NATIONAL SECURITY AND LANGUAGE COMPETENCE:
U.S. ARMED FORCES AND TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

KURT E. MULLER, MAJ, USAR
B.A., City College of New York, 1969
A.M., Rutgers University, 1974
M.Phil., Rutgers University, 1975
Ph.D., Rutgers University, 1977

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of
the student author and do not necessarily represent the views
of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any
other governmental agency. (References to this study should
include the foregoing statement.)
Abstract

NATIONAL SECURITY AND LANGUAGE COMPETENCE:
U.S. ARMED FORCES AND TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATION

by Major Kurt E. Muller, USAR, 154 pages.

Language competence has long been recognized as a required skill in the collection and analysis of intelligence. Previous experience in coalition warfare and current efforts at multilateral defense reveal the need for facility in other languages in operating with allies. Command and control may be affected significantly by the ability to communicate successfully between units of various nations. As operations in foreign areas also entail dealing with a population whose cultural background may differ from ours, language skill may be of command interest for its contribution to civil-military cooperation.

This study looks at the historical use by the armed forces of languages other than English and at the means by which these skills were acquired. As multinational experiences are well documented for World War II and Korea, the study concentrates on these two conflicts.
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... valid national strategy must embrace all our national resources of every kind -- human, material, industrial, scientific, political, and spiritual. The armed forces are simply the cutting edge -- a deterrent to hostile action in ordinary times but even when used in war, a last and desperate resort. (Committee on National Security Organization, Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government)

There should be no doubt that a nation's strength lies in its capacity to meet the demands of its citizens not only to be free from want but to prosper. To facilitate prosperity a government seeks to provide its citizens the wherewithal to produce an abundance of goods and services, to seek access to an ever wider choice of goods in the marketplace, and to insure the nation against catastrophic loss of its standard of living. If such a definition of national security seems broad, it is deliberately so. At their best, economic, material, and human resources contribute to a society's progressive development. By contrast, American military strength, in this century at least, is essentially conservative. Rather than serving as a vehicle for political aggrandizement -- as in dynastic or nationalistic wars -- it seeks to preserve a peaceful environment for the exercise of free international
trade. Thus we have seen multiple bilateral alliances give way to pluralistic collective-security arrangements. In a world characterized by increasing collective action (though it may at times appear to be collective inertia), unilateral decision making becomes ever more rare, and we find an ever greater need to communicate with trading partners whose needs, aspirations, and motivations may differ from our own. Thus it is that in dealing with equals, language is a tool of peace.

Lest our readers deny the necessity of multilateral action in international relations and affirm instead America's role as the preeminent world power (a la "big stick diplomacy"), we hasten to cite a former Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, General George S. Blanchard: "we can no longer approach the problem of the defense of Western Europe from strictly a unilateral national viewpoint."(1) Blanchard observes that we have the capability of putting a multinational defense team on the ground in peacetime [a first] and that "multinational exercises are becoming more the rule than the exception." He considers a basic element in the estimate of combat effectiveness to be people and their ability to communicate on the battlefield. "Language interoperability is the key and the base on which any operating sense of cooperation should be built. For, in
the heat of battle, there will be no time to request a translation of a fire mission or go directly to a dictionary to discover what Angriff means" (p. 59). Hence, Blanchard considers language to be a necessary tool of war.

So it is that language skill contributes both to peace and to war. We have seen in the private sector the effect of a lack of language competence. Consider the pen manufacturer who translated an advertising pitch that claimed the use of its ink would prevent embarrassment. Unfortunately for the company, the Latin American audience receiving the message usually attached to the word "embarrassed" not the intended notion of propriety in social etiquette but the connotation of an unwanted pregnancy. (2) In the public sector, too, we have seen sufficient evidence of the lack of language competence. On February 1979, the New York Times editorialized on "The Indispensable Mr. Chi," the interpreter who accompanied Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping of the Peoples' Republic of China on his visit to the United States. The Times wrote:

In 1972, President Nixon was able to speak with the Chinese leaders in Peking only through their interpreters. Seven years later, the humiliation -- and perhaps the damage -- continues on American soil.
Elsewhere we have written on the importance of language competence in strategic intelligence collection and given examples of failure to use American resources to interpret, translate, and analyze information from foreign sources. (3)

Our previous study of the contribution of language skill to military effectiveness was limited to materials commonly available in the press and in openly published professional literature. In contrast, this study makes extensive use of resources that are far more restricted. While many of the materials we shall consider in these pages have been declassified for more than thirty years, their availability solely in typescript form (including on microfilm) has not afforded them sufficient dissemination. Other sources -- particularly those concerning the Korean War -- have been declassified relatively recently. Still other sources, from which we quote unclassified passages, remain subject to security restrictions.

Our purpose in this study is to examine historical documents to determine the armed forces’ need for language skills. We shall look at after-action reports from multinational operations, at publications contemporaneous with our previous overseas deployment, at memoirs, at official histories, at student papers
submitted at mid- and senior-level service colleges, and at various staff studies. We shall also look at our history in meeting the needs we have perceived. The record of the nation's last general mobilization is particularly instructive for the variety of needs it uncovers and for the cooperation it demonstrates between the military and other sectors of our society. Our mobilization experience is germane, indeed essential, to deliberate planning for any future global calamity.

As national security can be seen both from the broad perspective of the total capacity of a society to improve the lot of its members and from the narrow view of a military reaction to an external threat of aggression, so too can language skill be employed for peace and for war. While we would rather extol the virtues of attempts toward mutual understanding in an ever shrinking global community -- our best hope for lasting peace -- we find it necessary to examine the need to communicate across linguistic barriers in a sometimes hostile human environment.

To introduce the reader to the topic, we shall repeat, in condensed form, our previous presentation before proceeding with the results of our current research. Readers who have seen our previous article in *Military Review* or in the *Modern Language Journal* may
therefore wish to skip the remainder of this chapter and continue with chapter two.

The Argument for Language Competence

Perhaps no other profession outside that of diplomacy is as concerned with the relationship between a nation and its neighbors near and far as the military. The common interest of the two is not surprising, of course, to the student of armed international conflict. In his classic text on the art and science of warfare, Carl von Clausewitz writes: "der Krieg ist nichts als eine Fortsetzung des politischen Verkehrs mit Einmischung anderer Mittel" war is nothing but a continuation of political relations with the addition of other means].(4) Whether one accepts Clausewitz's observation as Realpolitik or shudders at the identification of war with politics makes little difference; it seems clear that the military as well as the diplomatic arm of any government would follow with intense scrutiny the attitudes of its neighbors toward its own actions. Too, both devour whatever information is available on political developments in other countries. Readers of professional military journals are presented with articles on potential forces of destabilization, military build-up by adversaries, and
relations with allies. Readers' comments demonstrate their acceptance of these topics as appropriate issues for professional concern.

Our unfortunate experience has been that foreign language capability in the American armed forces has been restricted primarily to one sphere of military activity. In the minds of most casual observers, the military significance of foreign language competence is pigeonholed into the category of military intelligence -- strategic and tactical.

But the foreign policy of the United States has suffered severe setbacks because of precisely the inability to acquire and interpret reliable information. On 29 December 1952, an Associated Press story reported: Until the first American trained especially for Indonesian duty was assigned to the Embassy in 1949, all translating was done by natives. To please their employers, they interpreted everything to sound rosy, pro-American. But when American area and language experts began to read Indonesian newspapers and attend sessions of the National Legislature, the Embassy learned that strong communist-inspired anti-American feeling was sweeping the country. (5)

Twenty years later, elements of the Department of Defense found themselves making the same mistake in Vietnam. Even if we could discount the motivation of keeping one's job—in this example—or worse, of deliberately creating a false impression, we should note the drawbacks in using indigenous personnel for such
tasks. The accepted practice among translators (those who deal with written documents) and interpreters (those who deal with speech) is to translate or interpret into one's dominant language, not into one's second language. The language profession thus emphasizes accuracy of the product based on the reasonable assumption that the source document is correct.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we had the opportunity to question a defecting Soviet soldier who had sought asylum in the American embassy in Kabul. We failed to exploit this opportunity, however, as we had no one present on the embassy staff who could speak to the defector in Russian.

In intelligence collection, the utility of knowing the language of an area of interest is not limited to strategic intelligence. In a 1953 newspaper column, journalist Harold Martin relates its tactical importance as well:

I've spent many a harassed hour in foreign lands, blocked at every turn because I could not speak the language. That was merely inconvenience. But it can lead to tragedy too. For I saw a battalion badly bloodied once because nobody could understand what an excited Korean was trying to say -- that a strong Red force was lying in ambush, just beyond the hill. (6)
The acquisition and processing of tactical intelligence depends on the skill with which an interrogating team questions local civilians and captured prisoners. Without language facility, intelligence specialists are impaired in, or precluded from, the successful completion of their mission. Language ability also makes a longer-term contribution to the acquisition of area intelligence: fluency in the language leads to an understanding of the culture in which it is embedded. Without the capability to operate in a given culture, a unit or an individual will, at best, realize only limited success. At worst, an operational unit will find itself alienated from its environment.

Host country relations are of significant concern to the field commander, whether his unit is garrisoned abroad or is based in the continental United States and deploys for maneuvers. Since 1977, US-based military units deploying to Europe for NATO maneuvers (known as REFORGER, for “return of forces to Germany”) have been supplementing their battalion, brigade, and division staffs with reserve officers proficient in German. Reporting on the employment of these reservists in the 1st Infantry Division, the division chief of staff, Colonel Isaac D. Smith, wrote that the Active Army was deficient in language and area expertise and that the reserve foreign area officers (FAOs) "were the
cornerstone of effective Civil-Military Operations during Reforger 77."(7) In subsequent maneuvers with different units, the use of language-proficient officers has been increased. Observers have noted that the employment of such officers has greatly improved relations with the local populace and that the Army would have difficulty deploying large numbers of troops if there were no access to language and area expertise.

Damage to crops, buildings, roads, monuments, homes, and vehicles costs millions of dollars in these annual exercises. Civil-military cooperation ensures that public support does not degenerate to the point of threatening the alliance. At best, however, community relations only supplement a commander’s task. Central to the commander’s success is his ability to obtain intelligence, to maneuver in concert with adjacent units, and to supply his troops with materiel and subsistence.

