Master of Military Studies

TITLE:
An Interagency Smart Power Approach from the Sea

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR:
Andrew H. Bertrand, Lieutenant Commander, MSC, USN

AY 08-09

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Professor Erin M. Simpson
Approved: 18 Mar 2009

Date: 18 Mar 2009

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Francis H. Marlo
Approved: 18 Mar 2009

Date: 18 Mar 2009
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>2. REPORT TYPE</th>
<th>3. DATES COVERED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td>00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An Interagency Smart Power Approach From The Sea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5b. GRANT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5e. TASK NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. AUTHOR(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States Marine Corps, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Marine Corps University, 2076 South Street, Quantico, VA, 22134-5068</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14. ABSTRACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15. SUBJECT TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. REPORT unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. ABSTRACT unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. THIS PAGE unclassified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same as Report (SAR)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Presents by ANSI Std Z39-18
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The devastating tsunami of December 2004 energized the potential for soft power within the U.S. military. Major shifts in U.S. military policy, especially naval policy, triggered by the success of tsunami relief, culminated in the recognition and application of the emerging concept known as smart power. The new maritime strategy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power*, expanded the Navy's core capabilities while emphasizing the importance of stability, security and international partnerships. Increasing numbers of maritime smart power missions that the Navy has conducted since the tsunami underscore the influence of this new strategic approach. Arguably, the Department of the Navy leads the military in applying smart power, yet could further develop its use by building a sustainable sea-base to support task organized interagency teams. Civilians would lead this interagency task force, but the U.S. military, particularly the Navy, would provide the crucial infrastructure and logistics support to make such an endeavor both operational and sustainable. U.S. embassies and the regional Combatant Commands would serve as the primary enablers at the strategic and operational levels, while the sea-base, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Marine Corps company-level units would comprise the primary tactical military components of this interagency model. The mobility, security, sustainability and flexibility of such an approach would present a practical option to interagency, non-government organizations, international, and other partners in the conduct of crisis response and developmental assistance.

This paper includes six main sections: 1) introduction; 2) overview of soft and smart power; 3) discussion of smart power and the interagency/whole-of-government approach; 4) smart power case study applications; 5) analysis of current capabilities and options; and 6) prescriptions/recommendations.
INTRODUCTION

The U.S. is currently involved in counterinsurgency efforts and engaging other irregular threats in a world where weak and fragile states abound. These vulnerable regions often breed radical elements that obtain power through false ideologies, violence, intimidation and the suppression of human rights. Of the four instruments of power available, the U.S. has almost exclusively employed its military instrument to face ongoing and emerging irregular threats. With the realization that irregular warfare does not respond well to a conventional military approach, the U.S. military has adapted, and these adaptations have produced positive results, notably most recently in Iraq. The military though, cannot face these threats alone. The Navy and the Marine Corps serve as America’s rapid response force—able to project and sustain power in the world’s littoral regions—and naval leaders recognize the potential of a “whole-of-government” smart power approach. Consequently, military leaders have increased the use of naval hard power assets and platforms in recent years to conduct soft power missions, such as humanitarian assistance. Although the U.S. depends on the military to engage in these “non-traditional” functions, soft power missions have achieved a new legitimacy in promoting stability in areas around the world where vulnerable states and regions desire and seek U.S. assistance.

The Long War may become a generational conflict in which, as Dr. David Kilcullen skillfully illustrates, “we need both a ‘long-view’ and a ‘broad view’ that consider how best to interweave all strands of national power, including the private sector and the wider community.”

This speaks not only for the need of a continued and enduring presence (“long view”), but also illustrates that the present struggle is not the military’s alone to face, but a struggle demanding a whole of government (and societal) effort to win. A new and promising development is the expanding participation of the “interagency” and on occasion, non-government organizations.
(NGOs) as sources of expertise and manpower for military missions, especially naval seagoing ventures. The U.S. has the maritime capacity to rapidly deploy civilian-led missions. The role of the interagency—and to a lesser degree the role of NGOs—in what were formerly military-only missions must continue to expand for a whole of government approach to succeed. Furthermore, respective regional combatant commands and embassies must provide the requisite organizational, operational, and strategic level guidance to facilitate and support these interagency missions.

Civilian leadership of a whole-of-government concept in conjunction with close cooperation with the host-nation government is a vital prerequisite for the long-term success and credibility of U.S. efforts abroad. The U.S. should implement robust, interagency smart power to promote security, stability and cooperation in vulnerable regions. Establishing a mobile, scalable and flexible interagency sea-base, capable of rapidly responding to crises around the globe while providing continuous support from the sea, would present a viable option for implementing effective and sustainable smart power.

