



Ten Years Later: Insights on al-Qaeda's Past & Future through Captured Records: A Conference Report

January 27, 2012

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Executive Summary:

On 13-14 September 2011, the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University (NDU), and the Johns Hopkins University Center for Advanced Governmental Studies, hosted a conference to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks.

Entitled "Ten Years Later: Insights on al-Qaeda's Past & Future through Captured Records," the conference explored what scholars and policy-makers knew about al-Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) before 9/11 and what they have learned since, offering thoughts about the future of AQAM as well as directions for future research and policy.

The CRRC released 12 records from its AQAM collection in conjunction with the conference, providing primary-source material to scholars and researchers worldwide and helping show how captured records can contribute to understanding America's adversaries on both the academic and policy-making levels. The conference featured addresses by government officials involved in counterterrorism policy-making, and panel presentations by some of the world's foremost scholars and academics studying AQAM.

Key findings from the conference and the analysis of the captured records include:

- 1) Even though al-Qaeda has grown significantly weaker over the past ten years,

it is becoming an increasingly innovative adversary demanding a more dynamic and nuanced American approach to counterterrorism

- 2) Al-Qaeda affiliated, "lone wolf" and right-wing terrorism is on the rise
- 3) Winning the war of ideas, rather than just a military victory, remains paramount in defeating extremism and terrorism
- 4) Government officials and scholars must continue to work together to fully understand AQAM and other threats to the United States
- 5) The United States must continue to adapt in order to meet challenges from terrorism in the future
- 6) Academics and other researchers must continue to ask hard questions in order to help policy-makers come to the best conclusions about how to deal with America's adversaries

The CRRC will continue to provide primary source materials on AQAM, as well as on the Saddam Hussein regime, for academics and other researchers to employ in their historical and political studies of terrorism, authoritarian regimes, and other challenges facing the United States in the future.

Conference Findings and Themes:

1) “Al-Qaeda Central” has grown significantly weaker. The conference speakers and panelists almost unanimously agreed that what might be called “al-Qaeda Central” or “al-Qaeda Core” is on the decline after ten years of American and international counterterrorism efforts, adaptations and adjustments to modern counterinsurgency warfare, and the killing of Osama bin Laden. Former Secretary of Defense and now head of the CIA Leon Panetta, as well as other government officials, have heralded the “strategic defeat” of al-Qaeda. C. Michael Hurley, Senior Counsel to The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), pointed out to conference participants that al-Qaeda has not been able to orchestrate another attack on the scale of those seen on 9/11 and seems operationally incapable of doing so.

2) AQAM is nonetheless becoming an increasingly innovative adversary, which demands a more nuanced American approach to counterterrorism.

Mr. Hurley noted that AQAM is adopting a “strategy of innovation,” using new ways to attack the United States and its allies, especially at home. Attempted attacks such as strapping explosives to shoes or underwear, Mumbai-style attacks, and cyber attacks are just a few examples.¹ As “al-Qaeda Central” declines, other groups such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), will look for more innovative ways to attack the United States, and may try to take up the mantle of attacking the United States at home in the wake of “al-Qaeda Central’s” demise. Congressman Mac Thornberry (R-TX), Vice Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, former Chairman of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and

¹ Examples include the attempt by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to blow up an airplane on 25 December 2009 with explosives hidden in his underwear, the attempt by Richard Reid to detonate explosives in his shoes on board a flight on 22 December 2001, and the November 2008 attacks by members of Lashkar-e-Taiba against various targets in Mumbai, India.

member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, noted the value of the CRRC documents in his opening remarks. He spoke about how examining the CRRC primary source records can help academics and policy-makers see the evolution of al-Qaeda, and can help presage and preempt future attacks and strategies. For example, a CRRC record dated 1994 discusses “aerial martyrdom operations,” while other records encourage the use of cyber warfare.

While Congressman Thornberry and Mr. Hurley addressed the ways in which Congress and the U.S. Government have sought to meet the need for a more nuanced approach to counterterrorism, conference panelists also spoke of the need for better synergy between government and academia; increased information sharing, making use of archives like the CRRC, being able to see the forest from the trees, and the need to ask more nuanced questions all recurred as themes. In addition to this call for synergy was the suggestion to better understand the local contexts in which AQAM have and will continue to operate in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. In order to do so, government could increase training programs for regional, language, cultural, and anthropological education, and hire more analysts and researchers with such expertise.

