War, Korea has gone from a barren third world nation, to one of the leading economic powers in the world. Korea has invested in itself, worked hard to improve the infrastructure of a nation, and developed a strong and prosperous industry base. All of this the Koreans realize would never have been possible without the support of the US. It is because of this, that Korea will always feel a sense of gratitude and friendship toward the US.

What cannot be overlooked in this transformation that President Park writes about, is the thirst for knowledge about Korea’s own past and culture. During all of those centuries of foreign rule and conquer, their own culture on their own land was always denied. Through this new freedom, Koreans could learn about themselves and who they were as a people and culture. All of this helped build national pride and self-reliance. The Koreans no longer want to rely on others for their survival and prosperity in the future. Through their own hard work, they will do whatever needs to be done by themselves.13
In the *Korea Briefing, 1993*, edited by Donald N. Clark, a much closer look at the US policy toward Korea is undertaken. Here one can see the impact the new dynamic world order has had on the US and ROK relations. Both sides are now looking at the situation with a new perspective. The US can begin to reduce forces in the region to save money, and the ROK is able to step forward and take control of its economy and military. This does not mean that the US is any less concerned with the situation between the North and South Koreans. The US is just as concerned with that problem as ever, but they are shifting their views toward a more regional viewpoint. At the center of this region is the Korean peninsula, and from here the US can ensure the stability of the region and secure any vital US interests.

With such a standpoint, the Korean people have been pushing for continued concessions from the US. Not only has the military relationship changed drastically over the last decade, but the economic landscape has been changing just as fast. Now the South Koreans are one of America's largest trade partners. In 1991, the US accounted for 23.5 percent of South Korea's total imports, while it received 25.5 percent of South Korea's total exports. As a result, Americans know Hyundai, Kia, and Samsung products are just as well as Koreans know Coke and McDonald's. The Korean government has consistently pushed for favorable trading agreements, in order to help their industry grow and compete with other nations. Only recently have the Koreans been willing to accept some concessions of their own toward American products.

**Telephone Interviews**

A major portion of the input derived for this thesis has come from the people that will enforce and manage a combined training program between the USAF and ROKAF. Air Force staff agencies at Headquarters 7th Air Force, Pacific Air Force Command (PACAF), and air force units in theater have been contacted and questioned. A key individual contacted for this research
was Lieutenant General Ronald Iverson, 7th Air Force Commander at Osan AB, ROK. This topic is of great interest to him as the Air Component Commander (ACC) in the Korean theater. His views are critical for a major change in training philosophy this thesis promotes. Staffs have a broad range of concerns that will impact the proposition of combined training and will be addressed in the comparative and evaluative analyses.

Lieutenant General Iverson's staff was very supportive during the research for this thesis. The topic of combined training has been receiving much attention from General Iverson and his Korean counterpart. They are aware of the necessary steps that need to be taken before a full fledged combined program can be installed and are in the process of paving the way. For instance, 7th Air Force devised a new program that establishes "Sister Squadrons" among the various USAF units in Korea with ROKAF counterparts. This program started with many of the squadrons stationed at Osan AB and involves squadrons from every aspect of the air force, not just flying units. The program is also being implemented at Kunsan AB where the commanders are very closely aligned with the ROKAF fighter wing assigned at Kunsan AB as well. The program at present is designed to share ideas and develop a social bond. It is hoped that this program will lay the foundation of trust and understanding between the two air forces that will eventually allow continued expansion of the program.

General Iverson is paying close attention to this program and is a champion of combined training. He realizes that the situation between the ROKAF and USAF is changing from the time when the US dictated the military situation to the ROK. Now the ROK is beginning to establish their own control over their country and its defense. He knows that it is important to establish a solid working relationship with the ROKAF, or have to suffer the consequences down the road. A perfect example of the troubles that are beginning to show is the problem USAF squadrons are having scheduling airspace for training. Two years ago the ROKAF took control over the entire
airspace in Korea and have been restrictive toward the USAF in the amount and time airspace scheduled. As a result, the USAF canceled much of its training due to the lack of airspace.

Contact with the ROKAF Air Attaché in Washington, D. C., Colonel Yoon, provided both positive and negative results. He helped establish contacts with his commanders as well as with many other ROKAF pilots. As the research continued for this thesis, Colonel Yoon’s excitement never failed, but his actual input did not meet expectations. After five months of continued contact and communication, Colonel Yoon finally notified the researcher that the ROKAF was unwilling to support the study. Therefore, all of the requests for procedural information were returned unanswered. Of specific loss was the lack of the ROKAF training regulation that determines the Korean training doctrine.

It is very important to hear the views of both parties. The Korean staff agencies are the equals to the American agencies, and both work together on the CFC headquarters in Seoul. Because the knowledge of each other is limited, it is imperative to hear both sides concerns and inputs to this program. The success of any combined program must have the support of the commanders from both nations. Without the support of the ROKAF, a very important point of view is missing. However, this lack of a reaction is a very clear insight to the problems facing any American program that needs combined approval. Even though the Koreans are tremendous allies and need the support of the US military, they are still very wary of any changes the US might want to make.

Other individuals interviewed were the pilots of both nations who will be flying together. The pilots at Kunsan AB, both American and Korean, were the focus group for this thesis. The fact that both air forces occupy the same base makes Kunsan AB the most likely site for a trial program. The views of these pilots about flying together are a great insight to some of the problems and inhibitions that must be overcome.

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Previous commanders and pilots stationed at Kunsan AB were interviewed as well. These pilots have seen firsthand the training problems in Korea that they might face during the next conflict. Every American leaves with a view on how to improve the system. Previous commanders, specifically, Brigadier General L. D. Johnston, 8th Fighter Wing Commander from March 1995 to April 1996, has a great insight for the success of such a venture. His interaction with the ROKAF was on a daily basis concerning the operation of the base and future wartime planning.

During and after the comparative analysis, staffs were questioned in an effort to clarify any areas of uncertainty about this project. This was of prime importance during the evaluative analysis. Both air forces must accept a combined training program before it is a feasible option. Due to the turnover rate within the US staffs in Korea, it is important to note that views varied by individual, most likely due to the individual’s time in country.

**Summary**

Chapter 2 presents the available literature on combined operations between the USAF and ROKAF. The information reviewed stresses the fact that very little research has previously been conducted in this particular area. However, this does not mean the possibility is not something to be investigated. If anything, the views uncovered express that the time has come to begin looking into just such a program. The remainder of the thesis addresses this issue.

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6 Ibid., 29-30.


13 Ibid., 67.


15 Ibid., 66.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN

Chapter 3 explains the research plan and methodology. The research focuses on an answer to the question: Can the USAF and the ROKAF train together on a daily basis? To assist in answering this question, the thesis investigates four supporting questions. Each supporting question provides additional insight to the various phases of training and the compatibility of the two air forces’ individual training programs. Also of interest, are the extreme differences between the two country’s cultures and history and how that might impact future combined air operations.

This study uses comparative and evaluative analyses to explain the feasibility of combining USAF and ROKAF training programs in the Korean theater. For this thesis, research material uses five sources: Department of Defense (DOD) documents, service publications (both USAF and ROKAF), periodicals and journals, literature, and telephone interviews. The remainder of this chapter details the two analyses and the research sources.

Comparative Analysis

Chapter 4 provides a comparative analysis of the USAF and ROKAF training programs. This analysis highlights the similarities and differences of the two programs. Similarities define common phases of training that might offer consolidation opportunities. Differences define phases of training not compatible for consolidation. These differences may further enforce the reasons to maintain separate training programs between the USAF and ROKAF.
Chapter 4 primarily addresses two supporting questions: First, what is the current state of combined training between the USAF and ROKAF? Second, what are some of the differences between the social, cultural, and political systems of the two countries? Chapter 4 also lays the foundation to answer the other supporting questions addressed in chapter 5. Potential barriers to consolidating and attitudes toward consolidation are indirectly addressed in the comparative analysis. The comparative analysis presents issues that address the feasibility and the difficulty of combining the two training programs, both militarily and culturally.

Primary information sources used in the comparative analysis include DOD publications, literature on Korea, and telephone interviews. The training programs outlined by the training syllabi of both air forces are the foundation for the comparative analysis. These publications outline the requirements and currency of specific training events, academics, simulators, and training flights a pilot must perform to maintain his MR status. The primary emphasis of this study is on the flight training, but it also includes specific events, simulators, and academics. Telephone interviews with the training officers and other pilots helped to answer questions that arose during the study of the syllabi.

Due to the reluctance of the ROKAF to release their training regulations for this thesis, the author was limited to a small amount of information. Deducing from this information and knowledge of the USAF training program the author made some assumptions to compensate with this predicament. The first assumption is the specific flights outlined by the USAF training document are almost identical to the required flights by the ROKAF. There might be slight differences between the two, but none that should preclude a favorable comparison. As an example, an air-to-ground sortie for a pilot from one nation is not much different from that from another. Putting bombs on target requires the same skills for any pilot, and the same logic holds true for air-to-air skills. What must be addressed, are the possible impacts of different airframes,
and how the limitations of one can be worked into the training program to better prepare the pilots to optimize their aircraft in a mixed formation. Certain aspects of USAF training documents will be ignored since they would not be a valid concern for a combined training program. Specific examples of such a requirement would be some USAF specific ground training that would have no impact on flight operations and simulators, such as training about the protection of the President or the acceptance of gifts. This training is designed for the entire officer corps and would have little value for the ROKAF.

Evaluation Analysis

Chapter 5 presents the evaluative analysis for this thesis. This chapter answers the remaining supporting questions and highlights the previous supporting questions addressed in chapter 4. The evaluative analysis determines the feasibility and reasoning that supports a combined training program and to what degree between the USAF and ROKAF.

Chapter 5 answers all four supporting questions in the evaluative analysis section. First, what is the current status of combined training between the USAF and ROKAF? The evaluated answers highlight the value of the training that is already in place. Additional insights are gleaned for further development of a combined training program for fighter aircraft. Second, from the current training programs of both air forces, what is the compatibility for the various phases of training the USAF and ROKAF might combine? The comparative analysis weighs the findings uncovered. The value added by a combined training program in these areas must prove to be more beneficial than if the two air forces trained separately. Third, if the air forces combined their training programs, what are the benefits? Before either the USAF or the ROKAF agrees to some form of training consolidation, there must be a substantial benefit for each. Naturally, any detractors for each of the air forces will be noted. Specific area of interest is the overall combat capability of the combined force. Fourth, and maybe most importantly, what
barriers must the USAF and ROKAF overcome to establish a combined training program? This question addresses the many deeply seated emotions and preconceived notions about each other that they cannot be overlooked.

