
William H. Price, Jr
Lt. Col., CAC, O-21903
BRIEF
OF
POLITICAL MEASURES IN THE PROMOTION OF DEFENSE
AND
SECURITY
(For Oral Presentation)
1. THE PROBLEM

The subject is given as "Political measures in the promotion of security and defense." In order to convert this into a problem I have taken the liberty of changing the subject to read "What political measures should be employed to promote defense and security."

2. ASSUMPTIONS

In order to form a firm basis upon which the problem can be based certain assumptions are deemed necessary. These are as follows:

(a) That the discussion will concern political measures from the viewpoint of a citizen of the United States of America.

(b) That the discussion will be based on the present day world situation.

3. FACTS IN THE CASE

It is felt that the two basic facts in the case are the present-day world situation and the Constitution of the United States of America.

In "broad-brush" terms the present-day world situation is that the world today is divided into two opposing camps which are in open conflict on the political, economic, and ideological planes, but which are largely quiescent on the military plane. One camp is led by the U.S.; the other by the U.S.S.R.

In similar broad terms the essential facts as they relate to the Constitution are:

(1) That all treaties or international agreements must be approved by Congress.

(2) That only Congress can declare war.

(3) That only Congress can appropriate money.

(4) That only Congress can set the size of the armed forces.
4. DISCUSSION

Before a subject can be properly discussed it must be defined. Webster defines politics as "the science and the art of government." Applied internally it is known as domestic politics; externally applied it is known as foreign politics. For the purposes of this monograph the discussion will be limited to foreign politics. However, it must be understood that foreign politics depend to a large extent on domestic politics, and, not only this, but domestic politics in the pure sense may also affect security and defense.

It is essential to understand also the basic nature of politics. As a general rule, men and nations tend to do that which is to the interest of themselves or their particular group, and, more often than not, these measures are at the expense of other individuals, groups or nations. Inevitably this leads to conflict.

It is in order to accomplish the aims of a nation that the tool of foreign policy is used. Used wisely, and only so far as it can be backed by power, it can resolve the conflict mentioned above, or, failing to resolve it, resort to war as the ultimate tool of foreign policy can be had.

We spoke of the national aims -- for any country the broad basic aim is to secure for its peoples a maximum of security and prosperity. Again, however, it must be realized that ideological drives or megalomaniac drives of persons in power in a nation, may drive a nation to the point of attempted world domination.

It is necessary also to understand the relationship of political, economic, and military factors in security and defense. In this country, the economic and military factors stem from and are largely dependent on the political factors. We must remember Clausewitz who said "War is but an extension of political measures into the realm of force."

Having established these points of the discussion, I shall make the special assumption that all of you are more or less familiar with
what the United States has been doing in the way of foreign policy
and I shall proceed direct to my conclusions and recommendations.

5. CONCLUSIONS:

(a) That nations tend to do that which is to their best interests,
even though such actions may be, and usually are, to the
detriment of some other nation or nations.

(b) That conflict between nations is inevitable and will lead
eventually to war until such time as all peoples give
allegiance to a common government.

(c) That nations attempt to secure their national aims through
foreign policy which succeeds short of war only if backed
by adequate force, but failing short of war, foreign
policy is extended on into war.

(d) That the United States foreign policy with reference to
the world today is mainly engaged in combatting the biggest
threat to world peace and thus our security, namely Russian
expansionism under the guise of the ideology of Communism.

(e) That three main facets of our foreign policy are:

(1) Those measures devoted to an attempt to solve the
differences between the US and USSR by negotiation
in a concert of power, the U.N.

(2) Those measures, taken outside the U.N. designed to
contain Russian expansionism.

(3) Those measures designed to weaken Russian war
potential and increase the war potential of her
opponents.

(f) That the means utilized by the U.S. to accomplish the broad
objectives in "e" above include the following measures:

(1) Alliances, treaties, pacts and agreements as best
exemplified by the Rio Pact and the North Atlantic
Pact.

(2) Gaining of political influence as exemplified by our
increasing assumption of world leadership.
(3) Promotion of political conditions which remove causes for war as exemplified by U.S. promotion of the U.N., and aid in stabilizing governments of friendly nations.

(4) Utilization of a concert of power as exemplified by promotion of the U.N.O.

(5) Utilization of a Balance of Power as exemplified by treaties.

