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CREDIBILITY OF THE ARMY RESERVE IN THE NEW WORLD DISORDER

BY

COLONEL THOMAS M. STENGERT
United States Army Reserve

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The end of the Cold War, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union radically changed the balance of world power. To cope with the ambiguities of the resultant security environment and the inability to define clearly the threat, the U.S. has adopted a regionally-oriented and flexible military strategy. This strategy confronts the rapidly changing world security environment and competes with U.S. domestic issues for scarce resources. This study examines the relevance of the U.S. Army Reserves and the Army National Guard as effective participants in the new military strategy, the ability and credibility of the Reserve components to perform generic missions, their potential contribution to the Army's Total Force, and their cost effectiveness. The report discusses the organization of the Army reserve components, analyzes the Active Army's proposed reductions in Reserve forces end strength and Congress' objections, provides an assessment of Reserve forces readiness capabilities relative to generic missions and the requirement for rapid response contingency forces, and reviews systemic programs affecting the readiness capability of Reserve forces. The study concludes that the Army Reserve Components continue to be a relevant and credible part of the Total Army of the future.
CREDIBILITY OF THE ARMY RESERVE IN THE NEW WORLD DISORDER

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

COLONEL THOMAS M. STENGER
UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE

COLONEL STEPHEN L. BOWMAN
PROJECT ADVISER

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17103
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CREDIBILITY OF THE ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS
IN THE NEW WORLD DISORDER

INTRODUCTION

The second law of thermodynamics aptly describes the transition from the Cold War era to the "New World Order." Roughly stated, the law describes the spontaneous evolution from a state of equilibrium to an ever increasing state of disorder in the absence of a stabilizing force. Geopolitically, the law suggests rapidly changing world events, the spawning of an increasing number of potential flash points, and uncertainty as the world transitions from the relatively stable and predictable Cold War era to the unknown "New World Order."

Accordingly, the demise of the Warsaw Pact and communism in the Soviet Union marks the end of the Cold War and the conventional military threat to Western Europe. The disintegration of the Soviet Union into fifteen independent republics radically changes the balance of world power. While greatly reducing the possibility of global or nuclear warfare in the near future, the power imbalance fosters military, economic, and political instability, the proliferation of advanced weaponry, and a resurgence of ethnic, religious and nationality problems. Iraq’s hegemonic incursion into Kuwait and North Korea’s sudden withdrawal from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty underscore how abruptly regional stability can be threatened. The emergence of the United States as the sole
superpower demands a total reassessment of world security strategies. As the world's dominant stabilizing force, the United States must find new ways to reestablish equilibrium in the new world of disorder.

The current National Security Strategy of the United States reflects the complexity and uncertainty of a rapidly changing international security environment. It addresses the necessity for the United States, as the preeminent world power, to provide the strength and leadership essential for a stable and democratic world order. The National Military Strategy of the United States also reflects the ambiguities of the rapidly changing world and provides military guidance supporting the National Security Strategy. Strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution underpin the new regionally-oriented and flexible strategy. The new strategy provides a Base Force capable of executing the National Security Strategy with prudent risk.

The principal adversary during the Cold War was the Soviet Union. Even during the Cold War, the simplistic identification of a principal enemy proved wanting. Today's obscure threat defies precise definition. Inability to define clearly the threat precludes exactness in planning. The size and structure of the Base Force is designed around an uncertain and unknown threat.

Therein lies the root of the problem; the American public refuses to commit constrained resources to defend against an
undefinable and imperceptible threat. During the Cold War era, the American public sacrificed domestic investment and expended vast resources deterring global and nuclear warfare. That threat died with the Soviet Union and emergence of the United States as the sole world superpower. Today, domestic issues threaten to bankrupt America and demand immediate attention. National defense remains an important issue, but now the operative words are essential and cost effective. Not only is it imperative to achieve the most bang for the buck; there must be a need to bang.

PURPOSE

The National Military Strategy confronts the radically changed security environment and scarce resources with a significantly smaller, highly trained, flexible force capable of rapidly responding to regional contingencies. The restructured force must be capable of quick and decisive victories with minimal casualties. This report examines the relevance of the U.S. Army Reserves (USAR) and the Army National Guard (ARNG) as effective participants in the newly restructured force, the ability and credibility of Reserve Component (RC) units to perform generic missions, their potential contribution to the Army’s Total Force, and their cost effectiveness.

DISCUSSION

A brief discussion of the organization of the Army reserve components will facilitate a better understanding of the problem.
The Army reserve establishment consists of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. Most train regularly and get paid. Some do neither. U.S. Army reservists are members of either the Army National Guard (ARNG) or the Army Reserve (USAR). The two components are mainly differentiated by their chain of command and their role and missions. The Army Reserve is directly controlled by the federal government and consists primarily of support forces. The National Guard is organized by state and is controlled by state governors except when federalized by the president with Congressional authority. The National Guard is primarily a combat force.\footnote{Reservists are further divided into three readiness categories--Retired Reserve, Standby Reserve, and the Ready Reserve.}