We must admit that a combat force or a tactical intelligence unit would find it difficult to determine the languages in which it needs to develop and maintain expertise. The 82d Airborne Division might as easily profit from skill in Arabic or Korean as in German. Should highly mobile units maintain fluency in several languages? In practice, this question has been answered by augmenting active units with reserves as in NATO
exercises. Several reasons exist for this reliance on the reserve components. The pool of expertise is large, the active force can draw on only those individuals with the qualifications needed for a particular mission. The active component is finding it increasingly difficult to attract and retain linguists, especially in the enlisted ranks, where most language-designated positions are. Finally, augmentation by reserves is extremely cost-effective. Thirty percent of DOD personnel needs are met, at five percent of the budget, by reserve personnel. Given the increased importance of reserve linguists, it is time to look at the training they receive to acquire and maintain their language skills.

In attempting to allocate training funds parsimoniously, personnel managers would naturally tend to keep the training requirements for specific positions to a minimum. In conducting its research on language-designated positions (LDPs), the General Accounting Office interviewed officers overseas who had limited or no language capability. Among their interviewees holding LDPs:

A joint U.S. Military Assistance Group officer in an S-3/R-3 LDP but with no language capability, said he often has a feeling of being "left out" when using a translator. As part of the Foreign Military Sales team he makes inspection tours and observes military
training to see how U.S.-provided equipment is being used. During these inspection tours, he uses a translator (i.e., interpreter) when responding to questions asked by local officials. Because of this he feels his rapport with local officials has developed slowly and his communication with them is less than adequate.

An assistant air attache serving in an S-3/R-3 LDP has had no language training. He needs language ability to handle situations at local airports such as dealing with security guards, ground handling crews and other non-English speaking individuals. In addition, he needs to know the host country language in order to communicate with non-English speaking attaches from other countries.

The degree to which LDPs are filled by individuals with the required skill varies from one language to the next. In some languages the compliance rate is surprisingly low. In the "defense-security" occupations, the federal government has accounted for 4,576 positions requiring facility in Russian. In a background paper for the President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies, James R. Ruchti of the Department of State tallied only 2,039 incumbents who possessed the language qualification required.

Worse than instances of individuals in LDPs who do not have the requisite language qualification is the matter of underestimating requirements. The GAO claimed that language requirements are understated and that the systems for designating language positions are
inadequate (p. 47). GAO investigators found positions that did not require a language but for which language facility was essential. For example,

a regional security officer, who is in a non-LDP and does not know the host country language, is not able to work efficiently when contacting foreign-speaking individuals. The position responsibilities require numerous dealings with local police, security officials, national guard, and bodyguards of the Ambassador (none of whom speak English). The officer believed that the position should be language designated at the S-2/R-2 proficiency level. Post officials, however, have never requested that the position be an LDP"(pp. 48-49).

We mentioned above that the need for capability in various languages has led to greater reliance on the reserve components. If we expect to rely on the reserves for language skill, we had better ask about the size of the pool of qualified personnel and about the measures taken to ensure that language skills remain current.

In 1979, the coordinator of the Army's Reserve Component Foreign Area Officer Program reported a requirement for 1,703 reserve FAO billets and a shortfall of 1,224 officers to fill these positions. He estimated a mobilization requirement of 2,739 officers, for which there was a shortfall of 2,259. The Army's Reserve Component Personnel and Administration Center had identified 1,100 officers whose backgrounds made them eligible for selection for the specialty; the program manager noted, however, that even if all 1,100 were selected, there would still be a shortage of 50
percent of the mobilization requirement. In comparison with our allies, we have a long way to go to overcome the perception of the "ugly American." In the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, all officers study English. At the Führungsakademie, the equivalent of an all-service command and general staff college, officers are exempted from the study of English if they can demonstrate suitable proficiency. Those who do are permitted to study Russian instead. Our national shortcomings in international communication skills has been recognized in several reports prepared by the General Accounting Office. In one of these, the GAO lamented:

Our January 1973 report to the Congress addressed language requirements, training programs, and language-related staffing for several Federal departments and agencies and recommended improvement. At that time, we found that language essential positions at certain overseas locations were not adequately staffed, criteria for identifying foreign language requirements were not adequate, and language proficiency tests needed to be improved.... This report notes that similar conditions continue to exist.

With this information as background, let us investigate the record of our language needs in the military services and our attempts to meet them.
Notes to Chapter 1.


6. Cited by Parker, p. 107, the story appeared 4 October 1953.


8. General Accounting Office, More Competence in Foreign Languages Needed by Federal Personnel Working Overseas (Washington, DC: GPO, 1980), ID-80-31, p. 17. On the other hand, there were some positions for which the incumbents claimed a lower proficiency level than the one required would be adequate.


11. General Accounting Office, The Need to Improve Foreign Language Training Programs and Assignments for
Chapter 2. The View from Within: Defense

Looks at its Own Language Needs

...le "sens" de mes expressions m'échappe toujours; je ne sais jamais exactement si je signifie ce que je veux signifier ni même si je suis signifiant... (Jean-Paul Sartre, L'Être et le néant)

...the "meaning" of my expressions always escapes me. I never know if I signify what I wish to signify nor even if I am signifying anything... (J-P Sartre, Being and Nothingness)

In his monumental work on the character of human existence, the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre writes of the impossibility of communicating with others. Sartre's concern for the full range of meaning in a statement may at first seem too esoteric in the context of this treatise, but I would note that the problem he poses is between two persons speaking the same language. We may find it comforting to discover that English is the most prevalent foreign language in the world, but lest we assume that we can communicate easily with the 1,015,000,000 Asians, Africans, Europeans, and Latin Americans who are studying English, we ought to reflect on the difficulty we have understanding many of the 364 million native speakers of English, as well as those for
whom English is a strong second language. In South Asia, for example, 24.8 million persons use English, but we Americans would have difficulty acknowledging their variety of speech as the same language we use. Even between the United States and Britain the difficulty in mutual understanding is sometimes great. An American seeking an apartment in Britain is likely not to find anything suitable, as the British understand the term "apartment" as denoting a single room. An American "apartment" equates with a British "flat." Similarly, if we Americans ask for a "subway," we would be shown an underpass. If we find the "underground," then we shall have found the mass-transit vehicle we are seeking. These differences can be amusing; they can be serious if the divergence in meaning is greater or if the actions we wish someone to accomplish are crucial to us. If we were dealing in high finance and asked a bank for a loan of a billion pounds, we would be astonished to discover that the British billion, like the German, French, or Italian, is equal to an American trillion; an American billion is a British (French, German, Italian) milliard.

In North America, English has been the dominant language since before the revolution. But the degree of dominance has varied. While we have never really been a monolingual nation, the impact of minority languages has
fluctuated considerably. Until World War I, the influence of non-English cultures was reflected not only in ethnic settlements and the minority-language press, but also in the prominent place of language in the elementary and secondary school curriculum: in 1915, 24.4% of high school students were enrolled, at any given time, in a German class.

World War I gave each of the belligerents a good measure of linguistic chauvinism. Despite our involvement in a global crisis, we in the United States developed a cultural isolationism that was devastating to language study. Whereas almost one in four high school students had been studying German before the war, by 1922 the figure had dropped to six per thousand.(2)

By the time World War II became a threat to us, our orientation toward the languages of the enemy had changed. A year before the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the Navy recognized that only twelve officers were fully competent in spoken and written Japanese. Aware that in the event of war with Japan it would need to develop competence in Japanese, the navy embarked on a survey of civilians with a knowledge of either Chinese or Japanese. Of an initial file of 600, half had so little functional capacity in the language that they were dropped on first screening. Of
the rest, 56 were chosen to receive further training and become the nucleus of the Navy Japanese Language School. In Language and Area Studies in the Armed Services, Robert Matthew provides a detailed report of efforts like these to build competence in the languages of the areas where our troops would be. (3) Ironically, at the same time that the War and Navy Departments discovered they needed to build up language programs, the State Department suspended theirs. (4) This anomaly offers an interesting interpretation that a nation's military forces need to understand an adversary once the diplomats have abandoned their efforts to speak with him. Undoubtedly, this orientation toward the enemy is largely responsible for the identification of language skills with the military intelligence specialty.

It was of course the intelligence community that begat the large-scale military interest in languages, and it is still this segment of the uniformed services that provides the greatest number of students to the Defense Language Institute. As early as 1955, the Task Force on Intelligence Activities of the second Hoover Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government recommended:
That a comprehensive, coordinated program be developed to expand linguistic training among American citizens serving the intelligence effort; and

That the Department of Defense expand and promote language training by offering credit toward reserve commissions to ROTC students and drill credit to Reserve personnel for completion of selected language courses.(5)

In 1959, the army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) published a staff study on "Language Training for Officers."(6) The ODCSPER study delineated three types of requirements for language competence among officers: (1) to meet the needs of a specific assignment, (2) to provide a pool of qualified personnel to meet emergency or mobilization commitments, and (3) "to enhance our prestige in those overseas locations where our assumption of World Leadership commits us to serve"(p. 1). These three categories are implicitly accepted by several mid-level and senior officers who wrote papers at the Army Command and General Staff College or the Army War College on aspects of the Defense Language Program.

