Framework for Counterguerrilla Tactical Doctrine: A Theoretical Approach

A Monograph
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ABSTRACT


As the face of modern warfare changes, the threat of the appearance of guerrilla forces on the battlefield increases. Whether in the form of insurgent forces or partisan forces employing guerrilla tactics in support of conventional forces, their actions on the battlefield must be understood to be countered. Current operations in the Middle East lend special significance to an understanding of counterguerrilla operations.

Guerrilla doctrine and tactics spring from an enormous body of theoretical works, not the least of which are the writings of Mao Tse-tung. On the other hand, our current counterguerrilla doctrine and tactics are not based in theory. They represent the "how" without the "why" of counterguerrilla warfare.

Through the critical analysis of guerrilla and counterguerrilla tactical operations encompassing guerrillas in support of both insurgent and conventional forces I have identified theoretical concepts that can be used in the construction of a framework for counterguerrilla operations. These concepts were evaluated against the criteria that determine the adequacy of theory, namely that they explain and describe this type of warfare, and that they are succinct, supportable, and retrodictive.

This monograph concludes that the five concepts that emerge to form the framework are as follows: (1) the necessity to determine and understand the nature of the conflict and the ability to adapt; (2) the necessity to recognize the linkage between the political aim and the military application of force; (3) counterguerrilla warfare is conducted in an environment that is deeply submerged in the moral domain of battle and is a battle of will conducted over time; (4) the counterguerrilla must set the terms of battle through leadership, intelligence, and mobility; (5) the counterguerrilla force must isolate the guerrilla, internally and externally.
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SECTION I (INTRODUCTION)

Modern warfare is characterized by a battlefield in which high lethality, non-linearity and fluidity predominate. This results in increased dispersion of smaller, self-contained units operating independently. These conditions produce an expanded battlefield where the threat of guerrilla warfare spans the operational continuum. Therefore, guerrilla warfare is likely to be a factor whenever and wherever United States military forces are employed. In light of this, certain questions arise: Why are guerrilla forces successful? How are they defeated? What is the theoretical framework upon which counterguerrilla tactical operations must be based? These are the questions that this monograph will address.

Guerrilla threats exist in many forms. The two that will be examined in this paper are those of insurgent forces operating against legitimately installed governments and small forces using unconventional methods acting in support of conventional forces. This paper makes no attempt to explain or describe insurgencies or conventional wars. Its purpose is to address only the fact that guerrilla warfare is likely to occur in both.

Most studies of guerrilla warfare and tactics dwell on the insurgent aspect while the trend in modern warfare calls for a broader outlook. Napoleon's Peninsula Campaign and T.E. Lawrence's successful use of Bedouins in Arabia clearly show the utility of guerrilla warfare on the mid-to-high intensity level. Already in the current Middle East crisis, Kuwaitis are conducting small scale guerrilla operations against occupying Iraqi forces. Should this crisis develop into a shooting war, there is vast potential for guerrilla operations directed against U. S. forces.

These realities help to demonstrate that war is a
complex phenomenon, within which there exists an inviolable linkage between its theory, doctrine and practice. These three elements are a unified whole, each requiring the others to be complete and coherent. They can be viewed in terms of the human body: the head is the theory, providing the reason, description, explanation and purpose; the abdomen is the doctrine, which transmits messages to the arms and legs in the form of principles or concepts; and finally, the arms and legs perform the motor functions, or practice.

History tells us that guerrilla warfare is a viable form of war. It therefore follows that counterguerrilla warfare is also a necessity. The United States military must be certain that it is equipped with the proper intellectual tools to conduct counterguerrilla tactical operations. This implies that we need more than doctrine and tactics. We require the unified whole provided only by the theory, doctrine, tactics trinity.

Guerrilla doctrine and tactics spring from an enormous body of theoretical works, not the least of which are the writings of Mao Tse-tung. On the other hand, our current counterguerrilla doctrine and tactics are not based in theory. They represent the "how" without the "why" of counterguerrilla warfare. The body, arms and legs are poised to conduct counterguerrilla warfare without the theoretical "head" to provide the direction. Current doctrine has emerged in direct response to guerrilla tactics and not as an evolutionary product of significant independent thought. From a theoretical standpoint, it is reactionary, not proactive; the guerrilla calls the shots.

Throughout history, the United States has been unable or unwilling to treat guerrilla warfare as anything more than an aberration or abnormality. A comment by General
George Decker, Army Chief of Staff from 1960 to 1962, responding to a lecture on counterinsurgency, characterizes U.S. Army views on the subject: "Any good soldier can handle guerrillas." While times have changed and doctrine has been written, this view of counterguerrilla warfare has changed little over time.

In this monograph I will build a theoretical framework upon which counterguerrilla doctrine and tactics can be firmly rooted. I will begin by ensuring a clear understanding of the definition of guerrilla warfare, followed by a discussion of what a theory is and what it should do. I will then examine the evolution of U.S. counterguerrilla doctrine and determine whether this doctrine has a foundation in theoretical concepts. A discussion on the guerrilla theory of Mao Tse-tung will show how guerrilla tactics flow logically from an established theoretical base. Six historical case studies will provide the basis from which a theoretical framework for counterguerrilla doctrine can be derived.

SECTION II (THEORY AND HISTORY)

No discussion of guerrilla or counterguerrilla warfare can begin without an understanding of definitions. The term "guerrilla" was probably first used during Napoleon's campaign on the Iberian Peninsula (1809-1813) when skilled Spanish-Portuguese irregulars, or "guerrilleros", acted in support of the Duke of Wellington's regular forces to drive the French from the peninsula. They assisted Wellington by interdicting French lines of communication, providing intelligence and conducting outright attacks at the times and places of their own choosing. Today, there exists a multitude of definitions for the phenomenon called guerrilla warfare. Rather than provide a laundry list, the
following is a definition built from a number of sources:

Guerrilla Warfare is a violent, protracted type of warfare characterized by small, self-contained, lightly armed irregular forces fighting small-scale, limited actions using tactics characterized by surprise, rapid movement, deception, secrecy, stealth, intelligence and improvisation. The guerrilla avoids open tests of strength with the enemy unless success is assured. Guerrilla warfare may be conducted to challenge an existing political authority, or in support of conventional military forces. It is normally conducted against orthodox military forces. Guerrilla warfare has evolved into an instrument to achieve political goals.²

This definition forms the basis for all future discussion, and leads us into an examination of the role of theory.

Why is a theory of counterguerrilla warfare important and what should this theory do for us? Quite simply, counterguerrilla warfare defeats guerrillas. A theory of counterguerrilla warfare will tell us how to defeat guerrillas. If this theory is adequate, it will "explain" and "describe" counterguerrilla warfare. This theory must also be "retrodictive", "succinct" and "supportable".

These five criteria will be used in my analysis. The analysis, however, will focus on the criteria "describe" and "explain", since these are the most critical elements of an adequate theory.² The criterion of retrodiction will be discussed most thoroughly in the "implications" section.

The Random House definition of the word "explain" is to make something plain, understandable or intelligible. To explain something is to make it known in detail and to make it clear.⁷ The explanatory power of a theory is the single most important element in determining the adequacy of any theory. A theory of counterguerrilla warfare, therefore, must render this type of warfare clear and understandable. The aim of counterguerrilla warfare is defeat of guerrilla forces. Theory contributes to that aim by making the methods required to defeat the guerrillas clear and understandable. Also according to Random House,
to describe something is to give an account of, tell or depict. Additionally, to describe is to denote or represent. Therefore, a theoretical framework must present a "snapshot" of counterguerrilla warfare.

As mentioned earlier, an adequate theory must be retrodictive. That is, it must explain the past in terms of current realities and suggest possibilities for the future. To test a theory against this criterion, it must be shown that it has relevancy in today's reality. That the theory be succinct is a relative notion. To pass the test of this criterion, the theory must be precise enough to describe and explain, yet broad enough to account for the varied nature of counterguerrilla warfare. Finally, the theory must be supportable. The theory will pass this test if its component parts have been carefully derived from the historical case studies that follow.

Critical analysis, through which I will derive the theoretical framework, is the key to the development of theory. In the words of Clausewitz:

Theory will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first seems fused, to explain in full the properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects, to define clearly the nature of the ends in view, and to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical inquiry. Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him avoid pitfalls."

The United States military has had extensive experience with guerrilla warfare. Still, guerrilla warfare is regarded as something special. During the Eisenhower years (1952-1960), for example, there was a preoccupation with the belief that the country's nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter most wars and end favorably those it could not. There was a hesitancy within the Army to depart from traditional combat missions. Guerrilla
warfare was considered to be an aberration, or "sideshow". to regular conventional warfare.

The problem in dealing with guerrilla warfare, however, is more than a matter of personalities and misconceptions. A great part of the inability to accept this type of warfare and deal with it lies in the heart of the American people. A quote from Alexander Buchsbaum makes clear the problem the United States has in dealing with something other than a conventional war:

...to many Americans war is a form of crusade, where decision must be reached as soon as possible, as well as a nasty job which must be finished as soon as possible, especially when the army consists of conscripted citizen-soldiers and where the whole society is involved. No wonder that there is no patience or taste, in the American context, for a protracted war, which demands patience and more sophisticated techniques than firepower, where stratagem, cunning and deception are at a premium.11

The back-seat status of guerrilla warfare changed suddenly when John F. Kennedy became president. He considered the guerrilla threat to be the most active and constant threat to the free world's security.12 The age of strict reliance on nuclear supremacy was coming to a close and Kennedy was attempting to restructure military thinking to deal with this "new" and dangerous threat. Volumes of material were written in professional journals, but no real action was taken in the area of doctrinal publications.

By 1964, the Army was still struggling for doctrine and structure.13 Counterinsurgency/counterguerrilla doctrine had been pushed into the system by Kennedy from the top. Therefore, there was no real foundation of theoretical understanding or acceptance built from within the military institution.14 There was no evolution of counterguerrilla warfare derived through an examination of its history. There was no understanding based on the development of a theory of counterguerrilla operations.
There was only an order from the top and the imminent threat of fighting this type of war in Southeast Asia.

Doctrinal manuals from 1960 to the present version of FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations, prescribe tactics to defeat the guerrilla but have not been and are not founded on a coherent theory of counterguerrilla warfare. (This is not surprising when we consider that the U.S. military has no "published" theory of war in general). A sampling of this doctrine, along with an expanded discussion of military thoughts on the subject during the 1960s, appears at Appendix A. The sampling serves to illustrate the absence of a coherent theoretical basis, and even the lack of continuity in the ability to give counterguerrilla operations proper recognition.

Guerrilla theory must be examined in any study of the development of counterguerrilla theory for two reasons. First, it shows how theory and practice are linked on the part of the guerrilla. It displays how the guerrilla's actions are guided by a set of coherent principles that will lead him to success. Secondly, an understanding of guerrilla theory aids in the development of a counterguerrilla theory since it is the guerrilla who the counterguerrilla is attempting to defeat.

Any study of guerrilla theory must begin with Mao Tse-tung, considered by many to be the father of guerrilla warfare. This is not to say that guerrilla warfare originated with Mao, but it was Mao who developed the theory that has become a model for the conduct of guerrilla warfare and the use of guerrilla tactics worldwide. While I have defined guerrilla warfare earlier, a quote from Mao concerning guerrilla tactics is in order:

When it is not advantageous for our main land army to meet the enemy in large-scale engagements and we, therefore, send out commando units, or guerrilla units, which employ the tactics of
avoiding strength and striking at weakness, of flitting about and having no fixed position, and of subduing the enemy according to circumstances, and when we do not oppose the enemy according to the ordinary rules of tactics, this is called employing guerrilla tactics.16

While Mao's works on guerrilla warfare are extensive, certain theoretical concepts can be said to form the foundation of guerrilla warfare. In this portion of the paper I will identify the most important of these concepts and briefly discuss the principles that derive from them. This portion of the paper will demonstrate the linkage between the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare and suggest that a similar relationship exists between the theory and practice of counterguerrilla warfare.

