PROTECTING THE FORCE IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

A Monograph
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Abstract

PROTECTING THE FORCE IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, by MAJ Michael D. Stewart, 44 pages.

Army warfighting doctrine clearly delineates the definition, scope, and components of protection for application on the battlefield; however, the Army’s Operations Other Than War (OOTW) doctrine does not provide similar clarity for the concept in OOTW missions. Protection, as defined by FM 100-5, Operations, conserves the commander’s combat power, but none of the OOTW manuals give the same definition of protection. In examining Army doctrine, this monograph highlights the significant differences which appear in the key OOTW doctrinal manuals: FM 100-20 (Draft), Operations Other Than War, FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, FM 100-23, Peace Operations, and FM 100-23-2, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Humanitarian Operations. Comparing these manuals to FM 100-5 shows the disparities which exist in the doctrine. In operations other than war, the commander’s requirement to protect his force has received little attention in doctrine.

The history of the United States Multinational Force in Lebanon, September 1982 to February 1984, reveals several essential concepts necessary to protect the force in OOTW. Examining the bombing of the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) building in Beirut, Lebanon on the 23d of October, 1983 provides evidence to further modify existing Army doctrine. The commander must weigh competing requirements to secure his force while simultaneously exercising restraint in the use of weapons. Regardless of the mission, a commander must take precautions to protect his force. Especially during active hostilities, the need for security outweighs concerns about perception. In Lebanon, the Marine’s experience confirms legitimacy as a principle of OOTW, and analysis also shows that neutrality contributed to the USMNF’s protection.

Overall, Army forces operating in Somalia affirmed the applicability and unique character of protection in OOTW. Reviewing operations in Somalia provides several concepts for consideration in future OOTW doctrine. Rules of engagement were cited as critical to force protection while excessive restraint usually led to a perception of weakness on the part of the adversary. Commanders must balance between security, restraint and legitimacy. In determining this balance, commanders must recognize that the ability to use force, combined with a willingness to use it when necessary, contributes to protection. Even in peace operations, the use of force may be required. Hesitation to apply capabilities can be seen as a weakness by opposing forces, and the result can be a compromise in the protection of the troops. Additionally, force protection emerges as a possible mission for inclusion in future doctrine.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

At 0622, he [Sergeant Stephen E. Russell] was at his post in the door of the BLT [Battalion Landing Team] building when he saw, to his horror, a big yellow five-ton truck smash through the concertina wire and head straight for his sandbagged position. The small inside gate was wide open, as usual. Two nearby sentries did not open fire. They could not load their magazines fast enough. The truck gunned its motor, the driver smiled, and the speeding vehicle easily careened past the flimsy metal pipes lying in front of the BLT doorway. Russell ran out, yelling, "Hit the dirt!" It was too late.¹

For the inhabitants of Beirut, Lebanon in 1983, the city's situation involved combat in every sense of the term. One armed entity attempted to impose their will upon another through the use of force. Christian Phalangists, Amal Muslims, and Druze militias—all were committed to gaining power or control of their piece of Lebanon through violence.

The collection of warring factions gave Beirut's fighting a distinct character. Whether motivated by greed or religion, each group wanted to secure their sovereign status within Lebanon. Syrian regular forces, Russian advisors, Israeli Defense Forces, and Iranian extremists added to the confusing array of contenders. What made Beirut unique was the presence of a military unit committed to not using force. In the midst of an Israeli invasion and a Lebanese civil war, the United States placed Marines as part of a multinational contingent devoted to keeping the peace.

United States Marines came ashore with French, Italian, and British troops. Given the mission of establishing a multinational force presence in the Beirut area, the Marines occupied the Beirut International Airport and nearby sections of Muslim West Beirut. Among the various roles assigned to the Marines was the task of peacekeeping.² In
current doctrinal terms, peacekeeping falls into the category of OOTW--an Operation
Other Than War. Since the publication of FM 100-5, Operations, the term OOTW has
received increasing attention and widespread use by the military. Peacekeeping is one of
several possible OOTW missions.

Another type of OOTW mission involves humanitarian assistance. In 1992, the
United States participated in this type of mission. On the eastern horn of Africa lies an
ill-defined country--Somalia. No sovereign government had ruled within its accepted
borders since 1991. Like Beirut ten years earlier, Somalia suffered from civil war, but
Somalia's situation had little other resemblance to Lebanon's. Civil war only exacerbated a
widespread famine which had caused 500,000 deaths, and many more Somalis faced
imminent starvation.

Under United Nations' auspices, a multinational contingent was sent to establish a
secure environment for the delivery of relief supplies. Feeding starving Somalis became
the focus of this operation, and the force did achieve this objective. Later, as the UN
force transitioned to a nation-building role, the Somalis began to resist, and the UN force
became a target. Violence against U.N. forces escalated in June of 1993 when
twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers were killed. The U.N. declared that Mogadishu
warlord General Muhammed Farah Aidid was responsible. After a series of unsuccessful
attempts to capture the Somali National Alliance leader in Mogadishu, the U.S.
announced that it would withdraw its forces by March 1994. Most other U.N.
participants left soon after. The humanitarian relief element of the Somalia mission had
succeeded, but the subsequent attempt at nation-building and peace operations failed.
These experiences in both Beirut and Somalia illustrate the complexities of OOTW, but humanitarian relief and peace operations are only two possible OOTW missions. In the future, the United States Army can expect to continue conducting more OOTW missions. To define its required capabilities for war and OOTW in the twenty-first century, the Army published Force XXI Operations in August 1994. The Force XXI concepts in Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5 recognize the increasing frequency of Operations Other Than War missions. Operations Other Than War, according to another key Army publication--FM 100-5, Operations, are those missions executed during peacetime and conflict. War, on the other hand, "involves the use of force in combat operations against an armed enemy." On the surface, this seems to provide an adequate definition. War involves combat, and OOTW does not. However, doctrine and experience do not recognize such clean divisions. After providing a succinct definition on one page, FM 100-5 destroys the clarity on the next page. "The states of peacetime, conflict, and war could all exist at once in the theater commander's strategic environment. He can respond to requirements with a wide range of military operations. Noncombat operations might occur during war, just as some operations other than war might require combat." By contradicting the earlier definition, FM 100-5 reminds readers that doctrine cannot account for all situations.

While the doctrine cannot cover every case, the Army still places great importance upon it. "Doctrine is the statement of how America's Army, as part of a joint team, intends to conduct war and operations other than war." Doctrine has an authoritative aspect which shows the Army's accepted methods for conducting operations.
has several purposes according to FM 100-5; it "facilitates communication...", establishes a shared professional culture and approach to operations," and influences military schooling. Thus, doctrine is the Army's language for discussing military operations.

If one of doctrine's purposes is to contribute to shared understanding, it follows that doctrine must apply some rigor to the terms used. One doctrinal term which lacks focus and common meaning is force protection. "Protection conserves the fighting potential of a force so that commanders can apply it at the decisive time and place." As the U.S. Army becomes smaller, conserving forces becomes more important. The commander conserves forces by applying the concept of protection. In doctrine and in practice, force protection has grown in importance and scope. Every Army manual concerned with OOTW mentions protection; however, few provide the same definition.

A survey of OOTW doctrine reveals many inconsistencies in the use of force protection. Disparities range from inaccurate definitions to incomplete discussions of the components. The only consistent, complete reference to protection appears in FM 100-5, Operations. In the 1993 version, FM 100-5 mentions protection in the context of the dynamics of combat power. These dynamics consist of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. In the context of these dynamics, FM 100-5 lists the components of protection: deception and OPSEC, protecting health and maintaining morale, safety, and the avoidance of fratricide. Using these as the standard, an assessment of force protection in other doctrinal manuals can be made. This monograph highlights the inconsistent use of the term protection among the Army's OOTW manuals. In the Army's operational-level doctrine, the definition of protection becomes less clear. Concepts such
as theater missile defense (TMD), defense against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and air defense come under force protection. Operational level topics highlight the confusion in discussions about force protection. Neither does joint doctrine follow a uniform standard in the use of protection. Overall, joint and Army doctrine do not establish a common meaning for protection in OOTW missions.

In determining doctrine, FM 100-5 states, "[Doctrine] incorporates the lessons of warfare and the wisdom of the Army's collective leadership in establishing a guide to action in war and operations other than war." Protection, as a concept applied to OOTW, is relatively new, but reviewing past operations can clarify concepts and establish methods for inclusion in future publications. The operations of the United States Multinational Force (USMNF) in Beirut, September 1982 to February 1984 and joint forces in Operation Restore Hope (United Nations Task Force -- UNITAF) and United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), Somalia, December 1992 - March 1994 may provide insights to further develop the concept of force protection in OOTW. These OOTW missions provide examples of concepts related to protection not addressed by current doctrine. Additionally, these operations provide a basis for assessing the adequacy of current OOTW doctrine.