Colonel William P. Jones, Jr., for example, writes in general of the need for language competence among officers.(7) As background material, he cites a number of works that at the time of his study were standard fare for anyone concerned with language use. Additionally, he
quotes from congressional documents; he extracts a lesson from a classified study; and he relates relevant personal experiences. Jones accepts what might be called the "hypothesis of cultural imperialism": the concept that an American working in a foreign country who continues to use English exhibits an implicit arrogance by expecting others to make the effort to learn his language, an arrogance that suggests we are no different from the former colonial rulers. For foreigners to make the effort to learn the local working language is to demonstrate -- often dramatically -- a sense of respect for the people who speak that language. To avoid the effort can sometimes be interpreted as a show of disrespect. (8)

Jones follows this citation with a supporting example from his own professional experience with the Joint Brazil-United States Military Commission. "The accomplishments of this organization," he writes, "were directly proportional to the ability of its personnel to obtain the esteem and confidence of Brazilian officers.... Even a slight knowledge of Portuguese produced a favorable reaction." He relates an instance of two American officers discussing business in Portuguese. A Brazilian officer in their midst then remarked: "you cannot imagine how it thrills me to hear two Americans speaking Portuguese to each other. My reaction is this: if these Americans have taken the trouble to learn my language and even use it in talking to each other, they must think it
important, and my country, too" (Jones, p. 4). Having consulted William R. Parker's *The National Interest and Foreign Languages,* Jones paraphrases one of the instances Parker presents of mistranslation: that of the American reporter who, during the Indo-Chinese war, quoted a French general as demanding American aid. The reporter had failed to translate the French "demander," which is equivalent to English "ask." Jones adds another example of a "false cognate" (a word in a foreign language similar to one in the native language but with a different meaning) from his experience in Brazil:

In 1954 the Commanding General, US Army Section, Joint Brazil-United States Military Commission, wished by means of a courteous letter in Portuguese, to recommend to the Brazilian general staff a better organization for maintenance of American-furnished equipment. The translator rendered "recommend" by a form of the Portuguese verb "recomendar." Brazilian civilians do use "recomendar" in the sense of "recommend," but in the military service it has the force of an order, just as "desire" does in the US Army.(p. 5)

One might be tempted to conclude from this example that the general would have been better off sending a letter in English and letting the Brazilians translate it, but that would have (1) shown the discourtesy mentioned above, and (2) been subject to the same error by a Brazilian. In this example, we have not so much a mistranslation as a failure to perceive the connotations of a word in a
particular cultural environment. The same is true of Nikita Khrushchev's "we will bury you" speech. In the context of the Cold War, the phrase is menacing. In fact, however, the Russian idiom means "we will survive you" and does not convey an aggressive attitude. We, however, took it as a defiant remark. The hostility that results from errors in communication may not be quantifiable but it leads us to conjecture about the crucial nature of understanding in international relations.

In a 1963 War College thesis, Lieutenant Colonel William J. Truxal, like Jones, addresses the question of cultural imperialism.(10) He advocates schooling in a "secondary" language in order to shield the soldier-diplomat "from the accusation of racial or national 'snobbery.'" Truxal looks at several branches and specialties and comments on language use in these. Of the tasks normally encountered by special forces personnel, Truxal writes: "It is extremely difficult to be a teacher, or an advisor, in a foreign land without being able to communicate directly with the people in their own language. Anyone who has tried to teach even the most simple subjects through an interpreter can testify to the many frustrations and misunderstandings incurred" (p. 14).
In a student paper submitted at the Command and General Staff College in 1966, Major Katsuji Kobata emphasizes language training for special forces. (11) Kobata quotes Major General W. R. Peers, Army Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Special Operations, who writes that the special forces advisor "must be equipped with three essentials and related attributes: professional competence, understanding of the people and the...culture in his area of assignment and the linguistic capability to communicate his competence." (12)

Like special forces, whose expertise is oriented toward defeating insurgent military and paramilitary operations, members of military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) and military missions are often involved in teaching American tactical and operational doctrine to the armed forces of a host nation. Of these assignments Truxal writes: "Since no training method employing interpreters is truly efficient or fully effective, it appears imperative that the US instructors be as skillful in the language of the land as they are in the special knowledge they wish to impart" (p. 21).

Of particular branches, he advises: "Civil affairs detachments should have a thorough grounding in at least one of the local languages prior to the unit's employment
Truxal's comments on civil-affairs and intelligence officers are certainly on target. Yet training for employment in a foreign theater of operations often fails to test the effectiveness of a person's language skills. If we wish to evaluate our capacity for conducting psychological operations, we cannot simply write propaganda in English. The PSYOP specialist must practice his skill using another language, but are there language-qualified superiors (or a separate agency) to evaluate it? The civil-affairs officer is highly trained in a civilian profession, such as civil engineering, public health, or jurisprudence. Can he or she be effective through an interpreter? We shall examine the historical record in the next chapter; for now it is enough to note that some officers have advocated hiring
local persons who speak English to serve as interpreters. Only through realistic training oriented toward a specific environment can the advocates of indiscriminate local-hiring policies be disabused of the unwarranted optimism that anyone who speaks English in addition to his native language can be an effective interpreter. Our long and continuing history of contending with language problems by hiring local persons who speak English (and perhaps read and write it) contrasts starkly with the professional practice of translators and interpreters, who generally work from their weaker language into their dominant one. By hiring a work force to do the opposite, we run serious risks of misunderstanding.

In a student paper almost contemporary with Kobata's, Major Adrian Del Camp recommends the systematic incorporation of language instruction into officer career schooling, from basic branch courses through the Army War College.(3) Through his recommendation, Del Camp attempts to bridge the gap between a recognized need for language competence and the restrictive policy of sending only those officers for language training who have been selected for positions with documented language requirements. He quotes an article from infantry branch that admits "the desirability for all officers to become proficient in a foreign language."(4) but notes that
officers are usually expected to acquire and maintain language competence on their own. Del Camp notes that a survey of students at Fort Leavenworth revealed that language courses were high on the list of preferred electives (p. 7).

Del Camp's recommendation is neither new nor unique. Language education has long been advocated during the precommissioning environment. Modern languages appeared in the undergraduate curriculum at the US Military Academy as early as 1803.(15) We have already noted a 1955 recommendation from the Task Force on Intelligence Activities, chaired by General Mark W. Clark. In 1978, General George S. Blanchard, at the time Commander in Chief, US Army, Europe, called for the "institution in the precommissioning environment -- service academies, ROTC programs, and OCS -- of required and elective language courses in the history and cultural traditions of host nations"(16).

In Congress, the House Appropriations Committee agreed that language study contributes to the formative education and repertory of skills of an army officer. It suggested that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics consider instituting a language requirement for recipients of ROTC
scholarships. While the Office of the Assistant Secretary considered the imposition of such a measure a deterrent to recruitment, a one-year requirement, effective in the fall of 1980, was instituted nonetheless. The current administration at the assistant and undersecretary of defense level apparently sees the necessity for language competence as being more crucial than previously recognized and, in response to congressional desires, is now reviewing its language needs.

During 1977 and 1978, the Army conducted a major appraisal of the education and training of its officers, in which it looked at the formal and informal schooling and background necessary to perform successfully in each officer position throughout the Army. The commission conducting the investigation, chaired by Major General Benjamin Harrison, issued a five-volume report covering general and special requirements from precommissioning through the continuing education of general officers, entitled A Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO). In its well balanced discussion of the desirability or necessity for all officers to possess a degree of language competence, the commission notes that one general officer wrote to the study group: "Foreign language proficiency remains one of the fundamental requirements for the American army officer which is seldom
addressed in discussions of his education." The commission recognizes that English is the lingua franca of multinational security planning in the West and asserts that the use of another language is often "simply a gesture of good will." Although the commission finds "no clear and discernible operational need for all officers to be proficient in another language, it notes that building rapport with allies and foreign populations "is no small undertaking" and that: "the lack of qualified American foreign language specialists in appropriate positions continues to place the US Army in a bad light" (italics in the original text). While the study group finds a general requirement for language proficiency to be unrealistic, it recommends that all who aspire to become officers include in their undergraduate curriculum a minimum of two years of foreign language study.(19) The timing of the RETO proposal and its consideration by the Army's Chief of Staff coincides with the interest expressed by the House Appropriations Committee. The result is a requirement of one year of language study and a recommendation that officer aspirants pursue a two-year sequence.(20)

An undergraduate language requirement is not seen so much as developing fluency in a language as it is perceived as a valuable contribution to an officer's general background. The RETO study group finds that:
Even if proficiency is not attained, or is lost, the "study" of foreign languages does provide certain residual benefits. From contact with a foreign language and the study of a foreign culture, a student quickly learns that other people often have different perceptions of reality. Just as mathematics teaches or illustrates logical thinking, foreign languages illustrate the "illogical" thinking of foreigners. Foreign language study is, thus, one of the most direct routes out of our ethnocentric cocoon" (RETO, v. 4, p. p-3-10).

There are a number of excellent reasons not to rely on an undergraduate language sequence as a source of language-proficient officers. First of all, the language-teaching profession has never adopted a clear-cut, generally accepted goal of producing a specified level of proficiency (however measured) in the students taking a sequence of two-to-four semesters. In 1967, John B. Carroll et al. measured the proficiency of seniors concentrating in French, German, Russian, and Spanish. (21) Using the government proficiency scale (accepted by the Departments of Defense and State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Peace Corps), he ascertained that reading and comprehension facility of majors in these languages was generally at level 3; speaking facility, as should be expected, lagged behind and was generally at level 2-plus. No such comprehensive study has been conducted since 1967, and no study has investigated nationally the proficiency of
students undertaking a one-year or two-year language sequence. Only recently has the language-teaching profession moved toward a consensus that proficiency is a valid primary goal in a sequence of courses. With its proposal to the US Department of Education, and the subsequent award of a grant, the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages has embarked on a program to train language professionals to use the Foreign Service Institute's oral proficiency interview on their college campuses. As colleges reconsider their curricular requirements in general education, including the reestablishment of language requirements, they are finding a growing interest among the professoriat for a language requirement stated in terms of proficiency rather than in the number of quarter- or semester-credits a student undertakes. With the development of this new emphasis on oral facility, we see a major step beyond even the reorientation of professional concern evident in the audiolingual teaching methods that appeared in the 1950s. We can see a world of difference between the expectation that reading proficiency is the only skill that can be developed if students undertake only a two-year language sequence(22) and the advocacy of proficiency in all four language skills, to be acquired by the completion of a general-education program in postsecondary
The current goal that is gaining professional consensus looks toward extensive cooperation between secondary and higher education. In the late 1970s, the Modern Language Association, with the financial assistance of the Rockefeller Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities, formed a group of language task forces. The Task Force on Institutional Language Policy proposed the adoption of nationally recognized performance or proficiency standards. The expectation is that students would begin study of a language in high school (or earlier) and would have their achievements recognized as a step toward meeting a postsecondary proficiency requirement. Task force proposals go so far as to recommend:

As an incentive to language study and achievement at the secondary school level, colleges should award credit to students who meet their institutional language proficiency requirement upon entrance, provided that such students continue their study of the foreign language and culture in the next, more advanced college course. (24)

Such proficiency requirements are beginning to take hold. At the University of Pennsylvania, for example, the faculty is measuring student proficiency on the government scale, in preparation for converting their language requirement to one based on proficiency.
attained. (25) On other campuses, other tests of communicative ability are being applied, though not always -- perhaps not usually -- as part of a requirement. At Indiana University, for example, an Indiana University French Communicative Ability Test has been developed to measure the achievements of students in first-term French. (26) A number of colleges and universities are pursuing internationally recognized credentials for their students, such as the Zertifikat Deutsch als Fremdsprache (certificate of German as a foreign language) and the Zentrale Mittelstufenprüfung (central intermediate-level test) in German or the Certificat pratique de français commerciale et économique (a certificate in commercial French) and the Diplôme supérieure de français des affaires (an advanced diploma in business French) for students in third-year courses. (27) These, of course, do not equate with the US government proficiency levels.