The first of these concepts concerns the political nature of guerrilla warfare. Mao paraphrased Clausewitz when he said that, "...war is politics and war itself is a political action; since ancient times there has never been a war that did not have a political character."18 The main principle here is that the guerrilla never forgets that politics are inexorably linked to military action and that it is politics which determine the nature of the conflict and how it is to be conducted.

A second concept of guerrilla theory concerns time and space. Since the guerrilla is normally the weaker of two adversaries, he must use time and space properly. The guerrilla trades or organizes space to yield time and organizes time to motivate his own will while depleting the will of his opponent. Time, space, and will multiplied by manpower equals the totality of his military potential.17 Therefore, the guerrilla avoids conventional battle until his strength is greater than his adversary's and victory is assured. The guerrilla attacks when the enemy overextends.

A third concept concerns internal and external support
and overlaps both the physical and moral domains of battle. Successful guerrillas realize that ultimate victory requires support of the population within which the war is being waged. The guerrilla needs popular support to survive, both physical survival in the form of arms, equipment and food, and moral support in terms of sympathy for the cause. He requires external support to sustain guerrilla operations as well. The guerrilla does all he can to gain internal and external support while at the same time taking action to destroy that of the enemy.

The fourth theoretical concept rests in Mao's famous dictum, "When the enemy attacks, we retreat; when the enemy halts, we harass; when the enemy is weary, we attack; when the enemy retreats, we pursue." This simple dictum goes far in explaining and describing guerrilla warfare. From it, Mao derived the following guerrilla principles:

1. Defense against a superior enemy is not undertaken because victory is not assured.

2. The guerrilla does not tie himself down, but does everything to ensure freedom of action.

3. Economy of force operations predominate in guerrilla warfare because the guerrilla is aware that he cannot be strong everywhere, but must be strong at the point of attack.

4. Mobility, deception, surprise, and indirection are critical.

5. Guerrillas avoid strength and attacks weakness.

6. The guerrilla chooses the time and place of combat, always attempting to hold the tactical initiative.

7. The guerrilla gains and maintains local superiority by concentrating, attacking and dispersing.

8. The guerrilla draws off enemy forces and then attacks overextended forces.
A final concept concerns the object of war. To Mao, "The object of war is specifically 'to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy' (to destroy the enemy means to disarm him or 'deprive him of the power to resist', and does not mean to destroy every member of his forces physically'). This implies that in addition to enemy forces as targets, the guerrilla aims to disrupt his enemy's rear, destroy airfields and depots, and sever his LOCs.

Mao developed his theory of guerrilla warfare through the careful study of history. His tactics were developed directly from that theory. The case studies that follow provide the historical basis from which theoretical concepts can be derived to form a framework for the development of counterguerrilla tactical doctrine.

SECTION III (CASE STUDIES)

This section contains an analysis of selected operations within which counterguerrilla warfare was conducted. It is not intended to be an in-depth historical analysis of campaigns in which counterguerrilla forces were employed. The purpose of this section is to identify the key determinants of successful counterguerrilla tactical operations in order to derive general propositions and identify them as factors which are capable of producing success in such conflicts. A more detailed version of these case studies can be found at Appendix B.

In Clausewitz' words, I am using history as proof that an event is possible, not that it will always occur, for no two conflicts are alike. The case studies were selected because of their diverse natures to ensure the factors come from as broad a base as possible.

Two types of counterguerrilla operations are analyzed: successful and unsuccessful. Both are important because
successful counterguerrilla principles can be derived in two distinct ways. First, and most obvious, counterguerrilla principles can be distilled directly from those operations in which the counterguerrilla forces were successful. More subtly, however, they may be derived from cases where the guerrilla was successful. In each of the cases in this second category, the counterguerrilla failed to employ certain factors which, if applied, would have increased his chances for success.

The first successful counterguerrilla operation to be analyzed was fought in Malaya between the British and the Malayan Communist Party between 1947 and 1960. Ultimate victory for the British in this protracted struggle can be explained by a number of factors, summarized as follows:

(1) Eventual recognition of the nature of the war they were conducting and their ability to adapt their methods to the situation. Initial use of conventional military tactics brought miserable results. They soon found out, however, that adaptation from large conventional military sweeps against an extremely elusive enemy to small unit actions brought exceptional results.\footnote{71}

(2) Realization that defeat of the guerrillas was more than a military operation, and that close cooperation between the political apparatus and the military machine resulting in political/military unity of effort was required. In 1952, General Sir Gerald Templer arrived on the scene. Templer ensured all military action was coordinated with the overall political aim.\footnote{72} Clausewitz recognized the utility of this joining of soldier and statesman many years ago, referring to it as an ideal solution to the problem of coordinating military action with the political object.\footnote{73}

An additional factor of political/military cooperation
was displayed in Britain's effective use of local police forces to safeguard the populace and control guerrilla movement. They established coordinating committees consisting of civil authorities, police and military to ensure unity of command at all levels.  

(3) The British understood the importance of the moral domain, consisting of the interrelated factors of time and will. Time had to be viewed in the context of its effective utilization, i.e., denying the advantage of time habitually associated with the guerrilla force. Will must be discussed in the same breath for it is will that the guerrilla is trying to manipulate. Not only must the counterguerrilla harness the will of the local population, but also maintain the support of its people back home. The British effectively managed both areas.

The British achieved real progress upon implementation of the Briggs Plan. Designed by Sir Henry Briggs, the plan was centered around gaining the population's support and denying it to the enemy. His plan was to dominate the populated areas and acquire information from the populace. As a further measure of isolating the guerrillas, he transplanted over 500,000 Chinese squatters to "new villages". In this resettlement, he gave the squatters something to lose. In an analogy to Mao, he denied the water to the fish.  

(4) The British recognized the need for maintenance of the initiative and strong leadership. Denial of the initiative to the guerrillas was critical to the success of the counterguerrilla effort. By gaining and maintaining the initiative, they forced the guerrillas to act prematurely. These actions served only to alienate the peasants. The guerrillas were forced to step up activities and move between phases too quickly.
To maintain the initiative the British depended heavily on intelligence and mobility. So high was the British regard for intelligence that the Special Branch for intelligence was established so that decisions regarding action based on this intelligence were made on the spot, not thousands of miles away. To gather intelligence, extensive use was made of active patrolling and scouting.

Also critical to maintenance of the initiative was effective leadership on the part of the British. The contributions of Sir Henry Briggs and Sir Gerald Templer have already been noted. Leadership at the small unit level was heavily emphasized as these small unit leaders were allowed to conduct decentralized operations within the overall commander's intent to implement timely response to guerrilla action.

(5) The final success factor from the Malaya case study was Britain's ability to isolate the guerrillas from sources of physical support, both externally and internally. As mentioned previously, the resettlement portion of the Briggs Plan denied the guerrillas popular moral support. An additional product, however, was that it effectively isolated them physically from their source of food and supplies. The British also dealt effectively with the external support issue, isolating the guerrillas from third party countries.

The second successful counterguerrilla operation was conducted by the government of the Philippines against the Communist Hukbalahaps (Huks) from 1946 to 1952. Success factors from this operation are summarized as follows:

(1) Realization of the nature of the conflict and the ability to adapt established methods. The counterguerrilla effort in the Philippines initially faltered as the government's use of traditional conventional military
tactics quite often missed their target and alienated the peasants. They failed to determine the nature of the conflict in which they were involved.

In 1950, however, Ramon Magsaysay took over as Minister of National Defense. Magsaysay saw that conventional tactics were useless against the guerrillas. He therefore adapted by resorting to unorthodox methods. His use of small, armed units to hunt guerrillas and nibble away at the Huks brought increased success.

(2) Military/political connectivity. Initial efforts to defeat the guerrillas, taken by a government riddled with corruption, were strictly military. There was no unity of effort between the political apparatus of the country and the military. The government failed to recognize that their first mission was the protection of the people and concentrated on the elimination of the threat without paying attention to the security and rights of the governed. Magsaysay acknowledged the necessary bond between political and military effort and ensured unified action.

(3) Emphasis on the importance of the support of the local population and effective use of time. Magsaysay took the Communist cry of "land for the landless" and made it his own. His fight with the guerrillas became one of will and endurance. Utilizing a slow and methodical approach, Magsaysay effectively used time to his advantage. This fostered growing dissension in the ranks of the guerrillas, causing them to turn to increased terrorist methods that further alienated the population.

(4) Maintenance of the initiative. Through the leadership of Ramon Magsaysay, the counterguerrillas were able to gain and maintain the initiative. As in Malaya, two of the most important tools for maintaining the
initiative were mobility and intelligence. In addition to the tactical successes of the small, mobile units mentioned earlier, these units showed the presence of the government to the villagers resulting in increased intelligence.34

(5) Finally, Magsaysay and the Philippine government were able to isolate the guerrillas effectively from their sources of support, both internally and externally. The guerrillas were short arms, supplies, safe areas and effective communications.35 Without this support, the guerrillas eventually collapsed.

The final example of successful counterguerrilla action was in the Western Ukraine, in an area also known as Galicia, between 1944 and 1948. The conflict occurred between the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists and the Soviet Union.40 An interesting aspect of this particular case is that the Ukrainian guerrillas did more right than wrong. They relied on the proven guerrilla techniques of Mao Tse-tung and represented an entire population desiring freedom from Soviet rule and repression. According to Mao, Giap, and Che Guevara, a well organized, trained, equipped, and led guerrilla army which enjoys the support of the masses cannot fail. The Ukraine showed the reverse.41 Why then did the guerrillas fail? Or more significantly for our purposes, why were the counterguerrillas successful?

(1) The Soviets learned early that major military operations would not be effective because they understood the type of war they were fighting. They understood the strength of their adversary and realized that an adaptation away from large scale military operations was in order. They employed small units, or counterbands, to rout out the guerrillas. With small unit operations, the Soviets found they could achieve a high ratio of contacts based on
reliable information. "

(2) The Soviets were able to achieve unity of political and military effort through strict civilian control of the military to ensure the political goals were attained. The Soviets relied heavily on the use of police to control the population so the military could concentrate on defeating the guerrillas.

(3) Manipulation of will and the effective use of time by the Soviets were critical to their success. In addition to physical force, they relied heavily on propaganda and psychological warfare. They embarked on a resettlement campaign to separate the actively hostile population from those that were merely sympathetic. They did not expect to defeat the guerrillas overnight. They were prepared for a long fight, denying the guerrillas the advantage of time.

(4) The guerrillas were defeated by a tenacious, ruthless and competent totalitarian state under the leadership of Joseph Stalin. A quote from Buchsbajew serves to illustrate the advantages of a totalitarian state in dealing with guerrillas,

...the government which is prepared to employ repression efficiently, without scruples and on a vast scale, which is determined to carry on the struggle indefinitely, which is able to control its media and indoctrinate its public opinion, which manages to isolate the insurgents from the international forum, will invariably succeed.

(5) The Soviets isolated the guerrillas from the international forum in terms of physical and political support. Support that the guerrillas were counting on from the West never materialized. Blockades and other methods were employed to interdict the guerrillas' LOCs.

The next three cases provide counterguerrilla success factors according to the methodology described earlier. In review, this second method derives factors that, if
employed by the counterguerrilla, would most likely have succeeded. It is a more indirect approach to arrival at counterguerrilla success factors. From these cases, we can determine what might be called "missed opportunities" that will help in building the theoretical framework.