THE GENESIS OF SOFT AND SMART POWER

Joseph Nye first coined the term Soft Power in his 1990 book, Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power. Nye’s book challenged the growing perception that America was in decline by illustrating America’s strengths, to include introducing the concept known as American soft power. He describes soft power as, “The ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. Soft power elevates seduction over coercion as its basic principle. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.” America’s multicultural, pluralistic and openly liberal society attracts many to it. The U.S. military and economy—the most powerful in the world—represent two of the three
forms of U.S. power; *soft power* represents the third form. Appendix A illustrates the behaviors, currencies and policies of this triad of American power. Nye asserts that, "Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others." He also argues that the U.S. cannot take a unilateral approach in what has become a multilateral world, involving both state and non-state actors.

The concept known as *smart power* combines soft with hard power. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) chartered a bipartisan commission in 2006 to develop strategies for improving America's stature and prominence in global affairs. This commission coined the term *smart power* as its overarching strategy. Co-chaired by Dr. Nye and Richard Armitage, the commission published a report of its findings in 2007. Drawing from Nye's soft power concept:

Smart power is neither hard nor soft—it is the skillful combination of both. Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power. It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand American influence and establish the legitimacy of American action. Providing for the global good is central to this effort because it helps America reconcile its overwhelming power with the rest of the world’s interests and values.

One must understand the differences between hard and soft power to gain a fuller appreciation about the military use of *smart power*. Soft power shapes preferences through attraction while hard power seeks change through "coercion or inducement." Appendix B compares the spectrum of behaviors and associated resources common to hard and soft power. A U.S. military response to a foreign humanitarian emergency exemplifies *smart power*. The U.S. deploys military *hard power* capabilities to conduct humanitarian *soft power* missions.
Combinations of hard and soft power do not always involve military hard power. Hard powder also comes in economic and political varieties. Yet, for the purpose of this paper, smart power will always refer to the combination of soft power with military hard power.

The term smart power is new, but the application of military power to improve the condition of fragile societies is not new. Sir Robert Thompson wrote the now classic work on counterinsurgency, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: the Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam*. In one of a series of meetings between Thompson and Lieutenant General Victor Krulak in the early 1960s, Thompson said, “The peoples’ trust is primary. It will come hard because they are fearful and suspicious. Protection is the most important thing you can bring them. After that comes health. And, after that, many things—land, prosperity, education, and privacy to name a few.” Thompson drew his conclusions based on his experiences in Malaya and Vietnam, yet his words show particular relevance for the long war on terror, as the U.S. now recognizes a major element of winning this war involves protecting and earning the trust of the population. In the words of Mao Tse Tung, “The deepest source of the immense power of war lies in the masses of the people.” If Mao’s premise is correct (that the power for war resides with the people), then the power to maintain peace must likewise reside with the people.

Earning the trust of the population takes time and the willingness of those countries involved to stay the course. Effective smart power may also mean long-term presence; this runs counter to military operations, which tend to place a premium on exit strategy. Capacity building following the initial emergency phase of a humanitarian crisis is crucial to the long-term sustainment of distressed populations. Dr. Neil Joyce states that, “A humanitarian crisis also indicates the need for reconstruction, and rebuilding of infrastructure and healing, social support, and reestablishment of the capabilities of local populations and communities.” Success
becomes apparent and achievable when communities can again function independently without
the need for external foreign support. Paradoxically, this success will likely depend upon the
durability of external support.

A WHOLE-OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO SMART POWER

The idea of synergizing the whole-of-government to address a common cause is not a
new one. Although clouded in secrecy and eventually doomed to failure, the Overseas Internal
Defense Policy (OIDP) existed from 1962 to 1966, and laid out a plan that specified the roles and
responsibilities of each government agency in countering an insurgency. Reminiscent of the
short lived OIDP, the new U.S. administration has made a “pledge to develop ‘whole-of-
government’ initiatives to spur global stability, in which military and civilian efforts are linked
and a 25,000 strong Civilian Assistance Corps consisting of doctors, lawyers, engineers and
police is formed as a deployable unit available in times of domestic or international need.”

Furthermore, the National Security Strategy contains the following tasks highlighting the
need for more of an interagency focus: “Work with others to defuse regional conflicts; ignite a
new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; expand the circle of
development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.” Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates understands the importance of smart power to winning the long-term
struggle for Iraq and Afghanistan. In a speech given in November 2008, prior to President
Obama’s announcement regarding the Civilian Assistance Corps, Secretary Gates urged the need
for more interagency coordination in meeting U.S. security objectives, especially in the area of
development and capacity building.

