

COMMENTARY

STRATEGY AND THE STRATEGIC WAY OF THINKING

Mackubin Thomas Owens

Strategy is often portrayed as the interaction of ends, ways, and means, which is a useful formulation. In essence, strategy describes the *way* in which the available *means* will be employed to achieve the *ends* of policy.

The word “strategy” is used in a variety of contexts. There are business strategies, coaching strategies, financial strategies, and research strategies. Over the past few decades, the concept of strategy increasingly has been applied to organizations. An organization develops a strategy based on its mission or goal, a vision of the future, an understanding of the organization’s place in that future, and an assessment of the alternatives available to it, given scarce resources.¹

Yet the central application of the concept of strategy continues to be defense planning. History makes it clear that the development of a coherent strategy is absolutely essential to national security in times of both war and

peace. In the absence of a coherent strategy, non-strategic factors, such as bureaucratic and organizational imperatives, will fill the void to the detriment of national security.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The term strategy is derived from the classical Greek word *strategia*, the art of the general (*strategos*). Despite the ancient origins of the word’s etymology, modern strategic studies can be said to begin with the division of the art of war into the theory of “the use of engagements for the object of the war” (strategy) and “the use of armed forces in the engagement” (tactics)

Dr. Owens is Associate Dean of Academics for Electives and Directed Research and professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College. From 1990 to 1997, Dr. Owens was editor in chief of Strategic Review and adjunct professor of international relations at Boston University. He earned his PhD in politics at the University of Dallas. Dr. Owens, who led a Marine infantry platoon in Vietnam in 1968–69, retired from the Marine Corps Reserve as a colonel in 1994. He is coeditor of Strategy and the Logic of Force Planning (2000); a new book, tentatively titled Sword of Republican Empire: A History of U.S. Civil-Military Relations, is forthcoming from the University Press of Kentucky.

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by the great interpreters of Napoleonic warfare, Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz.² As the latter wrote:

Strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war. The strategist must therefore define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose. In other words, he will draft the plan of the war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it: in fact, shape the individual campaign and, within these, decide on the individual engagements.³

These nineteenth-century writers originated the modern conception of strategy as the art of assembling and employing military forces in time and space to achieve the goals of a war. Previously, writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli and his successors through the eighteenth century had used a related term, “stratagem,” to mean a ruse or gambit to achieve an advantage through surprise.⁴ While such writers limited their use of “strategy” to mean the application of military forces to fulfill the ends of policy, it is increasingly the practice today to employ the term more broadly, so that one can speak of levels of strategy during peace and war.⁵ Accordingly, more often than not, strategy now refers not only to the direct application of military force in wartime but also to the use of all aspects of national power during peacetime to deter war and win.

POLICY AND STRATEGY

This more expansive usage of strategy inevitably overlaps with the common meaning of “policy,” which is defined as the general overall goals and acceptable procedures that a nation might follow and the course of action selected from among alternatives in light of given conditions. In their military history of the United States, Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski define defense policy as “the sum of the assumptions, plans, programs, and actions taken by the citizens of the United States, principally through governmental action, to ensure the physical security of their lives, property, and way of life from external military attack and domestic insurrection.”⁶ For our purposes, “policy” refers primarily to such broad national goals as interests and objectives, and “strategy” to the alternative courses of actions designed to achieve those goals, within the constraints set by material factors and geography.

In general, strategy provides a conceptual link between national ends and scarce resources, both the transformation of those resources into means during peacetime and the application of those means during war. As such, it serves three purposes.⁷

First, strategy relates ends or the goals of policy (interests and objectives) to the limited means available to achieve them. Both strategy and economics are concerned with the application of scarce means to achieve certain goals. But

strategy implies an adversary who actively opposes the achievement of the ends. Second, strategy contributes to the clarification of the ends of policy by helping to establish priorities in the light of constrained resources. Without establishing priorities among competing ends, all interests and all threats will appear equal. In the absence of strategy, planners will find themselves in the situation described by Frederick the Great: “He who attempts to defend too much defends nothing.” Finally, strategy conceptualizes resources as a means in support of policy. Resources are not means until strategy provides some understanding of how they will be organized and employed. Defense budgets and manpower are resources. Strategy organizes these resources into divisions, wings, and fleets and then employs them to deter war or to prevail should deterrence fail.