As illustrated by the bombing of the Marine headquarters in Beirut, inadequate protective measures can result in tragedy. The Marine force lost 241 personnel in an instant. Reviewing the circumstances of the Marine tragedy serves three purposes. First, the monograph applies the doctrinal concepts of protection in FM 100-5 to an OOTW mission. This establishes that protection has relevance in OOTW missions. Second, links
between security and protection become apparent when examining this case. Finally, the tragedy in Beirut provides evidence of what happens when protective measures fail. Using the Marine failure for comparison, the evolution in protection concepts becomes apparent while examining operations in Somalia.

A review of operations in Somalia provides two important points for development of the topic. It was a relatively successful operation in terms of protection. United States' forces lost relatively few personnel due to causes other than combat. Also, evolving concepts about protection emerge for inclusion in doctrine. Both UNITAF and UNOSOM II give insight as to how forces in the field interpret force protection. An awareness of protection led to its development as a Battlefield Operating System by Army Forces, Somalia. Lessons learned reports from Somalia contain several discussions about protection. Somalia also provides an opportunity to test Army doctrine against Army operations. Additionally, it gives a unit's interpretation of protection in OOTW.

Inconsistent definitions used by the Army have led to a broadening of the scope of the term, particularly in OOTW missions. This monograph studies the historical examples of Beirut and Somalia to determine if protection in OOTW missions needs further clarification in doctrine. It also examines the competition which exists between the OOTW principles of legitimacy, restraint, and security which currently goes unrecognized in doctrine. Additionally, the historical examples are used to learn if other concepts emerge for inclusion in future OOTW manuals. Overall, Army doctrine leaves great uncertainty as to the applicability of protection to OOTW missions.
CHAPTER 2

DOCTRINE AND APPLICATION

Army Doctrine

To prepare itself for future OOTW missions, the Army needs adequate doctrine which solidifies approved and accepted concepts for executing these missions. The term protection, particularly in the context of OOTW, needs further definition in doctrine.

"Doctrine is the engine that drives change within our Army. That is so because doctrine embodies our ideas, and ideas drive change."14 Force XXI operations focus on the future. Not only does the future army have to prepare for war, but also it has to be ready to execute OOTW.

Protection, as a doctrinal concept, has evolved since it appeared in the 1982 version of FM 100-5, Operations. Consistent with current doctrine, the term protection was first used in the context of combat power. Combat power—achieved by the combination of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership—is an expression of force relative to the enemy. The role of protection is to conserve forces so the commander will have the necessary means to fight. Protection, as a component of combat power, interacts with the other three parts to "create the ability to fight."15

Both the 1982 and 1986 versions of FM 100-5 list two characteristics of protection.16 Protection "includes all actions to counter the enemy's firepower and maneuver by making soldiers, systems, and units difficult to locate, to strike, or to destroy. Among these actions are security, dispersion, cover, camouflage, deception, suppression, and mobility."17 Concealment also comprises a portion of this characteristic. Protection
also consists of "actions to keep soldiers healthy, to maintain their fighting morale, and to diminish the impact of severe weather. It also means keeping equipment in repair and supplies from becoming lost."

In this initial definition of protection as a doctrinal term, two themes are apparent. The doctrine intended for protection to be used in the context of combat power, and production of combat power required the use of protective measures plus maneuver, firepower, and leadership. Protection was also a comprehensive concept. It included "all actions" that a commander might use to conserve his forces. In the next edition of FM 100-5, these two purposes appear again.

In 1993, the Army published another edition of FM 100-5. This manual also uses the concept of combat power. It has the same four elements previously mentioned: maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. The most significant change in this version was the restructuring of the components of protection. In the current manual, four elements comprise protection: operations security (OPSEC) and deception operations; keeping soldiers healthy and maintaining their fighting morale; safety; and the avoidance of fratricide.19

Under the element of OPSEC and deception, the manual lists other aspects. These include reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance, dispersion, fortified fighting positions, security operations, and camouflage. Guarding equipment and supplies from loss or damage, formerly a separate concept, now falls in the second element: keeping soldiers healthy and maintaining their fighting morale. New to the discussion on protection is
safety which includes discipline, training, and standards. Finally, avoidance of fratricide consists of awareness and control measures.\textsuperscript{20}

From its first appearance in the 1982 version of FM 100-5, the concept of protection focused on conserving forces. By conserving forces, the commander had sufficient manpower and equipment available to combine with the aspects of firepower, maneuver, and leadership to generate combat power. Avoiding needless waste lies at the center of protection's definition. What also becomes apparent is that protection takes place in the context of combat power. Protection is not an end in itself. The commander conserves his forces so that he can apply them later at the decisive time and place. Clearly, protection in FM 100-5 has as a fundamental concept the conservation of forces and means.\textsuperscript{21} The Army's OOTW doctrine, however, interprets protection in a much wider sense.

**OOTW Doctrine**

The latest edition of FM 100-5 includes a new section entitled Operations Other Than War. While previous editions from 1962 onward addressed similar operations, not until the 1993 version did the manual devote a full chapter to OOTW.\textsuperscript{22} Structurally, the OOTW chapter relies on the pattern provided by the manual's previous chapters. Specifically, it incorporates concepts such as principles of war and alludes to tenets of OOTW--ideas from FM 100-5's Chapter Two, Fundamentals of Army Operations. Continuity of terms from earlier sections seems logical, and the idea that OOTW should have principles similar to those principles of war given in Chapter Two also seems
appropriate. Chapter Thirteen, Operations Other Than War, has some fundamental flaws, though, which detract from its doctrinal value.

Chapter Thirteen of FM 100-5 contributes to the misunderstanding of the term protection. In the introductory paragraph, the manual states that the "chapter describes the principles and tenets associated with Army operations other than war." The chapter quickly proceeds to a review of the environment of OOTW and then outlines the principles of OOTW. The chapter concludes with a review of the OOTW missions. Nowhere does the manual discuss the tenets of OOTW. This seemingly minor omission causes great repercussions in later manuals. By not defining the tenets and terms associated with this new area, the manual leaves great latitude for interpretation.

FM 100-20, Operations Other Than War (Draft), when published, will serve as the capstone OOTW manual. It continues and expands upon the principles of OOTW first seen in the 1993 version of FM 100-5. Like FM 100-5 though, it does not outline any tenets for the conduct of OOTW nor does it propose any unique characteristics of combat power during OOTW missions. While not all complex situations can be reduced to rules or laws, OOTW doctrine should indicate the fundamental characteristics of these missions. By not providing doctrinal terms and common definitions as structure, FM 100-20 (Draft) leaves wide latitude for interpretation of the subjects it does discuss. Further, by not integrating its concepts with existing doctrine, FM 100-20 (Draft) contributes to confusion rather than clarity.

A term which FM 100-20 (Draft) does not clarify is force protection. Asserting that "force protection is an important command responsibility at all levels," FM 100-20
(Draft) implies that protection deserves further development in the context of OOTW.²⁵ Contrasted with the full definition offered by FM 100-5, this new manual never defines the term in the text nor does it offer protection's unique characteristics in OOTW. As a result, the draft uses protection without defining its nature and scope in OOTW missions.

In its glossary, FM 100-20 (Draft) defines force protection as "actions to minimize the chance of damage to a military force from any threat, human or environmental."²⁶ This definition does not agree with the FM 100-5 description of protection as the conservation of forces. Additionally, FM 100-5 makes explicit the connection between security and protection. In discussing security during OOTW missions, FM 100-20 (Draft) merely implies a relationship between the two. However, the draft OOTW manual's real weakness is that it does not discuss the peculiar effects that other principles, such as restraint and legitimacy, have on the commander's ability to protect his force.

Additionally, FM 100-20 (Draft) establishes that OOTW poses unique challenges to a commander trying to protect soldiers and equipment. In the chapter entitled "The Peacetime Role of the Army," FM 100-20 (Draft) contains the following observation:

The protection of their soldiers and government equipment and supplies is an inherent responsibility for commanders in any situation. Military commanders engaged in operations other than war have the same responsibility, but their actions are complicated since the United States is not at war and the Laws of Land Warfare do not apply. In domestic operations, the use of force is restricted by US law and outside the United States, by the laws of the nation being assisted and international law. Competent counsel from the staff judge advocate (SJA) should be sought early and often during any OOTW. Constraints on weapons, tactics, and degree of violence are characteristics of OOTW. There are times when the mere presence of offensive weaponry will derail the operation.²⁷
Restrictions on the use of force and employment of means highlight that force protection in OOTW may not be the same as the stock definition. In discussing peace operations, the manual states that "peace enforcement severely restricts the use of weapons, especially air and artillery (except when necessary for force protection)."28 OOTW also has aspects which border on war. Some operations have many of the characteristics of war, and "the doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for warfighting generally apply."29 Implicit in this observation is the admittance that OOTW requires methods and doctrine apart from Army warfighting doctrine.