(6) Encouraging external and internal dissension among potential enemies as exemplified by the Voice of America broadcasts. This is being done half-heartedly however.

(7) The use of economic power to strengthen potential friends and weaken potential enemies as exemplified by the ECA and our agreements with Belgium on uranium and with Saudi Arabia on oil.

(8) The maintenance of strong armed forces.

(9) The acquisition of military influence in many countries as exemplified by the expansion of our military mission program.

(g) That U.S. foreign policy has in general accomplished its purposes, but that there are several weak links among which are the following:

(1) The possibility of aroused antagonism in the Moslem world because of our stand on Israel.

(2) The failure to relax its stand on the Franco Regime of Spain.

(3) The failure to exploit Japan as a balance of power in the Far East.

(4) The failure to take full advantage of propaganda war against the USSR.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

(A) That the U.S. continue its present policy with respect to all areas except the Middle East and the Far East.

(b) That the U.S. alter its policy somewhat in the Middle East
to insure that the Moslem world is not antagonized.

(c) That the U.S. alter its policy somewhat in the Far East
to build up Japan as an ally and a counterbalance to
Russian power.

(d) That the policy of ideological warfare as exemplified by
the Voice of America broadcasts be intensified.
POLITICAL MEASURES IN THE PROMOTION
OF
DEFENSE AND SECURITY
BY
WILLIAM H PRICE, JR.
Lt Col, CAC, O-21903
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POLITICAL MEASURES IN THE PROMOTION OF DEFENSE
AND SECURITY

1. THE PROBLEM:

The subject as given in the directive is "Political Measures in the Promotion of Defense and Security." With a little stretch of the imagination, very little change in the basic meaning, and the addition of a few words we can arrive at this restatement as a problem: "An Analysis of Political Measures in the Promotion of Defense and Security." See Annex 1, Directive.

2. ASSUMPTIONS:

In order to form a firm basis upon which the problem can be discussed, certain assumptions are deemed necessary as follows:

(a) That the discussion will concern political measures from the viewpoint of a citizen of the United States of America.

(b) That the discussion will be based on the present-day world situation.

See Annex 3, Justification of Assumptions.

3. FACTS:

(a) Present World Situation

The world today is divided into two opposing camps which are in open conflict on the political, economic, and ideological planes, but which are largely quiescent on the military plane. One camp is led by the U.S.; the other by the USSR. See Annex 4 appended.

(b) United States of America Constitution

One other fact must be considered in studying political measures as they relate to this country -- and that is the Constitution. All of our political moves must by law be within its framework. The essential points as they relate to this discussion are:

(1) That all treaties or international agreements must be approved by Congress.
That only Congress can declare war.

That only Congress can appropriate money.

That only Congress can set the size of the Armed Forces.

4. DISCUSSION:

(a) General Discussion

(1) Definition of Politics

Before we can properly discuss "politics" or political measures it is essential to know of which we speak. Webster defines "politics" as "the science and art of government." This science and art may be applied internally to a nation, in which case it is known as domestic politics, or, it may be applied externally to relations with other nations, in which case it is known as foreign politics.

(2) Nature of Politics

A moment on the nature of politics may be in order. In general, men and nations tend to do that which is to the interest of themselves, or their particular group, and, more often than not these measures are at the expense of some other individuals, groups or nations. Inevitably this leads to conflict, conflict between groups in a nation, and conflict between nations. The conflict between nations may take the form of diplomatic action, economic action, or military action with the final resort being the use of military force as an extension of political action. Within a nation there is resort to the courts, to the legislature, to economic action (strikes), or finally to revolution.

There are two fundamental differences, however, between conflict within a nation and conflict between nations. In the case of the conflicts within a nation, there is firstly, a sovereign state with complete jurisdiction over both disputants; and, secondly the disputants within a nation usually have a common language, culture, and inheritance, and have a common allegiance to their government. Since the converse is true of conflicts between nations it naturally follows that maintenance of peace between nations is ordinarily much more difficult than maintenance of peace within a nation.
(3) Exclusion of Domestic Politics

It was noted under the definition of "politics" that the subject could be classified under the two broad headings of "domestic politics" and "foreign politics." Further discussion of political measures will be limited to "foreign political measures" since the scope contained in the Directive (see Annex 1) contains only foreign political measures.