The first of these cases is T.E. Lawrence's guerrilla operations in the Middle East Theater during World War I, from 1917 to 1919. Lawrence, a young British intelligence officer, became convinced that the best way to defeat the Turks was through an Arab uprising. From 1917 to 1919, Lawrence and his Arab guerrillas waged war against the Turks, wearing them down and preventing their control and domination of the Middle East.

Lawrence's theory of guerrilla warfare boils down to five (5) essential elements. The guerrilla must:

1. have an unassailable base, guarded from attack or threat of attack. In Arabia he had this in the Red Sea ports, the desert and the minds of the men converted to the Arab cause.

2. have a sophisticated alien enemy, in the form of a disciplined army of occupation, too small to cover all ground.

3. have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic (2% active, 98% sympathetic).

4. rely on speed and endurance, ubiquity and independence of arteries of supply.

5. possess the technical equipment necessary to destroy or paralyze the enemy's communications.

Lawrence had these factors working for him in Arabia and the counterguerrilla failure can be said to be a result of the failure of the Turks to defeat them.

Counterguerrilla emphasis during this conflict should have been focused on the following:
Acknowledgement that they were not fighting a conventional enemy. The Turks looked for an absolute war solution in a non–absolute war situation. If the Turks were willing to acknowledge the nature of the war they were fighting, and that adaptation of conventional tactics was required, they may have enjoyed greater success. They continued to employ massive waste, using large conventional formations to attack the guerrillas, and found themselves often striking at air.

(2) In the moral domain, the Turks, according to Lawrence, should have employed the potentially most effective methods of treachery and bribery to "buy" a few key people and stir up traitors within the rebellion.

(3) The Turks needed to gain and maintain the initiative. They enjoyed greater mobility in the desert with their armored cars mounted with machine guns, and aircraft. They failed to use active patrolling along their LOCs to deny the guerrillas a target and destroy them upon engagement. They attempted to defend everywhere, thereby surrendering the tactical initiative to Lawrence.

(4) Finally, the Turks did not attempt to attack Lawrence where it would hurt him the most. Aside from active patrolling in their high mobility vehicles, the Turks should have sought to deny the Arabs their bases, namely their sources of supply along the Red Sea coast. Without this source of external support, Lawrence would not have had the means to wage his guerrilla war.

The second unsuccessful counterguerrilla case is that of the Chinese Nationalists versus the Communist Chinese under Mao Tse-tung between 1927 and 1949. Mao's theory and tactics have been summarized previously in this paper. This discussion will therefore center on the "missed opportunities" of the counterguerrillas.
Despite the length of the struggle, the Nationalists never acknowledged the type of war they were conducting. As a result of this failure, they did not realize that an adaptation of conventional practices might be necessary. A series of encirclement and annihilation campaigns were attempted by the Nationalists in an effort to defeat the Communists through the use of conventional warfare. These operations were poorly planned and executed, and produced no identifiable results. Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists failed to recognize the type of war Mao was waging.

An unstable political situation prevented military and political cooperation throughout the struggle. Efforts to defeat the guerrillas were purely military.

The political situation mentioned above further contributed to the guerrillas' ability to garner the support of the peasants. Political unrest and large conventional military sweeps alienated the peasants, driving them toward Mao's camp. The battle for the will of the people, so critical to Mao's entire theory of protracted warfare, was a one-sided affair. The Nationalists did not attempt to participate in this battle, playing right into Mao's hand.

While they were losing the battle of will, the Nationalists also forfeited the factor of time to the guerrillas. While Mao was willing to extend the conflict in order to grow in strength, the Nationalists continued to try to end it quickly, resulting in further alienation and military ineffectiveness.

The Nationalists were never able to gain the initiative. Mao's tactics enabled him to gain and maintain the tactical initiative while surrendering the strategic initiative to the Nationalists. Over the course of the
conflict, Mao's strength grew to the point that he was able to seize the strategic initiative as well.

The Nationalists failed in their attempts to seize the initiative in part through surrendering the advantage of mobility to the quicker, more evasive guerrillas. The guerrillas therefore had freedom to move about the population, striking blows at the cumbersome Nationalist forces and making contact with the peasant population. These contacts resulted in superior intelligence when compared to that of the Nationalists.

The leadership battle was also clearly won by the guerrillas. Mao was a student of warfare in general and a teacher of guerrilla warfare. This knowledge, coupled with his dominant leadership ability allowed the guerrillas to stay a step ahead of the Nationalists who fumbled under the ineffective leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.

(5) A final factor in counterguerrilla failure was their inability to isolate the guerrillas from their sources of internal and external physical support. Arms and equipment provided by the United States to the Nationalist government for their fight against the Japanese during the latter part of World War II fell into guerrilla hands. Peasant support for the guerrillas grew throughout the conflict. This support provided, in addition to moral support for the cause, critical physical support in terms of food and supplies.

The final unsuccessful counterguerrilla case occurred in Indochina, from 1946 to 1954. After World War II, Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap emerged as leaders of the Viet Minh, the largest of the resistance movements established during the war. The stage was set for a conflict between the French, who had no intention of forfeiting their interests in the area, and the Communist Viet Minh.⁴
After eight years of fighting, the French were unable to oust the Viet Minh from the north, and the Geneva Accord was signed dividing the country officially at the 17th parallel. The failure of the counterguerrillas must be examined to determine the factors that could have been implemented to aid in the defeat of the guerrillas.

(1) The French severely underestimated the opposition they would be facing in Vietnam, and never considered that there was more than mop-up operations to be conducted. They failed to understand the nature of their conflict and the actions required to defeat this type of enemy.

(2) There was little coordination between the military and the political decision-making authorities. In fact, by the end of the conflict, the French in Indochina were without the support of the government of France. Their operations became a series of military actions without political impetus. Uncertainty of political aims led to a lack of continuous and coherent military policy.

(3) Aside from initial pacification efforts, the French did little to win the battle of will and the battle of time. Their waning support at home forced the French to try to do too much, too fast, and time therefore rested firmly with the guerrillas. Their all out attacks destroyed peasant property and alienated them.

(4) Initiative and leadership rested firmly with the guerrillas. No strong effective leadership on the part of the counterguerrillas emerged. Early success by the French in gaining the initiative ended with their attempt to do too much, too fast. Over-extension resulted in an attempt to defend everywhere, thereby ceding the tactical initiative to Ho and Giap.

(5) A final cause of French failure was their inability to isolate the guerrillas from their sources of
internal and external physical support. Like Mao, Giap and Ho's plan of attack required the support of the population to provide food and supplies to the guerrillas. The French came up short in their efforts to win the support of the population and were therefore unable to isolate the guerrillas from their source of internal support. Failure to isolate the guerrillas externally resulted in continuous support from the Communist Chinese.

From these case studies, certain concepts emerge. The next section will derive these concepts and analyze them in terms of the criteria set forth earlier.

SECTION IV (CRITICAL ANALYSIS)

Drawing from the case studies discussed in the previous section, this section is devoted to the critical analysis of emergent theoretical elements, which can be "wrung" from those case studies. These concepts are to become the theoretical framework upon which counterguerrilla tactical doctrine should be developed.

In order for these concepts to form an adequate theoretical framework, they must be tested against the criteria discussed in Section II. In review, this theoretical framework must both describe and explain counterguerrilla warfare. It must be retrodictive and succinct. Finally, it must be supportable.

The five concepts that emerge to form the framework are as follows:

(1) The necessity to determine and understand the nature of the conflict and the ability of the political and military institutions of the counterguerrilla force to adapt established methods to the particular situation.

(2) The necessity to recognize the linkage between the establishment of the political aim and the military
application of force, coupled with complete unity of political and military effort.

(3) Counterguerrilla warfare is conducted in an environment that is deeply submersed in the moral domain of battle. It requires recognition that counterguerrilla warfare is a battle of will conducted over time and that the victor is the opponent best able to use both to his advantage. Success requires, therefore, what might be termed "moral endurance".

(4) The counterguerrilla must set the terms of battle, gaining the tactical initiative as well as the strategic initiative. Initiative is gained by outstanding leadership, access to "near perfect" intelligence, and advantageous use of mobility.

(5) The counterguerrilla force must isolate the guerrilla. The counterguerrilla force that directs his energy on denying the guerrilla sources of both internal and external physical support will place his adversary in an untenable position.

Analysis of these theoretical concepts will center on the criteria "describe" and "explain", since these criteria most critically determine the adequacy of a theory. The final portion of the analysis will address the criteria of "succinct" and "supportability", with a discussion of "retrodiction" being held for the "implications" section.

As mentioned previously, an adequate theory must "describe" counterguerrilla warfare. In order to be descriptive, the theoretical framework must tell, or depict, what counterguerrilla warfare is. Therefore, it is concerned more with "what", than "why" or "how". If it is descriptive, it will trace the outline of counterguerrilla warfare, or place it within a context that totally surrounds the outer boundaries of the phenomenon.
The first theoretical concept derived from the case studies describes counterguerrilla warfare as an endeavor quite different from conventional warfare. It is a type of warfare that varies with every appearance on the battlefield. Due to this varying nature, attempts to deal with it cannot be undertaken successfully until its exact nature is determined. Rigid doctrine or tactics are ineffectual to its successful prosecution. Therefore, adaptation of carefully structured doctrine and tactics is required both prior to and during battle.

The second concept describes counterguerrilla warfare as an endeavor to be taken only after a determination of the political aim is made. Once made, the application of military force must be strictly subordinated to that aim. Counterguerrilla warfare is a form of warfare where the blind application of military force may be as insignificant as the application of no force at all. In fact, it may even be counterproductive. This is true at all levels of guerrilla warfare, to include the tactical level.

Counterguerrilla warfare is a form of warfare shrouded in the dense sea of the moral domain. In this domain, the factors of time and will play a more significant role than in any other type of warfare. This concept describes counterguerrilla warfare as a form of warfare where the opponents battle for more than bodies and terrain. Each is battling the other for the will of the contestants in the overall dimension of time. The will to be won is that of the population, the counterguerrilla's home government and that of the international forum.

The fourth concept describes counterguerrilla warfare as a battle of leadership and initiative. The leadership aspect of counterguerrilla warfare is most evident at the highest levels. Perhaps equally as significant, however,
is that counterguerrilla warfare demands effective leadership at the lowest tactical levels. These lowest tactical levels are the levels of decision in counterguerrilla warfare. Decentralized operations within the overall context of the commander's intent characterize counterguerrilla warfare. This concept further describes counterguerrilla warfare as a form of warfare where tactical initiative is sought by both sides, with victory bestowed upon the side who dictates to the other.

The final concept describes counterguerrilla warfare as warfare in which the guerrilla must be isolated. He must be denied physical support, wherever it is to be found. The guerrilla does not have the means to persist without physical support. The counterguerrilla, with superior means of support, must place himself in a position to protect what he has and deny the enemy what he lacks.

The criterion "explain" concerns the theoretical framework's ability to render counterguerrilla warfare intelligible or understandable. Discussion of the concepts in terms of this criterion focuses on their ability to clarify, interpret and assign meaning to counterguerrilla warfare. Whereas "describe" provides a snapshot of counterguerrilla warfare, "explain" provides a moving picture of the phenomenon. This criterion is concerned with the "why" and "how" of counterguerrilla warfare. It attempts to show the relationship between cause and effect. In the discussion that follows for each of the theoretical concepts, cause is represented by the concept itself and effect is demonstrated by its ability to place the guerrilla at a disadvantage.

The first concept concerns the determination and understanding of the nature of the conflict and adaptation of methods to meet the challenge. Guerrilla warfare is
like a chameleon, changing its color to blend with its environment. The successful combatant in all of our case studies was the side best able to understand the situation he was facing and adapt his methods to fit. The losing side failed to understand the nature of his undertaking and failed to adapt adequately.