The War and Navy Departments had made use of universities in developing language skills for service members (we shall provide historical examples in subsequent chapters), and, undoubtedly, the Department of Defense would turn to institutions of higher education again in a future general mobilization, but for the most part the defense establishment has relied
on its own language institute to meet its operational requirements.

In a student paper for the Command and General Staff College, Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Wallis discusses problems of language maintenance encountered by graduates of the Defense Language Institute. (28) Language maintenance is a major problem beyond the scope of this inquiry, but we must remark that, with notable exceptions, such as Joshua Fishman's landmark *Language Loyalty in the United States* (The Hague: Mouton, 1966), concerned with linguistic minorities, and the recent volume edited by Richard D. Lambert and Barbara F. Freed, *The Loss of Language Skills* (Rowley, Mass.: Newbury House, 1982), this area of inquiry probably suffers the most neglect of any research field within the language profession. Pardee Lowe's contribution to the Lambert-Freed volume is of direct interest to readers concerned with the language skills of U.S. government employees. (29)

Although Lowe's chapter appeals primarily to language professionals, it should also interest managers of government offices that use linguists, because of (1) his comparison of maintenance and refresher programs among government agencies, and (2) an appreciation of
the difficulty in assessing skill loss, which may differ among languages. Despite lacunae in data and inconsistencies in recordkeeping, the records of government agencies provide fertile ground for research on skill loss. As such, we should foster cooperation between these agencies and applied linguists.

The RETO study was not the first comprehensive attempt since World War II to look at officer education, and it was not the first such review to address the question of language competence. A banner year for such studies was 1966, in which two separate ones appeared, one for the Army, and one for the Department of Defense. The Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools, also known as the Haines Board, after its chairman, then-Lieutenant General Ralph E. Haines, Jr., found the Army’s foreign area specialist program "very successful" but confined to a limited number of world areas. It recommended expanding the program to include "a modest number of specialists in Eastern European countries of the Warsaw Pact not [then] included and possibly some specialists in the NATO countries." The Haines Board also noted the existence of a problem recognized by numerous critics in the last two decades, both within the Department of Defense and outside it. The board found that procedures for identifying trained
linguists should be improved and reutilization tours for officers who had taken the longer DLI language courses should be increased." (30)

In the same year the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower published The Officer Education Study. In its consideration of language needs, the Defense Department staff divided the Defense Language Program into four instructional categories: full-time, mission-required training; part-time, mission-required training; voluntary (off-duty) training; and desirable language study (for career development). We shall consider this categorization in a later chapter. We mention it here to note its similarity with the DCSPER study's enumeration of three types of requirements for language competence and to intimate the problematic nature of such a classification scheme. While there have been frequent recommendations to the members of the officer corps that language competence is a desirable skill, there has been little substantive support for acquiring and maintaining this skill. The Officer Education Study, for example, states: "Each Service...encourages its officer[s] to participate in the off-duty voluntary language training programs and to become proficient in a minimum of one foreign language." (31) In our next chapter, we hope to
document the need for language competence. If we succeed in convincing the reader that this skill is a bona fide professional attribute, then it should be apparent that relegating its development and maintenance to voluntary, after-hours status undermines any expectation of success.

The 1966 education study also mentions briefly the stockpiling of language skills and notes that any such attempt "would require extensive and continuing training programs" (p. 277). Earlier in our discussion we asserted that the issue of maintenance, or the attrition of language skill, is still in its infancy as a research topic for language professionals. Most would agree, however, with Richard Lambert's proposed list of "predictor variables" (those we might expect to influence language-skill attrition). (32) Among the broad categories of personal characteristics, motivation, learning context, and use, we would emphasize the latter two as areas in which there should be a body of data from governmental records.

The matter of use is fundamental to a survey of officers undertaken in 1973 by Major Harold J. Hicks. In "An Analysis of Foreign Language Training for Officers," a misnamed, but quite useful, research paper,
Hicks reports the results of a questionnaire answered by 126 of his fellow students at the Army Command and General Staff College, all of whom had studied Vietnamese through the Defense Language Program. (33) The value of Hicks's appraisal lies primarily in the comparisons made among the length of the language course, the echelon of the command structure at which the officers used their skill in Vietnamese, and the individual respondent's perception of the contribution their language study had made to accomplishing their job tasks.

Hicks categorizes the courses taken by his colleagues in five increments of length: 3-5 weeks, 6-9 weeks, 10-12 weeks, 14-19 weeks, and 44-47 weeks (the basic course at the Defense Language Institute). In one respect, his respondents confirm the obvious: the more they had studied the language prior to their overseas assignment, the more they used the language in Vietnam. Of considerable interest is the effect of language study on the respondents' ability to accomplish their missions. The 3-5 week courses were of least utility to this group of officers: only 36% of those taking the shortest courses thought their language study had a significant effect on, or was absolutely essential to, their jobs in Vietnam. Two-thirds of those in the 6-9
week courses thought their language ability made a significant contribution. Of those who had taken 10-12 week courses, 62% said their language skill was significant or essential; 86% of those who had taken the 14-19 week courses, and 83% of those who had taken the full basic course replied that their language skills had a significant effect on job accomplishment or was absolutely essential to the performance of their tasks. Unfortunately, Hicks did not account for actual proficiency, as measured by the Defense Language Proficiency Test, as a relevant variable. Lacking this information, we cannot easily compare his results with the various investigations undertaken by the General Accounting Office. Nor can we estimate the skill levels required by various types of positions filled by army officers in Vietnam. Since the size of his responding sample for the two longest courses (thirteen officers) is too small for statisticians to accept his findings as significant, we are also hard-pressed to offer credible interpretations of the data he presents. Despite this shortcoming, however, it seems the medium-length courses (14-19 weeks) were of great benefit to the officers who took them. Therefore, we are tempted to conclude that the shorter courses should have been extended to the 14-19 week length in order for the participants to have been more effective on the job. Hicks's data, when
categorized by type of assignment, confirm this impression, though once again the small sample precludes us from offering confident opinions.

Hicks's survey includes officers who served with special forces, as province advisors, and as combat advisors. The latter group is further subdivided by echelon: division-level, brigade- or regimental-level, and battalion- or company-level. A year before Hicks submitted his paper, the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) published its Survey of Military Assistance Advisors.(34) While the HumRRO survey reports data for a sizable sample (over 300 respondents for many of the questions we looked at), it omits a number of important variables and fails to crosstabulate answers with the variables it does consider. As with Hicks's survey, the HumRRO questionnaire does not ask for proficiency level, as defined by the government scale, although the participants should have been quite familiar with this rating system. Moreover, there is no attempt to distinguish among types of advisory functions, and there is no analysis by country, language, or even world area. This lack of specificity is a serious shortcoming that precludes any detailed interpretation of the survey's results. We regard it as an egregious error, in questioning the importance of
competence in a foreign language, to pose the inquiry to officers serving in a country where English is an official language and then to fail to account for such circumstances. It is amusing to discover "that host country language ability was not of primary importance in at least one country due to the fact that English was the official language of the country, or because most of the host country officers spoke English fluently" [sic]. In view of such circumstances, it should not be surprising that the ability to read and write a foreign language is not essential in some locations.

Even without necessary distinctions among countries, the respondents to the HumRRO survey are quite positive in their support for language training. "Even a moderate ability to converse in the host-country language permits the advisor to follow discussions among host-country military personnel" according to 87.2% of the respondents. Three fourths of the advisors agree such ability "facilitates constructive discussion," and about four-fifths agree it "speeds and clarifies exchanges of ideas" (p. 142). Fully 94% of the advisors agree that conversational ability in the language enhances rapport with their counterparts (p. 144). As Hicks did, HumRRO asked its survey participants if inability to use the language on the job would detract
from job performance. The larger sample in the HumRRO survey is not as strongly pro-language as the advisors in the Hicks group: only 47.6% think lack of language competence would detract from their ability to function, either seriously (30.1%) or moderately (17.5%). The strong divergence in responses to the two surveys emphasizes the desirability of information on the duty stations of the HumRRO respondents. Elsewhere, we shall deal with the use of interpreters, another area of inquiry in the HumRRO project. Before we leave the present discussion, however, we wish to take one more poke at HumRRO's methodology and interpretation. The report finds:

A very high percentage (93.9%) of the responding advisors (who use interpreters) indicate that their interpreters "slightly distort" or "do not distort at all" the meanings of communications between them and their counterparts. Only 6.2% of the advisors responding considered their interpreter's distortion of communications to be "serious" or "very serious" (p. 146).

