

# **Developing a Self-Sustaining Afghan National Army**

**A Monograph  
by  
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## **Abstract**

Developing a Self-Sustaining Afghan National Army by MAJ Trahon T. Mashack, US Army, 52 pages.

The United States' (US) invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the subsequent removal of the Taliban regime are considered monumental successes. In the wake of this success remained the challenge of developing an Afghan National Army (ANA) in order to defend the democratically elected Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). This monograph proposes that international assistance, the development of internal Afghan industrial capacity and improved strategic level mentorship are the critical components in forming a self-sustaining ANA. The approach to analyzing ANA development centered on four areas within this research. ANA logistics culture was studied by reviewing the current, past and a desired logistics system to determine its potential for self-sufficiency. Regional neighbors were analyzed to identify their relationships with Afghanistan that could enhance partnered efforts in order to improve internal capacity. The analysis then explored the role of US advisors in Afghanistan as they seek to train and mentor Afghan leaders for the purpose of planning and executing strategic level logistics operations. Finally, the US success in developing a self-sustaining Greek National Army (GNA) following World War II offered some lessons learned that could be applied to the ongoing advisory effort in Afghanistan.

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## Introduction

The United States' invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and subsequent removal of the Taliban regime are considered monumental successes. In the aftermath of victory, however, Afghanistan returned to an all too familiar condition of being a failed state. In February 2009, seven years after the fall of the Taliban, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates told a senate committee "Afghanistan is the greatest military challenge facing the country."<sup>1</sup> Stabilizing Afghanistan is a key element in the United States effort to combat global terrorism. Building a capable Afghan National Army (ANA) promotes security within the region and denies a safe haven for terrorist groups. Combined Security Transition Command –Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is the lead agency responsible for developing Afghan National Security Forces. Working closely with the Afghan government and partner nations, CSTC-A developed a campaign plan as a framework to increase and sustain the Afghan Army. This monograph proposes that international assistance, the development of internal Afghan industrial capacity and improved strategic level mentorship are the critical components in forming a self-sustaining ANA.

Denying Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorist groups is important to US efforts to prosecute the global war on terror (GWOT). Afghanistan represents the chaotic nature of the current conflict and reflects the broader struggle to enable legitimate governments to exert effective control over ungoverned spaces. It is a place of limited central government influence, autonomous tribal communities, non-existent industrial capacity, and primitive infrastructure. This has produced a fragile Afghan environment that is susceptible to foreign influence and jihadist. The goal of the United States National Security Strategy (NSS) is to support weakened states such as Afghanistan, by integrating them into the international community to promote

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<sup>1</sup> Demetri Sevastopulo, "Afghanistan is Greatest Challenge," *Financial Times.com* (January 2009), <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8elf7d74-ec9e-11dd-a-534-0000779fd2ac.html> (accessed March 28, 2009).

development and enhance international security.<sup>2</sup> To assist Afghanistan, the US in 2001 employed elements from every domain of national power to stabilize the country. President Obama is now responsible for managing this commitment as his administration continues the work of the Bush administration.

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) flows from the NSS and informs the National Military Strategy (NMS).<sup>3</sup> Both strategies result from an assessment of the current and future international security environment. These strategies are tools to shape US security interest abroad. As the US builds its own internal capacity to fight terror it must also build capacity internationally. It is important to work with countries to combat terrorism but special emphasis must be placed on those countries at immediate risk. These countries have regions outside of governmental control that provide sanctuary for extremist groups. Eighteen years after the fall of the Soviet Union, the US effort has shifted from deterring the spread of communism to combating radical Islam. This threat could take the form of state or non-state actors who seek to destroy democratic institutions to promote their specific agendas. Therefore, it is within America's interest to weaken the credibility of terror groups and undermine their networks.

Achieving US objectives in Afghanistan involves building internal defense capacity. This presents a daunting challenge as nations such as Great Britain and the Soviet Union failed at the task. Both countries failed to adjust their doctrine to the realities of this harsh region as they were tailored to the meet the challenges of European battlefields. Now the US finds itself in Afghanistan with the task of building defense forces capable of defeating internal and external threats. CSTC-A is responsible for developing Afghanistan's defensive capability and released its

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<sup>2</sup> ILE Common Core,"National Security Strategy Documents" in C200 Strategic Environment National Strategy Documents, (FT Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2008), 3.

<sup>3</sup> "The National Defense Strategy 2008" <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008/> (accessed March 2, 2009).

campaign plan in September 2008. The plan provided the development structure of Afghan national military forces and police services over time, with consideration for partnership between the Afghan Government and the International Community.<sup>4</sup> CSTC-A's campaign plan is a continuation of previous agreements launched by the international community following the fall of the Taliban in 2001.

Providing security is essential for Afghanistan's growth and integration into the international community. The US-led CSTC-A, with the help of its international partners, will facilitate this process by building a defense structure from the ministry level to the Afghan kandak or battalion. The ANA's mission is to defend and deter aggression; defeat the insurgency and terrorism; and support Afghanistan's reconstruction and integration into the international community.<sup>5</sup> This mission statement provides the basis to develop the country's defense force structure. Afghan leaders acknowledged the ANA could not defeat existing security threats and requested international support and cooperation. The request from Afghan leaders was supported because the undermanned ANA could not conduct continuous clear and hold operations. Insurgent activity is widespread and the ANA lacks sufficient force to generate long-term success. To meet projected security requirements the administration announced plans to expand the ANA to 134,000 by December 2011.<sup>6</sup>

In order to sustain the ANA, the United States must assist by helping to develop a strategic logistics model tailored to meet the specific needs of the army. CSTC-A has the responsibility to not only develop forces capable of conducting raids to root out insurgents but to also create a logistics structure geared toward sustaining a fight without a foreseeable end. When

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<sup>4</sup> CSTC-A report, Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces, (September 20, 2008), 2.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, 5.

<sup>6</sup> FACTBOX-Afghan National Security Forces," *Reuters*, March 27, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSISL112818> (accessed 13 April 2009).

studying this dilemma, two areas offer immediate challenges that require action. It is essential to train and deploy a fighting force within the country to defeat an insurgent threat. It is just as important to develop robust logistics systems for a nation to sustain its national security force. A nation's defense supply system is historically tied to industry, which raises concern since Afghanistan lacks an industrial base. Improving the strategic level industrial support base is vital to the development, production, procurement, and distribution of equipment to the Afghan Ministry of Defense. Another challenge is the distribution of supplies and equipment from national depots to regional corps commands. The Ministry of Defense (MOD), with US help, receives equipment from foreign military sales and international donations. The MOD inventories and stores the equipment but the ANA lacks the capability to execute internal distribution. In a region of persistent conflict, distribution capability is essential to defeating an asymmetric threat.

Designing a logistics model to sustain the ANA requires a holistic approach to address the challenges faced by a young professional army unfamiliar with success against internal or external threats. True logistics requirements must be analyzed from both an Afghan and western perspective. Western countries understand the process of linking an industrial base to a capable defense force. Furthermore, professional schools in the west routinely train officers and non-commissioned officers on the importance of integrating logistics systems to sustain combat operations. The Afghans possess the experience of what really works in their rugged landscape. Many in the Afghan Army are also familiar with insurgent tactics and the rudimentary supply point methods utilized to sustain guerilla fighters. It would be easy to apply a "cookie cutter" approach to the Afghan logistics issue by providing money and equipment to the developing MOD. However, the challenge is cultivating a logistics culture that understands the complexities of warfare and is able to adjust in order to posture a uniformed force for success against a determined insurgency. To build a legacy of success, the US and the international community will have to study the requirements needed to promote an independently functioning ANA. This will involve the US and the IC providing the sustainment pipeline and an advisory force to ensure all

levels of logistics management are appropriately executed to sustain Afghan forces. At the other end of the spectrum, diplomatic efforts must be exercised to strengthen relationships with Afghanistan's neighbors.

The US may not agree with the policies of Afghanistan's neighbors but there are potential areas for the US to exploit in order to invite participation in shaping Afghanistan's future. China, Pakistan, and Russia share a similar concern, which is terrorism. Each country has experienced attacks from groups that have spent time planning and training in Afghanistan. A stable Afghanistan also allows for potential investment in mineral resources and natural energy extraction. Iran is negatively impacted by Afghanistan's opium production but also desires more trade with Afghanistan's western provinces. Stabilizing Afghanistan will encourage more focused opium eradication programs as well promote consistent trade. It is logical that Afghanistan seek these relationships in order to develop possible trade and invite additional foreign investment. Using the baseline of securing Afghanistan to deny sanctuary for terror groups is a start point for encouraging self-sustainment through regional partnerships. This may provide the long-term investment to grow the industrial base in order to provide the military material production to supply an Afghan defense logistics system.

## Literature Review

Afghanistan is a complex region, with a storied past. Studying its history beginning with European colonialism was important to understanding its initial development as a nation state. In determining what strategic logistics structure would sustain the Afghan National Army, the author examined four groups of literature: 1) an analysis of Afghan Army logistics present, past and future, 2) the likely impact of regional partnerships on the Afghan logistics system, 3) the role of US advisors in developing a functioning ANA logistics system, and 4) an examination of US advisory efforts to help the Greek National Army (GNA) defeat an insurgency following World War II.

## Afghan History

From the earliest recording of written history to the end of the European colonial era, Afghanistan's character was shaped by the battles of its neighbors. Persians to the west, Indians to the east and nomadic steppe warriors to the north<sup>7</sup> have battled on Afghan soil in order to achieve regional dominance. The expansion of the British Empire into the region was the force that propelled Afghanistan into its present existence. Following the loss of its American colony, the British concentrated their interests in Central Asia. By the 1840's, India became the new jewel in the British Empire as it provided prosperity stemming from its natural resources. To Great Britain's dismay, Russia soon encroached upon the region. Two geo-political events within the region validated Great Britain's concerns of Russian intrusion into Central Asia. First, Imperial Russia continued its expansion south by creating forts and bases in north central Asia. Secondly, Persia dropped its pro-British support to become an ally to Russia.

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<sup>7</sup> Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan A Military History From Alexander the Great to The Fall of the Taliban* (New York: De Capo Press, 2002), 7.