One of the keys to success in the long war lies in removing the ingredients that attract
people to terrorism. In addition to the capabilities that hard power brings to the fight, Alexander
Lennon points out that soft power, “such as post-conflict reconstruction, public diplomacy, and foreign assistance make to dry up the recruiting grounds that failed states provide terrorist networks.” Using soft power in such a manner complements military efforts, supports U.S. national security goals and helps build a framework to stimulate long-term global stability.

Many government agencies in addition to the Department of Defense (DoD) realize that they must collaborate more with one another to better influence the current security environment. One example of closer interagency coordination occurred in 2005, when the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) established an Office of Military Affairs to improve collaboration with the U.S. military. The current Administrator for USAID, Henrietta H. Fore, voiced that, “USAID...has come to realize how fundamental security is to the success of its mission in the fragile and failed states that make up the core of its development portfolio.” The recent partnership between DoD and USAID exemplifies a smart power interagency approach. By providing security for developmental agencies such as USAID, the U.S. military empowers these agencies to expand stabilization and reconstruction programs. Once these programs gain a foothold and stabilization becomes apparent, the military can reduce its security posture.

A well documented impediment to interagency coordination is the imbalance in manpower and resources between the DoD and other agencies. The size of the DoD is more than 200 times that of State Department (DoS) and USAID combined. The DoD has approximately 1.68 million uniformed personnel compared to 6,000 foreign service officers at DoS and 2,000 at USAID. The U.S. government will have to determine how to reconcile this imbalance in order to expand and tailor interagency programs in the best interest of national security objectives.

U.S. agencies involved in foreign assistance, whether DoD, DoS, or USAID, must always maintain open and continuous lines of communication with host-nation counterparts to guarantee
ongoing efforts meet host-nation objectives and increase the probability that capacity building programs will have lasting impact. “More than a half century of foreign assistance practice has shown that development does not move forward, nor is it sustained, without host governments taking the lead.”

In order to mitigate potential misperceptions regarding U.S. intentions abroad, a civilian agency should lead U.S. interagency missions, with the military still playing a key role, but remaining in the background. The military can provide security and other forms of assistance (e.g. command and control platforms, transportation, logistics, and personnel) to increase the effectiveness and durability of, for example, USAID programs. In fact, the lead representative for U.S interests abroad has always been the ambassador appointed to that respective state or region. Any U.S. agency planning to conduct missions abroad, to include the military, must first notify the respective U.S. embassy. As Bill McDaniel, U.S. Pacific Command’s (PACOM) senior representative for the hospital ship tsunami relief mission noted: “Upon the decision by higher authority to make a disaster relief or humanitarian assistance visit to a country, immediate contact should be made between the highest level of authority involved and the U.S. ambassador to that country.”

A History of Collaboration: The Navy and the State Department

The U.S. naval services share an enduring legacy with the DoS that could serve to further interagency-centric efforts abroad. Applying military power—especially naval power—to advance U.S. diplomatic aims has a long history. Since the early 19th century when President Thomas Jefferson dispatched the fleet to fight the Barbary pirates, the U.S. Navy has projected power on a global scale. In the early 20th century for example, President Theodore Roosevelt dispatched the Great White Fleet in a global demonstration of American naval power. The
continuing global reach and presence of U.S. naval forces has fostered a historically close relationship between the DoS and the Department of the Navy. In small wars of the past, DoS and the Navy often pursued diplomatic measures on an interagency basis. U.S. Navy ships have also been used to host historic diplomatic events, as was the case with the signing of the Japanese surrender onboard the USS Missouri on 2 September 1945.

Within the context of the historical relationship between the DoS and the Navy, the centuries-old concept of gunboat diplomacy provides some interesting contrasts and insights about the potential value of using a limited naval force to execute interagency smart power missions. Gunboat diplomacy can be defined as: "[T]he use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state." By definition, gunboat diplomacy employs hard power through the coercive means of the threat or use of force. Gunboat diplomacy though, holds some contemporary value for the use of a limited naval force in foreign territory. For the purpose of a smart power approach from the sea, the U.S could also apply limited naval force for reasons other than war, employing personnel and forces from across the whole of government and society. British naval historian Eric Grove sums it up well when he states, "Although navies are built primarily for war they find their main utility in peace, in deterring the outbreak of major and minor conflicts, in exerting influence and presence as part of normal 'peaceful' diplomatic activities..."
CASE STUDY APPLICATIONS OF SMART POWER

The Tsunami Devastates Asia and Redefines Naval Strategy

The 9.0 magnitude Andaman Island-Sumatra earthquake on 26 December 2004 generated a massive tsunami that devastated parts of Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka and seven other countries in the Indian Ocean region. The epic scale of this disaster became all too evident as daily casualty numbers mounted. The death rate across all 10 countries exceeded 280,000. Indonesia suffered the worst damage with more than 131,000 killed in the northern Sumatran province of Banda Aceh alone.\(^{28}\)