Although strategy can be described as the conceptual link between ends and means, it cannot be reduced to a mere mechanical exercise. Instead, it is “a process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate.” It is a mistake to attempt to reduce strategy to a single aspect, although it is not unusual for writers on strategy to try.⁸ Clausewitz dismissed as simplistic the reduction of strategy to “principles, rules, or even systems,” because, on the contrary, strategy “involves human passions, values, and beliefs, few of which are quantifiable.”⁹

Strategy, properly understood, is a complex phenomenon comprising a number of elements. Among the most important of these are geography; history; the nature of the political regime, including such elements as religion, ideology, culture, and political and military institutions; and economic and technological factors.¹⁰ Accordingly, strategy can be said to constitute a continual dialogue between policy on the one hand and these other factors on the other.

Different writers stress different aspects of strategy. Clausewitz identified five strategic elements: moral, physical, mathematical, geographical, and statistical.¹¹ Sir Michael Howard has laid out four “dimensions of strategy”: the operational, logistical, social, and technological.¹² Building on the foundation established by Clausewitz and Sir Michael, Colin Gray has provided a comprehensive list of seventeen factors divided into three broad categories. While some might accuse him of a failure to apply “Occam’s razor” to the problem of strategy, Gray’s exhaustive list demonstrates the complexity of the strategic enterprise.

Gray’s first category is “People and Politics,” in which he treats factors that contribute to strategic culture such as people, society, politics, and ethics. His second category corresponds to Clausewitz’s division of the art of war into “preparation for war”: economics and logistics, organization, military administration, information and intelligence, strategic theory and doctrine, and technology. His third category corresponds to “war proper”: military operations; command; geography; friction, chance, and uncertainty; the adversary; and time.¹³

STRATEGY AS A DIALOGUE BETWEEN POLICY AND NATIONAL POWER

To be successful, strategy making must be an interactive process that takes account of the interplay of all factors. An inflexible strategy may be worse than no strategy at all, as the Germans discovered in 1914 and the French in 1940. To paraphrase Gray, strategy is the product of the dialogue between policy and national power in the context of the overall international security environment.¹⁴

Strategy and Geopolitics

Real strategy must take account of such factors as technology, the availability of resources, and geopolitical realities. This last factor is critical, although in a globalized world we sometime forget that strategy is developed and implemented in real time and space. A state must consciously adapt its strategy to geopolitical realities. The strategy of a state is not self-correcting. If conditions change, policy makers must be able to discern these changes and modify the strategy and strategic goals accordingly.¹⁵

For instance, while the U.S. policy to contain the Soviet Union remained essentially constant during the Cold War, certain factors changed. Accordingly, it is possible to identify three distinct strategic periods during the Cold War, all of which had operational and force-structure implications.¹⁶ Similarly, the post-World War II strategic concept of the United States Navy demonstrates a remarkable continuity from its origins in the late 1940s until 1989, emphasizing forward, offensive action to secure sea control and to project power against the Soviets. The main variables during the Cold War were available resources and technology. Thus “during periods of budgetary constraint or when the international climate was unfavorable to the application of the preferred strategic concept,” the Navy’s leadership was forced to modify the particulars of its strategy by curtailing its offensive orientation.¹⁷

When strategy makers, operators, and force planners do not adapt to changing conditions, serious problems can result. Jakub Grygiel shows how a failure to adapt strategy to geopolitical change led to the decline of Venice (1000–1600), the Ottoman Empire (1300–1699), and Ming China (1364–1644).¹⁸ Each actor faced changing circumstances but made wrong strategic choices. These cases are cautionary for the United States, since it now is facing geopolitical changes of the same magnitude.

While U.S. policy makers have paid lip service to the idea that U.S. strategic focus must change as a result of the collapse of the Soviet empire, there is much evidence to indicate that America’s focus has not changed. From World War I up to the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. strategy has been based on the 1904 Heartland theory of Sir Halford John Mackinder.¹⁹ However, 9/11 and the rise of China have shown the limitations of such a theory.²⁰

Strategic Culture

Another important aspect of strategy making is the “strategic culture” of a state or nation. By applying the notion of strategic culture, analysts attempt to explain continuity and change in national security policies, thereby creating a framework that can explain why certain policy options are pursued by states.²¹ Kerry Longhurst describes strategic culture as:

a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, which are held by a collective and arise gradually over time, through a unique protracted historical process. A strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its original inception, although it is not a permanent or static feature. It is shaped and influenced by formative periods and can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective’s experiences.²²