The Retired Reserve contains all reserve component enlisted members and officers who are eligible for retirement and are not voluntary members of either the Standby Reserve or the Ready Reserve. Retirees can be recalled to active duty.\footnote{During Desert Storm 1,355 retirees were recalled.} The Standby Reserve, consisting mainly of key employees and reservists with temporary hardships or disabilities, can also be called to active duty, but only in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress.\footnote{The Ready Reserve contains the bulk of the reserve forces' capability and is made up of the Selected Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and the Inactive National Guard (ING). The Selected Reserve contains the soldiers that are assigned to the troop units in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. These}
soldiers are paid, train regularly one weekend each month and an additional two weeks sometime during the year, and are the easiest and most likely to be mobilized. Individual Ready Reserve members have previously trained in an active or reserve Army unit and are fulfilling remaining contractual obligations. Some members voluntarily extend their commitment to the IRR. Generally, IRR soldiers neither train nor get paid. The Inactive National Guard is the Guard's equivalent to the IRR.8

By executive order alone, the president can mobilization members and units of the Selected Reserve for nondomestic purposes. The president can mobilize up to 200,000 troops for a period of 90 days, and in some cases 180 days. Upon presidential declaration of a national emergency, up to a million members from all of the Ready Reserve can be activated for up to 24 consecutive months. Full mobilization of the nation requires Congressional legislation.9 All further references to reserves or reservists will include both the Army Reserves and the Army National Guard unless stated otherwise.

The passing of the Soviet Union significantly reduced the likelihood of global or nuclear war in the near future. The current Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) estimates two to five years warning time for a global conflict. The National Security Strategy focuses on regional conflicts and requires rapid deployment.10 The American public expects quick and decisive engagements with minimal losses. Such radical changes from the Cold War strategies beg the question: Is there still a legitimate
role for the Reserve Components in the new national security strategy?

Critics argue that with a regional military strategy based on a rapid response, reservists, part-time soldiers called to active duty for the crisis, would not be ready. The Roundout Brigade, activated during Desert Storm are cited examples. The units required extensive postmobilization training prior to deployment. The war was over before the units were ready. 

Conversely, antagonists contend that the long warning times available to prepare for a major war would allow ample time to reinstitute conscription, significantly reducing the need for the numbers of reservists in the Selected Reserves. Opponents also question the value added by some selected reserve units, such as aviation, relative to cost savings over similar active duty units. A further adversarial argument suggests that a downsized active force significantly reduces prior service personnel available to enter the reserve program. Many Active Component (AC) officers maintain that reservists are too inexperienced to handle the complexities of commanding and controlling brigade or larger size elements in a combat environment.

Most protagonists of the RC believe that reservists can successfully perform almost every generic type mission required in the Army today, albeit in some areas initially less skillfully than an Active Component counterpart. However, even those shortcomings could be greatly reduced with better training. While there are some jobs that AC units perform better, there are
also jobs in which reservists excel. The value added by the Reserve Components remains significant and cost effective for the military force of the 21st century.

Current budget and resource constraints push the military to the forefront of potential cost savings. The United States won the Cold War and the Gulf War and now is the world's only superpower. The American public does not perceive a real threat to our national security. Yet, the defense budget remains the largest part of the federal discretionary budget. To the American public, defense cuts represent reductions in federal government and active military forces—both are distrusted. A standing Army is expensive and potentially threatening to the nation that supports it. Historically, regular Armies have been unable to allay those suspicions. Despite the phenomenal success in the Gulf War, the perception of unfair treatment by the active Army to the three National Guard Roundout Brigades that were activated for Operation Desert Storm and subsequent fights over roles and missions and reductions in reserve troop strength merely underscore the cultural distrust. Americans have long advocated part-time citizen soldiers as an integral part of ensuring a free society.

The reserve system, an outgrowth of colonial American militia tradition, reflects the cultural suspicion of the professional military. Codified in the Constitution, military power is divided between the federal government and the states—citizen soldiers in the state militias and a professional Army.
The Constitution further provides Congress the authority to call the state militias into federal service, "...to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions," and to control them while federalized, "...provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and governing such parts of them as may be employed in the service of the United States...." Reserve forces, a source of tradition and local pride, provide a necessary link to the local communities as an outlet for local military interest and reassurances about the necessity for a continued strong military force. As the military steps into the 21st century, this stepping stone provides good footing--"reserve forces serve as the popular face of the regular Army." 

Former Speaker of the House Tip O'Neil frequently said, "all politics is local politics." The political influence of the reserves as a powerful constituency is not lost on Congress--which is not the case with the regular Army. The Department of Defense (DOD) directed the Army to reduce end strength by over 25% by fiscal year (FY) 1995. The Army proposed to cut the active force 31% and the reserve force 27% from Cold War levels. Congress approved the Army's projected reductions in active end strength, but only authorized 42% of the Army's planned cuts in the reserve end strength for fiscal years 1992 and 1993.

Continued Congressional pressure for greater reliance on reserve forces resulted in guidance from Defense Secretary Les Aspin to restore the scheduled 96,000 cut in reserve end strength
for fiscal year 1994, costing the active Army $451 million. These Congressional actions are not merely politically motivated, but reflect disagreement with Army arguments for proposed reserve cuts.

Three key factors guided the Army in their intended reduction of the reserve forces. Firstly, the change in the national security strategy required quick response to regional contingencies. Secondly, the experience gained during the Gulf War showed longer postmobilization training time required for reserve forces to meet requisite readiness levels for deployment. And thirdly, DOD’s Base Force mandated specific active and reserve end strengths and the divisional force mix.