The U.S. responded quickly to aid tsunami victims as a direct result of the continued forward presence of U.S. naval forces. The first U.S. military units to render assistance included the USS Abraham Lincoln and the USS Bonhomme Richard with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) embarked.\(^{29}\) The tsunami struck while the Abraham Lincoln strike group was conducting a port call in Hong Kong. The strike group, with its 6,000 sailors, was among the first from outside Indonesia to respond to this overwhelming humanitarian crisis. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps helicopters became one of the few means of delivering aid because the tsunami had destroyed many of the ports, roads and bridges along a coastal area stretching over 100 miles.\(^{30}\) The two primary supply hubs for delivering U.S. aid were staged in Banda Aceh and further to the south in Meulaboh. The U.S. military orchestrated relief efforts under the full cooperation of the Indonesian government and in close collaboration with the Indonesian military. Sailors from the Lincoln Strike Group managed the line haul at each of the supply hubs and loaded helicopters with boxes of supplies bearing the easily recognizable USAID moniker “Food from the American People.”\(^{31}\)
The tsunami disaster quickly escalated into a major international effort following the arrival of the Lincoln Strike Group. PACOM created Combined Task Force 536, led by III Marine Expeditionary Force, to coordinate U.S. coalition efforts (see Appendix C). PACOM named the mission *Operation Unified Assistance*. The United Nations coordinated the massive international relief effort. By the time the Abraham Lincoln Strike Group departed Indonesian waters on 4 February 2005, it had completed more than 2,800 missions, transported over 3,000 relief workers and delivered over 5 million pounds of supplies.\(^\text{32}\)

The hospital ship *USNS Mercy* arrived shortly before the USS Lincoln departed and began conducting tsunami relief on 3 February 2005, after departing San Diego California on 5 January 2005, and next stopping in Singapore to embark additional relief personnel and supplies. The 1,000 bed capable *USNS Mercy*, and its sister ship the *USNS Comfort* represent the only two hospital ships in the U.S. Navy. Designed to serve as floating hospitals during major combat operations, these ships also have a secondary mission to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. For *Operation Unified Assistance*, the *USNS Mercy* ran four operating rooms, 10 Intensive Care Unit beds and 50 inpatient beds.\(^\text{33}\)

*Operation Unified Assistance* marked the first time civilian staff had embarked on a Navy hospital ship. Of the approximately 540 shipboard staff (see Appendix D), about 90 of them came from the NGO *Project Hope* (*Health Opportunities for People Everywhere*).\(^\text{34}\) Medical teams departed the ship each morning to provide relief ashore and returned back to the ship at the end of each day. Most of the teams' work centered on Zaynal Abidin University Hospital in Banda Aceh. There, medical teams from the USNS Mercy worked closely with teams from Australia and Germany.\(^\text{35}\)
The U.S. response to the tsunami disaster led to a dramatic shift in public opinion by
Indonesians toward Americans. A survey conducted for the U.S. organization Terror Free
Tomorrow by the Indonesian pollster Lembaga Survei Indonesia only two-months after the
tsunami revealed a significant improvement in U.S. opinion by the Indonesian public. The
survey also indicated that 65% of Indonesians viewed the U.S. more favorable as a direct result
of the U.S. response to the tsunami crisis.36 Also, those opposed to U.S. anti-terrorism policies
decreased from 72% in 2003 to 36% in February 2005. As the largest Muslim country in the
world, this marked the first time in any Muslim country since 11 September 2001 that the
majority of the population approved of U.S. efforts in fighting the war on terror.

The Navy experienced significant “shifts” in strategy following the success of Operation
Unified Assistance because of a newfound appreciation for the practical value of soft power
missions. Admiral Mike Mullen published “eight tenets” outlining his vision for the 21st century
in January, 2006, while serving as the Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Mullen highlighted
the dramatic shift in public opinion in Indonesia toward U.S. policies on the war on terror, and
his decision to increase naval involvement in stability, security and reconstruction operations.37
As expeditionary sea services with global reach, the Navy and Marine Corp’s ability to
effectively respond to foreign humanitarian assistance missions makes them the ideal services to
expand and strengthen stability, security and reconstruction operations in partnership with other
U.S. agencies, nations and non-state actors, such as NGOs.

