Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments

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Summary

Since 2000, the U.S. military has been building up forward-deployed forces on the westernmost U.S. territory of Guam to increase U.S. presence, deterrence, and power projection for potential responses to crises and disasters, counterterrorism, and contingencies in support of South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, or elsewhere in Asia. Since 2006, three joint exercises based at Guam called “Valiant Shield” have boosted U.S. military readiness in the Asian-Pacific region. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate. China still has concerns about Guam’s buildup, suspecting it to be directed against China. There has been concern that China and North Korea could target Guam with missiles. Still, Guam’s role increased in engaging with China’s military.

In 2006, the United States and Japan agreed on a Realignment Roadmap to strengthen their alliance, including a buildup on Guam to cost $10.3 billion, with Japan contributing 60%. Goals were to start the related construction on Guam by 2010 and to complete relocation of about 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. In Tokyo on February 17, 2009, the Secretary of State signed the bilateral “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents From Okinawa to Guam” that reaffirmed the “Roadmap” of May 1, 2006. The two governments agreed that of the estimated $10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development for the relocation, Japan will provide $6.09 billion, including up to $2.8 billion in direct cash contributions (in FY2008 dollars). The United States committed to fund $3.18 billion plus $1 billion for a road for a total of $4.18 billion.

However, completion of the marines’ relocation by 2014 would be unlikely, and the original realignment actually would have involved more than moving 8,000 marines to Guam. In September 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) became the ruling party. This political change raised uncertainty as Japan sought to re-negotiate the agreement, even while the United States sought its implementation. The dispute over the location on Okinawa of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) to replace the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma raised implications for the relocation of marines from Okinawa to Guam. Then, North Korea’s attack on South Korea’s naval ship Cheonan in March 2010, and China’s deployment of its Navy near Okinawa and confrontation with Japan’s forces in April, catalyzed Japan to resolve the dispute in favor of stronger deterrence in alliance with the United States. On May 28, the Secretaries of Defense and State and their counterparts in Japan issued a “2+2” Joint Statement, in which they reaffirmed the 2006 Roadmap and the 2009 Agreement. In September 2010, the Navy and Army issued a Record of Decision that deferred some decisions for Guam. Nonetheless, despite the dispute over the FRF, Japan has budgeted for direct contributions and loans for the marines’ relocation to Guam.

Since 2011, some Members, including Senator Jim Webb and Guam’s Delegate Madeleine Bordallo, have urged more attention to concerns that included Japan’s impasse, expanded costs, and the delay in the realignment even as the U.S. military presence and readiness remain critical. On May 11, 2011, Senators Carl Levin, John McCain, and Jim Webb called for a review of plans to restructure military forces in South Korea, Japan, and Guam. Finally, on February 8, 2012, the United States and Japan agreed to “adjust” the Roadmap and separate the move of marines from the plan for the FRF, in order to make progress separately. According to news reports, of 8,000 marines to transfer from Okinawa, only 4,700 could move to Guam. Legislation includes the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2012, P.L. 112-81. Updated as warranted, this CRS Report discusses major developments and policy issues related to the defense buildup.
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Strategic Significance of Guam for Defense Buildup

Guam is a U.S. territory long valued as strategically significant to U.S. forward deployments in the Western Pacific. In the Pacific Ocean, Hawaii is about 2,400 miles west of California, and Guam is about 3,800 miles further west of Hawaii. Guam has two important U.S. military bases: Apra Naval Base and Andersen Air Force Base. The island, three times the size of Washington, DC, is home to about 160,000 people, according to the 2010 Census. As the Defense Department faced increased tension on the Korean peninsula and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Pacific Command (PACOM) began in 2000 to build up air and naval forces on Guam to boost U.S. deterrence and power projection in Asia. Concerns include crisis response, counterterrorism, and contingencies in the Pacific. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate.

Visiting Guam in May 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that Guam’s buildup will be “one of the largest movements of military assets in decades” and will help to “maintain a robust military presence in a critical part of the world.” Under President Obama, Secretary Gates issued the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in February 2010, in which the United States noted the importance of implementing the U.S.-Japan Realignment Roadmap of 2006 that will ensure the deployment of U.S. forces in Japan and transform Guam into a regional security hub. The QDR also announced the development of a new joint Air-Sea Battle Concept, to integrate the air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace forces of the Air Force and Navy to counter challenges to U.S. freedom of action, defeat adversaries with sophisticated anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, and improve power projection operations.

As part of the Obama Administration’s effort to re-engage throughout the Asian-Pacific region and reassure allies and partners facing a rising China that views the United States as an “outside” power, Gates participated at an annual Asian-Pacific defense ministers’ meeting in June 2010 in Singapore at which he declared that the United States is a Pacific nation and will remain a “power in the Pacific.” He highlighted that the South China Sea became an area of “growing concern.” He also stated that the defense buildup on Guam is part of a shift in the U.S. defense posture in Asia, a shift to be more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn III visited Guam in July and stressed Guam’s value, saying “from bases here, our forces can ensure the security of our allies, quickly respond to disaster and humanitarian needs, safeguard the sea lanes that are so vital to the world economy, and address any military provocation that may occur.” Still, follow-up questions include how to ensure a powerful presence in the Pacific, particularly with budget constraints.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued strategic guidance for 2011 that placed priority on U.S. security interests in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Still, he declared a sharper focus on the Asian-Pacific region in balancing risks from an aggressive North Korea and a more assertive China and in defending international freedom of navigation. With the U.S. military’s drawdown from Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. defense strategy of January 2012 declared a rebalancing toward a strengthened presence in the Asian-Pacific region. Guam is critical to enhancing the forward presence, strengthening alliances, and shaping China’s rise.

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Guam’s strategic significance has risen steadily. In 2000, the Air Force reportedly sought to base elements of an Air Expeditionary Force in Guam and sent B-2 stealth bombers to Guam to expand the range of U.S. options for contingencies involving North Korea. As PACOM’s Commander, Admiral Dennis Blair acquired approval to forward deploy air-launched cruise missiles on Guam for the first time in August 2000. The Air Force moved precision munitions to be stockpiled on Guam, including Joint Direct Attack Munitions and Joint Standoff Weapons.4

In February 1997, Guam’s Delegate Robert Underwood noted in the House that an aircraft carrier (the USS Independence, homeported in Japan) visited Guam for the first time in over 30 years.5 In early 2001, the Navy announced that it would station up to three nuclear attack submarines at Guam, in order to shorten the transit time compared to travel from homeports in Hawaii or California to the western Pacific and to shorten deployments for sailors. The first sub to be based at Guam arrived in October 2002. In July 2007, the USS Buffalo joined USS Houston and USS City of Corpus Christi as the three forward-deployed nuclear-power attack submarines (SSN) permanently based at Guam. The three SSNs based at Guam formed part of the deployment of about 60% of attack submarines in the Pacific by the end of 2009. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2006 called for an adjustment in U.S. force posture, with a greater presence in the Pacific than that in the Atlantic, including at least six aircraft carriers and 60% of submarines in the Pacific. Moreover, in mid-2010, three Ohio-class guided-missile submarines (SSGN), USS Michigan, USS Ohio, and USS Florida, showed their presence in the Pacific and used Guam to support their operations.6 However, in 2007, the Navy decided not to homeport the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson at Guam. Nonetheless, by 2008, the Navy planned for a transient berth in Apra Harbor to support an aircraft carrier for up to three times a year, each visit for up to three weeks.7 The QDR of 2010 called for maintaining a force structure of 10-11 aircraft carriers.