Again the primary information sources are DOD documents, professional journals, and telephone interviews, as well as literature addressing the Korean culture and history. Appendix A lists questions addressed during the interviews with USAF staffs and pilots, and the limited responses from ROKAF officers. The interview questionnaire is designed to address each of the supporting questions. Interview questions one and two focus on the first supporting question. The answers provided the researcher a much broader insight to what training is currently being accomplished. This is an area of great interest to the commanding generals of both air forces and is a high interest item. Therefore, areas of combined training are rapidly being developed. Interview question three concentrates on the second supporting question. The objective is to find possible improvements from the field that would increase, and improve, combined training. Interview questions four, five, six, and seven all focus on the third supporting question. Again, the objective of these questions is to get a better understanding from those in the field as to what, if any, benefits might come out of a combined training program. For any program to be accepted by the commanders, they must first know that their air force would be receiving valuable training. Finally, questions eight, nine, and ten delve into the perceptions about how pilots and staffs approach the other country’s air force and culture in the context of combined training. No matter what the literature says about the two countries and their cultures, it is the feelings of those who are forced to work together that will determine the success of such a program.

Summary

The purpose of the thesis research design is to establish a road map for this thesis to answer the supporting questions and ultimately, the primary research question. The research
design includes both comparative and evaluative analyses. Each analysis addresses specific questions and is supported by the various research sources discussed earlier in this thesis. Chapters 4 and 5 will provide the analysis and required data to answer the supporting questions and the primary research question.
CHAPTER 4

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Chapter 4 compares the USAF training program to that of the ROKAF for areas of compatibility. Thus, trying to determine what benefits, if any, can be gained from a possible consolidated training program. In addition, a comparison of the two air forces helps illustrate the societal and cultural differences between the two nations. This comparison highlights potential barriers that will have a significant impact on any combined training program.

Chapter 4 is divided into four sections for comparison of the training programs: USAF training, ROKAF training, training compatibilities, and a cultural comparison. First, the USAF training program is described in terms of its three main parts: ground, simulator, and flight training. Then, the ROKAF training program is outlined in the same fashion. An analysis for possible compatibilities between the USAF and ROKAF training programs follows. Finally, a cultural comparison of the countries highlights the impact their respective cultures have on their air forces. The primary focus of this chapter is on the flight training. however, ground training and simulator training are also discussed as they enhance the flight training programs and operations.

Currently, the USAF and ROKAF each have training programs for MR pilots. Chapter 4 focuses on this stage of training, since the air forces will never conduct combined training at either the basic stage or aircraft qualification stage. These stages teach the basics of flight and the necessary skills to fly in the air force and the checkout programs of specific aircraft. Even
though both air forces fly the F-16, they each have their own F-16 qualification process. Again, this qualification process will remain pure and, therefore, will not be addressed.

Once pilots qualify to fly a specific aircraft, they report to their first operational squadron. In an operational squadron, pilots develop the combat skills necessary to employ their jets and weapons against the enemy. Their preparations must cover the entire spectrum of possible operations. Air-to-air skills are tested, assuring that each pilot has the capability to either defeat enemy aircraft, or at least survive enemy attacks. The other aspect of fighter pilot skills is putting "bombs on target," or air-to-ground operations. Each of these tasks in themselves is daunting, but when combined on a mission, against a real enemy threat, they can become overwhelming. Therefore, many hours of training and practice are dedicated to instill the skills necessary to give a pilot the "edge" in battle.

USAF Training

The overriding premise driving the USAF training program is to insure that pilots maintain their highest level of combat capability. At this stage, MR pilots have already proven they are combat ready, and now they must remain so. The USAF devised a series of in-depth training regulations MCI II-F series, outlining the entire scope of required training for its fighter pilots. These regulations cover all three areas of training: ground, simulator, and flight training. Every pilot must reference the MCI II-F series regulation for his particular aircraft to insure the needed training is accomplished in the prescribed fashion and time. Because the F-16 is the primary aircraft stationed in Korea with the USAF, MCI II-F16 is referenced for this thesis.

Ground Training

The ground training requirements of the USAF cover a broad range of topics, all designed to make the pilot better prepared for a combat mission. Some specific examples of
required ground training are the Instrument Refresher Course and Life Support. In these cases, the designed training keeps the pilots informed on some of the basic knowledge they learned before they were MR. The information covered is a review of instrument procedures and life support techniques that every pilot must know, but are not taught in any detail over the course of the year. Therefore, to insure new techniques are introduced and older information is reviewed, the USAF requires an annual ground refresher training by every pilot.

Another aspect of ground training is ancillary training. There are three categories of ancillary training: functional, general, and awareness. All three categories further break down into specific topics and require a particular frequency for the pilots to maintain their MR status.

Functional ancillary training covers topics that specifically improve the pilot's combat capability and professional knowledge. The most important part of this training is the weekly Weapons and Tactics Academic Training taught by the squadron weapons officer. During this instruction, the entire squadron gets together and listens to the weapons officer explain a particular topic about their aircraft. Topics range from specific weapons that the aircraft can employ and how to employ them to advanced tactics to employ the aircraft against an enemy formation or threat. Certain topics covered yearly are mandatory and testable. The squadron tailors the balance to meet their needs according to USAF regulations.

Similar to Weapons Training, intelligence follows the same process. In many cases, the squadron weapons officer and the intelligence officer work together to insure their instruction compliments each other. Intelligence training helps keep the pilots informed on enemy weapons systems and capabilities, enemy situation, and the order of battle. There also exists a weekly requirement to build the pilot's overall knowledge of the expected wartime environment. Instruction must cover visual recognition, escape and recovery, and current intelligence for every pilot.
General ancillary training requirements include such topics as handgun training and "Buddy Care," or basic first aid. The frequency of instruction of these two events varies from every three years for handguns to every other year for "buddy care." These are just two examples and the list of requirements is much longer than necessary for this thesis. Every officer and airman must receive instruction on these topics, not just pilots. As such, general ancillary training has little impact on a possible combined training program between the USAF and ROKAF.

As for the awareness training, it helps pilots improve their cockpit organization. The reasons for this training is to help alleviate pilots of some of the mundane tasks involved with flying a jet. This allows them to concentrate on the employment of their aircraft against the enemy. For example, a particular topic might cover where and how to place maps or charts in the cockpit for quick and easy reference or during an engagement where to anticipate an enemy aircraft to appear on the canopy. The objective is to build upon basic cockpit tasks and skills developed early in a pilot's career.

These are just a few of the required training events required by the USAF for its pilots. The overriding goal of these requirements is to maximize the pilots' combat capability by keeping them abreast of all the latest information concerning their aircraft and environment. This ground training is the same for all fighter pilots and their differing experience levels have little or no effect on the requirements.

Simulator Training

Simulators help pilots practice procedures in the cockpit that they can do in a single-ship environment. The majority of simulator training involves emergency procedures, air-to-air systems employment and tactics, as well as air-to-ground systems employment and tactics. Each major command is responsible for developing actual scenarios and annual requirements for their
pilots. During every simulator mission, the pilot must practice instrument flight procedures and unusual attitude recoveries. Annually, inexperienced pilots must perform a minimum of twelve simulator missions and experienced pilots eight. Of these, at least four will be emergency procedure simulators for all pilots.

The simulator sorties themselves are an excellent opportunity for pilots to practice their cockpit organization and individual procedures. As the pilots progress, they develop their own system of cockpit organization to ease the task load during missions. For example, during an emergency procedure simulator, it is common for the pilot to deal with numerous emergencies while flying in marginal weather conditions. During a tactical simulator the pilot can practice against numerous air-to-air threats while still trying to hit a target. All of this helps push the pilot’s abilities to the maximum, while systematically testing the knowledge of the aircraft and its systems.

**Flight Training**

The flight training program is broken down into three types of sorties required for USAF pilots to maintain their combat ready skills: air-to-air sorties, air-to-ground sorties, and collateral sorties. Collateral sorties consist of instruments, basic aircraft handling characteristics, and cross-country sorties, all of which have no impact on this study. Once individual pilots reach a basic level of competence in these skills, it is their responsibility to insure they fly a different mix of sorties throughout the year to maintain proficiency. In accordance with MCI 11-F16, all inexperienced F-16 pilots must fly at least ninety-six sorties per year, while experienced pilots require just eighty-four. Depending on a wing’s operational commitments, the mix of particular sorties varies as determined by the major command’s Realistic Training Review Board. For example, a LANTIRN F-16 unit, like the 36th Fighter Squadron at Osan AB, would fly a limited number of air-to-air sorties. Because of the special capabilities of their aircraft, they expect to fly
a preponderance of air-to-ground sorties during any conflict. The 347th Fighter Wing at Moody AFB, also a LANTIRN unit, requires just ten air-to-air sortie for all pilots, and seventy-six or sixty-four air-to-ground sorties for inexperienced and experienced pilots.\textsuperscript{11} On the other hand, the 8th Fighter Wing at Kunsan AB without the LANTIRN mission would fly a greater amount of air-to-air sorties since the probability of flying such a sortie during a conflict is relatively high. The 20th Fighter Wing at Shaw AFB, who also fly non LANTIRN F-16s, requires inexperienced pilots to fly thirty-eight air-to-air sorties and forty-four air-to-ground sorties and experienced pilots must fly thirty-four air-to-air sorties and thirty-six air-to-ground sorties.\textsuperscript{12}

The Air-to-Air Phase

The current USAF air-to-air training program uses a building block approach. It begins with basic fighter maneuvers (BFM). BFM is the classic “dogfight” between two aircraft. During BFM training the two aircraft set themselves up into canned scenarios: one is on the offense and the other is on the defense. BFM allows pilots to perfect the required skills to maneuver the aircraft within visual range of another and elect to fight. In a BFM fight, the objective is to develop the basic skills required to maneuver the aircraft into a position of advantage and employ air-to-air ordnance, while prohibiting the “enemy” aircraft from doing the same.\textsuperscript{13}

While the skills of fighting within the visual arena are being honed, the pilot is also developing skills to employ radar and long-range air-to-air missiles. At first these sorties are simply one-versus-one intercept flights.\textsuperscript{14} Each aircraft starts from a point about twenty-five miles apart and turn towards each other at the “Fights On” call. One aircraft is again the “Fighter” aircraft and the other is the training aid, or “Bandit.” The objective is to develop radar mechanization skills and employment of missiles at longer ranges against a maneuvering or nonmaneuvering bandit. The objective is to kill at a relative long range, and if necessary, then move into close range and defeat the remaining aircraft with previously learned BFM skills.
After developing the skills required for the pilots to employ their own aircraft, they move on to the two-ship element employment.

From BFM and intercepts, pilots move on to Air Combat Maneuvers (ACM). In ACM three aircraft train together: two aircraft flying together in the basic fighter formation of a two-ship element and the remaining aircraft is the training aid. The two-ship element fly a line abreast formation, working on mutual support and visual lookout for enemy aircraft. Then based on the objective of a particular sortie, the training aid assumes an offensive or defensive position for the two-ship to maneuver against. Once the two-ship makes visual contact with the training aid, the fight begins and all three aircraft begin maneuvering. The objective for the two-ship is to demonstrate proficiency as an element in air-to-air maneuvering. The two-versus-one mission lays the groundwork for further increases in the number of aircraft within a formation. In the USAF, the two-ship element is the basic fighting element for fighter aircraft. Even when a pair of two-ships fly together as a flight of four, the two-ship is the basic element and they support each other throughout the mission.