The new national security strategy calls for a combination of forward presence and crisis response. The intent is to reduce previously forward deployed forces to the minimum required to demonstrate U.S. commitment to alliances and to enhance stability. Backing this forward presence are CONUS-based forces which can rapidly deploy to handle any regional contingency. Readiness and rapid deployment are central to the credibility of this new strategy.

Readiness and deployment capabilities of reserve forces during the recent Gulf War highlight their shortcomings. While combat support and combat service support units were generally deployed within 30 days of mobilization, the three roundout combat brigades that were mobilized required extensive postmobilization training prior to deployment (90-135 days).
Although the Army did not expect these roundout combat brigades to be ready for immediate deployment, the expectation was 30-60 days. Based on the actual postmobilization training times required, the Army revised their future expectations for reserve combat brigades to 60-90 days. The Army excluded the reserve combat brigades from contingencies requiring early deployment and relegated them to serve only in protracted and/or very large-scale conflicts. In two of the former "rounded out" divisions that were deployed to the Gulf War and have subsequently been assigned to the Army's contingency force pool, the Army substituted active brigades for the roundout combat brigades of the National Guard. The two former National Guard roundout combat brigades were redesignated roundup combat brigades. After 90 days postmobilization training, the roundup combat brigades would be available for deployment to their assigned active division as the fourth maneuver brigade.

Despite the admirable performance of reserve combat support and combat service support units deployed in the Gulf War, the Army decided to augment their earliest deploying forces with additional active support units--missions previously performed by reserve units. Current plans require only 9% of the Army's reserve forces to serve in conflicts lasting less than 75 days--all of them support forces. The decision limiting reserve force involvement in rapid deployment contingencies was further influenced by the fact that it took a few weeks to implement the President's reserve call-up during the Gulf War. This resulted
in shortages of support forces early in the war. Reserve combat forces and most of the reserve support forces now play a lesser role in crisis contingencies that evolve with little or no warning time. Reserve forces ultimately provide 40% of the support forces aligned with the five active divisions designated as the contingency force. With respect to reserve support for the active contingency force, only 7% of the reserve support forces would deploy in the first 30 days with the remaining reserve forces to deploy between 30 and 75 days. Only 9% of all reserve forces were designated to support the contingency force.

DOD's Base Force concept mandated both divisional force mix and end strengths for the Army's active and reserve forces. Constrained by prescribed configuration and strength caps, the Army had limited flexibility in force restructuring. A divisional mix of twelve active, six reserve, and two cadre reserve divisions were specified in the Base Force plan. End strengths were capped at 535,000 active personnel and 567,000 reserve personnel. The Army plans to have its portion of the Base Force in place by the end of fiscal year 1995, with twelve active divisions to meet the Base Force requirements for forward presence and crisis response forces. Of the eight reserve divisions, six National Guard divisions are earmarked for later deployment in a protracted major regional conflict and/or a potential global war, and two National Guard divisions are tagged as cadre for potential reconstitution. In addition to the
reserve support forces previously discussed, the remaining nondivisional support forces are assigned to preconfigured force packages to support deploying corps. 37

The Army’s recommended cuts in reserve end strength considered the revised National Security Plan, DOD’s Base Force Guidance, and lessons learned from the Gulf War. The Army’s proposed reductions were intended to result in a balanced force, realistic and necessary missions for all reserve units, and cost efficiency. 38 Congress does not agree, as evidenced by their disapproval of the Army’s proposed reductions.

Congress contends that the security environment has changed since DOD adopted its Base Force plan in late 1990, that other opportunities exist to use the reserves more effectively in the Army’s future force, and that planned reductions in reserve end strength do not consider all relevant factors.

The original Base Force envisioned two concurrent and extended major regional conflicts or a global war with the Soviet Union. Current likely scenarios depict multiple major regional conflicts evolving and being handled sequentially, and global war highly improbable. Estimates of warning time for a high intensity conflict requiring full mobilization, such as the reemergence of the Soviet Union, have increased from 18 months to 5 years. 39 Yet, neither of these major changes resulted in corresponding adjustments to the original Base Force plan.

Congress also questions the manner and effect of the Army’s downsizing. The Army’s approach to endstrength reductions is to
cut divisions and the corresponding support units associated with those divisions. The result is a smaller force, but still a replication of the previous Cold War design. Former President Bush emphasized this concern when he unveiled the new defense policy on 2 August 1990—the day Iraq invaded Kuwait.

The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess at present. If we simply pro-rate our reductions—cut equally across the board—we could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. What we need are not merely reductions—but restructuring.

The Army’s planned force-mix ratio in support of the Base Force is 49 percent active and 51 percent reserve. This compares to a 50-50 mix in 1988. Augmenting active forces with additional reserve support forces is one example that would preclude cloning a smaller version of a preexisting deficiency—a hollow active component support structure.


