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**THE NEW FIGHT ON THE PERIPHERY:  
PAKISTAN'S MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE  
UNITED STATES**

by

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June 2004

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PAKISTAN'S MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis explains the military relationship between the United States and Pakistan in the context of their divergent national security interests. During the Cold War, U.S. concerns focused on the global contest between democracy and communism. In this competition Pakistan was seen as an important ally. However, Pakistan viewed India as its primary threat and considered global ideological concerns as secondary in importance. At times, each country benefited from the other, but neither ever fully met the other's most important needs. The United States did not support Pakistan in its wars with India and Pakistan did not confront communism except to help oust Afghani governments non-compliant with Pakistan's interests. Pakistan's military held power for more than half of Pakistan's existence and became the U.S.' key ally in South Asia. Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear weapons distanced U.S. relations in the post-Cold War environment. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 catapulted Pakistan's importance as an ally but at the cost of supporting a military regime and the erosion of a democratic government in Pakistan. This thesis argues that Pakistan's military now shares a relationship with the United States that builds regional stability but which may also hold political consequences in the United States.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

How does the Pakistani military support U.S. interests? This question requires context to provide an understanding of the complex military infrastructure that defines Pakistan's military institution and its relationship with Pakistan's citizens. Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan sought a relationship with the United States as an ally in South Asia. As the Cold War emerged, Pakistan's role as a peripheral ally evolved into a key element of the U.S. policy for the containment of communism thus providing the United States close access to the Soviet Union's southern reaches. However, this relationship underwent several fluctuations due to changes in leadership in both countries and the policies chosen by those leaders. Pakistan's military participated not only in the execution of Pakistan's domestic and foreign policies, but also took the lead in the formulation of many of those policies. For more than half of Pakistan's existence, the top decision maker has been a serving military officer. Even during periods of civilian rule, Pakistan's military weighed heavily in the formulation of its foreign policy. Finally, Pakistan's military represents the only national institution that truly holds a favorable consensus of Pakistan's society and imparts some degree of unity in a society full of religious rifts and ethnic schisms. Pakistan's military, therefore, plays a role in assisting the United States achieve its national security goals not only tactically or operationally, but even more importantly, it often acts as the country's leadership.

The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the role of Pakistan's military in assisting the United States in the implementation of current U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) goals.<sup>1</sup> This evaluation is conducted in the context of the longstanding U.S.-Pakistani relationship. Controversy rests on how capable Pakistan's military institution is of supporting U.S. NSS goals. Two important detractors currently exist that may preclude the full potential of support from Pakistan's military institution. The first is Pakistan's fear of a hostile India intent on Pakistan's collapse. The second concerns the latent ties and sympathies that Pakistan's military institution shows to the Taliban and other jihadis. For the purposes of this thesis, jihadi groups refer to the politically motivated militant

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<sup>1</sup> Previously, national security strategy goals were not necessarily spelled out in the National Security Strategies as is currently the form in the Bush administration's National Security Strategy of 2002.

forces that typically use the defense of Islam or Muslims as the basis of their framing techniques. Pakistan's military employed some of these forces for over a decade to further its interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir. This thesis outlines Pakistan's ability to support U.S. interests through a history of overshadowing divergence of U.S. and Pakistani national interests to gain cooperation.

The scope of this paper includes, as a backdrop, U.S. and Pakistani diplomatic and military ties since Pakistan's creation in 1947 to the present. This thesis addresses the historical perspective; describes the Pakistani military 'institution'; defines U.S. goals; and concludes by examining the role Pakistan's military serves in assisting the United States in the implementation of its current national security goals. This thesis explores the diplomatic-military relationship between the United States and Pakistan to illustrate points of convergence and divergence of national interests. Cases include early vacillations ending with the misperceived South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance; Pakistan's desire to acquiring a nuclear capability; the Afghanistan War and its unintended consequences in the form of a military-ISI-Taliban linkage; and U.S.-Pakistani diplomatic-military relations since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. A descriptive analysis will identify the nature of Pakistan's military as well as explain the roles it played throughout each period, and which it continues to play today. Sources remain unclassified drawing both on primary and secondary references.

What do the U.S. national security goals require of the Pakistani military? The United States must clearly articulate its needs in order for Pakistan to evaluate the U.S. requirements of its military. What is the nature of complexity that constitutes Pakistan's military? Identification of Pakistan's military infrastructure is required to determine what roles it can and cannot complete. Beyond the physical constraints and limitations on the roles Pakistan's military can conceivably accomplish, it must also take into account political, ethnic, and religious considerations. How is Pakistan's military institution assisting the United States in reaching its NSS goals? Operation Enduring Freedom is made possible through the cooperation of Pakistan's military. Cooperative action and regional stability objectives are evidenced in Pakistan's leading of a coalition of South Asian countries (Nepal and Bangladesh) on a United Nations (UN) mission in the Congo.

Each of these is direct military action resulting from the United States' current NSS but may suffer from an intermittent ambiguity of domestic politics centering on Pakistan's fears of India and possible sympathies towards the Taliban and other jihadis.

The role of Pakistan's military, serving as a longtime supporter of U.S. interests, remains constant despite the nature of war on the periphery. Pakistan's military proved to be invaluable in containing the external threat of Soviet communism. Following the events of 9/11, Pakistan's military once again proves invaluable. However, now it suffers from linkages of some elements to the very organizations that the United States opposes. Pakistan's fear of a hostile India also continues to haunt Pakistan's military decision making, drawing Pakistan's military focus to its eastern border. This thesis provides a context to understand U.S. and Pakistani military roles better as a result of national interests converging or diverging, and serves U.S. military commanders and staff officers assigned to duties in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It also serves policy makers and officials within the Department of Defense (DoD), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Department of State (DoS) assigned to positions relating to U.S.-Pakistani military cooperation. This thesis depicts the degree to which previous U.S. interests were served and the continuing impact previous U.S. policies contributed to the South Asia region. Given this historical perspective, policy makers may better analyze the implications of current and future policies. Commanders and staff officers will be better able to understand their role in understanding and cooperating with Pakistani military officials. Also, this thesis will explore the degree to which Pakistan's military institution has made, and must continue to make, a complete breakaway from its previous support of the Taliban and jihadis as well as continue reconciliation and confidence building efforts with India.

#### **A. DIVERGENT INTERESTS**

The United States and Pakistan share a longstanding relationship that has vacillated during different eras. U.S. and Pakistani interests diverged in 1950; converged in 1954; continually diverged over nuclear proliferation (although this subdued during the 1980's and currently); converged during the Afghanistan War; diverged in the 1990's; and now teeter at the crossroads of supporting U.S. interests while risking domestic political schism. Pakistan's military typically determines Pakistan's domestic and

foreign policies, even during times of civilian governance. Pakistan supported U.S. interests so long as those interests did not preclude Pakistan from achieving its own goals. Pakistani interests overrode U.S. interests during the Korean War and when Pakistan acquired nuclear technology and refused to sign the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Pakistani military deemed its nuclear program necessary and unavoidable. The Pakistani military now grapples with issues of defending its borders against India; preventing Indian and other external forces from undermining Pakistan's ethnic splits; maintaining a Pakistani friendly government in Afghanistan; and extinguishing leftover linkages to the Taliban. Some of these issues are found at the core of Pakistan's interests that develop into divergent interests.

U.S.-Pakistani relations over the years have vacillated between peaks and valleys. These vacillations have typically been explained as to whether or not U.S. interests and Pakistani interests converged or diverged. This is not a valid argument. If this explanation holds true, then Pakistan needs only to match its interests to those of the United States in order to enjoy close relations. Similarly, the United States needs only to match its interests with Pakistan in order to enjoy the benefits of an ally in South Asia. At best, the interests of these two states have crossed only at a few points, which means that the United States and Pakistan have rarely shared common interests.<sup>2</sup>

A better explanation is that both states held their own divergent interests and enjoyed close relations when both shared a common goal. This common goal, however, shrouds an important understanding. The purpose behind the goal is driven by each country's divergent perspective. Both the United States and Pakistan shared a united goal in the rejection of Soviet forces in Afghanistan during the 1980's. However, the reasons each chose to pursue this goal could not have been more divergent. The United States supported a war against the Soviets in Afghanistan *in order to* contain communism. Pakistan supported a war against the Soviets in Afghanistan *in order to* maintain a hand in the control of Afghanistan, Pakistan's 'backyard'. The 'in order to' portion of the

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<sup>2</sup> In 1950, Pakistan refused to send troops to assist the United States in Korea on the basis that Pakistan needed its troops at home to guard against possible Indian aggression. Pakistan's reluctance derived from the U.S. refusal to guarantee Pakistan's safety against Indian aggression. The United States was not willing to make this guarantee because President Truman did not see Pakistan as a vital interest. He believed that an amicable relationship could exist between the two countries, but he did not see the benefit of a military obligation to Pakistan.



previous sentence distinguishes the actions and policies of these states from one another. Perspective drives each country's goals and policies, but what happens when the common goal is achieved? What is the end state vision of U.S. policy or, more pointedly, what is the result of the *lack* of an end state vision when the common goal is achieved and the United States leaves? The United States must consider follow through policies after accomplishing its objectives in order to avoid unintended consequences.

In this example of convergence of U.S. and Pakistani goals (not interests), the U.S. pulled its leadership role out of Afghanistan but continued to support Pakistan with minimal arms and viewed Pakistan with minimal interest. The U.S. achieved its goal of rejecting the Soviets and allowed a political vacuum to run out of control instead of pursuing a longer lasting policy of rebuilding Afghanistan. The shortsightedness of this policy allowed communist Afghans to retain power in Afghanistan despite the Soviet withdrawal. It also allowed a civil war to develop as many states used Afghanistan to pursue their various agendas, none of which were conducive to rebuilding Afghanistan. The United States and Pakistan once again demonstrated that the chasm between each state's divergent interests could diminish relations as evidenced at the end of the Afghan War.

What were U.S. and Pakistani interests, why were they divergent, and how long had they been divergent? U.S. and Pakistani divergence of interests develops from a contrast in perspective. U.S. interests from 1947 to 1990 can be summarized as one of containing communism. U.S. interests from 1990 to 2001 can be characterized as one of nuclear non-proliferation; preventing other nuclear powers from going to war (especially on the subcontinent); and global economic prosperity. Pakistani interests from 1947 to 1950 surfaced as seeking a U.S. guarantee of its safety against India. From 1950 to 2001 Pakistani interests meant building the capability to defend itself against a hostile India. Even the scale of interests diverged between the United States and Pakistan. The U.S. concerned itself with a global issue while Pakistan remained solely focused on a regional issue. This is not to dismiss the idea of Pakistan's ability to provide the United States an anti-communist stronghold in South Asia. Indeed, Pakistan often argued its location should be of great importance to the United States. The United States both agreed with

and benefited from this fact. However, this fact was merely a cross roads between Pakistan's regional focus and the United States' global focus. Still, no convergence of interests occurred.

Can U.S. and Pakistani interests produce a long-term relationship built upon a common positive goal? This thesis defines a positive goal as one that seeks to promote the welfare of each state rather than a common goal based on the presence of a common threat. Perhaps an example of a collaborative effort towards peace rather than one designed around a defense against a common enemy can answer this question. The United States viewed China as a communist enemy and gave Pakistan a cold shoulder when Pakistan began (under Ayub) moving closer to China. However, this view changed when the United States (under Nixon) took a different look at China and initiated steps to establish U.S.-Chinese relations. Pakistan's relationship with China offered an avenue to begin a secret U.S.-Chinese dialog, which caused two issues to occur that brought the United States and Pakistan closer. First, it brought Yahya Khan and the Nixon/Kissinger team closer together resulting in a more conciliatory relationship. Second, it provided both a common goal although not a common purpose. That goal was the establishment of détente with China. Pakistan established relations with China *in order to* solve its regional need for defense. Nixon wanted to cultivate U.S.-Chinese relations *in order to* gain "a lever with Moscow to press for U.S.-Soviet détente."<sup>3</sup> Yet, after the Nixon/Ford presidencies gave way to the Carter presidency, U.S.-Pakistani relations reached an all time low as Pakistan's search for a nuclear defense capability became a sticking point. Once again, even in the pursuit of a positive goal of establishing relations with China, U.S. and Pakistani divergent interests precluded a long-term, confident relationship. Had the United States taken a long-term look at South Asian regional interests and paid attention to Pakistan's perceived need for security against India, it may have prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Pakistan.

Can U.S. and Pakistani interests ever be the same? Possibly, but the trend in relations before 11 September 2001 demonstrates that any efforts toward a common goal cannot achieve a long-term positive relationship unless the purposes and interests

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<sup>3</sup> Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan: 1947-2000, Disenchanted Allies*. (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Press, 2001) 182.

overlap. In order to produce a common goal with a common interest, the United States must address Pakistan's regional and domestic concerns. Pakistan must also broaden its scope to address global concerns and not allow regional concerns to be its predominant policy making factor.

What does this mean in today's effort in the GWOT in Pakistan and Afghanistan? U.S. efforts in the GWOT developed from a change in the U.S. national security strategy in 2002. President Bush developed this new NSS based on the lessons learned from previous U.S. policies that revealed a lack of consideration for long-term impacts and possible unintended consequences. The NSS of 2002 clearly articulates a requirement for the United States to consider the regional and domestic needs of its partners when developing policies for intervention and in the deployment of military forces abroad. It further recognizes the importance of helping other governments establish the rule of law and to develop healthy economies as a goal and interest in producing security both in the United States and abroad for American citizens. Simply put, it is in Pakistan's best interests to meet its own domestic and regional interests in order to produce a stable, safe, and healthy state. Pakistan does this by attempting to resolve its regional border issues that give rise to the sectarian, ethnic, criminal, and political violence that allows terrorist networks to flourish. It is in the U.S. best interest to assist Pakistan in achieving its domestic and regional interests in order to produce a stable, safe, and healthy state, by instituting the provisions stipulated in its NSS. For the first time in U.S.-Pakistani history, both states have an opportunity to seek the same goals for the same reason: to promote the health and vitality of Pakistan in order to provide domestic security of each state. To achieve this goal and for both states' interests to serve the same goal in the end, the United States must not conduct the GWOT without also providing support to Pakistan's domestic and regional issues. If the United States marks its success by eradicating terrorists and loses sight of the other issues facing Pakistan, then it will ultimately not succeed. The United States is not alone in this partnership. Pakistan's contribution to the GWOT signaled a complete reversal of its politics of border contestation causing an upswing in both secessionist and religious extremist fervor. The

policy's greatest reversal has been Pakistan's abandonment of the Taliban and the strain caused by this reversal between Pakistan and the Pashtuns, both in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Finally, to what extent is the United States willing to support a military regime in Pakistan when the costs come in terms of eroding Pakistan's democratic process? The United States faces engendering criticism for supporting the postponement of democracy in order to fight for democracy. This seemingly contradictory policy may work in the short term but what guarantees does the United States have for returning democracy to Pakistan?

## **B. DEVELOPMENT OF THESIS**

Chapter II (Pakistan's Military Support of U.S. NSS Goals 1947-1978) expounds the definition of Pakistan's military by addressing its military organizational structure and capabilities. The chapter addresses the introduction of the Interservices Intelligence (ISI) and its military linkage. It also discusses the degree of the military's political influence on domestic and foreign policy. This chapter then proceeds to debate the points of convergence (the 1954 Alliance and President Nixon's Chinese entente) as well as divergence (Pakistan's nuclear acquisition aspirations, Kennedy's Indian entente, and the 1965 Pakistani-Indian War, President Carter's anti-nuclear stance).

Chapter III (Pakistan's Military Support of U.S. NSS Goals 1979-2001) addresses changes to Pakistan's military organizational structure, the strengthening role of the ISI, and greater military-ISI linkage. It explains the degree of the military's political influence on domestic and foreign policy. Finally, it analyzes the points of convergence (Control of Afghanistan) and divergence (U.S. containment of Communism vs. Pakistani installation of a Pakistan friendly government; U.S. Proxy war vs. Pakistan's direct war, which established the basis of linkages and sympathies of future Taliban members).

Chapter IV (Pakistan's Military Institution) provides a better understanding of the framework of Pakistan's overarching military institution. Encompassing more than the Army, Navy, and Air Force, Pakistan's military includes a robust internal and external intelligence agency and owns Pakistan's military industrial complex. This chapter also

develops the structural history of Pakistan's military institution and provides the basis for understanding why the Pakistani military is key to Pakistan's domestic and foreign policy arenas.

Chapter V (Pakistan's Military Support of U.S. NSS Goals 2001 and Beyond) illustrates a re-invigorated relationship as the result of the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 (9/11). In response to the terrorist attack of 9/11, President Bush promulgated a revision to the NSS that articulates a new long-term policy akin to the Cold War. This new global war on terrorism (GWOT) emphasizes the importance of the United States fighting this adversary in a peripheral setting. U.S.-Pakistani history revolves around this relationship, thus reviving a past role but with new perspectives. Of the seven goals that the U.S. NSS states, Pakistan's military institution is most capable of fulfilling 1) championing aspirations for human dignity; 2) the strengthening of alliances, 2) the diffusion of regional conflicts, 3) the prevention of enemies threatening the United States and its allies with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and 4) the development of agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power. This chapter addresses how the United States intends to translate these goals into objectives that the Pakistani military can achieve. Pakistan's military provides significant opportunities for the United States in intelligence collaboration, provision of space for bases of operations, logistics support, and airspace over-flight consent. This chapter illustrates the manner in which each of these areas is supported to assist the United States in its Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as embarking upon on the regional stability producing objectives that necessitate an expanding nature to Pakistan's military roles. Finally, this chapter answers the question of how Pakistan's military supports U.S. interests in a post-Bush presidency.

Chapter VI (Conclusion) ties together the elements from Chapters II-V and draws a conclusion on how Pakistan's military supports the United States in reaching the goals of its National Security Strategy. Moreover, the conclusion illustrates the ramifications of President Bush's policy of GWOT and whether or not it establishes the possibility of generating a convergence of interests that will produce long-term benefits to both

countries. The conclusion is drawn that support of Musharraf's regime should continue in the near- to medium-term, but that efforts must be made to re-establish democracy in Pakistan before Pakistan can truly become a regional stability producing ally.

## **II. PAKISTAN'S MILITARY SUPPORT OF U.S. INTERESTS 1947-1978**

What role did Pakistan's military play in assisting the United States in achieving its national security goals? This chapter illustrates the degree to which Pakistani military involvement in Pakistan's domestic politics, governance, and foreign policy contributed or detracted from achieving U.S. national security goals. The following questions facilitate illustrating Pakistan's military assistance. What points of divergence precluded its military from being more successful? What choices did the United States make that precluded its military from assisting the United States in reaching its national security goals?

Pakistani and Indian independence from Britain immediately led to sovereignty issues over Kashmir leading to the first Indo-Pakistani war. From this conflict, Pakistan realized its need for another state to provide a guarantee of military support to ensure Pakistan's territorial integrity. Pakistan's emergence coincided with the heightening of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, which is to say between democratic and communist ideologies. Of these ideologies, Pakistan's embryonic democracy readily sought a partnership with the United States, and by the early 1950's, began its role as a front-line partner to oppose Soviet communism on the periphery of the U.S. policy. Initially, Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan announced a policy of neutrality but quickly sought U.S. favor after the United States invited Indian PM Nehru to visit. This same invitation also alerted the Soviets to U.S. involvement in a region that it had previously disregarded as pro-Western but not posing a threat. The Soviets feared that the United States would secure access to the Soviet's southern "under belly". These events set the scene for more than 40 years of a relationship characterized by Pakistan's willingness to assist the United States counter Soviet communism in return for a U.S. guarantee of security from India.