The USAF calls a two-versus-two mission Air Combat Training (ACT). The objective of an ACT flight is to demonstrate proficiency in a two-versus-two beyond visual range engagement. At this point the mutual support of wingmen is crucial. The two, two-ship elements setup very much like the one-versus-one intercept sorties, except the initial distance between flights may differ. As a two-ship element, pilots work together to defeat the bandit formation at long range. If that fails, multiple aircraft converge to within visual proximity and the element with better situational awareness (SA) and greater mutual support at the merge usually defeat their enemy. Additional aircraft in the picture causes the situation to become very demanding. With the increased number of aircraft operating against each other, this requires
much more conscious thought. However, due to the complexity of the environment, it is also one of the first skills a pilot loses after even just a few months of noncurrency.

From the two-versus-two, the situation is ratcheted up further to a four-versus-four ACT sortie. From the previous paragraph one can imagine how taxing it can be for pilots and the amount of training that goes into maintaining the required skills. The remaining aspect not discussed yet is “dissimilar” engagements. By flying against different type of aircraft, pilots begin to develop an understanding of how their aircraft handles and performs against aircraft with different performance characteristics. Therefore, a USAF goal is for each fighter pilot to fly at least two air-to-air sorties every six months against dissimilar aircraft and these sorties can be any one of the air-to-air sorties just covered.\textsuperscript{18}

The Air-to-Ground Phase

In addition to air-to-air proficiency, a USAF fighter pilot must put bombs on target, commonly called air-to-ground. Pilots round out their combat skills by developing the skills necessary to ingress the target area, acquire the target, drop ordnance on that target, and then egress for home. The USAF accomplishes this through a similar building-block approach designed to continually stress pilots.

The USAF requires pilots to drop a minimum of six bombs in every event every six months to maintain currency on the primary deliveries. There are six events: 10-degree Low Angle High Drag, 10-20-degree Low Angle Low Drag, 30-degree Dive Bomb, 45-degree High Angle Dive Bomb, 45-degree High Altitude Release Bomb, and Low Angle Strafe.\textsuperscript{19} There are also a number of additional bombing events that require familiarization by all pilots and special weapons qualifications as they gain experience in their particular aircraft.

Initially, the program starts off with a basic surface attack (BSA) sortie. The flight will depart the airfield and practice an ingress route to a controlled air-to-ground range. The
objective of the route is for the inexperienced pilots to practice maintaining formation on the flight lead, while constantly clearing their flight path, as well as looking for enemy aircraft or surface-to-air missile (SAM) threats. Usually pilots fly the route without communication between themselves, so wingmen must know when turns are going to take place and maneuver the aircraft accordingly to maintain position. Again, this demonstrates the fact that the inexperienced pilots' SA is high enough to allow time to perform other tasks in the cockpit, such as performing radar searches and monitoring their aircraft systems.

Once the enroute portion of the flight is complete, the flight will proceed to the range. At the range, the aircraft enter the bombing pattern and work on the prebriefed events. On a controlled range, there is immediate feedback from the range control officer who scores the bombs. This information allows pilots to assess errors and to correct for them on the next pass. The initial pattern at this stage is a conventional “box” pattern flown around the target. This allows inexperienced pilots time to assess their position relative to the target, monitor their flight parameters, and perfect their aircraft control during the dive delivery. The next stage is the “pop” pattern. A “pop” pattern allows the pilots to fly the same delivery that they will use to attack an actual target from low altitude. The BSA range environment is very “canned,” without any threats, allowing pilots to concentrate solely on their bombing skills and techniques. These skills can be extremely demanding on a pilot, and as such, the objective of the BSA sortie is to practice mission employment at its simplest level, put bombs on target. The BSA sortie allows the pilots to meet the requirements for the various bombing events previously mentioned.

While mastering weapons delivery operations during a BSA sortie, pilots continue working on the skills to get to the target and then back home. Surface attack tactical (SAT) sorties are designed to place pilots in a simulated combat environment. Having proven the ability to handle the range environment, pilots now fly the flight planned route to a “tactical”
target to simulate a real world attack. The enroute structure remains the same, but now instead of ending at a canned target area, the two-ship (or four-ship formation) will attack a target as a flight. Then the flight egresses the area as fast as possible, while regaining mutual support. Although no actual ordnance is expended on these simulated attacks, pilots plan and execute the mission as if actually in a combat situation and delivering real weapons.

The SAT sortie itself is designed to resemble real world situation for pilots. Depending on the scenario developed for a particular flight, the mission places pilots under the same stresses as a combat mission. Every pilot focuses completely on reaching the target safely, executing a valid attack on the target, maintaining mutual support between flight members, and successfully returning to base. During the entire flight, the pilots react to both air-to-ground threats and air-to-air threats as they would in real world conditions. The objective of the SAT sortie is to practice flight operations in a high-threat scenario.21

Everything that goes into a fighter pilot’s training is called upon during the SAT sortie. The pilots must fly the route providing each other mutual support against any threats and reacting accordingly. The opportunity to switch from the air-to-ground mission to an air-to-air environment is always a possibility due to an enemy aircraft. Successful missions for pilots in this environment are the true measure of a pilot’s combat capability.

Once proficient at this stage of complexity, they are ready to face the ultimate peacetime challenge, large force employment (LFE). An LFE comprises an attack package designed to destroy an entire target array. This package usually includes a four-ship flight of air-to-air aircraft, a couple of four-ship formations of air-to-ground aircraft, at least a two-ship element of suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) aircraft, and an E-3 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft for airborne control. This whole package attacks a planned target
array together within a three-to-five-minute time-on-target (TOT) window. The package must fight their way into the target area, deliver their ordnance, and then fight their way home.

Defending the target area is a force of enemy aircraft and simulated SAM threats in the target area. All players on both sides of this battle fly at the limits of their ability to stretch their personal envelopes and to force mistakes so lessons can be learned. The primary objective of a LFE is to establish the environment of wartime operations under peacetime rules of engagement (ROE) and this is the most realistic combat training available.

Close air support (CAS) is the final type of sortie to be addressed, and one of the most important. If another Korean conflict occurs, as much as 40 percent of the air effort will be CAS. Therefore, many sorties are dedicated to CAS training.22

The CAS training sortie in Korea is always a real world sortie. Indeed, the wartime ROE is in effect. This is because all of the CAS sorties flown are along the DMZ, in a highly controlled airspace called P518.23 P518 runs the entire length of the DMZ and is on average about twenty-five miles wide. This airspace covers many of the same targets that will be attacked during hostilities.

The CAS sortie itself involves at least a two-ship formation working together with a forward air controller (FAC) or ground FAC. Together, the FAC and flight members coordinate an attack against a target in support of the ground forces. The flight must closely follow a scripted process that controls every aircraft’s movement into and within the DMZ airspace. As such, the CAS sortie requires much practice to insure pilots adhere to the required procedures.

In some cases this might be the first time a new pilot to the Korean theater will work directly with a Korean controlling agency or pilot. This is one area that currently receives combined training. A reoccurring lesson learned from every one of these missions is the impact of the language barrier between the different air forces. Given the fact that CAS is so heavily
dependent on clear, concise communication, achieving an effective mission can be extremely stressful and demanding.

Overall, the USAF training program encompasses every aspect of daily life within a wing. Everything should improve upon the current state of readiness, thus insuring USAF pilots and personnel are always combat ready. From the most basic facets of ground training, to the most complicated LFE, training drives to improve both the individual and the entire team.

ROKAF Training Program

Due to the reluctance of the ROKAF Chief of Staff to release the requested training regulations for comparison, the researcher looked to many other sources for the required information. Of those contacted in conjunction with this research was Colonel Yoon, the Air Attaché with the Korean Embassy in Washington, DC, who was very helpful establishing contacts with other ROKAF members. Through Colonel Yoon, contact was made with Majors Bang and Kim. Both of these officers are ROKAF pilots assigned to a year of study with the USAF at the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Major Bang flies the F-16, and Major Kim flies the F-5. Previous contacts established at Kunsan AB forwarded a portion of the ROKAF F-5 training syllabus. In addition, Lieutenant Colonel Johnson and Major Pelczynski provided their insights on the combined training environment between the USA and ROK Army (ROKA) aviation units. All of these individuals helped formulate a more complete picture of the ROKAF training requirements.

In all cases ROKAF training directly built upon the US training syllabi, both USAF and USA, except for modifications to meet specific requirements of ROKAF aircraft and avionics differences. After studying the current USAF regulation MCI 11-F16, Majors Bang and Kim helped substantiate the similarities between the ROKAF training syllabus provided. Major Pelczynski also stated that the ROKA training programs paralleled USA training programs. The
primary objective of the ROKAF training program is to maintain a combat ready fighter force. Their syllabi drives training to provide a well-rounded mix of sorties, designed to insure ROKAF pilots can fulfill their wartime requirements, much like MCI 11-F16 does. From all reviewed references and contacts, the ROKAF program appears very similar to the USAF program.

Ground Training

Ground training requirements for Korean pilots are much the same as those of the USAF pilots with the expected cultural differences required by their leadership. Aircraft and tactics training are also similar, with some minor differences taking into account the Korean intelligence community and their aircraft. The portion of the ROKAF regulation provided did not cover actual ground training requirements, but offered an insight to the training philosophy.

From the studies Majors Bang and Kim completed at ACSC, they stressed the fact the ROKAF ground training reflects many of the same requirements of the USAF. A couple good examples are weapons and tactics meetings, as well as pilot safety meetings. ROKAF ground training requires all pilots to continue tactical development through weapons and tactics classes. The actual training covers both air-to-air and air-to-ground topics. Major Bang mentioned their F-16 pilots spend hours discussing their air-to-air intercept tactics. All of this also lends to a building block approach in their training. The safety meetings reflect many of the same types of administrative training programs are also implemented. Ground training emphasis is upon improving basic airmanship skills and employment. Commander involvement is much more important than with the USAF program. Before any pilot can progress to a new level of training, the commander must validate the satisfactory completion of the preceding subject.
Simulator Training

ROKAF simulator training is very much like that of the USAF. According to the Majors Bang and Kim, the ROKAF simulator missions closely follow those of the USAF. The primary objective for the ROKAF simulators is to increase the basic skills of their pilots. ROKAF pilots use the simulator to work on their emergency procedures and tactical events. One minor difference between the USAF and ROKAF programs is the required number of simulators each pilot must complete over a six-month period. According to ROKAF Manual 5-5E/F(11), their pilots require only two simulators per six-months. Major Kim mentioned this was due to the number of simulators available.

Flying Training

Observations of the ROKAF in actual flight operations at both Kunsan AB and Kwangju AB greatly substantiated many of the assumptions made concerning their flying training program. The ROKAF predominately fly in flights of two, and occasionally a four ship. Very rarely was the ROKAF observed to fly in packages greater than a four-ship. Even during exercises when many ROKAF aircraft fly at the same time, they restrict themselves to numerous semi-autonomous independent flights of two.

