

SUPPORTING OPERATIONAL NATIONAL GUARD'S DUAL- ROLE: RECONSIDERING RESERVE COMPONENT CATEGORIES

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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RECONSIDERING RESERVE COMPONENT CATEGORIES**

by

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ABSTRACT

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The 2008 final report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) provided 95 specific recommendations to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Congress to formally transform the National Guard (NG) into a 21st Century operational reserve force. The SECDEF supported action or further action on all but 13 of the recommendations. However, no action was directed on the recommendation to reorganize current reserve component (RC) categories. This SRP will analyze this policy recommendation and argue for its validity for establishing a new strategy that will provide a sustainable, ready, and reliable operational NG capable of meeting all of its constitutionally-rooted, dual-role requirements in an era of persistent conflict. It concludes with recommendations to structure the operational NG to facilitate a Continuum of Service (COS) and reduce current dependence on recurring involuntary mobilizations. This restructured NG will be able to maintain its long-term viability as an all-volunteer reserve force while providing strategic depth and increasing readiness in support of national security.

SUPPORTING OPERATIONAL NATIONAL GUARD'S DUAL-ROLE: RECONSIDERING RESERVE COMPONENT CATEGORIES

A more robust operational reserve is more than a concept or a change in thinking. That has already happened: it is a reality. Now we are working on the underlying policies and practices to sustain Guard and Reserve forces that are integral to accomplishing the national military strategy.

—Secretary Thomas F. Hall
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs¹

Over the past eight years, the National Guard (NG) has been informally transformed to respond to demands at home and abroad: A strategic reserve force has evolved into an operational reserve force. This informal transformation has focused primarily on improving the NG's ability to meet its federal role (under Title 10 U.S.C.) to mobilize and deploy on a rotational basis for overseas contingencies. In addition, many initiatives were launched to improve the NG's effectiveness to respond under State's and Territory's Governors control (under Title 32 U.S.C.) in support of civil authorities (Defense Support of Civil Authorities or DSCA), or to prevent and respond to attacks on the homeland (Homeland Defense or HD). The Guard has performed magnificently in this dual-role,² supporting on-going overseas contingencies and responding to numerous emergencies in the homeland since 11 September, 2001. However, the relentless operational tempo in this era of persistent conflict, coupled with increasing dual-role requirements, has put excessive stress on this part-time force. The NG's dual federal and state responsibilities under Title 10 (T-10) and Title 32 (T-32) warrant thorough consideration of how the Guard should be formally transformed and structured to become a sustainable, ready, and reliable operational reserve force.

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) was established by Congress in 2004 to assess the military reserve components and to recommend

changes to ensure that the NG and other reserve components were organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet the needs of U.S. national security.³ Their final report, released in 2008, provided six conclusions and 95 specific recommendations to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Congress to formally transform the NG and Reserve into a 21st Century operational reserve force.⁴ Their sixth and final conclusion supported a recommendation to reorganize the reserve component (RC) categories to maximize the effectiveness of the total force for both operational and strategic purposes.⁵ It is noteworthy that the SECDEF supported action on the vast majority of the report's 95 recommendations, but directed no action on reorganizing RC categories.⁶

This SRP analyzes the CNGR recommendation to reorganize RC categories in an effort to have it considered further. Reorganizing RC categories--combined with other critical organizational, structural, and policy changes--would provide for an operational National Guard capable of meeting all of its dual federal and state overseas and domestic requirements indefinitely. It would facilitate the NG's Continuum of Service (COS)⁷ and reduce current dependence on recurring involuntary mobilizations. In so doing, the NG would maintain its long-term viability as an all-volunteer reserve force while providing strategic depth and increasing readiness in an era of persistent conflict.

What is an Operational Reserve and Strategic Reserve?

Our leaders have not adequately defined "operational reserve" because the concept is not widely understood. Similarly, our leaders have informally operationalized the nation's strategic reserve without pondering the strategic consequence of losing the strategic reserve. GEN McKinley, Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB), queried

students of the National Defense University in September 2009 regarding these issues.⁸ Speaking of this operational reserve, he concluded by claiming that the “Quadrennial Defense Review...will help us shape what that force is.”⁹

However, the recently released 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) failed to provide much new guidance in regard defining or shaping the operational National Guard. It simply confirmed that the challenges today and in the future “will require us to employ the National Guard...as an operational reserve to fulfill requirements for which they are well-suited in the United States and overseas.”¹⁰ It also reaffirmed DoD’s desire to “rebalance its reliance on the Reserve Component to ensure the long-term viability of a force that has both strategic and operational capabilities.”¹¹

The closest definition of an operational reserve comes from the 2008 DoD Directive 1200.17, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*:

The RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational roles, RCs participate in a full range of missions according to their Services’ force generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families, and employers. In their strategic roles, RC units and individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy. As such, the RCs provide strategic depth and are available to transition to operational roles as needed.¹²

Surprisingly, there is no DoD definition of a Strategic Reserve. However, all agree that the NG was traditionally managed as a strategic reserve during the Cold War, meaning Guard units and service members were available to augment Active Component (AC) forces during a crisis. The forgoing definition of the operational reserve also clearly indicates that the National Guard must be prepared for a strategic role. The 2008 *Joint Operating Environment* admits that “one cannot rule out the

possibility that U.S. military forces will be engaged in persistent conflict over the next quarter century.”¹³ In this context, it is critical that our RC be capable of providing strategic depth.

The Government Accountability Office may have best identified the key difference between an operational and strategic reserve.¹⁴ GAO characterizes the strategic reserve as utilizing a mobilize-train-deploy strategy that requires extensive post-mobilization training prior to deployment. GAO contends that the operational reserve, on the other hand, has transitioned to a train-mobilize-deploy strategy that requires RC forces to be trained prior to mobilization and deployment to support regular deployment requirements.

Despite continued uncertainty regarding the definition of an operational and strategic reserve, it is clear that the force must be trained and available for both on-going rotational missions and strategic contingencies. What is not clear is a common agreement on how the NG should be structured to meet these requirements.