### **A. U.S.-PAKISTANI RELATIONS 1947-1978**

The United States found itself increasingly dispersed throughout the world after the Second World War. As the Cold War began to gain ground, the United States faced a communist threat in Greece, supported the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe, advocated a

peaceful settlement in Palestine which turned into a war of independence for the new state of Israel in 1947, and monitored the Chinese civil war of 1947. The creation of Pakistan by truncating India in 1947 seemed to pale in comparison to other issues preoccupying U.S. interests. India's partition added to U.S. concerns as the United States immediately found that the Indo-Pakistani animosity created a bi-polar region that could not be reconciled and forced the United States to choose between Pakistan and India as its host nation to pursue Cold War policies. President Truman's administration favored Indian assistance, but India rebuffed attempts to be wooed into what it considered another form of foreign domination.

## **B. STRUGGLE FOR ALLIANCE 1947-1953**

President Truman's pursuit of an Indo-American alliance continued through the late 1940's but India maintained a policy of non-alignment and would not join an alliance. Pakistani PM Liaquat visited the United States in 1950 to educate Americans about Pakistan and to seek economic assistance and business support. While he was still in the United States, the threat of communism erupted on the Korean peninsula when communist forces attacked through Seoul and began to push U.S. and Korean national forces south to Pusan. Pakistan responded favorably in a United Nations (UN) assembly vote for international support to fight the communist assault. Egypt abstained from this vote clearing the way for Pakistan to assume a role of drawing support in Muslim countries for the U. S. led effort in Korea.<sup>4</sup> However, U.S.-Pakistani relations came to a point of divergence.

The first Indo-Pakistani War of 1948-1949 over claims to Kashmir inculcated Pakistan's leadership with a determination to provide security against a hostile India. During 1950-1951, Pakistan spent 50-75% of its budget on defense<sup>5</sup>. During this same period, Truman asked Liaquat for troops in support of the Korean War. Liaquat declined on the basis that India presented a threat to Pakistan's existence and therefore he could not support the U.S. request unless the United States guaranteed Pakistan's security. Truman primarily would not concede because he feared this would, at a minimum,

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<sup>4</sup> Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, 33-38.

<sup>5</sup> Christophe Jaffrelot, *A History of Pakistan and its Origins*, (London: Anthem Press: Wimbledon Publishing Company, 2002) 69.



infuriate India and possibly even push India into a pro-Soviet stance. This early point of divergence of national interests characterized the U.S.-Pakistani relationship that continues today. Pakistan clearly held a regional view of national interest while the United States pursued a policy of containing communism globally. Pakistan feared a territorial threat while the United States feared an ideological threat.

### **C. DEFENSE PACTS AND MILITARY ALLIANCES WITHOUT GUARANTEEING PAKISTAN'S SECURITY 1954-1958**

By 1954, India's continuing intransigence drove Pakistan to make a decision to gain sorely needed financial support and military hardware. Desperate to maintain an army end strength large enough to defend Pakistani borders, Pakistan eagerly began seeking U.S. support. The \$29M military aid package the United States offered disappointed Pakistani Commander in Chief General Ayub who expected 10 times that amount. His protestations resounded within the government and caused the United States to reconsider its offer. Over time, the U.S. offer rose to \$171M over three years in military aid and another \$105M in economic and other aid.<sup>6</sup> In 1954, Nazimuddin, Pakistan's new PM after Liaquat's assassination in 1951, agreed to enter into a defense arrangement with the United States. This arrangement included the sale of arms to Pakistan and allowed the training of Pakistani officers in the United States but fell short of promising a U.S. guarantee of Pakistan's security.<sup>7</sup> Later in 1954, Pakistan signed the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), which finally meant an alliance with the United States, but with the purpose of halting the spread of communist expansion in Southeast Asia, not for defense against India.<sup>8</sup> Pakistan then signed the U.S. Baghdad Pact in 1955, which provided for a seemingly united Muslim (Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan)

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<sup>6</sup> Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) 194-196.

<sup>7</sup> Christophe Jaffrelot, *A History of Pakistan and its Origins*, 100.

<sup>8</sup> SEATO was not successful as it required a unanimous vote of its membership which, in the case of Vietnam, was not supported with Pakistan's vote.

line of defense against Soviet expansion in Southwest Asia but which also did not provide for Pakistan's security.<sup>9</sup> For its cooperation, Pakistan received \$650 million in military aid from the United States over 10 years.<sup>10</sup>

These two defense pacts and the treaty all failed to provide Pakistan the security it desired although it did provide some financial and military materiel support. Instead, these treaties favored the U.S. policy of containing communism. Although U.S.-Pakistani relations looked good on paper, they did not meet the needs of Pakistan, and therefore, did not provide the strongest guarantee that would prove useful to containing communism in the long term. Indeed, the Baghdad Pact suffered its first blow in 1958 when Iraq withdrew and SEATO disbanded altogether later in 1977.

#### **D. PAKISTAN'S MILITARY LEADERSHIP 1958-1971**

Jinnah's leadership marked two elements that helped condition Pakistan for military leadership. First, Jinnah set a precedence of consolidating all authority into his office rather than fostering a truly representative form of democracy<sup>11</sup>, which continued with the next three governor-generals during the following decade. This made Ayub's coup and his resulting authoritarian leadership easier to accept. Second, Jinnah did not favor an Islamic government, nor did he oppose it, but he believed that a secular government would provide the basis for a democracy that could chose to be either secular or Islamic. As Egypt started to dominate the Arab world and thereby a large portion of the Islamic world, Pakistan took its first step towards forming a secular identity, increasingly defined by its secular government and by aligning itself with the United States.

Nine years after Pakistan's creation, Pakistan adopted its constitution in March 1956 and Mirza became its first President. Two years later, Mirza abrogated the constitution and declared martial law. Four Governor Generals and seven PM's served between 1947 and 1958, when the Chief Marshal Law Administrator (CMLA) General Mohammed Ayub Khan assumed Presidency. Pakistan would not see democracy again

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<sup>9</sup> Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*. (Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 2000) 40-42.

<sup>10</sup> Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *India, Pakistan, and the United States: Breaking with the Past*. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997) 31-33.

<sup>11</sup> Owen Bennet Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, 224.

until 1971, and the ability of Pakistan's military leadership to define the country's foreign policy and domestic economy began. In an era of tumultuous political leadership, the civil service in the form of the military asserted itself to bring order to Pakistan. Ayub continued Jinnah's precedents of centralized authority and secularization of the government.<sup>12</sup>

Ayub desired to continue relations with the United States, but he emphasized ensuring Pakistan's foreign policy would benefit Pakistan. The three criticisms of Pakistan's foreign policy that concerned him centered on Pakistan's alignment with the United States which:

offered no military protection against India; ...no prospect of any diplomatic pressure for a referendum on Kashmir; and it compromised pan-Islamic solidarity by making Pakistan look like an ally of imperialism against the upsurge of Arab nationalism<sup>13</sup>

Ayub decided to find ways to secure Pakistan's national interests by multilaterally engaging other countries without cutting Pakistan off from the United States completely. His first shift in foreign policy opened the door to talks with China in 1961.

President Kennedy reassessed U.S. interests in South Asia and proceeded with a policy of rapprochement with India, which suffered from failing ties to China. Having the effect of a zero-sum game, the U.S.-Pakistani relationship began to falter. The United States maintained its aid and Pakistan remained in both SEATO and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)<sup>14</sup> but diminished commitments under these organizations. India maintained its non-alignment stance but increasingly engaged in talks with the United States. In 1962, China attacked Kashmir and immediately traded certain territories with Pakistan. India lost territory, as new borders were drawn increasing tensions and triggering an Indian military buildup. India would not be caught off guard again. Pakistan's position vis-à-vis the United States soured dramatically to the point that Ayub sent Zulfikar Ali (Z.A.) Bhutto to Kennedy's funeral rather than attend it himself.

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<sup>12</sup> Owen Bennet Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, 225-226, 252.

<sup>13</sup> Christophe Jaffrelot, *A History of Pakistan and its Origins*, 101.

<sup>14</sup> CENTO replaced the Baghdad Pact after Iraq dropped out of the Baghdad Pact.

Although the United States continued to provide Pakistan with war materiel, Ayub was not able to persuade the United States to pressure India into allowing a plebiscite in Muslim dominated Kashmir to determine the will of the people. At the time, the United States competed with the Soviets to win over Indian leadership and did not want to risk losing influence over a known political hotspot. Realizing the status quo that the United States was determined to maintain, Ayub believed that the only hope of achieving Pakistan's irredentist claim to Kashmir lay in militarily assisting a general uprising against its Indian occupation. He further believed that this action would remain completely within the Kashmir region. On 1 September 1965, without consulting the United States, Ayub ordered the action executed. Two of his assumptions were proven wrong. First, India retaliated by opening a second front along Pakistan's eastern border. Second, the United States stopped military assistance to both Pakistan and India since Ayub's actions excluded U.S. involvement in planning and political considerations.<sup>15</sup>

The war ended 22 days later with Pakistan making no gains. The Soviet Union brokered the peace talks, the UN did not broach the subject of a referendum for Kashmiris, and Pakistan's prestige diminished in the eyes of Americans. The Second Indo-Pakistani War weakened Pakistan's military and its ability to gain diplomatic support in the international arena. Much to the chagrin of the United States, Ayub would not consider formulating a defense plan that would incorporate an Indo-Pakistani pact. He based his reasoning not only on mistrust of Indian cooperation, but more importantly, because it meant building an Indo-Pakistani defense agreement against communism.<sup>16</sup> The United States may have succeeded in diminishing Indo-Pakistani hostilities if it had focused on the issues causing the problems and centered less on U.S.-Soviet strategy. Ayub brought the divergence of U.S. and Pakistani interests to the forefront of the international arena by initiating the Second Indo-Pakistani War but failed to achieve the desired strategic and diplomatic results because of his misplaced assumptions. Relations between the United States and Pakistan diminished, especially as the United States began to focus on the Vietnam conflict. In March of 1969, Ayub resigned and General Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan assumed the role of CMLA and the presidency.

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<sup>15</sup> Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *India, Pakistan, and the United States: Breaking with the Past*, 35-36.

<sup>16</sup> Jaffrelot, Christophe. *A History of Pakistan and its Origins*, 103.

## **E. U.S. AND PAKISTANI INTERESTS 1971-1978**

General Yahya Khan put an end to the One Unit plan<sup>17</sup> paving the way to proportional representation as he resigned in favor of democracy. Pakistan held nation wide elections in December of 1970. The votes in Pakistan's eastern wing (now Bangladesh) represented a consolidated Bengali voter block greater than the voter block of contiguous West Pakistan. West Pakistani votes were fractionalized, but ultimately favored Z. A. Bhutto, an ethnic Sindhi. Thus, the East Pakistani candidate won the election and should have become president but Pakistan's fresh start in democracy went awry. Z. A. Bhutto would not concede Pakistan's leadership to a Bengali. Riots followed in East Pakistan and Z. A. Bhutto convinced Yahya Khan (still the president) to intercede militarily to quell the riots. By March of 1971, East Pakistan attempted to secede and a civil war ensued. The millions of refugees fleeing into India caused such a drain on India's system that in December 1971, India invaded East Pakistan. The United States intervened to assist the humanitarian problems and to ensure West Pakistan did not disintegrate.<sup>18</sup> India immediately recognized Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan. In the aftermath, General Yahya Khan resigned and Z. A. Bhutto became President.<sup>19</sup>

South Asia's Third Indo-Pakistani War resulted in the territorial loss of Pakistan although the United States provided for West Pakistan's survival. From a Pakistani's perspective, the United States did not do enough to intervene to save Pakistan's territorial integrity from what it considered a hostile Indian aggression. The United States could not risk entering Bangladesh to attempt to prevent the civil war that ensued. U.S.-Pakistani relations were never closer than under the Nixon-Yahya Khan team. Nixon built his Asian foreign policy on the foundation that Yahya Khan provided, especially in the secret meeting in China that opened the door for follow-on U.S.-Chinese relations. Even while Congress voted to cut funding to Pakistan, Nixon strove to increase funding to an ally that secured U.S. national security interests in South Asia. Congress may have

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<sup>17</sup> At partition, Pakistan was created from two geographically remote portions of India. Today's Pakistan used to be West Pakistan. Bangladesh encompasses what used to be East Pakistan. The One Unit plan was a non-proportional system favoring West Pakistan represented mostly by Punjabis who considered Bengalis a lower class of Pakistanis.

<sup>18</sup> S.V.R. Nasr, *Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-I Islami of Pakistan*. (Berkeley: Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994) 37-38.

<sup>19</sup> Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, 62-63.

acted differently had Pakistan's civil war somehow been fashioned in the Cold War terms of anti-communist. Yahya Khan's decision to knuckle down on the Bengalis only served to inflame a situation already out of hand. This situation started as an abrogation of the democratic process but soon surfaced as regional Indo-Pakistani hostility. Military involvement at Z. A. Bhutto's behest came too late and too weak to be effective and served only to waste lives. Yahya Khan's military involvement spelled the end of the military's ability to assist the United States achieve U.S. national security interests as Z. A. Bhutto shunned U.S. ambitions.

Further driving a wedge between the United States and Pakistan was Z. A. Bhutto's aspirations for acquiring nuclear weapons capability. The nuclear program became a new portion of Pakistan's military institution by 1974. This singular portion of Pakistan's military caused, and continues to cause, a disruption of U.S. interests in South Asia. Command and control issues and the lack of declaring a nuclear-use policy are at the core of Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons. President Ford continued Nixon's goodwill with Pakistan working to lift embargoes and other restrictions on military arms but President Carter did not continue in this approach. Instead, Carter followed the Pressler Amendment precluding military support and other forms of aid to countries possessing nuclear weapons but which refuse to sign the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). At this stage of Carter's presidency, the United States could afford to dominate this divergence of U.S.-Pakistani interests. This would change, however, in 1979 and discussed in Chapter III.

#### **F. DEGREE OF MILITARY'S INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY**

How much of a political 'party' did Ayub's military regime become? Pakistan's principal moderate Islamic party was Mawdudi's Jama'at-I-Islami. Mawdudi realized the JI's diminutive nature and the need to form a coalition to challenge Ayub's position. In doing so, the JI established a trend in forming alliances to achieve its goals, a truly democratic principle. Harder to swallow, the JI's coalition partner to challenge Ayub Khan in the upcoming elections in 1965 insisted on a woman (Fatimah Jinnah) as its candidate. Mawdudi convinced the JI's leadership to change its doctrine regarding the

role of women in public office.<sup>20</sup> Ayub's 'party' in this instance contributed to the democratization of Pakistan. Since military force would decimate radicalized elements, the only true competition that could challenge Ayub had to emerge through consensus and moderation. As relations between the United States and Pakistan diminished, Ayub Khan resigned and General Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan assumed the role of CMLA and the presidency in March of 1969.

Mawdudi urged the party to exert political pressure to cause an Islamic democracy (i.e., traditional and modern ideas) without falling into the trap of radicalization. This resulted in preventing Pakistan from polarizing into secular and religious camps. At the same time, it continued to stoke the coals of an anti-authoritarian position that ultimately helped to force elections in 1970. Despite the JI's anti-authoritarian stance, the JI sided with the army in 1971 to preserve the unity of Pakistan during the civil war that created Bangladesh, and thus solidifying the JI's nationalist position.<sup>21</sup>

What role does Pakistan's military play in Pakistani domestic politics? Pakistan's military represents an element of its society that brokers power. If this segment of Pakistani society becomes disenfranchised, it resolves itself to establishing its own justice. In August of 1973, Z. A. Bhutto established a new constitution and became PM with Chaudhry Fazal Elahi as the new president. The next year, he hosted the second Islamic Summit. Although these events indicate the establishment of real democracy and the narrowing of the religious-secular gap between society and government, Z. A. Bhutto's rule followed the familiar patterns of corruption and strict control reminiscent of earlier civilian leaders. His replacement of civil servants with those fitting his political interests caused a politicization of civil posts and added a new level of corruption to the one thread that traditionally stabilized Pakistan's governance.<sup>22</sup>

Elections in March 1977 proved to be the most democratic process yet as a 9-party coalition, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), challenged Z. A. Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and offered the first hope of a government based on political

<sup>20</sup> S.V.R. Nasr, *Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-I Islami of Pakistan*, 41.

<sup>21</sup> S.V.R. Nasr, *Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-I Islami of Pakistan*, 147-149.

<sup>22</sup> Owen Bennet Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, 118-119, 227.

compromise.<sup>23</sup> Although Pakistanis and the United States felt the election would favor the PNA, Z. A. Bhutto's PPP won 99% in the Punjabi districts. This caused an outcry over rigged elections as these districts historically supported the PPP's opponents. Pakistan's military, and the army in particular, is ethnically Punjabi. Not only was there an outcry against rigged elections, it came from the one facet of Pakistan's society that could oust Z. A. Bhutto's regime. Months of political impasse resulted in a deteriorating civil society, and Operation Fair Play, the military's answer to a failed political system, broke the disorder on 5 July 1977. Martial law under Army Chief of Staff General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq began in July 1977, and in September, he replaced Chaudhry as president.<sup>24</sup> Pakistani domestic politics must consider Pakistan's military as a party in and of itself. If this 'party' should become disenfranchised it reacts quickly and decisively.

#### **G. DEGREE OF MILITARY'S INFLUENCE ON ECONOMIC POLICY**

Pakistan's first authoritarian military initiated impressive reforms with a macroeconomic perspective. First, the ISI was largely shut down and replaced with an administrative body focused on implementing Ayub's policies and included an economic analysis capability (the Planning Commission) charged with producing five-year plans. Second, Ayub channeled resources to stimulate growth in Pakistan's industrial capacity targeting private rather than public industry. Third, he launched the Export Bonus System (EBS) for industrial exports that paid a subsidy to the manufacturer in order to keep the price competitive internationally. However, the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war brought sanctions and a loss of foreign aid compensated for through import controls, which reduced growth.<sup>25</sup>

The end result shows an impressive gross national product (GNP) rate of growth that almost doubles that of the previous period under civilian governance at nearly six percent over the period but at a drastic cost. Real wages in both the industrial and agricultural sectors rose during the 1961-1973 period, and there was no gap in real

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<sup>23</sup> Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*. (Translated by Anthony F. Roberts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002) 100-101.

<sup>24</sup> Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan*, 227-229.