Clausewitz emphasized the importance of understanding the nature of the war when he wrote, "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature". While there have been hundreds of instances of guerrilla warfare through history, one lesson is certain: each had its own distinct nature and required its own very distinct application of doctrine, techniques, and procedures. This application succeeded only when done so with an understanding of the nature of the conflict. When applied blindly, the application can be compared to the execution of an operations order without a clear understanding of the commander's intent. It is simply not how we wish to do business. The "why" and "how" are at least as important as the "what".

Concerning the ability the adapt, Sun Tzu wrote about the importance of knowing the enemy and that "one able to gain the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine". In our study of counterguerrilla operations, the truth of this dictum is evident. As Asprey put it, "...the tactical record suggests that orthodox generals who adapted conventional tactics to meet the guerrilla challenge usually prospered while those who failed to do so suffered defeat." Much of the difficulty in developing
counterguerrilla doctrine is that nothing is "standard". Ability to come to grips with this fact is the key to the ability to adapt. Unfortunately, the record suggests that the counterguerrilla quite often did not arrive at adaptation by his own accord. Rather, "such tactical adaptation was rare, and almost always was forced by the enemy rather than produced voluntarily by a commander trained to think in terms of either the unexpected or the indirect approach based on cunning."\(^5\)

Adaptation does not occur unless there is first an acknowledgement that guerrilla warfare is not an aberration or abnormality but a very real and distinct form of warfare that calls for distinct and adaptable methods. This adaptation, as shown by our case studies, very often took the form of the use of unconventional tactics. The use of small patrols as the major combat effort emerged. These small patrols were economical and were used to gain information, make contact, harass the guerrilla, and finally to destroy or capture him.\(^7\) Successful counterguerrillas were not confined to rigid established doctrine. Innovative practices at variance with conventional doctrine brought overwhelmingly successful results. These practices were limited only by ethical standards, ingenuity, and resources.

The second theoretical concept that emerged from the case studies is that recognition of the linkage between politics and the military application of force is required for the counterguerrilla to gain victory. If the quote, "War is a continuation of politics by other means", has meaning anywhere, it has special meaning in guerrilla warfare.\(^9\) In this type of warfare, especially in the counterinsurgency aspect, the political aim and the military aim are most likely to be vastly separated. It is
in this type of war, and under these circumstances, that Clausewitz's discussion concerning the difficulty of making war fully consonant with political objectives unless the soldier and statesman are combined in one man makes the most sense. In each of our case studies, the victor's political/military apparatus were closely linked, at times embodied in a single individual. In addition, the political/military decision-making apparatus was on the spot, i.e., in-country, making the decision as timely as it was unified.

Guerrilla warfare is characterized by conditions quite unlike conventional warfare. As Greene says, "To beat the guerrilla means to fight not in the sharp black and white of formal conflict, but in a gray, fuzzy obscurity where politics affect tactics and economics influence strategy. The soldier must fuse with the statesman, the private turn politician." As all of our counterguerrilla forces experienced, failure to recognize the undeniable linkage between action on the battlefield and actions in the government produced disastrous results. And finally, "...the political record suggests that even the most valid counterguerrilla tactics provided transitory victory that gained victory only when exploited politically by the ruler's putting his own house in order".

The third theoretical concept of our framework concerns time and will, and their closely related components of persistence and moral factors. The overwhelming presence of the factor of will on both sides in guerrilla warfare weights the importance of the moral domain. Guerrilla war indeed becomes a battle of will. It has become commonly accepted that the guerrilla uses time to affect will and therefore time is on his side. Our case studies demonstrate that the counterguerrilla force must
also know how to use time and all the factors that affect how much time he has. The guerrilla needs time to build strength in his organization, supplies, equipment, arms, and support for his cause. The common approach has been to deny him the time to grow strong through quick, violent, large-scale conventional attack. As evidenced by the case studies, this approach more often yielded inadequate results. The acknowledgment that time can and must be used to combat the guerrilla is essential to success. Our successful counterguerrillas were willing, either at the outset or later on, to invest the time necessary to defeat the guerrillas. Time, however, or persistence, only becomes an ally when it does not erode will internationally, at home and within the country where the operations are taking place.

Will is directly associated with time. The guerrilla attempts to create a situation where the will or support of the population is behind his efforts. He depends on the population to support his efforts, both physically in terms of food and supplies, and morally in terms of support for his cause. The importance of the maintenance of a sufficient "supply" of will is summed up by Valeriano: "If the guerrilla does not meet an enemy who has an equally firm commitment to victory, who has equal dedication, equal will to persevere in a sustained, relentless, and usually very unpleasant effort against seemingly insuperable odds, the guerrilla will win."\(^{75}\) The results, as evidenced by the case studies, clearly support this statement.

To harness the factor of will, the successful counterguerrilla used many tools. Regardless, the degree of success, perceived or actual, in the eyes of the population was what mattered most. To affect this, effective control of the media is essential. Psychological
operations and propaganda become as important as guns. A battle is waged for the protection of public opinion, the prevention of manipulation, and the manipulation of the other. The counterguerrilla must demonstrate his support of the people and provision for their protection. He attempts to beat the guerrillas at their own game, not by imitating their tactics, but by winning the population faster and dramatizing concern for the people. He demonstrates moral superiority and attempts to satisfy the aspirations of the governed and show great concern for their welfare. Above all, however, these efforts must be combined with military victory for overall success.

The fourth theoretical concept of our framework deals with initiative and leadership. While Airland Battle refers to initiative as one of its four tenets, in the context of counterguerrilla operations initiative steps up to a higher plane. Unsuccessful counterguerrillas were forced to fight on terms dictated by the guerrillas. Successful counterguerrillas forced the enemy to fight on their terms and forced them into making mistakes. In other words, successful counterguerrillas gained and maintained the initiative. Initiative did not require the search for a decisive battle. On the contrary, it required only that the counterguerrilla dictated to the guerrilla more than the guerrilla dictated to him. Initiative requires actions that are proactive, not reactive. Successful counterguerrillas from our case studies were proactive.

To maintain the initiative, two additional factors recur as critical: intelligence and mobility. Success on either side belonged to the one better able to obtain critical information concerning his enemy, while at the same time denying the enemy information about himself. This sounds almost too simple to put in a theoretical
framework, but there is no denying its place as a factor of success. Only through special emphasis on tactical methods and techniques to ensure those conditions are satisfied, will initiative be on the side of the counterguerrillas.

Intelligence implies more than knowledge of the enemy's intentions. It consists of an analysis of all factors affecting the situation: geography, tribal structure, religion, customs, language, politics, economics, standards, etc. Finally, it consists of the determination of guerrilla strengths and weaknesses. Proper determination of these strengths and weaknesses will preclude underestimation by the counterguerrilla.

The second factor of initiative is mobility. Mobility is an acknowledged cornerstone of guerrilla theory. In the counterguerrilla context, efforts have often been made to deny the guerrilla mobility by employing large conventional forces to track him and block his movements. In contrast, what emerges from the case studies is a necessary emphasis on mobility within the counterguerrilla force itself. Mobility equal to or greater than that of the enemy denied him sanctuary and infiltrated his intelligence and support mechanisms. The counterguerrilla must understand that superior mobility sometimes comes from the feet as opposed to highly mechanized forces.

Leadership's existence as an element of combat power as identified in the current edition of FM 100-5 becomes magnified in the context of guerrilla warfare. Almost without exception, the victorious side in a guerrilla conflict has had a dominating force behind the implementation of the appropriate tactics. In Malaya, it was the likes of Templer and Briggs. In the Philippines, it was Magsaysay who provided the leadership necessary for the counterguerrillas to defeat the guerrillas. Stalin was
the dominant force in the Ukraine, coupled with the
direction provided by the unified, totalitarian government
of the Soviet Union.

When the counterguerrillas were unsuccessful,
dominant, effective leadership was present on the opposing
side. The Communist Chinese, for example, had Mao Tse-
tung. T. E. Lawrence provided the direction for the Arabs
in the Middle East during World War I and it was Ho Chi
Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap who led the Communists to victory
over the French in Indochina.

In addition to the presence of a dominant charismatic
individual, leadership was evident in the successful
counterguerrilla operations at the lower levels. Allowed
the freedom associated with decentralized operations, the
leadership of individuals at the lowest tactical levels
working within the overall commander's intent came to the
fore in the successful cases examined. Critical decisions
were made at these low levels denying the guerrilla the
freedom of action that results from delay. This is not
unlike what we hope will occur as conditions on the modern
battlefield force us to rely on the initiative and
leadership abilities of small unit commanders.

The final concept that forms our framework is that of
the need to isolate the guerrilla from his sources of both
internal and external physical support. He must deny the
guerrilla supply routes and bases. We have already
addressed the importance of internal support in the
discussion concerning will and the moral domain. Isolation
of the guerrilla from the local population further denies
him support in the form of food and supplies.

A critical factor in the successful case studies was
the ability of the counterguerrilla forces to cut off the
guerrillas external supply or otherwise alienate the
guerrilla from the international forum. To be successful, the counterguerrilla must direct a considerable amount of energy to denying the guerrilla sources of physical support. Failure of the counterguerrilla to isolate the guerrilla and deny external support was critical to the success of the guerrillas in each of the case studies. Mao used arms and equipment supplied by the United States ultimately to turn the tables on the Nationalist government. Ho Chi Minh and Giap received extensive support from the Communist Chinese in the latter stages of the war with the French. Lawrence was supplied by the British from bases established along the Red Sea.

Having shown how the theoretical concepts describe and explain counterguerrilla warfare, what remains is whether these concepts are succinct, supportable and retrodictive. This theoretical framework is certainly succinct. The five concepts adequately describe and explain counterguerrilla warfare. Additionally, they are supportable. They were distilled from an in-depth examination of case studies taken from counterguerrilla operations of widely varying natures. These concepts were not isolated observations, but rather appeared as commonalities throughout the study. The matrix at figure 1 encapsulates these findings.

