IRREGULAR WARFARE
IN A NUTSHELL
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23 Oct 62
SUBJECT: "Irregular Warfare in a Nutshell" by Holliday and Dabezies

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TO: Commandant

1961 Regular Course U. S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1. A document prepared during the 1961-62 Regular Course in collaboration with an Allied student is submitted.

2. A desire to assist in improvement of the unconventional warfare instruction prompted this effort. The shift in viewpoint evidenced by the lecture at the end of the course, however, indicates action to correct many of the weaknesses noted during this course has already been taken.

3. It is requested this document be placed in the Library, after use by the faculty, where it will be available to both Allied and U. S. students. It is hoped this might encourage future students to make similar combined efforts. The personal contact from such work could be among the most significant profits from Allied students attending the College.

4. Any comments or suggestions on this document would be appreciated.

SAM C. HOLLIDAY
Lt Col, Infantry
Student
Dear Colonel Holliday:

The extremely well presented treatise, "Irregular Warfare in a Nut Shell", has just reached my desk, and a hasty review indicates that it is a document which will be of value to the College. I am having the document reviewed immediately to ascertain where in the College and elsewhere it can be used and to what extent we may desire to reproduce it.

I compliment you and Major Dabezies for undertaking this extensive effort. Your treatise, I am sure, will help in our efforts to develop better understanding of the challenge confronting both political and military leaders in combating irregular warfare.

Sincerely,

HAROLD K. JOHNSON
Major General, USA
Commandant

Lieutenant Colonel Sam C. Holliday
Nuclear Weapons Employment Course
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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
IRREGULAR WARFARE
IN A NUTSHELL

by

Sam C. Holliday and Pierre C. Dabezies
Lt Col., U.S. Army and Major, French Army

Fort Leavenworth
Kansas
1962
This is a critical, yet brief, analysis of combat in the current environment. It is not a study of "war" in its well known mold, rather it is a study of combat as it is being fought.

It has been prepared by two professional soldiers of different nations. It does not relate specifically to the problems of any country, but it aims to provide a few guideposts that any professional soldier of the Free World could use in his search for a solution to his specific problems.

While recent historical examples have been used to illustrate; none are covered completely - for that there are many detailed accounts available. Bringing the whole together in an understandable arrangement was the aim of this study.

13 June 1962
Fort Leavenworth
Some attach great significance to the difference between communist and Communist. These words are used in this study as:

(1) communist - anyone, party member or not, who favors or supports a system of social organization based on the ideology developed by Marx and Lenin and currently advanced by Khrushchev, Mao Tse-tung and Castro.

(2) Communist - a member of a Communist Party or one of its aliases.

The word communist is not used in this study in its original sense: a person of a commune (where all property belongs to the group) such as those which have occurred throughout history among religious sects.

Currently the accepted usage would include both (1) and (2) above as a Communist and leave communist to its original meaning. This is an accurate and realistic usage for actual party membership is difficult to determine and often unimportant. For those who prefer this usage, each time communist appears it should mentally be changed to Communist. The usage in this study, however, is in keeping with the accepted usage of fascist: anyone who favors or supports a governmental system similar to those practiced by Mussolini, Hitler, or Trujillo. A Fascist was a member of Mussolini's party of that name.

The use of communist in this study does not, however, have the meaning a few currently give it: anyone favoring any form of socialism varying from Marxian Socialism to that found at the present time in much of Western Europe.
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SERVICE OF AUTHORS
CHAPTER I

RELATIVITY OF COMBAT

"The tremendous effects of the French Revolution abroad (Napoleon's victories) . . . are chiefly to be attributed to the erroneous policy of the opposing governments." -- Clausewitz

Hannibal's tactics at Cannae seemed as unconventional to Varro as Bonaparte's seemed to many of his rivals. The passage of columns of armor through the Ardennes in 1940 was illogical in the eyes of most generals - master specialists in military science. The French Army of Indo-China, after eight years of waiting for a conventional engagement to show its superiority, lost it at Dien Bien Phu to experts in irregular warfare. In each case the intellectually pretentious, the conformist, lost; the bold, the imaginative, won.

Does "war" have a place for irregular activities? Is everything which is new irregular? Must all which is not yet doctrine for orthodox warfare, which has not yet been mastered by the military technician, which goes against "lessons of the last war," and which disturbs the minds of men full of habits, titles, and prejudices, be excluded from "war"? Such a restrictive mind caused a famous statesman of the last century to ridicule the future of trains, caused generals of 50 years ago to question the future of aircraft, and, much more recently, caused so many to hold guerrilla actions beneath the dignity of the professional soldier. Orthodox warfare as planned today, particularly nuclear, is as far from the campaigns of Frederick as is the combat presently waged by Ho Chi Minh. Both the evolution of weapons and the evolution of society cause combat to constantly change. To determine how, why, and to what degree combat has changed should be one of the main tasks of the professional soldier.
Scope of Irregular Warfare. To sever orthodox and irregular warfare is artificial and at best a convenience used to classify relative conditions of a specific time. Conflict is actually a spectrum which extends from diplomatic action (no use of force) to orthodox warfare (use of conventional military units in "war"). Between these two extremes lies irregular warfare. While this spectrum cannot actually be separated into parts, in an analysis such as this, words must be assigned to portions of the spectrum as a means of communication.

Without doubt, orthodox warfare has dominated combat during the past century, making us forget, or slight, the other forms. Yet irregular warfare has been common in the past. Although names may have changed, psychological, economic, and guerrilla actions, as well as espionage and subversion, have been the tools of combat throughout history. It is true that irregular warfare has very often been the weapon of the weak, but it has also been the weapon of the clever and the revolutionary.

Our World. The conditions of the past 15 years could hardly have been more to the advantage of the weak, the clever, and the revolutionary. Hatred for "fascist military dictatorships" has continued after any such regime which seriously endangered other states has been destroyed, thus the communist has an imaginary evil against which to organize support.
World-wide antagonists have emerged, each with the capability of globally delivering nuclear weapons to deter orthodox warfare and to cause condemnation of "war," thus providing the opportunity for the clever to conduct irregular warfare. Social and political development within Afro-Asia and Latin America have caused an increase in national consciousness and, in turn, the desire for equality with the world powers. The relative strength of the European powers and their colonies has changed, providing the weak the opportunity to revolt.

"The way to Paris passes through Calcutta and Cairo," said Lenin. This is indeed possible today. For the unrest throughout Afro-Asia and Latin America, even if justifiable and legitimate, is not only a means for the weak to throw off their former masters, foreign or indigenous; it also offers the revolutionary opportunities to conduct irregular warfare. The phrase "continuation of polity by other means" has added meaning as the clever engage in combat under the protection offered by the nuclear stand-off.

Within military circles of the Free World this revival of irregular warfare has caused much confusion. The mingling of terrorism, subversion, espionage, guerrilla actions, and propaganda is obviously a change from the pre-nuclear form of combat. Is the change only a new version of the countless insurrections of the past? Or, with the techniques of the modern revolutionary, is there a shift not only in degree but also in nature? Where do the legitimate desires for independence end, and where do the communists' conspiracies begin? And finally, how can you motivate individuals into dedicated warriors on the side of rule by law rather than force, freedom, and representative democracy when you are willing to use only a few of the means available?
The Three Approaches. Some cling to orthodox warfare. They consider all irregular activities the by-product of disorder, not strength. They believe that conventional military organizations, weapons, and soldiers are able to destroy any irregular force without difficulty. They consider irregular activity proper for the bandit, the inexperienced lieutenant, the clandestine agent, the non-fighting propagandist and "politician," but hold it in contempt and consider it beneath their dignity. Hitler, when he was still a revolutionist, probably had this type of person in mind when he told some intimates: "War is not a formal science surrounded by solemn ceremony which some military men would relegate to the status of a middle ages tournament. I don't need this chivalry!"  

Others do exactly the opposite. To them there is no revolt which is not the result of orders directly from Moscow. No insurgent who is not a communist. No liberal who is not an enemy agent. No guerrilla who has not memorized all of the works of Mao Tse-tung. To them we can defeat the communists only if we are all knaves who systematically adopt the enemy's methods. Perhaps they use this threat as a convenient alibi to impose some totalitarian regime; if not, they are indeed naive, for they are among the first victims of the struggle, since to confuse ideas and feelings is one of the initial aims of the communists. They are ready to dive into the water to avoid the rain; to strangle representative government to save freedom; to provoke civil war in their country in order to save it. Such is the Secret Army Organization, or OAS (Organization Armée Secrete), in Algeria.  

Finally, there are those who avoid skepticism, avoid oversimplification and try to understand. While things may seem the same, they are never exactly the same. In the present struggle, which has been raging for
more than 15 years, similarities can be seen in many of the campaigns; however, there are differences. While all were the result of universal political, social, economic, and religious forces, they were bolstered by conditions peculiar to the locale of the campaign. Each must be analyzed in detail, even if this analysis should go against some attractive theory. Each campaign has its own individual nature.

Those following this third approach recognize that combat is both an art and a science, but they also know that in matters of command, tactics, and strategy it is far more art than science. To reduce success in combat to measurable factors which can be applied with scientific certainty to any situation has been a goal as long as there have been brilliant staff officers. With increased mechanization, logistical requirements which can be reduced to statistics, and the development of electronic computers, there has been a renewed effort in this direction. Any such current effort will likely end as its predecessors: in defeat. All such efforts are based on the erroneous assumption that combat is a science. It is useful to classify, to file various techniques; it is vain and dangerous to give absolute values to such differences. The factors which comprise irregular warfare must be considered and applied with both professional judgment and ingenuity; not with mathematical precision.

Little effort has been devoted to the study of irregular warfare in the terms of this third approach. Traditional military theory is of little help since it is for that phase of conflict considered, at the time, to be orthodox warfare. Neither is political science for it abandons "war" to the military and considers only the civilian field - "peace." This struggle is neither "war" nor "peace," but both. The development of the third approach in order to contribute to any campaign of irregular warfare seems to be a problem worthy of serious thought.
Goals. In the vastness of this problem it is easy to become lost if attainable goals are not set. Thus, within the limitations of a study as modest as this, it will only be possible to cast some light on the theoretical and practical aspects of irregular warfare in order to see if some threads of unity do not pass through the many inconsistencies and contradictions. The first step in this attempt will be the separation of the subject into its parts. Then, these parts will be combined in different ways to produce different results. Next, this critical analysis can be given depth by placing the subject in its historical perspective. Finally, the means for its application will be developed. While no formula for certain success, no panacea, will be offered, it is hoped a few guide-posts can be erected which point the way for those trying to understand irregular warfare so as to turn defeats into victories.
"In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not profitable." -- Sun Tzu Wu

From oversimplification was born the darkness which surrounds much of the current thought in the Free World regarding irregular warfare. For example, all recent revolts are no more "revolutionary wars" as depicted by Lenin, than all rebels are communist agents. Even if they use methods perfected by Mao Tse-tung, even if the rebel leaders believe in socialistic philosophy, and even if the communist empire benefits indirectly, it would be giving undeserved credit to the communists to claim all of those supporting such insurrections were "revolutionary." To say that they are may be a convenient alibi, or may be useful propaganda with which to wake up public opinion and discredit an enemy. To convince one's self that it is true is, however, dangerous; this would be a refusal to analyze the facts and squander of a trump card which might be needed at a later stage of the conflict.

The Nature of Irregular Warfare. To reduce irregular warfare to a few isolated methods, e.g., propaganda, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare would be oversimplification. These all play a vital role. They might allow a handful of rebels to spread their influence in time over a whole country; however, all such specific methods depend on the environment in which they are used. At another time, another place, the same methods might produce meager results, or they might start a forest fire of popular supports which would race across the country with unquenchable speed and intensity.

Each irregular campaign must be analyzed and treated in its aggregate. Only after the analysis of the whole can the correct course be
determined. At times such an analysis might even make a withdrawal from that specific area desirable for the sake of strategy, e.g., Cyprus, Israel and Algeria.

In each campaign the immediate reaction is to treat the symptoms; this is to be avoided. The body must be examined to learn why and how the disease got its foothold. The nature of the disease is to be studied. Is the body subject to continual reinfection? How can the cause of the disease be destroyed? How can the body be strengthened until it has immunity to the disease?

It is also dangerous to view irregular warfare from only one side. As in all combat, there are both offensive and defensive operations. True understanding comes from the ability to see both sides as a whole. As in orthodox warfare, there are mobile, dynamic tactics for the defense, as well as static tactics, in irregular warfare. While the more active tactics are to be valued over the static, they cannot be considered offensive operations any more than a counterattack to restore the Forward Edge of the Battle Area can be so considered in orthodox warfare. Throughout the Free World there is a tendency to view irregular warfare from only one side—the defensive. In so doing, rather than considering irregular warfare, only counterinsurgency is considered.

All parts of irregular warfare which might be proposed are, more or less, common to the conventional soldier; however, some have different names or appear in a different form in irregular warfare than in orthodox warfare. Starting with those which play a similar role in all types of combat and ending with those which are clearly either more important in irregular warfare or are used in a different manner, the parts can be listed as:

- Area.
- Population.
Leadership.
Intelligence.
Dissatisfaction.
Belief.
Organization.
External support.
Combat skills.
Guerrilla tactics.
Terrorism.

It is from the combination of these parts, the sequence of their employment, and the degree of their use that each campaign gets its own character, its own strengths and weaknesses. It is, also, from an understanding of these parts that an effective defense against irregular attacks can be developed and an irregular offensive can be formulated. While it would require voluminous documentation to cover each part, and their combinations, the following offers an introduction.

Area. The obviously essential aid to guerrillas is terrain which provides concealment and restricts the mechanized mobility of the authorities. This stems from the fact that guerrillas are relatively weak, by conventional measurements of military strength, and must rely heavily on deception and surprise for their success. Terrain is not so important to the other rebels since they are oriented on the people and the sources of power; any area which meets the needs of the underground is satisfactory.

The nature of the area might have a direct bearing on the character of the irregular action, e.g., where space is lacking guerrilla action could be prevented and terrorism assume a dominant role. As a general rule for guerrilla warfare the available/must be large enough, and of a nature, to
allow the guerrillas to exploit surprise through their phantom-like quality gained from lightness of weapons, flexibility, freedom from conventional supply lines, and familiarity with the area.

Mountains, jungle, and swamps are considered the proper haunts for guerrillas. In general, this is true, but they are not limited to such areas and some such areas may not be suitable. In south Algeria where the terrain is a flat desert, the rebels had no success, but they had only slightly better success in the mountains in the north. Here the lack of vegetation resulted in only slightly better protection than that offered in the south. In both areas the encirclement of a guerrilla band was relatively easy, and helicopters could be used effectively in a tactical role. Forested mountains, jungles, and swamps are more to the liking of guerrillas. The conventional soldier who dreams of a few battalions encircling a band of guerrillas located in an area with heavy vegetation finds his dreams shattered by the score as the enemy disappears from his trap.

Less obvious is the concealment offered by areas of dense population such as large cities and rice paddy deltas. Here the people and the terrain intermingle to provide the needed concealment. Here the guerrilla and the underground join. Here all forms of irregular warfare can be employed. For years - as now with the OAS - an underground of thousands found shelter within the city of Alger. During 1952 several Viet Cong divisions continually operated in the rice paddies of the Red River delta - an area with a human density rarely exceeded anywhere in the world. With the population to provide concealment during daylight, the guerrillas were able to come forth at night to fight.

Thus the area used by guerrillas must provide protection through concealment in order to nullify the mechanized mobility of their enemy, but
these conditions can be found in a variety of terrain, and the area needed for other forms of irregular warfare can be conducted wherever there are people.

**Population.** While the size of the reservoir from which recruits are drawn is one of the classic means of judging the orthodox military strength of a nation, it is often not considered too important in irregular warfare. This is because many examples of a few highly motivated individuals offsetting large numbers can be cited. A coup d'état requires only a few persons. Sustained guerrilla operations, on the other hand, require the support of a large underground. If the movement is unable to attract, and maintain contact with, the necessary volume of support, it must confine its activities to forms of coup d'état. Population is, of course, closely related to dissatisfaction, belief, and internal organization. A heavily populated area provides the rebels the opportunity for capitalizing on "mob response" to produce more recruits. Also, in an area where the people share a common ethnic background the raising of recruits is easier.