Since the term OOTW is relatively new, FM 100-5's introduction set the stage for follow-on publications such as FM 100-20. Expanding upon this doctrinal base, the Army has already published several OOTW manuals for specific types of OOTW activities.

First released in July 1993, FM 100-19, *Domestic Support Operations* covers U.S. Army support and assistance to domestic authorities. In FM 100-19, the inconsistency which appears in FM 100-20 (Draft) continues in the Army's attempt to define protection during OOTW. Safety and OPSEC, two subordinate parts of protection, are covered separately in the manual while other aspects are not mentioned at all. The manual asserts that the "Army commander's primary responsibility is to accomplish the assigned mission and to provide for force protection."30 While this shows that the manual recognizes the contribution of protection to the mission, it does not address any of its other aspects unique to this type of mission.

In contrast to the limited treatment of protection in FM 100-19, FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, has greater depth in its discussion. It provides a lengthy analysis of
force protection as a planning consideration in peace operations. The manual addresses all four components of protection outlined in FM 100-5. First, it gives a list of those measures which contribute to OPSEC in peace operations. These include communications security; neutrality; photography; sites, accommodations, and defensive positions; roadblocks; personnel vulnerabilities; personal awareness; sniper threats; security measures; coordination; and evacuation. It also makes the observation that "deception may not be feasible in peacekeeping operations, but the nature of peace enforcement operations may require its use."31 The section also outlines unique problems regarding the maintenance of health and morale of soldiers. Lack of action may increase boredom. Other considerations may limit the robustness of the logistical support leading to stress. Safety remains an integral part of all planning, training, and operations. Finally, the avoidance of fratricide is addressed. Although normal wartime measures for the avoidance of fratricide apply, the environment where friendly or neutral parties are not easily recognized complicates peace operations.32

In the principle of OOTW called security, FM 100-23 discusses force protection extensively. "In peace operations, security deals with force protection as a dynamic of combat power against virtually any person, element, or hostile group."33 It goes on to suggest that perceptions also enhance a force's security. A unit may have to provide security and force protection to "civil agencies and NGOs [non-governmental organizations]," and it may have to restrict the use of normal protective measures.34

Humanitarian Assistance] are critical for force protection. The manual also uses force protection in the context of security. Discussing security, a principle of OOTW, the manual says a responsibility of the commander is to "provide HA force protection against virtually any person element, or group."

The Army's OOTW doctrine has some significant weaknesses. In the complexity of humanitarian relief operations, peace operations, or domestic assistance, the lack of clearly defined terms can only lead to more confusion. At a minimum, the doctrine leaves significant room for interpretation and thus fails to contribute to common understanding.

As defined in OOTW doctrine, protection has many meanings. Ranging from a "comprehensive security program" in peace operations and domestic assistance doctrine to "actions taken to minimize the chance of damage" in the capstone OOTW manual, force protection has no consistently agreed upon definition. One of the first tasks of any OOTW manual revision should be the determination of a common definition for protection. Conservation of forces should be central to this new definition since protection, as it evolved in FM 100-5, clearly holds that as a core concept.

Additionally, OOTW doctrine needs to determine the applicability of combat power to OOTW. Returning to the original concept in FM 100-5, combat power exists to render the enemy incapable of effective opposition. Does the concept translate in its entirety to OOTW, is it modified, or is a new concept needed? TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 suggests that power has other qualities. "Overwhelming, decisive power is not solely firepower. For example, in OOTW, it may be food delivered to starving civilians...." (original emphasis) On the other hand, Peace Operations suggests that the concept
applies with little modification while FM 100-20 (Draft) does not define combat power at all. Doctrine needs to clarify this point to insure that commanders can achieve the desired results in OOTW by focusing on the relevant factors. Only after agreeing on what constitutes power in OOTW can an adequate assessment of protection's role be made.

After deciding upon a definition and scope of protection, the doctrine needs to delineate the components of protection in OOTW. OOTW doctrine does not agree on these components. FM 100-5 provides a useful framework for formation of a definition. Of all the current or pending OOTW manuals, Peace Operations provides the most comprehensive discussion of protection. The other manuals, particularly the capstone doctrine, could benefit from adopting this style. What FM 100-23 clearly indicates, which the other manuals do not, is that protection has unique characteristics when applied to OOTW.

Joint Doctrine

Just as Army doctrine leaves room for interpretation, joint doctrine does not clarify protection in OOTW, either. Three documents provide the joint view of protection in OOTW: Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms; Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations; and Joint Publication 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations. These manuals contain some of the same discrepancies which appear in Army doctrine, but they do tend to agree with the parallel Army publication.
As the dictionary for joint operations, Joint Publication 1-02 provides a logical starting point. The joint dictionary provides a succinct, if limited, definition of force protection as a security program developed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs.40

This definition agrees with that given in the Army's peace operations and domestic assistance manuals, but it implies a formal effort to structure the measures which comprise protection. Its definition as a "program...accomplished through planned and integrated application" calls for much more commitment than current Army doctrine contains.

Joint doctrine does agree with Army concepts in most cases. In the warfighting manual, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, stresses conservation of forces like FM 100-5 does. In the context of a Joint Force Commander's (JFC) duties, Joint Publication 3-0 lists four components of protection:

- protection from the enemy's firepower and maneuver;
- health, welfare, morale, and maintenance;
- safety;
- and prevention of fratricide.

This manual closely adheres to the model in FM 100-5. Key aspects include "countering enemy's firepower and maneuver by making personnel, systems, and units difficult to locate, strike, and destroy" by using OPSEC and deception.41 By following a common framework with FM 100-5, this joint publication contributes to the idea that protection has several parts which cannot be isolated.
Specific to OOTW, Joint Publication 3-0 uses the original six principles of OOTW from FM 100-5: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. Under security, the manual states that "security deals principally with force protection." Other than giving examples of possible threats, Joint Publication 3-0 does not expand upon this statement. The definition does not indicate what aspects of protection are significant in OOTW. Consequently, the manual does not clarify the character of protective measures in OOTW.

Lastly, Joint Publication 3-07.3 deals with a specific type of OOTW mission, peacekeeping. It states that "experience has shown that force protection must be a high priority for a deployed peacekeeping force." Physical security, rules of engagement, weapons and ammunition access, and intelligence functions comprise force protection in this environment. In listing these characteristics, this particular manual, like FM 100-23, affirms that protection in OOTW missions has considerations not addressed in warfighting doctrine. Additionally, the manual has a particular sensitivity toward antiterrorism measures. While it does not specifically mention the Beirut tragedy, these concerns reflect an awareness of lessons learned from previous American experiences.

Overall, joint doctrine does not contribute significantly to the understanding of protection. While it has some shortcomings, it at least agrees with the related Army publications. Joint doctrine parallels the appropriate Army publications, but it appears that few cross-references were made to related works. To its credit, Joint Publication 3-07.3 expands the definition of protection in peacekeeping and thus contributes to clarity.
FM 100-5 provides a clear definition of protection as the conservation of a commander's forces; however, the Army's OOTW doctrine does not use the same definition. FM 100-20 interprets protection as a "actions to minimize damage" while FM 100-19 appears to borrow the meaning given in the joint dictionary. FM 100-23, Peace Operations provides the most detailed discussion of protection in an Army OOTW publication, and it gives specific examples of its unique characteristics in peace operations. This particular manual seems to have relied upon historical events to reach its conclusions. Joint doctrine also appears to make use of available historical examples to refine and focus the doctrine. Army doctrine, particularly FM 100-20 (Draft) and FM 100-19 could benefit from a review of past operations. Two operations which can further clarify the Army's OOTW doctrine, particularly humanitarian assistance and peace operations, are the Marine deployment to Beirut and Army operations in Somalia.

**Marines in Beirut**

At Camp Johnson, North Carolina, a monument's inscription says, "They came in peace." Few words so aptly describe the disbelief, shock, anger, and grief resulting from the Beirut terrorist bombing on October 23, 1983. Marines, as part of the United States Multinational Force, suffered 241 casualties in the bombing attack. Disagreement exists as to whether this act constituted terrorism or just an efficient method of warfare, but the reaction of the American public was clear. American troops involved in "peacekeeping" had died needlessly. In assigning responsibility for the Marine's deaths, the Department of Defense's official report singled out the failure of both the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU)
commander and the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) commander to "take the security measures necessary to preclude the catastrophic loss of life...." However, the report cited other findings that contributed to the tragedy. The unclear nature of the USMNF mission, contradictory tasks given to the Marines, and failure to adequately protect the force led to the loss. These factors lead to several conclusions regarding force protection. In OOTW, the nature of the mission indirectly affects a commander's ability to protect his troops. The commander must weigh competing requirements to secure his force while simultaneously exercising restraint in the use of weapons. Regardless of the mission, a commander must take precautions to protect his force. Especially during active hostilities, the need for security outweighs concerns about perception. In Lebanon, the Marine's experience confirms legitimacy as a principle of OOTW, and analysis also shows that during the first six months of their mission, neutrality contributed to their protection. When the Marines arrived in 1982, conditions were relatively benign; by 1983, Marines found Beirut a very hostile place.