Members within the British government debated Russia's actions; their positions placed them into one of two groups. Imperialists argued the British must extend their presence into Afghanistan to block Russian expansion. Non-imperialists believed the empire was overextended and should limit itself to India. The fear of possibly losing India to Russia provided enough ammunition for the imperialist wing of parliament to win. Afghanistan would again be the battleground to determine regional dominance. In the spring of 1839, the British with over 30,000 Indian soldiers invaded Afghanistan to deter Russian aggression and exert control. By the spring of 1840, British led forces ended the Russian threat by overwhelming local Afghan resistance and establishing a defensive network. Eventually, Afghan tribes grew tired of their foreign invaders, which resulted in a coordinated campaign to expel the British. Between 1842 and 1919, three Afghan-Anglo Wars were fought between Afghan tribesmen and British led forces. In 1919, fighting ceased as both sides saw little to be gained by the war. It also helped that the Russian threat no longer existed, as the government lay in shambles following years of revolution and the end of the First World War. Amunullah Khan emerged as the recognized leader of Afghanistan. With brute force, he united the major Afghan tribes and signed the 1919 treaty with Great Britain. Attached to the treaty was a letter declaring Afghanistan "free and independent in its internal and external affairs."<sup>8</sup> Historians view this as the birth of the modern Afghan state.

## **US Strategy to Help Afghanistan**

Documents reflecting international efforts to support Afghanistan consisted of CSTC-A's 2008 Campaign Plan for Afghan Security Forces and reports from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) which examined ANA development since the 2001 US led invasion. Thirty years of war crippled Afghanistan, resulting in a weakened and under developed national defense force. Following the removal of the Taliban, the democratically elected Afghan

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<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*, 219.

government ratified a constitution in 2004, which emphasized the government's desire to safeguard its security from internal and external threats. The National Security Policy (NSP), a document produced by the US National Security Council (NSC), outlined the roles and responsibilities of Afghanistan's newly formed MOD.<sup>9</sup> As stated in the NSP, "The MOD/ANA will: maintain the sovereign territorial integrity of Afghanistan, uphold the Constitution, defend Afghanistan's Islamic values, and contribute to the establishment of an environment conducive to the prosperity of its people."<sup>10</sup> CSTC-A's 2008 Afghanistan Security Plan acknowledged the Afghan MOD could not manage its forces alone to meet internal and external threats and required security assistance from the international community (IC).

### **Current Strategic Logistical System**

The ANA provides the combat forces to defend the government and divides them into five corps located in different regions within Afghanistan. The GAO highlighted the gaps in sustaining this force with its comprehensive review of CSTC-A's Afghan Campaign Plan. The Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) have not developed a coordinated plan for completing and sustaining the Afghan National Army.<sup>11</sup> GAO assessed the planning in Afghanistan as too limited in scope and referred to plans as too military in nature, lacking the whole of government expertise from DOS to assist in determining near and long term resourcing requirements.<sup>12</sup> The strategic vision from DOS is desired in order to assist the development of internal institutions and build relationships with regional partners, thus promoting economic

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<sup>9</sup> CSTC-A Report, *Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces* (September 20, 2008), C-2.

<sup>10</sup> *ibid.*, C-2.

<sup>11</sup> GAO Report, *Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces*, GAO-08-661, (June 2008), 12.

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*, 12.

activity to help supply Afghan defense requirements. As reported by the GAO, less than 2 percent of units are assessed as fully capable of conducting their primary mission.<sup>13</sup> There are roughly 33 combat service support battalions (CSSB) to support the ANA's five corps, but no CSSB's are rated as fully capable of leading missions. GAO reports pointed to competing global priorities by DOD and shifts in procurement processes that prevented the maturation of logistics even as Taliban violence against coalition forces in Afghanistan intensified.

### **Previous Logistics System**

Few documents written in English describe the structure of the ANA prior to the US invasion. Most documents about the ANA are in Russian because the Soviets trained and equipped the ANA before its forces invaded in 1979. As a result, the author was able to infer the ANA's logistical capability from a limited number of professional articles, books and monographs recounting the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. Reviewing the material written on the Afghan military revealed two competing logistics systems that emerged because of the Soviet invasion. The first is the highly centralized supply system associated with the Soviet Army. Afghan Army officers studied Soviet military doctrine, which was drawn from their experiences in World War II and their battles on the European plain.<sup>14</sup> The Soviet logistics support system was highly centralized from rear echelons, leaving little room for flexibility.

The second logistics system to emerge because of the Soviet invasion was the less centralized distribution process executed by the mujahedeen.<sup>15</sup> Unable to beat the Soviets in a conventional fight, Afghan tribal leaders resorted to guerrilla tactics to defeat Soviet forces. External support received from the US, Great Britain and Saudi Arabia enabled individual

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<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, 3.

<sup>14</sup> Charles A. Russo Jr., *Soviet Logistics in the Afghanistan War* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, April 1991), 5.

<sup>15</sup> Lester W. Grau, "The Soviet-Afghan War: A Superpower Mired in the Mountains" *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1, (March 2004).

guerrilla factions to wage protracted campaigns. Supplies and cash generally flowed in through Pakistan; each guerilla faction stored supplies in remote storage depots within its area of operations. Unlike Soviet trained forces, mujahedeen commanders received national level support from external actors and directly controlled the procurement and distribution of equipment and supplies. The current ANA is composed of leaders who understand the Soviet and mujahedeen based logistics systems.

### **Desired System**

Little is written on the desired logistics system to sustain the ANA. Reviewing CSTC-A's Security Plan for Afghanistan, GAO reports and professional articles provided insight into the expectations of the ANA by the IC and US. CSTC-A's report concluded that the ANA is to defend and deter aggression against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interest and values of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA).<sup>16</sup> The author could infer from reviewing available documents that the desired logistical system is one able to resource the ANA as well as sustain its fight against internal and external threats. The GAO also identified DOS as an important link to developing an environment supportive of this logistics system. According to the GAO, DOS should provide the strategic vision of building Afghan industrial capacity to support a logistics system and develop regional partnerships in order to assist in sustaining stability. CSTC-A suggested the MOD modernize the acquisition process through the establishment of a Joint National Logistics Agency.<sup>17</sup> This action would serve two purposes. It would link the MOD to the commercial sector for material procurement and manage strategic logistics and critical commodities.

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<sup>16</sup> CSTC-A Report, *Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces*, (September 20, 2008), C-2.

<sup>17</sup> *ibid.*, A-6.

Since the fall of the Taliban, the US along with coalition partners have been building a security infrastructure that includes operational forces, sustaining institutions, and the general staff and ministry that direct those forces and institutions.<sup>18</sup> LTC Cooley, LTC Ruhm, and MAJ Marsh submitted a collaborative article in *Defense AT&L* suggesting that organizations such as CSTC-A have overlooked the important role of trained acquisition program managers.<sup>19</sup> Iraq and Afghanistan represent the biggest endeavor for nation building by the US since World War II. Security assistance programs related to rebuilding efforts are often complex and require carefully phased out developmental activities to achieve the desired effect. Decision makers need to understand their desired end state and the sequence and integration of events that will get them there within budget and on schedule.<sup>20</sup> Program managers have an appreciation for this sequence based problem solving technique. Therefore, it could be fully integrated into all levels of CSTC-A's planning process as it builds a lasting security infrastructure in Afghanistan.

### **Regional Partnerships**

Economics is a key component to developing relationships with other nation states. LTC Harry E. LeBoeuf Jr. argued in today's world economic interdependence, one of the nation's most powerful tools for achieving its national security objectives can be the economic instrument of power.<sup>21</sup> LeBoeuf's monograph examines the four tools (macroeconomic policy, international trade policy, economic sanctions and foreign aid), which comprise the economic instrument of power. Strategic military leaders must improve their understanding of the economic instrument of power and its effectiveness when used simultaneously with military power. In today's world, the

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<sup>18</sup> William T. Cooley, Brian C. Ruhm, Adrian Marsh, "Building an Army Program Management in Afghanistan," *Defense AT&L* (July-August 2006), 14.

<sup>19</sup> *ibid.*, 13.

<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*, 14.

<sup>21</sup> Harry E. LeBoeuf Jr., *The Economic Instrument of National Power and its Relevance to Strategic Military Leaders* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, April 1999), 1.

pursuit of our military security interests represents only a part of foreign policy.<sup>22</sup> Gaining an appreciation for economic policy by strategic military leaders will impact their vision now and their understanding of future outcomes.

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) pointed out that Afghanistan is landlocked and resource poor, making it at risk for unwelcome external influences and its sovereignty vulnerable.<sup>23</sup> Historically it served as a buffer state between the British and Russian Empires and most recently, it experienced military occupation by a US led coalition. The United States Institute of Peace posits that over the last four years Afghanistan's neighbors have assessed that support for a stable, independent, and economically strengthened Afghan state is preferable to any achievable alternatives.<sup>24</sup> Constructive partnerships between Afghanistan and its regional neighbors are essential to regional security. Investments from regional neighbors are a step toward creating desired partnerships. Applying aid to Afghan infrastructure to develop roads and internal rail networks will improve the physical links that help facilitate trade and more investment. The USIP report emphasized Afghanistan's neighbors must understand the limited infrastructure in the country and include this factor when determining their levels of commitment. The report assumes there is enough interest in regional stability by Afghanistan's neighbors and international encouragement to cultivate effective regional partnerships.

Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan are complex, as they share cultural traditions, but the existence of ungoverned territories along their border generates tension between the two countries. The Kabul administration blames the resurgence of the Taliban and an

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<sup>22</sup> *ibid.*, 26.

<sup>23</sup> Marvin G. Weinbaum, *Afghanistan and Its Neighbors*, (Washington, DC:USPIP, 2006), [http://www.uspip/pubs/specialreports/sr162\\_afghanistan.html](http://www.uspip/pubs/specialreports/sr162_afghanistan.html) (accessed April 10, 2009), 2.

<sup>24</sup> *ibid.*, 2.

increase in suicide bombings on Islamabad.<sup>25</sup> To counter Kabul's claims, the Pakistani government increased the amount of soldiers deployed to the ungoverned territories to address the rise in violence by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Attacks by these terror groups resulted in ongoing finger pointing as to who bears the responsibility of controlling these groups. At times, it reached the point of Pakistan developing plans to fence the border to address the cross-border infiltration issues.<sup>26</sup> Rizwan Zeb argued that talking directly rather than blaming each other in the media is a better way to address cross border terror issues.<sup>27</sup> He highlighted the millions in US Dollars Pakistan has invested in Afghanistan, and their commitment to help rebuild Afghan infrastructure as positive steps. Omar Sharif, Director from the American Institute of Afghanistan Studies, concluded that Pakistan's strategic short term and long-term policy with Afghanistan must be revisited. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan was vague and uncoordinated.<sup>28</sup> Omar Sharif's answer to this problem is more participation from the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU) to address Afghanistan's internal issues.