We do not read the responses the same way as HumRRO did. The question did not ask whether the interpreter's distortion interfered with the advisor's performance. Degree and effect of distortion are two separate issues, and the distinction is important to professional translators and interpreters. Of the 178 advisors who answered this question, 70.3% agree that an interpreter
does distort their meanings, though most think the distortion is slight. But degree of distortion cannot be determined reliably, if we do not know the language skills of the respondents. As to the net effect of distortion, we are reminded of the proceedings of the House Committee on Un-American Activities in its questioning of the Marxist playwright and poet Bertolt Brecht. In presenting the text of some of his works as evidence of his communist leanings, the committee asked him if he indeed wrote the lines attributed to him. Brecht insisted on retranslating some of the content or on quoting from the original. The committee's own interpreter attempted numerous clarifications, culminating only in the chairman's comment: "I cannot understand the interpreter any more than I can the witness." The final question pursues the same absurd line of questioning. After citing several lines of translated poetry, the inquisitor asked Brecht if he wrote them. "No," he replied, "I wrote a German poem, but that is very different from this."(35) With that, he was thanked for his cooperation, and proceedings against him were dismissed. He was not asked if his meaning was distorted, or the degree to which his meaning was altered. And the committee was not competent to judge the significance of the distortion, if any.
Congressional interest in the contribution of language competence to national security has a considerable history in the post-World War II era. Since this discussion is oriented toward the military's own perception of its language needs, we shall not endeavor to trace the range of congressional actions since passage of the National Defense Education Act. We would be remiss, however, if we did not note that Congress has repeatedly, and almost regularly, caused the Departments of Defense and State to look at their needs for language skills. In 1973, in 1976, in 1980, and again in 1982, the General Accounting Office (GAO) published reports, in response to congressional inquiries, on the language needs of various agencies of the executive branch and on the programs to meet these needs. The first GAO report found that positions in which a language capability was essential were not adequately staffed, that "the criteria for identifying foreign language requirements were nearly nonexistent,"(36) that records of the proficiency of agency personnel were not current, that command language programs in the Department of Defense were neither properly reported nor adequately supervised, and that the various agencies needed to cooperate more closely. The last comment was made despite GAO's recognition that an Interagency Language Roundtable has existed since
1955. In 1976, GAO issued two separate reports on language training and assignments: one for the Department of State and the US Information Agency, the other for the Department of Defense. (37) The 1976 reports herald the beginning of an apparent litany of GAO complaints that the executive agencies are not adequately training their personnel. Closer inspection reveals that the 1976 reports are not entirely negative. The Department of State had temporarily raised the rate by which it filled positions with qualified personnel by lowering the qualifications for the positions (GAO Report ID-76-19, p. 1). But an internal review of language-designated positions (LDPs) in 1975 convinced the State Department that it needed to expand the number of LDPs. The percentage of appropriately filled LDPs in the US Information Agency fell by 3% over three years, but this dip was really a step forward, as the agency recognized its language needs and increased the number of LDPs in foreign locations. The Defense establishment did not fare as well. Criteria for defining LDPs were found to be too general, the qualifications of incumbents were extremely low (only 37% of those assigned to military assistance advisory groups [MAAGs] had the required language proficiency), language assets were still neither properly inventoried nor current, and command language programs were still not under the control of the Defense Language Institute.
In 1978, the GAO issued a report on federal support for language and area studies. But, as the report concerned Title VI of the National Defense Education Act rather than the personnel qualifications of government agencies, we shall not consider it here. Look at the prediction of national needs.

As part of the conference report on an authorization bill for the Department of State, the International Communication Agency, and the Board for International Broadcasting, the GAO was tasked in 1979 with evaluating the language programs and related personnel practices of government agencies. The resulting report found that language requirements remain understated. Of 28 agencies receiving the questionnaire, only the Department of Defense and four civilian agencies had formal procedures for designating positions as language-essential. These systems, mentioned earlier, were found once again to be inadequate. This report marks the third time GAO told Congress that the Department of Defense did not adequately fill its language-designated positions. For its 1979-80 investigation, GAO had the good fortune to use the data uncovered by the President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies, which issued its report and a companion volume of background studies in 1979.
If our repeated listing of GAO findings strikes the reader as a litany, let us reassure you that some government agencies, particularly the Defense Department, have freely echoed the refrain. Anyone interested in the Army’s efforts to meet its language needs should be aware of the five-volume Army Linguist Personnel Study, produced in 1976 by the Army’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. Essential reading is the fifth volume, which contains the executive summary as well as conclusions and recommendations applicable to both the active and reserve components. The linguist study (or ALPS) acknowledges the lack of current information on language assets. Data from the Military Personnel Center show that at the time of the study there were 14,232 commissioned and warrant officers and 18,500 enlisted personnel who had language qualifications noted in their records. Of these, 84% of the officers and 73% of the enlisted personnel had had their last test before July 1973, despite a requirement for biennial testing, promulgated in 1969.\(^{40}\) Two 1973 surveys by the Military Personnel Center had found a similar pattern of failure to comply with requirements for testing: of a sample of officers, only 18.8% had been tested within the two years prior to the survey, 54.3% had been tested more than two years prior, and 26.9% had never been
tested; of a sample of enlisted personnel, 40.9% had been tested within two years of the survey, 24% more than two years prior, and 35.1% had never been tested. (41) The ALPS implicitly recognized the difficulty of filling language-designated positions under a system of frequent rotation or progression of assignments. It recommended a training factor of 2.4 persons for each position.

One of James Ruchti's background papers for the President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies reports that a review of personnel records of the officers and enlisted personnel on active duty reveals a "margin of 50% above present requirements in most languages. The real value," he notes, though, "of this talent is debatable if one considers its availability, the problem of the retention of language skills, and the currency of the records which keep track of it." (42)

In a background paper written for the RETO study group (a year prior to Ruchti's paper), Major James R. Holbrook reasons that: "although the number of officers currently carried as possessing foreign language capability appears adequate to meet stated requirements, the level of proficiency among many of these officers is
suspect and in all likelihood is not sufficient."(43)
Indeed, if the percentage of obsolete proficiency
ratings is still at the level of the 1973 survey by the
Military Personnel Center, then a 50% surplus becomes a
76% shortage for officers or a 59% shortage for enlisted
personnel. Among his recommendations, Holbrook includes
continuing support for command language programs,
establishing high priority for the development and
production of language-maintenance packages, and
requiring cadets and scholarship recipients to take a
minimum of two years of a foreign language during their
undergraduate years.

Holbrook's recommendation that cadets pursue study
of a foreign language was accepted and promulgated by
the RETO study group, as we indicated earlier. The
interrelationship between the education community and
government agencies concerned with national security is
an important one that we shall explore in greater detail
in chapter 5. Indeed, the thrust of the report issued
by the President's Commission on Foreign Language and
International Studies is directed toward the
contribution of the education system to national
security ("national security" defined in the broadest
possible sense). During the year of the commission's
deliberations, the defense establishment was
surprisingly low-key in developing ties to the academic community. Perhaps the memory of campus opposition to our military involvement in Vietnam kept the two from appreciating their common interests. Perhaps the decline of language study on the college campus -- and its limited effectiveness -- prevented rapprochement. A background paper prepared by the Defense Language Institute for the President's Commission pointed toward the decline of academic language study as a retardant influence on its own programs, but little else was produced for the commission that properly appreciated a historical tie between these two segments of American society. Since the commission report, however, there have been continuing developments. The deputy directors of both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency have testified in Congress in support of a bill to support language study in the nation's schools and colleges. Admiral Bobby R. Inman, of the CIA, testified in 1981:

We ... believe that such programs as the Department of Education's International Education and Foreign Language Studies-Domestic Program and the Translations Program of the National Endowment for the Humanities made substantial contributions toward solving our language problems. The Humanities Endowment Translations Program provides significant support to the Intelligence Community through translations that contribute to an understanding of the history and cultural achievements of other cultures."(44)
Similarly, in his statement before the same committee, Major General Richard Larkin, of the Defense Intelligence Agency, discussed various factors that had been limiting our national capability in the use of other languages; he concluded:

the availability of language-trained personnel for the defense intelligence community is shrinking while potential information resources around the globe have rapidly increased, requiring a significant addition of professionals with foreign language skills. Additional language-trained personnel in defense intelligence will also mean further improvement in the quality of our analysis through greater insight into foreign cultures.

In his summary, Larkin speaks of:

the general benefit likely to accrue to the United States as a result of increased public awareness of problems affecting other nations and cultures. In addition, such an increase in language and area knowledge would be a significant factor in developing public understanding and support for such national security concerns as our foreign economic and military assistance objectives.(45)

In view of the widespread distrust of the intelligence community that is often evident on college and university campuses, Larkin’s statement deserves wide dissemination. It would go far in defusing academic suspicion of the defense sector.
Notes to Chapter 2


15. Telephone conversation with Colonel Edward Thomas, acting head, Modern Language Department, U.S. Military Academy, in the curricula of the service academies.

16. Reported by Colonel Samuel Stapleton, then-commandant, Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center, before the President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies, 23 February 1979.


19. Appendix 3 to Annex P, RETO, v. 4, pp. p-3-1 through p-3-11.


23. Some language professionals advocate a fifth skill area of culture.


40. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Army Linguist Personnel Study (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, 1976), v. 5, p. 4-14.


Chapter 3. Historical Need for Language Skills

We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way -- an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar.... (Benjamin Lee Whorf, "Science and Linguistics")

It shall not be our purpose in the present chapter to write an apologia for the acquisition and maintenance of facility in a foreign language. Rather, we shall investigate historical examples of the need for such competence within the military services.

Literacy in more than one language has long been appreciated and at times has been demanded of an educated populace. Since the English language by no means enjoys a monopoly in the publication of knowledge, it is highly advisable to read professional literature in other languages as well. In U.S. military affairs, access to such material has been recognized as valuable as long ago as 1800. In that year, President John Adams advocated the acquisition by the Secretary of the Navy of a library of Dutch, English, French, and Spanish works on naval architecture, navigation, gunnery,
hydraulics, hyrostatics, and mathematics, and of biographies of distinguished foreign admirals. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the professional study of military art and science achieved comparative dimensions with Emory Upton’s travels across Europe to study the organization and training of European armies. That the use of other languages was necessary to acquire greater knowledge of military developments is evident in the early work of the Office of Naval Intelligence. The first director of that office, Lieutenant T. B. M. Mason, has been described as a linguist who, with the assistance of a small staff, increased the availability of information on naval developments by translating foreign-language publications. By 1902, a considerable volume of translations was being produced on a regular basis for the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, the Bureau of Navigation, and other bureaus of the Department of the Navy.