Cosmopolitan from its inception, Lebanon long served as the western gateway into the Middle East. With a unique blend of Arabs from Christian and Muslim backgrounds, Lebanon eased the transition from western cultures into the conservative Arabic world. Lebanon catered to both Arab and westerner, and it created an economy out of brokering deals. This same diversity that allowed it to serve as a crossroads also destroyed the nation. Since 1958, Lebanon has endured violent outbreaks between its diverse communities. In 1983, Marines were caught in the crossfire.
United States' military involvement in Lebanon extends back to 1958. In July 1958, the United States put ashore a joint Marine-Army task force to bolster the faltering Lebanese government. This task force experienced relative success in its mission, and it remained for less than four months. On October 25, 1958, almost exactly twenty-five years before the bombing of the Marine headquarters, the last U.S. forces left Beirut.49

Marines returned in August, 1982 to cover the withdrawal of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from Beirut. Israeli intervention in Lebanon had pushed the PLO into a few small areas near Beirut. As part of a Saudi Arabia-Syrian sponsored agreement, a Battalion Landing Team of 1,000 Marines landed to serve as a buffer force while the PLO withdrew from Lebanon. This deployment did not have the open-ended nature of the upcoming USMNF mission. Less than thirty days elapsed between the introduction of forces and their departure.

After briefly returning to their ships, Marines landed again in September 1982 following the assassination of Bashir Gemayel, president-elect of Lebanon.50 In contrast to the 1958 mission, the United States Marines entered Beirut in 1982 as part of a multi-national force. Joined by French, British, and Italian troops, the United States intended

To establish an environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area. When directed, USCINCEUR will introduce U.S. forces as part of a multinational force presence in the Beirut area to occupy and secure positions along a designated section of the line from south of the Beirut International Airport to a position in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace; be prepared to protect U.S. forces; and, on order, conduct retrograde operations as required.51
As the Marines arrived, they occupied the Beirut International Airport (BIA) and vicinity. Initial conditions were much as expected. Beirut's residents received the Marines with relief. In the early months, Marines experienced few losses with most of them due to accidents. The first Marine unit to perform the presence mission was the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit led by Colonel James Mead. The 32d MAU, which sustained only one significant casualty, was replaced by the 24th MAU in late October. Another MAU rotated into Beirut in February 1983 led again by Colonel Mead. This time the violence of Beirut began to affect the Marines. As the operation progressed into the spring of 1983, security conditions deteriorated for the USMNF.

Plenty of warning signs of an impending crisis can be seen in hindsight. By mid-March 1983, events had taken a decidedly hostile turn. On the 16th of that month, five Marines were wounded by a grenade attack. Later, in April, a much more deadly event occurred. In a foreshadowing of the October bombing, a terrorist truck bomb detonated at the American embassy in Beirut which killed 17 Americans. During May, Colonel Tim Geraghty's 24th MAU replaced Colonel Mead's unit. Violence directed against the Marines continued to increase. Throughout August and September, the Marines received artillery, mortar, and rocket fire. Snipers continually harassed the forces occupying BIA. By October 22, 1982, the Marines had lost a total of seven killed and forty-seven wounded since occupying BIA just over a year before. As the situation worsened in September, the Marines retreated to the perimeter which ceded the initiative to their attackers. Mounted and dismounted patrols were discontinued, and outposts were withdrawn from exposed positions as a protective measure. The Marines attempted to
protect themselves by consolidation, and seemingly safest of all, the nearly 350 occupants of the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) building continued their mission.

The BLT building was selected for its imperviousness to indirect fire. Sturdy reinforced concrete resisted the barrage of rockets and artillery shells. For this reason, the Marine commanders selected this structure to house many of the BLT forces. However, this concentration of forces made an inviting target. Terrorists took full advantage of the opportunity presented them by the Marine dispositions. A lucrative target, lax physical security, false intelligence leads, and tactical surprise combined to give the bombers the advantage. A lone suicide bomber driving a truckload of explosives ended the lives, and credibility, of the Marines in Beirut.

The Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, acted quickly to determine the causes of the tragedy. On November 7, 1983 he appointed a commission to investigate the circumstances of the bombing. The five member commission looked at seven major topics: the Marine's mission, the rules of engagement, the chain of command, intelligence, security arrangements, the bombing, and casualty evacuation.56

From these broad areas emerge several observations pertinent to force protection in OOTW. Inadequate physical security measures directly precipitated the event by giving the bomber easy access to the compound. Rules of engagement that lacked uniformity were also partially responsible for the weak response to the intrusion. Previous false alarms also caused a decreased sensitivity to the threat. The ill-defined nature of the mission contributed to the tragedy, and ambiguous mission statements from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and United States European Command (EUCOM) led, at least indirectly, to the adoption of an inadequate security posture.

As defined by EUCOM, the Marine mission remained as in the JCS message. The concept given through Commander United States Naval Forces Europe to Commander Amphibious Task Force 61 CTF 61) was to

...land U.S. Marine Landing Force in Port of Beirut and/or vicinity of Beirut Airport. U.S. forces will move to occupy positions along an assigned section of a line extending from south of Beirut Airport to vicinity of Presidential Palace. Provide security posts at intersections of assigned section of line and major avenues of approach into city of Beirut from south/southeast to deny passage of hostile armed elements in order to provide an environment which will permit LAF to carry out their responsibilities in city of Beirut. Commander U.S. Forces will establish and maintain continuous coordination with other MNF units, EUCOM liaison team and LAF. Commander U.S. Forces will provide air/naval gunfire support as required. (original emphasis)

Later interpretation of the mission by lower echelon commanders reflected confusion as to what was expected of them. Commanders perceived the exact nature of the mission differently. Although occupy and secure were two tasks from the mission statement, commanders gravitated to the term "presence" in the mission statement. Leaders emphasized presence to the exclusion of other tasks. Had the mission been clearer, the situation might not have deteriorated as it did later for the Marines.

While their mission statement does not use the term peacekeeping, the DOD Commission which investigated the bombing states that the Marine mission was peacekeeping. Although the Marine force did not have the benefit of today's doctrine, their experience confirms neutrality as being essential to the peacekeeping force's protection. Peacekeeping activities, as defined in FM 100-23, Peace Operations, include
"observation and monitoring of truces and cease-fires and supervision of truces." \textsuperscript{59} Impartiality is a prerequisite, but the Marines had an additional, competing task. "The USCINCEUR concept of operations also tasked CTF 61 to conduct combined defensive operations with other MNF contingents \textit{and the LAF}...." (emphasis added)\textsuperscript{60} Army doctrine promotes neutrality as imperative to retaining the legitimacy of a peacekeeping force; the additional task given the Marines assured that the perception of impartiality would remain short-lived. Maintaining a neutral stance while actively aiding one of the parties contradicts current peacekeeping doctrine. In modern usage, peace enforcement better describes the nature of the task required of the Marines. Peace enforcement allows favoring one force over another. Relying on neutrality, Marines did not expect hostilities directed against them. Their two-faceted mission, however, insured that it would not take long for some faction to see the contradiction. Since they did not have doctrine to tell them otherwise, the Marines would have to learn about impartiality through experience.

By violating the concept of neutrality, Marines gave the warring factions a reason to target them. A significant source of Marine security derived from its perceived impartial stance in the conflict. In review, the DOD Commission saw this predicament. "The Commission believes there was a fundamental conflict between the peace-keeping mission provided through the chain of command to the USMNF [United States Multinational Force], and the increasingly active role that the United States was taking in support of the LAF." \textsuperscript{61} Druze and Muslim militia leaders saw this conflict well before the Commission reported it.
Marines suffered a loss of legitimacy by siding with the Lebanese army. This favoritism took many forms. Marines trained and patrolled with LAF units, and LAF units also received uniforms from the United States. At a distance, it became hard to distinguish Lebanese from Marines. Additionally, Marines supplied ammunition to the LAF and later began to provide indirect fire support. "When hostilities erupted between the LAF and Shiite and Druze militias, USMNF efforts to support the LAF were perceived to be both pro-Phalangist and anti-Muslim." As a result, Muslim and Druze militias began to escalate the violence directed against the USMNF.