<sup>25</sup> Ishrat Husain, *Pakistan: The Economy of an Elitist State*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 15-20.



income in these sectors in the decade 1960-1970.<sup>26</sup> The downside casts a bleaker shadow as wealth distribution worsened as evidenced by the increase in the absolute and relative number of Pakistanis living in poverty and only a two percent increase in real wages during that period. Ayub suppressed wage increases to maximize industries' investment opportunities in hopes of an economic take-off. EBS subsidies promoted inefficiencies in industry. Balance of payment problems continued as the costs of importing raw industrial materials was more than the amount exported. Worse, Ayub essentially reinforced comparative disadvantage through subsidies and relied on exogenous financial flows as payment. Pakistan began to rely heavily on foreign aid rising from 2.8 percent to 6.6 percent of the GNP from 1960 to 1965. On a good note, technological improvement in grains, chemical fertilizers, and tractorization enhanced productivity, thus forestalling an impending food crisis. This agricultural industrialization favored large commercial farms (and their ownership) and further spread wealth distribution inequality.<sup>27</sup>

## **H. CONCLUSION**

From Pakistan's creation, the United States was preoccupied with containing communism in Turkey and Greece and with rebuilding Europe in the wake of the Second World War. The United States initially placed South Asia on the back burner as the Soviets did not make intimations towards this area that it considered pro-West. This rapid reconciliation of U.S. and Pakistani national security interests never came to fruition. Instead, they agreed to assist one another but not for a common purpose. After making initial agreements in the early 1950's, U.S. foreign policy in Pakistan remained mostly unconcerned until the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war and that focus lasted only momentarily until the promise of democracy arose in 1970 only to be jaded by a usurpation of democracy which led to Pakistan's truncation.

Civilian governance lasted from 1947 to 1958 and again from 1973 to 1977, representing only 15 years of a 30-year period. The United States supported military regimes and continued to benefit from Pakistan's role as a front-line state in containing

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<sup>26</sup> Guisinger, Stephen E. *Wages, Capital Rental Values and Relative Factor Prices in Pakistan*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1978. i.

<sup>27</sup> Husain Ishrat, *Pakistan-The Economy of an Elitist State*, 15-20.

communism. U.S. support of Pakistan's military regimes did not engender much more than India's inconsequential protest, which the United States disregarded due to India's pursuance of its policy of non-alignment. In a world that the United States perceived in Cold War terms, India's non-alignment policy was tantamount to being anti-American. In fact, General Ayub supported U.S. policies far more than the civilian governments did even when the United States declined to support Pakistan fully in 1965. More impressive, Ayub's attempt at establishing a macroeconomic plan based on private rather than public ownership investment grounded on a five-year plan provided a dramatic growth in Pakistan's economy.

Early civilian governance, on the contrary, changed so rapidly that the U.S. ambassador remained busy ensuring U.S. policies would be continued from government to government. Elected regimes' corruption, incompetence, and lack of political coalition led to the instability that was their undoing. The longest standing elected regime, Z. A. Bhutto's, violated democratic principles and human rights and chafed against President Carter's nuclear nonproliferation position and human rights advocacy.<sup>28</sup> Points of divergence surfaced initially by the United States looking to India first while discounting Pakistan's value as an ally, further divided by Pakistan's insistence on a U.S. guarantee of Pakistan's security vis-à-vis a regional threat rather than the ideological threat of communism. Ayub's decision to fight a regional war and Yahya Khan's military action in East Pakistan became sticking points in U.S.-Pakistani relations and began to delay U.S. assistance to Pakistan. Finally, Pakistan's military incorporated the development and methods of employment of nuclear weapons in its structure, becoming the single most difficult barrier to the fulfillment of U.S. interests in South Asia.

During this period, it made political sense for the United States to support military regimes as well as assist in the democratic efforts of a budding democracy despite the divergence in each countries' national security interests. The United States stopped short of supporting Pakistan in 1965, and 1971 because the impact of supporting Pakistan's military regimes during these times would have detracted from the U.S. credibility. Pakistan's instigation of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War did not incorporate U.S.

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<sup>28</sup> Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan: 1947-2000, Disenchanted Allies*, 227.

cooperation in the planning stages and therefore did not consider the impact on U.S. international and domestic politics. The United States wisely distanced itself from an ally that did not consider the ramifications of U.S. involvement. The 1971 Indo-Pakistani War again meant that the United States had to evaluate its position and ultimately decided that U.S. credibility would be lost in supporting the suppression of democracy. The conclusion to be drawn from U.S.-Pakistani relations during this period is that there are limits to the support that the United States will provide to military regimes in Pakistan when either democratic principles would be compromised or when U.S. political interests are forsaken in the planning and instigation of military action.

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### **III. PAKISTAN'S MILITARY SUPPORT OF U.S. INTERESTS 1979-2001**

Nixon's presidency witnessed U.S. and Pakistani interests arriving at a crossroads that continued under President Ford. These relations, however, did not survive Carter's presidency as the issue of Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear capability became problematic. The harsh measures of Zia's Islamization program, along with Z.A. Bhutto's execution, further widened the chasm between these two leaders. U.S. and Pakistani relations were arguably at their lowest point. The overthrow of Afghanistan's king by communist Afghans changed this picture. Soviet involvement in 1980 provided impetus to U.S.-Pakistani cooperation to defeat a common threat. However, the common threat of Soviet intervention did not represent a common goal. The United States sought to contain communism. Pakistan sought to emplace a Pakistani friendly regime in Afghanistan. The different goals meant differing visions of an end-state. The conclusion of the Afghanistan war left a power vacuum fought over by tribal and political factions and left two million Afghani refugees in Pakistan with no economic prospects. A civil war followed in Afghanistan that continued until the mid-1990's, when one group began to rise above the many ethnic factions to establish a resemblance, however tribal, of order. Pakistan supported this rising group called the Taliban as the pivotal player in Pakistan's Afghanistan policy. The legacy of the Afghanistan War continues to haunt U.S. and Pakistan foreign policies today.

To what degree did Pakistan's military assist the United States in achieving its goals and what were the long-term effects of its military's leadership? The following questions reveal the effects of divergence of U.S. and Pakistani interests set against a background of peripheral threats. These questions also illustrate how Pakistani military decisions affect Pakistan's domestic politics and economy, which then impacts its ability to support U.S. goals. How did Pakistan's military affect U.S. interests during Carter's presidency? How did the Iranian Revolution affect the Pakistani military's ability to support U.S. interests in the short term and in the long term? How does the Afghanistan War prove divergence of interests despite Pakistan's military regime supporting U.S. interests? How did the Pakistani military's regime goals differ from U.S. goals and what

impact did this have on U.S. interests in the post-Afghanistan War period? What impact did Pakistan's military regime have on its foreign policy and domestic politics and how did this affect U.S. interests? What impact did Pakistan's military have on its economy and how did this affect U.S. interests?

**A. U.S.-PAKISTANI RELATIONS: 1977-1981**

How did Pakistan's military affect U.S. interests during Carter's presidency? President Carter's administration desired to gain better relations with India but India's interruption of the democratic process precluded this undertaking. Only after India's resumption of elections and an end to emergency powers enacted under Indira Gandhi could Carter invest in overtures towards India. Simultaneous with Indian elections, General Zia staged a coup resulting in Pakistan's second period of military governance and which drove a wedge between Zia and the Carter administration. U.S. goodwill shifted from Pakistan to India becoming readily apparent as President Carter visited India but failed to visit Pakistan. Additionally, Zia's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons resulted in the loss of an annual \$50 million in aid under the Glenn Act previously waived under President Nixon. The burning of the U.S. embassy by an angry crowd coupled with the Pakistani army responding uncharacteristically too late underscored the situation.<sup>29</sup>

**1. Iranian Revolution**

How did the Iranian Revolution affect the Pakistani military's ability to support U.S. interests in the short term and in the long term? The Iranian Revolution significantly impacted both U.S. and Pakistani interests. The Iranian Revolution disrupted U.S. interests in the region in three important ways. First, the United States lost influence in Iran's government when the Shah fled Iran. Re-installing the Shah became too difficult as Khomeini's support swelled amongst Iranians. Second, the United States lost its listening complex at Badaber. This facility represented a key intelligence gathering center for the United States intent on Soviet activities. Third, the failed military attempt to rescue American hostages only worsened U.S. prestige. Not having a viable military option forced Carter into secret negotiations with Ayatollah Khomeini in order to return the hostages after more than a year in captivity. Carter quickly came to

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<sup>29</sup> Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, 234-235, 242-244.

realize that the United States needed a regional partner. Carter gained Zia's support in the form of a listening post sans personnel within Pakistan's borders and the two leaders authorized intelligence gathering cooperation between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistan's Interservices Intelligence (ISI). Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, however, induced President Carter to restart the bilateral security agreements of 1959 and provide some assistance to Pakistan.<sup>30</sup> Zia, however, did not feel Carter's paltry assistance to be enough to warrant full cooperation. Zia declined any further assistance as the presidential elections loomed near with Ronald Reagan the expected winner.

The Iranian Revolution disrupted Pakistan's foreign and domestic policies. In Pakistan, Iran's support for Shi'ites resulted from Zia's Sunni-centric Islamization program. Zia announced his Islamization program in February 1979 by introducing the Islamic penal code to Pakistan. More importantly, he established government incentives popularizing madrassahs or religious schools, which utilized rote memorization to instill a strict Sunni Muslim indoctrination.<sup>31</sup> These schools produced ardent militants rather than creative thinkers better suited for civil roles. At first, these schools provided a method of education that the Pakistani government could not afford. However, the emphasis changed after the Iranian Revolution, driven by Shi'a Muslims, caused great concern in the Pakistani government. Zia feared that Iran's Shi'a uprising would spread to Pakistan causing social upheaval and intensifying a movement for an Islamic theocracy.

Zia's Islamization program intended to contain domestic Shi'a activity, to undermine the Shi'a activists in Afghanistan and to contain Shi'a activism in Iran by using Afghanistan as a buffer. The upsurge in Sunni activism because of Zia's Islamization program, however, further sparked Shi'a activism in otherwise neutral Shi'a Muslims. Iranian religious agents organized Shi'a activism in Pakistan. Zia's Sunni bias blanketed Pakistan's society making it difficult for Shi'a Muslims to obtain government jobs, services and other normally allotted rights and served to inflame Shi'a activism

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<sup>30</sup> Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, 237, 241-242.

<sup>31</sup> S. V. R. Nasr, Lecture notes from class NS3320- U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East dated 4 June 2003, at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

further. Sectarian militancy increasingly became the norm<sup>32</sup> as “sectarianism [became] a form of religio-political nationalism, and as such...related to discussions of identity mobilization and ethnic conflict.”<sup>33</sup> Islamic sectarian violence became a domestic and international issue. Pakistan’s military often stabilized areas when sectarian violence paralyzed local police forces.

A third impact of the Iranian Revolution on both the United States and Pakistan came in the form of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In 1978, communist Afghans rose to power when they overthrew Afghanistan’s king. The Soviets, not greatly invested in this communist government, did not see it as a key element in communist expansion. The Iranian Revolution, however, empowered an Islamic (Shi’ite) movement that sought to overthrow the communist Afghani government. The Soviets intervened not so much to protect the Afghani communists, but rather to suppress an Islamic movement that could potentially spread to the surrounding Soviet satellites and exacerbate ethnic and religious-political schisms.

#### **B. AFGHANISTAN WAR 1981-1988**

Iraq’s Sunni leadership and Saudi Arabia’s monarchy, both always fearful of Shi’a uprisings, also sought to contain Iran’s Shi’a expansion. Both provided economic assistance to Pakistan to establish madrassahs. This intra-Islamic sectarian violence escalated into the realm of the Cold War by threatening religious-political sectarian militancy in the Soviet Union’s southern reaches. Organizers from revolutionary Iran encouraged Shi’a activism in Afghanistan to eject communist control. Afghanistan’s borders were originally created as a buffer between British and Russian empires and continued into the Cold War under neither a western nor Soviet sphere of influence. Soviet military occupation removed Afghanistan’s place as a buffer region and prompted responses from the United States and Pakistan. Pakistan’s ISI, strengthened under Zia, would lead Pakistan’s front-line war against the Soviets while the United States supported Pakistan with financial and materiel support. How does the Afghanistan War prove divergence of interests despite the Pakistani military regime supporting U.S.

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<sup>32</sup> S. V. R. Nasr, “Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” in *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?* ed. Christophe Jaffrelot. 2002. 87-90.

<sup>33</sup> S. V. R. Nasr, “Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” 86.



interests? Under President Reagan, U.S.-Pakistani relations flourished as both countries shared a common interest in ridding Afghanistan of communists. The divergence in purposes, however, would lead to unintended consequences that neither country foresaw.

The Soviet response to subdue Shi'a activism in Afghanistan firmly focused U.S. attention on what appeared to be a Soviet expansion of communism. Leary of an extended and costly war, the Reagan administration formulated a plan that relied on Pakistan to fight communist expansion as a periphery element in the U.S. policy of containment. Zia's perspective on the goals of the Afghanistan War differed from the U.S. perspective. Rather than fighting a war of containment against communism, Pakistan fought for an Afghan government acquiescent to Pakistan by becoming the Mujahideen's sponsor by doling out U.S. and Saudi generated funds.<sup>34</sup>

Despite these differences, the United States and Pakistan strengthened their commitments to one another and expanded cooperation between the CIA and ISI. Ronald Reagan's election to office in 1980 brought a \$3.2 billion aid package to Pakistan that persuaded Zia's cooperation. The U.S. provided military assistance to Pakistan with the purpose of supporting guerilla warfare in Afghanistan.<sup>35</sup> These fighters, the Mujahideen, were U.S.- and Saudi- sponsored Sunni graduates of Pakistani madrassahs.<sup>36</sup>

### **C. POST-AFGHANISTAN WAR 1988-1994**

What impact did the divergence of interests have in the post-Afghanistan War period? The Soviets could not continue to sustain heavy losses in what had initially only been less than a battalion of troops. The Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan in 1988 with the last troops leaving in February 1989 after investing nine years and 15,000 dead. Zia never saw a government friendly to Pakistan installed in Afghanistan. He died in a suspicious airplane crash in August of 1988. In fact, Pakistan did not acquire a friendly government in Afghanistan and the United States did not remove communism from Afghanistan. Even as the Soviets departed, they continued supplying the communist Najibullah regime. The Bush administration wanted out of Afghanistan but conservatives

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<sup>34</sup> Roy Oliver, "The Taliban: A Strategic Tool for Pakistan" in *(Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?)*, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (2002) 150-152.

<sup>35</sup> David W. Lesch, *The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003) 448-449.

<sup>36</sup> S. V. R. Nasr, "Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan," 92, 94.

in Congress continued to funnel funds to the ISI in an effort to use the Mujahideen to support the Afghan Interim Government (AIG). The Bush administration wanted to use the funds to rebuild Afghanistan's economy. If the Mujahideen could take Jalalabad, then it would prove AIG's viability as the government in Afghanistan and thus gain international recognition. This ISI plan also met resistance from Pakistan's newly elected government under Benazir Bhutto, but she could not exert pressure over the ISI or any other part of the military.<sup>37</sup> Mujahideen forces failed to take Jalalabad due to infighting and a lack of coordination resulting in dwindling U.S. support after 1989. Pakistan's military continued to dominate its foreign policy making.<sup>38</sup>

Having contained Soviet expansionism, even if communism continued in Afghanistan, the United States achieved its interests with the help of Pakistan's military. Pakistan, however, suffered from the effects of a war in a neighboring country, a failing economy based on black market trade, and a failed foreign policy determined by its military. The United States left Pakistan to bear the brunt of the war's aftermath and in search of a new foreign policy. The divergence in interests led to a divergence in visions of an end-state, which, in turn, led to the aftermath discussed below.

#### **D. RISE OF THE TALIBAN AND SUPPORT OF JIHADIS 1994-2001**

The communist regime could not bring order and Afghanistan decayed into civil strife torn between tribal factions and along ethnic divisions. The Taliban rose as a grass roots based organization, Pashtun in ethnicity, and espousing only a loosely formed ideology of justice based on the Qur'an. Western minds associate the Taliban with an appallingly brutish human rights reputation and images of a lawless gang cum terrorist organization. Yet in 1994, the United States briefly welcomed the Taliban as an organization that could end the civil strife in Afghanistan and establish a modicum of stability. Quickly realizing its mistake, however, the United States hastily retracted its positive acknowledgements. Pakistan, nonetheless, proceeded to develop its relationship with the Taliban. This relationship, and its pursuant goals in Afghanistan, discussed below, became known as Pakistan's Afghanistan policy. To understand the nature of Pakistan's decision, it is necessary to recognize what the Taliban represents.

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<sup>37</sup> Chapter IV discusses Pakistan's military structure and ISI's role within Pakistan's military.

<sup>38</sup> Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan*, 297-299.

Millions of Afghan refugees have swamped Pakistan's borders since the Afghanistan War in the 1980's. By the end of 2002, Pakistan hosted 2.2 million Afghan refugees<sup>39</sup> creating a severe problem for Pakistan over the past 25 years. These Pashtun refugees brought their tribal traditions and laws as well as their rivalries against Tajik and Uzbek tribes. Afghan Pashtuns ethnically shared much in common with their Pakistani Pashtun neighbors. The main difference differentiating them became which side of the Afghan-Pakistan border they lived in when Pakistan was created in 1947.

Too poor to afford private schools and no access to Pakistan's few public schools, many of these refugees sent their sons to madrassahs in Pakistan where they received training, seminarian in character, geared towards a fundamentalist Islam rather than a general education beneficial to society. Religious extremism, for the purposes of this paper, means an unembellished and literal interpretation of the Qur'an disallowing interpretive conclusions drawn from a liberal, modern societal context. Religious extremism in madrassahs stemmed from the financial support of Saudi Arabia and thus, the importation of its strict Wahhabi form of Islam.

The purpose and end product of these madrassahs was the development of militants capable of fighting a godless foreign occupier (the Soviets) in Afghanistan. Once the Afghanistan War ended in 1988, the madrassahs continued to produce Islamic religious militants despite the elimination of a requirement for fighters. Brought up in a lifestyle of sparse conditions, devoid of female interaction, and bereft of broader education, these students did not receive the conceptual or philosophical balance that a broad perspective provides. Instead, the focus centered on an Islamist ideology predisposed towards quick judgments coupled with harsh punishment in an environment that no longer provided an outlet for their tensions. The Taliban emerged in 1994 from this group. What does the Taliban provide to Pakistan in order to become an accepted political tool for Pakistan's interests?

The Taliban offered domestic and foreign policy solutions to Pakistan by fighting Pakistan's 'Fourth War'. First, the Taliban offered madrassah graduates an opportunity

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<sup>39</sup> U.S. Committee for Refugees, "Country Report: Pakistan 2002" , in *Worldwide Refugee Information*. 15 September 03. Available On-Line at: <http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/scasia/pakistan.htm>; March 2004.

to be productive in a society in which they were otherwise ill equipped to compete for a livelihood. This same job placement opportunity also offered a 'religious' placement opportunity in the sense that students can play a role in actively advancing their fundamentalist/extremist Islamic values. Thus, envision the Taliban as a tool for Pakistan to export this fundamentalist/extremist element rather than suffer its negative effects within Pakistan's borders.<sup>40</sup>

Second, the Taliban provides Pakistan with a method of gaining influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan fears a strong and hostile Afghanistan because that would imply having to defend both its eastern and western borders against hostile countries. Instead, Pakistan intends to emplace and support a government that, if not controlled by Pakistan, at least will be pro-Pakistani. The civil strife occurring between 1988 and 1994 resulted from ethnic fighting between Uzbek, Tajik, Pashtun and other tribes for control of tribal Afghanistan as well as from intra-tribal fighting. The Pashtun ethnic background of the Taliban offered Pakistan a more controllable, if not reliable, partner in fighting against non-Pashtun tribes.