For example, over the course of the war, the Army exhausted its inventory of certain types of units such as water supply companies, graves registration units, pipeline and terminal operation companies, heavy truck and medium truck companies, units handling prisoners, and virtually all postal units. In some cases, the Army deployed virtually all of some types of support forces, leaving few, if any, to reinforce operations had the conflict lasted longer or a second conflict arisen. For example, the Army deployed 72 percent of its truck companies to support only 25 percent of the Army’s combat structure. ...other countries were able to provide more than 4,000 trucks and over 2,000 civilian truck drivers to meet transportation shortfalls. The fact that combat operations did not begin for 5 months and, once they did, lasted only a few days also lessened the impact of support force
shortfalls. The Army has noted that it may not be able to count on such levels of host nation support or this degree of preparation time in future conflicts.44

Additional support missions could be assigned to the reserves and excess reserve combat units could be converted to support roles. The Army estimates that approximately 90,000 doctrinally required support force positions will remain unfilled in their proposed FY 95 end strength projections.45 In some instances, the Army shifted support roles out of the reserves and into the active force, primarily to enhance early deploying active units. However, the Army's plan does not reflect the transfer of missions from the active component to the reserves to take advantage of the generally lower cost of reserves, despite the Army's acknowledgement of a significantly reduced threat.46

Based on FY 93 budget data, a reserve soldier costs approximately $18,000 as opposed to $62,000 for an active duty soldier.47 A 1992 Congressional Budget Office report estimates that the direct and indirect costs of a heavy division in the Army National Guard costs about $0.6 billion, or about 25 percent of the cost of an active heavy division stationed in Europe.48 The cost differential between like active and reserve units that are equipment intensive is considerably less, but still a significant savings. An Army analysis indicates that a reserve combat heavy engineer battalion costs about 64 percent less and a reserve attack helicopter battalion costs about 43 percent less than comparable active component units.49 Potential savings of that magnitude can not be ignored, but budget alone can not
dominate all decisions. The restructured force must be both cost effective and capable.

The unpredictability and spontaneity of the current world security environment requires fully-trained, highly-ready, rapidly-deployable, and initially self-sufficient contingency forces to function as a credible deterrent in the new national security strategy. The key to deterrence is credibility in the capability and willingness to use that capability. The Gulf War clearly demonstrated the fact that U.S. armed forces are a deterrent. Our overwhelming victory underscores U.S. capability, and the fact that U.S. forces were committed to protect U.S. interests abroad demonstrates willingness to exercise that capability. Additionally, the mobilization of the reserve forces sends an escalatory signal internationally and creates strong domestic political reaction. Over 225,000 reserve personnel were called to active duty in support of the Gulf War—more than 100,000 served in Saudi Arabia. More recent and sudden involvement in Somalia indicates the political willingness to commit U.S. forces.

Given those parameters and a rapidly shrinking active force, the Army prudently questions the readiness capability of reserve forces. As the budget constrains the force structure, reliance on reserve forces becomes greater—reliance on the combat readiness of reserve forces. Former Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono, in outlining the Army for the 1990’s and beyond, emphasized combat readiness as the focal point of a lethal army.
Lethality is the assured capability to defeat an opponent, winning as quickly as possible while preserving our most valued asset—the lives of our soldiers. ...The lethality of the Army of the future will be determined, above all else, by the actual combat readiness of the force—which, in turn, is a product of training. That is why training is the cornerstone of readiness.¹⁴

Despite the contribution of the reserve forces during the Gulf War, the debate over the readiness capability of reserve forces continues. There is a subjective reluctance on the part of many active duty officers to believe that the reserve forces are a credible force.⁵ Typical is a comment made by Major Daniel P. Bolger, currently serving as Chief of G3 Operations, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), as he discusses the impact of the new power projection strategy on the Army.

Army and Marine reserve components could provide certain specified support and combat service support units, prepare individual replacement lists, and maintain equipment parks. We might as well eliminate all of the organized reserve combat divisions and brigades, since they will never deploy anywhere but to the nearest flood plain or to an Independence Day parade. While we’re at it, let’s be sure to kill off the politically popular but militarily suspect roundout and roundup combat brigades and battalions. Power projection must be a way of life for full-time warriors, not an avocation for part-time soldiers who also carry a full-time civilian job, no matter how patriotic or dedicated these soldiers are. Contingency combat demands an extraordinary degree of battle readiness. Technically astute, tactically aware expeditionary soldiers and units must be ready to go now. To maintain such standards will require total professional commitment.⁷⁶

There are missions that the active component is best suited to perform, such as overseas duty, assistance to the reserve components, and no-notice and early deploying crisis reaction missions. There are also missions that match the competencies
and capabilities of the reserves. Peacekeeping, humanitarian, and domestic operations could be heavily augmented by reserve forces, thus freeing limited active assets to focus on warfighting missions.\textsuperscript{57}

Contrary to the fantasies of the American public, the likelihood that all future wars will be quick and decisive with minimal casualties is a pipe dream. The fact that years of advance warning might precede the next major conflict is of little consequence if the information is not acted upon. Pearl Harbor, Korea and, more recently, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait are examples of failure to act on information. If the U.S. is to maintain a viable and credible deterrent force, active and reserve forces must work together to improve and sustain both active and reserve readiness capabilities.

The Gulf War provides a starting point for improving readiness in the reserves and closing the credibility gap between the active and reserve forces. Studies to evaluate the postmobilization training conducted for the three Army National Guard roundout combat brigades provide useful information despite the fact that the Gulf War is an anomaly. A Congressional Research Service report for Congress about the relevance of the Army’s roundout concept after the Gulf War states,

\[\text{...although the roundout brigade mobilization process had never been tested before, the brigades proved capable of being validated for deployment within 3-4 months after being activated. This is an unprecedented achievement, when compared to the previous historical experience of mobilizing National Guard combat units of brigade or division size.}\textsuperscript{8}\]
includes an examination of postmobilization train-up time. It is central to their assessment. The report evaluates the readiness of the reserve components mobilized for the Gulf War.