Torn between the deteriorating situation and the perceived diplomatic nature of the mission, the commander chose not to enact more stringent security measures. "The commander trusted that impartiality and showing the flag could accomplish the mission as he understood it, to include protecting the force." To some degree, he may have been correct. Up to March 1983, the MNF received no direct attacks. After it became apparent that the Marines sided with the LAF, "urban Muslim militias reacted to perceptions that the MNF was getting too friendly with Gemayel's Christian-oriented military." Colonel Geraghty's reaction to the increased threat after mid-summer contrasted sharply with the actions of the previous MAU commander. Aggressive measures taken by Colonel Mead in April included constructing defensive positions, emplacement of barricades and use of armor. "When questioned later about possible political implications, Mead stressed that he considered defensive actions well within his command prerogatives." Colonel Geraghty, however, relied on visibility and neutrality as his
primary defense against attack. Diplomatic concerns weighed heavily in his decision not to react more aggressively. Despite numerous direct attacks against his forces, he continued to limit defensive preparations.

Oddly, additional security measures may not have caused any diplomatic problems at all. From the diplomatic standpoint, United States Special Envoy Philip Habib indicated that it would not have affected the mission adversely to have employed more obstacles. The U.S. Secretary of Defense agreed. Implementing additional security measures might have made a difference. In its report, the DOD Commission leaves the impression that proper security measures might have altogether prevented the tragedy. "Whether full compliance with the actions prescribed for Alert Condition II would have prevented, in full or in part, the tragic results of the 23 October 1983 attack cannot be determined, but the possibility cannot be dismissed." Blocking access to the compound and establishing more stringent security procedures, as happened after the attack, may have prevented the truck from reaching the Marine perimeter much less the building.

In the aftermath of the bombing, the Commission mentioned activities taken later in an attempt to improve the security posture of the USMNF. Specifically, the Commission noted improvements in five categories related to protection which "reduce[d] the vulnerability of the USMNF...." Dispersal of troops, construction of protective structures, improved security procedures, rules of engagement, and physical barriers were cited as ways to contend with the threat.

In countering enemy capabilities, FM 100-5 states that "proper dispersion helps reduce losses from enemy fires...." While fires in this context applies to the effects of
artillery systems, the idea applies equally well to the bombing at Beirut. Concentration may make sense from an administrative or control standpoint, but it also carries significant risk. The Commission's report singles out this decision as a significant factor in the magnitude of the tragedy. In one of the harsher statements in the report, it held "that the Battalion Landing Team Commander must take responsibility for the concentration of approximately 350 members of his command in the Battalion Headquarters building thereby providing a lucrative target for attack." The MAU commander also received some blame for concurring in the decision.

The commander concentrated the Marines for two primary reasons: protection from indirect fires and ease of control. The four-story building was the only large structure resistant to indirect fire effects in the Marine compound. Construction of protective structures would have negated the need to concentrate the Marines in one place. Lack of time or engineers cannot be cited as a reason for not having built more structures. The Marines had occupied the same terrain for over a year at the time of the bombing. Colonel Geraghty chose not to build safer structures because of the "temporary nature of our mission."

In establishing a secure environment, protective structures are just one aspect. Along with prepared positions, security procedures and physical barriers are needed, and at the time of the bombing, both were lacking. Security procedures cover a wide range of actions, but the DOD Commission singled out three areas--access control, searches, and responses to threat warnings. In the vicinity of the BLT building, the MAU had established eight guard posts of which seven were manned at the time of the bombing. Of
the eight total guard posts, only three were allowed to load their magazines into their weapons at all times. None of these three posts was near the entry point of the truck bomb. Further, the only physical barriers to entry into the Marine compound were concertina wire and two concrete pipes. As a result, the truck had little difficulty negotiating these protective measures and entering the BLT building. A month after the bombing, the DOD Commission found conditions much improved.75

In another finding of the DOD Commission report, rules of engagement (ROE) received significant attention. Marines operated under two sets of ROE. One set was used by Marines assigned to guard the temporary U.S. Embassy. Marines at BIA had a second set of ROE. What was unique in the report was the mention that the differing ROE "conditioned" the view of Marines at the two separate locations. As a result, the Commission found that those Marines stationed at BIA thought they faced a lesser terrorist threat than Marines guarding the Embassy. The Commission concluded that the differing ROE "contributed to a mind-set that detracted from the readiness of the USMNF to respond to the terrorist threat...."76

Combined with their ill-defined mission, the rules of engagement given to Marines did not allow adequate protective measures in their hostile situation. After further examining the circumstances, it becomes apparent that the Marines had surrendered their neutrality by actively aiding the Lebanese Armed Forces. In doing so, the protection offered by the Marine's status as a presumed neutral party was lost. Increasing numbers of attacks directed against the USMNF resulted in the force withdrawing most of its outer security perimeter which caused a further degradation of their protection. Militias and
other groups continued to target the Marines culminating in the bombing of the BLT building on October 23, 1983. In assessing the causes of the Marine tragedy at Beirut, the DOD Commission report emphasized the decisions made by the unit commanders concerning the security arrangements for the BLT building. While a significant cause of the large loss of life, the Marines had a larger security problem well before the date of the bombing.

The Beirut bombing demonstrated more than a simple lack of physical security; the Marines had not protected their force in a larger sense. Their active participation in a situation which demanded a less conspicuous role removed the protection afforded them earlier in the deployment. Conflicting ROE and a mind-set which discounted the immediate threat to their safety led the Marines to adopt lax security procedures. Approximately ten years later, an increased awareness of the threat plus a focus upon providing comprehensive protection to the force caused a much different result. At the same time, operations in Somalia reinforced many of the lessons learned by the Marines in Beirut.

**Operations in Somalia**

Force protection issues came to the forefront in Somalia. From Army operations in the country, many unique aspects of protection during OOTW become apparent. During this operation, force protection attained a level of recognition not previously seen. Official reports consistently mention the importance of force protection such as the UNOSOM II Lessons Learned Report which states "...force protection became one of the most important concerns of U.S. units and soldiers." The emphasis on force protection
arose from Somalia's situation. Austere conditions and the local threat combined to stress
soldiers and their systems, and protection from the environment became as important as
guarding forces against hostile action. With little host nation infrastructure available,

Since the late 1980s, the country known as Somalia endured civil war. As in
Beirut, factionalism served as the basis for the violence. In contrast with the residents of
Beirut, though, Somalis descended from a homogeneous background. This common
lineage, however, did not lessen the intensity of combat. Somali dissidents and later the
Somali clans sought to claim the widest possible territory for themselves. The fighting
plus widespread famine produced a human tragedy of great proportions.

Prior to 1991, the only moderating influence, minimal at best, was the presence of
a central government. Under Siad Barre's dictatorship from October 1969 to January
1991, Somalia fell under centralized self-rule for over two decades. Although he
experienced limited success initially, Barre still was unable to forge a strong, unified
nation. Greed and centralization of power within his own clan caused widespread
dissatisfaction among Somalis. As internal opposition grew, Barre began to repress
dissident clans. This evoked a greater reaction on the part of Somalis which in turn
caused more repression. By the mid-1980s, Barre had begun to manipulate the clan
structure to enhance his power which laid the foundation for later inter-clan violence.
This cycle continued until the domestic situation collapsed with his departure in 1991.

Internationally, Somalia underwent a significant ideological shift under Siad Barre.
Initially a client state of the Soviet Union, Somalia followed socialist practices for several
years, but Somalia's involvement in border disputes with Ethiopia and a Soviet shift towards Ethiopia increased external pressures on Barre. In need of international help in the late 1970s, Somalia turned to Muslim countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, for assistance. By 1980, Somalia sought aid from the United States. Later, U.S. concerns over domestic policies and repression led to a suspension of U.S. aid. Overall, the international assistance received by Somalia did little except postpone Somalia's crisis.

Internal difficulties culminated in 1991 with Siad Barre's forced departure from Somalia which ended central government in the country. Organization then devolved upon clan leaders in the country with each leader seeking to establish his own territory. Long known as a warrior society, Somali clan leaders used readily available weaponry to carry on traditional rivalries.

Since 1992, a regional famine also affected Somalia. Civil war between the fourteen clans in Somalia contributed to the misery. Famine claimed nearly a half million victims, and an additional one million Somalis faced near-term starvation. Clan leaders began to employ food as a bargaining weapon for power, and United Nations and private relief efforts experienced significant interference with deliveries of relief supplies. By late summer of 1992, media attention began to influence significantly United States' public opinion. The sight of so much starvation raised domestic support for a U.S. humanitarian assistance mission to Somalia.

While Operation Restore Hope became the most visible aspect of the relief effort, the United States had supported humanitarian relief operations for several months prior to the main deployment in December 1992. Based in neighboring Kenya, the United States
since August 1992 had conducted airlift of supplies during United Nations Operations in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) or Operation Provide Relief. UNOSOM I did not achieve its objective of alleviating the starvation. The magnitude of the famine caused much of the problem, but the constant interference with relief supplies insured UNOSOM I's failure. By November, it became apparent that a much more concerted effort would be required to avert further disaster.