Third, a deeper reason exists for tribal contests than simple historic claims to land. Pakistan's politicians and military leadership utilized the Taliban as a proxy army in defending Pakistan against foreign influence and aggression. This point illustrates Pakistan's fear of external actors attempting to undermine its ethnic and religious divisions through subversion. Afghanistan's value to Pakistan is that of a buffer country in which a reticent war was fought between Pakistan and India. The Taliban's value lay in its determination, motivated by ethnic and religious roots, to defend Afghanistan. India adds another layer to the rival tribes' efforts to control Afghanistan by supporting ethnic Uzbek and Tajik tribes against the Pashtuns.<sup>41</sup> India's goal is to prevent the Pashtuns from gaining control of Afghanistan and to preclude a Pakistani friendly regime in Afghanistan.

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<sup>40</sup> Rashid argues that these four arguments were assumptions that the Pakistani military made and ultimately proved false. Failed or not, these initial assumptions tied Pakistan's military into a relationship that it finds hard to rid itself of.

<sup>41</sup> Feroz Khan, conversation with author, Monterey, California, 9 September 2003. Notes in Section 5, NS4664.

Iran and Saudi Arabia also utilize religious sectarian violence to fight for strategic and political dominance in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Baxter and Kennedy write that, “It is obvious that in the mosques, madrassahs, and streets of Pakistan both Iran and Saudi Arabia are engaged in a proxy war for religio-political influence and clout in Pakistan, [and] Afghanistan...” in what they call a “fourth India-Pakistan War”.<sup>42</sup> This thesis refers to this furtive conflict as Pakistan’s Fourth War. Pakistan’s sponsorship of the Taliban, with its avowedly violent anti-Shi’a stance, further underlines the Pakistani-Iranian divide. Iran sees itself as the advocate for Shi’a Muslims and has a special affinity for Shi’a Muslims in a country with which it shares a common border. Pakistan’s Taliban ‘solution’ resulted in spurring sectarian violence rather than defeating it.<sup>43</sup>

Russian Federation (Russian) interests in Afghanistan in 1996 stemmed from a fear that the Taliban’s religious puritanicalism would spread to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Russia, therefore, supported the ousted Rabbani government to undermine the Taliban and to prevent it from establishing political control of Afghanistan. Russia also curtailed military sales to Pakistan due to the latter’s support of the Taliban.<sup>44</sup>

Finally, Pakistan could not afford to alienate jihadi groups, including the Taliban, because Pakistan needed them to control the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, to keep the Kashmir issue alive, and because Pakistan’s government could not govern in areas with a strong separatist sentiment.<sup>45</sup> Pakistan’s military cannot seal the Pakistan-Afghanistan border stretching 1,515 miles. Adding further to this impossible task is Pakistan’s fear of a hostile India. Pakistan reluctantly places military troops on its western border while deeming the requirement more necessary on its Indian border. It viewed the Taliban as a rear guard militia protecting its interests in Afghanistan.

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<sup>42</sup> Mumtaz Ahmad, “Revivalism, Islamization, Sectarianism, and Violence in Pakistan” in *Pakistan: 1997* ed. Craig Baxter and Charles H. Kennedy. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998) 115.

<sup>43</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan and the Post-Cold War Environment” in *Pakistan: 1997* ed. Craig Baxter and Charles H. Kennedy. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998) 54.

<sup>44</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *Pakistan and the Post-Cold War Environment*, 52.

<sup>45</sup> S. V. R. Nasr, Lecture notes on 10 September 2003. Monterey, California. Notes in Section 5, NS4664.

Internally, Pakistan did not possess a strong enough military to suppress a secessionist uprising by Pashtuns in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) or by the Balochis in Balochistan, and therefore, could not risk using strong-arm tactics to govern these separatist inclined areas. Pakistan staked its territorial sovereignty on a policy of engaging the Taliban and other jihadis in a positive manner. Nurturing close ties with the Taliban provided an avenue of government by consent rather than force.

Consequently, Pakistan relied heavily on the Taliban to provide an outlet for religious militants, to gain influence in Afghanistan, to defend Pakistan from external aggressors in Afghanistan, especially in its Fourth War with India, to better control the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and to help preclude territorial loss to active separatist movements. The Taliban provided this mostly unrecognized support in a manner that is effective, militarily efficient, and politically sound, yet, to some extent, deniable.

Throughout the 1990's, Pakistan's military worked closely with the Taliban fighting against the Indian supported Uzbeks and Tajiks in Afghanistan and against Indian forces in Kashmir. Time served together fighting alongside one another bound Pakistani officers and soldiers closely to their Taliban comrades. This bond deepened as time progressed to the point that Taliban fighters expected Pakistani troops to remain with the Taliban despite the Pakistani soldier's reassignment.<sup>46</sup>

If the Taliban became more of a liability than an asset to Pakistan's domestic issues, then it becomes reasonable to assume that the military institution's continued support of the Taliban rested on external fears. These fears become reasonable in the context of Pakistan's military strategy. Pakistan needed an ally to defeat Indian influences in Afghanistan. Despite Pakistan remaining a loyal supporter of U.S. interests in South Asia, the United States did not always support Pakistan when requested. U.S. support failed to materialize during the 1965 War with India and during the 1971 War when Pakistan lost its eastern state, which became Bangladesh. Having established a history of not supporting Pakistan during war, it fits then that Pakistan will first act to

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<sup>46</sup> Feroz Khan, Conversation with Author, 9 September 2003.

protect itself against external enemies even at the expense of internal strife, further evidenced more recently during the United States' global war on terrorism in Afghanistan.<sup>47</sup>

#### **E. MILITARY'S INFLUENCE ON DOMESTIC POLITICS**

What impact did Pakistan's military regime have on Pakistan's foreign policy and domestic politics and how did this affect U.S. interests? Pakistan's troubled democracy fell to General Zia's coup resulting in the military's total hold on Pakistan. Zia used the Jama'at-I-Islami (JI) as a cover to hide his military regime under the pretext of bringing about an Islamic state. He also borrowed heavily from the JI's vision on several policies. For example, Zia's continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability resulted in the loss of an annual \$50 million in aid under the Glenn Act, previously waived under President Nixon while Z. A. Bhutto attempted democracy. The JI supported the pursuit of a nuclear weapons program, although it feared the financial impact, as part of its vision to "develop Pakistan[s] defence potentials to the maximum, using all appropriate modes including [a] nuclear option."<sup>48</sup> Zia's Islamization program spurred a plethora of Islamic parties that split the JI's bid for the *moderate* Islamist vote, thereby giving rise to disparate groups prone to violent actions.<sup>49</sup> Thus, Zia's institution of policies, under the Islamic pretext, began to affect Pakistani lives.

Zia's announcement in August 1983 of the lifting of martial law in 1985 resulted in general, but not presidential, elections in February 1985 and the investiture of Mohammed Khan Junejo as the Prime Minister (PM). This façade of a democratic government, with Zia making the laws, did not deceive Pakistanis. In May 1988, Zia dismissed the Junejo government, dissolved national and provincial assemblies, and ordered a new election in 90 days. Zia died, however, before the holding of elections.<sup>50</sup> Constitutionally based elections occurred in November 1988 resulting in Benazir

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<sup>47</sup> This example is presented in Chapter V.

<sup>48</sup> JI Vision and Commitment web page available at <http://www.jamaat.org/overview/vision.html> December 2003.

<sup>49</sup> Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*. (Cambridge; New York; Cambridge University Press, 1988) 648.

<sup>50</sup> Owen Bennet Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, 273.

Bhutto's inaugural ceremony as PM in December. Zia's Islamization left a vicious legacy of sectarian militancy resented by many Pakistanis and left the JI with fewer members due to its association with Zia.

In 1993, Pakistan's army intervened in domestic politics but not via a coup. Instead, it negotiated a deal, in which Sharif resigned along with President Ishaq Khan to end the bitter power struggle that stagnated Pakistan's civilian governance. Elections were held again and Benazir Bhutto regained her position as PM in October 1993.

Upon Sharif's election in 1997, he embarked on preventing a military coup by appointing General Pervez Musharraf as Chief of Army Staff and intimidating the press.<sup>51</sup> The Kargil conflict in 1999 in which Pakistan launched an attack near the Siachen glacier in Kashmir, resulted from a military decision by General Musharraf rather than from an order from PM Nawaz Sharif. Launched primarily to gain political leverage by making Indian positions further down the Line of Control (LOC) untenable, the operation failed to produce the military's desired strategic benefits. The subsequent military defeat isolated Sharif's government on the international level, aggravated U.S. relations, and destroyed Pakistani confidence in Sharif's government.<sup>52</sup> Further exasperating his worries, Pakistan's political system became consumed by political fragmentation and corruption while the country suffered from continued sectarian violence, ethnic separatist issues, and organized crime. Fearing a coup, Sharif attempted to dismiss Musharraf but failed, and in October 1999, Musharraf ousted Sharif. "The violence has also complicated democratic consolidation...it forced the civilian government to look to the military...to restore order, and paved the way for the coup of 1999."<sup>53</sup> Musharraf intended for his military intervention to stabilize the nation long enough to rehabilitate a stagnated economy and to revive a viable democratic system.

### **1. Foreign Policy as a Result of Domestic Politics**

Pakistan's foreign policy results not only from external threats but also because of domestic politics. General Zia's decision to change Pakistan's defensive policy towards Afghanistan to an offensive strategy, his response to the non-submissive communist

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<sup>51</sup> Owen Bennet Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, 35-36.

<sup>52</sup> Owen Bennet Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, 34-35.

<sup>53</sup> S. V. R. Nasr, "Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan," 86.



government, derived from his domestic policy of Islamization. His Islamization policy intensified the religious sectarian schisms. These schisms acted as a domestic political springboard to justify military intervention in Afghanistan in the name of national security and framed in a religious context. No other head of Pakistan's military has been as successful in manipulating domestic politics as General Zia. Even Musharraf, the only military authoritarian since Zia, oriented on a secular government based on moderate governance rather than divisive exploitation.

Second, Zia based part of his decision to assist the United States in the Afghanistan War on a desire to gain U.S. support of his regime to bolster his legitimacy in domestic politics, thus preventing his regime's demise due to an unpopular domestic policy.

Beyond Zia's death, Pakistan's military institution continued to generate foreign policy from domestic politics. In 1994, Benazir Bhutto first made plans to utilize the Taliban as the basis of her (civilian) government's bid to gain political advantage and to develop an Afghanistan policy for Pakistan. The ISI quickly caught onto this scheme and firmly wrested foreign policy making back into military hands.

Despite which regime is in power, Pakistan's military institution determines regional and foreign policy. Pakistan's military institution is an apolitical entity that determines what it believes is in the best interests of national security and acts accordingly. Pakistan's strong military is not beholden to its civilian master, and as such, it embodies a military-state relationship uncharacteristic of a democracy. Pakistan's military is political in the sense that it pursues its own policies that a civilian regime may or may not support, and may or may not even be in the best interests of Pakistan. Pakistan's military institution acts in its own interests, which normally improves the state's security interests, often detracting from the overall welfare of Pakistan. Reducing the defense budget is a situation even Benazir Bhutto would not consider, even though she believed the money better spent in other areas.<sup>54</sup>

Civilian rule witnessed one of its longer stretches of governance after Zia's death. Yet corruption, political fractionalization rather than coalition, and regime preservation

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<sup>54</sup> Jones, Owen Bennet. *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, 237.

rather than nation building characterized civilian governance. Beneath this type of civilian governance, military decision-making accounted for matters of national security and foreign policy. The brief occasion in which the civilian government attempted to assert dominance over the army did not receive public support, but rather the opposite held true. Pakistanis almost welcomed the promise of stability that the army provided despite its military failure in 1999. This trend in Pakistani politics for the PM to seek relatively weak personages to place in positions that could end their regime as president or Army Chief of Staff, usually backfires. If a PM truly represented Pakistani citizens, then the citizenry would support the PM's government and resulting in a reduced likelihood of a military coup since historically, the military only intervenes to prevent a complete collapse of a failed civilian regime.

## **F. DEGREE OF MILITARY'S INFLUENCE ON ECONOMIC POLICY**

### **1. General Zia ul-Haq Liberalizes the Economy**

General Zia ul-Haq annulled Z.A. Bhutto's nationalism and re-empowered the Planning Commission, thus liberalizing the economy. Pakistani economists formulated the economic policy. To meet the rising deficit incurred by defense and public administration costs, Zia's regime borrowed against domestic non-bank savings avoiding problems associated with leveraging monetary tools and exacerbating its foreign debt. This tended to keep interests rates high curbing domestic investment while encouraging savings. Policy responses offered various incentives (e.g., tax breaks and rebates) to encourage domestic investment. Capitalizing on Z.A. Bhutto's promotion of small businesses, these incentives for domestic investment resulted in diversifying Pakistan's economy. The Afghanistan war meant an annual \$2 billion infusion of foreign aid. Regrettably, Pakistan could not tax what amounted to between 20-30 percent (about \$1.5 billion) of its GNP, invested in an illegal black market trade at a time when fiscal deficits reached eight percent.<sup>55</sup>

Protectionist measures for industry re-ignited and resulted in short-run investments that produced growth but did not include investment in human capital (training and education) or technological innovations, neither which would have increased long-term efficiencies. Pakistan improved its agricultural sector, where it held

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<sup>55</sup> Husain Ishrat, *Pakistan-The Economy of an Elitist State*, 28-31.

a comparative advantage, but did not give it preference over industrialization, thereby failing to leverage its comparative advantage. Worse yet, within agricultural sub-sectors, where Pakistan enjoyed a comparative advantage in wheat, it concentrated on improving its cotton sector. Zia's policies resulted in over a 6 percent GNP growth rate (agriculture managed four percent growth while manufacturing climbed to 8.8 percent) while inflation held at 7.6 percent. Pakistani remittances assisted greatly amounting to \$3 billion annually by the end of this period. Poverty dropped to 30 percent.<sup>56</sup> Pakistan's economy thrived on its ability to continue receiving U.S. and other international funding. Despite the growth that his policies brought, he failed to institute the long-term policies that could sustain Pakistan's economy beyond his regime.

## **2. Musharraf's Macroeconomic Stability**

General Musharraf began a strategy to provide macroeconomic stability to counteract the drift in the economic policies of the 1990's resulting from the tumultuous turnover of civilian governments. Looney identifies four goals of Musharraf's strategy. First, Musharraf undertook the re-establishment of relations with international lenders estranged in the 1990's by Pakistan's poor economic performance and defaulting payments. These efforts enabled Musharraf's regime to achieve short-medium run stopgap measures to stabilize the economy while buying time to implement long-term solutions. Second, he aimed at structural reforms to remove distortions in the economy. Distortions such as the overvaluation of the rupee and disparate interest rates made any further policy changes problematic. Third, he intended to improve economic policy formulation. This could be done through building better relationships between government institutions (e.g. the Ministry of Finance), the programs implementing government policies, and by providing feedback through ongoing analysis by an independent auditor, much like that of grant stipulations. This audit role would play well into assisting his fourth goal. Finally, Musharraf intends to address social concerns as part of his macroeconomic stabilization strategy focused on reducing poverty.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Husain Ishrat, *Pakistan-The Economy of an Elitist State*, 9, 28-35.

<sup>57</sup> Richard Looney, "IMF Stabilization Programs and the War on Terrorism: Conflicting or Complementary Objectives in Pakistan?" at Center for Contemporary Conflict Web Page Available at: <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/dec02/southAsia2.asp> March 2004.

Pakistan continues to receive aid in the form of direct aid, easements on loans and new loans from the IMF at the behest of the United States. Musharraf's regime benefits from U.S. support that will likely continue as long as he can implement the policies and programs t he initiated.<sup>58</sup>

Pakistan's economy went through periods of non-policy formulation, heavily influenced liberalism, centralized socialism, liberalism with analyzed policies, quasi-implemented liberalization, and is currently undergoing its strongest push yet for a free-market economy. Pakistan's economy either suffered from poor policies or from good policies implemented poorly. Pakistan's economic future lies with the leadership, civilian or military, that can deliver good policy and insure its implementation. Should the U.S. continue to support Pakistan's military authoritarian regime based on an economic imperative? Good policies are in place and need only stability to implement them. Musharraf is in the best position, now and in the near term, to deliver both stability and implementation. In a purely economic sense, support for Musharraf is desirable so that the rapid regime turnovers of the 1990's that formed a barrier to implementation do not continue into the new millennium. A return to civilian authority too early could undermine the stability his regime brings.

## **G. CONCLUSION**

U.S. relations with Pakistan saw its lowest point when Zia overthrew civilian governance and instituted his Islamization program. U.S. support of Zia's military regime declined until Soviet military action in Afghanistan abruptly refocused U.S. attention. It is likely U.S. relations may have tapered off completely under Zia given India's democracy was back on track and relations with China were increasingly warm. Zia's Islamization left a vicious legacy of sectarian militancy.

The Iranian Revolution in December of 1979 and the Afghan war during the 1980's deeply impacted U.S.-Pakistani relations and set the stage for today's continuing domestic and international political issues. As the United States and Pakistan joined efforts to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan, they sought different goals, which led to different visions of how the Afghanistan War should end. The United States wanted to

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<sup>58</sup> Richard Looney, "The Role of Foreign Aid in the War on Terrorism." At Center for Contemporary Conflict Web Page Available at: <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/july02/aid.asp> March 2004.

leave while maintaining support for Pakistan's effort to expel the communist government remaining in Afghanistan. Pakistan meanwhile meant to keep a hand in Afghanistan by emplacing a government agreeable to Pakistan. These divergent views allowed conditions to develop in Afghanistan leading to unintended consequences more than a decade later. The Afghanistan war brought the widespread sale of arms and drugs to Pakistan giving rise to lucrative criminal activities and a violent capability to sectarian militants.

Pakistan's military institution continued to maintain development and implementation of Pakistan's foreign policy during periods of both military and civilian governance. Even if no coup results, Pakistan's military institution jealously protects foreign policy making by engaging in domestic politics. Pakistan's military engages in its domestic politics typically to provide a decisive role during a crisis in civilian governance. This role may be a simple intervention to arbitrate disputes between civilian political parties or it may take the form of a military coup to establish security and/or stability.

Pakistan's military either directly controlled Pakistan's economy during periods of military rule or had an impact on the economy during civilian governance in the form of the defense budget. Zia's economic reforms achieved great rates of success during his regime's era. However, his reliance on funding from the United States clouded his ability to create a long-term economic plan. Musharraf's plan may continue to work provided he is capable of implanting each of the goals he identified. The ability of the Pakistan's military governance to provide a healthy and recovering economy impacts the conditions that contribute to the making of a successful state or a failed state, and thereby, the possible requirement for U.S. intervention to protect its interests in the region.

Pakistan's military assisted the United States in reaching its national interest in containing Soviet expansionism for almost a decade. Prior, it provided the Carter administration an intelligence gathering capability that the United States otherwise could not have gained in the region. Pakistan's military decided on two courses of action, the use of the Taliban during the 1990's and the Kargil gambit in 1999, that railed against U.S. desires but did not immediately counter U.S. NSS interests. However, the

unintended consequences of the Pakistani military institution's partnership with the Taliban seriously jeopardized Pakistan's relationship with the United States. Musharraf's cooperation since 9/11 came at a high price.

## **IV. PAKISTAN'S MILITARY INSTITUTION**

It is first necessary to outline Pakistan's military institution before a discussion can begin pertaining to Pakistan's capacity for military assistance to the United States. Military and civilian members of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) customarily speak about the American military infrastructure to include its "Total Force" concept (military, civilian, and contractor personnel), joint warfighting prescription (1986 Nichols-Goldwater Act), and links to industry vendors. The post 9/11 environment expands this meaning to include the integration of various executive branch agencies. The American concept of the military infrastructure does not form a parallel explanation for Pakistan's military institution.