The final criterion to be applied to the theoretical framework is that of "retrodiction". Due to the relationship of this criterion to current and future events, discussion has been reserved for the "implications" section of this paper, which follows. Current realities, i.e., United States military involvement in the Persian Gulf, lend themselves neatly to a discussion of the "retrodictive" quality of this framework.
**FIGURE 1: CONCEPT/CASE STUDY MATRIX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Concept Case Studies</th>
<th>Nature of War; Adaptation</th>
<th>Political/ Military Unity of Effort</th>
<th>Moral Domain and Moral Endurance</th>
<th>Initiative and Leadership</th>
<th>Isolation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* MALAYSIA</td>
<td>Recognized nature of war; Adapted from conventional methods</td>
<td>Use of Police; Coord Committees; Soldier/ Stalasen</td>
<td>Resettlement; Incentives, Bribery, Amnesty; Spt of Population</td>
<td>Intel &amp; Mobility; Small Unit Action; Patrol/Scout; Templar/Briggs</td>
<td>Resettlement; Denied Internal &amp; External Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* PHILIPPINES</td>
<td>Recognized nature of war; Adapted from conventional methods</td>
<td>Unified Pol/Hil Effort; Mil Action United w/ Pol Arm</td>
<td>Protection of Peasants; Land to Landless; Invest Time; Amnesty/Bribe</td>
<td>Intel &amp; Mobility; Small Unit Action; Patrol/Scout; Magsaysay</td>
<td>Denied Internal &amp; External Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* UKRAINE</td>
<td>Recognized nature of war; Adapted from conventional methods</td>
<td>Totalitarian Control; PSYOPS; Control of Media; Willing to Invest Time</td>
<td>Propaganda; Counterbands; Stalin</td>
<td>Repression; Isolated Guerrillas from Western Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** MIDDLE EAST</td>
<td>Failed to Recognize Nature of War; Didn’t Adapt Conv Methods</td>
<td>Pure Nil Solution; No Political Solution Attempted</td>
<td>Arab Vulnerabilities (Bribes &amp; Treachery) Not Exploited</td>
<td>Failed to Use Mobility; Gave Up Tac/Strategic Initiative; Lawrence</td>
<td>Failed to Cut External Support; Failed to Deny Bases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** CHINA</td>
<td>Failed to Recognize Nature of War; Conv Methods Failed; No Adaptation</td>
<td>Unstable Political Situation; All Action Strictly Military</td>
<td>Alienated Peasants; Poor Intel &amp; Mobility; Always Defending; Mao</td>
<td>Poor Intel &amp; Mobility; Over Extension caused Defense; Ho Chi Minh &amp; Giap</td>
<td>Failed to Cut External Support; Drive Population to Communists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** INDOCHINA</td>
<td>Failed to Recognize Nature of War; Underestimated Enemy; Didn’t Adapt Conv Methods</td>
<td>Lack of Pol/Hil Interface; No Political Aim</td>
<td>Too Much, Too Fast; Over Extension</td>
<td>Poor Intel &amp; Ltd Mobility; Over Extension caused Defense; Ho Chi Minh &amp; Giap</td>
<td>External Support Never Denied; Gov’t Action Drive Pop Population to Guerrillas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Counterguerrilla Success Factors
** Counterguerrilla 'Missed Opportunities’
SECTION V (IMPLICATIONS)

A retrodictive theory has application in current reality. It explains the past and present, and suggests trends for the future. Operation "Desert Shield", the name given to the current involvement of U. S. military forces in the Persian Gulf, offers an excellent example for us to determine if the theoretical framework is retrodictive. Even today, prior to the advent of a shooting war between the United States and Iraq, guerrilla warfare is being conducted in that theater. The Kuwaitis are waging a limited guerrilla war against Iraqi forces forward deployed in Kuwait. That these efforts are achieving any success at all should be cause for concern to all military forces.

As an invading army, Iraq has located itself in a hostile environment. Despite suppressive efforts, they have found it impossible to eradicate the Kuwaiti guerrillas receiving limited support from the United States. It is doubtful that the Iraqis anticipated the problem they are facing confronted by this poorly organized group of guerrillas fighting for a cause more important to them than death. By now they must know that any further advance into unfriendly territory will result in guerrilla activity that will certainly have an impact.

But what about the other side of the coin? What would happen if the United States and its allies were to invade Iraq in order to oust the Iraqis from Kuwait or even to continue the status quo? Is the United States prepared to fight the type of warfare that it would face on the other side of the Saudi Arabian border? Is the United States military even anticipating the threat accompanying an advance into hostile territory? The answers to these questions are difficult, but that does not mean they should be brushed aside.
The potential for guerrilla action against our armed forces can take many forms. Invasion by our forces across the Saudi Arabian border exposes us to a guerrilla threat in the form of the population of Iraq. Iraqi conventional forces themselves are likely to employ guerrilla tactics. The threat does not end there. Palestinian groups hostile to United States presence in the region pose a guerrilla threat to our forces whether we advance from current positions on the border or not. Support for our presence is by no means unanimous.

Even in the continuation of the status quo we are not immune to the guerrilla threat. There are many groups within the "friendly" boundaries of Saudi Arabia that are currently dissatisfied with their own government, both in its form (monarchical/totalitarian), and in its request for United States assistance. Again, support for our current efforts is not total, even within the confines of the Saudi Arabian borders.

Returning to the theoretical concepts, the question remains as to whether they are retrodictive or not. Accepting the fact that allied forces in the Middle East face the possibility of guerrilla warfare, the answer lies in the concepts' relevance to the current scenario. One at a time, I will analyze the concepts in terms of our current reality.

The situation confronted by our soldiers and Marines as we cross the border and become an "invading" army and is certainly one that will require determination of the nature of the guerrilla threat. The conventional threat has already been accurately assessed by the armed forces. The nature of the guerrilla threat must be equally assessed prior to the development of methods to defeat it. Once this has been accomplished, conventional methods, perhaps
those prescribed by the current edition of FM 90-8, *Counterguerrilla Operations*, must be adapted to meet the situation at hand.

That the political situation will determine the military application of force cannot be argued. The political aim must determine the implementation of all counterguerrilla operations. Military action cannot be taken without regard to this political reality and the degree to which unity of effort will determine the outcome.

In the broader context of conventional war, time and will are apparent factors. The conflict can only be sustained if the American people, the international forum and the Arab nations of the Middle East have the will to continue. This will carries into the counterguerrilla operations that must be conducted to defeat the threat. Only through persistence and the willingness to employ a slow, methodical approach will success be achieved.

The local population in the area of the invasion cannot be written off as sympathetic to the guerrilla cause. Gains in the moral domain of war are to be reaped. We must remember that the local population has been suffering tremendously as a consequence of United Nations sponsored embargoes. The opportunity presents itself for counterguerrilla forces to win the battle of wills by exploiting the deprived condition of the masses.

Once guerrilla attacks commence, our counterguerrilla forces must gain and maintain the initiative. It is doubtful, even if we desired, that we could employ large forces dedicated to the defeat of the guerrilla threat. Perhaps that is for the better since history has shown us that large, sweeping strikes at the air are fruitless. We must be willing to employ small, highly mobile forces to defeat the threat. It seems that our current light
divisions are well suited for this type of threat. In fact, they are trained for missions of this kind. However, with the exception of the 82d Airborne Division, there are no light forces in the theater at this time.

Initiative at the small unit level will be required. Decentralized operations will be critical. Decisions based on superior intelligence assets must be timely and made within the theater of operations. Only then can our counterguerrilla forces hope to achieve the degree of success necessary to allow our conventional forces to focus on the conventional threat.

Guerrillas operating against our forces in the Persian Gulf will rely on support from both internal and external sources. We could expect them to receive supplies from sympathetic Arabs throughout the region, especially from Jordan. We must be aware of this vulnerability and be prepared to exploit it.

Finally, one additional "so what" factor, alluded to earlier, exists for a study of this nature. The modern battlefield is becoming extraordinarily large due to the high degree of lethality of modern weapons. Units must disperse to survive and concentrate only just prior to the attack to ensure proper mass at the point of decision. This dispersion requires a great deal of confidence in junior leaders as small units will be acting autonomously for extended periods of time. These conditions are frighteningly similar to those I have been discussing for two reasons. First, a common guerrilla tactic is dispersion, concentration and dispersion again, precisely what conventional units will be doing on the battlefield. Secondly, dispersed small units are exactly what the guerrilla likes to find and mass against. If we do not understand guerrilla tactics and theory, and also
counterguerrilla tactics and theory, we may be quite surprised at what confronts us.

SECTION VI (CONCLUSIONS)

Why is it important that a framework exists upon which counterguerrilla tactical doctrine should be developed? As long as the threat of guerrilla warfare exists, sound counterguerrilla doctrine is imperative. This doctrine must be grounded in theory in order to be effective. Tactics that emerge in reaction to the adversary do not allow for assumption of the initiative, but result in allowing the guerrilla to dictate the terms. As mentioned earlier, doctrine and tactics require direction. Theory provides this direction.

Guerrilla warfare is a very real form of warfare that has existed for thousands of years. Rather than being a form of warfare on the wane, it is warfare on the cheap. Guerrilla warfare is likely to be present on future battlefields, and the U.S. military must be prepared.

Guerrillas fight utilizing tactics which fall neatly under a well-developed, evolutionary theory of guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla theory forms the foundation which serves as a guiding light to all actions taken by the guerrilla on the battlefield. Adherence to these principles produces victory against a reacting enemy while deviation results in defeat. There are a multitude of factors in play when guerrilla warfare appears on the battlefield and the interaction of these factors produce an infinite number of possible outcomes. It is impossible to predict the outcome precisely, but it is possible to determine counterguerrilla factors which increase the likelihood of victory for counterguerrilla forces.

While there is no cookie-cutter solution to the
problems posed by guerrilla warfare, through critical
analysis of history certain theoretical concepts emerge
that may be used to form a framework upon which
counterguerrilla tactical doctrine should be developed.
These concepts stand well against the test of a valid
theory of counterguerrilla warfare. The elements of the
theoretical framework upon which counterguerrilla tactical
doctrine should be developed are as follows:

The first thing that must be understood is the nature
of the war being fought. Only then can it be accurately
assessed so that the proper actions can be taken. Once the
nature of the war has been determined, there is no chapter
or appendix to turn to in any manual that will prescribe
precisely the actions that must be taken to attain victory.
What has been determined is that the ability to adapt or
alter one's tactics to fit the nature of the conflict often
determines the side that will be victorious.

As in all forms of war, the fact that guerrilla war is
a continuation of politics by other means, must never be
forgotten. Sound counterguerrilla tactical doctrine must
bear in mind that politics and the application of military
force are bound together, especially in guerrilla warfare
where the presence of an overwhelming amount of moral
factors constantly threatens to force the situation out of
control. Unity of effort, political and military, is
critical to the success of counterguerrilla forces.

Time and will comprise the third theoretical concept
of our framework. Time does not have to be on the side of
the guerrilla. In fact, the counterguerrilla forces able
to use time to their own benefit, choosing the time and
place for action, were able to defeat the guerrillas. Time
impacts many things, but none as severely as the factor of
will. The guerrilla uses space to yield time, and time to
strengthen will. The counterguerrilla must use time to
defeat the will of the guerrilla, while gaining the support
of the people, their own country and the international
forum. Doing too much, too fast, for the sake of putting a
quick end to the conflict, has been shown to produce
devastating results.

Initiative and leadership form the basis for the
fourth theoretical concept of our framework. It is
critical that the counterguerrilla not play into the hand
of the guerrilla. On the contrary, the counterguerrilla
must force the guerrilla into a reactionary mode. He must
force the guerrilla to make mistakes. He can do this only
by gaining and maintaining the initiative. He must dictate
to the guerrilla more than the guerrilla dictates to him.
Outstanding leadership produced outstanding results in
counterguerrilla operations. In every case, a leader
emerged who was able to bend and shape his tactics to fit
the situation and combine the political and military
machinery into a unified whole.

The final concept pertains to physical support. The
guerrilla is normally the weaker of the adversaries and
highly vulnerable. As such, he requires support from
someone to sustain his efforts. Normally, this is a strong
third party. The guerrilla must be denied access to these
third parties, for without external support he does not
have a chance of victory.

Guerrilla warfare is both real and unique. By the
same token, counterguerrilla warfare is real and unique.
Rarely will the application of tactics and techniques be
successful unless they are modified to fit the specific
circumstances of the conflict. There is no one set of
procedures that will work against guerrillas. Every
conflict was, and will be, different. It is therefore
important to understand the theoretical framework of
counterguerrilla doctrine so that it may shed light on any
situation. In the words of Clausewitz, this theoretical
framework will light the path down which the
counterguerrilla must travel to be victorious.
APPENDIX A: Evolution of Counterguerrilla Doctrine

The United States military has had extensive experience with guerrilla warfare. Still, guerrilla warfare is regarded as something special, and not a part of "normal" operations. During the Eisenhower years (1952-1960), for example, there was a preoccupation with the belief that the country's nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter most wars and end favorably those it could not. This belief was prevalent among the administration's top officials despite senior army officers' thoughts otherwise. Army Chief of Staff Matthew B. Ridgway continued to fight during his tenure for an expanded role for the Army in this age of nuclear weapons. A position paper prepared by the U.S. Strategic Operations Force Far East in 1957 concluded that there was a definite requirement for a doctrine concerning unconventional warfare support for the Army. In 1958, Army Chief of Staff Maxwell D. Taylor clamored for an army capable of handling wars on the limited side of the scale, to include counterguerrilla operations.