In 2002, the Commander of Pacific Air Forces publicly detailed his request for basing aircraft in Guam. In addition to munition stockpiles and jet fuel, he reportedly requested F-22 stealth fighters, 767 tankers, C-17 transports, bombers, and Global Hawk reconnaissance drones.8 In March 2003, after a new Air Expeditionary Wing was activated at Guam’s Andersen Air Force Base, B-1 and B-52 bombers deployed temporarily on a rotational basis from air bases in Texas and Louisiana as U.S. forces prepared for war against Iraq. Beyond rotation of aircraft, the Air Force began continuous deployment of aircraft into Guam. As part of this buildup, the first B-52 bombers (stationed out of Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota) to deploy to Andersen arrived in February 2004. B-52 bombers can each carry 20 AGM-86C/D conventional air-launched cruise

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missiles (CALCMs), and these long-range weapons have been fielded at Andersen. In April 2005, the Commander of Pacific Air Forces said that B-2 stealth bombers started to fly out of Andersen. In April 2005, F-15 fighters temporarily deployed to Andersen from Idaho. An Air Force official said in 2006 that the Air Force planned to station KC-135 tankers on Guam. In May 2007, the Air Force announced the deployment of 18 F-16 fighters to Guam for four months. In the summer of 2008, several F-22 fighters, based in Alaska since 2007, began deployments to Guam. Also, Andersen Air Force Base first planned to have four to six RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned drones for an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Strike Task Force by 2009, but the first of three RQ-4 Global Hawks arrived in September 2010.

U.S. Force Relocations from Japan

In May 2006, the United States and Japan signed a detailed “Roadmap” to broaden military cooperation, mostly dealing with changes and additions to U.S. forces in Japan. It provided for the relocation of the headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary Force and 8,000 U.S. marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. The cost of the relocation was estimated at $10.27 billion. Of this amount, Japan pledged to contribute $6.09 billion, including direct financing of facilities and infrastructure on Guam.

Agreement

On February 5, 2009, Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander of the Pacific Command (PACOM), told Reuters that the transfer of 8,000 marines to Guam might be delayed and cost more, but observers questioned his authority for the statement. Indeed, PACOM clarified the next day that the goals remained to start the related construction by 2010 and to complete relocation by 2014.

III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). Soon after, on February 17, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Tokyo and signed the bilateral “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents From Okinawa to Guam” that reaffirmed the “Roadmap” of May 1, 2006. The two governments agreed that of the estimated $10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development for the

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relocation, Japan would provide $6.09 billion, including up to $2.8 billion in direct cash contributions (in FY2008 dollars). The United States committed to fund $3.18 billion plus about $1 billion for a road for a total of $4.18 billion. Under the agreement, about 8,000 personnel from the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and about 9,000 of their dependents would relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014.

**Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF).** In addition to Japan’s financial contribution, the relocation to Guam would be dependent upon Japan’s progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). In the “Roadmap,” the United States and Japan agreed to replace the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma with the FRF constructed using landfill and located in another, less populated area of Okinawa (at Camp Schwab). The original plan expected an interconnected package that involved relocation to the FRF, return of MCAS Futenma, transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, and consolidation of facilities and return of land on Okinawa.

In April 2009, the lower house of Japan’s parliament, the Diet, voted to approve the bilateral agreement, and the Diet ratified it on May 13, 2009. The next day, the Department of State welcomed the Diet’s ratification of the agreement and reiterated the U.S. commitment to the completion of the relocation of 8,000 marines to Guam from Okinawa, host to about 25,000 U.S. military personnel and their dependents.

However, on September 16, 2009, Yukio Hatoyama of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) became prime minister. This political change raised uncertainty when Japan sought to renegotiate the agreement even as the United States sought its implementation. The DPJ had called for the Futenma air station to be relocated outside of Okinawa, with concerns about the impact on the local people and environment. In Tokyo on October 21, Defense Secretary Robert Gates stressed to Japan’s Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa the importance of implementing the agreement by “moving forward expeditiously on the roadmap as agreed.” Gates said at a news conference that “without the [FRF], there will be no relocation to Guam. And without relocation to Guam, there will be no consolidation of forces and return of land in Okinawa.” But by the time of President Obama’s visit on November 13, 2009, the two leaders could only announce a “working group” to discuss differences. The U.S. side agreed to discuss the agreement’s “implementation,” but Japan sought to “review” the agreement. At a meeting in Honolulu on January 12, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed moving on the implementation of the agreement but also acknowledged that the alliance had lots of other business to conduct. She expressed an expectation of a decision on the FRF by May, after Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada conveyed Hatoyama’s promise to decide by that time. Visiting Tokyo on January 15, Senator Daniel Inouye said Hatoyama reiterated this promise to decide by May. (On details about Japan’s dispute over Futenma, see CRS Report RL33436, *Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress.*)

Meanwhile, on May 20, 2010, the Republic of Korea (ROK), or South Korea, announced that an international investigation found that an attack on March 26 by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, sank the ROK’s naval ship, *Cheonan*, and killed 46 sailors. President Obama condemned that “act of aggression.” The crisis provoked by the DPRK catalyzed Japan’s resolution of the dispute over the realignment. Moreover, in April, Japan said that China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) deployed ships and submarines near Japan’s southern islands of Okinawa and Miyakojima and dangerously confronted Japan’s surveillance forces, including pointing guns from a PLAN destroyer at Japan’s maritime patrol plane and flying a helicopter in close approach to Japan’s destroyer in at least two incidents. The next month, China’s maritime survey ship approached and chased away Japan’s Coast Guard survey ship in the East China Sea, demanding that Japan’s ship stop its surveys. While the crisis with the
DPRK involved an attack that sank the ROK’s ship and killed its sailors, the PLA’s aggressiveness did not result in conflict at that time. Nonetheless, later in July, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Wallace Gregson testified to Congress that both the actions by North Korea and China (the PLAN’s deployment of a Surface Action Group near Okinawa) prompted Japan’s recognition of a vital U.S. role in Japan’s deterrence.12

**Joint Statements.** On May 28, 2010, in Tokyo, Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State Clinton along with their counterparts in Japan issued a “2+2” Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee. Thus, Japan reaffirmed its commitment to implement the 2006 Roadmap and 2009 Agreement on relocation of marines from Okinawa to Guam. The following month, Japan’s new Prime Minister Naoto Kan affirmed the agreement. However, by July 2010, the U.S. Navy expressed doubts about meeting the original goal of completing the relocation of marines to Guam by 2014,13 supporting Admiral Keating’s assessment in 2009.