Efforts to Transform the National Guard into an Operational Reserve and Relieve Stress

In January 2004, the DoD released the first comprehensive review of Service initiatives to rebalance the Reserve Components (RC) in order to ease the stress on the NG and Reserve due to the high operational tempo after 9/11.¹⁵ In this report, the SECDEF established some key planning considerations to govern future force structure decisions regarding the RC. He identified two metrics to ensure the judicious and prudent use of the RC: 1) to structure the RC to reduce dependence on involuntary mobilizations; and 2) to limit mobilizations to a reasonable and sustainable rate of one year deployed every six years.¹⁶ The SECDEF also directed the Services to develop

innovative management practices to include a new availability and service paradigm, called the Continuum of Service (COS).¹⁷

Another study conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, titled *The Future of the National Guard and Reserves*, was released in 2006. This study reported more than 40 findings and recommendations, including findings that “employing the reserve component as part of an operational force is mandatory, not a choice.”¹⁸ Further, it concluded that “DoD needs to flesh out and implement the Continuum of Service approach.”¹⁹

Finally, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves issued two interim reports before issuing their final report to Congress and the SECDEF in 2008, providing recommendations to formally transform the NG and Reserves into an operational force.²⁰

CNGR Proposed Changes to Reserve Component Categories

Current Reserve Component Categories. The current RC categories established in 1952 under the Armed Forces Reserve Act are specified in T-10 S1014(a). RC categories include the Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve and Retired Reserves. The Ready Reserve is further divided into the Selected Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and Individual National Guard (ING).²¹ The Ready Reserve consists of approximately 1.1 million reservists, the majority of whom are 829,000 personnel serving in Selected Reserve units. These RC soldiers are required to drill one weekend a month and attend two weeks of annual training.²² Reservists in the IRR and ING are not required to drill. Guardsmen in the ING or Retired Reserves may augment Guard units but are not assigned to drilling units. The vast majority of the National Guard, nearly 358,000 soldiers, belongs to Selected Reserve, with only 1,500 in the ING.²³ The

Standby Reserve consists of approximately 22,700 reservists, and the Retired Reserve consists of 627,000 retirees.²⁴

CNGR Proposed Changes to Reserve Component Categories. The 2008 CNGR final report concluded that the current reserve component structure did not meet the needs of an operational reserve force. It concluded that major changes in reserve component categories were needed to maximize the effectiveness of the total force for both operational and strategic purposes.²⁵ The Commission argued that the current reserve categories are not meaningfully tied to mobilization statuses; do not reflect readiness for mobilization; and do not reflect a priority for resourcing for rotational deployments.²⁶ The Commission then recommended that new reserve component categories should be established to place the operational reserve components on a sustainable path and support a true COS.²⁷

The CNGR recommended two new reserve component categories: the Operational Reserve Force and the Strategic Reserve Force.²⁸ They proposed an Operational Reserve Force composed of today's Selected Reserve units (identified for periodic active duty rotational tours) and IRR and ING volunteers.²⁹ Their proposed Strategic Reserve Force would be composed of two categories: (1) a Strategic Ready Reserve Force composed of Selected Reserve units (not scheduled for active duty rotations) and volunteers from the IRR, ING and Retired Reserves; and (2) a Strategic Standby Reserve, including IRR, ING, and retired reservists unlikely to be called upon but nevertheless worth tracking.³⁰

Under the CNGR proposal, the Joint Staff and the Services would determine which portions of the reserve should be placed in the Operational Reserve Force based

upon Service rotational requirements and models such as the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) and the Air Force Air and Space Expeditionary Force Models.³¹

Requirements for HD and DSCA would dictate how much of the National Guard should be placed in the Operational Reserve Force.³² Finally the Services would develop tools and incentives to manage the movement of personnel between the operational and strategic reserve forces in accord with the COS construct.³³

Continuum of Service

The COS management practice still being developed is defined by DoD as:

Management policies supported by appropriate statutes, benefit and compensation options, and agreements that facilitate transparent movement, to the extent possible, of individuals between active military, reserve military, and civilian service. These management policies provide variable and flexible service options and levels of participation, and are consistent with DoD manpower requirements and each individual’s ability to serve over the course of a lifetime of service.³⁴

Figure 1 depicts DoD’s COS construct.³⁵




Figure 1: Continuum of Service

Implementation of COS management practices will likely contribute fundamentally to any viable solutions to structure an operational National Guard in the future. The Army Campaign Plan has given the Army G1 the lead on facilitating a COS that allows soldiers to seamlessly transition duty statuses (See various statuses in Table 1), including modifying relevant statuses, policies, and procedures.³⁶

SECDEF Arguments against New Reserve Component Categories

After assessing the final CNGR report, the SECDEF did not support creating separate operational reserve and strategic reserve categories because (1) “The Reserve Components serve in both operational and strategic roles to meet the nation’s defense requirements in peace and war.” (2) “If ... implemented...units and members would routinely be transferred between categories depending on where they are in their Service’s force utilization cycle.” And (3) the separate categories “would create a system of tiered readiness and would adversely affect members and their dependents since some benefits are based on the category in which the member is placed.”³⁷

While these are valid concerns they can be mitigated by innovative management practices and other policy changes recommended in the reports above, cited later in this SRP. To better understand how the operational NG should be structured to meet DoD’s goals and to address SECDEF’s concerns, skeptics should consider the Guard’s various dual-role requirements and commitments.

Dual-Role Requirements of the Operational NG

Below is a description of the major National Guard DSCA and HD requirements that exceed on-going Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) T-10 rotational requirements.