(4) Interrelationship of Political, Economic, and Military Factors

As intimated before, political measures are only one of the factors that influence security and defense. Most writers list three such measures -- political, economic, and military -- grouping thereunder all other factors which other writers list, such as ideological, propagandistic, and sociological.

Of the above three factors by far the most important is the political -- whether the condition be war or peace, or whether the measures be directed internally or externally. In our country all men, money, and laws for security and defense stem ultimately from our political body, the Congress. Even the strategic direction of a war is subject to the guidance of politics. In fact, Clausewitz has said that "war is but an extension of political measures into the realm of force."

It becomes obvious then that economic or military moves stem from political measures, and that the factors are usually so inextricably bound together that logical separation is almost impossible.

It must be admitted, however, that political measures are not the only fount of effect on security, as witness the "Friendship Train", a propagandistic move (whether intended as such or not). This event was not initiated or particularly furthered by Congress, yet it did tend to promote our security.

(5) Object of Foreign Policy

There is a deep and fundamental goal toward which politics in the higher sense should be directed. Consider for a moment why peoples voluntarily band together into nations. The answer is obvious -- to increase their security, to increase their economic
well-being, or, more usually, to increase both. This being the case then, it is understandable that fundamentally a nation's domestic and foreign policy is normally directed toward the goal of securing for its citizens a maximum of security and prosperity.

It must be realized, however, that in some nations ideological drives, or, particularly in autocratic or dictatorial nations, the power thirst of individuals in power, may drive a nation beyond the point of the mere securing of security and prosperity to the point of attempted world domination.

(b) Discussion of U.S. Foreign Policy

(1) Western Hemisphere

With regard to the Western Hemisphere, and in broad terms, the effort and interest of United States foreign policy has been to weld more strongly bonds of harmony and trust. Especially have we succeeded in the case of Mexico and Canada. Not only is it unnecessary to guard these borders, but there exist Joint Defense Boards of the United States with each of our neighbors.

Specifically relative to Latin America, our policy there as late as the 1920's was at its best one of neglect, and, at its worst was one of Teddy Roosevelt's so-called "Big Stick." Now, however, we have embarked in a new direction in the belief that bonds forged by mutual interests and understanding are stronger than those forged by the threat of the sword. The Pan American Union was the first step in this direction. Politico-economic in nature, it has as its goal the fostering of better political and economic relations between the U.S. and all Latin American nations. As the years passed, and as the Axis Powers became a major threat to the security of the world, our interest in the nations to the south became more pronounced. Indications of this were the Inter-American Solidarity Declaration which came out of the Lima Conference of 1938; the Havana Conference of 1940; the March 1945 Act of Chapultepec; and finally the Rio Pact of 1947 and the Bogota Conference of 1948. All of these represent advances in relations, but of all, the most important is the Rio Pact,
for it is this pact which takes the present day world situation into account and which, by a politico-military alliance, unites 21 of the 58 United Nations into a common front against a common enemy, the USSR.

Another item of note with relation to the American nations, minor in scope, but with possible far reaching effects, is the growth of U.S. military missions in every country. This, if handled properly, can result in strengthening immeasurably understanding and military cooperation between our country and the other American nations.

As for our relations with Canada, we have as evidence of our policy the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940 which set up a permanent Joint Defense Board, and the Hyde Park Agreement of 1941 which, for the duration of the war at least, meshed the economy of the two countries. Although this economic agreement has expired, it has been replaced by peacetime trade agreements. In addition there is no doubt but that the Joint Defense Board has plans for remeshing the economies in the event of a common war.

U.S.-Canadian relations have been furthered also by the Atlantic Pact which is to the North Atlantic Nations what the Rio Pact is to the Western Hemisphere nations.

(2) Europe and the Near East

The problem in Europe and the Near East is much more complex. Here Russia has the visible geographical advantage of territorial contiguity or proximity. She may be presumed to be just as acutely aware as we of the strategic importance as a base for political or military operations of Western Europe, the Mediterranean, and the landbridge of the Near East which links three continents. It is in Europe and the Near East that U.S. and Russian interests clash most sharply.