The US may seek Iran's support to help build a stable Afghanistan. Iran shares cultural ties to Persian speaking Afghans in the Herat Province and other Shiite minority groups residing in Afghanistan. Greg Bruno's article in Council on Foreign Relations suggests the US leverage three key aspects of Iranian interest in Afghanistan to assist in shaping stability Iran has cultural links with Afghanistan, it desires a stable eastern boundary, and seeks to develop trade relations

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<sup>25</sup> Rizwan Zeb, "Cross Border Terrorism Issues Plaguing Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No.2 (2006): 70.

<sup>26</sup> *ibid.*, 72.

<sup>27</sup> *ibid.*, 73.

<sup>28</sup> Omar Sharifi, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy toward Afghanistan from 1947-2008," <http://www.en.afghanistan.ru/doc/130.html>. (accessed May 21, 2009).

with Kabul.<sup>29</sup> Iran's investment in road networks linking its country with Afghanistan's western region and Tehran's open support for the government in Kabul during heightened Taliban violence supports Bruno's suggestion. An established relationship with Iran also allows Afghanistan access to the Port of Chabahar in order to facilitate its trade export. Current port arrangements between the Iranian Government and Afghan businesses make Iranian port space more attractive than utilizing Karachi in Pakistan.

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York City, both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the US modified their strategic views of Afghanistan. The PRC's concerns about domestic terrorism, its international standing in a world dominated by U.S. power (particularly after the terrorist attack), and its image as a responsible leader helped explain China's supportive stance.<sup>30</sup> Dennis Roy submits that the Chinese see war on terrorism differently. He argues in his Asia-Pacific Securities report that America faces immediate danger from a large well-financed enemy with a long-term agenda for hostility. China, on the other hand, faces a vastly lower level of terror<sup>31</sup> based on its perceived standing within the Muslim world. The Chinese view themselves as champions of the developing world, resulting in an internal belief that they maintain better relations with Muslims. China's relationship with the US is lukewarm because of the increased military presence of US forces in Central Asia. The Chinese agree that the threat posed by terrorists is legitimate but also wants other countries to assist in minimizing America's worldwide involvement in its fight.

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<sup>29</sup> Greg Bruno, "Iran and the Future of Afghanistan," [http://www.cfr.org/publications/13578/iran\\_and\\_the\\_future\\_of\\_afghanistan.html](http://www.cfr.org/publications/13578/iran_and_the_future_of_afghanistan.html) (accessed May 14, 2009)

<sup>30</sup> Shirley Kan, CRS Report for Congress, *U.S.-China Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy*, RS21995 (December 2004), CRS-2.

<sup>31</sup> Dennis Roy, *Lukewarm Partner: Chinese Support for U.S. Counter-Terrorism in Southeast Asia* (Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, March 2006), 2.

China's economic growth increased its desire to secure energy resources to sustain its development. Throughout history, China has shown little interest in Afghanistan, but Afghan openness to foreign investment, along with its potential for energy and mineral extraction, have recently made it quite attractive. China is now a major investor within the region as it seeks to develop a trade relationship with Afghanistan. This growing interest was manifested with Beijing's giant \$3.5 billion investment in Afghanistan's Aynak copper field, the largest foreign direct investment in Afghanistan's history.<sup>32</sup> The investment in copper as well as developing bilateral business ties between both nations are viewed by the Central Asia-Caucas Institute as initial steps toward long-term economic partnerships.<sup>33</sup> Russia's potential role in Afghanistan's future is unclear as it suspiciously watches US activity in Central Asia. As Mr. Sean Roberts' testimony to Congress notes, a stable Afghanistan is in Russia's interest, to ensure the country does not become a further refuge for Chechen separatists who have been waging a war against the Russian state on and off for about fifteen years.<sup>34</sup> On the other hand, Russia sees the turmoil in Afghanistan as a legacy from its invasion. Due to Russia's pride, it may not want to see US success in an area where it had failed.<sup>35</sup> With suspicions of US activity and a failed history within the region, it is difficult to predict a positive Russian contribution to Afghanistan. In the contexts of economics, Russia is more likely to get involved with some reconstruction efforts, particularly those related to gas pipelines. Mr. Roberts encourages Russian investment in Afghanistan but understands the Russians are reluctant to perform any action that may be viewed as supportive to a continued US presence within the region.

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<sup>32</sup> Nicklas Norling, "The Emerging China-Afghanistan Relationship," <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?=node/458> (accessed May 10, 2009).

<sup>33</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> Sean Roberts, PhD, Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2009, [http://www.gwu.edu/~elliott/assets/docs/news/testimony/roberts\\_afghanistan\\_033109.pdf](http://www.gwu.edu/~elliott/assets/docs/news/testimony/roberts_afghanistan_033109.pdf) (accessed May 1, 2009)

<sup>35</sup> *ibid.*

## The US Advisor Role

There have been various articles and monographs on advising the ANA but they tend to fall short on certain aspects, leaving a void with regard to the recommended training of strategic level personnel. Most literature reflect advising at the tactical level and neglects to consider the responsibility to advise strategic level personnel who are charged with building and managing systems within the Afghan MOD to sustain security forces. CSTC-A is responsible for the training and equipping of the ANA. As a result of his strategic review, President Obama announced the decision to deploy 4,000 additional trainers to support CSTC-A's advisory mission.<sup>36</sup> The President's announcement helped alleviate some of the personnel shortages identified by CSTC-A and congressional research agencies. It also confirmed US commitment to grow and reform the ANA.

The training of US advisors has received criticism for not developing Afghan centric training. CPT David Helmer, in an article submitted to *Military Review*, made note of Fort Riley's attempt to train military advisors deploying to Afghanistan. CPT Helmer suggested Fort Riley separate those trainers with Afghan experience into one group focused on training for counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare in the mountains, deserts, and jungles of Afghanistan.<sup>37</sup> This highlighted that advisors who have only deployed to Iraq find it difficult to draw upon a relevant frame of reference when covering issues unique to Afghanistan. CPT Helmer's article also advocated ending the individual replacement of advisors and shifting toward rotating entire advisory commands. He claimed it would allow for better planning and staffing at the regional level because staffs and commanders would have trained together.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> MG Richard Formica, "Incoming brigades expand embedded trainer capabilities," *The Enduring Ledger*, Vol. 3, Issue 4 (Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, April 2009), 2.

<sup>37</sup> Daniel Helmer, "Twelve Urgent Steps for the Advisor Mission in Afghanistan," *Military Review* (July-August 2008), 74.

<sup>38</sup> *ibid.*, 75.

The failure to resource the war is another challenge the advisor faces in Afghanistan. To date the average expenditure in Iraq has been roughly five times higher.<sup>39</sup> According to the Center for Strategic & International Studies, this equates to the ANA suffering from inadequate numbers in all forms of equipment. Afghanistan's logistical strategy is based on donations of Eastern-bloc weaponry, civilian trucks, and a hodgepodge of other equipment. This has led to a non-standardized material base composed largely of poor quality gear.<sup>40</sup> The delivery of sub-standard gear combined with an overstretched military advisory corps impacts the overall readiness of the ANA.

### **US Participation in Greece**

The operational environment, culture, and strategic significance placed Afghanistan in the position of being a unique engagement for US military personnel. The author examined US stability efforts in Greece following World War II because the operation involved the US employing elements of national power to defeat an insurgency. Greece and Afghanistan share similarities as they were weakened following years of conflict. Government institutions lacked authority outside the capital and national militaries were ill prepared to defeat an externally supported insurgency. Based on President Truman's request, Congress approved \$400 million in aid for Greece and Turkey, along with detailing US civilian and military personnel to help in Greece's reconstruction effort and defense needs.<sup>41</sup> The US took two different approaches toward assisting indigenous forces defeat the insurgencies, which provides an example to assist US efforts in stabilizing Afghanistan. Students seldom study this part of US military history because

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<sup>39</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke, David Kasten, *Winning in Afghanistan: Creating Effective Afghan Security Forces* (Center For Strategic & International Studies, Washington DC: December 2008), 9.

<sup>40</sup> *ibid.*, iv.

<sup>41</sup> Frank Abbott, *The Greek Civil War, 1947-1949: Lessons for the Operational Artist in Foreign Internal Defense* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, USCGS, 1994), 9.

the American military provided only equipment, supplies, and advice.<sup>42</sup> The Greek insurgency is worth review because it displayed US success against an insurgency without deploying combat forces.

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<sup>42</sup> *ibid.*, 1.

## Methodology

This monograph will use a descriptive and comparative analysis approach to consider the appropriate logistics model to support the Afghan National Army as it fights a determined insurgency. As written by Tulane University's School for Medical Research, descriptive data comes from a variety of sources such as multi-indicators, cluster surveys, national statistics, and compilations done by international organizations.<sup>43</sup> Comparative analysis provides a frame to compare and contrast. According to the Harvard Writing Center, this frame of reference may consist of a group of similar things from which you extract two for special attention.<sup>44</sup> These two methods provide the intellectual underpinnings for the research conducted. The author's approach to conducting the ANA analysis is outlined in four major sections within the research. This monograph first describes the Afghan Army's logistics culture by reviewing the ANA's current, past and desired logistics systems to determine its propensity or potential for self-sustainment. This is followed by an examination of potential regional partnerships that could positively impact Afghanistan's need to develop the strategic infrastructure required to support a defense logistics system. The analysis then explores the role of US military advisors as they train and mentor Afghan leaders. Finally, the author reviews US efforts in Greece following the end of German occupation to build an indigenous capacity to sustain a national army in order to defeat an insurgency.

To analyze the Afghan Army logistics culture the author reviewed planning documents to include the Rand Study on Building an Afghan National Army, CSTC-A Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), Office of Secretary of Defense Briefing on ANSF Sustainment and the Afghan Military Strategy. The documents provided data

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<sup>43</sup> PANDA, "Basics for Statistical Analysis", <https://www.tulane.edu/analysis/pg1%descriptive%/analysis/oneway01.html> (accessed July 15, 2009)

<sup>44</sup> Kerry Walk, "How to Write a Comparative Analysis", <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~wricntr/documents/CompAnalysis.html> (accessed September 3, 2009).

from which to examine the ANA as an institution before and after the US lead invasion. To help determine the appropriate logistics model to sustain the ANA, an analysis of selected secondary data for detailed objectives, funding requirements and sustainability strategies was conducted. This analysis, combined with analysis of primary planning documents provided an opportunity to explore the challenges the Afghan logistics environment presents to planners.

Regional partnerships for Afghanistan were analyzed because US strategic security plans advocate an eventual self-sustaining ANA able to secure its sovereignty with little or no support from the international community. Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and China were studied as potential partners because they represent nation states with prominent roles within the region affected directly by terrorist actions that have been emanating from Afghanistan. The selected countries in the region also have the potential to provide an opportunity for Afghanistan's development through investment and trade.