3) Al-Qaeda affiliated groups and other types of terrorists like the “lone wolf” or right-wing terrorist, are on the rise. Despite the decline of “al-Qaeda Central,” speakers and panelists agreed that other types of terrorists and AQAM groups remain a significant threat. There are still many individuals who, regardless of their actual relationship with al-Qaeda, seek to use violence against the United States. The country has seen a number of attacks and attempted attacks such as the 2009 Fort Hood shooting. The July 2011 attacks in Norway are another example of a right-wing terrorist attack against an American ally. Individuals or small groups of individuals, as Congressman Thornberry noted, can still have an incredible impact. Many of these individuals become radicalized through the

internet, where al-Qaeda's presence continues to grow. As mentioned above, AQAP and other al-Qaeda affiliates may continue to attack not just local targets but the United States and its allies as well, which require different approaches than those used to combat "al-Qaeda Central."

4) *Winning the war of ideas, rather than military victory, remains paramount.* Congressman Thornberry and Mr. Hurley spoke of the need to win the war of ideas. Many counterinsurgency and 21st century warfare theorists have noted that the battle now often takes place amongst the people, through vying for "hearts and minds" to gain their support against terror. The panelists addressed issues such as the influence of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden's "brand" on the recruiting efforts of AQAM, the need to counter jihadi media strategies and especially online radicalization, and how al-Qaeda, through terrorists such as the now deceased Anwar al-Awlaqi, have sought to recruit Muslims living in the West, who they feel are best situated to attack Western targets.

5) *Government and academia must work together to fully understand AQAM and other threats to the United States.* In her closing remarks, Suzanne Spalding, former Counsel at Bingham McCutchen, Executive Director of the National Commission on Terrorism, former Assistant General Counsel of the CIA, former Minority Staff Director of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and now at the Department of Homeland Security, praised the conference and the CRRC's work for encouraging cooperation between those in government and academic circles. She pointed out that in some ways, academics are afforded opportunities that government analysts are not, including greater flexibility to "think outside the box," and allowing the facts to lead them to their own questions and answers rather than responding to specific questions posed by government officials and policy-makers. Academics often have more time to consider the historical perspective in their analyses, which, as the captured records have shown, can offer new insights and more depth to

many of the irregular challenges that policy-makers are working on today.

Ms. Spalding also noted how difficult it is for analysts and scholars to predict the future, and that the best way to do so is to understand the present environment. Ambassador Nancy McEldowney, then-Acting President, National Defense University, and now Vice President, echoed this sentiment in her opening remarks by acknowledging that giving academics and scholars access to resources and tools such as those made available by the CRRC enables them to help unlock the past in order to better prepare for the future. With government and academia working together on these problems, policy-makers will have a clearer picture of the challenges they face.

6) *The United States has and must continue to adapt to meet the challenges posed by terrorism.* Congressman Thornberry spoke about Congress's responsibility to help increase our country's understanding of threats such as terrorism, and about what Congress has done to contribute to this goal. Congressman Thornberry noted that there have been numerous Congressional hearings and exchanges between members of Congress and the military on issues related to terrorism. He also stressed the need for Congress to play a role in preventing the sclerosis of America's national security establishment and pushing, through its power of the purse, for organizational reform within this establishment. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security, in which Congressman Thornberry played a significant role, and the formation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, are two examples of such reform.

Mr. Hurley expanded upon these ideas and examined the national security reform the United States has achieved since 9/11 and what remains to be done. While Mr. Hurley, like Congressman Thornberry, commended the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, he called for more interagency coordination. He also stressed

the need to more fully implement the findings and recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Mr. Peter Bergen, noted author, director of the National Security Studies Program at the New America Foundation, and CNN commentator, encouraged policy-makers to shift America's national security focus away from combating al-Qaeda and terrorism as a means of not only weakening the prestige of the group but also to better employ American resources and direct American military, financial, and governmental efforts.