In November 1992, the United States president, in response to a United Nations resolution, ordered a joint force to Somalia to conduct Operation Restore Hope. United States forces committed to this operation included a Marine Expeditionary Force, the Army's 10th Mountain Division, and various Special Operations Forces (SOF). Under United States Central Command direction, the First Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) formed Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia. Coalition forces joined in the relief effort, and the resulting combined force became known as the United Task Force (UNITAF). Concerned with humanitarian relief, UNITAF had as its primary responsibility the mission to provide security for relief efforts.82

While delivery of supplies was part of UNITAF's mission, the primary task was to establish a secure environment. USCENTCOM provided the following mission statement:

When directed by the NCA, USCINCCENT will conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief organization operations, and assist UN/NGOs [non-governmental organizations] in providing humanitarian relief under U.N. auspices. Upon establishing a secure environment for uninterrupted relief operations, USCINCCENT terminates and transfers relief operations to U.N. peacekeeping forces.83
This operation continued until May 1993 when UNITAF transitioned operations to the United Nations Operations in Somalia II force. United States Forces Somalia (USFORSOM) formed the U.S. contingent of UNOSOM II. Approximately 4,500 U.S. troops participated in this phase including a 1,300 man Quick Reaction Force (QRF). While UNOSOM II had more extensive ambitions, including nation-building and peace enforcement, the overall force level was less than that of UNITAF. This phase ultimately proved to be a failure.

From the relative success of UNITAF to the blunders of UNOSOM II, United States Army forces learned much about protection in an OOTW environment. Army attempts to capture these lessons included use of a special team from the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and extensive reporting through the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System. Additionally, the 10th Mountain Division wrote an extensive After Action Report (AAR) based on its experiences in UNITAF.

From these documents comes an appreciation for the interpretation of protection as applied to an OOTW mission. Compared to the Marine experience in Beirut, Somalia provides a different focus to the discussion of force protection. Applying the concept of battlefield operating systems (BOS) to operations in Somalia, the 10th Mountain Division adopted force protection as an additional BOS applicable to their situation. Widening the scope of protection even further, several sources mention force protection as a stand-alone mission. Operations in Somalia also reinforce lessons learned during Beirut. Rules of engagement were cited as critical to force protection, and excessive restraint in the use of force usually led to a perception of weakness on the part of the adversary.
Overall, Army forces operating in Somalia affirmed the applicability and unique character of protection in OOTW.

Force protection appears in all of the AARs and lessons learned reports from Somalia. United States Army Forces, Somalia produced an AAR covering their operations from 30 November 1992 to 4 May 1993. In the report, the broad categories covered were rules of engagement; morale, welfare, and recreation activities; pastoral care; base camp construction and operation; safety; medical operations and rear detachment operations. Examination of these topics provides a unit's view of force protection in OOTW. All of the comments from the AAR fit into the protection activities described in FM 100-5 except rules of engagement. As happened in Beirut, commanders in Somalia saw a distinct link between ROE and force protection.

Continuing the trend identified earlier in Beirut, rules of engagement are seen as vital to force protection in OOTW missions. "The rules of engagement for humanitarian relief operations are critical for force protection." An explanation of this assertion comes in Kenneth Allard's lessons learned report on Somalia produced by the National Defense University. He points out that ROE in this type of operation have special characteristics. ROE must "calibrate the nature of the threat with the balance that must be struck between the often competing requirements of restraint and the security of the force." In essence, ROE serves as a bridge between the principles of restraint and security. ROE which is too restrictive favors the principle of restraint, but it endangers the force. On the other hand, ROE with few restrictions may compromise the force's ability to do its mission. Commanders must seek this balance between two opposites.
UNOSOM II continued this attempt to balance competing principles, but eventually the ROE began to favor security over restraint. As the situation in Somalia deteriorated, the ROE became less restrictive. Contrasted with Beirut where platoon leaders requested permission to return fire, the ROE in Somalia gave troops relative freedom.

Emphasizing the relation between protection and ROE, the CALL Lessons Learned Report for UNOSOM II cited ROE as vital to force protection. "The ROE allowed soldiers to defend themselves, their unit, U.S. property, UNOSOM II personnel and others who are under the protection of UN or U.S. forces." The U.N. commander, Turkish Lieutenant General Cevik Bir, issued Fragmentary Order 39 which allowed engagement of organized forces or crew-served weapons without provocation. Previously, UNITAF had operated under ROE which restricted deadly force. Deadly force could also be used to protect classified material, weapons, night vision devices, CS grenades and pepper spray because these items could be used against the troops. Thus, the ROE for UNOSOM II recognized an indirect link between theft of certain items and force protection. This relaxation of criteria led to an increasing reliance on force as a means of dealing with situations.

Diplomats associated with the operation confirm that willingness to use force contributes to security and protection. U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia Robert B. Oakley and coalition political advisor John L. Hirsch believe that force plays a significant role even in peace operations. They see no conflict between the use of force and the accomplishment of the mission. Referring of the UNITAF phase, they observed, "...it
became clear that a severely minimalist approach to the use of force was far more likely to hamper a peacekeeping operation, inviting challenge by appearing weak, rather than inspiring cooperation by demonstrating both strength and peaceful intent. Further, they see a direct correlation between the willingness to use force and the incidence of casualties. However, Oakley and Hirsch do not suggest that determining the appropriate balance is an easy task. Political factors influence the decision to use force as do coalition considerations. Overall, their statements point to a definite relationship between the ROE which defines the use of force and the protection effects which result.

Allard also recognized that use of force contributes to protection. He observed that the credible display of force resulted in caution on the part of potentially hostile factions. These observations are extremely important to commanders designing ROE for all OOTW missions. Restricting the use of force in an OOTW mission can be counterproductive to protection. While restraint may be suggested by the situation, too much restraint can endanger the force. ROE which allows a unit or individual to respond forcefully contributes to security.

In Somalia, security and protection became synonymous. Reflecting the current uncertainty as to the scope of force protection, several sources state that force protection became a primary mission of the U.S. forces. In Allard's review of the Somalia operation, he refers to the 10th Mountain Division's role during the latter portion of the UNITAF phase as a "mission...largely confined to force protection for the balance of its in-country tour." While some may not agree with his characterization of the division's contribution, he raises the question of force protection as a mission. LTC Dan Bolger, in his review of
recent low-intensity conflicts, continues this thought. Discussing the Quick Reaction
Force (QRF) role during UNOSOM II, he says that they "would be used only for force
protection." Force protection becomes a much larger task which is a mission in itself.

In preparing for operations in Somalia, the Beirut experience had an obvious
impact by raising awareness among Army commanders especially in the area of physical
security. In response to the Somalia deployment, CALL produced a pamphlet in January
1993 which states: "Security problems or shortfalls have contributed to the failure of force
protection programs during terrorist attacks against U.S. interests in the Middle East since
the 1983 Beirut [sic] bombings." Specifically, the pamphlet suggested:

- Remember barrier systems were unreliable; vehicle access controls were
  inadequate. Use additional security measures, such as vehicles, to block
  high-speed avenues of approach.
- Do not use solely host-nation personnel to provide perimeter security of any
  facility.
- Make critical physical security improvements by installing additional barriers to
  screen high-risk targets.
- Ensure that the ROE does not limit the ability of the soldier to defend himself or
  the facilities.
- Sensitive work areas must not be located in portions of buildings vulnerable to
  explosives. 6

Apparent within this document is a recognition of the important contributions
physical security and the accompanying security procedures makes to protection. The
resulting emphasis on force protection by commanders in their actions during operations
and the AARs which followed reflect this recognition of the importance of protection in
this OOTW mission.

Reviewing operations in Somalia provides several concepts for consideration in
future OOTW doctrine. Commanders must balance between security, restraint and
legitimacy. In determining this balance, commanders must recognize that the ability to use
force, combined with a willingness to use it when necessary, contributes to protection.

Even in peace operations, the use of force may be required. Hesitation to apply capabilities can be seen as a weakness by opposing forces, and the result can be a compromise in the protection of the troops. Rules of engagement, as the commander's guidelines in the use of force, directly impact the protection of his unit. Consequently, ROE must be seen as an integral component of protection. Experience in Somalia confirms that procedural and physical measures directly contribute to protection.