In Malaya the communist movement was restricted to the Chinese minority; from this limited base they were unsuccessful despite excellent terrain for guerrilla warfare and an advanced organization.

The counterinsurgency technique of collecting the people from isolated hamlets and concentrating them in fortress villages, and then establishing "off limit" zones, is to deprive the guerrillas support through physical isolation.

Without the population base on which to operate, rough terrain begins to work against guerrillas. This was one of the reasons the communists failed in Greece. They allowed themselves to be forced into mountainous areas in the center of the country where they were denied a population base.
and direct access to external support. Since all materiel had to be brought in by mule convey, they found an ever-increasing need to centralize their supply operations; this in turn resulted in larger and larger units and a corresponding increase in their vulnerability to attack by the Greek Army.

Leadership. The importance of good leadership is not limited to irregular warfare. Likewise, it is not necessary for the likes of Tito, Magsaysay, Mao Tse-tung, Papagos, or Khrushchev to wait for irregular warfare to show their ability. There are others, however, who make poor leaders in this type of combat even though proven commanders in orthodox warfare. Also, there are political leaders of unquestionable ability whose methods, rigidity, background, or associates deny them sincere popular support. Such may be listed as a contributor to the fall of Chiang Kai-shek or Batista.

The absence of effective leadership can be given as one of the reasons for the failure of the rebels of the Cameroons in 1961 and of Madagascar in 1947. With the death of its only two effective leaders, Um Niobe and Felix Moumi, resistance in the Cameroons ceased after several years of fighting. In Madagascar the educated originators found themselves isolated from their primitive followers when sorcerers took over the movement through fanaticism.

On the other hand, the role played by Mao Tse-tung and his team and the triad of Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Pham Van Dong in their successes is beyond measure. The latter were, for years, able to be the symbols of independence for their country through personal austerity and authentic Viet Nam nationalism. Then they were able to receive massive Chinese help without weakening the power derived from this nationalism, despite the fact that one of its main appeals had traditionally been opposition
to the Chinese. Mao Tse-tung's determination and skill, which provided hope and finally victory after years of hardship and setbacks, are now almost legendary.

**Intelligence.** The requirement for excellent intelligence is important to both the rebels and the counterinsurgents. Victory will always favor the side with the best intelligence.

The primary support the rebels obtain from the people is not food, or weapons, but information which allows them to use their main weapon: surprise. In a like manner, the whole defense of the authorities is founded on attempts to deny the rebels such information and to gain information which will allow them to counter the rebels. The authorities are not only interested in the size, location, and activities of the guerrillas but also in the composition, disposition, and activities of the underground.

**Dissatisfaction.** Without this essential ingredient a revolt cannot start. Since it is difficult for anyone involved in irregular warfare to be truly objective, the dissatisfactions which the insurgents use for motivation are often rationalized by the authorities into unimportance. Yet until there is at least a grain of dissatisfaction there can be nothing for propaganda to intensify; until there is dissatisfaction there can be no desire for change; and until there is a desire for change there can be no revolt. It is true that modern "diffusion" techniques and terrorism can bring to reality long dormant dissatisfactions, particularly in undeveloped countries, but to give them full credit for motivating the movement is oversimplification.

No matter how passive a people may seem there are always unexpressed grievances among the poor and dependent which await the exploiter, just as they await the true liberator. The force from these feelings can be
directed by well handled propaganda of insurgents to subjugate in the guise of liberation, and to provide hardship and scarcity in the name of improvement and plenty. The capable rebel leaders know how to rekindle ethnic, religious or social ties, forgotten pride, and legends of grandeur. Where in 1954 Algerian nationalism was only a gentle breeze, and the hope was only for complete equality and integration with the French, by 1960 it had grown into a sandstorm which dominated all actions and prevented movement in any direction. It is self-evident that in affluent nations there is less dissatisfaction and, therefore, less opportunity for irregular warfare.

To admit responsibility for conditions which cause the dissatisfaction is too bitter a pill for most authorities. Rather than acknowledge their errors they rationalize, they present scapegoats, they accuse the leaders of the movement as if they were spontaneous creations. Since, however, these leaders always symbolize, more or less, the dissatisfactions of the people, it is dangerous to belittle their efforts.

Napoleon as a result of his experience had good reason to observe that you cannot conquer a nation in revolt through propaganda. In reverse, propaganda alone will not produce a nation in revolt. The people must feel the movement's objective is in their best interests. "Our job is not merely to recite our political program to the people," said Mao Tse-tung, "for nobody would care to listen; but we must make the developments in the war part of the lives of the soldiers and the people . . . . This is a matter of first magnitude on which victory primarily depends."10

The dissatisfaction exploited by the rebel leader is often less important to the motivation of the people than the political and psychological errors made by his adversary. There are always only a few dedicated, hard-core communists in any campaign. Yet, what success are they able
to obtain! The fault is, all too often, that of the authorities who cannot, or will not, rally the people. In this manner they contribute to the alliance of the people with the rebels. Political skill and, if need be, willing reform are the true curb of dissatisfaction.

This is a key point: There is no possibility of final victory over an insurrection until the established authorities gain approval of the people; it can be checked and kept from view by effective police action, but it cannot be so eliminated. How this approval is gained and whether it is deserved are irrelevant. That it exists is the key. One need only recall the popularity of Magsaysay, his impatience with the corrupt and the inefficient, and his unconventional attitude, to find a worthy model for those of the Free World who aim to deny their communist opponents further advances.

**Belief.** Although a belief has been associated with every successful irregular campaign, its importance has often been overlooked. Since most of the members of such movements have had only superficial understanding of the belief with which they were identified, attention has often centered on the dissatisfaction rather than the belief which claims to have a solution for that dissatisfaction. Nothing could be more in error. It is the belief which gives the movement cohesion, staying power, leaders and direct external support. Although only a few of the leaders might have any deep understanding of the belief, it is from them that unity and dedication are derived.

Also, a defense against irregular operations can be built around a belief. The allegiance that people feel for their own, and their loyalty to their institutions, is the most accurate indicator of a people's ability to resist subversion.

The belief can be religion, a political philosophy, an ethnic allegiance or patriotism. Most often it is a combination of several of these.
For offensive irregular operations the belief must be revolutionary in nature. The belief can capitalize on dissatisfaction among the people only if it offers a change - a hope for improved conditions. "War cannot for a single moment be separated from politics. Any tendency . . . to isolate war from politics, and to become advocate of 'war is everything,' is erroneous and must be corrected." This is the way Mao Tse-tung expressed the importance of belief to success in irregular warfare.

Although currently some of those in the Free World claim nationalism and patriotism are harmful and outdated, any objective analysis cannot help but conclude that these are essential for a strong defense against an international conspiracy. Although it is not the purpose of this study to determine if nationalism and patriotism are to be condemned or exalted, their effect on irregular warfare is pertinent. It is obvious that those individuals with strong ties to their group and the institutions of that group can withstand any attempt, internal or external, to gain control of that group or to change its institutions. This holds true whether the group is a family, clan, tribe, small or large nation. Since modern history has been primarily concerned with the nation-state, these ties - or beliefs - are often called nationalism and patriotism.

It is impossible to know the motivation of those who strive to weaken nationalism and patriotism. The communist and fascist conspirators quite naturally want to weaken them within any country they have as a target since it will facilitate their conquest. They are keenly aware of the power of such beliefs, however, for as soon as they are in control they spare no effort to intensify them to serve their aims. In China prior to 1949 the efforts to destroy loyalty to the government of Chiang Kai-shek and to have the people "rise above petty, national allegiances" followed by a complete reversal after
the Communists take over to "no sacrifice being too great to lift China to its proper place in the world," give vivid examples of the manipulation of nationalism and patriotism to gain control.

The idealists reasons for wanting to weaken nationalism and patriotism are not quite so clear. In most cases their reason stem from knowledge of past conflicts in which nationalism and patriotism were used as motivating forces. This leads them to the conclusion any such beliefs are evils that must be suppressed. But such beliefs are actually, in themselves, neither good nor evil; they can only contribute to some purpose. That purpose may be good or evil. While it is easy to remember the harm these beliefs have been party to, it is often forgotten that they made possible all that we call civilization. They held individuals together, converted families into tribes, tribes into states, and states into nations. With their conclusion that nationalism and patriotism are evils, the idealists often see a single federation of the world as the only solution; then their zeal to reach this goal causes a systematic effort to destroy anything which might hinder the rapid attainment of that goal. While history shows a continuous increase in the size of groups sharing ties, it also records the fact most combat - and certainly the bloodiest - was caused by attempts to organize people into groups larger than that provided by common interests.

While nationalism and patriotism have been in the front of the battle against communist conspiracy, nationalism has also been allied with communism where the authorities were not indigenous. With the liquidation of colonial empires throughout the Free World this paradox should vanish. Now communism must ally itself with cleavages within the society of a country. Thus, it can be expected that renewed efforts will be made against nationalism and patriotism as a means of weakening a country's ability to react to subversion.
In China, communism and nationalism were used to develop guerrilla warfare against the Japanese. In Viet Nam they were used against the French. In Malaya, communism was combined with Chinese ethnic allegiances. In Greece, Philippines, Cuba, and throughout Latin America communism supported the revolts although efforts were made to hide its part. In Israel, Cyprus, Algeria, Kenya, Madagascar, and the Cameroons it was a combination of ethnic or tribal allegiances which supported the movements.

Organization. The value of a disciplined and efficient organization is less known and less evident than some of the other parts, yet it is no less important. The organization is the hinge between the active element (guerrillas, terrorists, saboteurs, those to conduct a coup d'etat) and the people. It is even the best means to judge the degree to which the movement has evolved. At one end is the spontaneous revolt with no organization. At the other is the "revolutionary war" with an organization which includes both internal and external components. Within the area of operations a net joins individuals from all social levels and all occupations; in turn this internal structure is joined to the external component of the organization. To communists this organization is the party.

Widespread dissatisfaction will greatly facilitate the establishment of an organization formed around a dynamic ideology which offers to correct that dissatisfaction. It, also, works the other way; an organization can foster dissatisfaction and contribute greatly to a cleavage between the authorities and the people.

As a general rule propaganda has less effect in a state in which the government is responsive to the desires of the people than it does in a state with authoritarian government. The latter is, however, better able to
prevent the dissemination of unfavorable propaganda through more strenuous police methods. In a state where anti-government propaganda is supported by a strong underground organization, and multiplied by many "front" organizations which spread a net throughout the people, propaganda can become a formidable tool against the authorities. This has been demonstrated by many recent and current examples throughout the Free World.

The internal component of the organization obtains its cohesion from a mixture of coercion, discipline, dedication, and traditional ties. No one is immune from the latticework established by location in one direction and by social position or occupation in the other. The parallel portions of the organization, based on social position or occupation, will exist within the military, the youth, the police, the workers, the government officials, the farmers, and the professionals. All key positions will be held by the dedicated followers of the belief which guides the movement. Cut-outs are established between all units of the organization to prevent compromise of more than a small portion at any one time.
SCHEMATIC OF AN IRREGULAR ORGANIZATION

EXTERNAL COMPONENT

- Host Nation Military Forces
- Exile Military Units
- Guerrilla Support Organization
- Propaganda & Intelligence Organizations

INTERNAL COMPONENT

- Province or State Chief
- Region Chief
- Local Chief
- Elite Guerrilla Units (for use in any region)
- Regional Guerrilla Units
- Local Guerrillas (May also be members of underground cells)
- Propaganda & Intelligence Cells

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY

- Host Nation Agents
- Youth Support Centers
- Farmer Support Centers
- Exile Chief of State
- Exile Government
- Exile Chief
- Exile Chief of State
- Exile Chief of State
- Exile Chief of State

Etc. parallel structure for workers, military, clergy, elders and other social or occupational groups.

Cutout (Security measures which permit communication but prevent physical association)

- Command
- Coordination and/or supply
When established in one location the web of the internal component of the organization will spread little by little into a new area under the cover of traditional ties and common understanding which exist within each of the categories. Progressively new clandestine committees are created, they grow in number, they eliminate the recalcitrant, and they prepare and fertilize minds. If danger becomes too great, they "disappear." Their aim is to gain control of a complete area so that in the end even the illusion of power is taken from the authorities.

Even if individuals might choose to fight the rebels they are caught by their families, their friends, their knowledge of local ties, their religion, or their race. For this reason it is foolish to think that it is easy to separate people from the active element of the movement. The problem is not so much one of physical separation, based on the terrain, but a social, economic, and political problem. Only through accurate sociological analysis of the area and deep knowledge of the community, will the way be found to effectively separate the people from the movement, and the underground from the guerrillas.

While the internal component is rarely perfect and might be locally dislocated, it can also rejuvenate. With an underground to provide the support needed, the active element of the internal component is able to continue its task. Without the organization the guerrilla bands would be very vulnerable even if they enjoyed spontaneous support from the people. Thanks to the organization the people furnish supplies, money, information and recruits. From the simple shepherd, to the tax collector, to the warehouse guard, that which is needed to grow, to destroy, and to escape destruction are provided.
It is the conventional counterinsurgent who combs the hills to find, fix, fight, and finish an "enemy" who is sleeping in the house next to his barracks, walking in the city streets, or stopping long enough from work in the fields to wave a friendly greeting. While the guerrillas are one part of the internal component of the organization, by themselves they would be useless. What the organization denies the authorities is not so much a portion of some forested mountains, but the ability to control the people - the very reason the authorities exist.

The internal component of the organization has many links with the external component. The external component in its full development has, in addition to secret training and support elements, an open military element. Those who have fled their homes express their opposition through the open military elements. Under the proper conditions these open forces would form the nucleus of units to conduct conventional military operations in conjunction with the internal component.

If one day a triumphant entry is made into a capital city by a "real army," which was once poorly equipped insurgents, it is not to their rifles that they owe their glory, it is to their organization. It is the organization which takes the dynamic belief, supports it with propaganda, and adapts it to the target: the people. It is the organization which multiplies the forces, spreads the battle to unseen corners, and directs it to the anteroom of victory.

**External Support.** It is clear that external support is not the least significant of the rebels' strengths. Experience has shown that when the rebels have not had the benefit of external support they were eliminated little by little. In the Philippines and Madagascar it was insularity which prevented the support the rebels needed. In Malaya, Kenya, and the Cameroons
it was remoteness. In Greece it was Tito's break with Moscow. In Algeria it was necessary to build 1,200 kms of barrier system, covered by tactical units, along the borders before seeing the rebels militarily lose any ground. In reverse, in Indo-China, and Korea, because of a Chinese sanctuary, the external support could not be stopped. Also Mao Tse-tung and Castro had no difficulty in receiving the external support they needed.

The artificial barrier erected in Algeria showed that it is technically possible to close a border, but because of the jungle, similar efforts in Southeast Asia would be considerably more difficult. In addition to the mines, wire, and electronic warning devices employed in depth in such a barrier, it is necessary for the authorities to have strong, mobile units available to destroy any force attempting to move across the border - just as an obstacle in orthodox warfare must be covered by fire to be useful. Until external support to the rebels is severed any victory by the authorities is problematical, yet the closing of the border will not make such a victory certain.

When we consider external support we must not think only in terms of materiel. Normally, the food and most of the weapons and ammunition needed by the rebels are taken from within the area of operations, thus making supply lines unnecessary. Only in the later stages of guerrilla operations are any appreciable volume of supplies required from external sources. External support for the rebels, other than materiel, can be either direct or indirect. Direct support is that provided the rebels by a sponsoring power: the sanctuary, training facilities, propaganda, a dynamic ideology, leadership and encouragement. Indirect is that provided by the environment in which the rebels and the authorities they oppose must operate.

While any direct external support which Mao Tse-tung received in his post-World War II fight for China came from Russia, or from Japanese
dumps through the courtesy of the Russians, indirect external support was received from much of the world including the United States. This at the very time the United States was providing material support to Chiang Kai-shek. Capable propagandists were successful in characterizing the communists as honest, benevolent reformers fighting for the rights of the peasant against corruption, despotism, and decadence. Indirect external support was the result. The degree this environment was instrumental in Mao Tse-tung's success can never be determined, but it can be estimated as a significant factor.