7) We must be ready, willing, and able to ask ourselves hard and provocative questions to understand al-Qaeda and other extremist groups.

Academics and analysts must be willing to think "outside the box" to challenge common assumptions and conventional wisdom about terrorism, terrorist actors, and counterterrorism policy. Only by doing so can the academic and policy-making communities adopt more nuanced approaches and adapt appropriately to an ever-changing enemy. These questions require us to reflect not only on the historical nature of AQAM through records such as those held at the CRRC archive, but to also question our assumptions and policies.

Panel 1: "What Did Scholars and Policy-Makers Know about AQAM before 9/11?" While some intelligence analysts and a few scholars had been looking at AQAM well before 9/11, a general lack of information and research on the movement made it difficult for analysts to "connect the dots." In addition, a lack of focus by government policy-makers on the issue of terrorism meant that the right questions were often not being asked and the appropriate resources were often not applied to answer these questions. However, as a number of the speakers such as Michael Hurley pointed out, the U.S. Government and intelligence community have done much since 9/11 to better facilitate, fund, and encourage research, analysis, and information sharing on AQAM and other terrorist threats.

Former intelligence analysts including panelists Dr. Mark Stout, now Lecturer at the Center for Advanced Government Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and Ms. Cindy Storer, Lecturer at Coastal Carolina University and Senior Analyst at Pherson Associates LLC, were thinking about AQAM and tracking their development from the time of the jihad in Afghanistan against the USSR throughout the 1990s. As Dr. Stout noted, the U.S. intelligence community was catching up with al-Qaeda as al-Qaeda itself was developing and forming into "a brand." However, because policy-makers at the time were not focused on the issue of terrorism despite a number of terrorist attacks at home and abroad, the issue did not come to the forefront of government concern until after the 9/11 attacks.² In addition, as Ms. Storer explained, terrorism was often seen as a law enforcement issue and not as an existential or military threat, which relegated it to the lower levels of national interest and concern.

Ms. Storer, a former CIA intelligence analyst who focused specifically on al-Qaeda, spoke of the challenges that she and her team faced while looking at al-Qaeda throughout the 1990s. These challenges included a number of issues endemic to the craft of intelligence analysis such as the ever-present ambiguity and uncertainty of collected information, the need to employ incomplete information to predict different possible yet uncertain outcomes, the requirement to often give a "bottom line" when alternative explanations and unknowns were pertinent, and the complexities of melding various academic disciplines and outlooks, both within and outside the intelligence communities, in order to come up with a complete and accurate picture of the situation.

Complimenting this was a presentation by Dr. Mary Habeck, Associate Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns

² Examples of such attacks include the August 1998 United States embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya and the October 2000 USS *Cole* bombing.

Hopkins University, which outlined al-Qaeda's intentions, structures, and goals leading up to 9/11 through the use of captured records. The CRRC AQAM archive includes a number of such organizational, thematic, and operational documents. Dr. Habeck pointed out that it is important for government analysts and academics alike to recognize that al-Qaeda's ultimate goal is not, and has never been, to attack or destroy America, but rather to engage in global jihad to create an Islamic Caliphate and destroy the United States in the process. In his remarks, Dr. Yonah Alexander, Director of the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, reminded the audience that having a keener understanding of earlier revolutionary and insurgent movements would have helped analysts and academics better understand al-Qaeda's aims. A greater understanding would have, in turn, helped policy-makers better prepare for the 9/11 attacks.

Panel 2: "What Have We Learned about AQAM Since 9/11?" Since 9/11, combating al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups has been placed at the forefront of U.S. national security policy. Resources such as the CRRC have opened up possibilities to scholars, as well as government analysts and policy-makers, to better understand challenges posed by these groups. Analyses of these sources have shown that al-Qaeda is not a monolithic group and, like other organizations, it suffers from internal divisions; recently it has been in decline as a centralized, powerful organization.