**World War I**

In our twentieth-century experience this largely academic need for language skill has often been supplanted by a more immediate need to communicate with allies or to intercept information from an enemy.
Although we are most familiar with the extensive training begun during World War II, it might be expected that there are numerous other episodes that have required language ability, as every war we have fought in this century was a coalition war. In World War I, for example, our army seems to have been concerned with the acquisition of facility in French. In *The American Army in France 1917-1919*, Major General James G. Harbord writes:

> the Commander-in-Chief [General Pershing] stated simply that he had been designated to go to France in command and desired me to go with him as Chief of Staff. Our conversation soon disclosed that I did not speak French, a fact not in my favor for the General himself was none too fluent in that language. I had served fourteen years in the Spanish-speaking possessions and had thought that in learning Spanish I was equipping myself for any foreign service that might occur for our Army in my time. (4)

Later in his memoirs (pp. 86-87), Harbord describes the particular contributions of a half dozen officers (some of whom later became general officers, including William Mitchell of Air Corps fame) who were well acquainted with the organization and tactical doctrine of the French Army and who all spoke French. In a published collection of letters to his wife, Harbord refers to daily instruction in French for American officers aboard the troop ships sailing for Europe. He notes that
instruction given by Major Robert Bacon, former
Ambassador to France and later Secretary of State, was
most popular and that the officer in charge of
instruction, Colonel Alvord, was a former French
instructor at West Point. (5)

In our last chapter, we mentioned the incredible
drop between 1915 and 1922 in the number of students of
German in American high schools. Such a phobia against
things teutonic is also notable in the chauvinistic
propaganda presented to American soldiers under the
guise of education. Despite such slanted presentations,
an excellent opportunity was afforded the doughboy to
learn French and British history and other academic
subjects through the educational programs established by
the YMCA. We might well assert, however, that German
culture, which had been accorded high respect in America
during most of the nineteenth century, was suddenly
transformed into an object of enmity, a taboo subject.
Instruction in French became the most popular subject.
John Erskine, professor at Columbia University and, in
July, 1918, acting director of the YMCA's educational
department in the A.E.F., estimated that 150,000
soldiers were studying French while stationed abroad;
three months later, as chairman of the Army Educational
Committee, he revised his estimate by an additional
Reports indicate that only some classes in the instructional program were free. The Office National des Universités et Ecoles Françaises proposed offering courses for any group of twenty or more men who were near a large town and wanted to learn French. These courses would be taught by lycée and school teachers at a small charge of fifty centimes per person per hour. In many camps, charges for French instruction were reported to be "high": two francs per hour for soldiers and four francs per hour for officers, "but even at these relatively high rates several scores of students (were) enrolled." So important was the study of allies' languages that a Commission de l'enseignement des langues vivantes dans les armées alliées (Allied Commission for the Teaching of Modern Languages) was formed with a French general officer as its president. These courses and a lecture series on British and French culture were provided to improve the fighting effectiveness of the American soldier by making him "much more sympathetic with his French and English allies" and to familiarize him with the "true character, the political and social ideals which have dominated them, and the difference between these and those of imperialistic Germany" (Stokes, p. 21). While these citations illustrate the official rhetoric behind the lecture program, it is more likely that the popularity
of the French courses was due to far more pragmatic motivations on the part of soldiers who wanted to make themselves understood among comrades-in-arms and among the civilian populace.

While Harbord's memoirs do not delineate the reasons for the officers' desire to learn French, it is clear that there were both military and social motives for doing so. At the individual level, our troops had to learn to use the equipment furnished by the French. French manuals on employment of weapons, tactics, and liaison between combat arms were translated for American use. At the tactical level, American regiments were supervised or assisted in their training by French divisions. The employment of American units was a matter of considerable discussion, as both the British and the French wanted to use Americans as individual replacements or to insert small units into existing commands. For both military and political reasons, Pershing, the War Department, and the Congress wanted to maintain national identity and to preserve or create the integrity of American divisions and corps. At the operational level, Marshal Foch, Supreme Commander of Allied Armies in France, did not command in English. Even prior to this appointment, communications with French commands (e.g., at corps and army-group levels)
and from the French military mission to the A.E.F. were in French. (8)

In stark contrast to the documentation from World War II, there seems to have been little emphasis on language training for the acquisition of intelligence or for the preparation of an army of occupation. Perhaps there is no evidence of the need to teach German because enough Americans could speak and understand it. Not only was German the most commonly taught modern language in American schools, but German-Americans were the largest ethnic minority. (9) Whatever the reason that facility in German was not a matter for concern, it is clear that there was emphasis on the acquisition of intelligence. A provisional intelligence manual mimeographed by the A.E.F. outlines the composition of a divisional intelligence section and specifies the inclusion of four translator-interpreters. Such a staff might be used in the interrogation of prisoners of war; it might also be used to translate documents. Although information on specific languages is sketchy, the A.E.F. intelligence manual asserts:

The Intelligence Section with all bodies of troops must be prepared to handle data in German, French and other languages. This requires that persons connected with the Intelligence Service as translators must be
able to read not only ordinary printed data, but script, often indistinct, and be familiar with dialects and technical terminology. (10)

A printed Provisional Combat Intelligence Manual specifies that the interpreter staff will consist of one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, and two sergeants. Language facility is not specifically identified for intelligence duties at regimental or battalion level. (11)

Presumably because of the acquisition of a great number of officers with little prior military experience, the A.E.F. established a General Staff College at Langres. From the notes to one of the lectures, we find that intelligence sections existed at every level from General Headquarters to regiment. At GHQ, the section dealt with strategic as well as tactical intelligence, and we can therefore deduce that language facility was necessary. For corps level, the lecture notes explicitly delineate the tasks to be accomplished by three officers with a command of German. Aside from examining documents and cross-examining prisoners, they were to acquire information on enemy order of battle, tactics, morale, disposition, combat service support, and so forth. (12)
Prisoners and captured documents were not the only source of information requiring language skills. The introduction of indirect-fire artillery, which could be placed out of sight of the opposing forces, required fire-control measures that did not rely on a line of sight between infantry and artillery command posts. Field telephones were used for this purpose and to communicate between trenches. Before long, a way was found to intercept the enemy's telephone conversations. This source of information gave birth to the Telephone Listening-in Service, which required "thoroughly trained personnel ... conversant with the enemies' languages not only in its [sic] scholastic form, but in the various patois, technical language, current slang, and official abbreviations." (13)

World War II

Our entry into World War II was preceded by a period of mobilization, during which we had sufficient time to consider the personnel qualifications of our service members. As early as December, 1940, the U.S. Navy identified a massive need for intelligence officers capable of using Japanese. Then-Lieutenant A. E. Hindmarsh brought the lack of qualified Japanese linguists to the attention of the Office of Naval
Intelligence, and, after consultation with the Director of Naval Intelligence and with the Chief of Naval Operations, steps were taken to rectify this deficiency by training junior reserve officers in Japanese. During the prosecution of the war in the Pacific, it was necessary to translate numerous captured documents, some of historic interest, others of immediate operational significance. In 1942, for instance, a Marine raiding party to Makin Island returned with air defense plans for all Japanese-held Pacific islands. When the heavy cruiser Nachi was sunk in Manila Bay, it provided the Navy with annotated charts of minefields and defenses, with fleet operations plans, and with materials on Japanese naval doctrine (Packard, pp. 294-295). By the end of June, 1944, the supply of captured war diaries, field manuals, code books, and other documents filled 130 cases, necessitating continuous expansion of the translation section of ONI. The translating unit of the Far Eastern Section alone grew from a staff of 15 to 35 by May, 1944, to 65 by September, and to 95 by February, 1945 (Packard, p. 295).

Of course, the Navy exploited the capture of documents in the European and Mediterranean theaters as well. The invasion of Sicily in 1943 progressed rapidly enough that the Sicilian headquarters of the Italian
Navy was captured before the Italians could destroy their files. Documents showing the entire disposition of Italian and German naval forces in the Mediterranean, with charts of minefields and safe-conduct routes, fell into Allied hands. In June, 1944, the capture of the U-505 yielded code books and tactical publications. By the war's end, ONI had translated hundreds of thousands of documents from twenty-two languages; sixty percent of their work was for naval bureaus other than ONI. In eight months in 1945, over 146,000 documents were translated from Japanese alone (Packard, pp. 294, 296).

In Languages for War and Peace, the linguist Mario Pei wrote:

Striking examples of the way in which linguistic training can be put to military uses appeared in the early days of the war, when German parachutists came down in Holland equipped not only with Dutch uniforms but also with a command of the Dutch tongue, and German motorcyclists, disguised as French soldiers, swept across Belgium and northern France spreading disorder and panic in excellent French.(14)

Our search of military documents related to language use has not disclosed any such dramatic evidence of deception in American operations. The bulk of the material we have found concerns the identification of problem areas and the efforts undertaken to resolve the
difficulties encountered. The Army's experience during World War II, similar to current requirements, determined the necessity for language-qualified personnel in numerous military specialties. While we have not discovered any crosstabulation of skills (e.g., the number of personnel trained in engineering who could understand Chinese), the narrative descriptions of the Army Specialized Training Program confirm the obvious expectation that such combinations were needed. As with demands for other specialized training, such as in communications or in chemical or mechanical engineering, requests for language-trained personnel varied widely from one six-month period to the next, sometimes from one quarter to the next. While production and demand records often do not agree when sources of information are compared, the need for language skills is well documented.

Major users of linguist skills were military intelligence and the Office of the Provost Marshal General. Records concerning military intelligence reveal significant emphasis on the development of skill in Japanese. As the historical records of various school programs assert that curricula remained responsive to needs articulated from the field, we can
look at developments in the curriculum as an indication of the tasks to which linguists were to apply themselves.

The Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS) and its predecessor, the Fourth Army Intelligence School, taught general language skills, such as translation and interpretation, oral expression, and reading and writing. Japanese military commands, interrogation of prisoners of war, geography, and Japanese field regulations were added and dropped as dictated by the needs of field units. Additional training was necessary for some graduates of the MISLS program: some were to meet Army Air Force intelligence requirements, others were to acquire order-of-battle information on the Japanese Army and Navy at the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas (JICPOA), at Pearl Harbor. MISLS had access to classified material direct from the field, which not only made it possible to work with fresh, authentic materials, but also to identify emerging needs before they were officially recognized by the War Department.