Command Control and Planning – JFHQ / JTF Requirements. Each state and territory National Guard has a Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ), composed of Army NG (ARNG) and Air NG (ANG) headquarters and a joint staff. The JFHQ provides administrative functions required to maintain readiness of all NG forces within the state or territory; it also provides the State or Territory Governor a capability to plan for and respond to domestic contingencies. Each JFHQ has a full-time Joint Operations Center (JOC) that coordinates emergency response and provides situational awareness. The JFHQ also provides all other administrative functions, such as planning and support of mobilizations of state Guard forces for both overseas and domestic deployments. The size of the JFHQs and percentage of full-time personnel vary depending on the size of the state's NG force. For example, a large state such as California is authorized 380 personnel; while a small state such as Maine is authorized 189.³⁸

Other large organizations within the state or territory Guard structure, such as ARNG brigades or ANG wings, are often utilized to form Joint Task Forces (JTF) to command and control NG and other military forces during emergency contingencies within the state or in support of a neighboring state.

Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear and High Explosive (CBRNE) Consequence Management Forces. The National Guard currently provides two types of CBRNE consequence management forces: Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) and CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP). The NG also provides forces for U.S. Northern Command's (NORTHCOM) CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF). Additionally, the NG, DoD,

and NORTHCOM are currently developing other all-hazards response forces that will require a large number of Guard personnel.

The National Guard has 57 WMD-CSTs, at least one per state and territory. These teams provide support to civil authorities by identifying and assessing CBRNE threats, and advising and assisting them on response options.³⁹ Each CST consists of 22 full-time ARNG and ANG Active Guard Reserve (AGR) personnel.

The Guard has 17 CERFPs composed of part-time ARNG and ANG soldiers and airmen that provide regional response to locate and extract victims from collapsed structures in a contaminated environment to perform medical triage and treatment, and conduct personnel decontamination from a WMD incident.⁴⁰

Two 4700 member CCMRFs are currently trained, equipped, and ready to assist civil authorities in response to a CBRNE incident.⁴¹ One CCMRF is composed primarily of active component forces with NG aviation augmentation, and the other is composed of approximately 50 percent NG forces.⁴² A third CCMRF is currently planned to stand up in October 2010 composed almost entirely of Guard forces. In total, over 5200 NG forces are assigned to a CCMRF, with about 15 percent of the service members currently on full-time T-32 duty to support mission readiness.⁴³

All Hazards Response Forces. Every state and territory has all hazards response forces in addition to the CBRNE forces listed above. Under National Guard Bureau (NGB) guidance, each state maintains at least a 500-member National Guard Reaction Force (NGRF) that can assist state and local law enforcement within hours of an incident. They primarily provide site security, presence patrols, control of civil disturbances, and force protection for other responders.⁴⁴ Also, similar all hazards

response force initiatives being developed by NORTHCOM, in consultation with the NGB.

Homeland Response Forces (HRF), announced in the 2010 QDR, will be aligned to each of the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions to respond to CBRNE attacks other terrorist attacks or natural disasters.⁴⁵ NGB initial planning indicates that each HRF will be composed of about 500 (90 full-time) Guard personnel. The QDR suggests that HRFs may replace the NG's commitment to the CCMRF forces, but it is not clear at this time whether the CCMRFs will be replaced.⁴⁶

The Domestic All-Hazards Response Team (DART) concept was developed by the NGB as a “regionalized, decentralized approach to provide support for significant all-hazards events.”⁴⁷ Under the emerging capability, three DARTs (East, West and Reinforcing) would provide modular and scalable force packages to a requesting State or Territory Adjutant General to assist in providing DSCA capabilities.⁴⁸ Force packages will be built to provide the “essential 10” DSCA capabilities.⁴⁹ NG Division Headquarters, on a rotational basis, provide command and control for the DARTs with some full-time manning augmentation.⁵⁰ When requested, DART force packages can be activated and deployed under existing Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC).

Counterdrug Forces. The National Guard Counterdrug Program supports the U.S. national drug control strategy.⁵¹ It consists of over 2700 T-32 full-time Guard forces nationwide that support law enforcement in drug interdiction and other counterdrug activities.⁵² These Guard members serve in a dual-status, full-time in state or territory counterdrug positions and other part-time positions in traditional National Guard units.

Other Homeland Defense Forces. The ARNG and ANG have a significant number of forces employed in homeland defense in federal or state status. These forces include over 240 ARNG soldiers currently providing National Capital Region integrated air defense.⁵³ The Army Guard also has the nation's only Missile Defense Brigade and Battalion operationally deployed in Alaska and California with 300 full-time T-32 AGR soldiers.⁵⁴ Finally, the Air Guard operates 16 of the 18 Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) sites, protecting U.S. airspace with about 3000 airmen,⁵⁵ including over 1500 in a full-time T-32 status.⁵⁶

Additionally, thousands of Guard troops deploy periodically for state or territory and federal DSCA or HD contingencies and events--such as border security operations, security for significant national events, and disasters such as hurricanes, wildfires, earthquakes, and floods.

Non OIF / OEF Overseas Requirements. Since 9/11, the NG has picked up overseas missions previously filled by AC forces. The Balkans and Egyptian Multi-National Force Observers missions have become regular NG rotations. Currently the National Guard has over 1200 soldiers deployed to Kosovo and 975 soldiers to Egypt.⁵⁷ The Guard may also fill a Fires Brigade rotation for Korea, which would commit 2600 additional Guard troops annually.⁵⁸

Table 1, Operational National Guard Dual-Role Requirements, Commitments and Availability, summarizes all full-time, committed, and non-available Selected Reserve NG forces, based on actual dual-role requirements. It is broken down in two categories: National Guard Total and California National Guard. This compares the forces required nationally and those required for a large state with a history of frequent responses to

major domestic contingencies. The table also breaks out the various personnel statuses of the forces. Overall, it depicts the percentage of the National Guard now serving in an operational status (and should therefore become part of an operational force category) as opposed to those that should be placed in a strategic reserve category.

The table shows that over 52 percent of the ARNG and over 46 percent of the ANG are committed to on-going overseas and homeland operations, or are actively supporting state NG command and control, administrative, planning, or logistics functions. For large states such as California, the percentage of committed operational forces can be even higher. The CA ARNG is nearly 60 percent committed, while the CA ANG is nearly 50 percent committed.