Following the publication of Admiral Mullen’s “eight tenets,” the Navy released its new
strategy emphasizes the importance of not only winning wars, but also preventing them. As the
name indicates, “cooperation” is an important aspect of this strategy. The Navy seeks to work
both with the interagency and international partners and cultivate a smart power approach. One only needs to look at the expanded core capabilities listed in the new strategy to gain an appreciation for the significance of this change from previous maritime strategies. In addition to the four core capabilities of forward presence, deterrence, sea control and power projection, the Navy has added Maritime Security (e.g. terrorism, piracy, transnational and other irregular threats) and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response.38

The Navy's current mission reflects the principles outlined in the maritime strategy and the new focus on smart power: “With global partners, we protect the maritime freedom that is the basis for global prosperity and we address transnational threats to peace...We conduct the full range of operations from combat to humanitarian assistance...We foster and sustain cooperative relationships with an expanding set of allies and international partners to enhance global security.”39

**Maritime Smart Power and the Combatant Command: Southern and Africa Commands**

Combatant commands (COCOMs) recognize the strategic relevance of smart power. The lessons from Operation Unified Assistance in PACOM not only affected naval strategy, but those lessons also impacted other COCOMs. Two notable examples include Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and Africa Command (AFRICOM). COCOMs have the capacity to identify opportunities to plan and execute smart power programs with international partners, the DoS at U.S. embassies, and public and private organizations. COCOMs therefore, can provide the strategic framework to support and sustain an interagency sea-base.

**Southern Command:** SOUTHCOM, under the leadership of Admiral James Stavridis, has shifted from a traditional military to a smart power strategy. Recognizing the need for development and the susceptibility of the region to natural disasters, SOUTHCOM is building its
capacity to provide humanitarian assistance and increase security cooperation with countries throughout Latin America. A sign of this gradual transition includes the significant naval capability added to SOUTHCOM’s arsenal with the recent establishment of Fourth Fleet as the Navy positions itself as the smart power service envisioned in the maritime strategy.40

The creation of the Interagency Partnering Directorate signaled another significant change at SOUTHCOM. The new civilian led directorate solicits help for SOUTHCOM’s humanitarian assistance projects from public and private partners. Another notable shift was the addition of new civilian leadership. This new leadership comes as SOUTHCOM adds staff from the interagency to support smart power initiatives. Similar to AFRICOM’s organizational structure, SOUTHCOM now has both a military and civilian deputy commander. A three-star flag officer fills the position of military deputy while a senior Foreign Service officer from DoS serves as the civilian deputy.41

Many of the ongoing smart power initiatives at SOUTHCOM have a maritime focus. The USNS Comfort deployed to South America in 2007 to conduct a mission called Continuing Promise. The ship’s hospital staff comprised of military, interagency and civilians, treated over 400,000 patients during the four-month deployment. During the same year, the high speed vessel HSV-2 Swift deployed for six-months also to South America as part of the Global Fleet Station concept (GFS).42 U.S. military training teams embarked onboard the Swift provided valuable maritime training to foreign militaries. The teams trained over 1200 foreign sailors in seven countries.43

Africa Command: Henrietta H. Fore points out that, “The greatest concentration of states facing the highest risk of instability and the most serious challenges to effective and legitimate governance is found in Africa...”44 The recent creation of AFRICOM reinforces U.S.
commitment to the growing global interest and concern over Africa. AFRICOM became the newest U.S. COCOM on 30 September 2008. Applying an unorthodox, whole-of-government approach and expanding beyond the traditional combatant roles and functions, AFRICOM, "serves as the DoD lead for support to U.S. government agencies and departments responsible for implementing U.S. foreign policy in Africa."45

AFRICOM’s commander, General William E. Ward, published an informative piece in Joint Forces Quarterly detailing AFRICOMs unique focus and vision. Gen. Ward describes AFRICOM’s mission as follows: “In support of U.S. foreign policy and as part of a total U.S. government effort, U.S. AFRICOM’s intent is to assist Africans in providing their own security and stability and helping prevent the conditions that could lead to future conflicts.”46 AFRICOM intends to conduct numerous security assistance programs throughout the African continent. Additionally, AFRICOM will strive to maintain a flexible and responsive approach in the implementation of these programs, as key elements driving AFRICOM’s principle of Active Security. Active Security empowers participating countries “to marginalize the enemies of peace; minimize the potential for conflict; foster the growth of strong, just governments and legitimize institutions; and support the development of civil societies.”47 AFRICOM’s Active Security programs range from anti-terrorism and peacekeeping operations to a mix of capacity building programs aimed at assisting unstable populations.48

Similar in design to the GFS concept, and a vivid example of the enhanced responsiveness attributed to Active Security, the Africa Partnership Station (APS) deployment from October 2007 to April 2008 emerged from the desire by several African countries to improve their respective maritime capabilities and security. APS enhanced maritime cooperation with African partners through initiatives tailored to improve maritime safety and security."49 Like
its GFS counterpart, the APS deployment implemented a series of military-to-military maritime training programs. During APS, the Navy also once again partnered with the medical NGO Project Hope on several initiatives geared toward building long-term healthcare capacity.50