Counterintelligence operations, specifically in censorship, provided a sizable requirement for Japanese linguists. A communication between Admiral Nimitz,
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, and the commanding general of U.S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area, established the magnitude of the censorship effort. In response, the Director of Intelligence, Army Service Forces, estimated Nimitz's requirement to be "about 2,000 officers and men in addition to several thousand U.S. and Japanese civilians." Of this total, 256 were to be "expert linguists"(15).

Civil Affairs and Military Government

The temporary substitution of military authority for civil government suffers from a long tradition of misunderstanding. Commanders at the tactical level have little exposure, if any, to questions of governing civilians in their areas of tactical responsibility. Except for the contributions made by local resources to the execution of a mission -- providing transportation or items peculiar to the environment, repairing roads, and the like -- the commander finds the presence of civilians in a combat zone a time-consuming nuisance. Even at the theater level, a commander finds the civil responsibilities thrust on him a burden to be borne only so long as absolutely necessary. In the opening
paragraph of their history of Civil Affairs during World War II, Harry Coles and Albert Weinberg quote a letter from the Supreme Commander to the Army Chief of Staff:

The sooner I can get rid of these questions that are outside the military in scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters."(16)

Eisenhower was not the first U.S. commander to deal with civil affairs. The imposition of military government in an occupied area had been fraught with argument in every conflict from the Mexican War to World War I (Coles, p. 4). Our national aversion to military rule could easily lead us to relinquish control of an occupied area before it is secure. Indeed, several executive departments can claim, and have in the past claimed, interest in administering an occupation government. Coles and Weinberg present extracts from numerous documents, illustrating, for example, the interest of the Department of the Interior: "because of this Department's unique experience with primitive people, we should participate actively in the administration of any island in the Pacific which may be occupied and governed by the United States."(17) The Secretary of War had requested from his Cabinet colleagues recommendations of individuals who might receive commissions direct from
civilian life. These officers might become available to these same civilian agencies after the necessity for military government had passed. One of the historical reports of the Military Government Division of the War Department relates the reaction of the other departments: "the smoldering antagonisms to War Department leadership in the occupational program burst into flame. Two entire Cabinet meetings were devoted to a debate on the matter in October and early November 1842."(18) In some sectors, fear of military control was expressed in writing by government officials:

The civilians are in danger of losing the postwar world by default. They are in danger of losing out because they seem to lack a comprehensive plan and a unified purpose. The Army, on the other hand, has a plan and a purpose. The Army’s plan is to train administrators for the postwar world and thereby to control it.(19)

Such fears can be based on writings familiar to the military. The Clausewitzian dictum that war is a continuation of political relations can certainly be interpreted as advocating the usurpation of powers over the assets of another sovereign nation. But even in countering aggression, the employment of military force entails assuming control over civilians. By default, a commander assumes responsibility for the welfare of the inhabitants of his area of operations. His responsibility is grounded in international law through
the Annex to Hague Convention No. IV, embodying the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907) and further recognized, after World War II, in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949). Like it or not, the commander is tasked with continuing to provide the services of the defunct government, from food supply to public hygiene to education. Eisenhower's task was not unique except in its magnitude. His message traffic with the War Department shows the theater commander's potential for exercising foreign policy. If control is returned to local politicians, particularly to those returning from exile, the commander in effect sanctions a new regime. If he relinquishes control to a civilian agency, he jeopardizes his logistic lines of communication. If he retains control, he must impose administration by a full-time civil-affairs staff.

At the policy-making level, too, military government was an unpopular concept. In a memorandum to the Secretary of War, President Roosevelt expressed his concern that "the governing of occupied territories ... is [primarily] a civilian task."(20) Despite jurisdictional disputes, the War Department planned, even prior to our involvement in the war, for military government by an occupation force. In a directive from
the G-1 to the Provost Marshal General (PMG), dated 3 December 1941, the PMG was given the mission of training officers for detail to military government activities (WDSS, p. 1). In responding to the directive, War Department planners discovered we had been involved in occupation operations since the Seminole War but that we had never trained a single officer for such duties. Estimates were made of occupation forces used by other countries. Initial investigations revealed that the German occupation of Belgium in World War I required 3,500 troops and that the existing Gouvernement Generale in Poland numbered at least 7,000 (WDSS, p. 5). Most useful to the PMG was the discovery of the after-action report filed by the chief civil affairs officer of American forces occupying the Rhineland after World War I. In it, Colonel I. L. Hunt laments the lack of qualified personnel assigned to occupation duty. According to the Army Special Staff history of military government, Hunt "closed that report, almost with a prayer, that never again should the American Army be permitted to undertake such a task without having first trained a sufficient number of officers qualified for the work in those special duties that were involved" (WDSS, p. 4). To its credit, the War Department recognized that officers assigned to occupation duty "must know something of the habits, customs, thinking
and reactions (and preferably the language) of the people upon whom they are to impose military control" (WDSS, p. 3). By June, 1942, only a month after the first class began, the Provost Marshal General's Office (PMGO) recognized the competition from the civilian agencies in the government and requested authority to expand its fledgling training program. By September, the School of Military Government, which had been established at the University of Virginia, began to prepare surveys of requirements for civil affairs officers for Germany, Italy, and Japan; the surveys were later extended to areas of potential occupation. In October and November, PMGO received authority to offer reserve commissions in the Army Specialist Corps (a technical branch that no longer exists) to 2,500 civilians. To augment the School of Military Government, an additional course was established at Fort Custer, Michigan. Graduates of the Custer program then proceeded to one of ten universities at which Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS) had been established. As Civil Affairs requirements grew, of course, so did the training programs. The Custer program began with authorization for 100 officers per class and by September, 1943, was up to 450. CATS, too, expanded from a group of six universities to ten: the original participants were Harvard, Yale, and Stanford.
Universities, the Universities of Chicago, Michigan, and Pittsburgh; the expansion added Boston, Northwestern, and Western Reserve Universities, and the University of Wisconsin. Students in the program at the School of Military Government, which was oriented toward Europe, included Public Health Service and Medical Corps officers, Navy and Marine Corps officers -- the Navy also had its own CATS -- and forty-three officers from allied nations. We have related the fear of civilian agencies that occupation government would be too militarized. In fact, this did not occur, as few career officers possessed the qualifications the Military Government Division was seeking. Of 9,180 officers whose records were submitted by the Classification and Reassignment Branch of the Adjutant General’s Office, 676 were accepted by the Military Government Division selection board. Of these, only 128 eventually entered the program (PMGO, p. 84). As various functions were to be filled by Civil Affairs officers, differing selection criteria are to be found in the after-action reports of the programs. In one section of the PMGO typescript, we read that each student was expected to come to the program with considerable experience at the managerial level in his field and it was “highly desirable
that Civil Affairs officers have some knowledge of the language" of the area in which they would serve. Professional or administrative skill was the primary selection criterion to which language skill was subordinated in anticipation of the successful employment of the intensive language-instruction model advocated by the American Council of Learned Societies (pp. 13-14). Elsewhere in the same typescript we find that officers "with real acquaintance with certain foreign countries were especially desired, and language qualifications, administrative or executive ability, and personal qualities of high order were other important factors considered in the selections by the Provost Marshal General" (p. 72; "other" refers to a primary criterion of "exceptional distinction" and "particular success" in technical or professional fields in civilian life). The School of Military Government and the CATS programs differed in emphasis: SMG was oriented toward staff work; CATS was oriented toward field operations. Consequently, "language instruction ... and the study of foreign peoples and foreign areas [were] to be a most important feature of instruction in the CATS, whereas [such study] had been definitely subordinated to other instruction at the School of Military Government" (p. 44).
The civil affairs officers who were expected to work with the local population apparently made good use of their newly acquired language skills, if we judge by an unsolicited letter directed to the Yale CATS:

For many months now I have been meaning to drop you a line, just to let you know that your efforts to prepare us for Italy have born rich fruit. My work in the field of Agriculture brings me in contact with many of Class I Yale men and I think you have a right to feel satisfied with the way they are putting your lessons into practice. I, for instance, recently made a thousand mile swing through Southern Italy, encouraging the production of next year's crops -- without an interpreter. Others of the group are sitting as judges in allied courts trying civil cases, or handling the ever difficult problems of supply. Many of us are, of course, in Southern Italy, where by their own admission, they are a bit backward. But thanks to the language and background courses I have been able to discuss "Latifundium" over the dinner table with the owner of a 20,000 acre barony without (knowingly at least) stepping on pet corns or creating acrimonious arguments. Had it not been for the sympathetic and accurate interpretation of Italian life and characteristics I very much fear for the outcome of a discussion of such a touchy subject.

So when you sometimes wonder (as all humans do) whether or not the job of creating the correct skills and impressions in the first class at Yale was really worth the wear of doing well, just reread this, and other letters I know you must have received, and be of good confidence -- for we're not letting you down.(22)
Of the graduates of European-oriented courses, 1,714 were sent to the European Theater of Operations (ETO). Plans for Civil Affairs in the Far East called for training successive six-week classes of 250 each at SMG; graduates would then proceed to one of the CATS for six months' language and area training (and additional military government subjects). The Army sent an additional 350 officers to the Navy School of Military Government at Princeton University.

Korea: Language Needs Never Met

We can find one of the worst instances of our national lack of language competence in our participation in the Korean War. Intelligence requirements and civil affairs problems encountered in our previous experience abroad arose again in Korea, but this time with additional difficulties. And this time we found a major gap -- far worse than in our experience in France in 1917 -- in the command and control structure of the United Nations Command.

That we underestimated the magnitude of our language problems in Korea can be seen in the reports of no fewer than four observer teams sent from the Office of the Chief, Army Field Forces; in Eighth Army
documents on linguist policy; in a major study by the Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University; and in historical files on interallied operations. (23) The observer teams noted repeatedly the inadequacy of trained interrogators. Team No. 5 found there was a "great need for personnel trained in proper techniques of interrogation." Observer Team No. 6 commented on the adequacy of both training and personnel: "In numbers, the interpreters and linguists are too few. All need a reorientation with stress on the Oriental psychology.... [Most are not competent] to interrogate without indigenous interpreters." Observer Team No. 7 reiterated this complaint, adding further deprecatory details: "Most of the interrogations and translations are being carried on by Chinese nationals and indigenous Koreans.... about 20 percent of the required Korean and Chinese-Mandarin linguists needed in FEC [Far East Command] are being trained."