The table also shows that at least 16 percent, and as much as 30 percent of the NG force, may be unavailable because they are in the training pipeline or are non-deployable. The available category includes NG forces that are deployable, not in a full-time status, and not committed to any contingency. Finally, Table 1 shows that only between 29 and 37 percent of Guard troops are currently available, except for the CA ARNG which is heavily committed due to a high number of soldiers on call for state contingencies. These low availability percentages, makes supporting Service deployment rotation models extremely difficult.

	Personnel Status	National Guard Total				California National Guard			
		ARNG Total		ANG Total		CA ARNG		CA ANG	
Total Assigned <small>59 60 61 62</small>		357647	%	106700	%	16697	%	4757	%
Active Guard Reserve (AGR) <small>63 64 65</small>	AGR T-10/T-32	30841	8.62%	14072	13.19%	1156	6.92%	468	9.84%
Federal Technician (FED TECH) <small>66 67 68</small>	FED TECH	29745	8.32%	22800	21.37%	1649	9.88%	912	19.17%
Full-Time Equiv. <small>69 70</small>	T-32 MOB	854	0.24%	0	0.00%	34	0.20%	0	0.00%
MOB Augmentee <small>71 72</small>	T-32 MOB	932	0.26%	0	0.00%	49	0.29%	0	0.00%
State Active Duty (SAD) <small>73 74 75</small>	SAD	311	0.09%	17	0.02%	469	2.81%	104	2.19%
Active Duty Operational Support <small>76 77 78 79</small>	T-10/T-32 ADOS	22809	6.38%	666	0.62%	796	4.77%	8	0.17%
WMD Civil Support Teams <small>80</small>	T-32 AGR	1026	0.29%	228	0.21%	44	0.26%	0	0.00%
Missile Defense <small>81</small>	T-32 AGR	300	0.08%	0	0.00%	7	0.04%	0	0.00%
Air Sovereignty Alert <small>82 83</small>	T-32 ADOS	0	0.00%	1511	1.42%	0	0.00%	307	6.45%
Counterdrug <small>84 85 86</small>	T-32 CD /M-Day ⁸⁷	2008	0.56%	722	0.68%	147	0.88%	57	1.20%
Total Full-Time Status		88826	24.84%	40016	37.50%	4351	26.06%	1856	39.02%
CERFP ⁸⁸	M-DAY	3162	0.88%	UNK		140	0.84%	46	0.97%
CCMRF ⁸⁹	M-DAY	4449	1.24%	UNK		0	0.00%	0	0.00%
NGRF/State QRF/RRF <small>90 91 92</small>	M-DAY	32400	9.06%	UNK		2686	16.09%	250	5.26%
Total Committed (M-Day)		40011	11.19%	UNK		2826	16.93%	296	6.22%
Mobilized AGR ⁹³	T-10 MOB	2825	0.79%	UNK		106	0.63%	0	0.00%
Mobilized CONUS ^{94 95}	T-10 MOB	1251	0.35%	UNK		0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Mobilized M-Day ^{96 97 98}	T-10 MOB	54989	15.38%	9987	9.36%	2426	14.53%	132	2.77%
Total Mobilized		59065	16.51%	9987	9.36%	2532	15.16%	132	2.77%
TNG Pipeline ^{99 100}	M-DAY	37100	10.37%	9000	8.43%	1670	10.00%	300	6.31%
Non Deployable ^{101 102}	M-DAY	28136	7.87%	8500	8.00%	3506	21.00%	380	8.00%
Total Non- Available		65236	18.24%	17500	16.43%	5176	31.00%	680	14.29%
Total Committed (Operational)		187902	52.53%	50003	46.86%	9709	58.15%	2284	48.01%
Total Available		104509	29.23%	39197	36.71%	1812	10.85%	1793	37.70%

Table1. Operational National Guard Dual-Role Requirements, Commitments and Availability

Service Deployment Rotation Models

The Army's deployment rotation model for the reserve, Reserve ARFORGEN, attempts to meet the SECDEFs goal of deploying reservists for one year out of every six years.¹⁰³ The current model, however, due to continued stress on the force, cannot even

attain its goal of one year deployed in every five years. “By 2011, our goal is to achieve a degree of balance by reaching a ratio of...one year deployed to four years at home for Reserve Component units.”¹⁰⁴

Year one of the Army’s cycle is set aside so returning units can recover equipment and personnel from deployment. Years two through four are set aside for training, but the units can be deployed if required for homeland or overseas contingencies. During year five, the unit is available to be deployed.¹⁰⁵ The model is not yet reliable because it does not account for surge requirements, does not effectively handle dual-role requirements of the Guard, and does not account for non-available personnel in units scheduled to deploy. A high level of unavailable Guard personnel necessitates cross-leveling¹⁰⁶ of personnel between units. In many cases this degrades unit readiness and forces Guard members to be involuntarily deployed more often than the ARFORGEN model requires.

The Army’s campaign plan reveals that, for the model to work, there needs to be a reduction in mobilization requirements, an increase in end strength, full funding of full-time manning requirements, or an increase in boots-on-the-ground time during overseas deployments to reduce the National Guard unit turnover rate.¹⁰⁷ However, it is unlikely that there will be a significant reduction in mobilization requirements, and extending the time reserve units are deployed would violate the SECDEF’s policy on one-year mobilizations.