The policy being pursued by the U.S. in this area may be termed bifocal. In one view this policy is directed through the United Nations Organization toward arranging some sort of understanding with Russia, if such is possible. In the other, and
simultaneous view, U.S. policy is directed to containing Russia --
this as a measure of preparedness against failure to arrange an understanding with Russia in the U.N. This policy of containment, which at the same time can be interpreted as a move to extend our influence, finds expression in our lending of political, economic, and military aid to critical areas. To be more specific, I am referring to such matters as the aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, and the North Atlantic Pact.

Associated with this aspect of our policy toward Europe, and as an integral part of the economic recovery of Europe, our policy is that of a unified Germany, at least in the western zone, which will enjoy a level of production substantially above the level prescribed at Potsdam in 1945. In short we realize that German economic recovery is an essential to the economic recovery of all western Europe, and, as such, it becomes a part of our politico-economic effort to contain Russia, based, of course, on the premise that Communism does not transplant well into a prosperous society. It is our hope that the Marshall Plan (ECA), a politico-economic move, and the North Atlantic Pact, a politico-military move will have the desired results of enabling the Western European nations, including a unified Western Germany, to be economically and militarily strong to the point where they can resist political and economic moves, and for a time at least, military moves by the USSR.

As for the Near East, the greatest outward manifestation of our policy is the Truman Doctrine implemented with aid to Greece and Turkey. By the furnishing of economic aid and military aid in the form of materiel and training, and then by backing these with an un-written but understood political commitment to preserve their integrity from outside aggression, we hope to enable these countries to resist the pressures applied by the Russian.

(3) The Middle East

In the Middle East, vital to our interests because of its strategic location and because of the tremendous oil reserves there,
our policy has been best exemplified in Palestine and Iran.

In Palestine it was essential to end the internal disorders there in order to eliminate a breeding spot for communism. Our task was to back the Jew in preference to the Arab. Here is one of those cases where the basic policy of keeping unrest at a minimum was good, but where in implementation of that policy we may have done more harm than good by antagonizing the Moslem world. This particular case also illustrates the strong influence of domestic politics on foreign politics, for although it may have been more expedient to take one stand based on national security interests, we were forced to another stand by pressure groups within our country.

In Iran we have been actively employing our policy of containment of Russia since shortly after V-J day. At that time Russia, in defiance of existing treaties, kept her forces in Northern Iran far beyond the agreed time for withdrawal. While so doing she was putting pressure on Iran for oil concessions, and, what was far more important, priming the Azerbaidjans to revolt. The eventual aim, of course, was to bring all Iran into the Soviet sphere, giving Russia an outlet on the Indian ocean and flanking our vital oil holdings in Saudi Arabia.

The U.S. quickly reacted with notes, becoming stronger and stronger in tone, demanding withdrawal of Soviet troops. In addition we brought the question up in the U.N. who, as a collective agency, applied strong diplomatic pressure. As a result of these two actions, probably more because of the first, Russia yielded and withdrew after having secured oil concessions. Upon Soviet withdrawal, the Iranians quickly put down the incipient revolt, and, in 1947, abrogated the oil treaty. Moscow screamed but Iran stood firm in the knowledge that U.S. and world opinion were on her side -- strong enough probably that military aid would be sent if necessary to preserve her integrity. Since then the U.S. has provided millions of dollars credit to the Iranians to bolster their economy and military strength.

(4) The Far East

In the Far East our foreign policy insofar as Russia is con-
cerned, hinges around the countries of Japan, China and Korea.

In Korea, although the conflict there is open, and thus more spectacular, our policy is solely one of containment, of insuring the integrity of that part of Korea south of the 38th parallel.

In the case of China and Japan the conflict is more hidden and revolves around our policy of a balance of power and of containment. We need in that area as an ally a country oriented east to the U.S., and that is stable and powerful enough to offset Russian power in the area. Our obvious and preferable choice is China, and on that nation we have placed our bets up to the present time — bets in the form of money, war materials, U.S. officers to aid training, and diplomatic pressures. But China, torn by internal strife and half occupied by a Soviet influenced government, will, even though miracles happen and the Communists are halted, be weak and unstable for many years to come.

This leaves only one practical alternative—to support Japan as the balance to Russia in the East. To implement this policy will require many changes. There must be a build-up of Japanese economy to a point of self-sufficiency, and eventually there must be a peace treaty executed. Then Japan must be allowed armed forces, at least army and air, sufficient to defend her own country.