In the past when insurgents could be crushed with little or no publicity, indirect external support was of slight significance. In Kenya, Madagascar, and the Cameroons elimination of the rebel forces was not restricted by world opinion or the pressure of anti-colonialism. In the Free World it is different today. By paying no heed to world opinion the communists prevent indirect external support from affecting their crushing of Hungary and Tibet. For several years the Markos movement in Greece was treated as a spontaneous expression of internal unrest against the government by most of the Free World, thus providing indirect external support to that movement. In Indo-China, France was identified as a European power attempting to maintain its empire at the expense of self rule by the local people, and thus the rebels enjoyed the benefits of indirect external support. In Cuba, Batista had indirect external support working against him for his regime was, in the eyes of the world, corrupt, unjust, and oppressive. While the true conditions affect the degree of internal support - from the people themselves - indirect external support comes from opinion of the rebels and the authorities within other nations, be these opinions true or false.

Thus to the degree the rebel movement is considered a fight for independence against oppression and unjust government, it benefits.
Knowing this the communists will spare no effort to clothe any of their movements in acceptability. If successful they not only double the strength of their own forces but obtain support from their enemies and spread the seeds of contradiction within the enemy's camp. This is not to imply that every revolt against an established government is communist inspired, but only to point out that the communists will use any means which will enhance the chance of success for movements under their control.

**Combat Skills.** When the soldiers of any army are well trained, when they know how to use their weapons, when they know their tactics, when they can maneuver, can communicate, then you have a better army. The same is true for irregular forces. Many of the skills are the same for orthodox and irregular forces; there is some difference in emphasis, but in both cases proficiency in these skills is one ingredient of success. Training in raids, ambushes, mining, hygiene, security measures and weapons, plus the skills needed to provide effective supply and communication systems, are among the skills used by guerrilla forces. It is important to note, however, that the most vital skill needed by a guerrilla is the ability to adapt to his environment. To a person indigenous to the area this is natural, but for an outsider this may be impossible. Thus a native may, by his very nature, have the skills needed for irregular warfare while the most extensively trained expert from another nation may be useless. It was failure to understand this fact that caused the United States OSS during the later stages of World War II to place a 6 foot, 190 pound, American of Yugoslavian parentage, and limited knowledge of China or its language, into coolie clothes and drop him in central China. Despite his knowledge, or perhaps because of it, he spent most of his time avoiding capture.
The development or improvement of combat skills and physical fitness are often given great attention by those aiming to conduct irregular warfare. While they are necessary for success, they alone are of little value.

**Guerrilla Tactics.** While guerrilla tactics are at times used during orthodox warfare by stay-behind units or by indigenous units coordinated through special forces detachments, in such situations they play an auxiliary role to the conventional forms of combat. Those using such tactics only support the efforts of the conventional military forces. In irregular warfare guerrilla tactics may become the main form of combat.

To consolidate the victory in irregular warfare is the task of guerrilla units.

Guerrilla units gain considerable advantage if their opponents fall to the temptation of seeing only their weaknesses: lack of mobility, logistical deficiency, hand-carried weapons. For this reason vast operations are launched against them which are without real results. Only upon the failure of such large militarily correct operations do the leaders of counterinsurgency remember the organization and dissatisfaction which places the people on the side of the guerrillas. Also, the ineffectiveness of numerous and powerful forces which would encircle such small, weak bands look ridiculous and tend to push the undecided among the people closer to the guerrilla. Each exploit of the guerrillas spreads from village to village and, in turn, their prestige grows. Rarely is word heard of anything other than the guerrillas' victories. Any reprisals against the people, for real or imaginary support to the guerrillas, only reinforces the dissatisfaction upon which the guerrillas rely.

Of course the authorities must destroy the guerrillas if they are to be successful. Perhaps it is necessary to have conducted scores of fruitless military encirclements to stimulate their thoughts on other means, and to realize that all guerrillas are not the same.
The underground includes the local guerrillas, but it also includes: information and food suppliers, old men, young girls, little boys, clergy, business managers, students, beggars, clerks, laborers, prostitutes, and what have you. These are a willing part of the underground organization, but do not take part in violence. Among the underground, and indistinguishable from them, are the local guerrillas: boys, men, and some girls who at night or in emergencies use grenades, guns, bombs, knives, machetes and matches. In the nearby jungles or mountains are the second group of guerrillas: the territorial bands. They may kill, destroy and raid but they are tied for one reason or another to a specific location. Behind these are the hard core guerrillas: the dedicated leaders, the couriers to higher headquarters, the well-trained and highly disciplined guerrilla units. To understand that guerrilla forces are of three different types and that they are supported by an underground is the initial requirement for both counterinsurgency and offensive irregular operations.

It is thus that a conventional military unit moving into an area to "destroy guerrillas" must penetrate first the people who, through fear or apathy, provide cover with their false leads to one side and accurate information to the other. Next the curtain of local guerrillas and the regional guerrillas must be pushed aside before the quarry is even confronted.

For guerrillas to disappear completely on terrain they know very well, and by night pass through the tightest of encirclement without it being possible to tell how it was done is part of their basic training. However, this is also why the classical military encirclements, little by little, contribute to the destruction of the guerrillas. Each time the guerrillas must abandon an area they know very well and pick another which offers safety. In so doing they lose, at least temporarily, one of their main advantages.
Another weakness of guerrilla forces is their leader's dream of heading regular military units. All too quickly such leaders want to regroup their small bands into larger units. This was, for example, one of the causes for the victory over the guerrillas in Greece. The same ambition, or lack of confidence, which leads generals and colonels to launch grandiose operations which could more effectively be accomplished by providing younger officers the opportunity to use their initiative, also influence guerrilla leaders. Too rapid "regularization" leads the guerrillas to neglect the means through which they gain the support of the people. When this support dries up, the guerrillas are left isolated. Then they must battle, by orthodox means, against forces far better prepared for such combat than they.

More difficult than preventing a guerrilla leader from consolidating his force into larger units too soon is the voluntary reduction of the size of such units. To break up large units when, for example, the underground in a specific area has been dismantled, requires self discipline and a strategic sense few guerrilla leaders can master. In Algeria, the failure of the rebels to realize in time that the barrier system on the borders of Tunisia and Morocco prevented them from using battalion size units caused them to suffer repeated military failures. Only when they dispersed into small units and returned to the terrorism stage, which they had passed through earlier, did they replace continued failure with both success and failure.

Unless the government the rebels oppose is weakened to the point of abdication, as in Cuba, or unless a coup d'etat solves the problem, it is mandatory that regular military units enter the conflict before victory can be gained. This can be through the formation of conventional forces from the guerrillas, as was done in China, or through coordinated action between the guerrillas and conventional units, as by the Russians against the Germans.
As Giap stated, "To annihilate enemy manpower and liberate land, guerrilla warfare has to change gradually to mobile warfare." Even when it becomes "mobile warfare" its background causes it to continue to display many of the characteristics of the guerrilla. In the later stages of Mao Tse-tung's conquest of China and Ho Chi Minh's conquest of the Red River area, there was a blending of the orthodox and the irregular which relied more on flexibility than on any particular type of combat.

**Terrorism.** Terrorism is one factor of irregular warfare which has no true counterpart in orthodox warfare. Not that orthodox warfare is without terrorism. Hitler and Genghis Khan both attempted to terrorize their opponents with the prospect of a crushing, catastrophic defeat as the only alternative to capitulation. To what extent the German bombing of England was an attempt to terrorize the British into submission is an interesting question. With nuclear blackmail a reality, can anyone deny the terror potential of nuclear and biological weapons? Terrorism of irregular warfare is most often directed at individuals rather than groups. It attempts to intimidate the weak, compromise the vulnerable, and destroy the strong.

Of all the techniques of irregular warfare terrorism is the one whose value is the most questionable. Its tendency to backfire on its user causes some to discount it altogether. Also, it is the antithesis of the humane and just beliefs of the Free World. Thus, like a preventive nuclear war, its very nature will prohibit its use by anyone believing in human dignity. Yet, to ignore terrorism in any study of irregular warfare would be a flagrant violation of objectivity. Conviction has an essential place in determining the correct action to take, but it has no right to censor critical analysis. The capabilities and limitations of terrorism must be understood for it will surely be used by those with communist, fascist, or primitive beliefs.
To be of any value to insurgents, terrorism must be used with great selectivity. Irregular war requires political sense, thus even the communists must forsake certain types of violence. Initially, in Viet Nam and Malaya terrorism was used but it was stopped when it was learned that such actions were, in the eyes of the people, causing the movement to lose prestige - a necessary ingredient of success.

While terrorism can only be considered as a supplementary means, it can be very effective for a limited length of time. It can eliminate the most stubborn opponents and cause all others to be more prudent. It can multiply the number of those who elect not to take sides, and diminish the number willing to oppose the movement. When terrorism is conducted under the very nose of conventional military forces of the authorities, it can make those forces look ridiculous. And finally, this antagonizing, strength-sapping weapon is very difficult to eliminate under any conditions and particularly so when only orthodox and democratic methods are used.

Terrorism obtains its maximum benefit when it is used with care by a dedicated minority against a decadent government. Where a strong military force of the authorities has the support of the people, terrorism by a minority is of little significance; yet, as the British learned in both Israel and Cyprus, it can be the decisive weapon where political confusion reigns and the counterinsurgent forces are not identified with the people.

Regardless of its repugnancy to the civilized, democratic, and just mind, terrorism can not be overlooked. At the start of a rebellion, before strong leaders have emerged, before a strong ideological basis has developed, terrorism by the insurgents may play an essential role among primitive and gullible people. When the movement is unable to attract a following on its own merit, the rebel leaders can force, through terrorism, the
cooperation of some of the people. In return often comes brutal and blind punishment of the people by the authorities, which in time causes the original victims to become the active allies of those who initially terrorized them. In Algeria it was one of the main forces which gave cohesion to the underground of the Moslems for seven years and with the release of Algeria to independence it became the major weapon of the O. A. S.

**Summary of Parts.**

- Guerrillas need an area in which protection is offered by the terrain.
- Guerrillas need a large underground which in turn requires a large population, but some of the other types of irregular warfare can be conducted by a small minority.
- Good leadership is important to both orthodox and irregular warfare.
- The side with the best intelligence system will have more victories than defeats.
- Dissatisfaction with economic, political or social conditions is the foundation on which any insurgency is built.
- A belief which offers a solution to the dissatisfaction of a specific country is the cement of an insurgent movement, whereas beliefs which join the authorities with the people is the best defense against revolt.
- The organization is the skeleton of any insurgency without which it cannot stand.
- Experience has shown that both direct and indirect external support are important to any extended guerrilla campaign.
- Native adaptability is more important in irregular warfare than training in specific skills.
- The tactics used by and against the guerrilla have been extensively illustrated during the past twenty years.
- Terrorism can be expected in irregular warfare.
"Discard hard and fast rules and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle." -- Sun Tzu Wu

The various combinations of the parts previously analyzed result in many varieties of irregular warfare. These extend from coup d'etat to "revolutionary war." Or as Lenin said it: "The dictatorship of the proletariat (communism) is a persistent struggle -- bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative ..." The conflict in a specific campaign might include one or several varieties of warfare; it might move from one to another. There can be no standard pattern. Several convenient groups can, never-the-less, assist in understanding and future study. To file for future reference some recent examples of irregular warfare will now be our aim.

It must always be remembered that the communists, while they do engage in the traditional conflict of state against state, are not content with this. Within each of their enemies they will instigate, or encourage, conflict which pits citizen against citizen.

The traditional means of conflict between states which rely primarily on persuasion or indirect pressures - diplomatic, psychological and economic - have over the years developed a set of rules. As a result of this formalization these methods have become "accepted" even if not universally respected. The continuation of conflict into espionage, subversion, guerrilla warfare, and war-by-proximity, although no less frequent, are most often ignored because of the unsavory character of these methods. Like a criminal in the family they can never be wished away but continual efforts are made
to keep them out of sight. Thus we see the imaginary jump from "peace" to "war." This is the clear cut, gentlemanly "war" in which the adversaries line up in uniform array to be counted and then give battle until the best shall emerge victorious to accept, gratuitously, the sword of the vanquished. Our interest is in the hidden criminals.

The following groups, of which none have precise composition or limits, are hereby offered to fill the gap between "peace" and "war:"  
* Coup d'etat.  
* Capitulation.  
* Primitive Revolt.  
* Organized Revolt.  
* Revolutionary War.

In addition to these is the use of irregular means to support orthodox warfare.

**Coup d'etat.** Of the illegal methods aiming to paralyze and then to replace the established authorities, the oldest, simplest, and best known is the coup d'etat. Having failed to install "acceptable" authorities through whatever legal means are available - strikes, political activity, propaganda, demagogery - the quickest and easiest illegal course is to physically remove the authorities and establish "acceptable" ones.

Are the authorities isolated from the people; are they decadent and the people apathetic; are the authorities in an alliance with some select group, or groups, within the country; and are those in the military, or other organizations which control force, opportunists? Or, on the other hand, are the leaders responsive to the desires of their people; are they energetic, skilful and dedicated politicians who can balance the resources of the nation against its aims; and are the military of that nation professional soldiers which, by definition, are instilled with the belief that it is their duty to protect their
nation from all assaults, either internal or external? In the first case the environment offers opportunity for a coup d'etat; in the second it doesn't.

A coup d'etat is easiest where the control of the state rests with a very few educated, and when there is no true basis for political support throughout the people. Here the power moves from hand to hand; the people move from master to master without much concern. This may go far in explaining the frequency of this type throughout Latin America. Examples of a straight military coup d'etat (golpe militar) are: Bolivia in 1946 following assassination of President Villarroel, Argentina in 1944, Ecuador in 1947, Paraguay in 1948, El Salvador in 1944, two in Guatemala in 1944, Venezuela in November 1948, Panama in 1949 to mention but a few. Also, there are variations called cuartelazo, or sargentada (if conducted by NCOs). There follows a set pattern: take over of the barracks, a "pronunciamiento," a march on the centers of communication and other key installations, the announcement of a new government, and finally, the appointment of a junta to govern. Among the examples of this type are: Argentina in 1930 and 1943, Venezuela in 1945, Nicaragua in May 1947, Peru in October 1948, and Ecuador in May 1944 and 1947.

In a more advanced country with an established middle class the same may happen when the way is lost and no ready solution to the problems at hand is apparent. Thus, the French let Bonaparte and his grenadiers take the reins of a middle class revolution, and again on 13 May 1958 when surrounded by the unsolvable Algerian problem the IV French Republic collapsed.

Lenin was well aware of the difficulties of a revolt against the armed forces. 15 A revolt, in reverse, with the armed forces is easy. The frequent involvement of the military stems from the fact that they have the
means to accomplish the job. In 1961 the Korean army was able to practice openly an elaborate plan to protect the government against student riots; then, with only a change in mission, General Chung Hee Park implemented this same plan on 16 May 1961 to gain control of the government. Most often the planning is done by chronic political agitators and conspirators, in or out of uniform, who try first to get the support of the military. Failing in this, they work for its neutrality and, relying on the apathy of the people, attempt to organize other para-military, or "non-military" units which they can control.

In addition to the official military forces, the national police, home defense, and labor organizations found in many countries today have the means - military organization plus arms - needed to subvert the government. In Czechoslovakia the Army was rendered impotent before the communists made their 1948 coup d'etat with units they had formed within labor and other organizations under their control. In this case these were the armed forces and played the traditional role of the military.

When the military, or some armed forces, do not become involved, the success of the coup d'etat depends on the apathy of the people. Thus the Kapp/von Rittwitz putsch in 1920 lasted but a few days when the military remained loyal to the Weimer Republic and solid resistance from the working class was met.