Generally, we would concur with the statement that "For the most part, when reserve forces were activated, their readiness levels were sufficiently high to ensure mission accomplishment with a minimum of post-mobilization training."...The ARNG combat units apparently were not as ready as prior reporting indicated. Once the deployment standard for ODS/S was raised, their train-up time took longer than expected. ...Most individuals were qualified to perform assigned missions and functions when deployed. In general, any lack of individual preparedness did not detract from overall readiness. However, any lessons to be drawn from this should be tempered by three facts. (1) A tremendous amount of effort was made to ensure that individuals were deployable prior to call. (2) Due to lift constraints, units remained at mobilization stations beyond the time needed to reach unit deployment and readiness standards, which allowed added time for correcting individual deployment problems. (3) Access to the IRR did not occur until January. Earlier access would have allowed more ready individuals, particularly in skill qualification, to be assigned to called units."

Both of these reports attest to the fact that reserve units, including combat units, were capable of meeting the required C-1 readiness level for deployment. The active Army relied quite heavily on reserve support forces during the Gulf War. Several larger combat support units were directly involved in the shooting war. General Vuono testified before the House Armed Services Committee on 20 February 1991 that the 142nd and the 196th Field Artillery Brigades, reserve combat support forces, performed well and made a substantial contribution to the Army’s
firepower.\textsuperscript{60}

In addition to corroborating the readiness capability of reserve units mobilized and deployed in support of the Gulf War, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report and the Rand report also noted many of the same deficiencies that, if corrected, could increase readiness posture and decrease the postmobilization training time required for future deployments. Some of the more salient readiness problems noted include

...inadequate technical, tactical, and leadership competence among officers and noncommissioned officers at all levels. ...Other problems included inadequate expertise in field maintenance and administration; and, very importantly—and not at all related to Guard personnel readiness—wholesale incompatibility of active Army and Guard logistical and administrative equipment, management procedures, and automated information systems.\textsuperscript{61}

All are serious deficiencies, but all are correctable. Some of the required corrective actions have already been implemented.

Aimed at improving the readiness capability of reserve units that might be needed to support contingency operations, the Army implemented a pilot training program, Bold Shift, in the summer of 1992. Under this program, selected reserve units receive extensive training and additional resource support from both the reserve command as well as active "sponsor" units. The program builds on a foundation of individual skills and continues through collective tasks at crew, squad, platoon, and small unit levels. Progress from one level to the next occurs only upon validation of proficiency. Additional leader training is provided to NCOs and officers. Units that complete the training
become part of a pool of combat ready units available for contingency operations. This concept is a direct result of lessons learned from the Gulf War. Other initiatives include linking professional development education and skill qualification to promotion for both officers and NCOs.

Better integration of active and reserve units would also enhance readiness and increase confidence in reserve capability. The current system of nonintegration fosters an out of sight, out of mind approach on the part of the active component towards the reserves. With respect to training management, the current reserve command structure is susceptible to inefficiency and detracts from readiness. Peacetime command and control of reserve units is mission independent. The Army’s CAPSTONE program aligns reserve and active units with wartime commands. The active wartime gaining command is required to provide training guidance to aligned reserve units. That guidance is the basis for determining which mission essential tasks are to be trained.

The active wartime gaining command does not command reserve units in peacetime—it only provides training guidance. The wartime commander does not supervise the implementation of the training guidance to reserve units as the wartime commander does subordinate active units; nor is the wartime commander held accountable for the reserve unit’s readiness capability. Although most reserve commands seriously attempt to implement wartime training guidance, disconnects in the training structure
reduce the effectiveness of wartime mission training in most units. Holding active wartime gaining commanders more directly accountable for training the reserves should foster integration and improve reserve readiness. Such relationships would also bring reserve training more in line with the requirement of Field Manual 25-100, *Training the Force*, to train as you fight.

Failure by the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Forces Command, and the Continental U.S. Armies to properly monitor the CAPSTONE program undermines readiness and affirms the need for greater accountability. A Government Accounting Office report in 1982 identified the need to improve the CAPSTONE information system.

In 1982, we reported that the Army’s CAPSTONE information system did not reveal that (1) gaining commands had not contacted many subordinate units and (2) some units had not received mission guidance. We also reported that FORSCOM did not know what procedures that the CONUSAs were using to monitor CAPSTONE. Accordingly, we recommended that the Army develop a reporting system that would provide information that could be used to identify and correct CAPSTONE implementation problems.

In responding to our report, DOD’s position was that the Army did not need to implement an improved management information system for CAPSTONE.