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF CURRENT CAPABILITIES AND OPTIONS

The growing trend toward interagency, NGO and international cooperation will continue as the U.S. seeks to optimize smart power as a viable tool of U.S. foreign policy. As described in the preceding sections, naval forces have incorporated aspects of smart power in several interesting ways, but have yet to fully harness the potential of smart power as a robust whole-of-government capability. Although the responsibility to leverage smart power does not lie entirely with the Department of the Navy or the DoD, the U.S. military can continue to put the pieces in place to facilitate such an interagency transition. In the case of the Navy, this means molding the pieces needed to develop a mobile interagency sea-base for performing operations both at sea and on the shore. The next several paragraphs describe current joint military capabilities and adaptations for supporting an interagency smart power approach from the sea.

David Richardson and others suggest redeploying a new Great White Fleet. This time though, instead of a unilateral effort, America could partner with its allies in the spirit of the 1,000-ship Navy concept (a component of the previously mentioned GMP), and provide U.S.-led multinational humanitarian assistance from the sea. The authors first suggest adding six new “USNS Comfort-type” hospital ships followed by the conversion of older large deck amphibious ships (LHAs) into hospital ships. Rather than having limited deployment periods, the new Great White Fleet could sustain, on a rotational basis, continuous forward deployed, rapid response humanitarian platforms (sea-base).51
In a similar article, Jim Dolbow suggests the construction of 15 additional hospital ships—three for each COCOM. With the advent of AFRICOM, the author may instead wish to suggest the construction of 18 ships. As one writer thoughtfully proposed, “If the nation is serious about dealing with humanitarian and related crises, what better way to address them than with hospital ships that can bring extraordinary capabilities to the vast majority of the world’s inhabitants who live within 50 miles of a coastline?”

“The new ships could sail with an expanded hybrid crew of civilian mariners, joint forces and coalition medical personnel, NGOs, and civilian volunteers to include retired medical personnel.”

The aforementioned staffing concept nearly mirrors the one for the USNS Mercy mission to Indonesia, except it does not reflect the critical contribution by the interagency. An attractive feature of this option, and similar to the New Great White Fleet proposal, is the potential to forward deploy these assets and thereby reduce the transit time vis-à-vis the current hospital ships. To put this into perspective, the USNS Comfort is home ported in Baltimore, and the USNS Mercy in San Diego. Lengthy transit times prohibit any realistic response to a foreign humanitarian emergency by either hospital ship.

Compared to hospital ships, large deck amphibious ships, which consist of the older LHA (Tarawa-class) and more recent LHD (Wasp-class) platforms, offer more capability for the range of possible humanitarian and development assistance missions. The ability to rapidly embark and debark personnel and equipment from large deck amphibious ships greatly exceeds the present hospital ship platforms. LHAs and LHDs can land up to 10 helicopters simultaneously while a hospital ship can only land one. LHAs and LHDs contain well decks that facilitate the rapid transport by sea of large amounts of material and personnel. A hospital ship can only embark patients from the sea through a relatively small and difficult to access side hatch. The
deep draft of a hospital ship in contrast to a large deck amphibious ship also prevents entry into certain ports. The speed and continued forward presence of LHAs and LHDs allow for a significantly better response time. For these reasons, one Navy physician recommends converting the older Tarawa-class LHAs into hospital ships by removing troop berthing and expanding the medical facility even beyond the present capabilities organic to the hospital ships.\textsuperscript{54} Others see the Wasp-class LHDs as underutilized platforms that should assume a broader mission set to include humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{55} Newer than the Tarawa-class LHAs, these platforms have more enhanced logistics capabilities (when compared to LHAs) that include helicopters, an afloat major hospital (second in capability only to a hospital ship), water production, construction equipment, engineering, and the ability to transport assets ashore either by land, air or sea.\textsuperscript{56}

Moving away from the littorals to the shore, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) reflect the future in interagency coordination and exemplify an active whole-of-government smart power effort now ongoing in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although a relatively new concept, PRTs have had several successes, to include, but not limited to, providing basic services, economics, governance and improvements to infrastructure.\textsuperscript{57} PRTs embody personnel from the military, State Department, local government, USAID and others. Ideally, PRTs represent functional experts from across the interagency.\textsuperscript{58} The mission of a PRT is essentially twofold: Maintain security and foster development. This dual mission demonstrates how the interagency and international partners' efforts can make a substantial contribution to counterinsurgency operations.
PRESCRIPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Sea-basing offers a practical and flexible option for the interagency to employ smart power. A sea-base can facilitate rapid mobility, access to security and the staying power for sustained operations. Basing from the sea is also less intrusive, thereby mitigating possible concerns by the host nation government regarding occupation. Interagency teams can also leverage organic shipboard capabilities such as food, communication, water, shelter, medical and fuel, for use ashore, while quickly returning to the ship if, for example, the security situation becomes untenable. Multiple agencies, organizations, coalition and international partners would contribute to these multidisciplinary task-organized interagency teams.