Dr. Nelly Lahoud, Senior Associate at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, provided the conference with insight into al-Qaeda ideology in the post 9/11 setting through a manuscript written by a top al-Qaeda secretary, Fadil Harun. Dr. Lahoud's analysis of Harun's writings and other CRRC al-Qaeda records led her to two conclusions. First, al-Qaeda is more a militant group than it is a religious one, and it puts matters and goals of jihadi militancy above those of theology. Therefore, analysts and scholars should be wary of looking at al-Qaeda doctrine solely through

a theological lens. Second, Harun and others believe that al-Qaeda franchised movements are not part of "al-Qaeda Central," but rather splinter groups that are not necessarily sanctioned to carry out attacks or even use the al-Qaeda brand. Though al-Qaeda is committed to a globalized jihad and seeks to train mujahideen all over the world, Dr. Lahoud cautioned against empowering al-Qaeda by crediting it with attacks that other jihadi groups, possibly more threatening than al-Qaeda, have carried out.

Ms. Jessica Huckabey, Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses, highlighted a number of records from the CRRC collection that shed light on what al-Qaeda members were thinking during the time of the 9/11 attacks. She pointed to specific documents such as the "Chat from the Top of the World" series that show, among other things, internal disputes within al-Qaeda. Like Harun's account, these reveal self-criticism on the part of some of its most important figures.³ These records show that al-Qaeda members such as chief al-Qaeda strategist Abu Musa'ab Al-Suri, have themselves said that in light of al-Qaeda's goal to create a global Islamic Caliphate, the group has indeed failed and is on the decline.

Dr. Flagg Miller, Associate Professor at the University of California at Davis, also provided an insightful look at some of al-Qaeda's internal divisions through his study of some 1,500 audiotapes captured from one of Osama bin Laden's former residences in Kandahar, Afghanistan.⁴ Dr. Miller discussed early rifts between the Saudi-

³ See AQ-SHPD-D-001-412, "Chat from the Top of the World: Part 1," Late 1990, Conflict Records Research Center, Washington, DC; AQ-SHPD-001-413, "Chat from the Top of the World: Number 1b," Late 1990, Conflict Records Research Center, Washington, DC; AQ-SHPD-D-000-288, "Chat from the Top of the World Number 7," Undated, Conflict Records Research Center, Washington, DC, as only some examples.

⁴ For more information on Dr. Miller's work with the bin Laden audio archive, see <http://religions.ucdavis.edu/people/faculty/miller>

Yemeni al-Qaeda axis as well as the Saudi-Egyptian axis. He explained that at al-Qaeda's al-Farouq training camp, for example, bin Laden may have been somewhat marginalized by his focus on liberating the Arabian Peninsula, which clashed with the pan-jihadi outlook of other original al-Qaeda leadership. He also spoke about the development of early al-Qaeda *aqidah*, or doctrine, which focused more on internal debates between Muslims than on how to treat the non-Muslims, that, al-Qaeda would eventually target as well.

Dr. David Cook, Professor of Religious Studies at Rice University, argued that tacit religious support of al-Qaeda among conservative and mainstream Islamic communities since 9/11 has largely collapsed. He pointed to interviews given and messages delivered by senior al-Qaeda leaders like bin Laden to show that since 9/11, when al-Qaeda gained world attention, the group has had to defend and justify its actions such as *takfir* (the labeling of Muslims as non-believers by other Muslims), the exigencies of jihad, and martyrdom operations. Acknowledging that one of al-Qaeda's primary goals is to have the greater Muslim community join its cause, Dr. Cook explained how the group's theological justifications failed on a number of levels, also pointing to its decline.

Panel 3: "What should be the focus of AQAM studies for the future?" Academics and policy-makers should continue to work together to best understand and defeat AQAM and other terrorist threats. Academics, who sometimes have greater leeway in their community, must ask challenging questions and think "outside the box." Questions must be addressed such as the future of AQAM in the world of a post-Arab Spring and rising China, the influence of bin Laden's death on al-Qaeda's ability to recruit and secure funding, and how to deal with growing radicalization at home.