As an institution, Pakistan's military is literally the government whether it acts by influencing civil governments or by acting as an authoritarian regime. Devoid of decision by democratic consensus, it is inherently more aptly suited to finding military solutions rather than diplomatic solutions. Military solutions are appropriate to continuing politics by force, if necessary, but rarely support a solid long-term strategy. The shifting of troops demonstrated above shows the strategic shortfall of this arrangement. Other significant differences also affect Pakistan's military institution.

What is the nature of complexity that constitutes Pakistan's military? The term 'military institution' refers to the incorporation of, and not simply the integration of, the four functional portions of Pakistan's military complex. The four functions include the Ministry of Defense, all intelligence assets (under the ISI), all military forces comprising the three service branches and the Missile and Nuclear Programs, and the military industrial complex. The military directs control over each of these four functional areas. Identification of Pakistan's military infrastructure is required to determine what roles it can and cannot complete.

### **A. COMPONENTS OF PAKISTAN'S MILITARY INSTITUTION**

#### **1. The Ministry of Defense**

The Ministry of Defense is the overall umbrella of Pakistan's military institution. Although a civilian chairs the Defense Council and is a member of the higher-level

Cabinet Defense Committee, this position is more of a liaison between the government and the military rather than a position of instrumental power. Probably the most powerful civilian in the Ministry of Defense is the Adviser for Military Finance. This individual functions in a dual role acting both as the head of the Military Finance Division in the (civilian) Ministry of Finance and as the Defense Ministry's principal financial officer. The Pakistani military differs from other national militaries in that it dictates, as Benazir Bhutto once lamented, the military budget despite civilian control.<sup>59</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee plays an advisory role by integrating and coordinating the three services and planning national military strategy. The Chairman fills a somewhat impotent position whose only avenue to substantial power lays in function of serving as the president's main staff officer in war.<sup>60</sup> This may help to explain Musharraf's posting of Islamist General Aziz as Chairman in 2001.

## **2. Inter Services Intelligence**

In American terms, a possible understanding of the ISI is somewhat analogous to a combination of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) all under one hat controlled by the military. Even during years of civilian democracy in the 1990s, ISI ownership continued to be completely within the realms of the military and thus provided the military the ability to challenge civilian rule using domestic intelligence gathering capabilities.

The ISI began as consolidation of each military branch's intelligence agency but then evolved by assuming Pakistan's national and domestic intelligence functions under Zulfikar Bhutto. Z. A. Bhutto's interest in expanding the roles of ISI lay in his desire to spy on his political opponents and to gain a better insight into international threats. This trend continued under the military authoritarian General Zia-ul-Haq who used it to spy on Z. A. Bhutto's political party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Zia expanded the scope of the ISI by placing it in charge of organizing Mujahideen fighters and distributing funds in the anti-Soviet guerilla war in Afghanistan. In this new funding role, the ISI quickly became involved in disrupting fair political practices by buying off political parties and

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<sup>59</sup> Owen Bennet Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, 237.

<sup>60</sup> GlobalSecurity.org Internet Website "Pakistan Military Guide" Available at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/> December 2003.



other groups with government funds. Most surprising, however, may be that the ISI considered this a legitimate practice. Finally, the ISI hijacked the Taliban, as a political force, from Benazir Bhutto when it learned of her desire to affect Pakistan's foreign policy in Afghanistan. The ISI quickly caught on and began funding the Taliban, more than Bhutto could sustain, and thereby, gaining the Taliban's loyalty. B. Bhutto had sourced funding from government budgets to pay the Taliban. Under Zia, the ISI came fully under military control where it remains today.<sup>61</sup>

With a staff of approximately 10,000 civilians, military officers, and others, today's ISI concerns itself with several issues such as the collection of foreign and domestic intelligence and coordinating the intelligence functions of the three military services. It also provides close scrutiny over its own ranks and surveillance of foreigners (including foreign diplomats), the media, politically active dissidents (within Pakistani society), and of Pakistanis (diplomats and civilians) outside of Pakistan. Key to assisting U.S. interests in the region, ISI also coordinates and conducts covert offensive operations.<sup>62</sup>

### **3. Military Forces: Army**

The Pakistani Army represents the chief power in Pakistan. The military staged three coups in 52 years and has been in power for more than 28 years out of Pakistan's 56-year existence. Stabilizing the country, however, is not the purpose of Pakistan's army. Pakistan immediately went to war upon its creation and has since always harbored a fear of Indian invasion in addition to internal fracturing at the hands of separatists, as happened in Bangladesh in 1971. These two primary national security fears have driven Pakistan to emphasize the need for a strong and capable army. This basis also denotes Pakistan's military focus, which will have to undergo revision if it is to be providing continued and improved assistance to U.S. goals.

Standing at 520,000 strong, Pakistan's Army receives the lion's share of Pakistan's military defense budget (4.6 percent GDP in FY01).<sup>63</sup> Nine corps comprise the Pakistani Army as well as a command element in Gilgit (Kashmir). What does this

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<sup>61</sup> Owen Bennet Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, 238-241.

<sup>62</sup> GlobalSecurity.org Internet website "Pakistan Military Guide".

<sup>63</sup> GlobalSecurity.org Internet website "Pakistan Military Guide".

mean to Pakistan's ability to support U.S. interests? The challenge of maintaining Pakistan's 1,515 mile-long western border quickly becomes apparent when competing with Pakistan's national geo-strategic interests. Simply put, Pakistan's army is not large enough to prevent infiltration of its borders, let alone deter India, suppress separatist movements, and provide forces for international, UN sponsored operations. How can this be resolved? One method is that Pakistan's army is least capable of fulfilling is to provide diplomatic and democratic solutions that alleviate the need for a continued military solution. What Pakistan's army can offer, however, is substantial in terms of placing units in key areas to monitor crucial border locations, assisting U.S. forces in engagements either conjointly or as Pakistani-only actions, and in providing logistical support areas supporting U.S. forces. With only 9,000-11,000 U.S. troops operating in Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), assistance from Pakistan's army becomes essential in engaging al-Qaeda.

#### **4. Military Forces: Pakistani Air Force (PAF)**

Pakistan's Air Force (PAF) places emphasis on supporting the army with more than 50 percent of its aircraft designated for ground support. Significantly smaller, the PAF numbers only about 45,000 personnel and approximately 650 aircraft.<sup>64</sup> More importantly is the capability that the PAF can bring to assisting U.S. interests in the form of securing Pakistan's western border and providing infrastructure support for U.S. forces operating from Pakistan. Pakistan already has 20 airfields capable of supporting jet fighters and has another ten that it is possible to improve quickly. Pakistan's pilots offer something else most other countries cannot provide. It possesses firsthand experience in dropping smart munitions at high altitudes in support of ground troops.<sup>65</sup>

How much of an impact did the PAF and its infrastructures mean to U.S. interests?

In a sign of the increasingly close security ties between the United States and Pakistan, President Gen Pervez Musharraf, has accepted a US request for a long-term presence at Jacobabad air base. [Also] US officials have requested 40,000 metric tons of concrete to renovate the base in

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<sup>64</sup> GlobalSecurity.org Internet website "Pakistan Military Guide".

<sup>65</sup> Surinder Rana, Class notes dated 16 December 2003. NS3668-Politics and Security in South Asia. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

Jacobabad...that a wall surrounding the base be raised four feet, and... to construct air-conditioned barracks for US troops. [Adding that] [i]n the foreseeable future, Jacobabad air base would continue to serve as a key facility for the US military's peacekeeping or counter terrorism operation in Afghanistan...[Finally,] US officials have asked that all but a few Pakistani liaison officers be withdrawn from the base.<sup>66</sup>

Not only is the PAF assisting the United States directly in this instance, it vacated one of its air bases for the United States' sole use.

## **5. Military Forces: Navy**

The least regarded of Pakistan's military services, the Navy, boasts an end-strength of only about 22,000 personnel, approximately 34 sea-going vessels, and 25 aircraft, of which 12 are operated by the PAF.<sup>67</sup> A recent breakthrough for Pakistan's Navy and for the country, has been the completion of its first domestically produced submarine, the new Agosta 90-B. While this submarine may give "a considerable boost to [Pakistan's] defense capability"<sup>68</sup>, it does not provide much direct use to U.S. interests. Indirectly, however, it is possible to use the funding of a portion of the submarine building program as a bargaining lever to gain additional Pakistani support. Engineering and building is completed in conjunction with France.

Pakistan's naval air power focuses on searching for Indian naval vessels and benefits from aircraft with long loiter times. If Pakistan's fears of an Indian naval threat could be subdued, then these aircraft could be freed up to provide more border as well as maritime (drug smuggling) surveillance.

Of note is Pakistan's two other sea-going organizations, the Pakistan Coast Guard and the Maritime Security Agency (MSA) working in conjunction with the Coast Guard. Pakistan created the MSA in 1994 to assist the Coast Guard response to civil needs and criminal activities. While not part of the military, its para-military organization and capabilities offers substantial benefits against the criminal activities (drug and weapons

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<sup>66</sup> "Pakistan Agrees to Extended US Troops Presence." *DAWN The Internet Edition* Available On-Line at: <http://www.dawn.com/2001/12/15/top7.htm> 15 December 2003.

<sup>67</sup> GlobalSecurity.org Internet Website "Pakistan Military Guide".

<sup>68</sup> "Pervez Vows to Keep Pak strong, Inducts Sub." *The Times of India* Available On-Line at: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-354890.curpg-1.cms> 12 December 2003.

smuggling) that provide financial and arms support to terrorist organizations.<sup>69</sup> Part of the FY02 \$2.5 million that the United States funded to Pakistan through the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) fund went “to improve Pakistan Coast Guard and Maritime Security Agency capacity.”<sup>70</sup>

#### **6. Military Forces: Missile Program**

Pakistan’s missile program includes smaller air-to-air missiles as well as much larger ground-to-ground systems, most notably in the form of the Ghauri and Shaheen missiles. These missile systems contribute to the national defense of Pakistan against conventional national forces but are of little use in assisting U.S. interests in the GWOT.

#### **7. Military Forces: Nuclear Program**

Much in the same light as Pakistan’s Missile Program, the Nuclear Program does not offer solutions to the GWOT. Conversely, Pakistan’s Nuclear Program proved favorable to Pakistani interests when President Bush lifted sanctions against this program in order to obtain Pakistani support in the GWOT. This program is almost entirely military in nature and, except for jobs and the argument that it provides national defense, does not provide a direct civilian benefit in the form of power production or development of the medical industry.

#### **8. Pakistan’s Military Industrial Complex**

An important function of Pakistan’s military institution is its military industrial complex as a completely integrated system of domestic production capabilities. Not simply a favored group of contractors, Pakistan owns this complex of plants and factories and receives its direction from the military.

The Pakistani Aeronautical Complex (PAC) hosts the Mirage/F-6 Rebuild Factory; the Mushshak/Super Mushshak (trainer aircraft) and Karakoram-8 (jet trainer) Manufacturing Factory; the Baaz and Ababeel Aerial Target System Manufacturing plant; and the Kamra Avionics and Radar Factory.

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<sup>69</sup> “Maritime Security Agency Act of 1994.” Available at: [http://www.vakilno1.com/saarclaw/pakistan/maritime\\_security\\_agency\\_act/maritime\\_security\\_agency\\_act.htm](http://www.vakilno1.com/saarclaw/pakistan/maritime_security_agency_act/maritime_security_agency_act.htm) December 2003.

<sup>70</sup> U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. *FY2004 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations*. (February 2003) International Affairs Budget website available on-line at: <http://www.state.gov/m/rm/c6112.htm> February 2004.

The Heavy Industry Taxila (HIT) employs about 6,500 workers, including about 2,000 military personnel, and produces and rebuilds the Al-Khalid main battle tank (MBT), the Al-Zarar MBT, the T-85IIAP MBT, and the Talha armored personnel carrier.<sup>71</sup>

This portion of Pakistan's military institution does not play a direct role in assisting U.S. interests, but indirectly produces aircraft, especially the Baaz and Ababeel, which can be outfitted as reconnaissance platforms that are suitable for patrolling the border and providing surveillance.

Pakistan's military has much to offer the United States in its endeavor to pursue the GWOT in Afghanistan. Most significantly though, Pakistan as a 'frontline' state, allows the United States a forward position with which to conduct OEF and Pakistan's military is the vehicle through which that support arrives.

#### **B. MILITARY'S POLITICAL INFLUENCE ON DOMESTIC & FOREIGN POLICY**

It is not possible to understand Pakistan's military influence in Pakistani politics fully without placing it into context. The Constitution of the United States of America is the singular national institution that unifies Americans. In Pakistan, the singular national institution that unifies Pakistanis is Pakistan's military. Despite its Punjabi ethnic make-up, it is the one national institution in Pakistan that engenders nationalistic patriotism. Only during Ayub Khan's Islamization program has Pakistan's military broken this image and has since regained its former status. The reason for Pakistanis' unity around this particular national institution is the fear of Pakistan's decimation at the hands of India.

India's efforts immediately after independence to undo Pakistan...were the main causes for the bitterness and sense of insecurity which gripped the Pakistani policy-makers from the very outset. This perception was to have a profound influence on the formulation of their defence and foreign policies. In the years that followed, the Pakistani policy-makers remained convinced that India...was conspiring against Pakistan's very independence and territorial integrity<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> GlobalSecurity.org Internet website "Pakistan Military Guide".

<sup>72</sup> Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, 39.

Since that time, civilian leadership regarded the military as Pakistan's savior against foreign threats. This helps to explain the military's latter involvement in foreign policy making, first in relation to security and then more broadly over all foreign policy.

Beyond physical constraints and limitations on the roles Pakistan's military can conceivably accomplish, Pakistan's capacity to provide assistance must also take into account political, ethnic and religious considerations.

### **1. Military Influence**

Military influence in Pakistan's domestic and foreign policymaking revolves around its history of providing a 'safety valve' that establishes stability in Pakistan's society when tumultuous civilian governments fail. General Ayub Khan (who later abdicated to Yahya Khan) responded to Iskander Mirza's failed government. General Zia-ul-Haq replaced Zulfikar 'Ali Bhutto's corrupt, authoritarian rather than democratic, civilian government when it collapsed. General Pervez Musharraf took control of the government in 1999 when the feuding between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif resulted in the turnover of their governments in 1990, 1993, and 1997. Their corruption and political infighting threatened the stability of Pakistan as a contiguous whole. Each of the four military authoritarians has significantly impacted both domestic and foreign policy issues while acting as the head of state.

The other aspect of the military's influence descends directly from the assertion of military supremacy in the government. This history of the military's willingness to take control of the government transformed Pakistan's military as a public servant into a 'political force' of its own. As a political force, Pakistan's civilian governments have given the military leeway to make foreign policy. In the same manner, the military's political force determines, to some degree, domestic policy by dictating its budget to the government.

### **2. Foreign Policy**

Even before Ayub Khan led the military's first coup against the civilian government, his influence persuaded civilian leaders to join the U.S. sponsored Baghdad Pact as he "was particularly keen to secure the latest American military equipment for the Pakistani armed forces"<sup>73</sup>. After his coup, he continued to reach out to develop stronger

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<sup>73</sup> Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, 43.

relations with the United States despite President John F. Kennedy's disinterest in Pakistan. By 1963, Ayub Khan began shifting towards Soviet agreements establishing trade, air services, and oil exploration agreements in the vacuum left by Kennedy. Ayub Khan's misjudgment of Indian intentions, of Pakistan's abilities, and of American support, witnessed the unplanned war of 1965 that Pakistan ultimately lost. This foreign policy failure became a turning point in his increasingly unpopular rule and would cause further foreign policy problems. By 1969, Ayub Khan's unpopularity caused the Soviets to reassess their alignment with Pakistan and instead support India.<sup>74</sup>

Yahya Khan's disenfranchisement of Bengalis in the 1971 elections, discussed below, also had international implications due to poor media relations. By prohibiting foreign reporters in East Pakistan during the suppression of these riots, Yahya Khan turned the international media against Pakistan. Also, while U.S. President Nixon, China, and some Muslim countries backed Pakistan, the rest of the world, including most Americans, favored the separatist Bengalis. Nixon felt obliged to support Yahya Khan's actions due to Yahya Khan's support of Kissinger's secret Chinese-American meeting which normalized relations. The culmination of this disregard for world criticism allowed India to proceed in training the separatists in fighting and providing a haven for the Bengali's exiled government. Finally, instead of accepting any of the proposals from the UN for a withdrawal of troops, Yahya Khan, through Zulfikar 'Ali Bhutto, suffered the humiliation of having 93,000 troops captured and losing the war.<sup>75</sup>

General Zia ul-Haq faced the threat of internal societal disruption after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, with its Shi'a ascendancy, railed against his Sunni brand of Islamization. Zia's regime centers around the dichotomy he brought both to Pakistan and to the military with his Islamization program. Heretofore, Pakistan's governance remained secularized. By instituting Islamism into Pakistan's governance, he exacerbated the Sunni-Shi'a schism in society. Pakistan's societal religious schism became, for the first time, a fixture in Pakistan's military. A Pakistani soldier's career suddenly became defined more by his religious sect and amount of piety and less by his ability as a professional soldier. An officer who drank whiskey could expect to lose his

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<sup>74</sup> Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, 46, 49, 57.

<sup>75</sup> Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, 62-64, 250.

career. A Shi'ite who was an absolute professional, and a moderate, might expect promotion. A pious Sunni, of mediocre proficiency, however, could expect promotion without hesitation.

How did Zia monitor such moralistic proclivities? First, entry into Pakistan's military required a questionnaire that included not just religious affiliation but that also asked for sect. A Shi'a soldier could face immediate discrimination simply from a glance at his identification.<sup>76</sup> Second, Zia created a post at each division and higher headquarters for a mullah whose office ostensibly gave religious guidance to regimental and battalion chaplains. In reality, these mullahs who occupied their respective headquarters G-2<sup>77</sup> Religion (vice G-2 Intelligence) sections functioned much like the political officers in the Soviet Union's military. G-2 Religion mullahs monitored officers and characterized the officer's degree of piety, formalized in a report that evaluated the officer on a scale of one (not pious) to five (highly pious). This injection of religious morality created a schism in Pakistan's embodiment of nationalism that also reflected in Pakistan's society as evidenced by Pakistan's increasing sectarian violence.<sup>78</sup>

Iran employed a policy of encouraging Shi'a unrest in Pakistan. Zia overplayed the value of the Shi'a unrest and over responded both domestically and regionally. Zia approached the exogenous issue with his Afghan policy. In other words, he supported militant Sunni factions to fight indigenous as well as Iranian Shi'as in Afghanistan. This later became the basis of the Mujahideen. Zia's adept handling of the Mujahideen guerrilla effort against the Soviets in the Afghanistan War, possibly better attributed to the abilities of the ISI, can be seen in a positive light because it succeeded. Finally, Zia's insistence on aggravating the Kashmir issue meant that he would have to reject the Simla

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<sup>76</sup> This same method of religious discrimination by a statement of religious affiliation permeates governments throughout the Middle East. One could argue that banning this type of identification would help alleviate bigotry and contribute to moderation and inclusion within a society.

<sup>77</sup> The G-2 section in most modern militaries fulfills the unit's intelligence operations activities.

<sup>78</sup> Feroz Khan, Conversation with author on 19 May 2004 at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.