Converting Tarawa-class LHAs into humanitarian and developmental assistance platforms (sea-base) would circumvent the additional cost and time to procure new shipping. Converted LHAs would offer a broad array of capabilities including the robust logistical configuration needed to embark on and sustain support for large-scale contingencies. The concept of increasing the inventory of hospital ships is intriguing, yet too specialized to support the wide spectrum of possible contingencies and diverse groups of interagency and international players. In fact, the window of need for traditional surgically intensive healthcare provided by hospital ships closes soon after the initial onset of a foreign humanitarian crisis. Instead, public health and health education programs have proved to have the greatest and most durable impact on vulnerable populations. Using LHAs to conduct public health and health education programs will not require any significant conversion from the ships’ existing medical facilities and will not become so resource intensive as to potentially jeopardize the execution of other relief efforts. Deploying a number of these afloat humanitarian and developmental assistance platforms on a continual and rotating basis to conduct a broad range of smart power missions
could result in lasting civilian-to-military and military-to-military relationships. These relationships may help to expedite requests for assistance from the U.S. during a time of crisis. LHA platforms enable rapid shore-to-ship evacuation in the event the security situation deteriorates. These sea-bases could also provide hotel services and respite for relief workers. U.S. Navy leaders should consider painting these ships white during the conversion process to reflect the interagency and civilian led (and international) mission of these platforms.

Temporarily folding humanitarian assistance into the mission set of existing LHD platforms would offer an opportunity to partially activate this *smart power from the sea* concept until LHAs finish rotating through the conversion process.

Incorporating a whole of government approach to smart power will present many challenges. Military and civilian organizations have not always partnered well in the past. NGOs and other agencies may question military motives and hesitate to coordinate efforts for U.S. led operations. In addition to conflicting objectives, civilian organizations (especially NGOs) do not typically participate in activities that might compromise their autonomy. During Operation Unified Assistance, the long-standing struggle in Banda Aceh between Aceh Separatists (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) and the government of Indonesia characterized the situation as a Complex Humanitarian Emergency (CHE) and demonstrates how the U.S. approach under such conditions may differ from an NGO. An NGO will likely try to maintain neutrality and not make a distinction between rebels and non-rebels when rendering aid. Others may not view the U.S. as a neutral party, since the U.S. generally only offers aid at the behest of the host-government. Yet, the U.S. must work with the host nation to maintain legitimacy and generate enduring development and stability. The U.S. military should make every effort to appear neutral when providing humanitarian aid and developmental assistance. This may create a
dilemma between the competing priorities of nation state and non-state actors (NGOs). In these situations, or cases of a nonexistent or weak government, establishing an international coalition to lead relief activities may help mitigate potential dilemmas.

Naval forces provide a forward and flexible presence, and have an established history of working with U.S. government (especially DoS) and international agencies. More recently, military forces have collaborated with NGOs and provided crucial security to agencies such as USAID. Defeating a counterinsurgency requires close coordination between all civilian and military agencies at the lowest possible levels. The success of a whole-of-government effort depends upon the ability of these different syndicates to come together and accomplish stated objectives. Each agency cannot work as a separate entity. Agencies must maintain overall situational awareness and continuously synchronize efforts. The final authority for all interagency activity should reside with the respective ambassador. The ambassador can provide a clear structure for the complex level of coordination need for these types of multilateral activities. Large deck amphibious shipping, task organized company level Marine units and Provincial Reconstruction Teams represent the basic military components of this interagency sea-base concept at the tactical level.