The role of military advisors in helping to develop the ANA's logistics system was chosen as a key factor for study in order to examine the requirements needed to mentor those Afghan leaders responsible for managing the defense supply pipeline. In order to reach a feasible recommendation the author examined the most current data detailing efforts to prepare advisors to operate effectively in Afghanistan. The review of advisor preparation included the evolution of institutional training and issues arising from the distribution of advisors in Afghanistan.

Analyzing the role of military advisors in Afghanistan is essential to determine what commitment is needed to create capacity or leverage the indigenous knowledge base already in place.

Therefore, an analysis of unity of effort in the execution of the advisory mission was required to determine overall effectiveness. Finally, the experience of the US in Greece following the end of World War II provided an example of a successful campaign to assist a government in defeating an insurgency. The approach to researching the Greek conflict was to gauge levels of US success at rebuilding an army based on the author's assessment in three areas: 1) the status of indigenous

defense forces, 2) what the US did to improve and sustain those indigenous forces, and 3) the results of US actions.

## Strategic Logistics in Afghanistan

Logistics is the bridge between the economy of the Nation and the tactical operations of its combat forces. Obviously, then, the logistics system must be in harmony, both with the economic system of the Nation and with the tactical concepts and environment of the combat forces.<sup>45</sup>

### US Department of Defense JP 4-0, Joint Logistics

The ANA is an essential element in developing a secure environment that is conducive for the Afghan Government to govern its citizens. Decades of war crippled government institutions and wrecked the economy, producing autonomous tribal regions without links to a legitimate centralized government authority. As Afghanistan continues its integration into the international community as a newly formed democratic nation, it struggles to build and sustain the ANA, which is essential to maintaining the government's legitimacy. Thus, the US and IC have been providing the money, training and equipment required to preserve stability within Afghanistan to prevent its demise as a collapsed state. However, the US and IC support these stability efforts to promote the establishment of functioning institutions with trained leaders that will eventually propel Afghanistan into becoming a self-sustaining state. Therefore, it is important to examine the current strategic logistics system that will allow for the sustainment of the ANA.

Afghanistan's GDP of \$11 billion,<sup>46</sup> along with its poorly developed infrastructure, necessitate the country's dependence on external logistics support to sustain the ANA. According to Obaid Younossi, Afghanistan's annual federal budget is \$4 billion, much of which is foreign aid; additionally, opium production constitutes a large part of the economic activity.<sup>47</sup> These economic figures suggest that Afghanistan will continue to rely on foreign assistance for years to

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<sup>45</sup> US Department of Defense, *JP 4-0, Joint Logistics* (Washington, DC:GPO 2008), I-1.

<sup>46</sup> Obaid Younossi, Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Jonathan Vaccaro, Jerry M. Sollinger, Brian Grady, *The Long March, Building an Afghan National Army* (Rand Corporation, National Defense Institute, 2009), xii.

<sup>47</sup> *ibid.*, xii.

come. Military theorist Antoine Jomini defined logistics as the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied.<sup>48</sup> Jomini's perspective assumed a given country possessed the capacity to conduct such operations. CSTC-A argued that Afghanistan's development failed to meet public expectations, constraining the government's ability to deliver upon its obligations or meet expectations.<sup>49</sup> Afghanistan was already one of the poorest countries in the world prior to the removal of the Taliban. This precondition of poverty caused the US to identify economic assistance as a major focus of strategy in Afghanistan. COL Vincent Dreyer stated the cost of creating government institutions and a functioning infrastructure – roads, hospitals, schools, telecommunication networks, power grids, etc.- is so staggering several donor conferences have been held to solicit funds.<sup>50</sup> The US is the largest contributor to Afghan infrastructure projects, providing over \$6 billion in aid since 2001, and the US pledged an additional \$20 billion at the 2008 Paris Conference.<sup>51</sup> Competing projects to build infrastructure and enhance security forces within Afghanistan highlight the difficulty of finding internal funding because of Afghanistan's weak economic base.

Dr. Nour Ali, the former Afghan Minister of Commerce, presented a strategy to help reconstruct Afghanistan's economy that would lead to increased economic growth. His proposed strategy from an Afghan perspective ties the reconstruction of the economy to the state and state services. Dr. Ali also provided a proposed economic model for Afghanistan that promotes its integration into regional and international economies in order to induce the highest possible growth rate. Dr. Ali's economic strategy is divided into three parts: 1) penetration by the central

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<sup>48</sup> Martin Van Creveld, *Supplying War Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1.

<sup>49</sup> CSTC-A report, Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces, (September 20, 2008), 12.

<sup>50</sup> Vincent M. Dreyer, *Retooling The Nation-Building Strategy in Afghanistan* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, March 2006), 7.

<sup>51</sup> James S. Robbins, "Afghanistan Back to Basics," *American Foreign Policy Council*, [http://www.afpc.org/publication\\_listings/viewArticle/492](http://www.afpc.org/publication_listings/viewArticle/492) (accessed July 10, 2009).

government into provincial areas, 2) participation from Afghan social groups, 3) integrating former Afghan fighters.

Part one of his strategy promotes participation of the central government at the provincial level. Dr. Ali recommends opening branch offices from the central government in all provinces. Opening branch offices allows representatives from the central government to penetrate into non-governed spaces. This action allows government authorities to work with local leaders, first to maintain security, then to prioritize of needed community projects. Dr. Ali recommended that proposed provincial plans be collected in Kabul then reappraised and screened jointly by the ministries of national planning, economic reconstruction, agriculture, mining, and industries, commerce, and the expatriate staff members of the involved unilateral and multilateral financial institutions.<sup>52</sup> The stability gained from the interaction of government representatives and local tribal leaders would establish the base for economic growth. The second part of Dr. Ali's strategy supports the reconstruction of the economy through the participation of Afghans from all social groups. This would include the return of Afghan expatriates living abroad to help in the rebuilding process, as well as to teach the untrained. He also said that it would be beneficial for expatriate business owners to maintain those businesses in their adopted countries, in order to maintain valuable economic channels.<sup>53</sup>

The final part of Dr. Ali's strategy is redemption of warfare weaponries. Decades of instability created an arms and ammunition market within the country and along its borders with Pakistan. He contends that a key to economic development is the integration of foot soldiers into an Afghan market not supported by warfare. The implication is that soldiers returning to the

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<sup>52</sup> Dr. Nour Ali, "An Introduction to the Economic Reconstruction of Afghanistan", Institute for Afghan Studies <http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/> (accessed July 8, 2009).

<sup>53</sup> *ibid.*

workforce will increase the prospect for peace, resulting in a willingness among the possessors of warfare items to sell them to government-purchasing centers.<sup>54</sup>

Dr. Ali also provided the background for an economic model to offer additional support for his reconstruction strategy. The first feature of his model is recognizing Afghanistan's role in both regional and international markets. He argued that the actions of Afghanistan's neighbors and the turbulence of international markets impact its economy. Therefore, a flexible economic model capable of adjusting to short and long-term investment requirements is essential. As stated by Dr. Ali, Afghanistan has thus no choice – neither objectively nor ideologically – but to follow, as much as possible, a least regulated free enterprise and free market model of economy.<sup>55</sup> The Afghan economic model should also reflect a small state regulating a growing market. This means a small Afghan government creating policy aimed at economic expansion. The cost to run a large state government is likely to offset any attempt to grow the country's GDP. Dr. Ali's economic model represents economic as well as social growth in Afghanistan. His economic and social approach to Afghan development promotes the distribution of resources, which creates buying power. The Afghan domestic market for industrial goods would be widened, thus laying the foundation for modern industrial development.<sup>56</sup> The creation of this domestic industry is an important step in enabling Afghanistan to sustain its army.

The final part is the Afghan economy and globalization. Dr. Ali argued that globalization should not be viewed as a negative force on Afghanistan's emerging economic system. According to Dr. Ali, globalization is manifested by intensified foreign direct investment, short-term flows of capital, multinational enterprise involvement, and production network reorganization on an

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<sup>54</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> *ibid.*

international scale.<sup>57</sup> In theory, globalization should not negatively affect Afghan industries such as its exportation of fruits, vegetables, skins, and minerals. However, one industry that may be negatively impacted is textile manufacturing, but this could be mitigated by upgrading equipment. Emerging industries such as mining copper and iron ore, and increased fruit exportation would also offset potential manufacturing losses. Colonialism, years of internal conflict and an oppressive Taliban regime divided groups along ethnic lines, fractionalized the country, and limited its growth. A democratic Afghanistan now has the opportunity to move forward with the help of the international community to develop its human capital, indigenous industries and natural resources to build the foundation for the economic base it lacks.

Dr. Ali was one of few to articulate what is truly required to modernize Afghanistan's economy. It is important to note that the success of his economic theory and model are based on some key assumptions. Security throughout the country would have to improve to allow the development of infrastructure projects and increase foreign investment. Warlords would have to be either integrated into the Afghan government or marginalized in order to prevent division through the establishment of individual fiefdoms within the country. Foreign radicals and agitators would require removal from the country, alleviating the negative impact of external influences. Meeting these preconditions would enhance the opportunity for realistic Afghan reconstruction. The development of a functioning and legitimate economy within Afghanistan is essential to assessing the potential for a strategic logistics base. James Robbins, from *The Journal of International Security Affairs*, wrote that economic growth in Afghanistan is likely to continue, spurred chiefly by the construction sector.<sup>58</sup> Energy extraction is another revenue-producing sector that is ready for development. Figures from 2006 showed 47.53 billion cubic meters of

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<sup>57</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>58</sup> James S. Robbins, "Afghanistan Back to Basics", American Foreign Policy Council, [http://www.afpc.org/publication\\_listings/viewArticle/492](http://www.afpc.org/publication_listings/viewArticle/492) (accessed July 10, 2009).

proven natural gas reserves, a small amount by Middle Eastern standards, but an important potential source of revenue in an otherwise poor country.<sup>59</sup> There are also plans to build a pipeline in Afghanistan to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan to India. This also would serve as a source of revenue and provide additional incentive to modernize the country's energy infrastructure.