For Carnes Lord, strategic culture constitutes the traditional practices and habits of thought by which military force is organized and employed by a society in the service of its political goals.²³

One of the charges often brought against American strategic culture is that it confuses technological superiority with strategy itself. For instance, critics of the current efforts to “transform” the U.S. military claim that America tends to seek technological fixes to strategic problems, in an attempt to remove itself from the sharp end of war.²⁴

Strategy versus Nonstrategic Factors

In any case, strategy is an indispensable element of national security. Without it, something else will fill the void. For example, in wartime service doctrines will dominate the conduct of operations if strategy is absent. This state of affairs is captured by Andrew Krepinevich in his characterization of the Vietnam War as “a strategy of tactics.”²⁵ In peacetime, defense planning is dominated by what Samuel Huntington calls “structural decisions”: organizational imperatives, congressional politics, etc.²⁶

To minimize risk, planners must, to the extent possible, avoid mismatches between strategy and related factors. For instance, strategy must be appropriate to the ends, as established by policy. Strategy also requires the appropriate tactical instrument to implement it. Finally, the forces required to implement a strategy must be funded or the strategy revised. If the risk generated by such policy/strategy, strategy/force, and force/budget mismatches cannot be managed, the variables must be brought into better alignment.

LEVELS OF STRATEGY

War and conflict can be divided into several levels. As noted above, Clausewitz distinguished between tactics, “the use of armed forces in the engagement,” and

strategy, “the use of engagements for the object of war.” It is now common to speak of an intermediate level between strategy and tactics, a realm concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns to achieve strategic goals within a theater of war—the “operational level of war.”²⁷ The central focus of this essay is the strategic level of war and conflict, which in itself is subject to further subdivision. Writers often refer to grand strategy, military strategy, theater strategy, and service strategy.²⁸

Grand Strategy. In its broadest sense, strategy *is* grand strategy. In the words of Edward Mead Earle:

strategy is the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation—or a coalition of nations—including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed. The highest type of strategy—sometimes called grand strategy—is that which so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.²⁹

Thus grand strategy is intimately linked to national policy, in that it is designed to bring to bear all the elements of national power—military, economic, and diplomatic—in order to secure the nation’s interests and objectives. Grand strategy can also refer to a nation’s overarching approach to international affairs— isolationism or disengagement, cooperative or collective security, selective engagement, or primacy.³⁰

Finally, grand strategy can allude to a geopolitical orientation—“continental” or “maritime.”³¹ Whichever meaning is emphasized, the choice of a grand strategy has a major impact on the other levels of strategy and force structure.

Military Strategy. Military strategy is concerned with the employment of military power in peace and war. In peacetime, military strategy provides a guide to what Samuel Huntington calls “program decisions” and “posturing.” Program decisions involve the strength of military forces, their composition and readiness, and the number, type, and rate of development of weapons. Posturing is defined by how military forces are deployed during peacetime to deter war (Clausewitz’s “preparation for war”). In wartime, military strategy guides the employment of military force in pursuit of victory (Clausewitz’s “war proper”).³²

A nation’s approach to its security policy and strategy can take the form of either strategic pluralism or strategic monism. The former “calls for a wide variety of military forces and weapons to meet a diversity of potential threats.” In contrast, the latter refers to primary reliance on a single strategic concept, weapon, service, or region. Strategic monism “presupposes an ability to predict and control the actions of possible enemies.”³³

Theater Strategy. Theater strategy is concerned with the operational level of war: the planning and execution of campaigns designed to achieve strategic results in a theater of war. This function, however, involves adapting the requirements laid out by the national and military strategies to the particular circumstances of a geographic theater. Combatant commanders (COCOMs) must take into account the objectives and priorities established by the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), National Military Strategy (NMS), and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report as they develop their own goals and plans for achieving them in times of both war and peace. The process of transforming national-level strategy into theater strategy and security is discussed below.

Service Strategy. Service strategy refers to what is more properly described as “doctrine,” or a “strategic concept.” Huntington defined the latter as “the fundamental element of a military service . . . its role or purpose in implementing national policy.” A service’s strategic concept answers the “ultimate question: What function do you perform which obligates society to assume responsibility for your maintenance?”³⁴ When a single service is permitted to claim an independently decisive role for its own strategic concept, the result is usually some form of strategic monism.