**Capitulation.** A variation on the traditional military coup d'etat was proposed by Trotsky. It depended on the indifference of most of the people in the country through confusion, apathy, frustration, or defeatism. It was thus applicable to advanced countries. When this condition was present "action groups" were to be formed, in most cases clandestinely, within organizations dominated by the Communist Party. On order they were to strike.
Authorities in the critical points within the government - particularly the armed forces and national police - were to be replaced. Once control of the government was gained the control was to be extended throughout the country until everything answered to the call of the party leaders. The events in Prague from 1946 to 1949 provide a modern example of this pattern. When first advanced this form of irregular warfare was at odds with Lenin's "revolutionary war" but with success it has become one of the accepted methods of the modern communists.

"The greater or lesser intensity which the struggle may assume, the use or nonuse of violence in the transition to socialism, depend on the resistance of the exploiters (the Free World) ... rather than on the proletariat (communists)," 17 said Khrushchev in 1956. If those in power, however, are not so decadent, if they choose to fight, then the agitation must be increased. All effective action by the government must be stymied, and contradictory issues must be released. The aim is to weaken those in power little by little until they can be struck directly. The capitulation is somewhat beyond the simple coup d'état for the part played by popular support has increased. The aim is weakening of the authorities until they capitulate rather than a sudden blow to seize power. However, in practice a coup d'état will often be the final blow of a capitulation, e.g., Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, it may not be, e.g., Israel, Cyprus, and Cuba.

In 1948 the Jews of Israel not only confronted the Arabs in their drive for control of Palestine but also the British who attempted to maintain order. The irregular warfare fought aimed for the capitulation of the authorities. Against the British the Jews used terrorism, as well as stall and delay tactics, in the hope they would feel the problem was insolvable and would look for a way to escape. What guerrilla warfare there was raged between Jewish
and Arab bands, not against the British. Confusion reigned through most of 1948 with the UN replacing the British and negotiating a semi-cease fire.

In Cyprus the same techniques were used by members (EOKA) of the Greek majority, against the Turkish minority and the authorities - again the British. Here again terrorism and the situation beyond solution were all that was necessary to obtain the desired goal.

Considerable indirect external support was initially on the side of the rebels since it was viewed in many circles as a fight for independence. This was changed to a degree when the part the Greek government and church played in direct support of the revolt became known. Also, concern for the rights of the Turkish minority on the island and an appreciation of the strategic value of British bases there had a bearing on the amount of indirect external support EOKA could rely upon. The small size and limited forested areas of Cyprus were instrumental in keeping the fighting on a small scale with terrorism playing a much greater role than in true guerrilla warfare.

In both Cyprus and Israel success depended on the accomplishment of specific political goals by a highly motivated and organized segment of the people in an environment of indifference or fatigue by the authorities. When the authorities are strong enough to prevent a coup d'etat, and are able to identify themselves with the interests of the people, it is impossible for a capitulation to succeed. The rebels may, of course, continue terrorism in the hope conditions will change and they may finally enjoy success.

In 1962 the Secret Army Organization (OAS) in Algeria hoped to use these techniques, which had proven successful in Israel and Cyprus, to sabotage the cease fire between France and the National Liberation Front (FLN). Knowing that the FLN had been reduced by military action of the
French Army from an organized force of about 25,000 in 1960 to some 8,000 disunified, unsupplied individuals, they could see no justice in a peace pact which would separate Algeria from France. Thus, through indiscriminate terror they hoped to make any peaceful solution impossible.

**Primitive Revolt.** A common type of warfare in underdeveloped countries is that launched by a handful of leaders who are able to arouse, but who are not able to organize in the modern sense. This type normally takes place in rural areas and is based on the primitive society found in such regions. The difficult terrain in which such revolts are conducted is one of the main advantages of the rebels; this is their home and the authorities have difficulty in adjusting to the environment.

Before discussing this type of insurrection in detail, mention should be made of the riot which has some of the characteristics of the primitive revolt - for it is unorganized - but since it takes place in cities of more advanced countries it does not have many of the most notable features of the primitive revolt. The riot is without order and of short duration. For these reasons it has no place in communist plans except to be used to spark some more organized type of revolt, e.g., Colombia in 1948.

Within primitive tribal society a handful of agitators can build upon local ties, myth, and superstition to fan the fires of revolt. Such were the Kikuyu of Kenya during 1952 to 1957 and various tribes of the Congo during 1960-1961, of Madagascar in 1947 and of the Cameroons during 1956-1960. The strength of these movements, as unorganized as they were, was from a few individuals using tribal or secret structure already in existence to fit their needs.

In Madagascar the 1947 revolt was inspired by a few educated leaders from the main tribes in the center of the island. It spread to the eastern
Here a primitive tribal society, practicing animism and dominated by witch doctors, lived in a tropical jungle. From the start mob emotions took hold of this revolt, reinforcing and focalizing the action. It spread like a train of gunpowder and in like manner it collapsed in spectacular panic.

The insularity of the area prevented direct external support, lack of publicity prevented indirect external support from influencing the outcome, the obsolete weaponry - spears, bows and arrows - and a weakness in modern combat skills, combined to give the revolt little chance of final success. Nevertheless, because the organization was based on the tribal structure the revolt spread to two-thirds of the island and required more than a year to eliminate.

The events in Madagascar and those in Kenya - among the Kikuyu - had many striking similarities. Both were violent manifestations of conflict caused by close contact of a primitive society with a more highly civilized society. They were greatly influenced by the fact that in African society the individual is of importance only as a member of his group and is expected to conform to the accepted behavior of that group, in contrast to western society which is based on the rights of the individual. Both were characterized by insensate cruelty, the savagery of terrorism, and oath taking in orgiastic ceremonies where black magic and the foulest possible rituals were utilized.

The Cameroons in 1956 provide another example of a primitive revolt launched by a very few educated agitators. Here the Bamileke and other tribes of the equatorial jungle were organized by a few capable leaders, such as Um Niobe and Felix Moumie. While it was on a higher level than the revolts in Madagascar and Kenya, having some political motivation in addition to the social and tribal unrest, it never passed the stage of terrorism. It did enjoy a limited sanctuary in adjacent countries and some of its leaders
were able to travel abroad in efforts to generate support for the movement. When the Cameroons received their official freedom, on 1 January 1960, the rebels were denied their major argument and the organization was badly shaken; yet, the infancy of this new state has been marked by spasmodic murder and other acts of terror. This unrest stemmed from a belief, among some, that the government was not truly independent of foreign influence and a desire for UN supervised elections. As in all primitive revolts the leaders were able to arouse mass emotions and reflex action but the organization needed for a modern revolutionary movement was lacking.

Although not as primitive as these examples from Africa, the machetismo of Latin America can be placed in this group. Such a revolt normally takes place in rural areas, it takes its name from the use of the machete in mass by the people to express themselves, and is based on personal leadership (caudillismo).

The revolts of the Kulaks of Russia during 1928-1932, the communes of China during 1960-1962, in Tibet during 1961 and many religious and ethnic uprisings throughout history may also be classified in this group because of their lack of organization, or they may be considered as organized revolts.

**Organized Revolt.** The fighting in Malaya from 1945 to 1954 illustrates an additional move within irregular warfare. The area had a significant role for both its location and the terrain. The remote location hindered external support, but the jungle terrain of much of the country and an extensive organization made possible the use of large guerrilla units. The value of the terrain and the organization, however, were lost when the resettlement of the Chinese squatters under the "Briggs Plan" isolated the people from the guerrillas and cut the guerrillas source of both food and information.
The nature of the population in Malaya (composed of Malayas, Indians, and Chinese, with British authorities) must be taken into consideration, since it prevented the movement from ever taking on a true nationalistic flavor; rather it was a Chinese minority fighting against a Malayan majority with the British in the middle attempting to maintain order. It can be assumed that the possibility of the rubber and tin of Malaya falling into communist hands to some degree influenced the indirect external support to the movement.

Another variation of organized revolt was represented by the Huks in the Philippines and the Markos movement in Greece. Since the Philippines are islands external support was slight. In Greece it was limited by the split between Yugoslavia and Russia; prior to this split external support had come from Yugoslavian territory. In both, the movement was never able to effectively use nationalism since they were against local governments. Prior to 1947 the guerrillas of Greece did enjoy indirect external support since the movement was considered, in most other countries, a legitimate desire for freedom by the people. When it was clearly identified as a communist attempt to subvert the independence of that country it lost that support. In both, sincere efforts by the leaders to correct the dissatisfaction which gave each movement its strength was probably the most important single factor in the rebels' defeat. The social and economic reforms made by both local governments, plus the economic and military support to these governments from the U. S., was the turning point in both campaigns. In Greece, a weakness in the communists leadership had an important bearing. Markos, whose prestige and warrior qualities were unquestionable, was replaced by a politician, Zacharias, with little knowledge of irregular warfare. He made a critical error in judgment by attempting to transform the guerrilla units into regular forces at the very time greater dispersion was called for. His larger
units were then more easily destroyed by the forces of the Greek Army. The terrain in both areas initially favored the rebels. When Magsaysay's reforms in the Philippines were able to win the active support of the people from the rebels this changed. In Greece when the guerrilla forces were isolated in the mountains the terrain began to work against them. While an extensive internal component of the organization was present in the Philippines, the lack of an external component was a major weakness.

The events in Colombia, which started in 1948, illustrate an organized attempt to effect a coup d'état through the exploitation of a spontaneous riot, and, when this failed, the development of a revolt. On 9 April 1948, Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, the Liberal leader of Colombia, was assassinated. This marked a dramatic change from 40 years of constitutional government, unique for Latin America, to 10 years of strife and bloodshed during which over 200,000 persons were killed. Gaitán’s murderer was killed on the spot by the mob and the city of Bogotá was in riot. This was the chance a small group of communists needed to implement a plan they had developed to gain control of the government. The radio station was seized, teams were dispatched to destroy selected installations with explosives or fire, and panic was fomented. For forty-eight hours this organization used the mobs in attempts to pressure the government into giving up. They failed and the revolt then spread from Bogotá throughout the countryside.

On the surface the fighting for the next ten years was between the Liberals and the Conservatives, but many forces were at work. Fundamental was the need for social and economic equality to alleviate the misery and social debasement of a majority of the people while a
few enjoyed comforts, status, and wealth rarely rivaled anywhere in the world. The effect of long-range strategy of pro-communist extremists, although impossible to prove, cannot be underestimated. By perpetuating violence and havoc they hoped to cause the government to rule by force and decree in order to maintain order and thus lose popular support. The communists organization spread from Bogota to the rural areas where it mingled with the Liberals to develop and support guerrilla warfare.

The continued conflict fortified the extremists of each side and the Army C/S, General Rojas Pinilla, seized power in June 1953 in order to prevent the establishment of a fascist state. He was able to maintain popular support as the custodian of the democratic future of the country until a series of incidents, starting with student riots in June 1954, caused an ever-increasing dictorial nature to his regime. Whether this increase in authoritarian rule was by General Rojas Pinilla's own design or forced on him, as he claimed in his many speeches calling for social and economic reform, is immaterial. The fact that the violence continued in the llanos, or backland regions east of the Andes, and dissatisfaction with the authorities grew throughout the country was typical of the pattern of an organized revolt. Finally, in May 1957 the two traditional parties and the church - the key political groups in the country - joined to force the resignation of General Rojas Pinilla and prevent further drift to the anarchy needed to support communist's ambitions. Thus, the revolt was prevented, at least temporarily, from reaching its goal while the basic conditions which caused the revolt were not changed.

**Revolutionary War.** The most complete combat before it meshes with orthodox war is the revolutionary war. The fight of the Chinese communists is probably the best example of this type. Also can be cited Algeria
and Indo-China. Cuba might be placed in this category or it might be considered an organized revolt ending in a capitulation. If in a revolutionary war all of the parts of irregular warfare are working for the rebels the outcome of the campaign is just a question of time. In such a case the rebels would enjoy: suitable area for the underground and the guerrilla forces, capable leadership, active support from part of the people and neutrality from the majority, continued dissatisfaction to which their belief offered a solution, a well developed organization, external support from an adjacent country, indirect external support to hinder the efforts of the authorities, and proficiency in the skills needed.

**Irregular Means Used to Support Orthodox Warfare.** The next shift is to "war." The methods and techniques of irregular warfare can be used to support the conventional military in orthodox warfare. This is given consideration in studies of "war," thus will not be discussed here. It is worth mentioning, however, that the techniques used to control people and eliminate opposition can follow in the wake of conventional military forces to subjugate a country. Excellent examples of this are offered by Eastern Europe after World War II, China after 1949, and Tibet.

**Summary.** To be able to group irregular warfare campaigns is of historical value, but the composition of such groupings is an academic matter. It is important, however, to realize that there are a variety of types of each depending on how, and in what sequence, the parts of irregular warfare are combined. From an understanding of the many varieties of irregular warfare comes the ability to fight this type of warfare - in both the defensive and the offensive.
"Polarity" can make of the all-overpowering element of war a mere tool; out of the frightful battlesword -- which must be lifted with the strength of both hands and the whole body to strike only once -- a light handy dagger or even a rapier for thrusts, feints and parries. --Clausewitz

A study of irregular warfare would be incomplete if it only considered the immediate. To add depth to any subject, and to grasp the underlying truths, it is necessary to place that subject in its proper historical perspective. In other words, to consider the subject from a philosophical point of view. Such a consideration will integrate diplomatic action, irregular warfare, and orthodox warfare ("war") as well as the various means used in all of these forms of conflict. Since all conflict is the product of the interplay of the polity of different states, it is inevitable that this be the center of any philosophical examination of irregular warfare.

Modern military history makes us familiar with the idea of orthodox warfare: the science of the military specialist, the "weapons mean everything" theory, the meeting of two fleets on the open sea, the shock of two symmetrical forces each championing its state. Combat, however, is this and much more. Combat is any use of force in a conflict.

The social, political, economic and religious considerations of states -- their polity -- may not only set the aims of states, but may direct the very nature of their conflict and its methods. Scientific discoveries and their military application, particularly in weaponry, may shape and modify military tactics; yet it is polity which shapes the military and modifies the use of force -- violent or feeble, total or limited. The use of force is not limited to orthodox warfare but extends throughout irregular warfare. For
these reasons there can be no clear breaks between diplomatic action and irregular warfare or between irregular warfare and orthodox warfare. The same means are used in all three of these forms of conflict. It is true that emphasis is placed on different means in different places in the spectrum of conflict, but this is accomplished by a gradual shift not by abrupt changes.

The prudence of kings and the spirit of chivalry contributed to the reduction of the intensity of many conflicts between states. To tie their peoples to their quarrels would have risked collapse of the balance of conditions upon which monarchy was based. For this reason European wars from about 1660 to 1789 were kept limited in both scope and intensity. But in other times the release of forces of national interest has magnified combat.
The use of such forces not only gave more power to its leaders, by identifying them as the pilots of a crusade rather than herdsmen of death, but also spread warfare into irregular fields. These forces fertilized the thoughts of the military with revolutionary furor, fortified the techniques of combat with ideological dedication, and mobilized not only the bodies but also the minds. Let us think of Philip of Macedonia to Genghis Khan, of Jugurtha to Machiavelli. Combat in its complete form was revived by the zealots of the French Revolution and the modern nation-in-arms was born. The success of the nation-in-arms under the genius of Bonaparte caused some people then, as now, to attempt to reduce to a recipe the secret of its successful combat. Luckily, Clausewitz's analysis of these events showed the shallowness of this approach. To him goes the credit for being the first to stress the essential role of the people and their will to fight, to highlight the importance of the internal structure of a nation, to see that a combination of combat (his "war") and polity (his "politik") was the key to future international combat. 

German applications of "Vom Kriege." Many persons interpreted Clausewitz's writings in their own way; paradoxically, the first to use his teachings, the German generals, were inept students. To them the industrial revolution led naturally to "absolute and real war," which was a movement of pure violence; the development of "total war" at a "Kolossal" scale - a phrase which rang so pleasingly in their ears. It is true that Clausewitz's "total war" embraced the people. It mobilized the whole nation and it tied the rear to the front through industrial support (which currently would include the use of strategic missiles). Clausewitz never, however, failed to insist on the supremacy of the state's polity and to emphasize that combat had no meaning if its state's goals were not attainable. The "total war" of the German generals of both World Wars included modification which converted
"war is the continuation of polity by other means" to the subordination of a state's polity to "war," through the logic that "war" was the ultimate form of polity. They lost sight of the supremacy of "polity" and the need for attainable goals. They relied too heavily on the military tool itself and thus failed to develop an overall strategy which would use their military forces as one, of several, means of combat. Instead, they used various means of combat to support the military forces.