The Air National Guard uses the Air Expeditionary Force Model to provide deployment predictability for its personnel. While the ANG model has provided relatively good predictability for their personnel, it has relied heavily on volunteers to decrease the

number of required mobilizations.¹⁰⁸ ANG planners are searching for solutions under the COS construct to relieve burdens on ANG members, their families and employers.¹⁰⁹

Transient, Trainee, Holdee, and Student (TTHS) Account

Before making recommendations on structuring the operational NG, the lack of an adequate Army National Guard Transient, Trainee, Holdee, and Student (TTHS) account must be addressed. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2010 required the Secretary of the Army to submit a report to Congress on the ARNG TTHS account within 180 days of the Act's signing (October 28, 2009).¹¹⁰ At this time it appears the Army will approve only slightly more than a 2 percent TTHS account.¹¹¹ However, Table 1 indicates over 18 percent of the ARNG force is unavailable. This means that the best personnel readiness a typical ARNG unit could hope to achieve would be 84 to 85 percent because unavailable Guard members must be assigned to operational unit positions. Furthermore, based upon comments made by the CJCS at the 2009 National Guard Joint Leadership Conference, it is not likely that a TTHS account will be approved unless it is taken out of existing NG force structure or unless a temporary end strength increase is authorized.¹¹²

Insights to Structure a Sustainable Operational National Guard Reserve Force

Returning again to Table 1, the data gives us some insight into how the NG should be restructured to facilitate a true COS, to increase overall NG readiness, and to support dual-role domestic requirements and overseas deployment rotations.

A viable operational National Guard does not necessarily mean that the Guard cannot also provide a strategic reserve. If the Guard is properly structured by modifying RC categories, the NG can continue to provide a sufficiently large operational force to

meet all on-going and future dual-role requirements while providing a strategic reserve to provide needed surge capability for unforeseen contingencies.

This can be done while improving readiness of the operational NG by placing units not needed for deployments, non-deployable personnel, and personnel in training in a strategic reserve category. Transfers of personnel and units between the two new strategic and operational RC categories can be managed based upon requirements, by utilizing innovative management practices and the COS construct.

A legitimate RC category for part-time service will ensure long-term viability for the all-volunteer force. Also, operational NG units with higher readiness levels can be allocated to homeland response missions between overseas deployments.

To summarize, the NG has evolved since the end of the Cold War from a strategic reserve to an informal operational reserve force. However, much more must be done to structure the National Guard force to support increasing dual-role state and federal DSCA, HD, and overseas contingency requirements for the long term.

The National Guard has managed to meet all of its dual-role requirements over the past eight years, but only through the use of massive cross-leveling among units and dependence on volunteers to fill vacancies caused by an increasing number of non-deployable Guard service members. This has reduced readiness of all units, making it impossible to meet DoD deployment predictability goals. Additionally, Service rotation models have not adequately accounted for increasing state NG domestic requirements.

The following options provide possible solutions to ensure a sustainable, ready and reliable operational NG for the long-term, capable of meeting increasing dual-role requirements in an era of persistent conflict. These options are designed to reduce

dependence on recurring involuntary mobilizations and maintain the NG's long-term viability as an all-volunteer reserve, while providing strategic depth and increasing readiness.

Option 1. Adopt the recommendations of the CNGR without modification.

Reorganize current RC categories into an Operational Reserve Force, and a Strategic Reserve Force as indicated in the CNGR 2008 final report.

An analysis of the data arrayed in Table 1 indicates that the NG could meet all of its dual-role requirements and still have sufficient forces to provide a strategic reserve. The new categories would provide variable and flexible service options for those Guard members who may not be able to serve beyond their minimum service requirements due to civilian careers. Alternatively, personnel desiring to serve more could voluntarily move to the operational reserve category. The measure would improve the readiness of operational NG units by removing non-deployable personnel and putting them in the Strategic Reserve Force category. This would reduce the need for unit cross-leveling, reduce the need for volunteers, and improve deployment predictability.

Option 2. Keep current RC categories with increased NG Full-Time Manning (FTM), and establishment of a large TTHS account. This option would not change the current RC categories, but would increase FTM for the National Guard to 100 percent of what is required. The FTM requirements, established before the current conflicts, are approximately 35 percent higher than the current authorized full-time manning levels in Army NG units.¹¹³ The ANG would need a smaller plus-up, but could use additional FTM to help make missions like Air Sovereignty Alert a steady-state mission.¹¹⁴ This option would also increase the ARNG end strength by 18 percent; the additional end strength

would be used to establish a TTHS account for personnel in the training pipeline or who are otherwise non-deployable.

This option would require the least Congressional action, and increased FTM is supported in the current Army Campaign Plan.¹¹⁵ A modest increase in unit readiness through the establishment of an adequate TTHS account would also reduce unit cross-leveling and improve deployment predictability. The option also supports a COS opportunity for a very small percentage of the force.

While the benefits of adopting this conservative option are clear, it poses significant drawbacks. Funding for the end strength increase needed for a large TTHS account is unlikely in today's economic environment. Cross-leveling of units and reliance on volunteers would not be totally eliminated because there is no category for personnel who are able to meet their minimum drilling requirements but cannot deploy for a variety of administrative reasons. There is no service option other than being part of an operational force unit. So there is no option to serve at a lower level of commitment. Finally, strategic depth under this plan comes only from the IRR, ING, Standby Reserve, or Retired Reserve. Recent efforts to pull personnel involuntarily from these force pools have met with very limited success.

Option 3. Create strategic and operational reserve categories that support both T-10 and T-32 missions. Similar to Option 1, this concept would reorganize the current RC categories into an Operational Reserve Force and a Strategic Reserve Force. The Operational Reserve Force would consist of specific Selected Reserve units that are routinely in high demand, such as NG Brigade Combat Teams, and volunteers from the IRR and ING. One Strategic Reserve Force category would include Selected Reserve

units not regularly scheduled for active duty rotations and the current IRR, ING, and Retired Reserves. This option would also provide for 100% required FTM, but only call for a 10 percent increase in ARNG end strength for a TTHS account to cover Guard members in the training pipeline.

The significant difference between this concept and Option 1 is that selected NG forces in the Operational Reserve Force, when not deployed in T-10 status, would continue to serve in Operational T-32 status to meet specific National Guard DSCA and HD requirements. In this way selected Guard units would be better prepared to meet the state / territory DSCA and HD missions outlined earlier in this paper.