NATIONAL-LEVEL STRATEGY AS A GUIDE FOR THE COCOM

How does the process work in practice? The NSS serves as the grand strategy document for the United States. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 requires that each administration produce a national security strategy early in its first term (most administrations have not done this) and “regularly” thereafter. The NSS defines U.S. security interests, objectives, and goals, and provides guidance to those who are charged with executing that strategy, such as the COCOMs. The NSS is supplemented by three other documents: the NDS, the NMS, and the QDR. These three core documents, as well as others on transformation and the family of joint concepts, provide the strategic guidance for translating national policy into theater strategy and force employment, integrating and synchronizing the planning and activities of the Joint Staff, combatant commands, the services, and combat support agencies.

The National Security Strategy. The NSS provides a statement of broad goals and the general way that the tools of national power will be employed to advance those goals. For instance, the current NSS flows from “the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”³⁵ According to the current NSS, the United States must be prepared to play the leading role in a global effort to make the world safer and more just.

One of the document's main themes is that the spread of democracy and respect for human dignity are inseparable from the national interests of the United States. The NSS discusses the progress made and challenges still facing the nation's efforts to champion aspirations for human dignity, strengthen alliances, help defuse regional conflicts, protect against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ignite economic growth through free markets and free trade, encourage democracy, develop cooperative agendas with other global powers, transform America's national security institutions for the twenty-first century, and engage opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.³⁶

National Defense Strategy. The NDS focuses on how the military instrument of power contributes to achieving national security objectives, providing a more direct link between the National Security Strategy and the NMS. The NDS lays out the Department of Defense's strategic objectives, articulates the ways the department will achieve those objectives, and discusses implementation of the strategy. The NDS established four categories of challenges that can serve as general planning cases: traditional (state versus state warfare), irregular (unconventional warfare, such as insurgency), catastrophic (an adversary's acquisition of WMD or the like), and disruptive (an adversary that develops a breakthrough technology to negate current U.S. advantages). The NDS also points the way ahead to force planning by describing the desired capabilities and attributes of a future joint force.³⁷

National Military Strategy. The NMS sets the strategic direction for the armed forces to implement the NDS by describing the ways and means to achieve supporting military objectives. Among other things, the NMS places an increased emphasis on homeland defense; mandates a shift from "threat based" to "capabilities based" planning; replaces the requirement to prevail in two "nearly simultaneous" major theater wars with the requirement to "decisively [defeat] an adversary in one of the two theaters in which U.S. forces are conducting major combat operations"; and enhances the focus on transforming the U.S. military to a twenty-first-century force capable of responding to a variety of threats across the spectrum of conflict.³⁸

The Quadrennial Defense Review. The NDS and NMS provide the strategic foundation for the congressionally mandated 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. The QDR provides a "snapshot" in time of the department's strategy, capturing the experiences of the armed forces over the previous four years and the direction to take in the future, emphasizing the needs of the combatant commanders.³⁹

Theater Operational Planning and the Theater Security Cooperation Plan. On the one hand, theater strategy is concerned with operational planning and

operational art, such as the planning and conduct of campaigns. On the other hand, however, it also includes the development and implementation of a Theater Security Cooperation Plan.

In terms of warfighting, the national and military strategies help to establish the desired goals in a theater, linking operational considerations to the requirements established by national authorities. Based on guidance from higher authorities, the theater commander determines the desired outcome within his area of responsibility. The staff then develops war plans based on an array of plausible scenarios. Using various force planning models and war games to determine force size and mix, the COCOM staff then derives the force necessary at the outset of a campaign to achieve the desired outcome.

In addition to determining the required force, staffs at all levels also determine the schedule for deploying forces from out of theater. Part and parcel of this determination is the establishment of the Time-Phased Force Deployment Line, designating in a detailed manner the timeline for forces to be deployed to the theater.

The higher-level strategies also establish priorities among the various theaters, indicating which will be the site of the main effort and which might be designated “economy of force” in the event that crises occur in more than one theater simultaneously.

However, warfighting and war plans are only one part of the COCOM’s job. Also included is the responsibility for shaping the theater in hopes of advancing U.S. interests without recourse to war, engaging the governments within the region, and developing the necessary security infrastructure to maintain a favorable state of affairs. In this regard, the COCOM employs such tools as security assistance, military exercises, and humanitarian support. The COCOM’s actions are not strictly military in nature; diplomacy and interagency operations play a major role in the development and implementation of the Theater Security Cooperation Plan of each geographic command.