Agreement signed by his predecessor Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto. This decision resulted in the denial of Pakistan’s appeal for re-entry into the Commonwealth, an important international forum.<sup>79</sup>

Musharraf’s most significant foreign policy decision has been to support the U.S. GWOT. Far greater than any other country, Pakistan has more to lose than any other country in choosing to support the United States. The long-term result, however, promises a tremendous payoff value in terms of regional stability and the follow-on ‘peace dividend’. U.S. intervention in South Asian politics catapulted Pakistani-Indian relations into a new intensity of entente. This entente so far has reopened cross-border bus services, with train and air travel quickly approaching, and has generated plans for the first ever Pakistani-led, South Asian, multi-nation peace keeping effort. The greatest long-term benefit will be the relaxation of tensions between India and Pakistan.

How does Pakistan’s military support of U.S. interests affect Pakistan’s foreign policy? Military support in this definition includes the government since the Army Chief of Staff (General Musharraf) is the head of the government. This is more thoroughly reflected in the name of Pakistan’s senior most policy making body. The eight-member council is called the Security Council instead of being given a more generic bureaucratic name. Musharraf’s decision to support U.S. interests profoundly affects the extent to which he conducts foreign policy. Pakistan’s support requires U.S. involvement in brokering funding through international agencies (e.g. the International Monetary Fund), establishing regional peace initiatives (the most ever seen between Pakistan and India), and holding more sway in international politics. Pakistan could not have achieved these as swiftly on its own. Most significantly, Pakistan can achieve something that it could not previously do. It can now provide diplomatic solutions that alleviate the need for continued military solutions in securing itself against external threats.

### **3. Domestic Policy**

Ayub Khan’s failure in foreign policy also spelled failure in his domestic policy as “not only the Pakistani people’s sense of national solidarity but also the standards of

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<sup>79</sup> Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, 71.

public morality, financial discipline, law and order as well as bureaucratic efficiency—all seem to have gone downhill.”<sup>80</sup> Ayub Khan’s indifference to the Bengalis of East Pakistan contributed to rising separatist issues.

The most dramatic instance of the military’s influence on domestic politics came in 1971 when Yahya Khan used the military in an attempt to quash riots in East Pakistan. These riots erupted after Mujibur Rahman, an East Pakistani candidate for prime minister, won the election but was not permitted to assume the role. These riots sparked a separatist rebellion that severed Pakistan and brought independence to Bangladesh. Having precluded the Bengalis from having a representative voice in democratic elections, Yahya Khan’s legitimacy fell, and he was forced to provide for new elections in a truncated Pakistan.

General Zia-ul-Haq came to power in 1977 and instituted his Islamization program. Efforts of this program elevated certain Islamic parties into government positions and hosted a fanfare of Islamic ‘reforms’ that gave the appearance of an Islamic state. Unwilling to acquiesce to meaningful Islamic reforms (such as replacing Pakistan’s constitution with an Islamic one, based more as a theocracy than a democracy), Zia alienated both the Islamic movement and those calling for the restoration of democracy. In the end, Zia and many of his ‘Islamic’ higher staff died when a bomb exploded in their aircraft. The worst domestic error that Zia made centered on his religious sectarian bias in his Islamization program. While sponsoring sectarian fighting in Afghanistan may work, his sponsoring of Sunni activism against a largely moderate Shi’a community inside Pakistan sparked a wave of Shi’a activism in direct response. His encouragement of sectarian activism and its resultant violence sharply exacerbated an already divided seam in Pakistan’s society.

How does Pakistan’s military support of U.S. interests affect Pakistan’s domestic policy? Musharraf’s decision to support the U.S. GWOT threatens to split Pakistan’s society along its ethnic, religious, and political seams. Providing direct military assistance against the Taliban, an almost entirely Pashtun organization, means alienating the Pashtun ethnic group. Pashtuns already threaten separation, both politically and

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<sup>80</sup> Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, 57.

violently, as an independent Pashtunistan. Heightening this issue is the Islamic form of government that the Pashtuns seek in contrast to the secular Pakistani laws. Religious sectarian violence continues between Muslims and Sikhs, and between Sunni and Shi'a factions unabated. Musharraf's inability to prevent sectarian violence harms his already questionable legitimacy. Finally, his handling of Kashmir, particularly his recent ceasefire agreement, is likely to be the cause of the recent attempt on his life. Whether or not the attempt was botched or merely a warning, it clearly sends the message that Islamic militants will not tolerate the loss of Kashmir.

Will President Musharraf be able to continue authoritarian rule while Pakistanis call for democratic elections? Historically, Pakistani citizens welcomed military coups as a stabilizing factor that returns power to democracy once the crisis ends. Sometimes even the government upholds authoritarian rule. While Ayub Khan managed to rule for a decade, Yahya Khan lasted only a couple of years. Zia-ul-Haq remained in power for over a decade possibly because of the influx of monies because of the Afghan War, before he acquiesced to an election. Once he reneged on this election, he was no longer trusted to complete the results of a new election and was killed.

How long Musharraf can perpetuate his regime depends largely on the legitimacy he continues to generate. His authority began when "Pakistan's Supreme Court validated the coup and granted Musharraf executive and legislative authority for three years from the coup date...[and when] Musharraf named himself as president...was sworn in...[H]is presidency was extended for five more years."<sup>81</sup> Musharraf wisely used the existing governmental mechanisms to gain legitimacy and may find a solution to maintaining it by providing his opposition inclusion in the political process through government posts, sub-national elections, or fair judicial review. He must ensure that Pakistani forces conduct, or at least lead, any actions within Pakistan's borders. Pakistan, like many former British colonies, resent the idea of an imperialistic occupation. Thus, Pakistan's military supports the U.S. GWOT by fighting terrorism within its own borders.

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<sup>81</sup> U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. *Background Note: Pakistan* Available On-Line at: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm> December 2003.

### C. CONCLUSION

Pakistan's military encompasses more than the sum of its Army, Navy, and Air Force. It represents the nation's intelligence network and its military industrial complex. Pakistan's military leaders provided leadership for more than half of Pakistan's 57-year existence. These leaders exercised Pakistan's domestic and foreign policy even during many of the years when civilian governance existed. Pakistan's military impacts Pakistan's domestic economy directly even to the point of determining Pakistan's economic policies as well as placing Pakistan's economy in jeopardy due to its budgetary influence during civilian governance.

Religious based schisms institutionalized in Pakistan's military reflected in Pakistan's society because of Zia's Islamization program. If it is not possible to keep Pakistan's singular source of national unity unfettered by institutionalized religion, then Pakistan itself cannot remain cohesive. This lack of national cohesion explodes into sectarian violence and only Pakistan's military can unify the country. At this point, Pakistan's military no longer suffers religious schism, but it must do more than re-unify itself. It must be used to re-unify Pakistan. This process is beginning now as non-Punjabis increasingly find a career in Pakistan's military.

Pakistan's military institution provides a robust capability in the new fight on the periphery supporting the GWOT. Besides providing the United States. physical space to operate from or in, Pakistan's military offers the United States an ability to wage the GWOT within Pakistan's borders without engendering an anti-imperialistic (American) social movement.

On the other hand, the limits of U.S. support of a military regime were reached when Pakistan pursued the use of the Taliban and other jihadis as the method to its foreign policy in regional affairs. This placed a distance between Pakistan's military regime and the United States. What does this portend for future U.S. support for Pakistan's military regimes? The cost that has so far been the breaking point for U.S. support of Pakistan's military regimes has been Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear weapons and its usurpation of democratic processes. During the 1980's, the United States overlooked both of these in order to wage the ideological war against communism. This

condoning of Pakistan's policies ended abruptly during George H.W. Bush's administration which was all the more telling in that this administration intended to maintain a strong relationship with Pakistan. The lesson to be drawn at this point is that so long as Pakistan provides a key role in assisting the United States towards its primary national security goals, the United States will support a military regime. This support however will be withdrawn once the goal has been achieved due to U.S. domestic political pressure as well as from the fear of losing credibility in international politics.

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## **V. PAKISTAN'S MILITARY SUPPORT OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY GOALS: 2001 AND BEYOND**

In response to the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001, President Bush promulgated a revision to the National Security Strategy (NSS) that articulates a new kind of policy. This new global war on terrorism (GWOT) emphasizes the importance of the United States fighting its adversaries in many peripheral settings across the globe. The history of the U.S.-Pakistani relationship revolves around Pakistan's past role as a U.S. ally in a peripheral battle against communism. The GWOT brings this past role into current operation but in a more direct manner. Unlike the furtive role Pakistan's military played in providing the Mujahideen training, intelligence and weapons during the Afghan War; the GWOT openly incorporates Pakistani military forces in its daily operations.

In order to answer the question of how Pakistan's military can assist the United States achieve its NSS goals in a post-9/11 world, it is necessary to discern the environment that characterizes the U.S.-Pakistani relationship and identify the factors that contribute to policy making. What Pakistani interests detract from Pakistan's ability to function as a U.S. ally? How does this affect Pakistan's ability to remain a reliable partner of the United States? How can Pakistan's military capability be best used to assist the United States achieve its NSS goals? What benefits does Pakistan gain that makes cooperation possible? This chapter examines how the United States translates its NSS goals into objectives that Pakistan's military can achieve. It examines how Pakistan's military assists the United States reach its NSS goals by analyzing how U.S. and Pakistani national interests coincide or diverge within the context of the GWOT. It illustrates the manner in which Pakistan's military supports the United States' Operation Enduring Freedom as well as embarking upon other regional stability producing objectives. This paper will also explore the expanding nature of Pakistan's military roles in response to the U.S. NSS.

### **A. U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2002: A NEW KIND OF POLICY**

The global war on terrorism is a policy not a war. This is an important distinction because it reflects a decision point in the American worldview. President Bush's 2002

NSS outlined a new global policy oriented on an anti-terrorist campaign. This NSS significantly lends focus to U.S. foreign policy that had been largely missing during the 1990's as the United States tried to articulate the role of its military and instead centered mainly on domestic economic interests. Terrorism directed specifically at the domestic United States focused foreign policy development towards a new goal. During the Cold War, the American worldview perceived a battle between the forces of democracy and communism, thus prompting the containment of communism as the center piece of U.S. national and military strategies. Today's enemy, however, represents a series of disparate social grievances and perhaps even social movements rather than a singular hostile nation. This is George Bush's vision of the threat to the United States:

That great struggle is over. The militant visions of class, nation, and race which promised utopia and delivered misery have been defeated and discredited. America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few. We must defeat these threats to our Nation, allies, and friends.<sup>82</sup> –The National Security Strategy of the United States of America- September 2002

The decision facing Americans face is whether they see the GWOT as a war, which necessarily has an end with the eradication of the last terrorist or whether they see the GWOT as a long-term solution that precludes an environment where terrorists can form, train, or even be seen as a legitimate means of protest. By seeing the GWOT as merely a direct action against terrorists, the United States will continually be reacting to a growing problem. By treating the GWOT as a two-point solution, one directly against known terrorists, and one directed at the cause of terrorism, it is possible to reduce the probability of a future generation of terrorists. President Bush's NSS of 2002 provides a two-point view. How to stop terrorism is well beyond the scope of this thesis, but understanding the facets of the U.S. NSS and how Pakistan's military can contribute to assisting the United States reach its NSS goals warrants examination.

## **B. PAKISTAN'S DOMESTIC & REGIONAL INTERESTS**

What domestic Pakistani interests detract from Pakistan's ability to function as a U.S. ally? Two important detractors currently exist that may preclude the full potential of

<sup>82</sup> The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Internet from the White House web site. Address as of 21 September 2002: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> September 2003. Current access is also available via PURL. 1.



support from Pakistan's military institution. These detractors center on the divergence of U.S. and Pakistani national interests. The first detractor is Pakistan's fear of a hostile India intent on Pakistan's collapse since partition in 1947. This issue dominates Pakistan's military thinking, which drives the need for a force potent enough to deter Indian aggression. The second detractor lies in the aftermath of the 1980's Afghanistan War. This detractor points to Pakistan's support of insurgency during the Afghanistan War and to latent ties and sympathies towards the Taliban; a force Pakistan has used for almost a decade to further its interests in Afghanistan. How does this affect Pakistan's ability to remain a reliable U.S. partner? Pakistan's military remains a constant supporter of U.S. interests despite the nature of war on the periphery and proves itself invaluable in supporting the U.S.' GWOT. However, it suffers from linkages of some elements to the very organizations that the United States opposes.

### **1. Fear of Indian Aggression**

Pakistan fears Indian aggression more than any other threat. Numerically, Pakistan cannot win a conventional war against India and promotes nuclear deterrence to protect itself from attack. Since the 1947 War, the times that Pakistan has fought against India (1965 and Kargil in 1999) have largely been the result of miscalculations of Indian response in what were supposed to have been limited skirmishes. In order to offset the numerical difference, Pakistan uses insurgent forces to maintain a claim on Kashmir. While this strategy limits 50,000 Indian troops, it stands in the way of the U.S. GWOT in two manners.

Jihadis do not readily de-radicalize when Pakistan changes its rhetoric or even its long-term policy. They continue to act violently and may direct their efforts at the Pakistani government if they perceive a threat to their struggle to gain Kashmir. Finally, jihadis may conduct terrorist operations in India (not Kashmir), which profoundly affects regional stability.

Indian threats are taken seriously and Pakistan reacts accordingly by redistributing troops to the eastern border and mobilizing. These actions could seriously derail on-going operations or encroach upon logistics and air bases currently provided to the

United States. The possibility of a scenario exists in which an al-Qaeda member could bomb an Indian target to stimulate an offensive Indian posturing that would disrupt ongoing U.S. efforts in support of OEF at a crucial timeframe.

## **2. Latent Ties to the Taliban**

Three increasingly broad levels link Pakistan to the Taliban; individual, political-national, and social-national. Individually, Pakistani military personnel, especially the Army and ISI, have fought along side the Taliban forging strong sympathies if not outright loyalties. These individuals are now reaching the upper echelons of their organizations. These ties are smaller in scale, but harder to sever.<sup>83</sup> On the political-national level, Pakistan's Afghan policy began its political ties with the Taliban in 1994, developing a working relationship that supports Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan. To renounce this political concession, the United States will have to ensure that Afghanistan's government is friendly with Pakistan, especially on issues of Pashtun ethnic nationalism. The national-social level recognizes the ethnic Pashtun composition of the Taliban and the resultant fissures in Pakistan's society that could arise when the government targets individuals of a single ethnicity. Pakistan must assuage Pashtun ethnicity issues as it dissolves its ties to the Taliban. Each of these three levels ties Pakistan into ethnic and political problems necessary to address in order to prevent social mobilization from taking root and resulting in a separatist rebellion. Pakistan's maintenance of a porous border allowed better use of the Taliban in Afghanistan. These areas also allowed for the training of jihadis, used to perpetuate the border issue in Kashmir. Pakistan's ties to the Taliban were at the heart of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy.<sup>84</sup> Pakistan's ties to jihadis in Kashmir represented Pakistan's (perceived) best hope at prolonging the Kashmir issue until Pakistan could attain a favorable conclusion. The question of how well Pakistan's military can support U.S. interests rests on whether or not Pakistan's military can divest itself of linkages to the Taliban and jihadis eager to fight in Kashmir.

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<sup>83</sup> Feroz Khan, Conversation with Author, 9 September 2003.

<sup>84</sup> Pakistan's Afghanistan policy sought to install a regime friendly to Pakistan which would be ethnically Pashtun rather than one of the other ethnic groups (Tajik, Uzbek, Turkmen, etc. which constitute the northern alliance).

Pakistan's domestic problems represent both a difficult and expansive set of problems including a society beset with religious and ethnic schisms fired both from within (as a result of Zia's Islamization) and from without (including religious sectarianism exported from Iran and Saudi Arabia). Conversely, Pakistan reaped success in its opium eradication program, which forcibly redeveloped Pakistan's poppy cultivation into grain harvests by destroying the poppy fields and providing farmers with the tools, seed, and financial incentives to make transition possible. This became a serious problem for organized crime, which largely switched to smuggling Afghanistan-grown opium, and re-affirmed Pakistan's monopoly on coercive force within its borders. The U.S. NSS seeks to address these types of issues with both U.S. support and with the support of Pakistan's military. ISI possesses a wide array of informational and military assets to assist local police fight organized crime.

### **C. U.S.-PAKISTANI RELATIONS SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001**

Historically, U.S. relations with Pakistan usually came to the detriment of relations with India, while seeking better relations with India came at the cost of losing relations with Pakistan. "Since last [2001] September's attacks, however, the United States has found itself in the unaccustomed position of having good relations with India and Pakistan at the same time."<sup>85</sup> The United States must capitalize on this opportunity and prevent perceptions of U.S. bias from reviving the previous zero-sum game.

On 12 September 2001, the Pakistani embassy conveyed to the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Rich Armitage, that President Musharraf pledged Pakistan's support to the United States. By 14 September 2001, Musharraf convinced his military staff that it would be in Pakistan's interest to align itself with the United States. This decision caused Pakistan to re-assess its long-standing Afghanistan policy and holds deep social and political implications.<sup>86</sup> How deeply was this felt in Pakistan? General Musharraf stated that:

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<sup>85</sup> Feinstein, L., Clad, J. C., Dunn, L. A., and Albright D. *A NEW EQUATION: U.S. Policy toward India and Pakistan after September 11. Working Paper #27.* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C. May 2002) Available on-line at: <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/fel01/fel01.pdf> March 2004.

<sup>86</sup> Jones, Owen Bennet. *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002. 2-3.

The tragedy of 9/11 transformed security policies and changed geopolitical calculations. Pakistan took a strategic decision, based on the principles of humanity and our national interest, to support the war on terrorism. Our intentions should be in no doubt. Our actions speak louder than words. Our capabilities were limited but have been progressively improved. We are acting against Al-Qaeda and its associates effectively. We have also acted against other organizations or groups involved in any form of terrorism. Pakistan will remain in the forefront of the war on terrorism.<sup>87</sup>

President Bush promulgated the United States' new NSS in 2002 to address these types of regional concerns and domestic issues. U.S. commitment to the goals outlined in the NSS diminishes Pakistan's fears of a hostile India and opens the door for the Pakistani government to cut ties with the Taliban, already indicated by the positive engagements between Delhi and Islamabad as a warming of relations. However, the United States also had to consider the implications of a partnership with Pakistan.

The major areas of U.S. concern in Pakistan include: nuclear nonproliferation; counterterrorism; regional stability; democratization and human rights; and economic reform and development. An ongoing Pakistan-India nuclear arms race, fueled by rivalry over Kashmir, continues to be the focus of U.S. nonproliferation efforts in South Asia and a major issue in U.S. relations with both countries.<sup>88</sup>

The U.S. State Department regards Musharraf's "country [as] one of our closest allies in the global war on terror," and that the attempt on his life "demonstrates that Pakistan faces as serious a threat from terrorism as other countries on the front lines [in] the war on terror."<sup>89</sup> The State Department highlights the points on which Pakistan supports the U.S. GWOT illustrating that "[s]ince 2001 Pakistan has provided extraordinary assistance in the War on Terror by capturing and turning over...more than 500 al-Qaida members."<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> UN.org, United Nations. *Address by H.E. General Pervez Musharraf President of Pakistan at the 58<sup>th</sup> Session of the UN General Assembly New York on 24 September 2003*. United Nations website available on-line at: <http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/pakeng030924.htm> March 2004.