Just after retiring as an Assistant Secretary of Defense, Gregson said in April 2011 that about 10,000 marines would remain on Okinawa after the relocation of some marines from Okinawa to Guam. Moreover, he clarified that the change would be a “realignment of the alliance to Guam.” Not only will there be a buildup of U.S. forces at Guam, but there would be a new continuous presence of Japan’s aviation, ground, and naval forces training at Guam.14

In the “2+2” Joint Statement of June 21, 2011, the United States and Japan rhetorically reaffirmed their commitment to implement “steadily” the realignment as agreed in 2006 and the Joint Statement of May 2010. However, the United States and Japan also conceded that the completion of the FRF and the relocation of marines from Okinawa to Guam will not meet the target date of 2014. After a new Prime Minister, Yoshihiko Noda, took office on September 2, 2011, Japan indicated it would implement the realignment. According to a press briefing by White House officials, President Obama met with Noda at the U.N. in New York on September 21 and stressed the importance for the alliance of implementing the relocation agreements. Before Defense Secretary Leon Panetta left for a trip to Asia, Senator Webb wrote him on October 19, urging a careful reexamination of alternatives to the agreements given the impasse. He wrote that senior officials and officers of the Defense Department expressed to him and Senator Levin some deep concerns about the affordability and workability of the 2006 Roadmap. Nonetheless, on October 25, Secretary Panetta met with Japan’s Defense and Foreign Ministers and said that both countries remained committed to the Roadmap and moving marines to Guam.

The impasse in Japan still continued through 2011, and Japan’s environmental impact report on Futenma had to be dropped in the cover of darkness at 4:00 AM on December 28 in Okinawa. In early 2012, visiting Diet Members noted the dispute for some pessimism about the realignment.

Finally, on February 8, 2012, after some in Congress urged a review of the realignment in realistic recognition of the persistent impasse (see below on congressional actions in May 2011 on a review of the force structure), Japan’s officials visited Washington for meetings with Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense and State. The two sides agreed to “adjust” the Realignment Roadmap of 2006 and separate the move of marines from the maintenance of the plan for the

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FRF, in order to make progress separately. The United States and Japan reaffirmed the need to strengthen the alliance and build Guam as a “strategic hub” with an “operational” Marine Corps presence. However, the U.S.-Japan Joint Statement on Defense Posture did not provide numbers and locations for transfers of marines, a timeline, or any changes in costs. According to Japanese media, only 4,700 marines out of 8,000 will move from Okinawa to Guam, while 3,300 will move elsewhere (perhaps 1,500 to Iwakuni in Japan and rotating 1,800 to Hawaii, Australia, and Philippines). Senator Webb stated that the statement was an acknowledgment that the Roadmap must be adjusted to preserve the strength of the alliance and the stability of the region.

**Budgets**

Nonetheless, despite Japan’s dispute over the FRF in Okinawa, Japan has allocated funds in the defense budgets for the marines’ relocation and buildup on Guam, including the agreed $2.8 billion in direct contributions. Japan allocated as direct contributions $336 million in the 2009 defense budget and $497 million in the 2010 budget. (Japan’s fiscal year covers April 1 to March 31.) In the 2011 defense budget, Japan funded $176 million for its direct contribution and also $416 million for loans to be extended by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) to fund the expansion of utilities (such as power, water, and wastewater) on Guam. Japan’s coping with the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster of March 2011 delayed budgeting for 2012. In December 2011, after the Congress cut funds for the marines’ move to Guam, Japan’s officials reportedly indicated that Tokyo would cut its funding in 2012 (perhaps to about $94 million).

**Concerns and Issues for Congress**

**Rationales**

One rationale for the military buildup on Guam is its status as a U.S. territory. Thus, the United States is not required to negotiate with sovereign countries on force deployments or face the risks of losing bases or access. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Guam in November 2003 and expressed support for building up Guam as he considered a new round of base closings. In contrast, the United States had to close Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines in 1992. Foreign countries could restrict the use of U.S. forces based there. U.S. forces based in Guam also do not have to contend with political sensitivities over nuclear powered vessels. Moreover, some countries, including allies, have raised doubts at times about their support for U.S. forces in a possible conflict between the United States and China.

Another rationale is the expansion of options that Guam offers to the evolving U.S. force structure. As Commander of PACOM, Admiral William Fallon expressed his vision for Guam as a staging area from which ships, aircraft, and troops can “surge” to the Asian theater. He stressed “flexibility,” saying “we need to have forces ready to react,” and we must have built-in flexibility to meet emergencies (including disaster relief). In 2004, the Navy held “Summer Pulse 04,” its first exercise to increase readiness to “surge” operations in response to a crisis.

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June 2006, PACOM held the first “Valiant Shield” exercise that brought three aircraft carriers to waters off Guam. The third “Valiant Shield” exercise occurred in September 2010.

A third rationale is the need to counter what commanders call the “tyranny of distance.” PACOM, headquartered in Honolulu, has an area of responsibility that encompasses almost 60% of the world’s population, over 50% of the earth’s surface, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, 16 time zones, and five of seven U.S. defense treaties. U.S. forces on Guam are much closer to East Asia, where the United States has five alliances with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. The United States also has concerns about tension and instability in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Yellow Sea; terrorism in Southeast and South Asia; humanitarian crises; and sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly through the Straits of Malacca. Combat aircraft on Guam can reach Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, or the Korean peninsula in two to five hours. Moreover, Table 1 presents the shorter sailing distance and time from Guam to Manila in East Asia, as an example, compared to that from Honolulu, Seattle, and San Diego.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To Manila, from:</th>
<th>Statute miles</th>
<th>Days at 20 knots</th>
<th>Days at 30 knots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>1,724</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honolulu</td>
<td>5,482</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>6,853</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>7,595</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Sailing distances in statute miles were calculated using nautical miles reported by “Distances Between Ports,” 2001, published by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Also, 1 nautical mile equals 1.15 statute miles, and 1 knot equals 1.15 mph.

Relatedly, under President Obama, the United States has paid greater attention to Southeast Asia. There is concern about potential instability over disputed islands and China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. In February 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, issued a National Military Strategy, declaring that the U.S. military also must invest new attention and resources in Southeast and South Asia, in addition to the long-standing presence in Northeast Asia. PACOM’s Commander, Admiral Robert Willard, testified to the House Armed Services Committee in April 2011, elaborating that it has become increasingly important for U.S. forces to attain more access to and support from allies and partners in South and Southeast Asia.