The Afghans' ability to sustain their national army depends on their commitment to develop a modern economy. The demand for local material generated by US and coalition forces, and the subsequent businesses that have developed because of that need, prove that an entrepreneurial capacity within Afghanistan exists. FM 3-07 states that host-nation enterprise creation is an essential activity whereby local people organize themselves to provide valuable goods and services. In doing so, they create jobs for themselves, their families and neighbors that are inherently sustainable after the departure of other actors.<sup>60</sup> This concept of building a sustainment capacity within Afghanistan is contingent upon maximizing indigenous resources. There are sectors within the country that if developed wisely, could push Afghanistan down the path of self-sustainment. These sectors include agriculture, textile manufacturing, minerals, and energy extraction. Investing in Afghanistan's underdeveloped markets and establishing internal security would provide a firm base to support the overall economy.

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<sup>59</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> Headquarter Department of the Army, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO 2008), 3-15.




Figure 1. Pillars of the Afghan Economy

The impact of this development would be an established industrial base, which would generate revenue and expand real GDP within the country. This would provide the government needed purchasing power to decrease its dependence on international donors who currently provide the bulk of materials and resources to sustain the ANA.

NATO's Parliamentary Assembly listed Afghanistan as the most impoverished Asian country in its 2008 annual report.<sup>61</sup> Afghanistan's poverty provides a unique challenge to the international community supporting reconstruction and security operations. The lack of a developed economy and poor infrastructure means nearly all supplies and equipment needed to support the ANA must be imported. This culture of logistics dependency permeates the Afghan military structure, because internal division and 30 years of conflict crippled industrial growth. Moreover, Afghanistan's poor economy and weak central government made it vulnerable to foreign influence. After gaining independence in 1919, following three wars with Indian-based British troops, the Afghan government sought military and economic aid. Russia accepted Afghanistan's request for support by providing varying levels of economic aid, military

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<sup>61</sup> Hugh Bayley, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 161ESC 08 E – rev 1, "Economic Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Developmental and Security Implications," <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1473>, (accessed July 13, 2009), 2.

equipment, and training from 1920 to 1979. Little is written in English that details the force structure of the Afghan Army and its use of strategic logistics. Available information on ANA development highlights estimated force strength following independence in 1919 and the use of Soviet assistance to help structure its force. Based on Afghanistan's experience with Soviet military advisors and the overall condition of its economy, the author could infer the level of strategic logistics capacity at the time leading up to the 2001 invasion. A description, based on that interference, follows.

Prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979, the ANA had not participated in a conflict of any sort in over 50 years. During this time, the ANA force size was approximately 90,000 but fell to less than 25,000 following the communist seizure of power.<sup>62</sup> This force consisted mostly of illiterate conscripts who were expected to use Soviet based doctrine against an asymmetric threat. LTC Charles Russo wrote, "Soviet logistics operations were set up to support the high intensity, European battlefield model where logistics is controlled at Front and Army levels to influence the battle."<sup>63</sup> In the Soviet's view, the conflict in Afghanistan would be short term. This amounted to no significant changes to Soviet logistics doctrine required to meet the challenges presented in Afghanistan. At the strategic level, supplies were procured from Army level depots located within the Soviet Union, then pushed to front line troops operating in Afghanistan. To their credit, Soviet supplies and equipment moved as planned once they reached the operational level, because they were within quick reach of operational commanders. The failure existed at the strategic level because Soviet planners underestimated the time and resource requirement needed to move supplies from an industrial base in the USSR to the geographically challenging confines of

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<sup>62</sup> Obaid Younossi, Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Jonathan Vaccaro, Jerry M. Sollinger, Brian Grady, *The Long March, Building an Afghan National Army* (Rand Corporation, National Defense Institute, 2009), 5.

<sup>63</sup> Charles A. Russo Jr., *Soviet Logistics in the Afghanistan War* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, April 1991), 5.

Afghanistan. As LTC Russo argued, it appeared they thought this would be such a quick operation that they could operate from supply points solely within the Soviet Union.<sup>64</sup>

Mujahedeen fighters who opposed the Soviet backed ANA were unable to use an internal industrial base to meet logistics requirements. This resulted in an influx of foreign aid and equipment to help them defeat the ANA. The United States and Britain gave their aid in the form of weapons, equipment, and supplies.<sup>65</sup> Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates gave their aid in the form of cash.<sup>66</sup> To minimize logistics issues, Mujahedeen groups built supply depots and supply points within Afghanistan for storage. Inaccessible areas in the mountains and canyons in places such as Tora Bora and the Sharikot Valley were prime examples.<sup>67</sup> These internal resupply areas assisted the Mujahedeen in defeating the ANA and the Soviet Army, whose rigid supply chain negated any inherent advantages of firepower and mobility.

There was not a substantial effort to develop an internal industrial capacity to sustain the ANA. From 1920 to 1979, the Soviet Union provided Afghanistan with the bulk of its economic and military aid. However, the Soviet Union's primary focus, especially during the Cold War, remained on Western Europe and the US. This resulted in doling out the minimum amount of assistance required to minimize Western influence in Afghanistan. The results were a perpetuation of divisive measures within Afghanistan's ethnic groups that prevented growth and modernization. Even as the Soviets waged war against Afghan guerillas, their European focused logistics doctrine did not allow for building indigenous logistics capacity, in order to minimize supply transit time. The Soviets viewed the conflict in Afghanistan as short-term, and as such did

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<sup>64</sup> *ibid.*, 7.

<sup>65</sup> Lester W. Grau, "The Soviet-Afghan War: A Superpower Mired in the Mountains" *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (March 2004).

<sup>66</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> *ibid.*

not warrant additional investment to develop indigenous industries capable of producing material to sustain an Afghan National Army.

A logistics system to sustain the ANA is a work in progress, as the IC and US continue to refine long-term strategies and adjust Afghan troop levels. The cornerstone of any desired strategic logistics system in Afghanistan is a long-term commitment by the IC to develop the country's weak economy. The requirement to grow the ANA to 134,000 by 2011<sup>68</sup> will require a substantial financial commitment from the international community, as the Afghan GDP does not allow for a budget to sustain this sized force. Therefore, until the DOS is able to develop and expand Afghanistan's economy through economic aid programs, the international community will have to continue to provide the resources needed. According to Fredrick K. Kagan, dramatic improvement in the situation in Iraq has already increased our options and flexibility in context to our position in Afghanistan.<sup>69</sup> This will allow additional resources for Afghanistan without degrading the situation in Iraq.

An increase in money and equipment may be the boost needed to help the US backed ANA defeat insurgents as the international community simultaneously builds a viable economic base to sustain them. According to Anthony Cordesman, the average expenditure on Afghanistan per years has been \$21.46 billion versus \$108.9 billion for Iraq.<sup>70</sup> A shift in resources to Afghanistan is expected based on the new administration's strategy to win in Afghanistan. Another key to reaching a desired strategic logistics system is establishing a military agency to serve as a link to indigenous industry, as well as foreign industry if required. The agency would

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<sup>68</sup> FACTBOX-Afghan National Security Forces," *Reuters*, March 27, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSISL112818> (accessed 13 April 2009).

<sup>69</sup> Frederick W. Kagan, "Planning Victory in Afghanistan" <http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=ZGZhOTRhMjRiYjE3ZGZlMTY1ZTA2MmM5YjY1ZTVlMzA=pdf> (accessed May 15, 2009).

<sup>70</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, *Follow the Money: Why the US is Losing the War in Afghanistan*, (Center For Strategic & International Studies, Washington DC: September 2008), 13.

serve a role similar to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), which serves as a main supplier to military services of critical resources needed to accomplish their missions. CSTC-A is currently developing a Joint National Logistics Agency (JNLA) to facilitate this need within the Afghan defense force. It is CSTC-A's vision that this joint agency be responsible for contract management, maintenance support and the management of strategic logistics assets and critical commodities.<sup>71</sup>

## Regional Partnerships

Long-term commitment by the international community is required to rebuild an Afghan economy that will allow for a viable strategic logistics structure to exist. Afghanistan's current economy is incapable of sustaining a national defense force, which ties this new democracy to foreign aid and international donation. Its externally based strategic defense supply pipeline has strained the budgets of the US and other nations committed to the growth of Afghanistan. Additional sources of support for Afghanistan's economic growth are within Central Asia. As stated by Marvin G. Weinbaum, whether on security or economic issues, regional relations are under- institutionalized.<sup>72</sup> Afghanistan shares its eastern border with Pakistan. The Afghan economy is tightly tied to Pakistan's and the two countries are closely linked culturally and historically.<sup>73</sup> This relationship makes Pakistan an important partner and a start point to enhance cooperation. Economically, it benefits Pakistan to have a stable neighbor as it offers opportunities for Pakistani entrepreneurs.

Pakistan's wide-ranging exports to Afghanistan, stand at roughly \$1.2 billion per year as opposed to the \$25 million in exports during the Taliban era. Pakistan imports more than \$700 million worth of goods, mostly fresh and dried fruits and

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<sup>71</sup>CSTC-A report, Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces (September 20, 2008), A-6.

<sup>72</sup> Marvin G. Weinbaum, *Afghanistan and Its Neighbors*, (Washington, DC:USPIP, 2006), [http://www.uspip/pubs/specialreports/sr162\\_afghanistan.html](http://www.uspip/pubs/specialreports/sr162_afghanistan.html), (accessed April 10, 2009), 7.

<sup>73</sup> *ibid.*, 8.

herbs. Offers by Pakistan to help improve airports, civil aviation, roads, and highways are meant to create a better infrastructure for trade.<sup>74</sup>

The potential for Afghanistan-Pakistan trade is promising, but it requires attention from the IC to ensure it becomes a mutually beneficial endeavor. Trade revenue generated by the two nations enhances Afghanistan's economic activity, resulting in jobs tied to a licit economy. Many in Afghanistan lack jobs and often seek illegal opium producers for employment. The IC, in concert with Afghanistan and Pakistan, could develop this existing trade relationship to support ongoing stability efforts.

The situation between both countries, though complex due to Pakistan's desire to ensure development within Afghanistan, supports Pakistan's security interests. This includes minimizing any economic, political, or military ties with Pakistan's chief rival, India. According to regional expert Ahmad Rashid, Pakistan's military considered its support to the Taliban in the country's strategic national interest.<sup>75</sup> Pakistan is the one regional neighbor that benefits from an unstable Afghanistan. Richard deVillafranca argued that in Pakistan, all strategy is linked to India.<sup>76</sup> This statement alludes to Pakistan's historic fear of its well-armed eastern neighbor. An unstable Afghanistan supports Pakistan's defense in depth strategy should India conduct offensive operations. This strategy, based on Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan, has been Pakistan's hedge against Indian dominance, and the FATA's Pashtun fighters are central to it.<sup>77</sup> In order to promote Afghan economic development the US and IC will have to address Pakistan's security concerns with India. If Pakistan's security interests are not addressed, then key elements within Pakistan's military, and intelligence service, will continue to undermine international efforts by

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<sup>74</sup> *ibid.*, 10.