Operational T-32 is covered under Chapter 9, T-32 U.S.C.; it was validated during Operation Jump Start from 2006-2008. Recent mobilizations are committing approximately 15 percent of the Guard force.¹¹⁶ Therefore, this option could be initially implemented designating 60 percent of the current Selected Reserve NG force to serve as the Operational Reserve Force and 40 percent to serve as the NG Strategic Reserve Force. Non-deployable personnel and personnel from the TTHS account would account for approximately 20 to 30 percent of the total NG force and would become part of the NG Strategic Reserve Force. An additional 10 to 20 percent of the available NG force could also be placed in the Strategic Reserve Force and could take advantage of variable and flexible service options. This designation of 40 percent in a Strategic Reserve Force category could be offset by increasing the frequency of Operational Reserve Force deployments to one year deployed in every four years compared to one year in five under the current RC deployment model. This one year deployed in four year model is similar to the current rotation rates.¹¹⁷ By increasing the readiness of

Operational Reserve Force units, better predictability can be attained through reduced unit cross-leveling. This will mitigate the negative effect of a slightly more frequent rotation model.

The option supports COS by allowing service members desiring to serve more than the minimum service commitment to voluntarily stay in the operational reserve category between deployments and support DSCA and HD requirements. Others could move to the strategic reserve category to continue a civilian career, thereby not requiring more volunteerism than we are seeing today. The high percentage of the NG force already serving voluntarily in some type of full-time status would be consolidated into operational units.

This concept carries the additional benefit of providing dedicated T-32 support for critical HD and DSCA missions. A higher percentage of full-time personnel assigned to operational units and a more achievable 10 percent TTHS account equates to fewer non-available personnel, higher readiness, and reduced cross-leveling and involuntary mobilizations. This will reduce post mobilization training requirements, reduce dependence on the active component for training, and increase NG boots-on-the-ground time.

Option 3 addresses the SECDEF'S concerns regarding separate operational and strategic reserve categories by improving readiness of National Guard Forces for both strategic and operational purposes through reduced cross-leveling and a better trained and ready operational force. Guard members would not be routinely transferred between operational and reserve categories to support deployment cycles as the SECDEF contends. In fact, the measure would likely stabilize personnel in their

respective categories. Lastly, there would be no more change in benefits caused by transferring between an active and reserve status than there is today. In fact, by relying on the COS construct and providing options for T-32 active duty service for DSCA and HD requirements, members would have more control over benefit options for themselves and their families.

Recommendations

Option 3 should be adopted to change the current RC categories into an Operational Reserve Force and Strategic Reserve Force. DoD, the Services and the NGB should then implement the required management practices to balance the National Guard force between the two categories and facilitate a viable COS. This will ensure the National Guard can continue to meet increasing dual-role requirements while ensuring the long-term viability of the volunteer force in an era of persistent conflict.

Conclusion

The recommendation of the 2008 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves to modify the current reserve component categories may have been dismissed prematurely by the Secretary of Defense. While the National Guard has performed magnificently over the past eight years--supporting both its domestic T-32 role and its overseas T-10 role--it has done so largely through volunteerism and by using reserve component categories designed to support the National Guard as a strategic reserve force. In today's strategic environment of persistent conflict, transforming the current RC categories and making supporting policy changes will ensure the long-term viability of an all-volunteer operational NG. The changes would provide for much needed strategic depth while improving the readiness of the operational force. These significant structural and policy changes will ensure the

National Guard can continue to play an integral role in supporting the current national military strategy, while maintaining preparedness for contingencies in the future.

Endnotes

¹ Thomas Hall, "Sustaining an Operational Reserve," *The Officer* 83, no. 10 (December 2007): 27, in ProQuest (accessed October 15, 2009).

² The National Guard is unique to the other two military components, the active component and reserve component, in that when not federalized under Title 10, the NG has a state role under Title 32 to respond as directed by their respective State Governors to contingencies within their state. This dual-role responsibility of the National Guard is rooted in the Constitution and draws from the NG's militia heritage.

³ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force: Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense*, (Washington, DC, January 31, 2008), 1.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., 322.

⁶ U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, "Recommendations of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves," Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense, Commanders of Combatant Commands, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, Chief National Guard Bureau, Washington, DC, November 24, 2008.

⁷ Management policies supported by appropriate statutes, benefit and compensation options, and agreements that facilitate transparent movement, to the extent possible, of individuals between active military, reserve military, and civilian service. These management policies provide variable and flexible service options and levels of participation, and are consistent with DoD manpower requirements and each individual's ability to serve over the course of a lifetime of service, see U.S. Department of Defense, *See Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, Department of Defense Directive 1200.17 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 29, 2008), 8.

⁸ Jim Greenhill, "McKinley: National Guard doing what it was designed to do," September 24, 2009, linked from *National Guard Home Page* at "news archives," <http://www.ng.mil/news/archives/2009/09/092409-designed.aspx> (accessed September 26, 2009).

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010), 53.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² U.S. Department of Defense, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, 8.

¹³ The Joint Operating Environment 2008, *Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force*, United States Joint Forces Command, <https://us.jfcom.mil/sites/J5/J59/default.aspx>, 3.

¹⁴ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Reserve Forces: Army Needs to Reevaluate Its Approach to Training and Mobilizing reserve Component Forces: Report to Congressional Committees* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, July 2009), 8-9.

¹⁵ Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *Rebalancing Forces: Easing the stress on the Guard and Reserve*, (Washington, DC, January 15 2004), v.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 18.

¹⁸ Christine Wormuth, et al, *The Future Of The National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report*, The Center For strategic and International Studies, (July 2006): IX.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, XIII.

²⁰ Commission On The National Guard and Reserves, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force*, 1.

²¹ Armed Forces, 10 *United States Code* S1014(a).

²² Commission On The National Guard and Reserves, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force*, 335.

²³ *Ibid.*, 336.

²⁴ Numbers of service members are approximate, see Commission On The National Guard and Reserves, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force* 337.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 45.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 341.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 46.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 47.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 46.