The Army's experience in Somalia indicates that force protection may become the mission of a unit engaged in OOTW. As both Allard and Bolger observe, units may adopt a level of activity which seeks only to conserve the force for future use. By extension this becomes the mission of the force. Since doctrine already suggests that in an OOTW mission protection may assume a stand-alone nature, the potential exists for further development of protection as a mission. In this context, protection orients primarily on the unit's security, but the broader scope of protection more adequately reflects the nature of the task. Of all the questions raised by operations in Somalia, doctrine urgently needs to clarify this particular topic.
CHAPTER 3
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Contrasts in Doctrine

As the Army adapts to the changing strategic, technological, and political environment, doctrine should change to reflect the current and anticipated future circumstances. Evolution in doctrine seems appropriate and indeed inevitable. Thus, some disagreements between later publications and their predecessors should be expected. In the case of OOTW doctrine, the evolution towards common concepts, terms and definitions has not yet occurred. In comparing the Army's OOTW doctrine to the capstone manual FM 100-5, many inconsistencies become readily apparent. Inconsistent definition of the term protection, to include use as a stand-alone term, occurs throughout the Army's OOTW doctrine. These variations and departures from FM 100-5 reflect a lack of vertical and horizontal integration within Army doctrine.

FM 100-5 contributes to this problem. Chapter Thirteen does not provide a definition of combat power in OOTW, nor does it offer a substitute concept. Two of the components of combat power, protection and leadership, translate readily to OOTW. Maneuver and firepower, however, may not apply to OOTW without stretching the current doctrinal definitions. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 provides an interesting insight not yet incorporated into Army doctrine. "Overwhelming, decisive power is not solely firepower. For example, in OOTW, it may be food delivered to starving civilians or a demonstration of joint military capability so decisive that an adversary modifies its behavior to meet friendly goals." This suggests that OOTW doctrine should further
explore this alternative to combat power. Determining a common view of what constitutes power in OOTW would alleviate much of the current confusion.

Additionally, FM 100-5 indicates that OOTW has tenets which it will later develop in the chapter. However, these tenets cannot be found. This causes a minor conflict with FM 100-23, Peace Operations. FM 100-23 is the only OOTW manual to assert that the tenets of Army operations—agility, initiative, depth, synchronization, and versatility—apply equally to peace operations.98 No other OOTW manual even addresses the subject. While this does not directly affect the concept of protection, a common basis might also lessen the confusion about force protection's role in OOTW.

Within the various OOTW manuals, none assigns force protection the same meaning. Additionally, none of them place force protection in the context of combat power. FM 100-20 (Draft) defines force protection as "actions taken to minimize the chance of damage" while FM 100-5 stresses the conservation of means.99 This lack of continuity appears in other OOTW manuals. Force protection definitions cited in FM 100-19 and FM 100-23 do not agree with the one given in FM 100-5, either.

Contrary to FM 100-5, current and emerging doctrine for OOTW finds force protection used as a separate term. All three of the manuals refer to force protection in the sense of a task to be performed. Added to the example of the 10th Mountain Division's use of force protection as a BOS, force protection may have utility as a stand-alone concept in OOTW.
Lessons from Beirut

The Marine experience confirms some of the existing OOTW doctrine. Additionally, the Marine's experience shows key relationships between doctrinal principles which Army manuals do not adequately address. Their operation validates legitimacy, restraint, and security as principles of OOTW. The commander's reliance on neutrality as a means of protection clearly implies that he saw value in this concept. Additionally, the Marines' relatively slight losses up until mid-March 1983 bolster this contention. When the factions' perceptions of the Marines shifted in 1983, so did the protective effects of neutrality. As it became clearer that the Marines sided with the Lebanese government, opponents became more willing to direct attacks against the Marines. Consequently, the Marines found themselves in the difficult position of attempting to maintain neutrality while exercising restraint.

Restraint does not contribute to protection in OOTW situations involving imminent or active hostilities. The contrasting losses of the two MAUs between the spring and the fall of 1983 indicates that aggressive reaction by commanders may preclude further attempts to attack friendly forces. Rules of engagement which restrict the ability of forces to protect themselves with available weapons only complicate the situation.

The Marine mission also demonstrates that rules of engagement directly affect protection. In wartime, when combatants are declared hostile, their mere appearance authorizes the use of force. In OOTW, the decision to use force does not follow such clear guidelines. As demonstrated by the USMNF, too restrictive ROE can lead to a hesitance to use force in cases where it is justified. Overall, ROE can either degrade or
enhance the protection of the force by affecting the perceptions of potentially hostile elements.

Lessons from Somalia

Army experience in Somalia also acknowledges the relationship of ROE to protection. Indeed, even the diplomats closely associated with Operation Restore Hope state that use of force can contribute to a force's protection. ROE must "calibrate the nature of the threat with the balance that must be struck between the often competing requirements of restraint and the security of the force." ROE directly determines the security posture of the force.

In addition to the inclusion of ROE in protection, the idea that protection may constitute a mission in OOTW emerges. If force protection becomes a stand-alone mission, as implied by Bolger and Allard from the Somalia experience, then doctrine has much work to do. Definitions offered in joint doctrine and some Army publications could lead to the creation of protection as a mission. By defining force protection as a "program" with a requirement that it be planned and integrated, doctrine has opened the way for an expanded definition of protection. This, combined with the continual emphasis on protection in AARs from Somalia, could lead to the definition of protection as a mission in OOTW.

Conclusion

What has become clear is that force protection, in current usage, has gone beyond that meaning which doctrine formally recognizes. Army doctrine does not fully explain the applicability and scope of protection in OOTW missions. Additional work is needed
to develop tenets of OOTW, the notion of power in OOTW, and the specific components of protection in an OOTW environment. At a minimum, doctrine should adopt a uniform definition of protection.

In defining protection, the Marine experience in Beirut during 1983 strongly suggests that emphasis on the non-military aspects of a mission to the exclusion of basic protective measures can lead to disaster. Too much reliance on neutrality during imminent or active hostilities risks failure of the military mission. While restraint has a place in OOTW, an overly reserved attitude adversely affects the security of a force. ROE, as the expression of the commander's desired level of restraint and security, directly affects the protection of the force.

Experience in Somalia affirms the relationship of ROE to protection, yet this has not been recognized in all doctrine. Future revisions of OOTW doctrine should emphasize this relationship. As doctrine and military thought have evolved, protection has assumed greater importance, and it may be that force protection in the future will become a standard tactical mission in OOTW. Finally, the willingness to use force contributes to the protection of the force, thus confirming that restraint, legitimacy, and security must achieve a balance to protect the force.

Looking to the future, the United States Army can expect to participate in humanitarian assistance and peace operations with increasing frequency. The pending deployment to Bosnia-Hercegovina as part of the Implementation Force is but one example. Commanders involved in these missions must focus on protecting their force while simultaneously accomplishing their objectives. The examples of Somalia and Beirut
demonstrate this is no simple task. To prepare commanders and Army units for these situations, the United States Army must develop doctrine which focuses on a common meaning for protection. This new doctrine must also fully explain the competing relationships between the various principles involved in executing these missions. Until then, commanders will have to rely on historical experience and good judgment to conserve their forces.
Endnotes


4 Department Of The Army, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, 1 August 1994), 2-10. This publication, oriented toward assessing the nature of future warfare, asserts that "most of the conflicts involving the U.S. Army will be OOTW or low-intensity conflicts, as few states will risk open war with the U.S."

5 Department Of The Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), pp. 2-0.

6 FM 100-5, 1993, p. 2-1.


9 FM 100-5, 1993, p. 2-10.

10 FM 100-5, 1993, pp. 2-10 - 2-12.

11 Department Of The Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations (Washington, D.C: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 31 May 1995), pp. 5-9 - 5-15. This manual defines operational protection as measures that conserve "the fighting potential of a force so that it can be applied at the decisive time and place." This remains consistent with the FM 100-5 definition of protection. The major departure from FM 100-5 is the integration of protection into the operational-level protection systems. FM 100-7 list eight major components of operational protection: providing operational air defense; conducting deception; protecting operational forces and means; employing operations security (OPSEC); providing security for forces and means; conducting rear operations, including combating terrorism; conducting risk assessments; and planning for possible response to or use of weapons of mass destruction.


14 TRADOC PAM 525-5, pp. 1-3 and 3-2.


16 No major revisions to the concept of combat power emerge in the 1986 publication of FM 100-5. This manual retains the four components of combat power as first described in the 1982 version. The addition of air defense and a discussion of protection at the operational level of war constitute the only minor changes. Protection continued to be defined as measures used to conserve forces.
Endnotes


18 FM 100-5, 1993, p. 2-5.

19 FM 100-5, 1993, pp. 2-10 - 2-11.


21 OPSEC and deception shield the friendly forces from detection. Reducing losses from disease makes more soldiers available for duty, while the emphasis on safety reduces unnecessary losses from accidents. Finally, fratricide kills soldiers needlessly while also adversely affecting morale.

22 Editions of FM 100-5 from 1962 onward discussed stability operations, low intensity conflict, and cold war operations. None of the manuals delineate the full spectrum of OOTW missions in the depth that the 1993 version uses.