<sup>75</sup> Omar Sharifi, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy toward Afghanistan from 1947-2008," <http://www.en.afghanistan.ru/doc/130.html>. (accessed May 21, 2009).

<sup>76</sup> Richard deVillafranca, "Reconsidering Afghanistan: Time for an Azimuth Check," *Parameters*, no. 4 (Winter 2008-09), 92.

<sup>77</sup> *ibid.*, 92.

supporting anti-government fighters. The IC and US will have to convince key decision makers within Pakistan's government that a stronger Afghanistan will not make it vulnerable to Indian expansion within the region.

Iran is another regional neighbor with historical and cultural ties to Afghanistan that may be leveraged for continued economic development. Greg Bruno states that Iranian influence in Afghanistan's western province of Herat runs deep as it served as a center of Persian power and culture up until the early fifteenth century.<sup>78</sup> This link between the Herrat Province and Iran has not received the level of attention needed to inspire more growth and infrastructure development in Afghanistan. According to the most recent data, four percent of Iran's exports went to Afghanistan, equating to \$503 million in revenue.<sup>79</sup> Afghanistan provides a steady revenue source, which led to a pledge of economic and humanitarian support by Iran to improve trade relations. Pledges by Iran of \$560 million in reconstruction assistance over five years have included extending its electric grid inside Afghanistan.<sup>80</sup> There are additional projects underway to improve rail lines between both countries, as well as to the Iranian port of Chabahar. In some aspects, Iranian economic initiatives to helping rebuild Afghanistan fall in line with US goals for Afghanistan. The millions in dollars pledged by Iran would encourage building the right kind of infrastructure that would serve as a base for a strategic level logistics system.

The key to maximizing an Iranian relationship with Afghanistan is to ease Iranian concerns about a US presence in Afghanistan. With US troops to its west in Iraq and a growing amount in Afghanistan, Tehran feels uneasy about the Afghan government's strong reliance on

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<sup>78</sup> Greg Bruno, "Iran and the Future of Afghanistan," [http://www.cfr.org/publications/13578/iran\\_and\\_the\\_future\\_of\\_afghanistan.html](http://www.cfr.org/publications/13578/iran_and_the_future_of_afghanistan.html) (accessed May 14, 2009)

<sup>79</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>80</sup> *ibid.*

the United States.<sup>81</sup> Tehran's uneasiness constrains additional Afghan reconstruction projects, which is needed to support any economic policy initiatives emanating from Kabul. The IC and US must emphasize the common interests they share with Iran. The first common interest is a stable Afghanistan, without a Sunni backed Taliban, offering tremendous opportunities for economic growth. The second is the eradication of opium production that provides revenue for extremist groups who destabilize the region and indirectly add to Iran's growing drug abuse/HIV problem. Afghanistan's independently functioning tribes also present a unique challenge to structural improvement. These tribes are fiercely independent and jealously guard their rights.<sup>82</sup> A combined effort to inform tribal groups on the benefits of development by the Afghan and Iranian governments could limit potential resistance from tribal leaders.

China's interest in Afghanistan centers on the potential energy and commercial import opportunities it has to offer. Unlike Iran and Pakistan, China showed little interest in Afghanistan prior to the Taliban's removal in 2001. China's interest in Afghanistan increased after 2007, when President Karzai declared his country open to foreign investment in its natural resources. The China Metallurgical Group won the rights to develop the world's largest undeveloped copper field in Anyak for \$3.5 billion.<sup>83</sup> China's interest is sure to stimulate the economy and employ thousands in the mine area. According to Niklas Norling, the mine will employ nearly 10,000 Afghans and produce \$400 million in royalties for the Afghan government annually, which is more than half of the present budget.<sup>84</sup> Additional investment in the region is expected to grow, as state owned Chinese businesses seek to exploit oil and gas resources. China possesses the

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<sup>81</sup> Marvin G. Weinbaum, *Afghanistan and Its Neighbors*, (Washington, DC:USPIP, 2006), [http://www.uspip/pubs/specialreports/sr162\\_afghanistan.html](http://www.uspip/pubs/specialreports/sr162_afghanistan.html) (accessed April 10, 2009), 13.

<sup>82</sup> Greg Bruno, "Iran and the Future of Afghanistan," [http://www.cfr.org/publications/13578/iran\\_and\\_the\\_future\\_of\\_afghanistan.html](http://www.cfr.org/publications/13578/iran_and_the_future_of_afghanistan.html). (accessed May 14, 2009).

<sup>83</sup> Nicklas Norling, "The Emerging China-Afghanistan Relationship," <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?=node/458>, (accessed May 10, 2009).

<sup>84</sup> *ibid.*

fastest growing economy in the world that requires energy sources to help sustain it. With the help of its large trade surplus, state owned Chinese businesses are able to out bid competitors seeking energy in foreign markets. According to a US geological survey, Afghanistan's natural gas reserves were upgraded by a factor of three, standing at a mean of 15,687 trillion cubic feet.<sup>85</sup>

China has also successfully increased its export profile in Afghanistan. It now ranks second behind Pakistan with regard to exporting products to Afghanistan. China's new established relations with Afghanistan now provide an opportunity to maximize economic development.

How can China aid efforts to establish the economy and logistical infrastructure needed to sustain the ANA? The first step is security. According to the Obama administration, the way to win in Afghanistan involves tackling internal issues in Pakistan. China has provided military support to Pakistan for decades. As Kevin Slaten suggests, China can help tackle the most urgent Afghan problem – a lack of manpower – by lending some of its 1.7 million ground forces to the mission.<sup>86</sup> Chinese forces could help Pakistan police its western tribal areas, which serve as a sanctuary for the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Additional forces from China would enhance the security situation, allowing for the completion of projects already underway to improve infrastructure. This action would also decrease recent tensions by Western nations that have surfaced due to China's ability to take advantage of Afghan opportunities. To this point, many see China as a free rider whose contribution to real stability within Afghanistan is lackluster.<sup>87</sup> Ideally, this would change to include a commitment of Chinese forces to troubled areas. The result would not only lower violence in Afghanistan but also curb training opportunities within the region by Chinese Muslim separatist groups such as the Uighurs.

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<sup>85</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>86</sup> Kevin Slaten, "China's Bigger Role in Pakistan, Afghanistan," *South China Morning Post*, February 12, 2009, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22735&prog=zc>, (accessed May 17, 2009)

<sup>87</sup> *ibid.*

Russia has cautiously watched US efforts in Afghanistan with both mild acceptance and suspicion. Russia initially supported the US invasion in Afghanistan as a sign of support in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Now, seven years after the initial invasion and removal of the Taliban, Russia views the US introduction of additional US troops into the region as continued cause for concern. With that said, many regional experts view Russia's intentions in Afghanistan following the removal of the Taliban as unclear. What is clear is the potential impact Russia could have on Afghanistan's economic development and regional stability. Russia has the most experience supporting Afghan efforts in establishing a national army. If the Russians provide trainers to mentor Afghan soldiers and police forces, Russia would fall in line with US desires to increase regional involvement in Afghanistan's reconstruction. Mr. Sean Roberts argued that regional players would rather see Afghanistan as a place for investment and development and not a source for terrorism and opium.<sup>88</sup> Emphasizing regional security and poppy eradication may be the leverage point needed by the US to increase Russia's involvement in stabilizing Afghanistan. Unfortunately, Russia's direct contribution to Afghan stability is relatively small, but its work with US planners in the establishment of alternate resupply routes sent a signal of increased involvement. Russia has also watched Chinese interest in Afghan resources and may encourage its own state run businesses to compete for lucrative contracts. This would support Russia's overall ambition to one day lead a global natural gas cartel. However, US efforts to lure Russia into supporting stabilization efforts in Afghanistan will compete with their suspicions of a presumed long-term US presence in Central Asia.

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<sup>88</sup> Sean Roberts, PhD, Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2009.

## Advising the Afghans

Do not try to do too much with your hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are able to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also under the very odd conditions of Arabia your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.<sup>89</sup>

T.E. Lawrence, "Twenty-Seven Articles," 1917

T.E. Lawrence is often quoted today, as the US military trains and prepares advisors to serve as mentors in Afghanistan. The historic mission of US military advisors is well documented, as the US has provided advisors to foreign allies since the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The focus of this section of the monograph is the role of US advisors to Afghanistan at the strategic level of military logistics operations. Most scholarly writings and government reports from Afghanistan reflect successful US and coalition mentorship efforts at the operational and tactical level of sustainment operations. Current literature also suggests that advisor training conducted at Fort Riley, Kansas has gradually improved. Based on lessons learned from the field, training is now tailored to meet the different challenges presented by the Afghan and Iraq environments. This tailoring occurred because the two countries are substantially different in geography, culture, language, and overall social development. This is a positive development, as Afghanistan and Iraq are now framed by US forces as different mission sets.

According to CSTC-A's campaign plan, their organization provides advisors to assist in the education and mentoring of Afghan military and civilian leadership on a daily basis.<sup>90</sup> Contracted personnel are also utilized to provide support to all levels of logistics planning and systems management. However, CSTC-A and the contractors utilized to mentor Afghan leaders

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<sup>89</sup> T.E. Lawrence, "Twenty-Seven Articles", *The Arab Bulletin*, referenced by Robert D. Ramsey III, *Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 18* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas :Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007), 1.

<sup>90</sup> DOD Report, *United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces*, (June 2008), 11.

have failed to produce information that reflects operational proficiency of sustainment functions at the strategic level. Obtaining the information in order to quantify an assessment at the strategic level may be problematic since there are few objective measures. CSTC-A and the GAO have provided metrics that detail the levels of operational proficiency of Afghan units at the brigade and battalion levels. US advisors rate the readiness and proficiency of Afghan units by utilizing capability milestones. These capability milestones range from one to four, with one representing a unit sustaining itself with minimal external support. CSTC-A reported in September 2008 that 7 of the 42 formed ANA battalions reached capability milestone one.<sup>91</sup> These metrics are evidence of US advisors building operational proficiency within Afghan units. Unfortunately, information displaying Afghan strategic level logistics proficiency is not readily available, which warrants implementation of objective measures to document progress.

As reported by DOD, the CSTC-A Deputy Commanding General, in coordination with the US Embassy and international community, are responsible for defining ANA equipment requirements.<sup>92</sup> The unstable operational environment dictates the use of non-Afghan personnel to lead strategic logistics planning and execution. In preparation for the eventual transition of internal logistics responsibilities to Afghan personnel, the Afghan Joint National Logistics Agency (AJNLA) is under development. According to CSTC-A, the AJNLA will be responsible for contract management, maintenance support and the management of strategic logistics assets and critical commodities.<sup>93</sup> Until this organization is operational, the roles of Afghan leaders will be marginalized because US personnel coordinate most sustainment and acquisition activity.