³² Ibid., 47.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, 8.

³⁵ Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *Rebalancing Forces: Easing the stress on the Guard and Reserve*, 18.

³⁶ Department of the Army, "Annex I (Transition the RC into an Operational Force) to FRAGO 1 to Army Campaign Plan 2009," June 26, 2009.

³⁷ Gates, "Recommendations of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves."

³⁸ U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency Force Management System, "CAARNG Element, Joint Force Headquarters TDA and MEARNG Element, Joint Force Headquarters TDA," <https://webtaads.belvoir.army.mil/unprotected/splash/welcome.asp> (accessed November 24, 2009).

³⁹ GEN Craig R. McKinley, *National Guard Posture Statement 2010 America's Indispensable Force* (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2010), 22.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 23.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² CCMRF 10.2 and 11.3 are authorized approximately 2200 ARNG soldiers each of the approximately 4700 service members authorized in each CCMRF, see Guard Knowledge Online (GKO), "ARNG CCMRF Footprint," https://gkoportal.ngb.army.mil/sites/G3_aroDO/CCMRF/default.aspx (accessed January 6, 2010).

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ McKinley, *National Guard Posture Statement*, 2010, 24.

⁴⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 2010, 19.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Chief, National Guard Bureau, GEN Craig R. McKinley, "Concept of Operations and Initial Sourcing of Domestic All-Hazards Response Team (DART)," Memorandum For The Adjutants General Of All States, Puerto Rico, The U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and the Commanding General Of The District Of Columbia, Washington, DC, July 8, 2009.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ The Essential 10 capabilities that the National Guard provides for DSCA are: CBRNE response, ground transportation, communication, medical, command and control, security, engineering, aviation, logistics, and maintenance, see GEN Craig R. McKinley, *National Guard Posture Statement 2010 America's Indispensable Force*, 10.

⁵⁰ “DART 101 (Domestic All Hazards Response Team),” briefing slides, Army National Guard Directorate, National Guard Bureau, August 31, 2009.

⁵¹ U.S. Departments of the Army and the Air Force, National Guard Bureau, *National Guard Domestic Operations*, National Guard Regulation 500-1/ANGI 10-8101 (Washington, DC: Departments of the Army and Air Force, June 13, 2008), 7.

⁵² *National Guard Counterdrug Program Home Page*, <http://ngbcounterdrug.ng.mil/aboutus/Pages/default.aspx>, (accessed December 3, 2009).

⁵³ “ARNG Units Currently Mobilized/Deployed,” November 3, 2009, <https://gkportal.ngb.army.mil/sites/ARR-C/default.aspx> (accessed November 3, 2009)

⁵⁴ U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency Force Management System, “100th Missile defense Brigade and 149th Missile Defense Battalion TDAs,” <https://webtaads.belvoir.army.mil/unprotected/splash/welcome.asp> (accessed November 24, 2009).

⁵⁵ Mike Smith, “Air Sovereignty Mission Needs Attention, Air Guard Chief Tells Congress,” April 24, 2009, linked from *Department of Defense Home Page* at “news,” <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54068> (accessed December 3, 2009).

⁵⁶ “NGB Info Push 020700ZDEC09, National Guard Operations Personnel,” briefing slides, National Guard Bureau, December 2, 2009.

⁵⁷ “Army National Guard Mobilized / Deployed,” briefing slides, Army National Guard Directorate, National Guard Bureau September 28, 2009.

⁵⁸ COL Jay Rasmussen, Division Chief, NGB Readiness Division, telephone interview by author, November 12, 2009.

⁵⁹ COL Douglas Curell, National Guard Bureau ARZ, “Definition of Operational Reserve Force,” Information Paper, Arlington, VA, September 11, 2009.

⁶⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *Defense Manpower Requirements Report Fiscal Year 2009* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel Readiness, August 2009), 2.

⁶¹ California Army National Guard, Status of Forces-Common Operating Picture (SOF-COP),” briefing slides with attached spreadsheets, Sacramento, CA, Army Division, California National Guard, October 2, 2009.

⁶² “California Air National Guard Air Division Headquarters Update Brief (HUB),” briefing slides, Sacramento, CA, Air Division, California National Guard, November 9, 2009.

⁶³ “CNG Full Time Manning Report,” briefing slide, Sacramento, CA, Joint Force Headquarters, California National Guard, October 5, 2009.

⁶⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Defense Manpower Requirements Report Fiscal Year 2009*, 2.

⁶⁵ *NGB Full Time Support Management Control System Home Page*, <https://ftmcs.ngb.army.mil/protected/FTSMCS/Default.aspx> (accessed November 12, 2009).

⁶⁶ CNG Full Time Manning Report.”

⁶⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *Defense Manpower Requirements Report Fiscal Year 2009*, 2.

⁶⁸ *NGB Full Time Support Management Control System Home Page*.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Full Time Equivalent Personnel are service members that are brought on active duty T-32 orders to augment a unit that is preparing to deploy to bring them to their full requirement of full time manning. The national numbers are estimated based upon the California National Guard ratio.

⁷¹ *NGB Full Time Support Management Control System Home Page*.

⁷² Mobilization Augmentees are service members that are brought on active duty T-32 orders to replace AGR personnel that have deployed with their units. AGR personnel are usually back filled at the ratio of 1 Mobilization Augmentee for every 3 AGRs deployed. The national numbers are estimated based upon the 1 to 3 ratio.

⁷³ Total ARNG State Active Duty (SAD) numbers do not count the entire rollup of SAD personnel for the individual states. That data is not readily available. The national SAD numbers only include the numbers of SAD personnel supporting domestic missions tracked by NGB with 286 supporting critical Infrastructure protection, see “DARNG Update, Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, ARNG Domestic Operations,” briefing slides, Arlington, VA, Army National Guard Directorate, National Guard Bureau, December 1, 2009.

⁷⁴ *Air National Guard Portal* “Air National Guard Operations Summary (OPSUM)”, <https://xoxang.af.mil/commandcenter?OPSUM/current%20Month/2009/dec/03dec.htm> (accessed December 3, 2009).