Recently, another U.S. Government Accounting Office investigation of the Army’s CAPSTONE program in 1992 revealed that more than 460 reserve units, thirteen percent of the reserve units eligible for a CAPSTONE alignment, had reported that they had not received wartime mission guidance. These units trained without mission guidance for more than two years. Additionally, Army war planners were unaware that since 1989 at least 116 active and
reserve units did not have a CAPSTONE alignment. Furthermore, information management systems were unable to identify unaligned units readily nor to verify that aligned units had received training guidance from active wartime gaining commanders.\(^7\)

Wartime mission guidance is critical to a unit's ability to focus training resources on mission essential wartime tasks. Failure to monitor the CAPSTONE program could also result in unaligned units being deactivated. General Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before Congress in 1991 that units without a military requirement should be eliminated from the system.\(^7\)

Increased levels of equipment on hand and full-time support would further enhance reserve readiness capability. The Army's policy of first-to-fight, first-to-be-equipped, allowed reserve roundout units to receive fairly modern equipment. However, other early-deploying units, support units, have not fared as well. The prioritization of purchasing combat arms systems before combat support and combat service support systems created a significantly lower readiness level among U.S. Army Reserve units as compared to the active Army or the Army National Guard.\(^7\) A recent Government Accounting Office report, Reserve Forces: Aspects of the Army's Equipping Strategy Hamper Reserve Readiness, says; "Army Reserve and National Guard units are much better equipped than they were 10 years ago. However, substantial shortages of major equipment items remain, which adversely affect unit readiness."\(^7\) The lower readiness among
USAR units, which include approximately forty percent of the Total Army combat support and combat service support structure—many early-deploying—is the result of failure to resource. Currently, the USAR equipment-on-hand is approximately 60 percent of wartime requirements. The ARNG, with about 23 percent of the Total Army combat support and combat service support structure, has approximately 80 percent of their required wartime equipment-on-hand. Equipment redistribution as units deactivate will still leave the USAR with a 20 percent shortfall and older equipment, which reduces interoperability with the active Army and increases maintenance costs. Similarly, the overall level of USAR full-time support is 10 percent as opposed to 12 percent in the ARNG and 14 percent Department of Defense average. Lack of adequate full-time support is a major inhibitor to readiness.

Unquestionably, additional full-time support to handle routine administrative tasks, assist in performing scheduled maintenance on equipment, and coordinate and prepare for training increases the efficiency and effectiveness of the limited training time available to reservists. The high state of readiness achieved by the Air National Guard is attributed to the high proportion of full-time members, approximately 30 percent. Currently, the full-time level in the USAR is approximately 10 percent and in the ARNG, 12 percent. As additional equipment is given to the reserves, required maintenance will compete for limited training time. Without additional full-time support both
maintenance and training will suffer—both directly impact combat readiness.

One of the most significant ways to increase the combat readiness of the reserve forces is to increase the numbers of reservists who have extensive active duty experience. Recent reductions in the active force make large numbers of experienced soldiers available. The projected endstrength of the active force in the out years will reduce the number of prior service soldiers available for recruitment into the reserves. The Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 establishes minimum percentages of prior active duty personnel in the ARNG by September 1997. The Act requires 50 percent of enlisted and 65 percent of officer strength to have at least two years prior active duty experience. Fiscal year 1989 figures show the ARNG far below the mark with only 36 percent of the enlisted and 38 percent of the officers meeting the requirement. Although not legislatively required at this time, the USAR comes closer to meeting the requirements, but still short of the goals with officers at 62 percent and enlisted at 42 percent.80

Changes in reserve personnel and compensation policies may be necessary if the reserves are to attract larger numbers of prior service soldiers and to retain the best qualified soldiers.81 One such piece of legislation is again before Congress. The proposed law would overhaul the procedures for appointment, promotion, and separation of National Guard and Reserve officers. The proposed changes would bring the reserve
officer system more in line with the active duty regulations. From a readiness perspective, the most significant change would be the selection of "best qualified" officers for promotion as opposed to the current "fully qualified." As the active force endstrength is reduced, the number of available active duty losses that are willing to join reserve units will also shrink. Recruiting and retaining sufficient prior service personnel to meet and sustain higher prior service experience levels in the reserves will require major reform of current active and reserve compensation and personnel policies and especially the linkage between the two.

CONCLUSION

The Army reserve Components, the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve, remain a credible and integral part of the Total Army's deterrent force. The reserves provide valuable cost effective combat, combat support, and combat service support units capable of augmenting active forces in response to regional contingencies. Additionally, the reserves play an important role interfacing with the public and convincing them of the need for a strong military.

Within reasonable limits, reserve forces are capable of performing a wide range of missions from domestic operations to combat. This was validated during the Gulf War. Current limitations preclude large-scale commitment of reserve forces to short or no-notice contingencies. While serious deficiencies do
exist with respect to the combat readiness capability of some reserve units--most notably combat units--the effects of those shortcomings can be eliminated or reduced to an acceptable level of risk.

Significant improvements in the readiness capabilities of reserve forces can be achieved through increased integration of active and reserve forces through CAPSTONE alignment, additional modern equipment and full-time support, increased emphasis on leadership competence at all levels, concentration of training effort on individual and collective skills through company level, and increased active duty experience among reservists.

Immediate action should be taken to capitalize on the available pool of experienced active duty losses that are willing to join reserve units. Such additions provide immediate increases in combat readiness and require minimal training resources. As this invaluable resource pool shrinks, the prior active service experience level in the reserves will deteriorate—adversely impacting combat readiness. Significant changes to active and reserve compensation and personnel policies and the linkage between the active and reserve components' policies will be necessary to maintain the level of prior active duty experience in the reserves.