Hitler followed the same rut, despite better beginnings. Being revolutionary by nature, he knew the power derived from channelizing the passions of the fanatic into the building of a ruthless regime and he knew the value of subversion. His thoughts as they related to foreign affairs, however, never passed the stage of intellectual terrorism - fear, hate, revenge. In the beginning he accurately outlined his strategy as: "The confusion of allegiances, moral conflicts, panic, and indecision - these will be my weapons." But by relying solely on the military tool to implement this strategy, and failing to have adequate political, social, economic and religious forces to support this tool, he lost.

The fact that Hitler's thoughts, in many ways, and those of the communists have much in common is not surprising. He was a rival revolutionary; each gaining its strength from the same forces, and using similar means. Far from being the diametric opposites, as suggested by extreme "left" and "right," they were actually competitors with the same goal. Hitler used anti-communism to divide, weaken, and subvert his opponents, as present day communists use anti-imperialism and anti-fascism.

To the extent Hitler was successful in attempts to subvert his enemy was largely due to the fact that his regime was considered by many as an efficient antidote to the international communist conspiracy. For this reason he
gained support from within his victims. Such collaborators were from those who had been traditionally among the most patriotic, and on a national basis their allegiances were still, undoubtedly, with their own nation rather than Germany; yet, they also had political allegiances which were dominant. It was a weakening of their nationalism on one hand, and a strengthening of anti-communism - the ideology they shared with Hitler - which made them traitors. For this reason it can be claimed, with a certain degree of accuracy, that communists indirectly politicized World War II.

**Communist's application of "Vom Kriege."** Lenin, after Marx and Engles, read Clausewitz. They thought of polity not as Clausewitz's nation-state and its interests, but as an international state - communism - and its interests. But, it was Clausewitz's visualization of the unifying strength of a strong polity on one hand, and the enemy's polity as a target on the other, which stimulated their interest.
Marx substituted the struggle between classes within a state -vertical conflict - for the struggle between states. Then Lenin recognized that polity of a belief knows no borders. He visualized vertical conflict of beliefs on a world-wide basis with his shock troops being within territory controlled by his enemies. This was ideological warfare which in history can find its counterpart only in religious wars. It is Clausewitz's "Kriege" in the absolute form - the climax - and then some. At this point war and polity were one; no longer was "war the continuation of polity by other means," since they were indistinguishable. Also, the transition from "peace" to "war" vanishes as tactics and strategy were joined. Tactics offered a choice of methods, used together or in succession, ranging from demonstrations to guerrilla attacks, from subtle twisting of truth to coup d'etat. Strategy was the same only on a larger scale. When conflict thus became a mingling of a conflict which raged within states, as well as between states, the "revolutionary war" was born.

Its promoters then set out to apply the theory. Lenin claimed the best strategy was to delay open operations until the morale of the enemy disintegrated so as to make the striking of the final blow easy. Here, again, he leaned heavily on Clausewitz with his belief in the superiority of defensive warfare - a most active form of defense to be sure - to exhaust your opponent and then crush him completely at a point of your choosing. Thus, on the strategic field today we know the "on" and "off" approach, belligerency followed by calmness, which strives to exploit any cleavages between the nations of the free world, and on the tactical level we know the attacks on the sensitive points where the interests of the different authorities - political, judicial, religious, commercial, and military - are joined. In each case the communists hope for slow and weak reaction as a result of limitations of habit,
rivalry, legality, and morality. In current conflicts the communists plant the seeds of subversion within the camp of all their enemies to divide and weaken - vertical conflict - and thus slow their enemies ability, and will, to react in their own interest against horizontal attacks. In reality, all this is only the application of universally accepted military methods.

To prevent his opponent from reacting in an effective manner while he executed a crushing blow was Lenin's aim.\textsuperscript{21} To reach this objective he rejected revolt without order and direction, military plots without firm popular support, and social or political evolution which insured widespread satisfaction. At the same time he adopted Trotsky's insurgency methods\textsuperscript{22} to which he added the party. He rejected orthodox war - the saber which mutilates - and preferred the revolution which infects. Lenin considered it necessary for communism to infect the body of the target and spread to every point of the society. Territory or economic advantage, which had been the objective in all previous orthodox wars, had lost their importance in his scheme; now the people were the real stake. Tactics and strategy were not the daughter of mathematics and geometry, they instead followed laws of physics which govern osmosis, sympathetic explosion, chain reaction and critical mass.

Each of the methods used is not new; each can be isolated and countered; however, during the compressed time-frame when they are all used together, they are, in their total effect, overpowering. The population becomes so involved the conflict seems to change in nature. The rules of combat seem to have lost meaning; the relative combat power, when computed by regular means, seems ridiculous. If these methods achieve success the conflict will continue in another place, utilizing the same methods. If not, new ones will be added. Even so, the communists have gained, for the contradictions and problems presented by this shift will serve to divide and weaken - such is the way of "revolutionary war."
Free World's Neglect of "Vom Kriege." The action of the Free World has given adequate evidence that it is either not aware of Clausewitz or discounts his opinions. The Free World's record has been quite consistent in attempting to separate conflict from polity or in making the same mistake of the Germans, i.e., relying solely on military forces. For example: Chinese War (1945-49), Malayan War (1945-54), Philippine War (1945-48), Indo-China War (1945-54), Indonesian War (1945-47), Greek War (1946-49), Korean War (1950-53), Algerian War (1954-82), Hungarian War (1956), Cuban War (1958-59), and Tibetan Revolt (1959).

And finally, what can be said of the integration of conflict and polity by NATO? by SEATO? by CENTO? While each has a military objective, can anyone claim each has a comparable polity? If we give Clausewitz's thoughts any value, this salient weakness should be self-evident.

Summary.

- Polity determines the nature and intensity of conflict.
- Conflict can be between states or beliefs; in the second case, state boundaries are of no importance.
- The military are but one tool with which a state implements its strategy.
- It is impossible to separate the means which use force from those which use pressure and persuasion.
"With the Marxist formulas mixed with your democratic slogans we can revolutionize the world. The right of people to order their own affairs! Here is a magic key which opens to Russia the door of the East . . . ." Field Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevski

What Mao Tse-tung refers to as "revolutionary theory, objective and strategy" is only a specific expression of the communists' doctrine for world conquest. We see cohesive offensive operations against individual countries at one level and against all of the Free World at the global level. The raw strategy of the communists, which has its roots in the military theory of Clausewitz, is all too often opposed by disunity, compromise, and a failure to understand irregular warfare. But the communists have another advantage: in their eyes, theirs is a "just war;" therefore, they feel completely free to use all means including those traditionally considered unlawful or amoral in addition to the manipulation of the techniques of diplomacy without regard to continuity or sincerity.

Considered at both the single country and world-wide levels, what defense is possible against the communists' attack? How can the handicaps mentioned above be overcome? Counterinsurgency must consider all such questions, but of immediate interest to a country under attack are the methods of warding off the insurgents within their borders.

Basic Requirements. Defensive operations at the single country level can be divided as follows for purpose of analysis; however, in practice, action will overlap and must be conducted concurrently: (1) Elimination of the dissatisfaction. (2) Counterguerrilla operations. (3) Destruction of the rebel organization.
Counterinsurgency is dependent on information. Only from timely and accurate intelligence can plans be formulated which will result in effective action. Without such intelligence the situation is similar to a blindfolded man in a dark room trying to catch a black cat.

A break with the concept which limits irregular warfare to guerrilla warfare and believes it can be handled by strickly "military" means is necessary. Irregular warfare is in essence political. When the military of a state are prevented from defending on the avenue of approach to the mind they are vulnerable. In other words, if the military are prepared only to move, shoot and communicate without regard to morale, espirt de corps, dedication and patriotism the battle can be lost as a result of an envelopment which captures the objective before the power of the military forces is ever brought into the conflict. Victory is not at the end of the rifle. The ability of the military to understand the scope of their new battlefield, and to be allowed to operate in all and not just the "military" part of that battlefield, is a basic requirement of counterinsurgency.

**Democratic Heritage.** Many of the conditions which hinder effective counterinsurgency are institutions of western culture which have evolved after centuries of trial and error. Freedom by its very nature results in conflict within a state. Law, justice, and morals place limitations on the means available. Public pressure requiring any faint, or superficial, peace hope to be explored to exhaustion results in the weakness of inaction and inconsistency. All of these place the Free World at a disadvantage. Yet to cast these aside would be unacceptable. Therefore, a universally acceptable solution for the defense of the Free World against irregular attack is impossible.
If a nation of the Free World, with safeguards to protect liberty, wants to crush a subversive movement, it is prevented from using the strongest possible means against the movement when that movement is still weak and vulnerable. The police, and the military if involved, are slowed by laws, customs, and beliefs which protect minority political thought and the rights of individuals. Attempts to counter the enemy's psychological activities are hindered by freedom of expression and assembly, as well as by a need to justify all actions to the legislative and the critics of the press. Attempts of the military to consider all aspects of irregular warfare conflict with the safeguards established to prevent politically oriented armed forces. Fully aware of these conditions, the rebels spare no effort to cleverly intensify all internal conflicts so as to hinder effective action against them.

There are dangers to a representative democracy from development of the very means needed to protect itself from irregular attack. Any armed force training for counterinsurgency will have the means needed to usurp control of the government. To eliminate this danger conclusively is impossible. Nothing can, on the other hand, be gained by ignoring the problem. It falls to the political leaders of a nation to see that their military are sufficiently politically oriented and trained in population control to effectively meet any irregular attack and at the same time to see that adequate safeguards are maintained to prevent the military from usurping power. To successfully walk this wire requires political skill of the highest order. Too many governments have paid with their own existence from failure to understand, or maintain, this delicate balance. Rome didn't fall only under the blows of barbarians but also under the blows from its own legions. Today France is endangered by the same forces.
A review of the forces which have pulled at the French Army since World War II provides a modern illustration of an old and fundamental problem. It would behoove all of those who believe in representative democracy to become familiar with any such experience so as to more profitably steer their own course. Smug contentment in the past is poor preparation for the future.

As in all such cases, the majority of the military took no part in the political considerations; they remained completely loyal to their political leaders at all times. It was a minority, without political background, who lost direction when thrown into the political/military environment of irregular warfare. In their application of strictly military methods to their tasks of gathering information and controlling the people they met with difficulties.

After experience in Indo-China this minority within the French Army attributed that failure, with a high degree of accuracy, to failure to adapt to the enemy's concept of warfare. Knowledge of the enemy's methods lead them to adopt, at times, questionable methods, and, as a result of oversimplification and a desire for efficiency, caused them to deviate little by little from loyalty to their subordination to the political leadership. The inability of a free society -- particularly the jurisdictional system and public opinion -- to react effectively against irregular attacks caused this minority to view freedom of expression as treachery, and the protection of the rights of individuals as a weakness. The desire to win a specific campaign (Algeria) plus knowledge of the enemy's methods lead to revolt when the political leadership felt, for reasons of political strategy, that a change in policy was desirable.

The only sure protection against this danger is a military dedicated to serve as a tool of the political leadership which, in turn, expresses the
will of the nation. This comes from a deep sense of duty to their country and an understanding of the political environment in which they must fight. Failure to understand this problem offers: (1) the prospect of a repeat of the tragic experience of the Secret Army Organization (OAS) in any representative democracy, or (2) a handicap which can not be afforded if a negative approach, which limits the military to the traditional role required by orthodox warfare, is followed.

To adhere to the traditions of western culture at all times, against an enemy adept at exploiting them to his advantage, could well be the cause of these beliefs vanishing from the earth. Likewise, the violation of these beliefs in order to deny this advantage to an enemy could result in the same dismal end. How to provide an effective defense against an irregular attack and still remain faithful to democratic beliefs is, therefore, the basic problem. The solution to this problem is political. The final success of any counterinsurgency depends on how well it is solved by the political leadership.

Double Standard at the World Level. Just as a state with democratic institutions hinders itself, the Free World hinders itself in providing a defense against the world-wide attack of communism. The unique division of the world into a peace zone (communist's controlled territory), and a war zone (all the rest of the world), places the Free World in an untenable position from the start. Neutralism also works as an ally of the communists; its advocates consider any action against the governments of the Free World as evidence of needed reforms, yet, in some remarkable way they can take no notice of slaughters such as those in Hungary and Tibet. The idealists of the Free World are not to be denied their double standards: crying for the liberation of underdeveloped countries which have just emerged from anarchy and which could fall back into the same with little difficulty, yet remaining dumb
to the most extensive and oppressive colonial empire in the world. Another example of this environment of double standards which hinders the Free World is that which allows the Soviets to condemn, in a spectacular manner, a U-2 flight thousands of feet over their territory yet accepts as normal the USSR's massive network of subversion and intrigue throughout the world.

**Elimination of the Dissatisfaction.** To split the rebels from the people who inform, shelter, feed and provide recruits is a basic objective of counterinsurgency. How can this goal be reached? Any movement is built on some dissatisfaction. This may be the result of an oppressive and unjust government, a desire for political independence, hunger, a desire for improved working conditions, or a cleavage between ethnic, religious, or social factions. When the dissatisfaction, relative to the control measures used by the authorities, is not sufficient to cause the people to support the rebels, the movement will atrophy.

The degree that the people identify the authorities with their own aims, well being, and interests will accurately reflect the degree of dissatisfaction. When the unpopularity of the authorities has reached a certain magnitude no amount of police and military force can eliminate the potential of revolt; it can only hide it from view. Under these conditions true progress against the insurgencies can only be made with a change in the government. When such a change is not made voluntarily by the authorities, it is often a handful of army officers who attempt to remedy the situation with a coup d'état. All too often this starts a chain reaction of revolts which are worse than the harm they were trying to suppress.

The significance in underdeveloped countries of the authorities at the very lowest level is worthy of special note. In these countries, particularly when the people have no political thoughts, the sole impression of the authorities is given by the local officials. The people are preoccupied with living
decently and peacefully; therefore, if they support the rebels it is not so much for the positive belief the rebels are attempting to advance but from fear or long standing cleavages between the people and the authorities which the rebels have exploited. If it is fear, it is necessary that the people be protected. Most often the insurgents only intensify, through propaganda, some dissatisfaction which already exists. To this they add their promises of peace, justice, and reform. For this reason it is the minor functionaries at the village level who play a vital role. It is from their incompetent, crude, and dishonest acts that the people form their opinion of their government.

**Counterguerrilla Operations.** This is the first, and, unfortunately, sometimes the only aspect of counterinsurgency understood by the conventional soldier. It deals with the destruction of the guerrilla forces and is accomplished by two forces: the mobile striking force and the territorial units.

The proper balance between the territorial units and the mobile striking force is rarely obtained. One military commander will place complete emphasis on mobile striking forces while another will neglect them for the territorial units. In both cases failure will be the result since the virtue of the system lies in the blending of both elements. The proper proportion cannot be specified in a classroom; it must depend on the situation and the environment.

The territorial units, which control and protect the people as well as gather information, are spread across any territory threatened by insurgents. Each of these units are assigned a specific area which may, or may not, be based on boundaries of the local civil administration. Para-military and police organizations may be involved with the territorial units, yet sole utilization of such forces for this task will, in most cases, result in failure of the whole operation. The territorial units live in the villages, organize the
self-defense units, bring isolated villages together for easier protection, help the people in their work and their plans, and provide medical assistance. Step by step they are integrated into the community and gain the acceptance of the people. When accepted they are able to advance the spirit of nationalism which will tie the people to the government and effectively counter the efforts of the rebels. Also, they are then able to obtain the type of information which the normal intelligence agencies are rarely able to gain. At times the territorial units will be mere branches of the civil government or, when civil administration has collapsed, they may have the sole role of authority. In the latter case they must control the food and the production; functions normally unpopular, but made easy if the people know, like, and respect the territorial units. As this process develops, the bond between the rebels and the people grows weaker and weaker.