Mr. Brian Fishman, Counterterrorism Research Fellow at the New America Foundation, posed a number of interesting questions to the academic and research communities. He exhorted them to ask the

necessary and hard questions that can provide intelligence analysts and policy-makers, who may lack the time to do so, with the analysis and information that is needed to preempt attacks by AQAM in the future. Mr. Fishman spoke about how different terrorist groups organize and act out their violence, citing differences in the way that Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's current emir, and the deceased head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musa'ab al-Zarqawi, thought about their target populations. He asked scholars and researchers to think about al-Qaeda's views on China in the context of the changing global environment and al-Qaeda's concept of the "far enemy." Mr. Fishman also proposed a study on al-Qaeda's history in failed states, where he proposed they may in fact have more trouble establishing a foothold because they are sometimes seen as a foreign, external force. He also challenged the research community to analyze online radicalization, asking whether people are actually radicalized online or if jihadi websites and forums instead just reinforce extremists' views.

Dr. Zabikhulla Saipov of The University of World Economy and Diplomacy (Tashkent, Uzbekistan), delivered a unique presentation on Uzbekistan's counterterrorism strategies, offering a framework with which to view Uzbek counterterrorism efforts and Central Asia's position in the context of international counterterrorism. Dr. Saipov noted that the region has become an area of growing interest to the United States for its counterterrorism efforts, its importance for supplying U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and its energy resources. He explained how the Uzbek government uses various tactics such as the training of imams, counter-radicalization and nationalism campaigns, and efforts to decouple local Islamists from global ones as part of its strategy to counter unofficial Islam in the country. Dr. Saipov concluded that the United States could learn from Uzbekistan's relatively successful strategy to counter religious extremism in its own country.

Ms. Anne Stenersen, Research Fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI),

addressed the question of how to study AQAM in the future by focusing on al-Qaeda's relationship with the Taliban from 1996-2001 as a way to understand how al-Qaeda, a stateless organization, forms alliances with local groups in order to survive.⁵ Like Mr. Fishman, Ms. Stenersen encouraged the audience to question its assumptions about al-Qaeda and terrorism in general. She made use of CRRC records on al-Qaeda's relationship with the Taliban to challenge, among other things, the conventional wisdom that the al-Qaeda-Taliban relationship was a pragmatic one in which the Taliban relied on al-Qaeda's funding resources and Arab fighters in its war against the Northern Alliance. Captured records have shown, she argued, that in fact it was the local context, rather than the international one, which best explains the relationship between the two groups. At the time, there was a debate within the jihadi community about the legitimacy of the jihad against the Northern Alliance. In this context, Ms. Stenersen posited that the Taliban allowed al-Qaeda to run the al-Farouq camp, mentioned previously by Dr. Miller, as a means to shore up support for its jihad amongst the foreign fighters entering Afghanistan. The Taliban assumed that as bin Laden was a well-known figure, his support for them would encourage other foreign fighters to do so as well. Many scholars have examined the basis for the al-Qaeda-Taliban relationship, but by looking at the Taliban's decision-making process through the use of the CRRC archive, Ms. Stenersen was able to uncover a policy node that may prove useful when examining al-Qaeda's relationship with local groups in the future.

Dr. Thomas Lynch III, Distinguished Research Fellow for Near East & South Asia at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, discussed Osama bin Laden's role in al-Qaeda and how academic and policy-makers might think about the group after his death. Like Ms. Stenersen, Dr. Lynch emphasized that the story of al-Qaeda in South Asia must be viewed in

⁵ Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt (FFI), www.ffi.no/en.

the context of a local conflict involving al-Qaeda, other Salafi-Jihadi groups, and a proxy war between Pakistan and India. Depending on bin Laden's legacy, this local conflict could affect the global arena in various ways. Dr. Lynch challenged academics and scholars to understand how influential bin Laden's charisma and fund-raising capabilities really were, whether al-Qaeda's "brand," as mentioned by Dr. Stout, will remain as powerful with bin Laden dead, and how al-Qaeda will continue to fare in a dynamic Pakistan. Like many of the other speakers and panelists, Dr. Lynch predicted that regardless of the bin Laden legacy, the world will continue to see "lone wolf" terrorists, but that the strength of the al-Qaeda core is waning. He also discussed al-Qaeda's relationship with the Taliban, which he believes will begin to erode further now that bin Laden is gone, as he was the main bridge between these groups.