The key to the credibility of the Army Reserve Components is the same as it is for the Active Component--maintain a high level of combat readiness. That can only be achieved through training.
ENDNOTES


5Ibid., 7-8.


7Binkin and Kaufmann, 7.

8Ibid., 6-7.

9Ibid., 7.

10Bush, 7-8.

11Robert L. Goldich, "The Army’s Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War," CRS Report for Congress (91-763F Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C.:The Library of Congress, 22 October 1991), 14. After approximately 90 days of postmobilization training, the 48th Infantry Brigade was formally validated on 28 February 1991, the date of the ceasefire with Iraq. The ceasefire interrupted the training for the 155th Brigade and the 256th Brigade. These units were expected to complete postmobilization training and be validated in 105 and 135 days respectively.

12United States Congress, Congressional Budget Office, A CBO Study--Structuring U.S. Forces After the Cold War: Cost and Effects of Increased Reliance on the Reserves, (Washington, D.C.:

"Ibid., 2.


"Ross Perot, United We Stand (New York: Hyperion, 1992), 55.

"Bennie J. Wilson III, ed. The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, May 1985), Chapter 1, by Robert L. Goldich, "Historical Continuity in the U.S. Military Reserve System," 22, 25; Chapter 2, by Jonathan M. House, "John McAuley Palmer and the Reserve Components," 29. Both authors trace the origin and evolution of the state militia, citizen soldiers, to the continued desire to maintain a separation of state and federal government. Disdain for strong government and professional military was at the core of the American Revolution. That attitude persists today. Jonathan M. House writes, "Americans have long believed that the part-time citizen-soldier is the best defender of a free society. They have traditionally seen a standing Army as expensive, undemocratic, poorly motivated and potentially dangerous to the nation that pays it." Robert L. Goldich notes, "Finally, the United States had not shed its intense distrust and dislike of a major military presence in American society and of compulsory military service, nor had its satisfaction with the dual state-federal nature of the National Guard abated. .... Despite the transition of the United States from an agrarian ministate to an industrialized superpower, the Guard remains the local militia, and the active Army the force of the central government, as was the case 200 years ago. The blending of the two for national defense purposes, and their continued separation for domestic order purposes, represents a not often recognized triumph of American democracy."

"Ibid., 29, Chapter 2, by Jonathan M. House, "John McAuley Palmer and the Reserve Components."

Wilson, 15. Chapter 1 of this book, titled "Historical Continuity in the US Military Reserve System," by Robert L. Goldich, traces the origins of "regular" and "reserve" forces from feudal times, through our British ancestry, to its infusion into American culture. The quotes used are from the Constitution of the United States of America and are also a part of the above referenced work.

Walker, 303.

Ibid, 308.

Ibid.


Goldich, 14.

U.S. Government Accounting Office, Army Force Structure: Future Reserve Roles Shaped by New Strategy, Base Force Mandates, and the Gulf War, 22. At the time of mobilization, these brigades had reported required postmobilization training times to be between 28 and 40 days to prepare for all mission essential tasks.

Specific changes that should alter underlying assumptions about the threat of a global war include the official dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the failed coup attempt in the Soviet Union in August 1991, and the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991. Between February 1991 and February 1992, DOD and the Army downgraded the threat from Soviet-led aggression that would overrun Europe, to a possible resurgence of Soviet threat, and most recently to an unknown and uncertain threat.

An extract from President Bush's speech in Aspen, Colorado on 2 August 1990. Senator Sam Nunn, in his speech on the Senate floor on 2 July 1992, reiterated the same point when he referred to a discussion he had with former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William J. Crowe Jr. "He (Admiral Crowe) said that at every point in our history as a country, when we have faced the end of a period of military crisis and the start of an era of relative peace, we deal with our defense policy in a two-step process. The first step is to cut the defense budget. And when we do that we usually get a smaller version of what we currently have. The second step is to shape a new force in light of the changed circumstances. Admiral Crowe said that we have always tended to do the first step and failed to follow through with the second. That is why, he said, generals are usually prepared to fight the last war. It isn't their fault, Admiral Crowe said, because the Defense Department only gives them a smaller version of what they had in the last war."

Ibid.
A 1990 Government Accounting Office report, (GAO/NSIAD-91-3, 29 November 1990), *Army Force Structure: Lessons to Apply in Structuring Tomorrow’s Army* on the Army of Excellence restructuring efforts during the mid-80’s revealed that the Army had substantially reduced active component support forces. The Army acknowledged the greater risk in support functions but was willing to accept that risk in order to maintain higher readiness levels in the active combat force. U.S. General Accounting Office, *Army Training: Long-Standing Control Problems Hinder the CAPSTONE Program* (GAO/NSIAD-92-261) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, September 1992), 12. The report indicates that the troop lists established in 1989 in support of war plans contained shortages of support units. Unit types included medium truck, heavy equipment transporter, ammunition, and maintenance.


Some analysts have suggested that a larger role in air defense may be feasible.

These cost estimates are from Army documentation and include both direct costs; pay, allowances, and benefits ($8,300 for a reservist and $39,000 for an active duty soldier); and indirect costs such as operation and maintenance, housing, and military construction.