Concerns

Infrastructure. As U.S. forces relocate to Guam, the state of its infrastructure has been of concern to some policymakers. Also, Guam’s political leaders have expressed concerns about the impact of additional deployments on its civilian infrastructure, including utilities, roads, and water supplies. Guam’s location in the Western Pacific also requires construction of protection for U.S. forces and assets against typhoons. In the fall of 2006, PACOM officials briefed Guam on some aspects of an undisclosed draft plan for military expansion, the Integrated Military Development Plan, with possible military projects worth a total of about $15 billion. In addition,

18 KUAM News, September 12, 2006; Pacific Daily News, September 13, 2006; Stars and Stripes, September 17, 2006.
Guam’s size, remoteness, and conditions raised more questions about hosting and educating military dependents; training on Guam and with other units in Asia, Hawaii, or the west coast; and costs and time for extended logistical support and travel. Addressing another concern, a former commander of Marine Forces Pacific urged in 2007 that Guam’s buildup include more than infrastructure to develop also human capital, communities, and the environment.19

Strategic Target. A concern is that Guam’s higher military profile could increase its potential as a strategic target for terrorists and adversaries during a conflict. For example, potential PRC and DPRK missile attacks could raise Guam’s need for missile defense. Still, when he worked in Guam in 1974, Senator James Webb wrote that “as long as the U.S. maintains and communicates a credible military presence and capability, Guam is under no greater threat, in reality, than any other part of the U.S.”20 China is believed to have deployed ballistic missiles that could target Guam, considered by China as part of the “Second Island Chain” from which it needs to break out of perceived U.S.-led “containment.” China’s missiles that could target forces based at Guam include the DF-3A (CSS-2) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). China also has developed an extended-range DH-11 ground-launched land-attack cruise missile (LACM) and the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), the DF-21D ASBM, to target aircraft carriers and other ships. While the DF-21D’s initial range could be 1,500-2,000 km (930-1240 mi), a more advanced variant could extend the range to about 3,000 km and reach Guam.21 In addition, the DPRK has developed an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a range over 2,000 miles. There has been a question about whether North Korea deployed this IRBM. In 2008, South Korea’s Defense White Paper stated that North Korea started to deploy its IRBM (Taepodong-X) with a range that could reach Guam. At a high-profile military parade in October 2010, North Korea showed a new IRBM (a missile some called Musudan), apparently deployed without flight testing in North Korea. It was unclear whether it was the same IRBM reported by South Korea, with a different designation. The U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) reported to Congress in early 2011 that North Korea in 2010 continued to develop a mobile IRBM and did not report that it was deployed. Still, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, Jr., testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 10, 2011, that North Korea has tried to upgrade already deployed missiles that included IRBM.22

Allies and Partners. Moreover, there was concern that Guam is still too distant from flash points in the Asia and advocated closer cooperation with allies and partners such as Singapore, Australia, the Philippines, and Japan.23 Building up the U.S. presence in those countries could enhance alliances or partnerships, increase interoperability, and reduce costs for the United States. In 2010, Defense Secretary Gates wrote an article, calling for “building partner capacity” to help other countries to defend themselves, or if necessary, to fight alongside U.S. forces by providing them

with equipment, training, and other security assistance. The stress would be on helping other countries provide for their own security.24

Later in 2010, Australia proposed that the U.S. military increase use of this ally’s existing bases.25 In April 2011, PACOM’s Commander, Admiral Willard, testified to the House Armed Services Committee that the U.S. military has increased attention to Southeast and South Asia. He acknowledged that the U.S. force posture in Southeast Asia has involved mostly deployed U.S. forces, making it costly and inefficient. He sought to expand the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia beyond only Singapore. Willard also confirmed that Australia might further support the U.S. posture. In testimony the same month to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Willard stated that Marine Corps forces could rotate into northern Australia and other locations closer to Southeast Asia, in addition to marines in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii. Secretary Gates announced at a conference in June 2011 in Singapore that the United States will deploy Littoral Combat Ships there. On September 15, the United States and Australia held Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) at which the two sides, *inter alia*, agreed to strengthen potential defense cooperation that would entail greater U.S. access to Australian ranges, facilities, and ports; prepositioning of U.S. equipment in Australia; and combined activities in the Asian-Pacific region. Visiting Australia on November 16, President Obama announced that 2,500 marines will deploy on a rotational basis to Australia’s Darwin base and the Air Force will rotate more aircraft to Australia. Thus, the changes would further disperse the U.S. forward presence, beyond moves to Guam.

**Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).** In July 2010, the U.S. Navy’s Joint Guam Program Office issued the Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on implications of the buildup on Guam.26 The detailed study estimated a higher population increase than a move of 8,000 marines to Guam. As noted above, the U.S.-Japan agreement of 2009 provided for 8,000 marines and 9,000 of their dependents to relocate from Okinawa to Guam. However, the EIS of 2010 estimated that a total of 8,552 marines plus 630 Army soldiers would form the 9,182 permanent military personnel to relocate to Guam. The total military population on Guam would increase by 30,190 (including 9,182 permanent military personnel, 9,950 dependents, 9,222 transient military personnel, and 1,836 civilian workers). In addition, construction workers and others could mean a total increase in population of about 79,000 at the peak in 2014, in this initial assumption.

**Tinian.** The study also found that Guam cannot accommodate all training for the relocated marines, and the nearby island of Tinian (100 miles away) could help to provide land for their training. There would be a challenge for sustaining operational readiness in training while limiting the time and expense to travel to train. The study found that “the training ranges currently planned for Guam and Tinian only replicate existing individual-skills training capabilities on Okinawa and do not provide for all requisite collective, combined arms, live and maneuver training the Marine Corps forces must meet to sustain core competencies. As with Marine Corps forces currently in Okinawa who must now travel to mainland Japan, other partner nations, and the U.S. to accomplish this requisite core competency training, the Marine Corps forces relocating from Okinawa to Guam would also have to use alternate locations to accomplish requisite core competency training.” After a visit to Guam, Tinian, and Saipan in February 2010, Senator James Webb expressed concern about placing live-fire ranges on Guam for the Marine

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Corps and urged greater use of Tinian. Also, Guam’s Delegate Madeleine Bordallo expressed concern about a proposed firing range on Guam and urged the Pentagon to consider an alternative for a range on Tinian, at a hearing on March 15, 2011, of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment testified that certain training for the marines needs to be on the island of Guam.

In addition, the Navy would need a new deep-draft wharf at Apra Harbor to support a transient aircraft carrier. Third, the Army would relocate about 600 military personnel to establish and operate an Air and Missile Defense Task Force (AMDTF).

**Record of Decision.** However, as stated in the Record of Decision on the Final EIS issued two months later in September 2010, the Navy and Army deferred decisions on a site for the marines’ live-fire training range on Guam, a site for the transient aircraft carrier berth within Apra Harbor, and construction of an AMDTF on Guam. Also, the Record of Decision used an assumption that construction to support the marines’ relocation would start in 2014 and not be completed until 2016. Moreover, the Record of Decision projected that instead of a peak of an increase of 79,178 people (including military personnel, dependents, and workers) in Guam in 2014, a “more realistic” projection would see a peak of 59,173 growth in population in 2015. The peak of 10,552 more marines on Guam would be reached in 2017 instead of 2014.