There is, of course, another side to this question. We must understand the implications relative to other nations who have interests in the area — in the main these are Australia, China, and the Philippines. Undoubtedly, such a move will to an extent be prejudicial to their interests.

What the U.S. will do is still a diplomatic secret but there are indications that at the least we shall attempt to make Japan's economy self sufficient.

(5) In the United Nations Organization

As mentioned before, U.S. foreign policy may be considered to be bifocal — one phase being prosecuted through the U.N. and the other phase through normal diplomatic channels. In theory it had been planned that the U.N., as a collective security agency, would,
by consent of power, be the major agency of foreign policy of all
member nations. In practice this has not been proved true, for
the so called "veto" insisted on by the USSR, and amply used by her,
has to a large extent nullified the power of the U.N. to act as a
concert of power. However, the planners of the U.N. must have fore-
seen trouble, for there is inserted into the U.N. charter a provision
which allows member nations to seek security in alliances -- a
reversion to a balance of power concept. To date, most U.S. foreign
policy has been implemented without the U.N., but there is a growing
tendency in the world toward the concept of collective security.
Obviously, until the matter of the veto is resolved, nations will
find it necessary to their national interests to work toward a bal-
ance of power.

5. CONCLUSIONS

(a) That nations, just as individuals or groups of individuals,
tends to do that which is to its best interests, even though such
actions are usually to the detriment of some other nation or nations.

(b) That nations attempt to secure their national aims through
foreign policy, preferably by methods short of war, but with war
as an extension of that policy if other methods fail.

(c) That economic and military measures spring from political
measures and are a subfacet of those measures.

(d) That the goal of the foreign policy of a nation is to secure
for its people a maximum of security and prosperity.

(e) That conflict between nations is inevitable and likely to erupt
on the military plane until such time as nations are willing to
surrender much of their sovereignty to a common world nation.

(f) That the Western Democracies are today engaged in a struggle
with the USSR on all save the military plane in an effort by both
sides to secure their national aims.

(g) That the U.S., as leader of the Western Democracies, is
utilising all means short of war to insure world peace by building
an overwhelming balance of power on her side.
That the means utilized by the U.S. include the following measures:

2. Gaining of political influence as exemplified by our increasing assumption of world leadership.
3. Promotion of political conditions which remove causes for war as exemplified by U.S. promotion of the U.N., and aid in stabilizing governments of friendly nations.
4. Utilization of a concert of power as exemplified by promotion of the U.N.O.
5. Utilization of a Balance of Power as exemplified by recent treaties.
6. Encouraging external and internal dissension among potential enemies as exemplified by the Voice of America broadcasts. This is being done half-heartedly however.
7. The use of economic power to strengthen potential friends and weaken potential enemies as exemplified by the ECA and our agreements with Belgium on uranium and with Saudi Arabia on oil.
8. The maintenance of strong armed forces.
9. The acquisition of military influence in many countries as exemplified by the expansion of our military mission program.

(i) That the U.S. has strengthened its security by political, economic, and military agreements with nations in opposition to Communism.

(j) That the weakest links in our foreign policy are with respect to the Middle East and the Far East.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) That the U.S. continue its present policy with respect to all areas except the Middle East and the Far East.
(b) That the U.S. alter its policy somewhat in the Middle East to insure that the Moslem world is not antagonized.
(c) That the U.S. alter its policy somewhat in the Far East to build up Japan as an ally and a counterbalance to Russian power.
(d) That the policy of ideological warfare as exemplified by the Voice of America broadcasts be intensified.
SUBJECT: Political Measures in the Promotion of Defense and Security.


NOTE TO STUDENTS:

1. The references above are furnished to give the student enough material with which to begin his research. It is anticipated that the student will make use of all other available sources in order to give adequate scope to his subject and, when appropriate, to complete development of the subject to date.

2. The scope suggested below is intended as a guide only, and is not to be construed as a limitation on the student's perusal of the subject.

SCOPE:

1. Measures directed upon territory of other states.
   a. Exclusion of potentially unfriendly influences.
   b. Acquisition of economic, military, or political influence.
   c. Occupation or annexation.