Mr. Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, PhD Candidate in War Studies at King's College in London and Research Fellow at The International Center for the Study of Radicalism, spoke about al-Qaeda's media strategy and the radicalization of Muslims living in the West. Specifically, Mr. Meleagrou-Hitchens examined a CRRC record titled "On the Jihadi Media: How To Communicate To the Public," to explain the evolution of al-Qaeda's media strategy through the eyes of Abu Hafis al-Masri, one of al-Qaeda's top operational and strategic commanders, now deceased; and Abu Musa'ab al-Suri, a revered al-Qaeda strategic thinker.⁶ Both al-Masri and al-Suri saw the need for a comprehensive media strategy, employing specific jihadi media cells, in order to influence populations not just in the Islamic but in the Western world as well. Mr. Meleagrou-Hitchens posited that perhaps Anwar al-Awlaqi, killed by U.S. forces in Yemen in September, 2011, was capable of leading the jihadi media charge in the West. Al-Awlaqi made use of the extensive

⁶ See AQ-SHPD-D-001-157, "Jihad media document, regarding means of communication with the population and the importance of slogans and truthfulness," 1990, Conflict Records Research Center, Washington, DC.

network of online jihadi media and having been raised in the United States, was able to connect with Western Muslims by speaking English and appealing to Western sensibilities. In fact, he was known to have played an important role in radicalizing a number of terrorists in the United States and abroad. Al-Awlaqi would have sought to convince them, as Mr. Meleagrou-Hitchens explained is necessary to radicalize Muslims living in the West, that the Western world is at war with Islam, and that this war is taking place not only in faraway lands like Iraq and Afghanistan, but on their doorsteps as well.

Questions for Further Research: The CRRC and Johns Hopkins University Center for Advanced Governmental Studies conference, “Ten Years Later: Insights on al-Qaeda’s Past & Future through Captured Records,” pointed the way for government and civilian researchers to explore important questions regarding AQAM and terrorism in order to better understand the past, as well as to inform scholarship and policy-making in the future. Such questions include: How should we understand AQAM in both the local and global contexts? How can academics and scholars best help intelligence analysts and policy-makers understand groups like al-Qaeda? How can we better employ historical perspectives on AQAM in the policy-making of today? How can policy-makers exploit differences between terrorists groups and their ideologies? How effective is online radicalization and what is the best way to combat it? What can the United States learn from other countries’ counterterrorism efforts? What is the future of al-Qaeda after the death of Osama bin Laden? How should the United States counter radicalization and terrorism at home?

The Conflict Records Research Center:

The CRRC’s mission is to facilitate the use of captured records to support research within both the civilian academic and governmental communities on issues such as terrorism, authoritarian regimes, nuclear proliferation, and adversarial policy-making. The Center was established in 2010 by the

Department of Defense to fulfill Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s intent to enable research into captured records with “complete openness and rigid adherence to academic freedom and integrity.” The CRRC was created at the direction of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) (OUSD(P)) and is hosted at the National Defense University under the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS). A Senior Leadership Council (SLC) made up of defense officials, scholars, and the CRRC director provides a Charter and Standard Operations Procedures for the Center.

Digital copies of records captured in Afghanistan and Iraq reside in a limited-access U.S. Government database. The CRRC is mandated to make a significant portion of these records available to researchers as quickly and responsibly as possible while taking into account legitimate national security concerns, the integrity of the academic process, and risks to innocents or third parties. The CRRC currently holds two collections: the AQAM collection and the Saddam Hussein’s Iraq collection. Included in the AQAM collection are records on al-Qaeda doctrine, theology, operations, recruiting, histories of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and other countries, and terrorist training manuals. Researchers have access to around 4,200 pages of primary source material in the AQAM collection. The Saddam Hussein collection includes audio tapes of Saddam discussing political and military matters with his top generals and advisors, Iraqi intelligence reports, and Ba’ath Party memoranda. Researchers have access to 29,000 pages and around 150 hours of audiotape in the Saddam Hussein collection. All records in the collection are available in their original languages (mostly Arabic) and are fully translated and searchable in English. In the near future the records will be searchable in the original language as well. Indices for both collections, containing the full list of available records, are available online.⁷

⁷ For more information on the CRRC and to view a list of its holdings, visit the CRRC website at www.ndu.edu/inss.

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