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<sup>91</sup> Younossi, Obaid, Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Jonathan Vaccaro, Jerry M. Sollinger, Brian Grady, *The Long March, Building an Afghan National Army* (Rand Corporation, National Defense Institute, 2009), 47.

<sup>92</sup> Department of Defense Report to Congress, *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan* (January 2009), 37.

<sup>93</sup> CSTC-A Report, *Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces* (September 20, 2008), A-6.

Furthermore, the lack of strategic airlift assets and a nonexistent defense budget to procure supplies places Afghan leaders in a secondary position to advisors. The current environment supports Afghan led planning once US procured equipment and supplies are transferred to national level depot sites. At this point, Afghan leaders are able to exercise internal distribution functions to sustain the ANA. CSTC-A set up an efficient system of coordinating the import of sustainment supplies once the requirements are validated. The lack of scholarly writing on Afghan achievement at the strategic level of logistics indicates a dependence on US advisors. As reported by the Rand Institute, the logistics capability of the ANA is universally seen as falling short and there appears to be a tendency to look to embedded forces to solve logistics problems.<sup>94</sup> In January 2009, CSTC-A offered to make logistics that is currently contracted an ANA core responsibility.<sup>95</sup> Transferring this mission to the ANA would provide an opportunity for US advisors to take a secondary role to Afghan leaders, as Afghans would receive and distribute supplies at the strategic level for Afghan use. Moreover, the eventual test of Afghan progress at the strategic level will occur as Afghan troops increase from 122,000 to 134,000 soldiers. Afghan leaders at the strategic level will have to tackle the challenges associated with meeting the sustainment and infrastructure requirements to support a larger force.

### **A Historical Example of Success: US Support to Greece**

The US support to the Greek government following its liberation from German occupation provides an opportunity to evaluate previous US efforts to defeat an indigenous insurgency. From 1947 to 1949, the US provided over \$600 million in economic and military aid

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<sup>94</sup> Younossi, Obaid, Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Jonathan Vaccaro, Jerry M. Sollinger, Brian Grady, *The Long March, Building an Afghan National Army*, (Rand Corporation, National Defense Institute, 2009), 59.

<sup>95</sup> *CSTC-A report, Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces* (September 20, 2008) , 14.

to Greece, along with civilian and military advisors.<sup>96</sup> A study of US efforts in Greece and what led to success is relevant today as the US faces a similar situation in Afghanistan. The withdrawal of Nazi forces from Greece in 1944 created a vacuum of power that required international intervention in order to block Soviet expansion. According to Frank Abbot, after World War II, the Greek nation, with its ruined economy and unstable government, faced an increasingly strong communist insurgency.<sup>97</sup> The Greek Monarch, King George II, returned to Greece following the Nazi withdrawal but faced a stiff challenge for power by the Communist Party of Greece. The British deployed a 26,500-man liberation force to Greece, but its small size relegated it to protecting a few cities such as Athens. The British Army's inability to provide adequate protection provided an opportunity for the Soviets to assist the military wing of the Greek Communist Party. As posited by Kevin Dougherty, Greek communists benefited greatly from the Red Army's presence and Soviet influence around Greece.<sup>98</sup> Soviet troops occupied Albania and Yugoslavia, which provided sanctuary for Greek communist fighters. This enabled Greek communists to control Greece's northwestern region. Suffering from its own post-war economic shortage, and faced with a bleak situation in Greece, the British decided to pull out. On 21 February 1947, the British informed the US that they were leaving and on 3 March, the Greek government formally requested US aid.<sup>99</sup>

President Harry Truman addressed the nation and outlined his concern about the possible spread of communism in Greece. The policy to block Soviet expansion became the Truman Doctrine and served as a basis to justify US support to Greece, as well as Turkey. On 22 May

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<sup>96</sup> Frank Abbott, *The Greek Civil War, 1947-1949: Lessons for the Operational Artist in Foreign Internal Defense* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, USCGS, 1994), 1.

<sup>97</sup> *ibid.*, 2.

<sup>98</sup> MAJ Kevin Dougherty, "FAO History: General Van Fleet and the JUSMAPG in Greece," <http://www.faoa.org/journal/vanfleet.html>, (accessed May 17, 2009).

<sup>99</sup> *ibid.*

1947, President Truman signed a bill authorizing \$400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey.<sup>100</sup> The US then faced the challenge of rebuilding a country ruined by occupation while simultaneously defeating a well-sourced communist insurgency. US policy makers believed the unstable situation in Greece provided an opportunity for improvement. Economic advisors under Secretary of State George C. Marshall believed the post war Greek economy did not have to be confined to its limited pre-war capacity. Stavros B. Thomadakis wrote that the route to economic restructuring would have to be a drive toward industrialization.<sup>101</sup> This approach was important as it established an industrial foundation to support an economy needed to sustain a fledgling Greek National Army (GNA). The development of raw materials and the utilization of alternate sources of energy fueled the Greek economy as it slowly matured under US advisement. The desire to build a strong GNA directly correlated with developing Greek industry. The US initiated contracts with local businesses, which helped to rehabilitate previously profitable industries. The American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) worked closely with Greek industrialists to supply the necessary items to sustain the GNA. The AMAG then provided them with the necessary means, materials, and financing.<sup>102</sup> Requirements for items such as uniforms and combat equipment allowed the AMAG to create a supply and demand relationship between the Greek defense community and commercial industry in Greece.<sup>103</sup> This ultimately contributed to economic stability and restored the confidence of the Greek people in their democratically elected government.

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<sup>100</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>101</sup> Stavros B. Thomadakis, "Stabilization, Development and Government Economic Authority in the 1940's" in John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley ed. *Greece at the Crossroads, The Civil War and its Legacy*, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 189.

<sup>102</sup> US Department of Defense, *USAGG History Volume I*, Box 53, Folder 16 (Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Research Library), 117.

<sup>103</sup> *ibid.*, 118.

In order to shape the Greek environment for economic prosperity, the US government decided that increased military action was required to defeat communist insurgents. To accomplish this mission, the US rapidly expanded the GNA. The Joint US Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), under the leadership of LTG James Van Fleet, was formed to provide logistical and operational guidance to the GNA. LTG Van Fleet's team consisted of approximately 350 advisors whose purpose was to retrain and reorganize the GNA. LTG Van Fleet attached American officers to each corps and fighting division headquarters, as well as the Greek General Staff.<sup>104</sup> LTG Van Fleet was responsible for guiding a GNA that listed on paper as 132,000 soldiers, and categorized as ill equipped, dispersed, and not-too-efficient.<sup>105</sup> LTG Van Fleet improved the GNA's logistics by streamlining operations and linking it to the emerging industrial system. By the end of 1947, an estimated 174,000 tons of supplies had been delivered to the GNA.<sup>106</sup> With these supplies on ground, LTG Van Fleet's advisory team set up a quartermaster salvage plan, which established base salvage depots throughout the country. Establishing salvage depots supported JUSMAG's goal of increasing the GNA's sustainment capability by moving supplies closer to the fight. This allowed for a shorter distribution timeline for Greek support elements as they sustained combat operations against communist insurgents. As result of JUSMAG's efforts, a Greek sustainment system emerged which supported the GNA. This included improved tactical logistics based on JUSMAG's use of salvage depots and the GNA's link to industry for strategic level sustainment. This newly established logistical structure gradually matured and provided a model for the Greek government to utilize. As their economy

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<sup>104</sup> MAJ Kevin Dougherty, "FAO History: General Van Fleet and the JUSMAPG in Greece," <http://www.faoa.org/journal/vanfleet.html> (accessed May 17, 2009).

<sup>105</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>106</sup> Paul Olkhovsky, *The Greek Civil War: The Examination of America's First Cold War Victory* (Alexandria, Virginia, Center for Naval Analyses: Support and Operations Division, 1991), 5.

grew, it allowed them to produce and distribute indigenous materials to support the GNA. Therefore, US commitments to develop Greek industry and enhance GNA logistics capability were key elements in the restoration of a stable Greek democracy, and its ability to provide for its own defense.

There are several lessons learned from the US experience in Greece that may be applied to the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. According to JP 4-0, the nation's ability to project and sustain military power comes from the strategic level.<sup>107</sup> Both Greece and Afghanistan required international assistance in order to rebuild from years of internal conflict. The American Economic Mission to Greece reported that Greece faced reconstruction problems of immense proportions because roads, railway bridges, railroad equipment, water systems, and power stations were destroyed during the war.<sup>108</sup> One reason for success in Greece was that senior US policy makers were committed to stabilizing the country by allocating the bulk of US resources to building capacity. Most of the \$600 million authorized to help Greece defeat the insurgency went to programs to rebuild an industrial base in order to sustain the GNA, and not to fund combat operations by US personnel. Another lesson that may be applied in today's conflict is the role of the US advisor. Though influential at senior levels, the Americans did not run the war. Only three American service members died in the Greek civil war.<sup>109</sup> The secondary role Americans held allowed it to be seen as a Greek conflict and not one in which Greeks were fighting Americans. This is in contrast to the thousands of US forces that not only advise and provide logistical support but also lead combat operations in Afghanistan.

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<sup>107</sup> US Department of Defense, *JP 4-0, Joint Logistics*. (Washington, DC:GPO 2008), I-5.

<sup>108</sup> US Department of Defense, *USAGG History Volume I*, Box 52, Folder 27( Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Research Library), 18.

<sup>109</sup> Paul Olkhovsky, *The Greek Civil War: The Examination of America's First Cold War Victory* (Alexandria, Virginia, Center for Naval Analyses: Support and Operations Division, 1991), 12.

US advisors also recognized the need for the GNA to secure key lines of communication and incorporate innovative ways to facilitate logistics functions to sustain the GNA. Securing supply routes improved the GNA's ability to distribute supplies from US established salvage depots to combat units. It also limited the insurgents' ability to resupply their forces by denying them access to the routes. Northern Greece provided a sanctuary for insurgents because of its mountainous terrain and lack of roads. This environment often limited the movement of the GNA and the sustainment supplies needed to support them within the area. To solve this problem, US advisors requisitioned horses and mules to carry GNA supplies in order to support clearing operations in remote areas. Records show that 4,000 animals plus their equipment was procured from the United States at a cost of \$382 each, or a total of \$1,528,000.<sup>110</sup> Similar conditions in Afghanistan exist as they did in Greece following internal conflict. More importantly, these challenges provide an opportunity for US advisors to work alongside Afghan leaders to analyze the operational environment and diversify distribution methods in order to sustain the ANA.