<sup>88</sup> Peter R. Blood, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. "Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Updated 10 March 2002." in *CRS Issue Brief for Congress*. Congressional Research Service: United States Library of Congress. 3. Available on-line at: <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9057.pdf> March 2004.

<sup>89</sup> Times of India On-Line "US Condemns Bid on Musharraf's Life." 17 December 2003 available on-line at: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/363556.cms> December 2003.

<sup>90</sup> U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. *Background Note: Pakistan*.

The United States also offers incentives for Pakistan, other than lifting sanctions based on Pakistan's Nuclear Program. Financially, the United States dramatically increased "economic assistance to Pakistan, providing debt relief and support for a major effort at education reform...[and] intends to provide Pakistan \$3 billion in economic and military aid over the next 5 years."<sup>91</sup> According to the Department of States' *Country/Account Summaries ('Spigots')*, the United States provided Pakistan with \$1,044,994,000.00 in FY02.<sup>92</sup> However, even though 9/11 reinvigorated U.S.-Pakistani relations, Pakistan's regional fears can hamper this relationship.

The terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December of 2001, just three months after Pakistan's promise to assist in the GWOT, shows the ability of a small group<sup>93</sup> to influence the actions of two larger nations and to disrupt the military operations of the United States in Afghanistan.<sup>94</sup> This singular terrorist action caused a military reaction across the region and could have led to the possibility of a regional war.<sup>95</sup> In mid-December 2001, American forces engaged members of al-Qaeda in the mountainous region of northeast Afghanistan bordering Pakistan.<sup>96</sup> The operational plan called for American forces to encircle al-Qaeda on three sides and push them south down a valley to the Pakistani border where positioned Pakistani troops could trap the al-Qaeda fighters.<sup>97</sup> As this operation was forming, India shifted 170,000 forces towards the Pakistani border in response to an Islamic terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament. Pakistan, fearful of Indian aggression, countered by pulling troops off its western border with Afghanistan and re-deploying them to its eastern border. The encirclement did not occur and al-Qaeda slipped away into the mountains.

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<sup>91</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Background Note: Pakistan*.

<sup>92</sup> U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. *FY2002 Country/Account ('Spigot')* International Affairs Budget website available on-line at: <http://www.state.gov/m/rm/c6112.htm> February 2003.

<sup>93</sup> The terrorist organizations thought to be responsible for the attack on the Indian parliament are Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba, both of which India accused Pakistan of supporting.

<sup>94</sup> Peter R. Blood, "Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Updated 10 March 2002," 14.

<sup>95</sup> Circumstances aside, World War I arguably started from a similar act of singular violence that sparked a chain of events leading to war.

<sup>96</sup> "Relentless assaults on Al Qaeda fighters." *DAWN The Internet Edition* 15 December 2001 available on-line at: <http://www.dawn.com/2001/12/15/top4.htm> December 2003.

<sup>97</sup> "Buildup of Pakistani forces near Afghan border." *DAWN The Internet Edition* 13 December 2001: available on-line at: <http://www.dawn.com/2001/12/13/welcome.htm> December 2003.

The United States gains much from allaying Pakistan's fears, not the least of which is securing a tactically reliable ally during challenging events. The United States can better rely on Pakistan's military forces being available by brokering peace between Pakistan and India. This precludes Pakistan's military from deploying east at critical times. More importantly, stopping Indian support for Pashtun separatist elements denies sympathizers a reason to support the Taliban in Afghanistan and in Kashmir. The United States must also place diplomatic pressure on Iran to stop sponsoring the Shi'a sectarianism both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan if the expectation is curtailment of sectarian violence.

How does the Pakistani military support U.S. interests in the post 9/11 environment? After joining the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism, and faced with a new confrontation over Kashmir, Pakistan resolved to crack down on terrorists operating within its borders. The questionable results tend to follow a pattern of U.S. pressure forcing the capture of a nominal number of terrorists. Pakistan's inability to produce more than a token number of arrests after being pressured may signal Pakistan's reluctance to completely cut its previous ties and shift its policies in Afghanistan and Kashmir. However, Secretary of State Colin Powell applauded the involvement of Pakistan in combating terrorism on its own soil.<sup>98</sup>

Should the United States continue to support Musharraf's military regime or press for a return to democracy? Supporting an authoritarian while delaying democracy might seem like a point of divergence, but it may be in the best interest of both countries to continue this process of gradual return to democracy rather than try to force democracy unhesitatingly. The 'polarized religious opposition' argument rests on the premise of the eventual ouster of an authoritarian regime by a regime that polarized on religious issues since Musharraf is pointedly secular. The historical analogy cited is the Shah's overthrow in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The problem with this argument is that it disregards the legitimacy that Pakistan's government affords to Musharraf in addition to

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<sup>98</sup> Peter R. Blood, "Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Updated 10 March 2002," 18-19.

the lack of a widespread anti-regime social mobilization based on Islamic framing.<sup>99</sup> While political structures and mobilizing structures are present, opposition groups are still afforded as well as partake in political institutional inclusion albeit not in electing the president.

Liberal critics argue that a “benign military dictator is no substitute for a participatory democratic process” and that “Musharraf has weakened the country's Parliament, Supreme Court and other government institutions, as well as its two main secular parties.” Additionally, while it may be true that “Pakistan needs to develop its institutions and not be so dependent on one person.”<sup>100</sup>, logic would dictate a gradual return to democracy so that parties could better array themselves for consensus rather than the factional infighting that decayed the national political process leading to a military coup.

The United States views Pakistan's authoritarian leadership as a legitimate source of national leadership. Despite the incongruent nature of supporting the idea of democracy and a military authoritarian, the United States cannot adopt a shortsighted plan that insists on a democratically elected national leader. When elected, each of Pakistan's previous civilian governments during the 1990's sought to ensure their hold in office by pitting one faction against another so that none was strong enough to represent a threat. This practice exacerbated rifts in Pakistani society and the rioting prompted General Musharraf to lead a coup to re-establish security and civil order. Pakistanis welcomed the act...as a temporary measure. As such, Pakistan's military became the only national institution that could provide unity in a country falling apart at multiple schisms. Despite being a military authoritarian, Musharraf allows a degree of civilian governance to continue under military rule. Pakistan's legislative branch passes laws and its judiciary branch also continues to provide its checks and balances. However, Musharraf holds the executive branch closely claiming both the office of the President

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<sup>99</sup> Even Pakistan's largest religious party, the Jama'at-I-Islami (JI), cannot muster enough support to challenge Musharraf's claim to the Presidency seriously. This inability to formulate a broader movement is despite Musharraf's decision to support the United States providing the JI an anti-American framing reference, which it uses to challenge Musharraf's authority.

<sup>100</sup> David Rohde, “Bomb Aimed at Pakistani Leader Weighed Nearly Half a Ton.” *New York Times On-Line*. 16 December 2003 available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/16/international/asia/16STAN.html> December 2003.

and continuing as the Chief of the Army, a situation that clearly rails against the Pakistani constitution. For the time being, Musharraf's cooperation provides the United States with stable assistance in the GWOT without the negative aspect of a violently repressive regime normally associated with military authoritarians.

**D. ROLES PAKISTAN'S MILITARY CAN PLAY IN ASSISTING U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY GOALS**

Pakistan's military fulfills Pakistani society's deeply entrenched need for security. The United States must nurture a change in this mindset without disrupting the legitimacy that Pakistan's military holds. In order for Pakistan's military to assist in fulfilling the U.S. NSS goals, the United States must clearly articulate its needs in order for Pakistan to evaluate what is being required of its military. Identification of Pakistan's military infrastructure is required to determine what roles it can and cannot complete. Beyond physical constraints and limitations on the roles Pakistan's military can conceivably accomplish, it must also take into account political, ethnic, religious, and criminal considerations. Translating these goals into military objectives and then coordinating those objectives becomes a prerequisite for success. Providing multinational military linkages contributes to tactical and operational success. United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Commanding General Abizaid summarized how Pakistan's military coordinates with U.S. forces in a testimony to the House Armed Services Committee:

President Musharraf has made great strides in curtailing the influence of terrorists within his nation and the Pakistani Army has become more effective along the Afghan border... [He] has begun a long term strategy to engage the tribal leaders in these areas [by] offering them access to government resources if they purge the terrorists from their area of control, but at the same time, he is prepared to take military action against those found non-compliant. We are supporting these efforts through increased intelligence sharing and security assistance while improving operational coordination between CFC Afghanistan and the Pakistani military. We also conduct regular meetings between Afghan, Pakistani and U.S. Military leaders to promote transparency and cooperation between governments along the border.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> John Abizaid, *Fiscal 2005 Budget: Defense Programs* in a testimony to the House Congressional Committee on 3Mar04. Federal Document Clearing House, Inc. 2004. Nexis Database available on-line at: [http://www.nexis.com/research/home?\\_key=1079405805&\\_session=8f80d9ac-76f5-11d8-8114-8a0c5904aa77.1.3256858605.120336.%20.0.0&\\_state=&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkBl&\\_md5=f39261997d9aa260392d153e2b0d9df7](http://www.nexis.com/research/home?_key=1079405805&_session=8f80d9ac-76f5-11d8-8114-8a0c5904aa77.1.3256858605.120336.%20.0.0&_state=&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkBl&_md5=f39261997d9aa260392d153e2b0d9df7) March 2004.



Pakistan's military assists the United States in reaching its NSS goals in several ways, such as providing significant opportunities for the United States in intelligence collaboration<sup>102</sup>, airspace use, and with bases for operations, logistics support and airfields. The cooperation of Pakistan's military enables Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and its many smaller operations, some of which are on going. Pakistan's leading of a coalition of South Asian countries on a United Nations (UN) mission to the Congo is evidence of cooperative action and regional stability objectives. Each of these is a direct military action resulting from the United States' current NSS but may suffer from the intermittent ambiguity of Pakistan's domestic politics fearful of Indian aggression and latent sympathies towards the Taliban and jihadis. The following sections briefly describe how Pakistan's military can directly or indirectly contribute to assisting the United States achieve five of the eight goals outlined in the U.S. NSS<sup>103</sup>.

### **1. Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity**

Pakistani forces can assist in achieving this goal in two primary manners. As described earlier, the Taliban advocates an oppressive form of Islam that creates fear in innocent civilians, denies education and other rights to women, and promotes brutality in establishing 'justice'. Direct military action that assists in the destruction of the Taliban removes the forces that propagate this culture of fear. Second, Pakistan's military institution can assist local police forces against organized violent crime in the form of information sharing and as a forcible deterrent. Organized crime represents a national threat to freedom at the grassroots. Local police, politicians, and judges often ignore or dismiss charges against criminals backed by criminal organizations, which brutally intimidate and sometimes kill officials attempting to enforce the rule of law.<sup>104</sup>

Conversely, U.S. support of Pakistan's military leader also raises questions about the contradiction between promoting human dignity with its inherent democratic principles and prolongation of a regime that suppresses these values. The previous

<sup>102</sup> Pakistan's military can provide "information that is often unavailable from U.S. intelligence sources" (See Lee and Perl, 14-15), Specifically, it can provide human intelligence to which the United States does not have access.

<sup>103</sup> Of the eight NSS goals, the following are not easily influenced by Pakistan's military: 1) Global economic growth through free markets and free trade, 2) Transforming America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, 3) Expanding the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.

<sup>104</sup> S. V .R. Nasr, "The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan," 139-180.

chapters illustrated how U.S. support towards Pakistan's military regimes waned after U.S. national security goals had been achieved and Pakistan's military regimes continued to usurp civilian governance. Will the United States support Pakistan's military regimes once Operation Enduring Freedom ends? This question depends on the extent to which Pakistanis feel that their rights have been violated. An indication may well be found in the amount and type of political parties that Musharraf (and any future military successor) allows to be active. If Musharraf permits the moderates to continue political contestation for power then there will be a degree of social outlet in the political arena. However, if Musharraf finds this contestation a threat to his regime and suppresses the moderates it will radicalize them. At this point, the threat of a social movement to overthrow the U.S. backed regime could quickly develop into an event damaging to U.S. credibility and interests similar to the backing of the Shah in Iran. The best solution lies in supporting the current regime to the extent that suppressions of freedoms do not incur a large scale social movement. At the same time, the United States must work to provide the infrastructure (educational, health, economic, etc.) that will support the viability of an elected government and urge Pakistan's military regime to move towards civilian governance as soon as possible. Because the GWOT is not likely to end soon, the United States cannot use this as the condition for ensuring Pakistan's transition to civilian governance.

## **2. Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against the United States and Its Friends**

Pakistan's military should prove most effective in fulfilling this NSS goal. Pakistan's military forces focuses on direct military actions whether as a coalition force, as demonstrated over the past two years in eradicating the Taliban, or on its own. The risk of using direct military action in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and in Balochistan hinges on the political volatility of these areas in direct confrontation with government forces over separatist issues. On a positive note, Pakistan's military enjoys access to tribal areas that it never could attain prior to joining the U.S. GWOT. The risk of direct military action in Afghanistan is found in the resentment many Afghans have for Pakistan, and as a result, Pakistani troops usually remain within Pakistan's border. An anti-Pakistani uprising in Afghanistan could easily carry into both the Afghan population in Pakistan as well as into

the separatist states of the NWFP and Balochistan. Despite these risks, it is imperative that Pakistan engage militarily in the tribal areas as President Musharraf has directed. Since 2002, Pakistani troops have been regularly patrolling FATA areas increasing both its presence and its capabilities in patrolling the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.<sup>105</sup> This effort to harden the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is crucial to establishing distinct Pakistan and Afghanistan national identities rather than fostering the ethnic identities that both transcend and threaten modern state borders.

Pakistan's military operation in March in Balochistan provides a good measurement of the capacity of FATA inhabitants for government involvement in FATA areas. Forty-six Pakistani troops, 63 militants, and 15 civilians died in operations as Pakistan's military attempted to capture suspected al-Qaeda members. Despite the possibility of igniting Pashtun separatist nationalism, local inhabitants regarded the action as a legitimate use of force in asserting the government's authority. Pakistan's army coupled this show of Pakistan's resolve to support the GWOT with a policy of voluntary civilian demilitarization through a non-reciprocity weapons turn-in. In order to alleviate Balochis' fears of remaining defenseless, the Pakistani military offered Balochis the ability to join the army.<sup>106</sup> The near term benefit meant the voluntary turn-in of weapons by locals while the long-term benefit means that the predominantly Punjabi<sup>107</sup> army becomes ethnically diversified, and thereby gain the ability to moderate Pakistan's military.

The "successful use of military force...presupposes the ability to identify a terrorist perpetrator or its state sponsor, as well as the precise location of the group."<sup>108</sup> Since the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces do not require large physical facilities, there are few fixed targets. Instead of fighting a war of tangible assets, a war of loyalties, thoughts, and when identified, against armed forces is fought. However, as intangible as

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<sup>105</sup> General R.B. Myers, *Prepared Statement of General Richard B. Myers Before the House Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee*.

<sup>106</sup> Ibrahim Shinwari, "Tribesmen Surrender Weapons: 50 Detainees Freed in Wana." *DAWN The Internet Edition* 26 April 01 available on-line at: <http://www.dawn.com/2004/04/26/top6.htm> May 2004.

<sup>107</sup> Owen Bennett Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, 284.

<sup>108</sup> Rensselaer Lee and Raphael Perl, "Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy: Updated 26 March 2002" 14-15.

Al Qaeda and Taliban assets may be, they require funding to operate. This funding is created in the poppy fields of Afghanistan, and believed to become fungible in the form of gold<sup>109</sup> or cash as banking accounts have been seized. It is possible to use Pakistan's military forces (ground and air) in locating and destroying these crops in conjunction with or under the control of U.S. forces in order to prevent hostilities between Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, there must be a corresponding investment of seed, fertilizer, and equipment to assist farmers in establishing food or cotton crops.<sup>110</sup> Providing 20-40 percent of U.S. consumed heroin and 70 percent of European consumed heroin, Afghanistan's heroin traffic also supplies approximately 1.5 million heroin addicts in Pakistan, making the drug trade a \$20 billion dollar business in Pakistan.<sup>111</sup> Hardening this border, therefore, would also curtail Pakistan's domestic health issues surrounding heroin use.

### **3. Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts**

Of the regional issues between India and Pakistan, cross-border terrorism continues to spur on defensive mindsets, especially in Kashmir. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell described cross-border terrorism as something that "we [the United States and Pakistan] are committed to defeating...[and] there are still opportunities for dialogue."<sup>112</sup> Pakistan's support of jihadis in Kashmir officially ended at the same time Musharraf declared alignment with the United States.<sup>113</sup> This reversal, much like that with the Taliban, did not mean that cross-border terrorism stopped. Pakistan and India both have much to lose if Kashmir goes to one side or the other. Pakistan's military must act in complete contrast with its actions in the 1999 Kargil conflict in which they infiltrated Kashmir at the town of Kargil dressed as jihadis. Instead, Pakistan's military must now prevent incursions by jihadis and secure its northern border. To this point, Pakistan is hard pressed to deliver evidence that it is complying and its critics, especially in India, charge that Pakistan continues to support these elements.

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<sup>109</sup> Kenneth Katzman, "Iran: Current Developments and U.S. Policy: Updated 29 January 2003" 8-9.

<sup>110</sup> Lee, Rensselaer and Raphael Perl, "Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy: Updated 26 March 2002," 14-15.

<sup>111</sup> Peter R. Blood, "Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Updated 10 March 2002," 17.

<sup>112</sup> Colin L. Powell, Briefing at the FPC on "U.S. Foreign Policy after the UNGA".

<sup>113</sup> Peter R. Blood, "Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Updated 10 March 2002," 6.

#### 4. Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with WMD

While nuclear non-proliferation is a major concern for the United States in the regional stabilization effort, nuclear forces do not represent a useful military tool in fighting the GWOT and not addressed in this paper. However, since 9/11, the United States and Pakistan “have held talks on improving security and installing new safeguards on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants”<sup>114</sup> in order to prevent these weapons from being used either by terrorists or by Pakistani military personnel that might stage a coup against President Musharraf or future governments.

Despite U.S. efforts since President Carter to ‘punish’ Pakistan for its quest to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, the United States made concessions on this issue when it needed Pakistan’s help as evidenced by the waiving of the Pressler Amendment during the 1980’s and with the lifting of sanctions in 2001. Despite the issuance of waivers for the nuclear weapons issue, the United States cannot have a partner that supports terrorists, especially not the Taliban. To this end, Musharraf:

has begun to address Pakistan’s many pressing and longstanding problems, including the beleaguered economy, corruption, terrorism, and poor governance. Pakistan will receive well over one billion dollars in U.S. assistance and several billion dollars from international organizations to help strengthen the country as a key member of the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition.<sup>115</sup>

Musharraf carried his stand against terrorism to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) members stating that “NAM must be a strong, principled voice against terrorism...base[d] on [the] fact that no cause justifies acts of violence against innocent civilians”<sup>116</sup> while using language to encourage international support for resolving long standing disputes (e.g. Kashmir). Pakistan’s military (Nuclear Forces) must also work in conjunction with the United States to ensure security of its nuclear infrastructure as well as safeguarding its nuclear information. This has become particularly troublesome as Pakistan’s preeminent nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, pleaded that Pakistan’s military

<sup>114</sup> Peter R. Blood, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Updated 10 March 2002,” 11.

<sup>115</sup> Peter R. Blood, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Updated 10 March 2002,” 3.