**Expanding Costs.** However, there would not be only 10,552 marines. There has been greater congressional concern about expanding costs involved with moving more marines (estimated at 10,552) with additional army soldiers (estimated at 630) and civilian military workers (estimated at 1,836). That could be an increase of 13,018 military and civilian personnel working for the Defense Department. Also, there could be expanded costs (for schools, health care, housing, transportation, etc.), if the option is used for personnel to be accompanied by dependents. The estimate of additional dependents increased from 9,000 under the U.S.-Japan agreement to 11,695 (9,000 Marine Corps dependents, 950 Army dependents, plus 1,745 civilian military dependents). Total personnel and dependent growth could be 24,713 from 2017 on, after completion of construction. At a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 12, 2011, the Chairman, Senator Carl Levin, expressed concern that the delays in the realignment might significantly increase costs. The Ranking Member, Senator John McCain, said that total investments by the United States and Japan for new bases for U.S. forces on both Okinawa and Guam could reach at least $30 billion. PACOM’s Commander, Admiral Robert Willard, conceded that the delays and new requirements on Guam have raised uncertainty about the cost, which could be higher than $10.3 billion. Senator James Webb urged for greater clarity about the realignment and attention by the Senate. In his study in 1974 for Guam, Webb had called for a broader look at the total cost of the U.S. force structure in the Pacific that took into account any savings in consolidation of bases, more joint service uses, and the fact that bases in Guam are permanent bases on U.S. soil. Then on May 26, 2011, Senators Levin, McCain, and Webb cited as support for their proposal to reexamine the plans for realignment (see below) a GAO report that estimated costs of over $27 billion to realign bases on Okinawa and Guam.

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30 Senator Carl Levin, “GAO Report Validates Recommendations for Bases in East Asia; Action Needed to Re-examine DoD Planning”; Senator Jim Webb, “GAO Findings a Call to Action on Realignment of Military Bases in (continued...)
Naval Assets. As another concern, the marines on Guam would need naval assets for transportation for both deployments and exercises. Options include basing in Guam another Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) with amphibious ships of the Navy to transport a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Another consideration would homeport in Guam the new non-combatant sealift Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). Since 2001, the III MEF in Okinawa already has experience with using a leased theater support ship called “Westpac Express.” The marines used this fast, roll-on/roll-off ship to deploy with helicopters to reinforce Guam’s defense after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001.\footnote{Consultations with PACOM in Honolulu in November 2010 and Pentagon in Washington in December 2010.}

Outside Workers. Some have noted a concern about the potential introduction of temporary outside workers to Guam during construction for the defense buildup. In 2009, Representative Neil Abercrombie of Hawaii urged a preference for American workers.\footnote{Neil Abercrombie, “Why Construction on Guam is Right for Americans,” letter to Washington Post, July 13, 2009.} Regarding defense policy, some have raised security considerations of the country of origin of any foreign workers, including China. For example, in 2009, Guam’s Governor Felix Camacho said that it was likely that foreign workers could come from skilled labor in the Philippines, if local labor is insufficient. He said that China’s workers would not be hired “because of security concerns related to work on military bases.”\footnote{“Guam Governor Expects Filipinos to Fill Jobs,” The Star, July 1, 2009.} Workers outside of Guam could be hired from Hawaii, the U.S. mainland, American Samoa, Northern Mariana Islands, Freely Associated States, or other places.

Military Readiness. At a hearing of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness on March 15, 2011, Representative Randy Forbes and Guam’s Delegate Bordallo focused on the issue of whether U.S. forces in the Pacific have sufficient military readiness, including in the realignment on Guam. Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment Jackalyne Pfannenstiel testified that the first focus would be on assuring adequate land to be able to train the marines as they arrive in Guam. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Michael Schiffer added later that there would need to be parallel progress between the United States and Japan, so that the Futenma Air Station relocates to the Futenma Replacement Facility, and marines relocate from Okinawa to Guam. He said that preparation on Guam needs to begin well in advance of actual construction on the ground for the replacement facility at Camp Schwab and that relocation of the marines from Okinawa will be phased with completion of suitable infrastructure on Guam, with sequencing to maintain unit cohesion and operational readiness. In answer to Mr. Forbes’ question of whether the Air-Sea Battle Concept was ready, Schiffer testified that the concept was still an evolving operational concept. Major General (USMC) Randolph Alles, PACOM’s Director of Strategic Planning and Policy (J-5), stated that the concept addresses anti-access/area-denial but would be broader than just China, cover situations around the world, and take several years to implement. Also, Alles acknowledged concern about the vulnerability of above-ground stored fuel on Guam.

Review of Force Structure. There could be attention to how Guam fits in more broadly to the U.S. force structure in the Pacific. Senator James Webb called for more attention to “all the players out there in the region” regarding the realignment, at a hearing on April 12, 2011, of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Webb started in the 1970s to look strategically at Guam’s place in the U.S. defense posture in the Pacific, writing in 1974 that “it is quite conceivable that (...continued)
in ten to twenty years the entire U.S. Pacific presence will be centered on a Guam-Tinian axis.”
He had proposed a shift of the Marine Corps from Okinawa to Tinian. He lamented that “Guam
has been a loyal, though often unrecognized and ignored, segment of the American system.”

As Senator Levin said at the Senate Armed Services Committee’s hearing in April, “the details of
the plans for Okinawa are many and complex, as are the details of the associated military buildup
on Guam. That said, because these actions will affect the U.S. military’s strategic positioning well
into the future, it is important that these issues be discussed and resolved.” Senator Webb said, “I
have a concern that we are at this point allowing the process to be determined in many ways
simply by the momentum of defense planners at a time when a lot of these pieces are in question.
So I hope we can have a hearing. I’m going to be traveling to Korea and then into Guam again
and Okinawa in the coming weeks, and Chairman Levin is going to accompany me to Guam and
Okinawa. I think it will be a very important set of visits and perhaps we can try to find ways to at
least clarify this matter and move forward.”

Subsequently, trying to move forward, Senators Levin, McCain, and Webb called in May 2011 for
a re-examination of plans to restructure military forces in South Korea, Japan, and Guam. They
critiqued the planned realignment as “unrealistic, unworkable, and unaffordable.” As another
objective, the Senators sought to reassure “Japan, Korea, and other countries that the United
States strongly supports a continuous and vigorous U.S. presence in the region” as well as “strong
bilateral alliances.” They also noted consideration of Japan’s enormous financial burden that
resulted from the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster in March 2011. Contrary to much
press reporting that stressed the proposal as criticizing plans and trying to “freeze” or to “put on
hold” the plans, a goal of the Senators’ proposal to review basing plans was to address concerns,
cut costs, and make progress at a time when the realignment to Guam faced an impasse and a
strong U.S. military presence remained critical in the Asian-Pacific region. For Guam, the
Senators proposed to base a permanently assigned headquarters (with family accompaniment) for
a “stripped-down” presence of the Marine Corps, but bolstered by deployments of rotating
combat troops that would be home-based elsewhere. They noted that rotating units into and out of
Guam from a home base such as in Hawaii or California (and thus leaving families at those bases)
“would make a strong difference in terms of infrastructure costs for schools, medical, recreational
facilities, and housing.” The Senators also recommended that the Defense Department examine
the feasibility of moving Marine Corps assets from Futenma into Kadena Air Base while dispersing
some Air Force assets now at Kadena to other areas in the Pacific region, including Andersen Air
Force Base in Guam. They further noted that Kadena’s 6,000-acre ammunition storage site could
be downsized by making use of two ammunition storage areas already located in Guam.