The ROKAF training regulations available for review focus on F-5 operations and not those of the ROKAF F-16s. ROKAF F-5 and F-4 squadrons operated together and in combined exercises run by both air forces, but ROKAF F-16 operations never combined with the USAF at any level. This may be directly attributed to the ROKAF's concern for any possible loss or shortfall of their F-16s. Their F-16s are considered a national asset and a loss of one would have a major impact on their air force. According to ROKAF pilots interviewed, flight operations mirror very closely to those of the USAF. The reviewed ROKAF regulation demonstrates how
close their training program is to the USAF. The ROKAF built the program along the same building block philosophy of the USAF, with both air-to-air and air-to-ground training requirements following the same pattern.28

The Air-to-Air Phase

Older ROKAF F-4 and F-5 aircraft and avionics limit their air-to-air tactical employment capabilities. Due to these restrictions on their aircraft, air-to-air training is limited to BFM, ACM, ACT, and basic intercept flights (limited to two-versus-two) with radar control to a visual pickup.29 The actual events covered on each sortie and in what order are also prescribed by the ROKAF regulation. For example, an inexperienced pilot must fly eight BFM sorties, twelve ACM sorties, and six ACT sorties.30 Unlike the USAF, ROKAF pilots must fly a regimented training syllabus regardless of their individual strengths and weaknesses. Major Kim said the ROKAF scripted many of their sorties with specific events flown on a particular sortie. For example, on some particular sorties, the syllabus outlines the entire flight from take-off to landing.

According to Major Bang, the F-16 training closely resembles that of the USAF in all areas.31 The F-16s fly the same type of sorties as the USAF previously described in this chapter. Due to the legislation affecting foreign military sales, the USAF restricted the sale of the AIM-120 advanced medium range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM). The ROKAF was allowed to purchase the AMRAAM for their F-16s but was denied access to the tactics of its employment developed by the US.32 This would cause a difference in ROKAF tactics at long range against an enemy aircraft when compared to the tactics of the USAF. Other than this minor training difference, the ROKAF training program closely parallels specific flight profiles of the USAF air-to-air training program.
The Air-to-Ground Phase

Again the ROKAF program reflects the strong influence of the USAF training program. The required bombing events are the same as those of the USAF and cover both the conventional "box" pattern and the "pop" pattern. As for the sorties, they require three "box" pattern sorties, seven "pop" pattern sorties, and two random SAT attack profiles per six months. Also, each pilot must fly 56 air-to-ground sorties every six months.33

The ROKAF program has all three air-to-ground sorties: BSA, SAT, and CAS. Each one has the same objectives as the USAF counterpart. As with the air-to-air sorties, individual events for the sorties are outlined, and commander involvement is much more prominent than the USAF syllabus.34 Due to the various airframes in the Korean inventory, only the F-16s have the same event parameters and weapons as the USAF F-16s. As for the F-4 and F-5 squadrons, their individual events are slightly different.

From the researcher’s experiences in Korea during 1995 - 1996, it is known that the ROKAF partakes in combined LFEs to a limited extent with the F-4 and F-5 units. Also, the ROKAF many times would fly LFEs without any USAF involvement. As mentioned earlier, the only prominent difference was their predominate use of two-ship formations. Actual requirements for LFE participation was not available in the portion of the regulation received for any analysis.

Training Program Compatibility

With an in depth review of the USAF training system and a less in depth analysis of the ROKAF, it is now possible to develop a combined training program. All three areas of the different training programs are presented for comparison: ground, simulator, and flight training.
Ground Training

Ground training may prove to be the area that offers the biggest return on effort invested in the early stages of a combined training program. Depending upon the commander’s involvement, it also is the area that should be the easiest to begin.

Because each air force has restrictions on certain information they deem releasable to other nations, there are areas of instruction that are presently restricted. However, these problems are correctable with proper preparation of the topics and forum of instruction. The primary impact will affect weapons and tactics training. The USAF has a number of topics not releasable to foreign nations, and the same most likely holds true for the ROKAF. As previously stated, USAF AMRAAM tactics are not yet releasable to the ROKAF. However, there still remains a vast amount of information that can be shared between the USAF and ROKAF pilots.

Within the realms of ground training, areas definitely open for discussion include such topics as basic aircraft operating limits and procedures during wartime conditions and configurations. The objective would be to increase the common understanding among pilots on each nation’s restrictions and capabilities. Such understanding would allow them to task each other appropriately during actual future combined flight operations without pushing beyond an established comfort limit. Building upon this information, pilots can then explain some of their standard ground and flight procedures. The design of this information would enable the two air forces to better understand how and why each operates the way it does. The program might establish some standard operating procedures (SOPs). These SOPs would increase each air force’s knowledge and training capabilities and that is the goal of any training program.

Ground training does not have to limit itself to operations, but would also include such topics as safety (both air and ground), communications, and language. All of this only helps pilots better understand each other while developing a rapport that can be the beginning of
further confidence in the other’s ability. This point goes back to some of the current shortcomings many USAF pilots believe the ROKAF pilots bear. To break down the many common misperceptions, a continued exchange of ideas and experiences must take place. A place that would stimulate open conversation without the stifling environment of the office provides many of the best opportunities. In a setting, such as the Officer’s Club or squadron lounge, pilots from each air force see other pilots in the same light as they see themselves. This might prove to be the best form of combined training for future operations.37

Simulator Training

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the simulator is not the best environment for training beyond the individual pilot. However, the simulator may provide an area for pilots to observe and question each other’s actual flight operations and reasoning in a controlled environment. It is very easy to stop the simulator and to discuss what a pilot is doing and why as it happens. The simulator would allow pilots to basically look over the shoulder of another pilot while he is flying a simulated combat mission. Being able to share their perspective on a given situation, one-on-one, will promote a far greater understanding among individual pilots. Many times this understanding becomes lost among the numerous briefings that cover the gamut of information of flight operations. Again, before access to the simulator is approved, the confidentiality issues needs investigation, but may prove a valuable aspect of a combined training program. As a suggestion only, this would be a volunteer requirement only for individual pilots to fulfill on their own time.

One issue of concern noted by every pilot and commander during the telephone interviews is the language barrier. The Korean native tongue is Han-Gul. Americans naturally have very little knowledge of this language, let alone the ability to speak it. As for the Koreans, they must learn English in school and understand it fairly well. However, because Han-Gul is so
different, they have a hard time speaking English clearly. As mentioned earlier, radio communications are vital to pilots during all phases of flight. The stress of combat compounds these problems. The simulator offers a great environment to practice radio communications in a canned environment that involves many of the stresses actual combat situations demand. What will ROKAF pilots say or hear under these stresses when the adrenaline and excitement hit? Here pilots can help each other and take the time to work on something considered so basic, yet so very important.

Flight Training

The primary reason for such a combined training program is to avoid having USAF and ROKAF pilots flying together for the first time in the high-stress environment of combat. This is the focal point for a combined training program, and where everyone gains the experiences and benefits combined training offers. Therefore, the desired training syllabus is a building block approach designed to allow pilots to experience the breadth of flight operations.

The building blocks themselves will begin during ground training and any simulator training melded into the program. As for the flight training itself, all pilots would fly a mix of air-to-air and air-to-ground sorties. Due to the fact the current wartime plans have most of the ROKAF flying air-to-ground sorties within combined combat packages, the preponderance of sorties flown in a combined training program would be air-to-ground. However, this does not mean pilots will not fly combined air-to-air sorties.

Briefings

The tactics one air force uses in a given situation will undoubtedly differ from the other. Pilots can discuss these differences during the flight planning and briefings. Understanding these differences and knowing what to expect from each other during an engagement are the ultimate
goals of this endeavor. During this training, as members of the USAF and ROKAF discuss possible situations that might present themselves, pilots can work out ways to safely deal with any situation and still handle the mission. From these lessons learned, USAF and ROKAF pilots can establish a list of areas for improvement to work on during the next sorties. Because of the importance of capturing the lessons learned during the briefing process, pilots from both the USAF and ROKAF expressed a strong desire to insure the briefing process is enforced. As it stands now, pilots who fly together never debrief together and only speak over the phone, even if they are collocated at the same base. Every one of the pilots who answered the survey realizes that without a good debrief, the lessons learned are lost and this is a potential weak point for a future combined operation. As such, surveyed pilots unanimously stress briefs should be a mandatory aspect of combined training.38

Air-to-Air Training

A great majority of pilots who answered the survey called for some form of air-to-air training.36 Their biggest concerns revolve around the possibility of fratricide between the USAF and ROKAF during hostilities. The air-to-air sorties would be introductory in nature. First, the ROKAF F-4 and F-5 pilots would develop an appreciation of their BFM and intercept skills against a different aircraft and pilot force. Second, F-16 training would span the entire range of different air-to-air engagements, focusing on weapons employment doctrine and ROE for the AMRAAM. Finally, these flights would require an in-depth review by both air forces to establish the desired learning objectives for each air-to-air sortie. Because of previous experiences with the ROKAF, air-to-air engagements might cause the highest amount of discomfort for ROKAF leadership and possibly the least amount of learning.40 It is important to acknowledge that both air forces recognize the risk involved for fratricide without a common
knowledge about how each intends to employ weapons in the air-to-air regime. For this reason, it is imperative to establish a common ROE and SOP.

**Air-to-Ground Training**

As for the air-to-ground training, the whole range of sorties could be open for combined training. Given the fact that all pilots are involved are MR and different aircraft fly different bombing profiles on the range, it makes little sense to fly any combined BSA sorties. The CAS program in Korea is already a combined program between the FACs and fighter aircraft. In addition, CAS is generally flown as a two-ship element from the same unit. As such, the CAS and BSA sorties should remain separate. The sorties that are most important and really at the crux of the problem are SAT sorties.

In keeping with the building block approach, the program would begin with one USAF aircraft and one ROKAF aircraft in the same two-ship element. Together they would fly in a very canned environment. By having just the two aircraft, the pilots can spend time planning their initial flight. This would increase flight profile predictability and also limit needless radio communication during the mission. Both pilots can have an input to the itinerary of the flight so that they can work on specific maneuvers and tactics each deems necessary due to apparent strengths and weaknesses. Some of the best lessons learned from a flight are usually in the flight planning and briefings, both before and after the flight. Considering the ROKAF regulation reviewed, this freedom to determine a flight profile is new to the ROKAF and might warrant some discussion between air force leadership. Specific objectives and flight profiles would need to be agreed upon prior to flight operations begin.

During the first flight, pilots would work on just a few primary tasks with limited objectives. Considering the expected flight profile during wartime, pilots would concentrate on a standard air-to-ground scenario. A possible flow for the initial flights would include ground
operations and take-off, departure direct to the orbit point, medium altitude ingress to the target area, weapons delivery, rejoin, and recovery to base. This flight scenario is rather simple, but it covers all the basic events of a combat sortie. The important point is pilots can compare and learn how each would operate during a wartime mission. If pilots want to perform additional events, they can always repeat certain aspects of the flight or practice basic intercepts.