Consider as an example just one theater—U.S. Central Command. In the near term, U.S. security concerns remain focused on the war on terrorism, access to oil and gas, furthering the Arab-Israeli peace process, the influence of radical political Islam on states in the region, and the futures of Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Central Asia. The Central Command posture statement lays out the major issues that the command faces in its area of responsibility; they include stabilizing the situation in Iraq, training Iraqi security forces, contending with terrorist attacks, and furthering the Arab-Israeli peace process.⁴⁰


STRATEGY AS A GUIDE TO FORCE PLANNING

Strategy also serves as a guide to planning future military forces. In theory, the strategy–force planning process is logical. The planner first identifies national

interests and the objectives necessary to achieve those interests. The planner then assesses the ability of adversaries to threaten those interests or to interfere with the achievement of national objectives. These represent the “operational challenges” that U.S. forces must surmount in order to implement the strategy. Next, the planner forges a strategy to overcome operational challenges and a budget to fund the capabilities and operational concepts required to implement the strategy.

To execute any chosen strategy, certain strategic requirements must be fulfilled. These requirements determine the necessary military capabilities and operational concepts, which in turn drive the acquisition of forces and equipment. Thus, if there is a strategic requirement for a particular capability, the forces or equipment that provide that capability should presumably be obtained.

As previously noted, throughout the process the planner must constantly evaluate any risk that may be created by a potential ends-means mismatch. The figure graphically portrays in idealized form the essential link between strategy making and force planning.⁴¹



For example, the geographic position of the United States and its status as the dominant world power requires that it be able to overcome the “tyranny of distance” in order to project sufficient troops for necessary influence into a potentially hostile environment. To do so, U.S. forces must surmount such operational challenges as countering an adversary’s asymmetrical antiaccess strategy;

defending its space assets, bases, ships, or even the continental United States from attack; and operating in urban terrain. Part of thinking about operational challenges is making educated guesses about the types of military competition that may take place in the future.

To overcome these operational challenges and confront plausible future areas of military competition, the United States must develop new operational concepts. These might include operations based on stealthy, extended-range, unmanned system-dominated air warfare; distributed, deep-strike, nonlinear ground operations; submersible, distributed, sea-based power projection, both strike and amphibious; space warfare; and independent, integrated information warfare.⁴² Currently, all the services are developing such operational concepts.⁴³

In practice, strategic decisions must always compete with the demands of domestic politics, or what Samuel Huntington has called “structural decisions.” These are choices “made in the currency of domestic politics.” The most important structural decision concerns the “size and distribution of funds made available to the armed forces.”⁴⁴ As the example of the Reagan administration illustrates, the strategy maker or force planner can never ignore fiscal constraints. Indeed, political reality sometimes dictates that budgetary limits will constitute the primary influence on the development of strategy and force structure. Additionally, bureaucratic and organizational imperatives play a major role in force structure choices.⁴⁵

Strategy is designed to secure national interests and to attain the objectives of national policy by the application of force or threat of force. Strategy is dynamic, changing as the factors that influence it change. Strategic requirements have evolved considerably since the end of World War II, and with them the descriptors of military strategy.

The evolution of military strategy over the past fifty years illuminates the interrelationship of ends, means, and the security environment. Potential mismatches between ends and means create risks. If the risks resulting from an ends-means mismatch cannot be managed, ends must be reevaluated and scaled back, means must be increased, or the strategy must be adjusted.

Strategy making is a central component of defense policy. Without a coherent, rational strategy to guide the development and employment of forces, structural factors such as bureaucratic and organizational imperatives dominate the allocation of resources for defense, leading to a suboptimal result.