Guam’s Delegate Madeleine Bordallo promptly issued a press release on the same day. She
focused on the Senators’ “re-examination” of the plans for bases in Guam and elsewhere. She also
focused on the Senators’ appraisal of Guam’s “strategic importance.” She saw their
recommendation as another opportunity for the Defense Department to further clarify plans and
rationale concerning the bases. However, she seemed to raise concerns that consolidating Marine
Corps assets from Futenma to Kadena Air Base needs to be addressed directly between the U.S.
Government and Japan’s Government, because it would require “serious changes” to the Defense
Posture Review Initiative (DPRI). She also raised concern that moving air assets from Kadena Air

35 Senate Armed Services Committee, “Senators Levin, McCain, Webb Call for Re-examination of Military Basing
Plans in East Asia,” May 11, 2011.
Base to Andersen Air Force Base would require “careful attention to the balance among forces on Guam so that additional air assets and associated personnel do not overload and unduly strain [Guam’s] infrastructure.” Further, she raised concern that a “transient presence” of marines on Guam would reduce family housing but also reduce funds that would come from permanently stationed forces. In addition, she expressed concern about reducing military families and their ties to Guam. At the same time, Delegate Bordallo cited a mention in the proposal about an issue related to firing ranges and reiterated her call for the Defense Department to certify a national security requirement for such ranges. She also highlighted the Senators’ reference to Guam’s “clear message” about its need for federal funds to build up its infrastructure outside of the bases. According to her, when the time came for the conference on the National Defense Authorization Act, the Senators “will now better see” the need for her proposal to give the Defense Department the authority to transfer funds to support local infrastructure. Finally, she assured her constituents that the Senators did not propose to stop Guam’s buildup and that she took their view to be in line with her’s and others in the House, namely, that the buildup should be “done right.”

In the House Armed Services Committee, Representative Randy Forbes and Delegate Bordallo wrote to Secretary Panetta on September 30, 2011, to express concerns about the realignment of forces, particularly to Guam. They sought a master plan for and senior-level attention to the realignment as a top priority. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy finally replied on December 13, acknowledging that the Pentagon was re-examining options for Guam. Finally, in the Joint Statement of February 8, 2012, the Obama Administration reached an agreement with Japan to “adjust” the Realignment Roadmap, as discussed above.

Local Concerns. Related, there has been an issue of whether policymakers have addressed Guam’s concerns about the scope and pace of the construction, as expressed by the local people or their elected officials. For example, at a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee on February 3, 2010, Guam’s Delegate Madeleine Bordallo urged Secretary Gates to take into account the concerns of the local community that the buildup would be “done right,” including in the impact on the environment. Senator Webb visited Tokyo, Okinawa, and Guam in February 2010, in part to listen to various people about the U.S. realignment in the region. He also urged a more open discussion about the realistic timeline for the realignment and buildup on Guam by 2014. He urged sensitivity to the stress of the people and limitations of space on Guam, including over the issue of whether the military should have more land beyond the current one-third of the island. On April 25-26, 2011, Senators James Webb and Carl Levin visited Guam and met with local officials, who assured them that Guam’s people support the defense buildup but with local gains and improved communication of information from the Defense Department.

Allies and Partners

For combined training and engagement with allies and partners, Guam has provided valuable and less constrained airspace and bombing ranges for the air forces of Japan, Thailand, Singapore, South Korea, and Australia. Also, Taiwan has asked to fly to Guam for training. Taiwan’s F-16

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36 Madeleine Bordallo, “Reaction to Senators’ Call for Re-examination of Military Basing Plans in East Asia,” May 11, 2011.
fighter pilots already train at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona. Taiwan has other options for both training and operations (such as humanitarian missions) to fly to Pacific nations like Palau and the Solomon Islands that keep diplomatic ties with Taipei. Taiwan could assist such nations to improve and extend their runways if needed. Taiwan could contribute more to regional security. In October 2011, exercises with fighters based at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni (on Japan’s mainland) moved for the first time to Guam from Kadena Air Base in Okinawa. In February 2012, Guam’s Andersen Air Force Base hosted an air exercise (Cope North 2012) among U.S., Japanese, and Australian Air Forces, with Australia’s participation for the first time.

**South Korea.** The Guam Integrated Military Development Plan, parts of which were reported in October 2006, indicated that U.S. Army units withdrawn from South Korea were not likely to be stationed on Guam. The Pentagon’s restructuring plan reportedly intended to maintain U.S. air power in South Korea, particularly the three squadrons of F-16 fighters based at Osan Air Base.\(^{39}\)

In September 2008, Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter submitted a report that envisioned a consolidation of the expeditionary training centers of the U.S. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) from South Korea to Guam.\(^{40}\) However, the Record of Decision for Guam of 2010 did not mention South Korea. In testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on April 6, 2011, PACOM’s Commander, Admiral Willard, testified that PACAF has planned to use Guam as the “hub” for air force assets in strike and refueling missions in the Asian-Pacific region. Also, PACAF has been building some projects to set up the Pacific Regional Training Center at Guam.

There could be an option for South Korea to contribute to the cost of the defense buildup on Guam. Some officials have tied the buildup to North Korea’s threat. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Michael Schiffer testified to Congress in March 2010 that the implementation of the 2006 Realignment Roadmap would help meet shared security challenges, including the threat posed by North Korea. Just after North Korea launched artillery attacks on South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, Guam’s Delegate Madeleine Bordallo issued a statement that she received a briefing on the situation in South Korea from the Defense Department. She also asserted that “this attack by North Korea is a reminder of the importance of the United States remaining a vigilant and visible power in the Asia-Pacific region. Further it highlights the importance of realigning our military forces in this region to be better postured to address destabilizing events.” Senator Jim Webb delivered a speech in Tokyo in February 2011 in which he noted that, given regional tension in the Koreas and elsewhere in Asia, “it is extremely important for Japan and the United States to work to maintain a strategic stability in this region and also for us to take advantage of the willingness of South Korea to join in this effort.”\(^{41}\)

**Japan.** Under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, U.S. concerns involved possible conflict between China and Japan over their competing claims to the Senkaku islands (called Diaoyu islands by China) in the East China Sea. (Taiwan as the Republic of China also claims the islands as Tiaoyutai.) The United States administered the islands after World War II and turned them over to Japanese administration in 1972. Clinton and Bush Administration officials stated that the

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\(^{41}\) Michael Schiffer’s testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, March 17, 2010; Guam Delegate Madeleine Bordallo’s press release, November 23, 2010; Senator Jim Webb, keynote address, New Shimoda Conference, Tokyo, Japan, February 22, 2011.
Senkakus fall under the scope of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In September 2005, the PLA Navy deployed five naval ships to the disputed area in the East China Sea with competing territorial and oil claims. Under President Obama, after China escalated tension with Japan in wake of a PRC fishing boat’s collision with Japan’s patrol boats in September 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Gates explicitly assured Japan of the U.S. position that the Senkakus are covered by the defense treaty. National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director for Asian Affairs Jeff Bader also stated that while the United States takes no position on the sovereign claim over the islands, the U.S.-Japan treaty covers areas administered by Japan, including the Senkakus since 1972. The next month in Honolulu, Clinton publicly declared that “the Senkakus fall within the scope of Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.”