<sup>116</sup> Islamabad Policy Research Institute. *Address of the President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, at the Inaugural Session of the 13th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM-XIII)*. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 24Feb03. On-line at: <http://ipripak.org/journal/summer2003/doc7.shtm> March 04.

leadership had complicit knowledge of nuclear information transactions between himself and the North Korean government. Pakistan's ISI must work in conjunction with U.S. intelligence agencies to preclude further leakage of information and proliferation of nuclear equipment and technology. Musharraf's grip on ISI allows some assurance that this is being done. The United States must cultivate the contacts and policies that will ensure cooperation in this endeavor under future civilian governance.

#### **5. Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with Other Main Centers of Global Power**

Pakistan and India enjoy a degree of cooperation and dialogue unattainable in the first 54 years since partition. This political cooperation also gained some headway in the para-military coast guards of both countries with clearly undefined borders. The international waterway is demarcated as an extension of a large creek that sometimes changes position during the rainy season. Although it does not hold the same deep-rooted feelings that Kashmir conjures, it does provide a starting point for the countries to discuss border issues as well as military cooperation.

Remarkably, Pakistan currently leads a brigade sized coalition force under the United Nations (UN) mission MONUC (Democratic Republic of Congo) that includes infantry battalions from Bangladesh and Nepal, a Nepalese engineer unit, and a Bangladesh helicopter squadron.<sup>117</sup> This type of collaboration, especially with Bangladesh, comes only from U.S. insistence and assistance in building peace in the region.<sup>118</sup> This is in addition to the approximately 4,400 troops and observers that Pakistan contributes to other UN missions worldwide.<sup>119</sup>

#### **E. ECONOMIC FACTORS IN FIGHTING TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN**

The short-term dividend of providing Pakistan with economic assistance provides Pakistan's military the assets it needs to patrol the FATA areas and begin to harden the Pakistani-Afghan border. Longer-term dividends of economic assistance provide an alternative to the madrassah educational system thereby developing citizens better suited

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<sup>117</sup> United Nations MUNOC website at: <http://www.monuc.org/home.aspx?lang=en> March 2004.

<sup>118</sup> Feroz Khan, Conversation with Author, 19 May 2004.

<sup>119</sup> Peter R. Blood, "Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Updated 10 March 2002." 14-15.

to contribute positively to Pakistan's society. Throughout Pakistan's history, the military institution played a key role in determining Pakistan's economic viability. This trend continues and Musharraf's current efforts resonate well with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

Pakistan's economy plays a key role in the environment in which Pakistanis live. Pakistan's ability to provide for internal security, basic health care, education, basic utilities (especially clean water), affordable housing, and social programs, institutional governance structures, etc. rely on one thing: financial capacity. Increasing Pakistan's economic viability would eventually provide for these basic needs diminishing frustration, despair, indignity and humiliation. It will take decades to eradicate these feelings provided economic factors succeed.<sup>120</sup>

The United States demonstrates a vested interest in Pakistan's economic viability. As depicted in the NSS, failed states present a threat to the United States in terms of possible future interventions either to stabilize a region or to fight hostile elements that flourish where the rule of law is absent. The U.S. Department of State's FY2004 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations budget stated:

Developing and sustaining a strong U.S.-Pakistan relationship will remain critical to a successful U.S. regional strategy for South Asia, and indispensable to continued progress in the global war on terrorism. FY 2004 security assistance to Pakistan will enable continued cooperation with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and will promote stability on its borders. Economic, development, and democratization assistance will promote reform and address the conditions that breed extremism by helping to stabilize the economy and strengthen social, political and economic institutions in ways visible to ordinary Pakistanis. Improved border security and control in the regions of Pakistan adjoining Afghanistan is in the long-term interest of the United States, Pakistan and the region.<sup>121</sup>

Pakistan's military stands on the threshold of delivering economic reform by implementing policies outlined by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), currently applying an \$8Bn dollar aid package to develop four large cities in Pakistan, ADB policies for a \$2Bn improvement program in Balochistan, and the

<sup>120</sup> Husain Ishrat, *Pakistan-The Economy of an Elitist State*, 340-345.

<sup>121</sup> Department of State webpage *FY 2004 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: South Asia* at website Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations available on-line at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/17789.pdf> 436, April 2004. This website provides an appreciation for the direction and vision of the Department of State's foreign policy development.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). The economic incentives for growth in Pakistan need a corresponding reform in Pakistan's societal structures of the local police, governance, and domestic and foreign policy considerations, and issues. For instance, it is possible to squander domestic economic interests if Pakistan's military chooses to make a grab for Kashmir. Why would this be a consideration? Punjabis represent the primary stakeholders in gaining Kashmir whereas most Pakistanis might welcome a peaceful negotiation to the Kashmir issue. Pakistan's army, predominantly Punjabi, however, holds the ability to decide the issue based more on ethnic proclivities rather than on the nation's interests.<sup>122</sup> The long-term benefit discussed earlier of an ethnically representative military may help moderate Pakistan's military decisions in the interests of Pakistan.

#### **F. CONCLUSION**

The U.S. NSS of 2002 reflects a new vision in American foreign policy that views the world in terms of a symbiotic whole in contrast to the democracy versus communism dichotomy of the Cold War. To an extent, it acknowledges the correlation between societal grievances in foreign countries and U.S. domestic security. Specifically, the U.S. NSS identifies the threat to the United States because of failed states. The NSS provides the framework to begin a two point solution to combating terrorism by relying on both direct military actions against terrorists coupled with the intent "to help make the world not just safer but better"<sup>123</sup> by directing resources at the causes of societal grievances. The danger that America faces to a long-term solution is that the GWOT becomes ingrained in the American psyche as one of fighting terrorists without a corresponding fight against the societal ills of the failed states where terrorism spawns. The resultant outcome may define success as terrorist body counts and failure as coalition body counts along the same false presumptions touted during the Vietnam conflict. A much broader societal scale and at a global level must measure success.

Pakistan's military institution directly assists U.S. efforts in the GWOT from support infrastructure to direct military engagement and indirectly meets U.S. NSS goals of regional stability making. However, Pakistan's military institution must relax its fears

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<sup>122</sup> Owen Bennett Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*. 284.

<sup>123</sup> The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*.



of a hostile India and divest itself of alignment towards the Taliban to assist the United States completely in the GWOT. The United States must be able to bridge the gap between these two countries, as it has already started, and assist Pakistan in finding solutions to the political and social problems that threaten the ethnic and sectarian seams in Pakistan's society.

The United States should continue to support Musharraf rather than push for a sudden democracy because a democratic government at this point may lead to a reversion to political chaos at a time that is still critical to conducting the GWOT in Afghanistan. Additionally, a democratic government is not as likely to be as accommodating towards U.S. interests and may be much slower in acting to assist when choosing to do so. Finally, a democratic consensus is likely not going to be as accepting of the regional peace initiatives currently underway. Despite Pakistan's government validating Musharraf's presidency, U.S. support for Musharraf cannot be based on this thin veil of legitimacy. Support for Musharraf's regime should recognize the value of the media rather than his current censorship, take measures to avoid, rather than exacerbate tensions with India such as the current ceasefire, and allow institutionally inclusive rather than exclusive measures to diffuse opposition and gather consensus. Fulfillment of U.S. interests depends on the Pakistani military's ability to translate these prescriptions into attainable military actions.

Sectarian violence and corruption continued but the economic issues have relaxed somewhat as U.S. economic assistance helped to stabilize Pakistan's stagnated economy. The recent peace initiatives with India that Musharraf embraces could not have taken place under a civilian government. U.S. support for Musharraf's regime continues to pay dividends in efforts towards regional stability.<sup>124</sup>

The Taliban presented Pakistan's military institution with a solution to its domestic and foreign policy issues, notably it fought Pakistan's Fourth War. Domestically, the Taliban became more of a liability than an asset. Its value as a tool in Pakistan's Afghanistan policy became questionable in the late 1990's and has since become untenable due to the terrorist events of 9/11. The United States positioned itself

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<sup>124</sup> Owen Bennet Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, 285-288.

to assist Pakistan end its Fourth War but must be able to address Pakistan's main concerns: fear of Indian aggression and divesting Pakistan's military and society from religious militancy, both from jihadis in Kashmir and from the Taliban. Additionally, Pakistan requires assistance in guaranteeing religious-political and ethnic-political divisive elements from operating across its Afghanistan and Iranian borders.

The United States creates regional stability by brokering confidence-building measures between Pakistan and India, thus increasing the reliability of Pakistan's military to assist the United States in realizing its NSS goals. This alleviates pressure at the national level to continue an Indian-focused regional strategy and sets the framework for redefining Pakistan's national and military strategy in broader terms.

Pakistan's military leadership continues to provide national leadership until such a time that governance passes back into civilian hands. The United States risks the unintended consequences of creating anti-U.S. criticism amongst Pakistan's moderate majority if the U.S. does not take steps to provide the foundation for a transition to civilian governance. This process underscores the responsibility for the United States to earnestly foster the economic and social structures that will encourage political consensus in civilian governance and ensure that Pakistan's military regime hands over control prior to the outset of a large social movement demanding such action. The United States views Pakistan's authoritarian leadership as a legitimate source of national leadership but must recognize that this could change and be able to transition without hesitation. The United States seeks to address the issues that could lead to Pakistan becoming a failed state rather than exerting a strong pressure against Pakistan for a return to democracy. The United States supported military authoritarians in the past to gain its NSS goals, the difference this time being that the goal of the GWOT is a two-point solution that addresses the needs of Pakistan rather than simply using Pakistan as a staging ground for military actions against terrorist targets. Future U.S. presidencies must recognize this distinguishing concept and continue actively participating in Pakistan's development in order to preclude the possible failure of Pakistan, a return to regional conflict, and a continued supply of men trained for conflict rather than men educated for the benefit of society.

## VI. CONCLUSION

The New Fight on the Periphery identifies the divergences of U.S. and Pakistani national security interests throughout its relationship. The common thread woven through this relationship centers on Pakistan's military, the one national institution with which Pakistanis regard as embodying Pakistan's nationalism and its only institution capable of unifying Pakistan.

The national security interests of the United States and Pakistan never converged. The United States saw the world as a contest between democracy and communism. Regional concerns were ancillary to the overall Cold War. This view implies a global level perspective characterized by an ideological contest. Pakistan identified its threat as a hostile India bent on Pakistan's destruction. Global concerns were beyond the scope of this immediate threat. This view implies a regional level perspective characterized by a territorial contest. At times, each could benefit from the other but neither country ever met the other's needs. The United States would never guarantee Pakistan's complete territorial integrity, although Nixon did ensure West Pakistan's integrity in 1971, and Pakistan would not confront communism except when it precluded a government compliant with Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan's warming relationship with communist China in the mid- to late 1960's was a point of contention with the United States. The divergence in joint efforts revolved not around *what* each country would do (e.g., fighting communists in Afghanistan), but *why* it would do it based on either an ideological or territorial purpose. Even joint efforts proved to have conflicting results.

U.S. preoccupation with rebuilding Europe and containing communism at the end of the Second World War meant that the relegation of South Asia to a secondary role although the United States by no means ignored the region. Initially, the United States favored India and sought an alliance but could not convince India to drop its non-alignment policy. As the Soviet threat grew, Pakistan became a viable solution but the pacts made suffered from a lack of integrating U.S. and Pakistani national security interests. Instead, these pacts and agreements demonstrated a Cold War aim rather than addressing the regional issues of concern to the member nation-states.

Pakistan's civilian governments were not conducive to achieving U.S. interests in Pakistan because they never stabilized long enough for democracy to work. Pakistan's early governments turned over too quickly to gain a modicum of reassurance that U.S. interests would be understood, let alone achieved. Z. A. Bhutto's autocratic regime politicized the civilian bureaucracy to the point of corruption and stifled Pakistan's economics by nationalizing many sectors of the economy both of which led to a failed government. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif's quick reversals in governments hearkened back to Pakistan's early days of regime turnovers. Worse yet, they created political divisions within Pakistan that exacerbated Pakistan's already frail social fabric.

Pakistan's military governments were by no means perfect even contributed in part to the loss of East Pakistan in 1971. Despite this exception, Pakistan's military governments are generally seen as saving Pakistan from the chaos of failing civilian governments and incur a certain amount of legitimacy as the government for short durations. Yahya Khan's confinement of the 1971 War to East Pakistan prevented an escalation with India that would have threatened West Pakistan. Zia's administration proved to be the most divisive of Pakistan's military in which his Islamization program worsened religious sectarian violence both in the military and in society. However, his macroeconomic stabilization effort benefited Pakistan's economy in the near- and medium-term. Musharraf's administration began as an intervention out of necessity as Sharif attempted to oust Musharraf while Musharraf was out of the country. The military asserted itself amidst Sharif's failing government.

U.S.-Pakistani relations reached their height during the Afghanistan War as both countries had a considerable stake in evicting the Soviets. The divergence of interests led the United States to leave once its Cold War interests were reached, but left Pakistan unfulfilled and ill prepared to cope with the issues 2.2 million refugees brought to a country already divided along ethnic, political, separatist, and religious sectarian lines. The U.S. failure to foresee the unintended consequences of ignoring a partner's national interests caused the United States to return at a much higher cost.

If the United States supports Pakistan's military, then it must ensure that the military assesses the wider scope of social implications when it makes decisions. The unintended consequences of partnering with the Taliban in the long term runs counter to region stability building. In order for Pakistan's military to develop regional stability options, the United States must inject a reasonable assurance of cooperation with India.

The GWOT must also be fought inside Pakistan's borders. Pakistan's military institution must be the one to do this without fostering the impression that U.S. forces are participants in order to prevent anti-American resentment.

How capable is Pakistan of supporting U.S. policy as a front-line state? A comparison of the results of each of the periods affecting U.S. policy in Pakistan gives a measure of the success to what the current policy brings and what other policy options could anticipate. Pakistan remains a resolute ally even in the face of U.S. detachment between periods of concern to U.S. interests. U.S. support of civilian regimes met with equal success to that of military regimes; more so as military regimes tended to drive foreign policy risks without consulting the United States (e.g., 1965 and Kargil in 1999). The incentives that the United States offers Pakistan have arguably been less than what it should be if the United States were truly committed to a long-term program of creating stability in the region rather than focusing on narrowly defined periods where U.S. interests were directly threatened. The United States utilized Pakistan's religious sectarian issues to form the basis of its proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. In doing so, the United States exacerbated the religious sectarian schism. From the roots of this program, Pakistan adopted the Taliban to maintain its anti-Shia efforts but lost control over it. Now the United States and Pakistan not only face attempts at dismantling this creation, but also the organizations that model themselves after the Taliban. Any policy options that the United States considers, and it must consider bringing stability to South Asia, must include a plan to address the vacuum of public education that the madrassahs currently fill.

Would the U.S. War on Terrorism be threatened by unstable democracies typical of Pakistan's history? Stability is good, but democracy must necessarily undergo the failure of political polarization before the establishment of peace of political coalitions.

Historically, a military coup takes place each time a democratically elected government starts to falter. Instead of allowing it to falter and pay the short-term consequences of a failed government, the military steps in to establish control. This may not be the best answer for a long-term democratic solution. The answer lies in assisting Pakistan in creating and empowering the state institutions necessary to enforce social order.

U.S. support of Pakistan's military regimes may have a negative impact on Pakistan's legitimacy in the eyes of religious extremists (especially the Taliban) and in courting disapproval towards the United States over human rights issues at the international level. On the other hand, the importance of stability produced by military regimes is significant in dealing with a nuclear weapon capable state. The problem is that politically oppressed freedoms and a broken economy will eventually spell disaster. The United States implemented a long-term strategy to assist Pakistan with economic aid and in preparing the structural apparatus and competent bureaucracy for democracy to succeed. U.S. success in securing a stable South Asia depends on Pakistan's success. Pakistan's success depends on continued U.S. support beyond President Bush.

The question that must now be confronted is whether or not U.S. and Pakistani interests can produce a long-term relationship built upon a common positive goal. This cannot occur unless U.S. and Pakistani national security interests serve a common goal with a common purpose. Either Pakistan must begin to see its interests in a broader global perspective or the United States must realize that its national security interests (domestic security) lies in the regional interests of Pakistan and other countries. To this end, Pakistan must much more globally minded by taking part in UN missions (MUNOC) and establishing global economic ties with a reduction in its trade barriers. President Bush's NSS of September 2002 clearly recognizes the threat to domestic security that failed nation-states can represent. To this end, the NSS articulates U.S. interests in assisting nation-states build stability within their borders and regionally with neighboring nation-states. South Asia provides a perfect example of how the United States redirected its efforts towards easing the tensions between Pakistan and India and designed a peace process encouraging long-term regional stability.

The danger exists that the United States will see the GWOT as a war and not as a policy and be susceptible to forgetting the importance of resolving regional tensions. The second danger lies in the turnover of regimes. If President Bush is not re-elected, will the next president continue the goals delineated in the Bush administration's NSS?

The U.S. guarantee of security for Pakistan, both from India as well as from interventionists such as Iran, Russia, India, Saudi Arabia in Afghanistan, asked for since 1947, is finally an absolute requirement for U.S.' national interests. The Afghanistan government is far from retaining the monopoly of coercive power in Afghanistan. It does not control weapons within Afghanistan nor does it have any real power to prevent opium-funded organized crime. Since it is in the United States' interest to remain for an indefinite time in the region, it stands to reason that it will continue to require military assistance from Pakistan. This, in turn, means that the United States must continue to contribute to Pakistan's wellbeing. With no end in sight in the near future, it makes sense that it is in the United States' interest to assist Pakistan in its interests over an extended duration. During this time, every effort should be taken to assist Pakistan to be able to function as a reliable partner even after U.S. forces leave at some future date. If the U.S. leaves without ensuring Pakistan's ability to be an economically and socially successful state, the United States may very well have to return to ensure U.S. domestic security.

The United States turned its back on democracy in Iran in 1953 supporting the Shah and creating a dictatorship. Does this risk exist in Pakistan? Not likely. Musharraf indicated a return to civilian control. If in the future he does not relinquish control, it may be in the interests of the United States to assist in his removal. However, given the lack of political coalition that could form a stable government, it is possible to serve U.S. interests better through the stability brought by Musharraf. Furthermore, supporting Musharraf's regime provides a way to stabilize Pakistan's economy by supporting *Musharraf's* policies and its implementation vice an *American* or western plan which could be viewed as intrusive. Musharraf is the U.S.'s best short-run and medium-term weapon in Pakistan's role as a front-line state in the War on Terrorism. If supported now, his legacy may establish a long-term solution continued by subsequent democratically elected regimes.

Musharraf's leadership, however, needs to stop dismantling the political parties hostile to his regime. This will not contribute to stability in the eventual return of democracy to Pakistan. The United States should continue support of Musharraf's military regime, and, more importantly, ensure he creates the necessary foundations for the success of a future civilian government. To allow Musharraf to surrender control too early would be to invite disaster for a democracy not ready to take the reins of leadership. This necessarily means that the United States should support an end to sectarian violence, support the growth of political parties, and provide continued economic stimulus with a long-term vision of bilateral relations.

Pakistan and India stand on the unprecedented ground of dialogue in which the United States can assist both sides. Pakistan must capitalize on its globalization efforts to continue on this path with its military used to take the first steps. Pakistan's military is the only truly *unifying* national institution in Pakistan. As Pakistan's military goes, so goes Pakistan.



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