Initially both pilots involved in this sortie would be instructor pilots. This builds a cadre for the next phase of combined training. Also, two sorties are required at this stage so each pilot can fly as both a flight lead and a wingman. Flying in these two positions allows each pilot to gain confidence in the other and will also gain additional insight into the operational considerations of the other air force.

After the initial sorties, the next phase would be a four-ship flight, with two aircraft from each air force. This would allow the USAF aircraft to fly together and operate as a standard two-ship, while the ROKAF two-ship does the same. Both elements are led by the two instructor pilots who were in the initial sorties, so that a common understanding builds upon their previous experience. This will allow flight leads the opportunity to help wingmen understand the differences and expected areas of concern that might come up during the flight. The flight itself would be along the same lines as the initial flights, only growing in complexity by the slight increase in size. At this stage nothing done during the flight should catch any of the pilots off guard, or challenge their capabilities. This design allows the flight leads to develop confidence in each other's tactics and abilities to put bombs on target, while introducing the wingmen to this new combined multi-ship environment. Again, two sorties would be required to allow both elements the chance to lead the four-ship.

The program has three possible approaches. First, one could continue to rotate new pilots through the basic flight scenario as just described until the majority of the squadron flew in
a combined four-ship flight. Second, pilots could also continue to fly within the same four-ship flight and progress to a more difficult tactical environment. Finally, a combination of the two options is possible. Either way, once pilots are comfortable with the program, they then move into a more complex tactical scenario. Depending on the type of sortie pilots start with, they would move from basic medium altitude routes to now having to react against possible threats enroute to the target and in the target area. Pilots would work on their mutual support between the differing two-ship elements and on how they work together completing the mission without losses and ineffective sorties. All of this would be dealt with according to the game plan briefed by the flight lead. Pilots must react as a team and operate in a rapidly changing situation. This additional stress forces pilots to make decisions that affect everyone in the flight. How well one two-ship reacts to an air-to-air or simulated SAM threat, and how the other two-ship supports them becomes the true test of combined operations.

The flights would continue until they have built up to at least a four-ship formation involving both the USAF and ROKAF in a high-threat environment. The flights must continue working on the different scenarios that might face pilots during a combat sortie. An example would be low altitude operations due to weather. All must keep the goal of mutual understanding and trust in each other’s abilities and tactics, and this insures mission success hopefully without the loss of life or aircraft during war. It is through understanding and confidence in each other that the USAF and ROKAF will be able to face the enemy and successfully handle any situation. Routinely training together will make a true air combat team.

As pilots reach this level of training, it will then be time to move up to combined LFEs. Here the USAF and ROKAF pilots would practice training with a full package against an expected enemy force limited only by exercise ROE. An LFE expands the training possibilities due to the increased size and scope of the tactical operating area. LFEs do not have standard or
academic training objectives and, therefore, tactical flexibility requires and demands higher levels of SA. As previously stated, the Combined LFE Special Instructions provide the SOPs and ROE for all phases of the mission. Once a flight knows their specific mission, they can reference the instructions for guidance that also includes telephone numbers and a fax number for easy access to other squadrons in the Korean theater. This allows pilots to conduct a major portion of the planning process without the entire formation being present which has been a major stumbling block in the past.  

As an official training program, pilots might call each other and telephonically agree to meet somewhere for limited additional combined training events. This is necessary to ensure the training will not get stale or lost. Since USAF pilots rotate in and out of Korea, it is important to insure the combined training program continuously evolves. This is imperative for USAF pilots, since in Korea a combined experience is extremely perishable. Most likely the ROKAF will be the ultimate benefactors of combined training since their pilots remain within their own theater of operations and can only gain from the continuous combined interaction. With possible future USAF reductions on the peninsula, the ROKAF may initially have to defend themselves until the USAF can return and provide additional assistance.

Cultural Comparisons

Chapter 2 covered the differences between the Korean culture and history. However, it is important to understand how the two cultures differ within the squadron environment and its impact on flight training. Two major differences between the USAF and ROKAF addressed are the command relationships between the ranks and the aggressiveness of the different pilots. Pilots must understand these concerns and differences to realistically participate in a combined training program. Otherwise, pilots may walk away from the first few meetings with a distrust for each other.
Command Relationships

Probably the biggest difference is the ROKAF pilots’ unconditional acceptance of the commander’s vision and direction. This flows down from the highest levels of command to day-to-day interactions between captains and lieutenants. The Korean culture places a high value on a person’s position in society. As such, the commanders and superior officers warrant the respect due a position and rank.

With this respect comes an unquestionable acceptance of the commander’s word. As a result, many wonderful ideas are never addressed that might improve pilots’ combat capabilities. Instead of voicing new and inventive ideas, lower ranking officers keep their thoughts to themselves. This aspect of the Korean culture causes a reluctance for ROKAF pilots to do anything that might challenge their commander’s airmanship and leadership capabilities. Such an action would be viewed as extreme disrespect and be cause for a harsh reaction from the superior officer.

During conversations with ROKAF pilots and other officers in Korea, lower-ranking officers were unable or unwilling to address this issue. There is a difference in how the two countries accept guidance from their respective commanders. In the ROKAF, everyone seems unwilling to voice their opinion, even if they are convinced it might improve the situation. In the Korean culture that would be viewed as insubordination and possibly cause a loss of face.

Unlike the ROKAF, the climate within the USAF promotes such interaction between commanders and pilots. The lines of communication are always open to suggestions designed to improve a situation, generally without fear of reprisal. The openness of the American culture fosters this type of relationship between senior officers and the men and women under their command. Most USAF commanders encourage and applaud anyone with new ideas and improvements to positively affect combat capability. While USAF commanders perform mostly
administrative duties. They realize they must rely on junior ranking pilots and personnel to devise new effective solutions to the problems they face. However, it goes without question that USAF commanders still provide tactical, as well as professional guidance.

Aggressiveness

The two air forces display a marked difference in the aggressiveness toward their profession. The higher levels of command have the greatest impact on changing the training environment through their aggressiveness. Everyone fears possible aircraft losses during flight training, but due to the nature of fighter operations, at times losses are unavoidable. ROKAF leadership appears dramatically more worried of this possibility than their USAF counterparts. Because of these fears, ROKAF training seems to be much more cautious. This is evident in the restrictions placed on their training. Examples include the limited number of aircraft that routinely fly together in ROKAF formations and the flying restrictions due to weather. Another classic example is the intensive restrictions placed on the F-16 squadron’s ability to take advantage of realistic training opportunities. Since 1994, the ROKAF F-16s have not participated with the USAF in any form of combined training. As a key member of the defensive forces arrayed against the North Koreans, it is imperative the ROKAF F-16s participate in training that prepares them to defend the ROK.

The prime concern at the present time between the two air forces appears to be USAF pilots’ lack of confidence in their ROKAF counterparts. USAF pilots believe the ROKAF has taken very conservative steps in the development of their force and capabilities. USAF pilots fear that ROKAF pilots cannot handle a situation out of the norm. Whenever the ROKAF was faced with a situation beyond their control, they forced their pilots to work within specific limitations placed on them. Many young USAF pilots refused to accept the explanation of concern.
by the ROKAF to avoid embarrassment. This is a perfect example of the common misunderstandings that plague the two air forces.

The pride mentioned earlier in the thesis runs deep within Korea as it should. What has to change is the perception within the ROKAF leadership that if something happens, it would not disgrace them or Korea. Lessons learned during such challenges and exchanges are always so much more valuable and lasting that they would eventually lead to increased combat effectiveness. Members of the USAF must understand and appreciate the climate within the ROKAF. This understanding might help the USAF accept a slower and more controlled approach toward combined training.

As a note, included with the Combined LFE Special Instructions was a schedule for future combined LFEs. Because of the vast differences between how both air forces operate, a jump directly to combined LFEs without prior combined training may be beyond the comfort zone of the ROKAF and the USAF. Ultimately, such a rapid jump to the LFE stage of training may cause many problems for individual ROKAF commanders and pilots. The USAF must accept a slow rate of change and improvement, which in the long run offers far greater advances for combined operations.

The bottom line is that the two air forces reflect their respective cultures. The USAF is much more open and aggressive toward change. From the upper most reaches of leadership to the lowest airman, if a new idea comes along, the USAF encourages the person to stand up and be heard. No matter what the outcome of a suggestion, even if it fails, there is no stigma attached. The ROKAF, on the other hand, reflects the structured, rigid culture of South Korea. From their upper most reaches of leadership comes directions and restrictions within which everything operates. Those tasked with performing the jobs do so without question or input. These restrictions run along the entire chain of command. As a result, and again as reflected by
society. changes within the ROKAF are hard to come by and slowly incorporated into their standard operating procedures. Everyone must understand and accept these differences for a combined training program to flourish.

Summary

Chapter 4 offers an insight into the training regimes of both the USAF and ROKAF. This information presents a comparative analysis of these two supporting questions: First, what is the compatibility of the two training programs of the USAF and ROKAF? Second, what are the impacts of the social, cultural, and historical barriers that might impact a combined training program? The first part of the chapter outlines both air forces' training programs covering ground, simulator, and flight training. The two programs were compared for areas of compatibility that would provide a valuable improvement toward combined operations by both the USAF and ROKAF. An analysis of the two cultures provided a better insight into the current barriers. This may highlight where efforts must be focused to overcome possible problems. Understanding both USAF and ROKAF cultures and the impact each culture has on the training programs currently in place provides a clear view toward future combined training. The answers to these questions might establish a foundation upon which a combined training program between the USAF and ROKAF will flourish.

1Air Combat Command, Multi Command Instruction 11-F16, vol. 1. (Langley AFB, VA: Air Combat Command, October 1994). 13. Exact requirements for these programs are outlined in Air Force Instruction 11-401. Multi Command Regulation 60-2. and Major Command Supplements. The specifics of these training events are not relevant to this thesis.

2Ibid., 14.

3The squadron weapons officer is a pilot who has completed the USAF Weapons Instructor Course at Nellis AFB, NV. Pilots chosen to attend this course are the best in their particular airframe. The course is six months long, and is designed to prepare these pilots to instruct other pilots more about their jet, the weapons, and how to employ both with maximum efficiency.
4MCI 11-F16, 15.
5Ibid.
6Ibid., 17.
7Ibid., 15.
8Ibid., 14.

9Ibid., 19. Fighter pilots become experienced three ways: when they attain 500 hours flight time in their primary aircraft; after 300 hours with 1000 hours total flight time; or previously experienced in another fighter aircraft and 100 hours in the new aircraft.

10Ibid., 7.

11This is the annual requirement as provided by the wing training officer in the 347th Fighter Wing at Moody AFB, GA during a telephone interview. 7 February 1997.

12Major Dale Fridley, Wing Training Officer for the 20th Fighter Wing at Shaw AFB, SC, 7 February 1997 provided these figures. These numbers represent a close comparison to the 8th Fighter Wing's requirements based on aircraft capabilities.