The territorial units must be assigned in keeping with their environment. The terrain has less significance than in orthodox warfare in determining the location of boundaries since the territorial units must work on, with, and for the people.

The first of three phases in the assignment of areas to the territorial units will, however, be based on the terrain. This is the quickest method and the one most familiar to the military commander. Rivers, mountains, swamps, and forests will govern. Thus a light infantry unit will get the mountains and a mechanized unit will get the plains. While this is a reasonable start, the forces which never pass this stage are committed to only fighting the terrain. Since the people are the key to the rebel’s tactics, they must also be the key to the organization of the counterinsurgency forces.

The second step is an adjustment of the territorial units to conform to the social structure. The more underdeveloped a country, the more
primitive is its society; this means closer bonds between families, clans, tribes, and sects. The territorial units must also conform to these forces of the internal life of the area - forces which play a vital role in the society, but which are covered by routine of everyday life to those not accepted. These are the "lines of magnetive force" in the community. Their hidden presence goes far to explain the actions of the community. When the territorial units learn the family ties, the interests, the beliefs, the allegiances, and the ambitions which hold together, or divide, the different groups, half the work is done. The rebels know these same conditions and have integrated their organization so that they can be utilized. It is very rare that a critical study of the social structure will not lead, in one way or another, to the rebels.

While modern life has certainly broken many of the ancestral bonds, has mixed the community, and thus weakened the traditional, or natural, organization of the society, these older ties are still significant. This is, however, not evident to the eyes of the tourists or to the conventional military man preoccupied with being assigned to the comforts of the large cities. In time of stress most individuals look for security within groups. In societies where traditional structures exist in any form, the people will look inward and cling to past values; this will strengthen such bonds during periods of combat. The political leaders of a new state, in order to develop nationalism and be considered "modern" by other nations and government officials, to make their tasks simpler, may play down the importance of such a social structure: in so doing they administer terrain rather than people.

The multifactioned pattern of life in all of Viet Nam provides a typical example of the conditions which will be found within regions formed into a political unit prior to the evolution of a nation-state for that region.
While the Annamese people are dominate along the coast, in the Red River valley of Tonking and in the Mekong Delta, they are by no means a united people. Within the Annamese themselves, those in the north and south have their differences in temperament and attitude; as in Italy the Milanoese differ from the Neapolitans. Also, large minority groups can be found among them. Chinese are to be found in great numbers in and around Saigon and throughout the Tonking Delta and north to the Chinese border. A million Caoaistes, and an equal number of Hoa Hao, are susceptible to special appeals as are the Catholics, Negroes and Texans in the United States. In several areas of South Viet Nam some 300,000 Cambodianese are the dominate group. Finally, throughout the mountains are what can be classed only as mixed remnants of tribal people - called Montagnard in French and Nguoi Thuong in Vietnamese. While this ethnic conglomeration forms a sufficiently confusing social pattern, the religious and cultural variation can also be added. Within areas of Chinese culture memories of the Mandarin lives on. In what was, prior to 1948, the French political unit of Cochin-China some broke completely with their old traditions to adopt full westernization; their brothers which held to the old customs of life and habit share little love for these "butter-eaters."

When large numbers of people, including many Catholics, migrated from the north to the south, because of the pressure of the communists, the pattern was again altered. These social patterns and the psychological ties, or conflicts, which they provoke are well known and exploited by the Viet Cong.

The final adjustment of the territorial units is to the rebel's organization itself. This is a dynamic and ever changing phase which comes only with accurate and detailed intelligence on the rebels. Then the rebels can be challenged at every turn and the authorities can place their feet where the rebels place theirs; then the vastness and complexity of the rebel movement
becomes apparent. During this phase the guerrillas are shown to be only the "action element" of a much larger organization which is secret and spreads throughout the country.

The territorial units may engage in combat with the rebels. They can surprise their agents, attack isolated detachments and destroy supplies. They rarely, due to their dispersion, are able to fight strong guerrilla units, but they provide the information to the mobile striking force which leads to its success in such fighting.

The powerful, mobile, well trained conventional military units which are used against the guerrillas are quartered in strategically located spots so that they can answer the call of the territorial units. In themselves they are blind and impotent, yet as a part of the system they make the blow which reduces the rebels from units to individuals.

The tactics needed to fight guerrillas have been used and refined extensively over the past twenty years in such a variety of different locations and circumstances that anyone wanting to use them can find what he needs without too much difficulty. Ambush, counterambush, escort, road opening, raids, food seeking are the everyday bread of the counterguerrilla. What the British call "cordon and search," "drive," "eggbeater," and "partial sweeper" are all flexible versions of traditional military operations. The use of helicopters, despite their noise, can greatly increase the reaction time of the mobile striking forces although their vulnerability to ground fire may place limits on their usefulness.

Blind execution of these tactics will insure poor results. One of the few times in recent history when a U. S. Army unit has been primarily engaged in counterinsurgency illustrates this point. By the end of September 1950 the battle in Korea moved north after the capture of Seoul. The 25th
Division was left in the center of Korea to "mop up the enemy." The enemy were remnants of the North Korean Army. Some were organized units. Some were bands of stragglers. Many had exchanged their uniforms for civilian clothes. The local communists were busy integrating as many of these soldiers as possible into their guerrilla bands. Most of the U.S. units used the classical patrolling and encirclement tactics of a mobile striking force. Their results were routine. However, during one six day period one battalion captured 1372 of the enemy - far more than all the rest of the division for that period. It is significant that this battalion had developed a plan to: (1) obtain the active support of the local people, (2) separate the highly motivated guerrilla leaders from their potential recruits, and (3) destroy the enemy’s "will to resist."

The true strategy of the guerrilla is like the tide: when it is coming in it smashes ferociously at the top of submerged rocks and when it goes out it undermines the base of the rocks. When the mobile striking force receives reports of guerrilla activity from the territorial units, it moves in. First it meets the traditional delaying actions and ambushes of the local and regional guerrillas. As the local guerrillas, who hide their weapons, and the regional guerrillas, who move back, "disappear" the mobile striking force seems victorious. Its supply lines, however, are at this time stretched; it is out of breath and must pause to consolidate its gains. Then the active defense of the guerrillas begins. The local guerrillas dig up their rifles. They set depots afire and destroy bridges. The regional guerrillas reappear all along the extended supply lines. For the first time the counterguerrilla forces meet the elite guerrilla units. Even then the guerrillas aim for many limited successes to sap the strength of their opponent rather than complete victory. To the
guerrillas' time is of little importance. To harass both the territorial units and the mobile striking force until they withdraw, thereby forfeiting control of the area, is the guerrillas' goal.

The more closely those in the mobile striking force resemble guerrillas the better they are able to fight the guerrillas on their own terms. Guerrillas, however, are more a way of life than they are the sum total of techniques. Training in the techniques of the guerrilla is valuable, however, principally because it provides physical conditioning which is the prime quality of both guerrilla and counterguerrilla. The counterguerrilla must adapt himself, as best he can, to the climate, terrain, food, shelter, and physical risks of the guerrilla. For example, in Viet Nam the guerrilla lives in water: rainy season, humid season, scattered storms, sweat, fords, rice paddies, flooded deltas, and rivers as the only route to the plateau. Also, someone new to Viet Nam might need time to realize that the grass fires on the mountain sides or the thumping of empty bamboo against empty bamboo, which mysteriously accompany his unit wherever it might go, are not just some local custom. Since the members of the mobile striking forces are rarely able to adapt to the way of life of the guerrilla, their ability to fight guerrilla warfare is often limited.

While it is true that special units, such as the British SAS, are better than normal infantry in the counterinsurgency role this is because they are just better soldiers, not because of special training. Since the tactics used to fight guerrillas are not too different from orthodox small unit tactics, they can be readily learned, by normal infantry as well as special units. The main reason for using both is the necessity of avoiding the creation of two armies: one small specially trained one to be used everywhere, and one large one sitting useless as it waits for orthodox warfare.
Destruction of the Organization. It is from the underground of the organization that the guerrillas receive the information, supplies and finances needed for success. Wherever possible the underground organizes the people, to a degree, through enlistments within its cells, or by keeping them available through pressure and fear. It is, therefore, the whole which must be penetrated and destroyed to overcome the rebellion. If solely the guerrillas are killed or captured it will be temporary, since the underground will soon supply replacements. The victory bulletins issued by the authorities when the guerrillas are destroyed will become meaningless paper as fresh bands rise from the ashes of the old. For this reason it is an endless task to destroy the rebels statistically. Rather, the rebel organization must be destroyed in parallel. As the mobile striking force destroys the guerrillas, the territorial units concurrently seek out and destroy the underground. Step by step, block by block, village by village the pressure must continue while the guerrilla bases in the mountains or swamps are also under attack. Only after such a double attack will the movement fail to bloom again. If the movement has not progressed far enough to have guerrilla units the action against the underground, which is essential to any movement, is still the same: through intelligence and control measures.

The importance of intelligence to counterinsurgency forces cannot be overemphasized. This stems from the fact that the people themselves are at stake with both the rebels and the authorities trying to capture them. It is necessary to know the reaction and mentality of the people before efforts to correct the dissatisfaction can be started, before beliefs which will have significance to the people as a means of solving their problems can be promoted, and before the ties between the people and the rebels can be cut. The easiest way for the intelligence net of the authorities to penetrate the rebel
organization is through the people. The establishment and continual improvement of the intelligence system which works among the people is a cardinal principle of counterinsurgency. Initially this will be done by a national police, or investigation, organization of the government. As the activity of the insurgents increases it can be expected that these organizations will grow in size and power. The capabilities, however, of any such organizations are limited since their objectivity and methods are often open to question. Since they rarely enjoy the confidence of the people, they cannot maintain the accurate and timely intelligence needed to destroy the rebel organization. This role will normally fall to the territorial units when the movement begins to threaten seriously. Since they are a part of the nation's military they are as a result of experience, objectivity, and deployment, capable of gaining the acceptance of the people and bridge the gap which so often splits the people from the authorities. This is why the territorial units, like the rebel organization, are constructed so that they conform to the natural organization among the people.

The insurgents never neglect their intelligence. For this reason a disenchanted Viet Cong leader, who had agreed to conduct a joint operation against his fellow communists, once said there was no need to inform him of the plans of the counterinsurgency forces. Since he always knew their plans at least twenty-four hours in advance, he explained, he would have more than enough time to conduct his part of the bargain. Before they can expect to enjoy a significant success, however, the intelligence of the authorities must be better than that of the rebels.

It is true that theoretically it is possible to control the movement of people and supplies without the necessity of organizing the people along military lines, but true control is very difficult without such regimentation. The
rebels, being very clever, know the authorities' weaknesses and know, very well, how to adapt to any new measure used to counter their efforts. This is why, although it imposes an enormous amount of effort and might be politically impossible except under true emergencies, the degree of control of the people is directly proportional to the degree they are organized -- the extreme of which is regimentation.

Organization of a city requires: (1) A leader for each building, (2) A leader for each block, or street, who controls through the building leaders, (3) Blocks to be organized into groups of blocks and these in turn, formed into regions of the city. The leaders at each level may, or may not, be voluntary. It does not matter. Each leader is, however, responsible for all those within his area -- what they do and what they do not do. Files are maintained at each level since all absences and activities must be justified by the leaders. Identification cards are used to keep each individual restricted to as small an area as his work might allow. Any unauthorized movement of individuals, any breaking of the curfew, would be suspected; it might lead to detection of the underground.

Cities play a key role in an irregular organization, yet paradoxically the authorities often believe that their troops stationed in such locations have only to maintain order, holding key installations and critical routes. The staff of the underground is most often in cities; this includes the most capable individuals in the movement -- those who will run the government if the movement is successful. They control the finances, coordinate the external support, develop policy, and operate the intelligence net within the government they seek to destroy. Without those in cities the guerrillas in the mountains would be, to paraphrase Mao Tse-tung, a person with but one arm.
TYPICAL DIVISION OF TERRAIN
BY INSURGENTS

NOTE: The City contains the rebel leaders and a portion of each required organization. Between the City and the guerrilla's hideout in each region is an Intermediate Zone. The local guerrillas and members of that region's underground live in the villages in this zone.
The vital importance of the major cities in a country was repeatedly shown in Algeria. Inevitably, when the rebel organization was finally uncovered it was superimposed over the country like a wagon wheel with a city as the hub. Not only was the staff of the regional movement in the city, but also the critical segment of each of its subordinate units. True, the guerrilla bands kept to their hideouts and had little direct contact with the leadership which was hidden in the city. Between the city and the hideouts was an intermediate zone in the rural area. In this zone was a segment of the underground, charged with, in addition to information gathering, sabotage and terrorism, maintaining contact between the head in the city and the fists in hideouts. Those in the intermediate zone also supply the guerrillas with a large part of their food and their shelter during periods of inactivity.

In cities the control needed is easier to establish than in the rural areas. In rural areas the resettlement of many people into more easily defensible villages increases travel time to work and will often cause a major readjustment in the economic life of the area. To accomplish its purpose the organization must be so complete that no one can escape its control. This restricts movement to the point that support of the guerrillas becomes extremely difficult and establishes within an hierarchy unquestioned responsibility for the action of everyone.

Within this rigid and complete military organization of the people the authorities have the means to control and thus to physically separate the people from the guerrillas. In addition the authorities have the means to intensify the propaganda and indoctrination needed to influence the beliefs of the people. In cities the control of food, through the use of food stamps issued only to the head of a household, restricts the possible flow of this key item to the guerrillas and also provides a means of controlling the activities.
of the storekeepers and food supplies. Resettlement in the rural areas, coupled with curfew times, makes it possible to consider anyone in certain zones or outside of the fortified villages at certain times, as an enemy and subjects him to being killed on sight. Little by little these controls cut the flow of information and supplies within the rebel organization. The position of the insurgent becomes untenable as the source of his strength - support from the people - is withdrawn.

Such regimentation and control is in no way in keeping with the tradition of freedom and representative democracy of western culture, but neither is the type of irregular warfare fought by the communists. The declaration of an emergency and the establishment of such an organization of the people is a political decision which can come only reluctantly from any political leader with sincere belief in the rights, and dignity, of the individual. There are times when a decision must be made and none of the alternatives offered are acceptable; then it is always better to pick the best of available courses rather than capitulate from a lack of courage required to make a decision. When, however, such a decision is made by the political leaders, the military will be expected to establish such control as quickly, efficiently and humanely as possible.

After the people have been regimented there are techniques which can be used to intensify the control of the people and insure the dismanglement of the rebel organization. These are limited only by the skill, intelligence and ingenuity of those charged with this responsibility. One example picked at random might be cited. A few persons working for the authorities who have assumed the identity of the rebels, and from all outward appearance be indistinguishable from them, might stop private cars, or trucks, moving through an area where the rebels are known to operate. The explanation given by the
drivers will often prove most helpful. Information such as to whom they have paid for safe passage can either provide an entry into part of the underground, or dry up, from fear of compromise, the rebels use of this means of control. At times the drivers might fail to report to the authorities the fact they were stopped by "rebels" and this in itself may be significant. At times supply trucks can be allowed to pass so that they can be followed into the rebels' hideout, or packages, which will explode upon opening, can be placed on such trucks to be transported directly to the rebels. An indirect result of such activity by the authorities can be the intensification of suspicion among rival rebel leaders. From such techniques the rebels will little by little be divided, scattered and weakened, and their organization destroyed.

**Summary of Defensive Irregular Operations.**

- Counterinsurgency is based on intelligence.
- The policies of the political leadership must gain and maintain the support of the people.
- The people are controlled to the degree needed to break up the rebel organization.
- Territorial units protect and gain the support of the people who in turn provide information on the rebels.
- The mobile striking forces' primary purpose is the destruction of the guerrillas.
"Offensive action is necessary to achieve decisive results and to maintain freedom of action." -- U. S. Army

The attention of the Free World has, quite naturally, been directed to the defensive aspects of irregular warfare. Any analysis must not, however, be content with consideration of only one side of a subject; through the examination of all sides a better understanding of the whole can be gained. It is well known that within communist controlled territories there are weaknesses, contradictions, abuses, and errors. Can these be exploited through the use of some type of irregular warfare? What obstacles stand in the way?