⁷⁵ CA has a large SAD force in their JFHQ for day to day operations and that is why the CA SAD numbers in the table are actually larger than the national numbers, see “CNG Full Time Manning Report.”

⁷⁶ Total number of ARNG soldiers on Active Duty Operational Support (ADOS) orders (both T-32 and T-10) includes ADOS soldiers supporting CCMRF mission, In ADOS status, reservists can serve up to 3 years within a 4 year period. Many reservists have served nearly continuously since September 11, 2001 by bouncing between mobilizations and ADOS statuses, see LTC Timothy M. Rooney, e-mail message to author, January 7, 2010.

⁷⁷ ANG airmen on COADOS orders. airmen on Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) counted separately, see Major Sandy Smith, e-mail message to author, January 12, 2010.

⁷⁸ “California Army National Guard, Status of Forces-Common Operating Picture (SOF-COP).”

⁷⁹ “California Air National Guard Air Division Headquarters Update Brief (HUB).”

⁸⁰ Based upon 57 CSTs, with 22 AGR Personnel per CST with an average 80% / 20% split between ARNG and ANG personnel. Each State and Territory has 1 CST except CA, FL and NY that have 2.

⁸¹ U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency Force Management System. “100th Missile defense Brigade and 149th Missile Defense Battalion TDAs.”

⁸² Air National Guard Operations Summary (OPSUM).

⁸³ California Air National Guard Air Division Headquarters Update Brief (HUB).

⁸⁴ DARNG Update, “Domestic Operations Slide.”

⁸⁵ Air National Guard Operations Summary (OPSUM).

⁸⁶ California Air National Guard Air Division Headquarters Update Brief (HUB).

⁸⁷ Traditional part-time Selected Reserve NG soldiers and airmen assigned to Troop Program Units (TPU) are referred to as M-Day (man-day) soldiers and airmen. They are required to serve 39 days per year (1 weekend per month and a 15 day annual training period).

⁸⁸ U.S. Army J39, “Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosive Enhanced Response Force Package Information Paper,” <http://www.army.mil/aps/06/maindocument/infopapers/J-39.html>, (accessed December 6, 2009).

⁸⁹ Guard Knowledge Online (GKO), “ARNG CCMRF Footprint.”

⁹⁰ Estimate NG Total Based upon 500 Servicemember National Guard Reaction Force (NGRF) per State.

⁹¹ “California Army National Guard, Status of Forces-Common Operating Picture (SOF-COP).”

⁹² CA Air National Guard Air DIV Headquarters Update Brief (HUB), 9 NOV 09

⁹³ U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency Force Management System.

⁹⁴ “Army National Guard Mobilized / Deployed,” briefing slides.

⁹⁵ Air National Guard Operations Summary (OPSUM).

⁹⁶ “Army National Guard Mobilized / Deployed,” briefing slides,

⁹⁷ California Army National Guard, “CA Mobilization Spreadsheet,” spreadsheet, Sacramento, CA, Army Division, California National Guard, November 10, 2009.

⁹⁸ CA Air National Guard Air DIV Headquarters Update Brief (HUB), 9 NOV 09

⁹⁹ Actual Army National Guard training pipeline numbers, CA ARNG Training pipeline numbers are estimated based upon the NGB total, see LTC Timothy Pheil, "Army National Guard Human Resources, Trainee, Transient, Holdees, and Student Account" briefing slides, Army National Guard Directorate, National Guard Bureau, January 2010.

¹⁰⁰ Training pipeline estimated based upon recruiting goals for ANG for FY10. SFC Jon Souy, Army, Air Guard miss recruiting goals, 12/15/09, www.ng.mil/news/archives/2009/12/121509-Army.aspx?src=rss

¹⁰¹ Army National Guard National non-deployable percentage, see LTC Timothy Pheil, "Army National Guard Human Resources, Trainee, Transient, Holdees, and Student Account" briefing slides.

¹⁰² California Army National Guard, "CA ARNG Non Deployable Stats 2005-2009," spreadsheets, Sacramento, CA, Army Division, California National Guard, November 10, 2009.

¹⁰³ U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, "Utilization of the Total Force," Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense, Washington, DC, January 19, 2008.

¹⁰⁴ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies, *On Quality Of life In The United States Army, Statement by General George W. Casey, Chief of Staff, United States Army: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., May 6, 2009, 7.

¹⁰⁵ Pete Geren and GEN George W. Casey, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2009, Addendum E – Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)*, Posture Statement presented to the 111th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, May 2009).

¹⁰⁶ Cross-Leveling is taking personnel or equipment from one or more units to make another whole or more ready.

¹⁰⁷ Geren and Casey, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2009*.

¹⁰⁸ LTG Craig McKinley, *Statement Before The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves* (San Antonio TX, July 19, 2006): 5.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ellen Krenke, "NDAA includes provisions for Guard," November 3, 2009 linked from *National Guard Home Page* at "news archives," <http://www.ng.mil/news/archives/2009/11/110409-NDAA.aspx> (accessed December 5, 2009).

¹¹¹ The estimate of the size of the Army National Guard TTHS account was derived from multiple Army and Army National Guard sources.

¹¹² ADM Mike Mullen, "JCS Speech," 2009 National Guard Joint Leadership Conference, November 19, 2009, linked from Joint Chiefs of Staff *Home Page* at <http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?id=1273> (accessed February 3, 2010).

¹¹³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Defense Manpower Requirements Report Fiscal Year 2009*, 12.

¹¹⁴ Smith, "Air Sovereignty Mission Needs Attention,

¹¹⁵ Department of the Army, "*Annex I to FRAGO 1 to Army Campaign Plan.*"

¹¹⁶ "Army National Guard Mobilized / Deployed," briefing slides.

¹¹⁷ The Army is not expected to meet the one year in five year model until 2011, see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Statement by General George W. Casey*, 7.