In fact, in 1960, Army Chief of Staff Lyman Lemnitzer recommended that the MAAG in Vietnam shift its emphasis to antiguerilla warfare training. As General Maxwell Taylor later expressed it, "While conceding the need to deal with so-called brush-fires, the [Eisenhower] Administration operated on the highly dubious assumption that if armed forces were prepared to cope with nuclear war, they could take care of all lesser contingencies."

Still, there was a hesitancy within the Army to depart from what it considered to be traditional combat missions, or conventional warfare. Guerrilla warfare was considered to be an aberration, or "sideshow", to regular conventional
warfare. The problem in dealing with guerrilla warfare, however, is more than a matter of personalities and misconceptions. A great part of the inability to accept this type of warfare and deal with it lies in the heart of the American people. A quote from Alexander Buchsbajew makes clear the problem the United States has in dealing with something other than a conventional war:

...to many Americans war is a form of crusade, where decision must be reached as soon as possible, as well as a nasty job which must be finished as soon as possible, especially when the army consists of conscripted citizen-soldiers and where the whole society is involved. No wonder that there is no patience or taste, in the American context, for a protracted war, which demands patience and more sophisticated techniques than firepower, where stratagem, cunning and deception are at a premium."

The back-seat status of guerrilla warfare changed suddenly when John F. Kennedy became president. Kennedy had become interested in counterguerrilla warfare as a congressman and senator, and brought this interest with him to the White House. He considered the guerrilla threat to be the most active and constant threat to the free world's security. The age of strict reliance on nuclear supremacy was coming to a close and Kennedy was attempting to restructure military thinking to deal with this "new" and dangerous threat. There was considerable activity within the military as the services attempted to comply with Kennedy's directive and develop a coherent doctrine for the conduct of counterguerrilla warfare. Volumes of material were written in professional journals, but no real action taken in the area of doctrinal publications.

By 1964, the Army was still struggling for doctrine and structure. Counterinsurgency/counterguerrilla doctrine had been pushed into the system by Kennedy from the top. Therefore, there was no real foundation of theoretical understanding or acceptance built from within
the military institution. There was no evolution of counterguerrilla warfare derived through an examination of its history. There was no understanding based on the development of a theory of counterguerrilla operations. There was only an order from the top and the imminent threat of fighting this type of war in Southeast Asia.

Doctrinal manuals from 1960 to the present version of FM 90-8 prescribe tactics to defeat the guerrilla but have not been and are not founded on a coherent theory of counterguerrilla warfare. This is not surprising when we consider that the U.S. military has no "published" theory of war in general. A sampling of this doctrine follows. The sampling serves to illustrate the absence of a coherent theoretical basis, and even the lack of continuity in the ability to give counterguerrilla operations proper recognition.

(1) FM 31-15, Operations Against Airborne Attack, Guerrilla Action and Infiltration, 1953, addressed the guerrilla threat to the rear areas of conventional forces, but no more, with little assistance as to how to deal with it. In 1961, this manual was superseded by FM 31-15, Operations Against Irregular Forces, a manual which, until that time, carried the number FM 31-20. In 1967, it was rescinded without replacement.

(2) FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations, 1963 and 1967, was the forerunner of our current counterguerrilla doctrine. The 1967 version of FM 31-16 was rescinded in 1981. These documents contained much useful information concerning the threat and the use of military forces against it. In 1986, the Army published FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations. This current manual recognizes the distinction between the two types of guerrilla warfare, those in support of conventional forces
and those against insurgencies. As with the earlier versions, it prescribes tactics to be employed in particular situations but does not sufficiently emphasize the "why" and "for what purpose" aspects of counterguerrilla warfare. As a doctrinal manual, FM 90-8 is an excellent publication. However, there is no theoretical basis for its application."

(3) FM 31-20, Operations Against Guerrilla Forces, 1951, addressed how to use conventional forces against the guerrilla threat. The information here was on the right track, but it failed to provide any real information as to the nature of the guerrilla threat and the overall purpose of counterguerrilla operations. In 1961, the title of this manual was changed to Special Forces Operational Techniques, with information focused on the friendly use of guerrilla type forces. This manual was updated in 1965 and 1971. In 1977, it merged with FM 31-21 becoming FM 31-20, Special Forces Operations(C). This was a classified manual containing much the same type of information. A final version was published in 1990."

(4) FM 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare, 1955, covered the use of friendly guerrilla warfare and included a surprising amount of information on anti-guerrilla operations in support of conventional forces as well as counterguerrilla operations in general. Unfortunately, the updated version, FM 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations, 1958, deleted references to counterguerrilla operations entirely. This manual was revised in 1961 with little change. In 1965, its title changed to Special Forces Operations with revisions in 1969 and 1974. As previously mentioned, it merged with FM 31-20 in 1977 and became a classified publication dealing with special forces techniques."
APPENDIX B: Counterguerrilla Case Studies, Supplemental Information

The purpose of this appendix is to expand upon the case studies presented in the text of the monograph. It is not intended to be an in-depth study of the cases presented, but rather it provides supplemental information.

MALAYA

The first successful counterguerrilla operation to be analyzed occurred in Malaya. It was fought between the Malayan Communist Party and the British between 1947 and 1960. Guerrillas who fought against Japanese occupation, with British support, during World War II turned their attention to the British. Following the surrender of the Japanese, Britain returned looking for business as usual in their pre-war colony. What they found was a strong Communist party to contend with and animosity among the three largest ethnic groups in the country (Malays, Chinese and Indians). In addition, the government found themselves saddled with political problems.

Chen P'ing, the leader of the Communists subscribed to Mao's threefold plan: (1) a limited guerrilla phase in conjunction with organization and propaganda activities; (2) an expansion phase with the development of popular bases in towns and villages; and (3) a consolidation phase marked by conversion of guerrilla units to conventional army forces with the goal of defeating the government's regular forces.

While the British ultimately defeated the Communist guerrillas, their initial efforts failed. These efforts were characterized by an inability to comprehend the nature of the war they were conducting. Conventional military tactics brought miserable results. The British sought a
battle of decision with the elusive guerrillas which was never to come. Commanders with World War II battle experience displayed tremendous difficulty in adjusting from World War II tactics. They soon found out, however, that small unit actions brought results. They employed teams consisting of a handful of highly trained soldiers who had mobility equal to that of the guerrillas. These teams were able to work in close concert with the local officials, safeguarding the population and obtaining critical intelligence concerning guerrilla dispositions. Additionally, these teams were allowed to conduct decentralized operations within the overall commander's intent to accomplish timely response to guerrilla action.20

While the effort against the guerrillas began to show progress with the small team concept, real progress came for the British upon implementation of the Briggs Plan. Designed by Sir Henry Briggs, the plan was centered around gaining the population's support and denying it to the enemy. His plan was to dominate the populated areas and acquire information from the populace. He therefore isolated the guerrillas from their source of food and supplies. As a further measure of isolating the guerrillas, he transplanted over 500,000 Chinese squatters to "new villages". In this resettlement, he gave the squatters something to lose.21 In the analogy of Mao, he denied the water to the fish.21 Briggs established coordinating committees to ensure unity of command at all levels consisting of civil authorities, police and military. This resulted in timely intelligence exchange and little duplication of effort.21

Excellent leadership continued when in 1952 General Sir Gerald Templer arrived on the scene. In Templer, soldier and statesman were embodied in one man. He was the
High Commissioner and Director of Operations. Allowed by the British government to be a virtual dictator in order to eradicate the guerrillas, Templer ensured all military action was coordinated with the overall political aim. Clausewitz recognized the utility of this joining of soldier and statesman many years ago, referring to it as an ideal solution to the problem of coordinating military action with the political object.

Other factors contributing to counterguerrilla success in Malaya were:

1. Persistence. The British did not allow time to be on the side of the guerrillas. For thirteen years they maintained support of the home government, maintained favorable international support and continued to gain the trust and support of the population.

2. Intelligence. A superior intelligence effort was of critical importance. The Special Branch for intelligence was established and decisions regarding action based on this intelligence were made on the spot, not thousands of miles away. To gather intelligence, extensive use was made of active patrolling and scouting.

3. Incentives/bribery/amnesty. The greatest incentive the British provided the people was the promise of independence. Incentives do not have to be of that order, but the counterguerrilla must be prepared to offer the population more than the guerrilla. They gave the population the incentive of knowing that better times were coming. Increased benefits were provided to the people who registered with the British government. This was used as a tool to control the population. An effective amnesty program was implemented to recruit counterguerrilla fighters from the ranks of the Communists. Effective use of propaganda and control of the media resulted in the
denial of the people to the guerrillas.

(4) Local Police. Effective use was made of the local police force to safeguard the populace and control guerrilla movement. The army worked closely with the local militia to enable them to provide for their own security. This freed the British Army from defense duties far and wide. The decisive tactical element became the local police force. The military would stay within supporting distance to aid the police force when necessary.

(5) Support/Isolation. Not only did the British deny the support of the population in the moral sense, but isolation also caused food and supply problems for the starving guerrillas. The British also dealt effectively with the external support issue, denying the guerrillas support from third party countries.

(6) Pressure. The pressure exerted on the guerrillas through British persistence and their willingness to expend the amount of time necessary to complete the task, forced the guerrillas into action that aided their own defeat. Desperation resulted in the use of terror and extortion to garner support among the population which only served to alienate the peasants. The guerrillas were forced to act too quickly. They failed to recognize the proper time to step up activities and move between phases. They did not yet have sufficient support of the population to ensure adequate supply of manpower, supplies and arms.

PHILIPPINES
The second counterguerrilla successful operation was conducted by the government of the Philippines against the Communist Hukbalahaps (Huks) from 1946 to 1952. The Huks were another survivor of Japanese occupation following
World War II. Supported by the United States during the war, the Huks became a force to be reckoned with. They buried large amounts of arms and ammunition following the Japanese surrender and, in 1946, began a movement to overthrow the government of the Philippines. Success initially went to the Huks as the government proved unable to effectively deal with the situation. The Huks took advantage of a situation in the Philippines comprised of widespread poverty, political corruption and a need for land reform. In 1946 the Huks embarked on an attempt to overthrow the government promising "land for the landless". The Huks were strong, but not politically organized. Also, they required logistical and intelligence support of the population to survive. In addition, the Huks had to contend with communication over 6,000 miles of primitive country. After six long years of fighting, the government defeated the guerrillas. Success of the government can be attributed to a number of factors.

As in the case of Malaya, the counterguerrilla effort in the Philippines initially faltered as the government's tactics consisting of search and destroy techniques: heavy artillery and air strikes; terror; conventional, large unit operations; and, recon by fire, quite often missed their target and alienated the peasants. The use of small detachments to search out Huk leaders where they lived and execute them led the population to believe that the government was as bad as the Huks and drove the people to the guerrillas. In the words of Taruc, the Huk leader, "One thing seems clear: no country--least of all a Christian land--can defeat Communism by the use of un-Christian methods". Finally, there was no unity of effort between politics and military, and in the critical area of intelligence. The government failed to
recognize that their first mission was the protection of the people. They concentrated on the elimination of the threat without paying attention to the security and the rights of the governed. They failed to determine the nature of the conflict in which they were involved.  