13MCI 11-F16, 28.

14A sortie is one flight. It is the measuring tool used by the USAF to assess a pilot's training status.

15MCI 11-F16, 28.


17MCI 11-F16, 28.

18This is a goal commanders set for their pilots. Due to the lack of dissimilar assets and their availability, the USAF cannot state this as a requirement.

19MCI 11-F16, 26-27.

20Ibid., 13.

21Ibid., 32.

22The standing air tasking order (ATO) in the Korean theater calls for a high percentage of CAS sorties along the DMZ to slow a North Korean advance. As such, the daily schedule for each USAF F-16 squadron calls for a minimum of four training sorties a day.
21 P518 airspace runs from the west coast to the east coast of the Korean peninsula and all along the DMZ to just north of Seoul. Entry into this airspace is closely monitored due to the sensitivity between North and South Korea.

24 ROKAF Headquarters, ROKAF Manual 5-5E/F(11). (Seoul: ROK: February 1996). 68. Due to the limited portion of this regulation received, the exact author is unknown.

25 Ibid., 68-71.

26 Ibid., 73.

27 This information is a compilation of personal insight gained while stationed at Kunsan AB. and working in the control tower as the Supervisor of Flying. In addition, personal interviews with ROKAF pilots about their flying programs help substantiate this information.

28 ROKAF Manual 5-5E/F(11), 70-71.

29 Ibid., 73.

30 Ibid.

31 All references to Majors Bang and Kim are a result of numerous telephone conversations during February, 1997.

32 This insight to the political impact, and differences in tactics between ROKAF and USAF F-16 operations came to light during Weapons and Tactics instruction while assigned at Kunsan AB, 1995-1996. Colonel Rhino Gross, a prior Vice Wing Commander at Kunsan AB, also mentioned this point as a concern for a combined training program between the two.

33 ROKAF Manual 5-5E/F(11), 72-73.

34 Ibid.

35 Major Weddle. Combined LFE: Special Operating Instructions. (Osan AB, ROK: January 1997). During the research, General Iverson’s staff forwarded a copy of the proposed Combined LFE Special Operating Instructions. This outlines a vast amount of detailed information for all player within the Korean theater about how to orchestrate an LFE. This common list of rules and guidelines everyone follows, thus answering many common questions and situations addressed in the planning stages of an LFE.

36 Every month at Kunsan AB the wing has a Safety Meeting. At least once per quarter the ROKAF pilots are invited to partake because they share the same airfield and each impacts the operations of the other.

37 While stationed at Kunsan AB, only twice the entire year did pilots from both air forces get together in a social environment. On both occasions, pilots spent time together in small groups (foursomes on the golf course) that allowed open and casual conversation, followed by a
large group gathering. Afterward, everyone left with a much better appreciation for their allies and hungered for more interaction.

38 One hundred percent of the pilots surveyed mentioned the briefing process as a point of concern and a major emphasis item for a future combined training program.

39 Eighty-five percent of the pilots surveyed expressed concern about fratricide because of a lack of understanding about the ROE. Every ROKAF pilot surveyed had the same concerns and expressed a desire for combined air-to-air training.

40 From the limited interaction between ROKAF and USAF units, the ROKAF expressed much concern about the ROE and safety between formations. They were very concerned about the aggressiveness of the flights, and limits pilots would operate under.

41 Combined LFE Special Instructions, 11.

42 The researcher had the opportunity to discuss the command relationship in the ROKAF with numerous officers and non-commissioned officers while assigned to Supervisor of Flying duties at Kunsan AB and Kwangju AB. In every case these individuals confirmed the status of the commander and their inability to address an issue that might differ with the commander's point of view.

43 These are observations of ROKAF operations by the author, and highlighted during telephone interviews with Captain “Lucky” Quirion, 35th Fighter Squadron Training Officer at Kunsan AB, ROK. During a combined LFE in October 1996, the ROKAF pulled out at the last minute due to weather while the USAF units flew as planned. Also, during the planning for the LFE itself, the ROKAF had many operational restrictions placed on them that had a direct impact on the LFE itself.

44 Combined LFE Special Instructions, 1.
CHAPTER 5
EVALUATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Chapter 5 presents an evaluation of the current combined environment in Korea between the USAF and ROKAF. Both the USAF and ROKAF presently operate within the same environment on the Korean peninsula, yet they are also operating separately from each other. Therefore, it is imperative to investigate and evaluate this predicament. This chapter will look at the reasons why they are training in separate environments, and address why the two training programs are not being blended together. This evaluative analysis addresses these issues and hopefully will make combined training a reality.

Chapter 5 addresses all four of the supporting questions for this thesis. The first supporting question is, what are the USAF and ROKAF currently doing in the area of combined training? This will focus on what is being presented accomplished between the USAF and ROKAF. Answers to this question will address improvements to the current training and open more avenues for a combined training program. Some specific lessons about barriers to combined training already exist and one cannot overlook the problems highlighted. This part of the analysis is presented in the Current Combined Training section of this chapter.

Although Chapter 4 already addressed the second supporting question about the compatibility of the USAF's training requirements and those of the ROKAF, an evaluative analysis of this question warrants another look. It is important to present some very interesting points of view raised during the telephone interviews and surveys. These additional insights could have a dramatic impact on the scope of any combined training program. The answers to
this question are presented in the Compatibility of Current Training Programs section of this chapter.

The third supporting question is, how would possible consolidation of these areas benefit each air force? This will offer possible benefits a combined training program might offer the USAF and ROKAF. This thesis weighs the benefits a combined training program offers to validate its worth to the leadership of the two air forces. This perceived value will differ for the two nations involved. Thus it is extremely important to address the wide range of view points and how the leadership may feel about such a program. Since the ROKAF did not officially take part in this thesis, the researcher substituted interviews and survey results with ROKAF members to establish possible ROKAF perspectives. The Possible Benefits section of this chapter presents the answers to this question.

Finally, what are the social, cultural, and political barriers the two nations must overcome to make such a vast change in the training regime possible? All personnel contacted for this study have a vested interest and concerns about combined training. Each individual's cultural background colors their different perspectives. The answers to this question undoubtedly affect the final outcome of the thesis, and will probably have the greatest impact on any combined training program adopted by the leadership of the CFC, USAF, and ROKAF leadership. The Social, Cultural, and Historical Barriers sections of the chapter presents the findings to this question.

Lastly, a conclusion to the entire thesis is provided to focus on some of the primary reasons behind the need for a combined training program between the USAF and ROKAF. The President and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff offer some pointed guidance on this subject. In addition, the limits of this particular thesis are pointed out, as well as areas for further study.
Current Combined Training

Ground Training

In the Korean theater the highest levels of command establish the environment that allows, and requires, daily interaction between the USAF and ROKAF staffs. The headquarters staffs of the USAF and ROKAF operate out of Osan AB, ROK and they work together on common issues under the ACC. Naturally, both have a wide variety of issues unique to their own commands, but the issue of combined training is something very near and dear to the hearts of the commanders. During telephone interviews done with General Iverson and his staff, they stated combined training is a subject of great interest and importance. For individuals on the ACC staff itself, combined training happens on a regular basis as they operate within their staff functions. As such, some of the problems that face a combined environment become obvious.

One of the most troublesome problems is the lack of trust ROKAF staff members have for the USAF. According to members of 7th AF staff, their ROKAF counterparts meet any new business the USAF staff wishes to address with much skepticism. As a result, the 7th AF staff members must constantly explain their intentions to convince the ROKAF of their desires. In addition, the concerns for “saving face” are real, and a daily concern for USAF members on combined staffs in Korea. Issues and problems are handled very delicately to ensure ROKAF leadership can look good, or at times not to look bad. Staff actions and decisions that normally take hours or days within an American staff now take days, weeks, or even months to coordinate and approve. Every member of combined staffs interviewed voiced the same sentiment. Such sentiment and skepticism must be addressed before a combined training program can operate effectively.

Advances are being made at the highest level of leadership within the ACC staff to improve combined training. Each year in August ACC holds a combined command post exercise...
called ULCHI FOCUS LENS. The ACC staff designed ULCHI FOCUS LENS around the entire command and control structure of the Korean theater. The objective is to insure all nodes of the command and control structure work together as expected during wartime situations. As the exercise evolves, the lessons learned indicate fewer problems exist between the command and control agencies of both air forces.

Another area of combined training being studied at the ACC staff level, is that of sister units. During the fall of 1996, the ACC staff pushed to establish sister squadron relationships between USAF and ROKAF units. It is designed for units of a common type to share procedures, techniques, and ideas about their jobs. At the same time, units hopefully establish a friendship and bond to help bridge the social and cultural gap now separating the USAF and ROKAF at the unit level. USAF units at both Osan AB and Kunsan AB are establishing these affiliations with their ROKAF counterparts. The whole USAF 8th Fighter Wing established a sister wing program with the ROKAF wing, both collocated at Kunsan AB. The 8th Fighter Wing's program has each USAF squadron adopt a ROKAF squadron, and establishes a relationship that goes beyond just the working environment. Hopefully, these relationships will allow a combined training program to flourish and be a productive aspect for everyone's combat capability.

Flight Training

Combined training is not limited to just ground training activities. On a limited basis flight training also takes place between USAF and ROKAF pilots. However, it is not as organized as the ULCHI FOCUS LENS exercise and sister unit program. Most of the combined flight operations are chance meetings between a few pilots without much planning or forethought about the objectives and goals for their training. The author was lucky enough to take part in three such flights.
The first flight with the ROKAF was in the P518 area along the DMZ with a ROKAF FAC. In this case there was a two-ship of USAF F-16s flying with a ROKAF O-2. The O-2 is a twin engine propeller aircraft, designed and built by the US specifically for the FAC mission during the Vietnam era. The flight itself was very informative about the challenges facing combined operations between the USAF and ROKAF. For almost thirty minutes, both the USAF pilots and ROKAF pilot struggled with the language barrier. Due to the intense restrictions on delivering ordnance within close proximity of friendly troop positions, it is imperative that all parties involved insure they attack the proper target. By the time everyone confirmed what target to attack, the F-16s had enough gas for only one attack. The following mission of F-16s scheduled into the target area also had to return to base due to fuel considerations. If this occurred during an actual wartime situation, one of the two-ship elements would have to drop their ordnance on an alternate target or returned home as a noneffective flight. This situation is a perfect example of the language problems presented by combined flight operations.