Any offensive involves risk. Always leaving the initiative to the enemy, however, involves greater risk, although this fact is not always obvious. Even Clausewitz who repeatedly stressed the defensive, in the abstract, as being stronger than the offensive, recognized the negative nature of combat which merely warded off the enemy's blows and made no attempt to return the blows. He stated: "If the defensive is the stronger form of conducting war but has a negative object, it is self-evident that we must make use of it only as long as our weakness compels its use, and that we must give up the defensive as soon as we feel strong enough to aim at the positive objective."\textsuperscript{28}

An orthodox army team, like a football team, can never hope to win through fighting only in its own territory. It might be possible to prevent defeat if all of the attacks of its enemy were stopped; victory, however, can only be gained through the combination of offensive and defensive operations. The same is true with irregular warfare. In other words, final victory requires some of the battles to be carried into the enemy's territory. Even
when final victory is not within grasp, offensive operations can contribute to a more effective defense. When the enemy is absorbed with troubles at home his capability of executing offensive operations is reduced.

**Obstacles.** While the necessity of conducting offensive operations should never be lost from view, it is also important that this desire not cloud the vision into overlooking its dangers and difficulties. It is a basic fact that the Free World and the communist empire do not enter this battle on equal terms. It might be possible to remove some of the current conditions which hinder the Free World, but there are others for which there is slight prospect of change.

The first obstacle is that of world opinion. Despite communist gains, which cause many in the world to hedge their bets to make certain their money is riding on a winner, there is little dispute of the fact that the Free World enjoys a moral advantage. How valuable is this advantage? On this question there are many opinions. Be this advantage worthless or significant, it is true that a degree of it would be lost if the Free World supported efforts to weaken or replace communist governments. How this loss of moral advantage will balance against the increase in confidence and respect for ability which the Free World will gain is again a matter of dispute.

Related to the first obstacle is another: The communists will exploit any opportunity to claim that the leading nations of the Free World are the true aggressors. The case of the U-2 shot down over Russia and the events which followed provide a vivid illustration of this technique and its results. Such efforts by the communists are not only aimed at obtaining a favorable reaction from those countries steering a middle course on all issues, but also to weaken the capability of their enemies to reaction. Their hope is that such events will cause pacifists to hinder the efforts of their own governments.
The risk of a nuclear war must always be considered. Whether a particular course will increase or decrease the possibility of a nuclear exchange is, quite correctly, a question to be asked. It is true that irregular warfare provides a positive course of action when the potential consequences from the use of conventional military forces excludes their use, yet it too might lead to violent reaction from its victim. If and when the victim of irregular warfare reaches a point that his defeat is only a question of time, his actions should tend to become less rational. Will this lead to disregard of the nuclear deterrent of his opponent?

Finally, there is the danger of the authorities retaliating against the people to such a degree that those needed at some later date will be killed or discouraged. This question has both its practical and moral aspects. Until there is hope that a movement against a particular government will be carried to a successful conclusion, there is little to be gained by compromising that movement's organization. To a degree this is the reason the communists have not conducted guerrilla warfare in Great Britain, France, Germany, United States, or Italy. Since they know such attempts would fail at this time, they wisely have elected to pursue other means of conflict. In turn, it would be equally unwise to attempt active operations within USSR or China if they were certain to fail. The ruthless retaliation against the people which would certainly come from the communists wherever their rule was threatened induces a moral problem. Can the Free World accept morale responsibility for contributing to the action which triggered these deaths? The communists do not have to concern themselves with this problem for through communist logic, within the structure of Marxist-Leninist dogma, any such effort is "right."29

Will the ethics of the Free World allow effective offensive irregular warfare? To wipe out such activity the communists will not hesitate to kill,
Can the fear so generated be overcome by one who will not also kill? Will intimidation, compromise, and terrorism be committed for the sake of freedom and the dignity of the individual? To date the answer to these questions has been "No," and to date effective offensive irregular operations by the Free World have also been lacking. Only the record of history will show whether these matters were critical. Regardless of the answer, however, it is true that irregular warfare is no place for the moralist. It requires men with iron nerves, deep dedication, and a powerful sense of duty.

**Basic Considerations.** There must be dissatisfaction among the people and a cleavage between the people and the authorities before an area can be considered to have irregular potential. There is little, other than economic warfare activities, that can be done from external sources to initiate dissatisfaction - this is done by the authorities and the environment. However, once some dissatisfaction is present, no matter how small, it can be intensified by waging psychological warfare.

Next a belief, which is meaningful to the people as a way to correct the conditions with which they are dissatisfied, must be formulated. The all-pervading ideology of communism with a philosophy which claims the ability to solve all economic, social, and political problems is the most active revolutionary belief in the current world. They conduct continuous propaganda to impress the underdeveloped countries with the thought that the example of USSR and China provide the answer to the problems these countries know all too well. It is therefore, not surprising that communism supports most of the irregular activities in the current world. In each campaign conducted by the communists their ideology is supplemented and combined with other thoughts so as to have a belief for that specific campaign. Since the environment, political awareness, and stage of economic development all
influence the dissatisfaction shared by a people, it is important that the belief developed be meaningful to the specific people in question as a means of solving their dissatisfaction. Until the Free World establishes a revolutionary doctrine to be advertised, promoted and sold with vigor, shrewdness, and sincerity to match, or exceed, that communism now enjoys, successful offensive irregular operations within communist controlled territory are highly improbable.

The formation of an organization, around the belief, is the third basic requirement. As dedicated leaders emerge, both the internal and the external components of the organization can be established.

The relationship of dissatisfaction to the control measures of the authorities is often overlooked when considering offensive operations. Some consider that because widespread dissatisfaction exists, irregular warfare can be conducted. This is not necessarily true. The dissatisfaction of the people must be able to overcome the control measures of the authorities.
Much greater dissatisfaction is required in Country "A" to create conditions favorable for irregular warfare than in Country "B" because the internal control measures are more effective in Country "A." While this fact is basic, it is not understood by those who feel that since the people living under communism must be unhappy irregular warfare would be easier to conduct in the communist empire than in the Free World. Yet just the opposite is true.

A detailed study of the invasion attempt of Cuba on 17 April 1961 will undoubtedly offer many lessons. The need to consider the relationship between dissatisfaction and control measures now appears to be one. Assume that the reports of dissatisfaction within Cuba prior to this invasion attempt were accurate - exiles, however, have a natural tendency to greatly overestimate the degree of dissatisfaction in their homeland. The possibility that the Cuban authorities would upon first sign of invasion conduct mass
arrests, which by hit or miss would take into custody those who might have sparked an uprising to supplement the invasion, appears from information currently known to have been given little, if any, weight. Even though the dissatisfaction in Cuba at that time can be considered to have been sufficient to support a revolt if limited control measures had been in effect, it was insufficient in light of the control measures which were utilized.

A major obstacle to effective offensive operations is the frame of mind which considers unconventional activities to be only for the support of conventional forces. While there is no question that irregular forces can materially assist any operation of conventional military units, to limit them to this role deprives them of their true potential. This frame of mind stems from an attempt to consider only the "military" aspects of irregular warfare - an absurdity. Those who desire to consider only the "military" aspects are following in the tradition of the 14th Century mounted knight with his disgust for the Bowman and other foot soldiers, the British regular of 1777 with his contempt for the American rifle, and the 19th Century mercenary with his disapproval of the nation-in-arms wrought by universal conscription. The ultimate goal of irregular activities is making the use of conventional forces unnecessary - not close support of them.

Each particular campaign which is contemplated must be analyzed in detail to determine the nature of irregular warfare which has the best prospects of success. For example, location of the area of the campaign with respect to major antagonists must be considered. To attempt to foment active guerrilla operations in the Ural Mountains of USSR, or the Appalachian Mountains of the USA, would be equally undesirable at the present time. Much better opportunities are to be found in the countries on the peripheral of the major powers. Here the governments are weaker, dissatisfaction
is greater because of the undeveloped nature of the countries, and terrain is more favorable because of lack of modern transportation networks. Once the basic requirements of dissatisfaction, belief and organization are established a movement against the authorities can be developed. Determination and patience must be added in heavy dosages, however, before the first blossom of success will appear.

An analysis of the irregular potential in the satellite states of Eastern Europe will show a variation between these states and great difference. In Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary strong national appeal is possible and the educated, political aware people make an appeal on the basis of political or religious ideology possible. The terrain, while not ideal, is fully satisfactory for any type of irregular warfare. External support poses a major obstacle. The existence of a neutral Austria and a changeable Yugoslavia prevents direct access to most of the area, and the "Iron Curtain" effectively isolates the rest. The memory of Hungary which received only moral assistance, which has little effect on tanks, in its hour of need adds to the difficulty of developing offensive activities. For while individuals may be willing to risk their own life, they are much more reluctant to risk the lives of all their families and friends. The hope of success must be short range if any great number of the people are expected to actively support the movement; until that time the best that can be hoped for are a few dedicated and motivated leaders to organize and strengthen the underground.

Any analysis of the irregular potential in an underdeveloped country must consider the general apathy and lack of political awareness of the people. While exiles will always paint the dissatisfaction within their homeland as being very great, it may be relatively insignificant. If starvation, hardship, corruption, and regimentation have always been a part of a peoples
life, there is little chance there will be sufficient motivation among that people to support a resistance movement.

While in a relatively advanced country, with a middle class, there is a broad basis from which to develop a resistance movement, this is not true of an underdeveloped country. Often you must rely on two small groups: disenchanted intellectuals or primitive tribal people with traditional hostility toward the authorities. Both groups are small minorities which are separated from most of the people and are therefore, a poor basis from which to operate. They cannot be a catalyst. The intellectuals in underdeveloped countries are so few, and so far removed from the people, they often seem to be of little help. For the long run, however, they offer more promise than the primitive tribes. These tribes are obsolete and since they are static as far as social and economic development are concerned, their future is dim no matter how courageous they may be as individuals and how skilful they may be as warriors.

Irregular warfare is slow. Mao Tse-tung took leadership of the Chinese communists from Li Li-san in approximately 1930, but was not victorious until 1949. If speed is essential only orthodox warfare can be the answer. The very nature of irregular warfare requires years to build an organization which can make offensive operations possible. The title of one of Mao Tse-tung's works on such warfare, On Protracted War, places this in proper perspective.

The Case of Viet Nam. The efforts of the French Service Action (similar to U. S. Army Special Forces) in Viet Nam from 1950 to 1954 illustrate offensive operations conducted within communist controlled territory. This experience is far more pertinent to problems of today than are the much better recorded experiences of World War II. For while unsucess-
ful from a strategic point of view it provides many lessons which can be useful today.

There are several reasons why these efforts are not better known; they were carried out in secrecy, thus were known to only a few at the time they were being conducted; with France's withdrawal from Viet Nam those who had participated in them preferred to remain silent after they had to abandon the natives with which they had worked. Thus, valuable experience was forgotten or ignored.

France's initial attempt after World War II was to reestablish control of the whole region of Indo-China. These attempts were supplemented by efforts to strengthen her influence among the minorities. In the south this was made easier through agreements with the religious sects. In the center and north the support of mountain minorities met with some success. Thousands of auxiliary native troops were enlisted and their excellent performance resulted in victories in all orthodox battles. Guerrilla operations of the Hre movement, on the plateau, and among the Thais, in the northwest, were some of those allied with the French which enjoyed success as long as the balance in the orthodox battles between the communists and the French tilted in favor of the French. When the forces of Ho Chi-minh, with Chinese support, were finally able to take the offensive in orthodox battles, however, the irregular operations of these mountain people collapsed. In brief, the day came when the French and their supporters were too few in number to protect all of the mountain regions and had to concentrate on defending the more vital parts of the country.

Finally in 1951 a Special Action Group was formed under direct command of the French Commander-in-Chief in Indo-China. Its mission was to conduct unconventional warfare (escape and evasion, guerrilla activity, and sabotage) in communist controlled territory.
Initially, commando type units were established near areas controlled by the communists with instruction to penetrate as deeply as possible into these areas. Other units were given the task of landing within the Viet Cong controlled zone in the center of Viet Nam to disrupt the rebel's logistic and communications systems. Although there were a few notable successes, the total results were meager since opportunities for good ambushes or sabotage were rare due to the austere nature of the Viet Cong forces and the fluidity of their operations. Since the people lived in fear of communist reprisal they showed a reluctance to assist unless the conventional military units of the French returned in large numbers. For the same reasons efforts to operate escape routes from remote prison camps failed.

After the disappointing results of the initial effort, consideration was given to the development of guerrilla activities in order to hinder the communists through threatening their bases and causing a portion of their effort to be diverted to their rear area. Three groups provided insurgent potential: the religious sects in the south, the Catholic colonies, and the mountain people.

The religious sects were spread over much of Cochin-China and were already engaged in fighting with the Viet Cong. They were, however, only interested in consolidating their own control over specific areas. As a result they wanted to create armies within an army, and states within a state rather than work for a united nation. With this motivation they had no desire to go into enemy held territory. The continual struggle for power for which they were the participants, as well as the cause, resulted in anarchy which reduced many times their usefulness to insignificance.

The Catholic colonies represented another problem. Due to their higher degree of education and more stable structure, they could have been
helpful. They had, noticeably in the north, been organized into self-defense communities. They were copies of the religious fiefs found in Europe during the Middle Ages. They had, however, a historical handicap. Approximately a hundred years previously they had opposed the authorities in order to protect their religion and at that time were considered more or less as traitors. They were now preoccupied with the desire not to be considered traitors again by their countrymen. They, therefore, followed a neutral course in this conflict which found their countrymen on each side. For example in the communities of Phat Diem, Bui Chu and Binh Dind, although persecuted by the communists and starving, they restricted their efforts to self-defense and refused to conduct guerrilla operations against the Viet Cong.

As a result of the limitations on the use of the religious sects and the Catholics, the guerrilla efforts supported by the French rested on the mountain people: Thai, Man, Miao, Meo, and Muong. They were poorly educated but, as all mountain people, they were courageous and ingenious. With strong traditional unity within each tribe and dedication to defense of their home area they were opposed to the Viet Cong who had tried to restrict their freedom. They were, therefore, happy to receive support in order to revolt against the Viet Cong. They knew well how to exploit the rugged nature of their country and were well adapted to guerrilla warfare.

Operations were first conducted in the extreme north of Viet Nam along the Chinese border by a leader of a tribe in that area: Cho Quan Lo. Teams of men native to that area were parachuted in with radios. In less than two months over 1500 guerrillas were organized by these teams and they were able to deny the mountains to the Vietminh. This was such a threat that a Chinese division had to be brought across the border to help the local Vietminh regiment which was attempting to eliminate the guerrillas.
Despite such massive counterinsurgency operations the mountains were held for more than one year. These guerrillas were crushed after the fall of Dien Bien Phu.

The news of this resistance spread among the mountain tribes and their desire to protect their home area from the Viet Cong supported the formation of other guerrilla units. Some were trained at a guerrilla center established by the French at Camp Saint Jaques and were returned with radio sets to their own regions. Others were organized locally by French units before withdrawal. After these guerrilla bands were established the French provided supplies by both air drop and landing on small air fields held by the guerrillas. The towns of Phung Tho and Than Uyen were held by these guerrillas for several months; the border bridge at Lao Kay leading to China was destroyed.

In the spring of 1953, one year before the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the successful evacuation of the pro-French garrison from Nansan, in the Thai region, was made possible by the guerrilla units which blocked the movement, or attracted the attention, of the communist’s troops. The movement continued to spread until the fall of Dien Bien Phu. For example, 55 native teams were dropped in the area on the northeast side of the Red River in a three month period. They were able to organize an area with some 35,000 people and captured villages of Pak Ha and Hoang Su Phi from the Viet Cong. They received 2,087 weapons which were dropped to them, took 720 Viet Cong soldiers who defected with their weapons and killed 358 Viet Cong soldiers in battle. At the same time in other areas other methods were successful: natives dropped with radio sets reported enemy activity to a French plane which flew over each day on a prearranged schedule.
As always, the commanders of the conventional military forces wanted to use such forces to support their immediate operations rather than allowing them to concentrate on long range objectives. While they were not used until late in the campaign and many opportunities were lost as a result of misunderstanding of their purpose by the conventional commanders this group did illustrate the potential of operations within communist territory.