After four years of faltering, a strong, confident, and competent leader emerged on the scene in the form of Ramon Magsaysay, who became Minister of National Defense in 1950. Magsaysay saw as his first mission the protection of the peasants. He took the Communist cry of "land for the landless" and made it the government's rallying cry. He taught the army to associate itself with the people, arrested the Politburo and Secretariat of the Communist Party in Manila and checked government corruption. By 1952, the Huks were beaten.

Magsaysay saw that conventional tactics were useless against the guerrillas and therefore resorted to unorthodox methods to fight them. He disguised his soldiers as Huks and infiltrated them to gather intelligence and expose guerrilla leaders. His soldiers booby-trapped "left behind" ammunition so that it exploded when fired. He staged mock battles to gain the friendship of the guerrillas and then discovered their bases. Stay-behind tactics were used after large unit sweeps in a given area to destroy the guerrillas as they emerged from hiding.

His use of small armed units to hunt guerrillas and nibble away at the Huks brought increased success. These same small units showed the presence of the government to the villagers resulting in increased intelligence. Mobile checkpoints were established to further disrupt guerrilla communications. Parallel patrols were used for mutual support and saturation patrols kept the guerrillas off balance. His tactics were
characterized by extreme mobility and an active role for the counterguerrillas.124

Additionally, Magsaysay established an amnesty program which brought disillusioned guerrillas to his camp, placed bounties on the heads of Huk leaders and used bribery extensively. He ended military terrorism and committed the bulk of the army to social work.125 Above all, he offered the guerrillas what they were fighting for, land.

Magsaysay effectively isolated the guerrillas from their sources of support, both internally and externally. They were short arms and supplies, safe areas and effective communications.126 His slow and methodical approach, effectively using time to his advantage, resulted in growing dissension in the ranks of the guerrillas. This in turn led to an increase in terrorist methods that began to alienate the population from the guerrillas.127 A good example was the guerrillas' execution of the popular widow of President Quezon which generated widespread wrath among the population.128 Clearly the guerrillas began reacting to Magsaysay and lost the tactical initiative.

UKRAINE

The final example of a successful counterguerrilla action was in the Western Ukraine, in an area also known as Galicia, between 1944 and 1948. The conflict occurred between the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists and the Soviet Union and Communist Poland.129 The West Ukrainian Republic was established in 1918. Prior to 1918 it was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in 1920 it was conquered by Poland and remained a part of Poland from 1920 to 1939. The small republic never lost its nationalistic fervor.130 In 1942, a nationalist movement under the control of the Organization of the Ukrainian
Nationalists (OUN) and its militant arm, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA), emerged to fight for independence. Since Poland was not a police state, the movement could grow. Terrorist acts and assassinations were staged to cause Poland to repress and upset the masses. In 1944, the Soviets gained control of the Western Ukraine and forcibly united it with Soviet Eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainians viewed this move as colonial oppression.

Under both the Poles and Soviets, economic problems, famine, starvation and unequal treatment beset the Ukrainians. In 1944, social problems looked likely to continue, so the Ukrainians decided to revolt, resorting to guerrilla warfare conducted by the UIA.

This particular guerrilla conflict is unusual in that it is one of the only movements of its kind to occur against a totalitarian regime. Stalinist Russia was not bound by the "rules" associated with the Judeo-Christian ethic. Viewed in that light, it is interesting to examine the effectiveness of unrestrained counterguerrilla actions.

Another interesting aspect of this particular case is that the Ukrainians did more right than wrong. They relied on proven guerrilla techniques and represented an entire population desiring freedom from Soviet and Polish rule and repression. They had a superior organization, made use of mobility, outflanking maneuver and avoidance of frontal assaults. They assaulted from different directions on narrow fronts and made extensive use of night operations. Their operations were carefully planned and they employed speed, surprise, deception, intelligence, secrecy and camouflage. Why then did the guerrillas fail? Or more significantly for our purposes, why were the counterguerrillas successful? According to Mao, Giap and Che Guevara, a well organized, trained, equipped and led
guerrilla army which enjoys the support of the masses cannot fail. The Ukraine showed the reverse. A quote from Buchsbajew serves to illustrate the advantages of a totalitarian state in dealing with guerrillas.

...the government which is prepared to employ repression efficiently, without scruples and on a vast scale, which is determined to carry on the struggle indefinitely, which is able to control its media and indoctrinate its public opinion, which manages to isolate the insurgents from the international forum, will invariably succeed. He contends that the ability to apply force must be combined with the will to use it in order for counterguerrilla action to be effective.

In addition to the above, the Soviets used many other techniques that emerge as commonalities in the case studies examined. They embarked on a resettlement campaign, years prior to that employed by the British in Malaya, to separate the actively hostile population from those that were merely sympathetic. They employed small units, or counterbands, to rout out the guerrillas and relied heavily on propaganda, psychological warfare, and intelligence gathering. They isolated the guerrillas from the international forum. Support the guerrillas were counting on from the West, never materialized. Blockades and other methods were employed to interdict the guerrillas' LOCs.

Unity of effort through strict civilian control of the military ensured the political goals were attained. The Soviets relied heavily on the use of the police to control the population so the military could concentrate on defeating the guerrillas. They did not expect to defeat the guerrillas overnight and were therefore prepared for a
long fight, denying the guerrillas the advantage of
time. They made certain that they did not underestimate
the guerrillas' capabilities nor overestimate their own.

The Soviets quickly learned that major military
operations were not effective; the small ones counted.
With small unit operations, the Soviets found they could
achieve a high ratio of contacts based on reliable
information. The more contacts they made, the more kills
they recorded. The more kills they recorded, the greater
the peoples' confidence in government's ability to rule.
This resulted in more and better information and the cycle
repeated itself until the guerrillas were defeated.

The next three cases illustrate unsuccessful
counterguerrilla operations. From these cases, we can
derive what might be called "missed opportunities" on the
part of the counterguerrillas which contributed to their
defeat. This is the indirect approach to the distillation
of counterguerrilla success factors.

MIDDLE EAST, 1917–1919

The first of these cases is T.E. Lawrence's guerrilla
operations in the Middle East Theater during World War I.
from 1917 to 1919. Lawrence, a young British intelligence
officer, became convinced that the best way to defeat the
Turks and the Ottoman Empire was through an Arab
uprising. The British army did not have the available
troops necessary to defeat the Turks. Most were tied up in
the European theater. This use of guerrillas was to be in
support of conventional troops operating in the area.
While most of Lawrence's superiors disagreed, Britain's
Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, and the chief
of British intelligence in Cairo, Major General Clayton,
encouraged Lawrence to pursue his idea.
Revolt broke out in the Hejaz in the summer of 1916 and succeeded only in taking a few Red Sea towns before grinding to a halt. Lawrence was sure that the failure of the revolt was due only to the lack of effective leadership and that his plan could still work.\textsuperscript{150} He found a strong leader among the Arabs and persuaded some top-ranking officials to provide much-needed arms and supplies to the Arabs. He was ordered to become advisor to Feisal and organize the guerrilla forces.\textsuperscript{151} From 1917 to 1919, Lawrence and his Arab guerrillas waged war against the Turks, wearing them down and preventing their control and domination of the Middle East.

Destruction of the enemy was not Lawrence's purpose and perhaps it was even beyond the means of the guerrillas. Turkish LOCs were the target. He saw that enemy casualties were not as critical as their assets, which were scarcer.\textsuperscript{152} He relied on will to repair numerical and material weaknesses and noted that the contest was not physical, but moral; battles were a mistake.\textsuperscript{153}

An ardent admirer of Clausewitz, he followed his dictum to attack the hub of all power and strength; attack the enemy's weak link and bear on it until the mass falls.\textsuperscript{154} He used highly mobile, highly equipped forces of the smallest size. Speed and time, not hitting power, secured victory.\textsuperscript{155} These forces were able to keep the enemy occupied while he destroyed their lifeline.\textsuperscript{156} Lawrence stretched the Turks and attacked their LOCs; he forced them to try to be strong everywhere and they became strong nowhere. For example, they spent half their force defending Medina and the other half to defend their LOCs and spent the rest of the war on the defensive.\textsuperscript{157}

Lawrence supplied the Arabs with a viable goal: national freedom/independence, and understood both friendly
and enemy capabilities, never underestimating his adversary. What he termed "perfect intelligence", was critical to the guerrillas' successes against the overextended Turkish forces. Lawrence's theory of guerrilla warfare boils down to five (5) essential elements. The guerrilla must:

1. have an unassailable base, guarded from attack or threat of attack. In Arabia he had this in the Red Sea ports, the desert, and the minds of the men converted to the Arab cause.

2. have a sophisticated alien enemy, in the form of a disciplined army of occupation, too small to cover all ground.

3. have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic (2% active, 98% sympathetic).

4. rely on speed and endurance, ubiquity and independence of arteries of supply.

5. possess the technical equipment to destroy or paralyze the enemy's communications.

Lawrence had these factors working for him in Arabia and the counterguerrilla failure can be said to be a result of the failure of the Turks to defeat them.

Another tactic Lawrence employed which the Turks could not counter was his unwillingness to attack or defend fixed points. Rather than employ the conventional tactic of gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy, Lawrence fought a war of detachment, not disclosing himself until the moment of attack. He and his Arab forces had intimate knowledge of the terrain. He invented special methods to suit the situation and always had a well thought out plan, explained to every member of the force.

Lawrence had his own insights as to why the Turks were unable to defeat him. These insights will be useful in our
discussion of successful counterguerrilla tactics, as Lawrence himself felt certain that if the Turks had adopted them, they could have been successful.

The Turks looked for an absolute war solution in a non-absolute war situation. If the Turks were willing to acknowledge that they were not fighting a conventional enemy and that adaptation of conventional tactics was required, they may have enjoyed greater success. The Turks had greater mobility in the desert in their armored cars mounted with machine guns. They failed to use active patrolling along their LOCs to deny the guerrillas a target and destroy them upon confrontation. They continued to employ massive waste, utilizing large, conventional forces to attack the guerrillas, often striking at air. A smaller approach may have reaped greater dividends. Finally, and perhaps most importantly according to Lawrence, the Turks failed to employ the potentially most effective methods of treachery and bribery to "buy" a few key people and stir up traitors within the rebellion.

CHINA

The second unsuccessful counterguerrilla case is that of the Communist Chinese versus both the Japanese invaders and the Nationalists from 1927 to 1949. Discussion of Mao and the revolution in China is abbreviated in this section due to the lengthy discussion of his theory, tactics and principles earlier. His use of guerrilla tactics and protracted war worked successfully against both the Nationalist Chinese from 1927-1937 and 1945-1949 and against the Japanese from 1937-1945. Victory came for the Communists in 1949 as Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government gave up the fight and fled to Taiwan.

In addition to the factors discussed earlier, it
cannot be denied that Mao provided outstanding leadership to the Communist effort, without which success would have been doubtful. Also, the Japanese invasion of China occurred at a time when the Nationalists were making important gains against the Communists. This interlude provided Mao and his movement with the time to build a supply of arms and equipment, continue his organizational efforts and continue his agitation among the masses against the Nationalist government.

The Japanese were guilty of a number of errors which contributed to their defeat at the combined hands of the Communists and the Nationalist government. Throughout the war they displayed an arrogance derived from success and the feeling of racial supremacy. Also, they allowed themselves to be harassed and irritated, tying up thousands of troops trying to protect their initial gains. Perhaps their biggest mistake, for a number of reasons, was their attack on Pearl Harbor which drained off a tremendous amount of their resources and gained them a formidable enemy. As were the Nationalists close to victory when the Japanese invasion occurred, so too were the Japanese when they embarked on their attack of Pearl Harbor.