China

Building Guam as a strategic hub has played a critical role in balancing U.S. security interests in responding to and cooperating with China as well as in shaping China’s perceptions and conduct. The Obama Administration’s strategy has sought to shape China’s rise as a power that is peaceful, responsible, and respectful of international rules and laws. However, China’s civilian and military commentators commonly have suspected the U.S. defense buildup on Guam as partly aimed at China, as part of the U.S.-led “encirclement” or “containment” of China. Some critics have questioned whether there is a coherent strategy for addressing China’s security challenges, while other critics worry that U.S. actions and statements would raise tensions with China.

Washington and Beijing have long differed over China’s threats to use the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) against Taiwan. U.S. policy on helping Taiwan’s self-defense is governed not by a defense treaty but by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8. Moreover, some concerns about the PLA’s accelerated modernization since the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996 have expanded beyond a focus on Taiwan to include PLA preparations for possible conflicts with the United States, Japan, and others. In Southeast Asia, China claims much of the South China Sea as well as the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands in that sea as its “sovereign territory.” The PLA has increased attention to Guam and has been building up its submarine force (both nuclear-powered and diesel-electric). In November 2004, the PLA Navy sent a Han-class nuclear attack submarine to waters off Guam before intruding into Japan’s territorial water. Further, the PLA’s rising power has implications not only in Asia. By early 2012, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) testified to Congress that: “Many of Beijing’s military capability goals have now been realized, resulting in impressive military might. Other goals remain longer term, but the PLA is receiving the funding and political support to transform the PLA into a fully modern force, capable of sustained operations in Asia and beyond.”


44 James Clapper, testimony on worldwide threats to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 31, 2012.
In 2007, PACOM Commander Admiral Timothy Keating visited Guam and acknowledged that its defense buildup was partly due to concerns about tension over Taiwan and North Korea. At the same time, he stressed U.S. transparency, saying the buildup was not “under the cover of darkness.” Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Michael Schiffer testified to Congress in March 2010 that the implementation of the 2006 Realignment Roadmap would help meet shared security challenges, including the threat posed by North Korea as well as uncertainty posed by the PLA’s “rapid” modernization. In the same month in answer to Senator Daniel Akaka, PACOM’s Commander, Admiral Willard, cited the PLA Air Force’s fighters and air defense systems for U.S. deployment of F-22 fighters in the Pacific, including at Guam’s Andersen Air Force Base. The Commander of Pacific Air Forces, General Gary North, acknowledged in October 2011 that U.S. forces needed to watch China’s “expansive claims” in the South China Sea. He added that the three Global Hawk reconnaissance drones based at Guam can stay airborne for over 30 hours.

However, the impasse with Japan that started in 2009 over the realignment to Guam raised increased concerns about PRC misperceptions of weakened U.S. alliances that could affect stability. Also, with the planned move of significant numbers of marines from Japan to Guam, the PRC could misperceive pushing a U.S. retreat from the “first island chain” to the “second island chain.” In Congress, Senator James Webb said in a speech in Tokyo in February 2011 that Northeast Asia is the only place in the world where the interests of the United States, Russia, China, and Japan intersect. He noted that the U.S.-Japan relationship resulted in regional stability. Concerning China, Senator Webb said that when the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States became “overexposed and unprepared” for the way that China has expanded. While affecting the U.S. economy, China’s rise also has incrementally affected regional stability. He urged careful handling of the realignment of bases to avoid giving the wrong signals for strategic stability.

**Air-Sea Battle Concept.** Under President Obama, the Pentagon issued a QDR in February 2010 that announced the development of a new Air-Sea Battle Concept, as noted above. The QDR’s discussion of that concept did not name China. Nevertheless, some analysts discussed the Air-Sea Battle Concept as a way to counter the PLA’s rising capabilities in anti-access and area-denial (to prevent U.S. forces from entering into a theater of operations and to prevent U.S. freedom of action in an area under an adversary’s control). A year later in February 2011, PACOM’s Commander, Admiral Robert Willard, said that the Defense Department added the Marine Corps into the study of the new doctrine. In March, Secretary Gates acknowledged that China, North Korea, and Iran are countries that pose emerging asymmetric threats by developing capabilities that appear designed to neutralize the advantages of the U.S. military in unfettered freedom of movement and projection of power to any region. Gates added that, with the new concept, the Air Force and Navy would leverage each other’s capabilities to overcome future anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) threats. At a hearing of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness

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46 Testimonies before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, March 17, 2010; and Senate Armed Services Committee, March 26, 2010.


on March 15, 2011, Major General (USMC) Randolph Alles, PACOM’s Director of Strategic Planning and Policy (J-5), explicitly testified that the new concept addresses anti-access/area-denial but is broader in scope than attention to China. The concept would address security situations around the world.

On November 9, 2011, the Defense Department announced the establishment of an office on the Air-Sea Battle Concept, in order to integrate air and naval combat capabilities of the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to counter A2/AD challenges. Soon after, at the start of 2012, President Obama and Defense Secretary Panetta issued a Defense Strategic Review on how to maintain U.S. military superiority in the face of budget cuts and to re-balance U.S. defense with a greater focus on Asia. The strategy explicitly cited concerns about China’s rising military power as potentially causing “friction” in Asia and about U.S. power projection against A2/AD challenges, particularly from China and Iran. However, the strategy did not mention the Air-Sea Battle Concept. Instead, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued on January 17 a new Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC). Thus, the initiative expanded from a response by the Navy and Air Force, to add the Marines, then to cover joint air, sea, land, space, and cyber domains.

Cooperation in Common Interests. Still, the policy challenge has been to avoid conflict with China and deter aggression by China as well as to assure it that the U.S. goal is expanded cooperation with this rising power as a responsible, peaceful, and rules-based country. Indeed, China has benefitted from U.S. preservation of peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. The PRC leadership acknowledged to President Obama in November 2009, in the first U.S.-PRC Joint Statement in 12 years, that “China welcomes the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability, and prosperity in the region.” The Administration has sought to build “strategic trust” and a “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive” relationship with Beijing.

In Guam’s buildup, the Commander of Pacific Air Forces said in 2005 that the PLA’s modernization gave him “pause for interest” but did not make a difference in significant force redeployment. Also, in 2006, Guam became a focal point for improving the military-to-military relationship with China. To blunt charges that Guam’s buildup targeted China, PACOM’s Commander, Admiral Fallon, invited PLA observers to the U.S. “Valiant Shield” exercise that brought three aircraft carriers to waters off Guam in June 2006. The PLA Navy sent a Deputy Chief of Staff and specialist in submarine operations to lead the observers, who also boarded an aircraft carrier and visited Guam’s air and naval bases. In May 2008, two C-17 transport aircraft flew supplies from Guam to China for earthquake relief. Also in 2008, Deputy PACOM Commander, Lt. Gen. Dan Leaf (USAF), addressed the question of whether China posed a threat and if China could see Guam as a threat, and he said that while the United States had concerns about China’s military buildup, “that’s not why we’re basing forces in Guam.” He noted that the forces were already based and standing ready in the Pacific, with new adjustments in U.S.