As for the other two flights the researcher had the opportunity to partake of, both were during wing exercises. The first flight was during an USAF exercise by the 8th Fighter Wing at Kunsan AB. During this sortie, three pairs of ROKAF two-ships were to meet three USAF four-ships at a rendezvous point south of the target area. At the designated time everyone ingressed and egressed the target area as a package with AWACS control. Without any direct planning between pilots before the mission, it resulted in much confusion during the mission. One of the biggest lessons learned during this mission were the limitations on the radio. ROKAF F-5s have only one radio and used the package mission radio channel for their inter-flight communications. This example points out another area of concern to be addressed and overcome for combined operations to be both valid and safe.
The final flight consisting of combined training opportunities was during a ROKAF exercise. In this case the USAF F-16s flew in support of the ROKAF and presented themselves as enemy targets for ROKAF F-4s and F-5s to practice intercept tactics. The USAF F-16s flew in a straight line, at a set medium altitude, and at a specific airspeed. This allowed the ROKAF pilots to run a very controlled intercept with radar controllers to arrive in a position where they could easily identify the aircraft and employ ordinance. This is a simple exercise from the USAF point of view, but demonstrates the differences between USAF and ROKAF tactics. This type of exercise might indicate a starting point for combined operations acceptable to the ROKAF.

It is important to realize these are the only three opportunities this researcher had to fly with the ROKAF. It is imperative to address the concerns and problems these three flights highlight before a real world combined package crosses the DMZ into North Korea. From all of the telephone interviews conducted and surveys answered, this amount of combined training appears to be fairly standard for USAF pilots in Korea. In some cases, USAF pilots stationed in Korea for a year or more never had the opportunity to fly with the ROKAF.

One attempt to establish a combined training event occurred during the fall of 1996. As the 8th Fighter Wing scheduled and planned a LFE for November, the wing asked the ROKAF 111 Fighter Squadron, also stationed at Kunsan AB, to partake. As far as anyone knew, this was the first time a USAF unit extended such an invitation for a non-exercise LFE toward the ROKAF. Since everyone was assigned to the same base, the flightleads were able plan the entire package together. During the flight planning ROKAF pilots raised some concerns about the tactics USAF pilots wanted to employ. A few of these were ingressing to the target at medium altitude (around 18,000 to 22,000 feet) and rolling in on the target from the left. Both of these tactics are normal for USAF pilots, but when looked at by the ROKAF pilots it was something quite new. For one thing, due to the avionics in ROKAF F-5s, a medium altitude roll-in on a
target is very difficult. Because the F-5 lacks a Global Positioning System and a strong radar, the pilot must visually acquire the target prior to commencing the attack and rolling-in on the target. The other concern ROKAF pilots had about rolling in from the left is that this is something they do not practice. Even though the ROKAF pilots were concerned, they were still willing to try.

This LFE established two important points and offers great insight on the combined training aspect between fighter units. First, the concern by the ROKAF pilots at possibly not hitting their designated target for whatever reason causes them to truly worry about "saving face." Second, even though the USAF pilots were asking the ROKAF pilots to do something new and different, which might cause them to miss the target, they were still willing to try. As it turned out the weather for the LFE was below limits and canceled.

The USAF also has an A-10 squadron stationed at Osan AB. The 25th's primary mission in Korea is to control fighter aircraft along the DMZ as the fighters perform CAS missions in support of the ground battle. Pilots in the 25th Fighter Squadron work with ROKAF pilots on a regular basis. They perform a vital role in day-to-day flight operations, as well as the role they will fulfill during actual combat. As such, these pilots work directly with a wide range of ROKAF fighters. The biggest concern these A-10 pilots have about working with the ROKAF is the language barrier. The language barrier compounds the extremely demanding environment of peacetime CAS, let alone the wartime demands of timely execution of CAS missions.

The realm of combined training between the two air forces is already in existence both on the ground, in the air, and at the command level. However, as a formal training option between individual pilots, combined training is still lacking. Hopefully, the next section may establish a possible solution to this predicament.
Compatibly of Current Training Programs

As discussed in chapter 4, there is a great deal of compatibility between the USAF and ROKAF training programs. The question begs attention in a new light as to how individual pilots involved will react to a combined training program, and if they deem it compatible. The telephone interviews and survey responses substantiate the findings in this section.

Language

The majority of the responses had some interesting insights concerning the relationship between the USAF and ROKAF. One concern repeatedly conveyed was the language barrier. In every case, USAF pilots stated the Koreans should work on their English skills. Not only is English the international language of aviation, but due to the complexity of the Korean language and the average Korean’s capability to speak English, it also makes the most sense. This simple improvement would have the greatest positive impact across the broad spectrum of combat related issues.

Even ROKAF pilots themselves realize the language barrier is a problem. They voiced their willingness to work on the problem as well. Major Kim and Major Bang both agreed the ability to speak better English would dramatically help Korean pilots operate in the combined arena. They are of the opinion that working together with USAF pilots stationed in Korea would be the best opportunity for ROKAF pilots to perfect their English language skills. When asked if a specific language course would help, they thought it would not be as beneficial as just talking with other Americans. Simple conversational language skills are what the ROKAF pilots thought would be most beneficial and help their pronunciation. In addition, they pointed out they would work on their English while taking part in some combined ground training.

USAF pilots did not seem to have an opinion as to how to improve the ROKAF English language skills. Nevertheless, there is great interest in the opportunity to brief together with
ROKAF pilots before and after any flight. Briefings would be the perfect chance to work together with just a few individuals on both language and flying skills. In many cases, by the time the debriefings end the day is over and it is common for the pilots to get together in the squadron lounge to review the day’s experiences. As pointed out by a number of pilots, this would also lend itself nicely to the opportunity to exchange ideas in a social environment. This social setting would help the ROKAF pilots’ English skills, and more importantly allow a greater exchange of ideas between pilots and cultures.

SOP and ROE

Both air forces have slight differences in their tactics and approach toward training. Ironing out these differences and misunderstandings between pilots was the overriding concern of all pilots. A point brought up by Captain Steve Platt, now assigned to the 68th Fighter Squadron at Moody AFB, Georgia, was to establish a common set of ground rules and ROE. This would involve everything from the ROE to bandit reactions and basic weapons employment. This would give everyone a common guide to reference for combined operations. It is routine procedure for every USAF fighter wing to have SOPs the entire wing operates from. With concurrence from the ROKAF, a combined training program could use the same SOPs or a modified version. A perfect start for this type of guidance would be the Combined LFE Special Instructions already devised by 7th Air Force at Osan AB.

Flying Training

Briefings

One notion repeatedly brought up by USAF pilots was the need for combined briefings. Missions currently flown together do not involve a combined pre-brief or debrief. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, briefings are crucial to the learning process among fighter pilots. One note
of caution raised in conjunction with the need to brief is the concern for “saving face” by ROKAF pilots. In a USAF briefing there is relatively no rank among the flight members and everyone is free to exchange thoughts and criticisms with the thought that more lessons learned will arise in this environment. This concept is quite different from that of the ROKAF where lower ranking pilots would never criticize their commanders or higher ranking officers. By breaking down this stigmatism, better open communication between pilots can take place. Not only do ROKAF pilots need to approach the briefings differently, but USAF pilots must be aware of the ROKAF sensitivities and brief accordingly. Only by sharing the findings of a flight immediately afterward can pilots explain the how and why they did what they did during the flight. Usually in a debrief and discussion pilots learn and understand the best lessons taken from a particular flight. The peacetime briefing experience lays the foundation of knowledge between pilots, so when under wartime conditions, the planning and coordination of a mission are understood without the need for further briefings. In many cases, pilots flying together on a combat mission do not enjoy the luxury of a briefing.

Air-to-Air Training

Combined air-to-air training flights would employ guidelines derived from the SOPs used during any air-to-air engagement. Hopefully, this might alleviate one of the biggest concerns USAF and ROKAF pilots have about each other’s air-to-air weapons employment doctrine. Both USAF and ROKAF F-16s carry the AMRAAM missile and due to its long range, it is important all pilots understand the ROE for employment during combat operations. The horrible mishap in Iraq between two USAF F-15 and two USA UH-60s is a perfect example of what may happen when communication and command and control break down. Therefore, it is vitally important ROKAF F-16 squadrons train with USAF F-16 squadrons. Together, both can
devise common tactics to employ the AMRAAM missile. This should hopefully lower any risk of fratricide under the stress of a combat situation.

The combined training program in the air-to-air regime would also be a building block approach working from basic intercept training up to four-versus-four ACT sortie. From the examples of ROKAF air-to-air capabilities, it would not be wise to jump directly into a complex scenario. A slow, controlled development would be much more acceptable and beneficial to all parties. One building block approach would include at least a one-versus-one basic intercept sortie, followed by a two-versus-two intercept sortie. After everyone is comfortable with the intercept tactics and employment, then the program would move to a two-versus-two ACT sortie. The number of sorties required before moving to the four-versus-two or four scenario would be dependent on the pilots' comfort zones. After successful completion of a four-versus-four scenario, an excellent opportunity to ensure proper understanding and employment would be to fly as defensive forces during an LFE using the agreed upon tactics. The overriding premise is a building block approach, so as to avoid pushing any pilots beyond their comfort level.

Air-to-Ground Training

When looking at the types of flights that would be compatible for a combined training program, most pilots are interested in air-to-ground. Considering the plans call for the ROKAF to fly a majority of their sorties as air-to-ground during the next conflict, and it only makes sense to train in that regime. From the limited information available by flights already flown together, it is obvious pilots have a vast amount of information to share with each other.

Chapter 4 covered the air-to-ground missions, but it warrants an in-depth look at a possible program. With the building block approach applied to air-to-ground sorties, pilots would begin with two sorties as a two-ship element in a low threat environment. Then the program would build to a four-ship flight consisting of a ROKAF and USAF two-ship element.
each. Again two sorties would benefit all, so pilots could experience the flight from the front and back of the formation. As the sorties continue, pilots have the freedom to increase the threat level of each sortie. This concept continues until four aircraft from each air force operate together in a high threat environment. Then the pilots are ready to operate in a combined LFE as the offensive force. Noting the ROKAF's limited aggressiveness, it is recommended such a conservative approach would be more acceptable and beneficial to all. Which leads into the next section about possible benefits a combined training program offers the USAF and ROKAF.

Possible Benefits

The actual benefits of a combined training program are not necessarily tangible. Instead the benefits would come from the shared information each air force brings to the training itself. How pilots use information to improve their combat capability is the ultimate benefit. Through this training another very important benefit would be the mutual knowledge, trust, and friendship between the USAF and ROKAF forces that would grow out of such training. Through knowledge comes the understanding that will prove to be the ultimate reward.

The overriding premise for this program is to reduce the chances of fratricide, noneffective missions, and possible combat losses. In a combined training program all pilots will share the information required to avoid these things. Together pilots of the ROKAF and USAF will work to establish a game plan everyone is comfortable with and understands. This allows everyone to know what is expected of them and the others during a combat mission within a package. Otherwise, as Major Dave Asselin, a USAF Weapons Officer, said “We will be fighting two wars, one we understand and one they understand.” During wartime missions, the chances to brief together and work out any problems within a package do not exist, thus prior knowledge is required so everyone can operate safely and effectively without missing a beat. Major Doug Troyer, another USAF Weapons Officer, mentioned in his questionnaire that

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something as simple as a dependable list of squadron phone numbers and fax machines to ensure effective communication during these times would be unbelievably helpful. Currently, to contact a ROKAF squadron by phone is a major challenge for USAF pilots.