In contrast to Nye’s assertions that soft power provides a means to obtain what we want through attraction, Lieutenant General Norman Seip, Commander, 12th Air Force, remarked in a recent op-ed piece that in the case of military soft power missions, “influence is never the objective.” Instead, what the U.S. military hopes to do is promote programs that generate security and stability through regional cooperation and partnerships in order to allow people to prosper by countering the corrosive elements that breed insecurity and instability. The U.S. can deliver these programs and help countries develop them, but countries must take complete
ownership of such initiatives to realize enduring results. Rather than “winning hearts and minds,” the real goal is to recognize and help minimize the symptoms that can lead to chaos and therefore maximize the opportunities that help generate stability and promote enduring peace.
### Appendix A

**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behaviors</th>
<th>Primary Currencies</th>
<th>Government Policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Power</strong></td>
<td>coercion, deterrence</td>
<td>threats, force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>protection</td>
<td>coercive diplomacy, war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Power</strong></td>
<td>inducement, coercion</td>
<td>payments, sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>aid, bribes, sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Soft Power</strong></td>
<td>attraction, agenda set</td>
<td>values, culture, policies, institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>public diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Three Types of Power**

Appendix B

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spectrum of Behaviors</th>
<th>Hard</th>
<th>Soft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Command</td>
<td>coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Likely Resources</td>
<td>force</td>
<td>sanctions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix C

Task Organization

LEGEND

Command
Coordination
Military
State Dept.
U.S. Gov. Agency
International Agency
Host Nation
Coalition
NGO

USPACOM
Pacific Fleet
Seventh Fleet
CTF 73
CTG 73.1
US Navy MTF
Project Hope
AMEMBASSY Jakarta
DATT Country Teams

USNS MERCY

Mercy Ashore Coordination Cell

TNI
GOI MOH
USAID
WHO
NGOs

USNS SWIFT
USNS NIAGRA FALLS
USNS SAN JOSE

Multinational Military Hospitals
HN Hospitals

Source: Adapted from Mark Llewellyn, Perspectives from MTF USNS Mercy, 32.
Appendix D

USNS Mercy military and civilian staffing for Operation Unified Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medical officers</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dental officers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Oral surgeon</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Service Corps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT, EHO, microbiologist/enzymologist</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Corps</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant officers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HM 0038</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursing</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HM/DT technician</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HM</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DT</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonmedical (Supply, air, communications, MAAs, administration)</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project HOPE (n = 180; 91/99)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMD/OMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse practitioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRNA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCSW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mark Llewellyn, Perspectives from MTF USNS Mercy, 31.
Endnotes


2 For the purposes of this paper, the terms interagency and whole-of-government are interchangeable, and symbolize cooperation and collaboration between two or more government agencies.

3 Project Hope (see tsunami case study)—serves as one example of NGO support to a military operation.

4 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), X.

5 Nye, Soft Power, 44.

6 Nye, Soft Power, XI.

7 Nye, Soft Power, 5.

8 Nye, Soft Power, 4-5.


10 Nye, Soft Power, 7.


20 Joyce, “Civilian-Military Coordination in the Emergency Response in Indonesia,” 70.


33 Llewellyn, “Perspectives from MTF USNS Mercy,” 30.

34 Llewellyn, “Perspectives from MTF USNS Mercy,” 31.


41 Paterson, “SOUTHCOM Turns to Soft Power,” 57.

42 “Global Fleet Stations Concept.” Working paper, Chief of Naval Operations, N3N5, July 30, 2007. GFS originates from the broader Navy concept known as Global Maritime Partnerships (GMP). The GMP concept seeks to partner with other nations to promote and assist with maritime security and stability. GFS serves as the operational sea-based template for fostering international partnerships to meet GMP objectives. GFS missions build regional partnerships from an afloat forward staging base, usually consisting of at least a large deck amphibious ship, and often also a specialized platform such as a high speed vessel (HSV) or hospital ship. Typical GFS activities include military-to-military training, civil affairs projects, medical civic assistance programs, and regional information sharing. In the spirit of GMP, coalition partners and NGO personnel often participate in GFS missions.

43 Paterson, “SOUTHCOM Turns to Soft Power,” 58.


60 Leavitt, Vorce and Hsu, “For Compassion and Country,” 48.


63 “Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies.” An Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Reference Paper, United Nations, June 28, 2004. IASC defines a Complex (Humanitarian) Emergency as “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme.” 8.

The Marine Corps concept of Enhanced Company Operations may provide an attractive option to support forward deployed naval forces patrolling the littorals as a flexible and rapid amphibious response force. Companies employed under ECO offer ideal size and maneuverability to either join or support PRTs from a sea-base. ECO would offer a flexible security option to support interagency development and capacity building efforts (such as USAID). The posture of Marine forces operating under an ECO construct could rapidly expand or contract as determined by the security conditions on the ground. This would concentrate ECO forces only in those areas with security concerns. Once the security situation stabilized, ECO forces could either retrograde to the sea-base or shift to another location. For further information about the ECO concept, please refer to General James T. Conway’s article: “A Concept for Enhanced Company Operations,” Marine Corps Gazette 92, no. 12, http://proquest.umi.com/.


Seip, “Soft Power.”
Bibliography