The Nationalist Chinese were also guilty of arrogance and underestimation of their enemy's capabilities. As Mao was gaining strength, they dismissed him and the rest of the Communist Chinese as bandits. National instability in the government helped Mao garner support. Bandit suppression campaigns utilizing massive conventional strikes exhausted the troops as they continually were striking at air, allowing themselves to be lured into battle and destroyed on Mao's own terms. These tactics alienated the government from the people and drove them into Mao's camp.
INDOCHINA

The final unsuccessful counterguerrilla case occurred in Indochina from 1946 to 1954. French colonial interests in Indochina date back to the mid-nineteenth century. Their rule, however, was largely ineffective and life in Indochina was filled with poverty and dissension for the Malays, Chinese and Indians who had settled the region centuries before. Upon the capitulation of France in 1940, the Japanese saw an excellent opportunity to gain a foothold in the region for use to cut the Chinese off from the south and as a foothold to the rest of Indochina and to Indonesia and the Philippines. The Japanese left the French government in place as a puppet government but were clearly in control. The French encouraged nationalism among the people, a concept that would eventually come back to haunt them.

In 1945, the Japanese ousted the French, declared the end of French rule completely, and declared the independence of Vietnam, retaining control of Cochin China to the south. This independence was short-lived, however, as the Japanese surrendered World War II just a few months later. Following the Japanese surrender, the French moved in to reestablish control of the country. The seeds of independence, however, had been sown.

Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap emerged as leaders of the Viet Minh, the largest and strongest of the resistance movements established during World War II, with designs on a Communist, independent Vietnam. In fact, they were aided by the United States and Britain during the war to hamper Japanese operations in the area and provide intelligence to the Allies. Giap gained control of the north and declared the Democratic government of Vietnam. The British occupation force and the skeleton French force remaining in
the country refused to grant the Viet Minh a toehold in the south and ejected them from Saigon. The stage was set for a conflict between the French, who had no intention of giving up their interests in the area, and the Communist Viet Minh.\footnote{181}

After eight years of fighting the French were unable to oust the Viet Minh from the north and the Geneva Accord was signed dividing the country officially at the 17th parallel. Ho Chi Minh controlled the north and Ngo Dinh Diem was brought in to head the government in the south. It was hoped that talks were to continue that would lead to eventual unification of Vietnam.\footnote{182} The counterguerrilla forces had been clearly defeated.

Throughout the conflict, the guerrillas enjoyed excellent external support, initially from the United States, and later from China.\footnote{183} While conducting guerrilla operations against the French forces, the Viet Minh, under Ho Chi Minh, continued to build a conventional army and continued to mobilize the population.\footnote{184} It was not a total success story for the guerrillas, however. They suffered early setbacks when they attempted to deviate from Mao's proven tactics by accelerating to conventional conflict too early and skipping the guerrilla phase almost entirely.\footnote{185} The Viet Minh leader in the south, Tran Van Giau, alienated the inspired nationalist feeling rather than harnessing it as Giap was doing in the north.\footnote{186}

Ho continuously extolled nationalism against the French and the promise of independence to arouse the masses and gain their support and used propaganda extensively and effectively.\footnote{187} He took special care to ensure the guerrillas treated the population properly and established a parallel government to demonstrate the movement's legitimacy to the people.\footnote{188} By 1948, guerrilla raids were
well organized and effective. Night operations, speed and surprise combined with accurate intelligence and a sympathetic population started the ball rolling which the French were unable to stop. Victory of the Communist Chinese in 1949 provided tremendous impetus to the guerrillas as it increased their availability of arms and supplies and provided them with a sanctuary to the north. By 1953, Giap had an estimated 7 divisions. This proved to be more fighting strength than that of the French, who had a great number of troops tied to the defense of outposts that they had established. Victory belonged to the guerrillas.

Why were the French unable to defeat the guerrillas? To begin with, they severely underestimated the opposition they would be facing in Vietnam, and never considered that there was anything more than mop-up operations to be conducted. The population was literally starving and the French did seemingly nothing, so the masses began to turn to the guerrillas for answers to their problems. Despite these problems, they did enjoy initial success with pacification efforts, the occupation and defense of important cities, protection of LOCs with strongpoints and dividing areas into small operational squares and clearing each methodically. However, little effort was made to use local authorities to assist in holding these areas. Whirlwind tactics were used in clearing the operational squares, characterized by constant mobility within zones, attacks, ambuses, patrols, searches, an established netted intelligence system and contact and assistance to the people.

French success faltered in 1947. They once again underestimated the Viet Minh's strength and tried to do too much, too fast. In October 1947, they conducted an all out
attack on Ho in Hanoi (good defensive terrain) and failed in their effort to capture Ho and the Viet Minh hierarchy. The advance did nothing but result in the French having a string of highly vulnerable outposts in the north.\textsuperscript{195} Their operations became a series of military actions without political impetus. They failed to see the political connection. The people of Vietnam really didn't care who was in charge of the country, they only wanted their needs taken care of by somebody. Communist or otherwise, and independence. The French failed to recognize this basic desire.\textsuperscript{196} They had promised independence and had no intention of granting it and it became obvious to the people.\textsuperscript{197}

Despite their setbacks, the French continued to believe that victory was near, although the Viet Minh were in control of a vast amount of the countryside.\textsuperscript{198} Their all out attacks destroyed peasant property and crops and alienated them.\textsuperscript{199} By 1953, the French in Vietnam had lost the support of the French people and government, and the support of the Vietnamese.\textsuperscript{200} Uncertainty of political aims throughout the war led to a lack of continuous and coherent military policy.\textsuperscript{201}
ENDNOTES


3. Ibid., p.131.


5. The criteria used to determine the adequacy of a theory were formulated by Mr. James Schneider, School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. Mr. Schneider presented these criteria to Seminar One during Course 1-1 of the Theory block of instruction on 26 Jun 90.

6. Ibid.


8. Ibid., p.538.


10. The Army had direct experience with enemies employing guerrilla tactics in the Indian Wars, the Seminole War, the Philippines in 1899 and with Pancho Villa on the Mexican border. The Marines faced guerrillas in Nicaragua, Cuba, Panama, Haiti and Santo Domingo from 1900 to 1920. More recently, the military has had experience with guerrillas as advisors in the Philippines in 1949 and direct experience in Vietnam from 1964 to 1972.


13. Ibid., p.135.


22. Ibid., p.868.


25. Bowman, p.43.


27. Bowman, p.42.

28. Asprey, p.871.

29. Ibid., pp.864-5.

30. Ibid., pp.824-5.

31. Ibid., p.822.

32. Ibid., p.830.

33. Bowman, p.41.

34. Asprey, p.822.

35. Ibid., p.831.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., p.829.

38. Ibid.


40. Buchsbajew, p.169.

41. Ibid., p.169.

42. Ibid., p.331.

43. Ibid., p.315.

44. Ibid., p.325.

45. Ibid., pp.56-7.

47. Ibid., p.169.
48. Ibid., p.34.
50. Ibid., p.351.
51. Asprey, p.280.
52. T. E. Lawrence, "The Evolution of a Revolt", CSI reprint from Army Quarterly and Defense Journal, October 1920, United Kingdom, p.22.
53. Asprey, p.286.
54. Ibid., p.290.
55. Ibid., p.291.
56. Ibid., p.291.
57. Ibid., p.381.
58. Ibid., p.378.
59. Ibid., p.625.
60. Ibid., p.740.
61. Ibid., p.887.
62. Ibid., p.889.
63. Ibid., p.776.
64. Ibid., p.877.

65. The "moral domain" of battle is one of three domains of battle studied at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. The other domains of battle are the "cybernetic" and the "physical". The moral domain deals with the intangible moral factors that contribute to the fog and friction of war. Some of these intangibles are troop morale, exertion, the will to fight, personalities, ability to act in the face of personal danger and fatigue.


68. Asprey, p.xii.
69. Ibid., p.37.


71. Clausewitz, p.87.
72. Ibid., p.608.
73. Greene, p.v.
74. Asprey, p.xii.
75. Valeriano, p.3.
76. Ibid., p.27.
77. Ibid., p.28.
78. The purpose of this appendix is to expand upon the references to the evolution of counterguerrilla doctrine presented in the body of this paper. Some of the information I present is redundant, but it is included because it is necessary to provide continuity to the discussion.
79. The Army had direct experience with enemies employing guerrilla tactics in the Indian Wars, the Seminole War, the Philippines in 1899 and with Pancho Villa on the Mexican border. The Marines faced guerrillas in Nicaragua, Cuba, Panama, Haiti and Santo Domingo from 1900 to 1920. More recently, the military has had experience with guerrillas as advisors in the Philippines in 1949 and direct experience in Vietnam from 1964 to 1972.
80. Bowman, p.76.
82. Bowman, p.69.
84. Bowman, p.69.
85. Ibid., p.80.
86. Buchsbajew, pp.310-11.
87. Bowman, p.81.
88. Ibid., p.83.
89. Ibid., p.135.
90. Ibid., p.179.


95. Bowman, p. 42.
96. Asprey, p. 859.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid., pp. 864-5.
99. Bowman, p. 43.

100. Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, p. 44.
101. Asprey, p. 867.
102. Ibid., p. 868.
103. Clausewitz, p. 111.
104. Asprey, p. 871.
105. Ibid., p. 863.
106. Ibid., p. 867.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid., pp. 869-70.
110. Asprey, p. 861.
111. Ibid., p. 819.
112. Ibid., p. 820.
113. Ibid., p. 821.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid., pp. 824-5.
116. Ibid., p. 826.
117. Ibid., p. 827.
118. Ibid., p.822.
119. Ibid., p.830.
120. Ibid., p.831.
121. Ibid., p.830.
122. Bowman, p.41.
123. Asprey, p.829.
124. Ibid., p.830.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
130. Ibid., p.16.
131. Ibid., p.19.
132. Ibid., p.16.
134. Ibid., p.78.
135. Ibid., p.315.
136. Ibid., p.331.
137. Ibid., p.169.
138. Ibid., p.34.
139. Ibid., p.57.
140. Ibid., pp.56-7.
142. Ibid., p.351.
143. Ibid., p.315.
144. Ibid., p.325.
146. Ibid., p.351.
147. Ibid., p.331.
148. Asprey, p.280.
149. Ibid.
150. Ibid.
151. Ibid., pp.281-3.
152. Ibid., p.285.
153. Ibid., pp.286-7.
154. Lawrence, p.12.
155. Lawrence, p.13.
156. Asprey, p.289.
157. Lawrence, p.4.
158. Asprey, p.289.
159. Lawrence, p.10.
160. Ibid., p.22.
161. Lawrence, p.3.
162. Lawrence p.10.
163. Lawrence, p.15.
164. Lawrence, pp.17,20.
165. Asprey, p.286.
166. Ibid., p.291.
167. Ibid., p.290.
168. Ibid., p.291.
169. Ibid., p.398.
170. Ibid.
171. Ibid., p.400.
172. Ibid., p.378.
173. Ibid.
174. Ibid., p.380.
175. Ibid.
176. Ibid., p.621.
177. Ibid., p.615.
178. Ibid., p.621.
179. Ibid., p.622.
180. Ibid., pp.623-4.
181. Ibid., p.625.
182. Ibid., pp.904-5.
183. Ibid., p. 742.
184. Ibid., p. 761.
185. Ibid., p. 765.
186. Ibid., p. 767.
187. Ibid., pp. 769-70.
188. Ibid., pp. 722-3.
189. Ibid., p. 755.
190. Ibid., p. 777.
191. Ibid., pp. 875, 877.
192. Ibid., p. 740.
193. Ibid., p. 741.
194. Ibid., p. 751.
195. Ibid., p. 752.
196. Ibid., p. 753.
197. Ibid., p. 761.
198. Ibid., p. 760.
199. Ibid., p. 776.
200. Ibid., p. 887.
201. Ibid., p. 889.
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