Powell, *National Military Strategy of the United States*, 23. The ability to respond decisively in the current volatile world environment is key to the credibility of U.S. forward presence as a stabilizing force. Robert J. Art, in his book *Strategy and Management in the Post-Cold War Pentagon* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 22 June 1992), 14-15, echoes the need for the U.S. to plan for a well-equipped, ready, sustainable, and mobile force. He emphasizes the necessity to focus on the maintenance of critical skills in both active and reserve units.

Binkin and Kaufmann, 109; and Rand, 94-97.


Rand, National Defense Research Institute, *Assessing the Structure and Mix of the Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1992), 132. Statement by Senator Sam Nunn before a Senate Armed Services Subcommittee, 30 July 1975, underscores the major problem with fully integrating the active and reserve forces. "I personally felt that one of the big impediments in preventing the total force policy from being a reality rather than a rhetoric has been the subjective reluctance of many people on active duty to believe that the Reserve Forces are a credible force." Walker, 303. Wallace Walker comments that U.S. regular officers tend to judge reserve forces in terms of their skills to close with and destroy the enemy on the battlefield. As a consequence, regular officers have been highly critical--and in some cases contemptuous--of reserve forces, especially in their abilities to perform effectively on the battlefield.


Roger W. Sandler, *The Chief, Army Reserve’s Vision*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 29 January 1993), 8-11. Missions that are generally short in duration, absent of direct combat, and logistically oriented are well suited to reserve strengths. The reserves also have large amounts of equipment that could be made available without impairing the readiness capabilities of early-deploying contingency force units. Civil Affairs, medical, and engineer reserve units have repeatedly proven their ability to successfully perform humanitarian missions. As a part of the local communities, reserve forces are well suited to interface with the public in support of domestic missions such as disaster relief, civil disturbances, and the fight against drugs.
Goldich, 23. This definitive report examines the problems experienced in the mobilization of the three Army National Guard roundout brigades during the Gulf War. He further examines alternative solutions to the problems experienced with the roundout concept. These solutions are instructive in the developing better training programs to minimize required postmobilization training time in the future. It should also be noted that these brigades were required to meet C-1 readiness levels prior to deployment. This proved that reserve combat brigades could reasonably meet C-1 readiness levels with 90 days or less postmobilization training. See also, Rand, 54-56; and Les Aspin and William Dickinson, Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War, pages 59-60.

Rand, 62. The quote contained within the quoted material came from the Department of Defense publication Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: An Interim Report to Congress, 1991, p. H-22. The Rand study provides a good analysis of the reserves and offers alternative force structures, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each course of action.

United States Congress, Congressional Budget Office, A CBO Study--Structuring U.S. Forces After the Cold War: Cost and Effects of Increased Reliance on the Reserves, 18.

Goldich, 21-22.

Rand, 120.


Jeffrey A. Jacobs, "Integrating the Total Army: The Road to Reserve Readiness," Parameters 20 (December 1990, 77-78. Jacobs examines current command structure in the reserves and its impact on readiness. Even the establishment of the new U.S. Army Reserve Command does not rectify the accountability problems inherent with the reserve command structure. Most reserve units are assigned to a higher headquarters based on geographic location and not their assigned mission. Consequently, a reserve headquarters may have such diverse unit types as graves registration, medical, signal, chemical, postal, and engineer.
Training management is further exacerbated by the fact that these diverse units have missions in several different wartime commands. In his article, Jacobs proposes that the active Army command that a reserve unit mobilizes with during wartime should exercise operational control over training during peacetime. The reserve command would then be limited to administrative and logistical functions.

"Jacobs, 77. The relationship between the reserve units and their active wartime commander is essentially one of voluntary cooperation. The relationship and training management is further exacerbated by constrained resources.

Rand, 132-133; Jacobs, 79-80.


Ibid., 20.

Ibid., 12-13, 19-24. Of the units without mission guidance, all but one claimed to have requested wartime training guidance from their higher headquarters, who forwarded the requests to the appropriate CONUSA. The CONUSAs instructed the units to develop their own guidance. The Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans has overall responsibility for establishing and implementing the CAPSTONE program. The Commander of FORSCOM is responsible establishing and maintaining alignments and ensuring that the wartime commanders provide wartime guidance to subordinate units in a timely manner. The Continental U.S. Army commanders are responsible for the day-to-day management of reserve forces to include alignment with a wartime command and to ensure that the reserve unit received wartime mission guidance.

Ibid., 3.


Katherine McIintire, "Equipment Shortages Harm Reserve Readiness," Army Times 5 April 1993, p. 14:1. This article discusses the findings of the recent Government Accounting Office (GAO) report, Reserve Forces: Aspects of the Army's Equipping
Strategy Hamper Reserve Readiness. The GAO study indicates a $13.7 billion shortage of major equipment in the reserves. Much of it is deemed essential to wartime missions. The findings state that the reduction in the total force will alleviate some of the shortages, but unless the Army changes the way it procures and distributes new equipment, reserve readiness will continue to suffer.


7Sandler, 3-4.
7Foss, 8; Sandler, 3.
7Binkin and Kaufmann, 70-73; Ward, 2-8.
7Sandler, 3; Ward, 2-8.
8Rand, xxxvii, 262-263.
8Rand, xxxviii.
8Rick Maze, "Officer Personnel Bill Resurrected in House," Army Times, 5 April 1993, p. 14:1. This will be the seventh year this bill has been considered in Congress. The proposed changes should also increase active officer confidence in reserve officers.
8Rand, 282.
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