

MILITARY CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS:  
THE LESSONS OF POLITICAL-  
MILITARY COORDINATION

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by

W. K. CLARK, CPT, USA  
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1966  
B.A., M.A., Oxford University

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the utility of conventional military intervention by Western powers in achieving their short-term foreign policy aims. Through a survey of the literature of political-military coordination, case studies of contingency force interventions, and comparative analysis of the interventions, factors fundamental to successful contingency operations are developed.

The study finds that many contingency force operations have succeeded in attaining short-term foreign policy objectives. Operations designed for overt coercion have been less successful than interventions to defend territory or support friendly governments. Situational constraints in operating directly against hostile powers and incurring risks of escalation to nuclear warfare are found to be important elements in overall failure. Clear definition and careful coordination of tactical and strategic military objectives were required in successful defensive and stability operations. Precise delineation of military objectives was not necessary to achieve coercion through deployments of forces; however, once these forces engaged in active combat operations, military success was a necessary but not sufficient precondition for overall success. Future contingency forces will need additional capabilities to deploy sizable armored forces to achieve coercion and defense objectives.

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