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<sup>110</sup> US Department of Defense, *USAGG History Volume I*, Box 52, Folder 16 (Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Research Library), 18.

# Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

## Summary

Afghanistan emerged in late 2001 as a war torn state in need of international assistance to meet the demands of self-governance. Security issues continue to plague this newly formed Islamic government as it develops centralized institutions to serve its population. The US and its allies have invested billions of dollars to improve Afghanistan's stability and to facilitate its integration into the international community. This international commitment to develop Afghanistan is a monumental attempt to bring order to a complex region. Providing a secure environment is a fundamental part needed to help Afghanistan reach its potential. CSTC-A is responsible for developing an internal security capacity to meet the challenges associated with Afghanistan's volatility. The long-term objective of the Afghan government and its supporting international partners is eventual self-sustainment. Meeting this objective requires a well-orchestrated effort to enhance security and create the economic infrastructure to support independent action. Therefore, developing an Army capable of conducting security in support of the Afghan government depends on establishing an economic infrastructure for its sustainment.

Afghanistan's \$11 billion<sup>111</sup> GDP does not support current or future requirements to sustain the ANA. Foreign aid and international donations cover Afghanistan's shortfalls as the country develops its internal economic capacity. CSTC-A helps Afghanistan meet current security requirements and foreign assistance provides resources for continuous military operations. Economic experts such as Dr. Nour Ali proposed ideas to facilitate Afghanistan's desire to take control of its future in order to minimize its foreign dependency. Dr. Ali's strategy tied economic reconstruction to state development and increased foreign investment. His

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<sup>111</sup> Obaid Younossi, Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Jonathan Vaccaro, Jerry M. Sollinger, Brian Grady, *The Long March, Building an Afghan National Army* (Rand Corporation, National Defense Institute, 2009), xii.

approach to Afghanistan promoted economic growth through the development of internal industries based on the resources available in the country. Dr. Ali's idea provided a pathway to future military sustainment.

Afghanistan's economy is linked to several nations within its region which could provide opportunities for the economic growth required to sustain the ANA. Afghanistan offers investment opportunities in natural gas extraction, mining, and agriculture production. Economic relationships with regional neighbors remain underdeveloped due to years of conflict; however, a stable Afghanistan increases its investment potential. Furthermore, US advisors provide the personalized assistance needed to mentor Afghan leaders in order to help the Afghan government reach its potential. The US experience in Greece, following the end of World War II, highlights the importance of advisors in stabilizing a war torn nation. The advisors' role is invaluable, as they help execute foreign policy in indigenous institutions from the strategic to tactical levels. The US and IC will inevitably provide assistance in Afghanistan for years to come. However, the IC's commitments to assist development of security and internal capacity, as well as improve strategic level mentorship, will provide the means by which Afghanistan is able to sustain its national army.

## **Conclusion**

This research utilized information from historical data, reports from government and international organizations, to include opinions from regional economic and security experts. The data reflected a broad spectrum of ideas relating to the sustainment of the ANA. A common theme that emerged is the complexity the Afghan problem presents the US and the IC. The magnitude of Afghanistan's devastation following years of war provided an endless supply of obstacles that impeded its development. The focus of this paper sought to examine the strategic logistics structure needed to sustain an independently functioning ANA. Analysis indicated a need to create a modern economy with the industrial capacity to sustain a security force. The

Obama Administration's strategy in Afghanistan applies new emphasis on the economic instrument of power. According to National Security Advisor James L. Jones, the piece of the strategy that has to work in the next year is economic development. If that is not done right, there are not enough troops in the world to succeed.<sup>112</sup> His statement aligns with that of former Afghan Commerce Minister Dr. Ali, who argued that economic reconstruction is essential to the creation of Afghan statehood. Furthermore, the issues of developing a logistics framework to sustain the ANA are interrelated with the economic and political challenges associated with building a prosperous Afghanistan.

There are sectors within Afghanistan that provide potential for economic growth. Afghanistan has a history of exporting agricultural products that in turn provided a source of government revenue. Afghanistan's under-developed mineral and natural gas industries are promising areas for foreign investments. Regional powers require additional energy to sustain growth, and Afghanistan is likely to reap the economic benefits created by their demands. Construction projects will produce the bulk of economic stimulus in the near future because of Afghanistan's immature infrastructure. Afghanistan's lack of paved roads, electrical grids, and government facilities underlines the enormous effort required to bring Afghanistan into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. An independently functioning ANA will one day trace the origin of its capability to the billions of dollars invested in its nation's infrastructure.

Examining Afghanistan's relationship with regional powers Iran, Pakistan, China, and Russia, offered insight into additional sources of revenue to support Afghanistan's economic growth. These regional powers could develop sectors within Afghanistan that are mutually identified as most profitable. Thus, Afghanistan's relationships with its neighbors are based on the resources they are able to exploit. The exception is Pakistan, which benefits from

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<sup>112</sup> Bob Woodward, "Key in Afghanistan: Economy, Not Military", *Washington Post.com*, July 1, 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/.../AR2009063002811.html> (accessed August 8, 2009).

Afghanistan's instability. An unstable Afghanistan supports Pakistan's defense in depth strategy should India conduct offensive operations. In order to promote Afghan economic development the US and IC will have to address Pakistan's security concerns with India. If Pakistan's security interests are not addressed, then key elements within Pakistan's military and intelligence service will continue to undermine international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.

Employing advisors to foreign nations is a major focus of US security policy, as it seeks to build indigenous capacity in order to meet the challenges that affect the international security environment. Since the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the US and its allies have improved the training of their advisors to meet the unique challenges presented in Afghanistan. However, most improvements to advising Afghan leaders are more evident below the operational level. A weak economy and poor infrastructure require US advisors to execute strategic level logistics planning in Afghanistan. After eight years of advising leaders within the Afghan MOD, US advisors remain in charge of most strategic level operations. Changes to the current arrangement can only be expected to occur once Afghanistan develops the capacity to make, buy, and transport the materials required to sustain its army. The US effort in Greece following German occupation provided an opportunity to study the development of an indigenous defense sustainment capability. Under President Truman, the US committed economic and military support to the Greek government as it struggled to defeat a communist based insurgency. A failed Greek democratic state parallels Afghanistan, as it would have facilitated the spread of instability throughout Turkey and the adjacent Middle Eastern states. Under LTG Van Fleet, advisors collaborated with Greek leadership and restructured the GNA into a mobile force able to defeat communist insurgents. Simultaneously, economic experts along with military planners rebuilt Greek industry by tying its development to the logistical requirements needed to sustain the GNA. The demand created by this indigenous defense force stimulated the economy, building a link between Greek industry and the military.

## Recommendations

The analysis and conclusions provided in this monograph underscore the need for continued examination of how to build the indigenous capacity needed to sustain an independently functioning ANA. International organizations committed to helping the Afghan government reach its potential deserve a voice in shaping the future of this war torn country. A deeper understanding of the complex social, economic, and security issues are required to facilitate long-term development. Most importantly, the Afghan people are a vital component of any strategy that facilitates the country's integration into the international community. To inspire growth in Afghanistan, the international community must remain aware of the long history of fragmentation and armed resistance to outside powers who sought to influence its political makeup.<sup>113</sup> Therefore, unity of effort with the Afghan people, as well as patience in implementing developmental policies are necessities in helping Afghanistan emerge from decades of conflict.

The US and IC will have to continue their economic and military support to the Afghan government for years to come. The country's volatile security environment, coupled with its fragile economy, dictate this requirement to preserve stability within the region. Eight years of emphasizing military power perpetuated instability and unified various elements of the Taliban. Employing economic and military power must remain a simultaneous effort, because both instruments of power are mutually dependent. To generate success in Afghanistan requires the same level of commitment invested in Iraq. According to the Center for American Progress, Afghanistan is a war of necessity.<sup>114</sup> This is not to advocate utilizing the same template in Afghanistan as in Iraq, but to generate the same level of political energy and resources to meet Afghanistan's unique challenges. To date, the establishment of the ANA is ahead of the

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<sup>113</sup> Lawrence Korb, Caroline Wadhams, Colin Cookman, and Sean Duggan, *Sustainable Security in Afghanistan Crafting Effective and Responsible Strategy for the Forgotten Front* (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, March 2009), 7.

<sup>114</sup> *ibid.*, 7.

developmental framework required to sustain it. The current strategic logistics system in place to sustain the ANA is incomplete, and requires improvement at the strategic level to cover its shortfalls. Creating an industrial base is one aspect of supporting the Afghan defense supply pipeline. Developing an Afghan Joint National Logistics Agency is the second part of ensuring sustainment capacity. These actions will enhance the MOD's strategic level interface with commercial industry in order to manage the material requirements needed to sustain the ANA.

Attempts to improve institutions that sustain the ANA will be undermined if Pakistan's security concerns are not addressed. Pakistan is Afghanistan's largest regional trading partner and accounts for over \$1 billion in trade. However, the US and the IC must ease Pakistan's fears because a stable Afghanistan does not support its current strategic security interests. Pakistan must be assured that a stable Afghanistan would not make them vulnerable to Indian expansion within the region. This assurance will only come from increased strategic dialogue and the establishment of common goals between the IC and Pakistan. The human capital, potential trade relationships, and natural resources are in place to help Afghanistan move forward. Therefore, leaders within Pakistan's government must see that support for the Taliban and other extremist groups operating in Afghanistan compromises their security as well.

Support for the ANA by the US and IC must continue in order to build lasting institutions and develop a professional Afghan Army. According to the Obama administration's fiscal year 2010 budget, the United States will save approximately \$330 billion from reduced combat missions in Iraq over the next five fiscal years.<sup>115</sup> These potential savings should be redirected each year to support the challenges associated with developing a framework to support the ANA. The development of the ANA should not be limited to combat units, but also should be extended to the institutions that will one day sustain the force. The success of the ANA to this point can largely be attributed to the international supply pipeline that sustains ANA combat operations. An

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<sup>115</sup> *ibid.*, 5.

equally robust effort in the areas of mentorship and logistics planning at the strategic level are essential to providing sustainment once the US and its allies have departed. Furthermore, CSTC-A should continue to refine the logistics support framework required at each level of the ANA. The next step should be an Afghan focused campaign to link the long-term plan of economic improvement with the demands required to sustain a growing Afghan Army. The issues addressed are complex and require additional US commitment, but establishing a logistics infrastructure to sustain the ANA will in the long-term support US security interests.

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