NOTES

1. For a practical example of strategy as a guide to organizational planning, see Admiral M. G. Mullen, *Navy Performance Guidebook*, Sec. 3, "Develop a Strategic Plan" (undated), <http://nwcintrantet/CNOPublications.pdf>.
2. Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), p. 128.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
4. For an excellent treatment of the origins of modern strategic thinking, see Azar Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989); cf. the chapters on Jomini and Clausewitz in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986).
5. Paul Kennedy, ed., *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1991); Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1987), *passim*.
6. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*, rev. and exp. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1994), p. xiii.
7. I am indebted to Dr. Robert S. Wood, former dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, for this formulation.
8. For instance, Luttwak, in *Strategy*, reduces strategy to a manifestation of "paradoxical logic." In his monumental *The Art of War in the Western World* (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1987), Archer Jones reduces strategy to a choice between "persisting" and "raiding." In *World Politics and the Evolution of War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1995), John Weltman explicates warfare in terms of a simplistic version of Delbruck's distinction between strategies of annihilation and attrition.
9. Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, "On Strategy," in *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War*, ed. Williamson Murray et al. (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994), p. 1; Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 134–36.
10. Murray and Grimsley, "On Strategy," pp. 7–20.
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14. Colin Gray, "Inescapable Geography," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 22, no. 2/3 (June/September 1999), p. 169.
15. Jakub J. Grygiel, *Great Powers and Geopolitical Change* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2006).
16. See Mackubin Thomas Owens, chapter 28 in *Strategy and Force Planning*, ed. Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, 2nd ed. (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1997), pp. 391–94.
17. See Mackubin Thomas Owens, "U.S. Maritime Strategy and the Cold War," in *Mysteries of the Cold War*, ed. Stephen J. Cimbala (London: Ashgate, 1999), p. 167.
18. Grygiel, *Great Powers and Geopolitical Change*, pp. 51–161.
19. See Mackubin Thomas Owens, "In Defense of Classical Geopolitics," *Naval War College Review* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1999), esp. p. 65f.
20. But see C. Dale Watson, *Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century: Multipolarity and the Revolution in Strategic Perspective* (London: Routledge, 2007).
21. On strategic culture, see Jack Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1977); Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979); Colin S. Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture," *Parameters* 14, no. 4 (Winter 1984), and *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* (Lanham, Md.: Hamilton, 1986); Carnes Lord, "American Strategic Culture," *Comparative Strategy* 4, no. 5 (November–December 1985); Alastair Ian Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995); Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998); Lawrence Sondhaus, *Strategic Culture and Ways of War: An Historical Overview* (London: Routledge, 2006).

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28. For instance, see Luttwak, *Strategy*, pp. 69–189.
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30. Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 5–53.
31. Colin S. Gray, *The Geopolitics of Super Power* (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1988), and *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartlands, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution* (New York: Crane Russak, 1977).
32. Huntington, *Common Defense*, pp. 3–4. Huntington's strategic category corresponds to Graham Allison's "rational decision model," in which "governments select the action that will maximize strategic goals and objectives" (Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review* 63, no. 3 [September 1969], p. 694). Huntington's structural category shares many of the attributes of Allison's "organizational" model, which sees the actor in national decisions as "a constellation of loosely allied organizations" (Allison, p. 699). Allison's original paper was later expanded into a book: *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). An updated and expanded version was released as Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999).
33. On strategic pluralism and strategic monism, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957), pp. 400, 418–27, and *The Common Defense*, p. 264; Gordon W. Keiser, *The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification, 1944–47: The Politics of Survival* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 121–22. Cf. Mackubin Thomas Owens, "The Hollow Promise of JCS Reform," *International Security* 10, no. 3 (Winter 1985/86), pp. 106–108, and "Goldwater-Nichols: A Ten-Year Retrospective," *Marine Corps Gazette* (December 1996), and "The Use and Abuse of Jointness," *Marine Corps Gazette* (November 1997).
34. Samuel Huntington, "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 80, no. 5 (May 1954), p. 483.
35. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: White House, March 2006), p. 1.
36. *Ibid.*
37. U.S. Defense Dept., *The National Defense Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: March 2005).
38. U.S. Defense Dept., *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 2004).
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40. Admiral William J. Fallon, "Statement of the Commander, U.S. Central Command before the House Armed Services Committee," *CQ Congressional Testimony*, 18 April 2007.
41. Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman, Jr., "Strategy as a Guide to Force Planning," *Naval War College Review* 41, no. 4 (Autumn 1988), p. 15.
42. For example, see Michael Vickers, *Warfare in 2020: A Primer* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1996), p. 1.

43. See Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Do We Still Need the Services? The Limits of Jointness," *Armed Forces Journal* (June 2006).
44. See note 29, above.

45. Thomas Ricks and Anne Marie Squeo, "The Price of Power: Why the Pentagon Is Often So Slow to Pursue Promising New Weapons," *Wall Street Journal*, 12 October 1999, p. 1.