(...continued)


51 Interview with General Paul Hester, Inside the Air Force, May 6, 2005.
posture. While in Australia in late 2010 to discuss the alliance, Defense Secretary Gates stated that moves to strengthen the U.S. military presence in the region were more about relationships with the rest of Asia than about China. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Jonathan Greenert, clarified in early 2012 that a greater strategic focus on the Asian-Pacific region would not mean a large increase in the naval presence in the Western Pacific. Greenert said, “it’s not a big naval buildup in the Far East. We’re there. We have been there. We will be there.” He said that the U.S. Navy will engage closer with the PLA and cooperate more with allies and partners to promote a rules-based international order and maintain freedom of navigation.

Escalation of Tensions. There have been competing concerns about the risks of escalating tensions and exacerbating mistrust with China, particularly the suspicious PLA. The PRC’s official, authoritative media has defended China’s “defensive” policy of “deterrence” and criticized the Air-Sea Battle and other U.S. defense adjustments as directing Cold War-like threats against China and provoking China’s counter-measures. Contrary to U.S. goals in seeking shared interests and access to global commons, China has seen an American zero-sum pursuit of “militarism” at the cost of PRC security. In contrast to much of the region’s welcome of the U.S. presence and concern about China, on November 30, 2011, the PLA’s spokesman attacked the U.S. announcement about deploying marines to Australia (in an established alliance) and the Air-Sea Battle as Cold War thinking and detrimental to regional stability and mutual trust. On January 9, 2012, the PRC’s diplomatic and military spokesmen called the new U.S. defense strategy’s “accusations” against China “groundless” given its “peaceful development.”

Some in the United States have advocated attention to accommodation with China to avoid a relationship with a more adversarial, assertive, or aggressive China with rising military power. Such views have included a call for a review of policy on the military dispute over Taiwan. Thus, with a forward presence in Guam and strengthened alliances, U.S. defense has faced the challenge of balancing security interests in responding to as well as cooperating with a rising China, while mitigating risks of hostility. As the CNO wrote in late 2011, “Being forward is critical to deterring aggression without escalation, defusing threats without fanfare, and containing conflict without regional disruption.” At the same time, he noted the risk that a country can characterize A2/AD capabilities as defensive and deploy them from its mainland territory, “making attacks against them highly escalatory.”

Legislation

This section covers major legislation related to the defense buildup on Guam. In July 2006, the Senate Appropriations Committee issued a report (S.Rept. 109-286) on the Military Construction and Veteran Affairs Appropriations Act, which expressed concerns about a construction program on Guam estimated to cost $10.3 billion (with Japan paying 60%) and expectations of a master plan for Guam from the Defense Secretary by December 29, 2006. In the Consolidated

Appropriations Act for FY2008 (that became P.L. 110-161 on December 26, 2007), the appropriations committees decided against a Senate provision that would have required the Defense Secretary to submit the master plan by December 29, 2007, and provided more time for a report by September 15, 2008. In response, the Navy Secretary reported on planning for Guam, with initiatives for the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Also, he reported that the Pentagon was developing the Guam Joint Military Master Plan.57

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2009 (that became P.L. 110-417 on October 14, 2008), inter alia, authorized a total of about $180 million for Guam’s military construction projects, established a Treasury account for all contributions for military realignment and relocations, and required the Defense Secretary to report on military construction projects by February 15 of each year.

On May 7, 2009, days before Japan’s Diet ratified the relocation agreement with the United States, Defense Secretary Gates submitted the proposed defense budget for FY2010. As part of the realignment of the Global Defense Posture, he requested $378 million to start construction in Guam to support the relocation of 8,000 marines from Japan in order to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. This amount would contribute to the total U.S. cost of $4.18 billion for the relocation.

The NDAA for FY2010 (enacted as P.L. 111-84 on October 28, 2009) authorized the first substantial incremental funding for the relocation of marines from Okinawa to Guam, but conditioned upon the Defense Department’s submission to Congress of a Guam Master Plan. Among a number of provisions related to Guam in the legislation and conference report, Congress designated the Deputy Secretary of Defense to lead a Guam Executive Council and coordinate interagency efforts related to Guam. Congress also required a report on training, readiness, and movement requirements for Marine Forces Pacific, with a sense of Congress that expansion of Marine Corps training should not impact the implementation of the U.S.-Japan agreement on relocation from Okinawa to Guam. Congress authorized a total amount (including for Defense-wide, Army, Navy, and Air Force) of almost $733 million.

The NDAA for FY2011 (enacted as P.L. 111-383 on January 7, 2011) changed the name of the Guam Executive Council to Guam Oversight Council. Among the provisions related to defense realignment on Guam, Congress required a report from the Defense Secretary on an assessment of the natural and manmade threats to realigned forces on Guam, the facilities needed to support those forces, and required costs. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees stated concern on December 22, 2010, that the Defense Department failed to report to Congress the detailed plan for projects for the realignment and that the Navy’s Record of Decision of September 2010 deferred key decisions, including on training ranges and amphibious landings for the Marine Corps. The committees recommended that Congress defer authorizations for construction for the relocation on Guam pending additional information that includes an updated master plan from the Defense Department. The committees reduced $320 million in the requested authorization of appropriations (for three construction projects involving aircraft parking, site preparation, and utilities). The NDAA for FY2011 authorized $176 million for projects on Guam.

On May 26, 2011, the House passed H.R. 1540, the NDAA for FY2012, to authorize a total of $303,521,000 for Marine Corps and Air Force projects in Guam in FY2012, after a reduction of $64 million. After Senators Levin, McCain, and Webb called for a re-examination of the

realignment of forces, on June 17, the Senate Armed Services Committee completed its markup of the NDAA. According to the committee, it cut about $156 million for two projects for the realignment of Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam because they would not be necessary in FY2012 and the Defense Secretary failed to provide a master plan; and it cut $33 million for grants to purchase items related to the relocation to Guam because the funds would be ahead of need. At the same time, the committee stated that the relocation of marines to Guam remained an important aspect of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The committee reported its NDAA for FY2012 as S. 1253 on June 22. Out of conference, the legislation authorized only $83.6 million for Air Force projects on Guam. On December 12, Guam’s Delegate Bordallo expressed opposition to the conference report, for delaying other investments. Enacted on December 31, 2011, as P.L. 112-81, the final legislation also included the Senate’s language in Section 2207 on Guam, which stipulated that none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or amounts provided by Japan for projects on land under the Defense Department’s jurisdiction may be obligated or expended to implement the realignment of Marine Corps forces to Guam until certain conditions are met. Congress required a force lay-down for PACOM from the Marine Corps Commandant, a master plan for construction from the Defense Secretary, certification of tangible progress on Futenma, a plan on Guam’s infrastructure, and an assessment of the U.S. posture in the Asian-Pacific region.

(Also see CRS Report R41939, Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies: FY2012 Appropriations.)
Figure 1. Map of Guam

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