Summary of Offensive Irregular Operations.

Irregular operations in communist territory pose problems for the Free World which do not apply equally to the communists in their operations throughout the Free World.

Basic requirements are:

Dissatisfaction great enough to overcome the control measures in effect.

A belief to offer the people a solution to their dissatisfaction.

A complete irregular organization.

Long range hopes are less effective than prospects of short range results in developing an irregular potential.

Each campaign must be based on a detailed analysis of the conditions in that area rather than in some standard manner.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

The importance of irregular warfare, or at least that portion called guerrilla warfare, is fully accepted today by the military and political leaders of the Free World. It is, therefore, not necessary to reiterate its importance as it would have been a very short time ago. For irregular warfare it is now more vital to stress: (1) the role of the professional soldier (2) the dangers and pitfalls, and (3) the need for strategic direction.

Role of the Professional Soldier. The professional soldiers of the Free World have a unique place in the current conflict. Some view them as an evil, perhaps necessary, but still an evil. A more correct view would be as a necessary part of any free society. It is a part of such a society which remains strong but unnoticed when there is no threat, but which comes forth to protect that society when there is danger. The image of the military should be that of a strong, alert and ever-ready body waiting in the wings to be called; it comes forth in time of crisis when the weak-hearted are fleeing, the fine words ring hollow, and the future seems bleak; at that time, through thought, word, and deed, it restores order and confidence by decisive action which leaves no room for doubt of ability or intention, humane conduct which gains popular support, and efficiency which gains respect; then, it returns to the people and the proper authorities, as rapidly as possible, their rights and duties before returning to its normal place in the wings.

There have been examples of, and no doubt will be more, opportunists in uniform who have used their position to advance their own, or some special group's, interests at the expense of the people. There have been,
however, far more examples of the dedicated professional soldiers whose sole interests were the protection of the people of their nation. It is rarely possible to tell the military opportunist from the professional soldier by training, appearance or words. The true difference is in his intent: to exploit the people in one case, and to protect and help the people in the other. This can best be known from deeds.

As all professionals, the soldier has a duty to render advice. The doctor and lawyer must advise their patient or client as to what should or should not be done. Whether the patient or client follows this advise is a decision they alone must make, but if the professional has true expertness in his field, the odds are heavily in favor of following that advice. The soldier's field is defense of his nation. He must be alert to how, why, and to what degree combat has changed and then give any appropriate advice. When combat shifted from the club to the bow and arrow, those who failed to make the shift were defeated. When mechanization brought the truck, tank, and airplane to a place of dominance, those who failed to adjust were defeated. Now that warfare has made several shifts the prospects are no brighter for those who fail to adjust to the new environment of both nuclear missilary and irregular warfare. The professional soldier must clearly and objectively analyze the current environment and render the best possible professional advice as to the requirements for success. If those who must then make the decision elect, for economic, political, or social reasons, to ignore this professional advice, this is, of course, their privilege. Just as the patient or client has no obligation to follow the advice of their doctor or lawyer so the political leaders have no obligation to follow the advice of their soldiers.

No doctor or lawyer worthy of his profession would hedge his advice on the anticipation of some objection or criticism of that advice; so for the
professional soldier. It is rare that the political leaders have provided all
the men, weapons, and bases that their professional soldiers have felt
necessary. It can be expected that the expense of nuclear missilery and the
context of irregular warfare will prevent the political leaders of many states
from providing that which their soldiers believe to be necessary for success.
If they are professional soldiers they will accept this without any attempt to
reverse the decision by force, but on the other hand they will never rational­
ize their professional judgment into something which is "acceptable." Also,
assuming the advice of professional soldiers to be correct, the chance of
success will be directly related to the degree that advice is approved.

While advice by the military on the guns, ships, planes, nuclear wea­
pons and missiles they believe necessary for success creates no great prob­
lem - since they are an accepted part of "war" - this is not true with the
weaponary of irregular warfare. Due to the political nature of this kind of
combat innumerable traps and pitfalls are presented to those soldiers who
advise on the requirements for success. The military opportunists will,
without doubt, choose to remain silent on this subject since this is the path
to personal advancement in a free society. The professional soldiers cannot
follow this path for the protection of their nation and the well-being of the
people of that nation are at stake. They must clearly and objectively render
their advice in keeping with their professional duty regardless of personal
consequences. The criticism and attacks, which they might, and most surely
will, receive are a sacrifice they must bear in the interest of duty to their
country; considering that they are prepared at any time to give their life for
the same, it is a small sacrifice by comparison.

Risks to Democracy. The risks involved by the military of repre­
sentative democracy fighting irregular warfare are great, since the con­
venient separation of "military" and "political" matters is impossible in this form of conflict. To be effective all aspects of irregular warfare must be considered as a whole, but it is important that the following risks always be recognized:

1. To meet all irregular attacks of either fascists and communists it is necessary to accept a certain, but controlled, degree of politicalization of the military. This same politicalization, however necessary, diminishes one of the chief safeguards against rule by force. The ideal would be that the military would be politicalized sufficiently to protect those they represent from destruction by either internal or external forces but not to usurp power. Reaching this ideal is not easy in the current world, yet nationalism and patriotism offer the best hope.

2. To make the military a dynamic force needed to combat communist or fascist ideology requires their indoctrination with a positive belief. The heritage of the west requires that this be done through the slow evolution of the thoughts of each individual rather than through the massing of modern psychological techniques to direct the minds of all subjects in a desired direction. Whatever the means, dedicated, self-directing warriors for a specific belief are the aim. While success rests on the relative degree to which the opponents approach this aim, this uniformity in itself produces risk for a democracy.

3. To protect a country against insurgency requires the use of some methods (organization of the people, resettlement, sever controls, etc.) which are the antithesis of a representative democracy. The continuation of the judicial processes designed to protect the individual from mistreatment results in slow and lenient action which weakens the ability to control the people. An effective defense of a representative democracy against irregular
attack, therefore, presents almost insurmountable problems, contradictions, and risk.

4. To stop an enemy from recruiting among the people might require social, economic, and political reforms. This requires closer identification of the people with the authorities either through actual reform or effective presentation of the authorities' position. When taken in the local context the needed reforms may be very difficult to accomplish through democratic means and propagandization of the people by the authorities may be contrary to freedom of expression.

These risks call for decisions. The dangers of defeat from failure to provide the means to fight successful irregular warfare are matched by the dangers of dictatorial control. The decisions required must be made by the political leaders. The military, and any other organization with force at their disposal, must obey. If the political leaders default in their task of decision making, it is the duty of the professional soldiers to prevent the military opportunists from usurping power in order to make the decisions themselves, yet it is also their duty to continue to advise the political leaders of the need for providing the means used in fighting irregular warfare. The courage, farsightedness, intelligence, and skill required by the political leaders in making these decisions are without equal. Success or defeat in irregular warfare will depend on how well they are made.

The military have a most difficult task in the environment of irregular warfare for the convenient separation of "military" and "civilian" functions of orthodox war does not apply. Their key is to always remain professional soldiers who are loyal to the political leaders. This requires them to avoid partisan activities or becoming involved in discussions of domestic political issues, and thus to serve no faction, and to seek no political advantage.
They remain professionals in the field of protecting their nation and the people of that nation.

**Strategy.** Although everyone agrees that the current communist threat is world-wide, there has been a noticeable absence of a unified strategy of the Free World to counter it. It would be improper for professional soldiers to advocate specific ways, or institutions, to provide this need. This is the task of the political leaders of the Free World. Yet, it is the duty of the professional soldiers to point out the weakness in the Free World's current conflict with communism from the absence of such a strategy.

What then are the strategic requirements the professional soldiers can rightly expect if they are to accomplish their tasks?

1. An objective or mission. With respect to real estate, some of the mission has been provided. To protect that land, sea and air presently under the control of the Free World is currently a mission. The exact mission with regard to that territory under communist control and space, however, is not as firm. The mission with respect to the minds of men is not clear. With our opponents actively engaged in the advancement of a positive ideology, a positive ideology for the Free World to enter this portion of the conflict is still, at least in practice, lacking.

2. An allocation of means. With a considerable portion of the Free World's strength in the industrialized nations which lie in the northern hemisphere, the coordination and utilization of all their resources in close partnership is essential. Also, it is necessary that the less developed countries of Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East be helped so that they can play a useful role in the defense of the Free World. The
utilization of all available resources and the building of new north-south ties throughout the Free World is a strategy requirement.

Unity of Action. Related to the strategy of the Free World in the current conflict is the question of a coordinated response. Is containment, which will allow the enemy to destroy itself or evolve into a member of the Free World, the course to be followed? Or is liberation of the people under the control of the enemy correct? This and other basic decisions are required from the Free World before a common viewpoint is obtained and a united front can be presented to the enemy's monolithism.
NOTES

CHAPTER I


2. Although Cannae is one of history's most studied battles and an example often cited by those of the "tactics by geometry" school, recent work by the Italian Ministry of Monuments has cast doubts on the very foundations of all such thought. Previously this battle was considered to have taken place on flat, low ground. It was thought that the convex centre of Hannibal's battle-line was forced back into a concave position, and at that point Hannibal directed a crushing blow with his heavier flanks. Now it appears that Hannibal's victory was primarily the result of a giant ambush of the Roman Army through shrewd use of terrain. The centre seems to have fallen back into a concealed "L" shaped valley with the massacre taking place when the Romans followed into that valley.

3. There is no standard terminology for the subject of this study. The whole subject has been called unconventional warfare (James D. Atkinson), fourth dimensional warfare (Frank R. Barnett), irregular warfare, cold war, and situations short of war. Each term has its own peculiar meaning to each author. The term unconventional warfare has a more restrictive meaning among United States military (guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion). The term irregular is used in this study in the broad sense presented in U. S. Army FM 31-15, Operations Against Irregular Forces, May 1961, which includes military, political, psychological and economic acts for the purpose of eliminating or weakening the authority of an established government.

CHAPTER II


6. In Soviet usage revolutionary is any person who willingly and unconditionally will defend the USSR.

7. Guerrilla has a more restrictive meaning than rebel or insurgent, both of which include those of the underground and auxiliary personnel, in addition to active combatants. In this study no distinction is made between rebel and insurgent. There is, however, currently an effort to use rebel when referring to a person indigenous to the area of combat and insurgent to refer to any person in the movement.

8. Viet Cong means Viet Communists and refers to communists in both north and south Viet Nam. The communists are at times referred to as Viet Minh which comes from the first and last words of Viet Nam Doc Lap Minh (Viet Nam Independence Coalition). This was an organization of both communists and non-communists formed in 1943 in South China. For the propaganda advantage it offers, the communists have continued to use this title.


12. Giap, Vo Nguyen, *La Guerre de Liberation et l'Armee Populaire*. Mobile warfare as the term is used by Giap and Mao Tse-tung means that
form of exterior-line, quick-decision combat which is undertaken by conventional military units along an extensive front.

CHAPTER III


16. While both Lenin and Trotsky were thinkers as well as leaders, it can be said that Trotsky was the organizer and the man-of-action for the Russian Revolution. Lenin's contributions to the revolution were primarily his conversion of Marx's philosophy and guide to social action into a living political force pertinent to feudal Russia and his political skill. Trotsky thought in terms of coup d'etat while Lenin thought more of using the people in mass to overthrow the government -- revolutionary war. In November 1917, when the government of Kerensky fell, it was Trotsky who had organized and rehearsed the teams to take over the power plant, the bridges, the railway stations and other key installations in Petrograd (the capital). For this reason Trotsky's name is often associated with the coup d'etat in which a minimum of dedicated persons usurp a government. After an unsuccessful attempt in 1920 to install a Communist government in Poland, however, Trotsky accepted Lenin's idea of the revolutionary war. Trotsky then systemized this concept into five distinctive and progressive phases. Even though he established this theoretical plan of action Trotsky also realized that its chief characteristic would have to be flexibility. Thus, after a failure, he favored the rebels returning to a lower phase from which the revolt would continue.
CHAPTER IV

18. English translations normally use policy for Clausewitz's politik, and herein lies a failure to communicate. Policy in such translations is used to mean the fundamental system of a state and the interests of all of that community; in other words, the nation-state and its objectives. As will be shown, the communists have enlarged Clausewitz's concept. In modern English policy is normally used to mean an established position on a given question. In this study "polity" has been used rather than policy, because polity can be interpreted as having the same meaning as Clausewitz's "politik" and its limited usage should prevent misinterpretation.


20. Rauschning, op. cit.

21. Lenin, op. cit., Vol VII.

22. The five phases of revolutionary war as developed by Trotsky are:

   (1) A few individuals organize clandestinely. They increase the size of the underground and attempt to cause or accentuate insecurity and misery -- the "fire of harvest" -- of the people. The rebels hope to weaken the authorities' influence over the people and to make the authorities uneasy.

   (2) The leaders of the movement continue to build their organization. Action to cause insecurity and dissatisfaction grow bolder: strikes, riots, selective terrorism and intimidation. The rebels hope the authorities will react awkwardly since they do not know the importance of the movement and they are restricted by both laws and ethics.
(3) Local guerrillas are organized. Terrorism is planned. The war is everywhere and nowhere. The rebels control certain areas at night. The people are forced to assist the movement and thus are "hostile" in the eyes of the government. The rebels hope little by little to transfer the loyalty of the people from their government to the rebel organization.

(4) The rebels create a base of operations and establish a "liberation government" to rival the legal authorities. The net of the underground tightens its control over the people. Regional guerrilla units are established and an elite mobile guerrilla force is trained and equipped. The rebels intensify their psychological warfare to gain approval of their movement and contempt for the government, they aim to replace both within their country and throughout the world. The rebels hope to have the people so well controlled that the legal government actually controls only the cities and a few isolated areas.

(5) The rebels launch their attack with all means available -- the revolutionary war.

CHAPTER V


26. For details see article "Cops Tell Reds GIs Are Crazy; PWs Flock In," Pacific Stars and Stripes, October 1950. For other examples of successful use of unorthodox techniques by the U. S. Army see "Captured Arms Found in Suwon," United Press Dispatch, 26 January 1951 and Battleground Korea (Tokyo: Kyoto, 1951) Chapter 14 reference action of 20 April 1951.

CHAPTER VI


SAM C. HOLLIDAY

1948  Graduated USMA
1948  Colombia and Equador
1949-50  Platoon Leader, 29th Infantry Regiment - Okinawa
1950  Battalion S2, 25th Division - Korea
Sep-Nov 50  Counterinsurgency Duty - Korea
1951  Rifle Company Commander, 25th Division - Korea
1951-53  PMST, Carthage, Missouri
1953-54  Honor Graduate, Advanced Infantry Course, Fort Benning
1954-55  Tank Company Commander, 2d Armored Division - Germany
1955-57  Aide to CinC, Allied Forces Southern Europe - Italy, Greece
         and Turkey
1957-59  Fort Carson, Colorado
1959-61  Advisor to Army of Republic of China - Taiwan
1961-62  USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth

Silver Star, plus 2 unit citations, 2 combat wounds, 9 other awards, and 2 badges
PIERRE C. DABEZIES

1944-45  4th French Battalion, SAS Brigade - England
1945-46  Military Academy
1947     Platoon Leader, Ski Troops - Germany
1948-50  Native Paratroop Unit - North Vietnam and Chinese Border
1950-53  French Special Forces - Vietnam
1953     Duty with U. S. Army Special Forces - Korea
1955-57  Counterintelligence Duty - Madagascar
1958-60  Executive Officer, Paratroop Regiment - Algeria
1960-61  Aide to Minister of Defense, Republic of France
1961-62  USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth

Officer of Legion of Honor plus 8 citations and 3 combat wounds; Doctor of Law (Political Science).