2. Political measures.
   a. Measures intended to avert threats to security: Alliances and friendly understandings, nonaggression pacts; promotion of political, economic, and intellectual conditions discouraging war through the removal of its principal causes.
   b. Pursuit of a policy of neutrality or isolation: Less effective than formerly, especially for states close to regions of conflict.
   c. Participation in "collective security", as through a league of nations.
   e. Military alliances.
   f. Encouragement of external or internal dissension among potential enemies.
   g. Use of economic and financial power to weaken potential enemies.
ANNEX 2

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2. PERIODICALS

ANNEX 3
ASSUMPTION JUSTIFICATION

It is felt that some justification of the foregoing assumptions may be worthwhile to show that they are essential to solving the problem.

Firstly, why must we consider the problem from the viewpoint of one country? The answer is this: that a political measure that may promote security and defense in one nation may be prejudicial to the interests of security of another nation if applied therein. For example, a national service law which drafts all manpower for labor or military service may greatly increase security in a country where labor is psychologically prepared for such a move, whereas in another country such a move may create so much resentment on the part of labor that the unrest caused would more than offset the gains to the potential for war.

Secondly, why must the discussion be related to a particular world situation? Again the answer is simply this: that a move which might promote security and defense under one set of world conditions might not do so under another. For example, if there existed in Western Europe a balance of power, friendly to us, and strong enough to force the USSR to expend all her effort and a year or more to defeat, it would weaken rather than augment our final war potential to provide huge sums to maintain large standing forces.
Annex 4

Summary of Present-Day World Conditions

Out of World War II has emerged a world more or less divided into two camps -- camps that are opposed politically, economically, ideologically, and socially. All the great powers, and most of the lesser, have by circumstances been forced to side one way or the other. Most of those that have not sided openly have, by virtue of the necessity of economic drives, been forced to embrace one ideology or the other. Still other nations are in a state of chaos from the internal and open conflict of the two ideologies. In short the world is a gigantic powder keg.

Backing these two camps are the only two superpowers to come out of the last war -- the U.S. and the USSR.

There is today between these two powers a rift. This is not new, for there has been a rift since the early days of the young American Republic. If, then, there has been a rift all along, why is the situation today so different? The reason is simple -- the rift has been widened by a change in the nature of the ideology of Russia and by an intensification of her activity in political, ideological, and economic spheres.

Until the October Revolution of 1917, Russian ideology was totalitarian and imperialistic in nature, but since that time there has emerged a government whose aims were not only to obtain security for their own country, but, because of dedication to Marxism, was committed to fostering world revolution with ultimate aim of world domination.

As mentioned, political differences were also accentuated by the end of World War II. Until that time political differences were more or less readily solved because our spheres of influence touched so lightly and because there was a balance of power. In the west the balance was Germany, and in the east Japan. But, today the political
interests of the U.S. and the USSR impinge directly, particularly in Korea, Austria, and Germany, and there is no adequate balance of power in either the East or West. In the attempt by both sides to build such a balance there is inevitably conflict.

Toward the end of World War II and since, the USSR has been building for herself a belt of satellite nations, presently comprising the nations of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. John Foster Dulles says of these countries:

"... which are not yet ripe for incorporation into the Soviet Union, but which are close enough to it to be amenable to the influence of Soviet Military Power. The zone recently has been or is occupied by the USSR. Where there is no occupation there is fear of it. Governments there are under strong inducement to put their foreign policy, army, and most important of all their secret police and censorship into the hands of persons who take considerable guidance from Moscow. There are currently efforts to extend this zone to include other nearby countries."

The countries into which the USSR is attempting to extend her influence are Finland, Greece, Iran, and China.

In addition to this setting up of a belt of Satellites the USSR is trying and sometimes succeeding in causing unrest in other countries such as Italy, Siam, Burma, and Indonesia.

In an attempt to lessen U.S. prestige and to facilitate her aims, the USSR has always applied pressure at one place or another, in the hopes that they would succeed somewhere. Examples are the Berlin Blockade, the espousing of the Greek Rebel Cause, the pressures on Turkey and on Iran, and the formation of the Cominform to combat the Marshall Plan.

This then is the situation. There is the USSR, the bastion of Communism, which now exercises influence over many satellites and
who seeks to extend that influence; and there is the U.S. who is attempting to halt this expansion of Soviet power and to counter Soviet aims in those countries which have not yet fallen under her spell. In a small way the U.S. is also attempting a counter-ideological war through the Voice of America, broadcasts directed at Soviet and Soviet dominated peoples.