As mentioned time and again throughout this thesis, the main benefit would be breaking down the barriers that separate the USAF and ROKAF. A bond that builds upon a common goal must replace the misconceptions and distrust. The Koreans are our hosts and the USAF needs to share their outlook on the situation as much as the USAF would like for them to view it from an American understanding. Individual pilots echoed these sentiments repeatedly in response to the survey, now if the leadership would acknowledge this point as well.

Social, Cultural, and Historic Barriers

As discussed extensively throughout this thesis, both the USAF and the ROKAF must overcome the barriers toward combined training before it can become a reality. For this to happen, both air forces must come to a better understanding of how each operates, and why they operate the way they do. With every minor step toward a common understanding the walls of misunderstanding and distrust will come down allowing a more comprehensive approach toward the necessary training.

Colonel "Rhino" Gross, a prior Vice Wing Commander of the 8th Fighter Wing, pointed out some primary concerns of senior commanders toward combined training. The most obvious, and probably the hardest to overcome is the language barrier. Everything done within an air campaign ties to the communications of the entire force. As it stands now, the communication situation between ROKAF and USAF personnel is limited to the English speaking ability of the ROKAF members. This factor goes beyond the actual combat environment and affects every part of a combat sortie. The language barrier affects the initial planners on the staff, commanders in the field, pilots in the cockpits, and controllers behind radar screens. This language problem can
best be handled through better lines of communication between both air forces across the entire scope of operations by as many people and as often as possible. Practice by both sides speaking together will not only improve their language skills, but foster a common understanding.

By opening lines of communication between USAF and ROKAF personnel, they will overcome remaining social and cultural barriers. Both air forces approach this relationship with their own views about themselves and each other. These can only be supported or disproved by sharing information about themselves. By working together they will come to understand the problems each other face and can, therefore, work together on addressing the solutions. This is the answer that must be accepted and supported by the leadership of both air forces. The army leadership of both countries already accepted these problems. Lieutenant Colonel Johnson and Major Pelczynski testify to the fact that in virtually every facet of army operations in Korea, both the USA and ROKA work together in a combined fashion. The time has come for the USAF and ROKAF to follow in their footsteps and improve their own combat capability.

From the survey responses, this researcher has concluded the vast majority of individuals are willing and ready to train together. They feel the time has come to put their initial differences aside and address the issues together. There are a few individuals who have become tired of the situation in Korea and are ready for US forces to return to America. This viewpoint was limited to only a few who have already served on the combined staff in Korea. This fact may offer a great insight to one of the true barriers yet to overcome. If the airmen in the field are willing and able to work together, why are the leaders still dragging their feet? When senior leaders from both countries address the situation they use glowing terms of friendship and support for each other. However, when the actual opportunity to work together presents itself, it appears the leadership stops it from happening.
Summary

Now that all four supporting questions were evaluated, the answers provide a clearer picture of the situation between the USAF and ROKAF. The current combined training addresses the limited access currently available to USAF and ROKAF pilots. An evaluation of the compatibility of both USAF and ROKAF training programs helps to design a possible combined training program between the two air forces. Possible benefits of a combined training program provide validation to the worth of such a program. Finally, the evaluative analysis provides the social and cultural barriers that presently divide the USAF and ROKAF. All of this allows a broader understanding of the situation currently in Korea and the possibilities to improve upon it.

Conclusion

In the very beginning of this thesis Lieutenant Colonel Nam said he was amazed someone from the US military cared for his input on the subject of combined training. From his point of view, that simple gesture was unheard of between his military and the US's. This simple statement offers a tremendous insight to the problems the US and ROK must overcome if they are to become true allies. For the last forty-five years, the US has taken an autocratic, or at best parental, approach toward the situation in Korea. However, the time has come for the US to acknowledge the growth and capability of ROK forces and begin treating them with the respect and expectations such advances deserve.

Captain Uk Chong, of the USAF stated, "Deep cultural differences do cause conflict and animosity, because people from unlike cultures think and view things differently." Now these two allies must get to know one another as equals. South Korea has come of age politically, economically, and militarily. In general the US must face this fact and begin treating them with
the respect due an ally and host nation to American forces. A key factor in this quest for improved knowledge and relations is the armed forces.

As stated in President Clinton's *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, US military forces are deployed throughout the world to establish America's commitment to defend its vital interests. Specifically the US stations forces to enhance the effectiveness of coalition operations by improving our ability to operate with other nations, and to promote an international security environment of trust, cooperation, peace, and stability. As America's primary tool to insure the vital interests, the armed forces provide fertile ground for coalition cooperation and stability. In many cases the relationships established between US and ROK forces meets the President's objectives. However, the relationship between the USAF and ROKAF appears to have room for improvement.

General Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, writes in his *National Military Strategy*, that combined operations through military-to-military contacts provide many benefits: combined training, joint readiness, and interoperability. This thesis addressed all three of these benefits substantiating why the USAF and ROKAF should pursue combined training. The Chairman's guidance concerning this aspect of peacetime engagement may be worth listening to in future studies.

This thesis answered the question: can the USAF and ROKAF train together? The thesis compared both the individual pilot training requirements and their respective training syllabi. In both cases the USAF and ROKAF requirements proved to be compatible for combined training. The aircraft assigned to the Korean theater are also compatible. ROKAF F-5, F-4, and F-16 aircraft easily mix with the USAF A-10 and F-16 aircraft. Both air forces also fly the same types of missions, air-to-air and air-to-ground, that lends toward a combined training program. The
barriers facing a combined program appear easily overcome by dedicated leadership and action within the pilot force. The research proves pilots are hungry and ready for the challenge.

Areas for Future Study

Areas for future study in relation to this thesis should include answering the question: what impediments must the USAF and ROKAF overcome to establish a combined training program? An inspection and review from the top down is required to establish actual administrative needs and goals for combined training. ACC leadership must write and accept some basic guidelines and regulations affecting this training. The leadership must accept the responsibility and feel secure in their decisions about the program. The USAF and ROKAF also need to address the topic of classified information. Examples of this type of concern are the AMRAAM and differing tactics each air force develops.

Another area for future study in relation to this thesis is: how would combined training be implemented. Once the actual syllabus is accepted and the guidelines established, how does the 7th Air Force commander want to get individual units involved. At Kunsan AB where both USAF and ROKAF units live and work together, combined training would be an easy proposition. However, when units from other bases fly combined missions, how will pilots actually get together for the planning and briefing of their flights? Both of these questions deserve further research so a clear picture of the situation is available. The answers to these questions may further validate, or possibly refute the need for a combined training program.

Summary

This thesis answered some very basic questions about a possible combined training program between the USAF and ROKAF. The objective being to establish that such a program is viable for both air forces. The answer is yes with some consideration to the basic differences
between the parties involved. Those considerations take into account the differing aircraft, language, and cultures. The findings of the research suggest a building-block approach toward a combined training program. Such an approach allows pilots to realize the greatest benefits and reduces possible resistance to a combined training.

1The Air Component Command is part of the Combined Forces Command and assigned to Osan AB, ROK. Both the ROKAF and USAF headquarters are assigned to Osan AB. Individual command buildings for each are only a few blocks away from each other.

2From early September 1996 through January 1997, numerous contacts were made with General Iverson's office and his staff at Osan AB.

3Lieutenant Colonel Givens and Major Fridley, both prior members of combined staffs in Korea expressed the troubles related to the decision making process on the staffs. Colonel Givens worked on the CFC staff in Seoul and Major Fridley worked on the ACC at OSAN AB.

4Started in 1994 by the CFC, Ulchi Focus Lens lasts two weeks and exercises the entire command post system within the Korean theater. Every base and post is activated along with the command post staffs of units expected to deploy to Korea during hostilities.

5While assigned in Korea at Kunsan AB from July 1995 to June 1996, the researcher noticed the status of combined flight training as almost non existent. For the entire year, the opportunity to fly with the ROKAF presented itself only on three occasions. All three occasions represented the standard type of training opportunities available at the present time.

6Captain "Lucky" Quirion, 35th Fighter Squadron Training Officer, forwarded the entire story. Captain Quirion was the designated mission commander for the entire package.

7Two USAF pilots stated that the situation in Korea no longer warrants US presence in the region. A key point for both was the friction between both parties and the thought the US is unwanted in Korea. This viewpoint is extremely limited, but highlights some of the feelings individuals have about the situation.

8From telephone interviews and survey responses, all five USAF weapons officers mentioned the need for combined briefings. Without an opportunity to capture lessons and questions from each sortie, there is little to be gained from a combined training program. Majors Kim and Bang also agree the briefings are crucial to combined operations success.


APPENDIX
EXAMPLE OF STAFF QUESTIONNAIRE

MASTER'S THESIS QUESTIONNAIRE: CAN THE USAF AND ROKAF TRAIN TOGETHER ON A REGULAR BASIS?

BACKGROUND: First let me thank you for taking a moment to considering these questions. The reason behind them is to explore the possibility and relevance of a combined training program between the United States Air Force (USAF) and the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF). Both countries are responsible for the defense of South Korea. In addition, due to the reduction of forces by the United States and the growth of the ROKAF, the planners for such a defense are calling on both to work together in the air on the very first sortie. To this researcher, it would seem obvious we need to start training together now, before hostilities breakout on the peninsula. It is imperative to know each other's capabilities and limitations. Who knows, we might even learn something from each other!

This is a new approach to training together that has not been tried between allies. Without any previous history to rely on, I need your inputs to piece together the feasibility and actual outline of a combined training program. This will be presented as a masters thesis to the Army Command & General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. You are the experts in the field, and on the staffs right now in Korea. You, and the individuals that will fill your cockpits and desks when you leave, are the people this plan will help should it be executed. Therefore, please give this some thought. be candid, talk about how you feel with others, and please add any insights you think might help. I truly appreciate anything you might have to say concerning this matter.

Please return this by 10 November, to: Maj Swony Swonson
36 Biddle
Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027

or email: LJSwonson@aol.com

YOUR COMMENTS:
1. What is the current status of any training being done right now between the USAF and ROKAF?

2. From what you have done with the other air force, what were a few of the key lessons learned?

3. If you could make any changes to the current training, what would it be?
4. If we could train together, what type sorties would be the most beneficial?
   
   Air - to - Air :

   Air - to - Ground :

5. What do you think would be the benefits to you and your unit if training with the other air force were possible?

6. If there was one thing you would like to share with the other air force, what would that be?

7. Do you think a combined training program would help during actual wartime? What would the specific impact be?

8. What are the prime hurdles to overcome for such a program?

9. Are you willing to work with the other air force to develop your skills?

10. Do you they are willing to work with you?

Thanks for your help!

Major John R. Swanson - “Swony”
35 FS “Pantons,” 1995 - 1996
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8th Fighter Wing
Chief of Training
Kunsan Air Base, ROK
APO AP 96264-5300

Major Charles C. Floyd
Air Force Element
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

Major Keith B. Bartsch
Air Force Element
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

SFC John C. Broom
Combat Studies Institute
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352
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APO AP 96205-0010

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APO AP 96278

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