23 FM 100-5, 1993, p. 13-0.

24 Department Of The Army, Field Manual 100-20 (Draft) Operations Other Than War (Washington, D.C: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 15 May 1995), pp. 1-8 - 1-14. This manual expands upon the principles of OOTW contained in Chapter 13, FM 100-5, Operations. The draft manual lists primacy of the political effort, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, patience and perseverance, restraint, and security as the principles. This represents a maturing of OOTW doctrine with the addition of primacy of the political effort, adaptability, and patience. FM 100-20 deletes the principle of objective.

In the preface, FM 100-20 that it is "conceptual, aiming more at broad understanding than at details of operations." p. iv.


26 FM 100-20, Glossary-6.

27 FM 100-20, p. 3-4.

28 FM 100-20, p. 5-25.

29 FM 100-20, p. 4-7.

30 Department Of The Army, Field Manual 100-19, Domestic Support Operations (Washington, D.C: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1 July 1993), p. 4-17. In the context of safety, the manual adds, "He [the commander] accomplishes this through the systematic use of risk management techniques and the total integration of safety throughout all aspects of the operation." This manual, like FM 100-23, defines force protection as a comprehensive security program.

Of all of the OOTW situations, use of military forces in support of domestic assistance would prove most difficult for the commander. "In domestic operations, the use of force is restricted by US law.... Constraints on weapons, tactics, and degree of violence are characteristics of OOTW. There are times when the mere presence of offensive weaponry will derail the operation." (FM 100-20, p. 3-4) FM 100-19 leaves a military commander engaged in domestic assistance wanting for guidance. Questions as to proper measures for physical security, acceptable levels of base defense, and means to integrate with domestic law enforcement go unanswered. For instance, serious perception problems could be generated if a unit were to employ sandbags and concertina wire on its perimeter. A commander's common sense and sensitivity to local conditions might preclude such drastic measures, but it might not. Doctrine provides no procedures for protecting an Army force in the midst of its citizens.
Endnotes


32 FM 100-23, 36-37.

33 FM 100-23, 16.

34 FM 100-23, 17. Other principles of OOTW appear to have some bearing on this concept. If a force is perceived to be legitimate by the other actors, it may increase the security of the force. Likewise, impartiality, respect, and credibility can make the force more secure.


37 FM 100-23, 106; FM 100-19, Glossary-6; FM 100-20, Glossary-6.

38 FM 100-5, p. 2-9.

39 TRADOC PAM 525-5, p. 3-3.

40 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C: Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 July 1993), 151-152.


42 Joint Publication 3-0, p. V-2.


46 DOD Commission, 92. The MAU commander, a colonel, was overall responsible for the Marine operations in Beirut. The BLT commander, a lieutenant colonel, was the ground component commander of the MAU force. Both were based at the Beirut International Airport.

47 DOD Commission, 7-10.


50 Two other events contributed to the decision to return the Marines. Public outcry following the massacres at the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps coupled with Israel's occupation of West Beirut led to the reintroduction of the Marine force. See Thomas L. Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem* (New York: Bantam, Doubleday, Dell, Anchor Books, 1989), 191.
"The USMNF would not be engaged in combat. Peacetime rules of engagement would apply (i.e. use of force is authorized only in self-defense or in defense of collocated LAF elements operating with the USMNF). USCINCEUR would be prepared to extract U.S. forces in Lebanon if required by hostile action."

Friedman, 197. Friedman quotes a Navy corpsman as saying, "When we first arrived in Beirut, it was just great. People were always stopping you and giving you things. We really felt appreciated. The people saw us as their protectors from the Israelis."

Bolger, 171, 176, 188. It would be helpful to distinguish between mission creep and situational deterioration. Mission creep occurs when the military force assumes additional responsibilities outside the initial tasking. Mission analysis may not deduce the tasks to be accomplished to fulfill the objectives. The military may have to apply additional forces or capabilities. In this instance, the military is drawn in to further commitment. The latter case, situational deterioration, happens when the environment changes. Contrasted with mission creep, the circumstances swallow up the force placed in the midst of a deteriorating situation. Beirut fell into the second category.

DOD Commission, 39.


DOD Commission, 2. Members of the commission included Admiral (ret.) Robert L.J. Long, Chairman; Honorable Robert J. Murray; Lieutenant General Joseph T. Palastra, Jr., U.S. Army; Lieutenant General (ret.) Lawrence F. Snowden, USMC; and Lieutenant General (ret.) Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., USAF.

DOD Commission, 36.

DOD Commission, 37.

FM 100-23, 4.

DOD Commission, 36.

DOD Commission, 55.

DOD Commission, 42.

Bolger, 184.

DOD Commission, 47.

Bolger, 179. The DOD report also cites evidence as well. "The Commission recognizes that there was abundant evidence that Syrian, Druze, and some Shiite leaders had come to consider the USMNF as a partisan participant well before Suq-Al-Gharb. CINCUSNAVEUR advised the Commission that 'by mid-to-late August 1983, Druze, Shia, and Syrian leaders had begun Making statements to the effect that the Multinational Forces, especially the U.S. element, was one of 'the enemy.' On 25 August PSP leader Walid Jumblatt claimed that 'the Marines have bluntly and directly threatened us. This is proof of the U.S. alliance with the Phalange Party.'", 60.

Bolger, 180.

Bolger, 182-184.
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger indicated that physical barriers were indeed permissible.

Alert Condition II was the security posture of the Marines at the time of the attack. Overall, the Marine force had established four levels of security: I-IV. Alert Condition II was the second highest level of readiness.

The Commission also cites key weapons employment as a factor affecting security. Since this relates more to firepower, it will not be examined in detail here.

Actions taken to improve security procedures include closing two lanes of the main airport road which runs adjacent to the MAU area, thereby creating a buffer zone; restricting vehicular access in the MAU perimeter to U.S. vehicles only; blocking all but essential entrances to the area; excluding non-essential civilians; relocating LAF personnel outside of the perimeter; and employing spot U.S. roadblocks and vehicle searches on the main airport road.

Marines on the Embassy security detail used ROE from the "Blue Card." This expanded ROE was developed following the April 18, 1983 U.S. Embassy bombing. The majority of the force, including the USMNF stationed at BIA, used the "White Card" ROE.

Promulgation of different ROE for those performing Embassy security duties contributed to a sense among the officers and men at BIA that the terrorist threat confronting them was somehow less dangerous than that which prevailed at the Embassy."

Other sources illustrate the confusion that existed among the Marines about implementing the ROE. When Marines first came under heavy fire in August 1983, a platoon leader waited before calling his company for permission to fire back. Even the strictest ROE does not preclude the right to self defense. Yet a young Marine officer endured ten minutes of machine gun, rocket propelled grenade, recoilless rifle and automatic rifle fire before requesting permission to return fire. That such confusion could exist can partly be attributed to the shock of realizing one is under fire for the first time, but hesitation for such a long period indicates that Marines were not prepared to act decisively in the ambiguous situation in Beirut. Even after attacks against the Marines intensified in September 1983, platoon leaders continued to request permission to return fire. Bolger, p. 190. In one incident, Marines receiving machine-gun fire from a building called the company headquarters for permission to return fire. The platoon leader was granted authorization, but he was also "cautioned to remain within the rules of engagement." Eric Hammel, The Root (San Diego, CA: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Publishers, 1985), 195-210.


U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, Somalia Operations Other Than War Newsletter 93-1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center,
January 1993), 2. Eighty five percent are of Hamitic origin while fourteen percent are from the Bantu background. Hereafter referred to as CALL, Somalia.

80 Hirsch, 13-14.
82 Hirsch, 41-44, 49-54.
84 Hirsch, 112. Bolger (p. 297) cites a figure of 1,200 fighters.
85 USARFOR, Somalia AAR, 3. See also Major Michael Winstead's extensive discussion in the School of Advanced Military Studies monograph "Force Protection as a Battlefield Operating System" (M.M.A.S. Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, 1995).
86 USARFOR, Somalia AAR, 80-84.
87 USARFOR, Somalia AAR, 80. At the soldier's level, rules of engagement evolved into the four "Nos:" No technicals (armed vehicles), no banditry, no roadblocks, and no visible weapons. Allard, 36.
88 Allard, 37-38.
89 UNOSOM II Lessons, p. I-8-6.
90 UNOSOM II Lessons, p. I-8-6.
91 Allard, 37. Allard also notes the more aggressive response of U.S. forces following relaxation of the ROE. Allard says this relaxed ROE led directly to more U.S. involvement in combat operations.
92 Hirsch, 162.
93 Allard, 37.
94 Allard, 63.
95 Bolger, 296.
96 CALL 93-1, 20.
97 TRADOC PAM 525-5, p. 3-3.
98 FM 100-23, 18.
100 Allard, 37-38.
101 Joint Pub 1-02 DOD Dictionary, 151.
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