The ORO research team reports the existence of four levels of linguist skills, labeled A through D. At the bottom of this scale, Class D linguists, which we might tentatively equate with level 2 on the current scale, were used in the signal, military police, medical, ordnance, quartermaster, and transportation corps, in handling prisoners of war, in supervising local labor
forces, in some advisory assignments, and in combined operations with UN units. Class C linguists, which from the ORO description may be roughly equivalent to level 3 (minimum professional competence), were needed in intelligence, civil affairs, and advisory groups, and among military police. Class B linguists were to be found in intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs, in advisory groups and in the attache system, handling POW's, in criminal investigation detachments and in the Army Security Agency, and among the military police. Class A linguists were considered in a "super" category; these were accomplished professionals with specific skills, such as simultaneous interpretation, that are beyond the characteristics of a level-5 speaker of English and another language. For these linguists, the ORO report mentions tasks of advising and negotiating, as at the peace talks at Kaesong and Panmunjom, and laments that "the Army has no career personnel in this category in either Korean or any Chinese dialect" (ORO, p. 13).

Fishel and Hausrath, the ORO authors, point out the qualifications of the interpreters at the peace talks. The principal Chinese interpreter for nearly two years was Kenneth Wu, First Lieutenant, USAR, who received his commission specifically for his work as a language
officer. His replacement, in 1953, was Robert B. Ekvall, Lieutenant Colonel, USAR, who was called to active duty for this express chore. The principal Korean interpreter was Horace Underwood, Lieutenant, USNR, a missionary who served at the peace talks until July, 1953. He was replaced by an Army NCO, whose lack of rank made negotiating difficult -- "not so much in dealing with the enemy across the table, but in dealing with US negotiators" (ORO, p. 17).

At the highest level of proficiency, the linguist also has a thorough familiarity with the customs, habits, social psychology, and cultural anthropology of the target culture. On one occasion at Panmunjom, for example, Lieutenant Wu noticed that the ears of the Chinese delegates grew red during a presentation by North Korean General Nam II. The indication was that the Chinese disagreed with Nam’s position, and this information proved advantageous to our negotiators. On another occasion, Wu overheard Chinese General Hsieh Fang whisper in a Chinese dialect other than Mandarin -- one that had not been used during the talks -- that the Chinese held a particular hill. The hill in question was held by a UN unit at the time, but the General whispered "we’ll attack tonight and take it, and by tomorrow morning it’ll be ours anyway" (ORO, p. 15).
The UN units were thus warned of the impending attack and were reinforced, although not sufficiently to hold it against a heavy Chinese advance. These highly professional skills require constant use in context to maintain a keen edge. Both Colonel Ekvall and Lieutenant Underwood, whose language skills were of high caliber, noted that they had considerable difficulty initially in meeting their tasks.

The lack of language-qualified interrogators resulted in the need to use interpreters in up to ninety percent of all interrogations. The common pattern reported to the ORO research team:

was for a Japanese-speaking interrogator to question a Chinese POW through a Korean interpreter who understood both Japanese and Chinese (reminiscent of the classic rumor experiment of psychologists). The reason for this complicated, cumbersome, and unsatisfactory procedure was the inability of most interrogators to interrogate without the aid of indigenous (intermediate) interpreters and the corollary inability of most qualified linguists to interrogate effectively (ORO, p. 18).

Psychological operations required linguistically qualified interrogators, interpreters, translators, script writers, calligraphers, announcers, monitors, and observers. But in 1953, Eighth Army Paywar Division
reported that the lack of acceptable proficiency among U.S. military linguists compelled Eighth Army to use indigenous personnel for these purposes. Responsibility for the correct and appropriate translation thus fell to Korean Critical Military Specialists (CMS) and Formosan Department of the Army Civilians (DAC). The shortage of language-qualified U.S. military personnel meant that

Propaganda materials once written in English and translated to the Korean or Chinese could not be checked for accuracy, clarity, intent, content analysis; the American personnel never knew whether or not the desired information, message, or effect was being gotten across to the target audience (ORO, p. 22).

Any translator could tell us that a good translation is actually a recreation of an intended message, and any educated bilingual can affirm that an idea conceived in one language is far more easily developed in that language than translated into another. Not only did the lack of qualified U.S. personnel risk inaccuracy in our propaganda efforts; it also offered potential security risks of willful mistranslations. To check the accuracy of translations, scripts and broadcasts were monitored in Tokyo and Washington, but only after the fact.

In the scramble for scarce language resources, there is an understandable penchant for hiring local
personnel who have at least minimal facility in English. In Korea, we made use of 1,800 Korean Army officer-interpreters and numerous enlisted personnel and civilians. Of 228 Korean civilians working for the U.S. Eighth Army in June, 1953, 100 were subject to induction into the Korean Army. The Eighth Army G-2 considered this situation serious:

the loss of these civilians would seriously cripple division, corps, and Army POW interrogation, as well as counterintelligence and communication reconnaissance activities. The Department of the Army has been able to furnish only a small fraction of Korean-speaking intelligence personnel. It will be impossible for Eighth Army to fulfill AFFE [Armed Forces, Far East] post-hostilities intelligence requirements if CMS personnel are lost through induction (ORO, p. 62).

Prudence dictates that hiring personnel whose primary allegiance is to a country other than the United States poses a security risk for us. And such risks were encountered in Korea. For example:

On 20 Nov 52 an interrogation of a Chinese Communist POW conducted for 302d MISC by a Chinese DAC, formerly an officer in the Chinese Nationalist Army, brought to light the existence of an underwater tunnel, presumably under the Yalu River. Reportedly this was the initial mention of this tunnel; the information was evaluated as fairly reliable, and insofar as was known this remained the only report on the tunnel. But on 9 Mar 53, "Periscope," a copyright feature of Newsweek magazine, published a brief report that Nationalist Chinese intelligence had learned of the existence of a tunnel beneath the Yalu River, and phrased it in terms similar to those of the mentioned interrogation report.
Officers in the office of ACoS, G2 [Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence], Eighth Army, drew the conclusion that the contents of the interrogation report had been leaked to Nationalist Headquarters in Formosa by the DAC who had conducted the interrogation. This could not, of course, be confirmed, but the inference is reasonable.

In another instance, a Korean translator-interpreter employed by the 302d MISC was apprehended in April 1953 by the CIC [Counterintelligence Command] in Seoul after having been accused by another Korean of being the head of an intelligence gathering net and of supplying the accuser with a forged 302d MISC pass. It was eventually ascertained that the accused translator not only was employed by the 302d MISC but simultaneously also by 8240 AU. Subsequently, significant discrepancies were noted in the content of captured document translations performed by the accused for 302d MISC, one document containing NKPA [North Korean Peoples' Army] APO numbers (which he omitted from his translation), another outlining the organization and operation of an intelligence net. The latter document was reported by the accused to be "unintelligible due to poor handwriting." However, subsequent investigation by 302d MISC revealed the second document to be clearly written. Ultimately, he was discharged by both US intelligence organizations that had employed him. (ORO, pp. 62-63)

Command, Control, and Communications in the UN Command: The Use of Liaison Teams

Our current foreign policy commitments cause the military planner to envision an operational environment that is multinational. Military doctrine, as espoused
in Field Manual 100-5, Operations, devotes attention to regional security arrangements in Europe, Korea, and Japan. Common to our operational capacity in all three areas is concern for command and control, coordination and liaison, combat organization, environment, and language. Command and control relationships foreseen for these areas operate on a concept of maintaining the integrity of large units under national control. This arrangement was not what we had in Korea, however.

Aside from the U.S. and South Korean divisions, combat, support, and service-support forces were contributed by twenty countries, as follows:

British Commonwealth Division (formed from units already in Korea on 28 July 1951)

United Kingdom: two infantry brigades
Canada: one infantry brigade
Australia: one infantry battalion
New Zealand: one artillery battalion
and a service-corps unit
India: one field-ambulance and surgical unit

Turkish Armed Forces Command

one separate brigade with artillery and a combat support, combat service support slice

Ethiopian Expeditionary Force

one infantry battalion and support elements

French UN Command
one infantry battalion and additional staff elements

Belgium: one infantry battalion

and one infantry detachment from Luxembourg

Colombia: one infantry battalion

Greece: one infantry battalion

Netherlands: one infantry battalion

Philippines: one battalion combat team, including

one artillery battery, one tank company
(without tanks), one reconnaissance company
(seven tanks), and one replacement company

Thailand: one infantry regiment of one battalion

with medical and MP detachments and support elements

Union of South Africa: air and naval forces

Norway: one mobile ambulance and surgical hospital

Sweden: one Red Cross hospital (mobile evacuation)

Italy: one Red Cross hospital

Denmark: one hospital ship

This paragon of international cooperation was not without its difficulties, to be sure. The typical employment of the UN units, as the non-American units were called collectively by the American command, was by attachment of a UN battalion to a U.S. regiment. Since American personnel constituted the bulk of the UN force,
orders and directives were issued in English, with the burden of translation falling on the supporting UN unit. Problems of understanding differed greatly among units, from extensive difficulties in the Turkish brigade and the French battalion to minimal difficulty in the Colombian battalion. At the first major action in which the Turkish brigade took part, at Kunu-ri against the Chinese, the Turks suffered losses of twenty percent in killed, wounded, or missing in action. Losses in communications and vehicles were first estimated at up to ninety percent (later revised slightly downward); only six artillery pieces were salvaged. (24) The blame for this debacle was placed on misunderstandings resulting from language differences. In consequence of this action, the Turkish Armed Forces Command (TAFC) was detached from the Second (U.S.) Division and attached instead to the 25th (U.S.) Division. Through the use of liaison teams of English-speaking Turkish officers, much of the language difficulty was overcome. The Turkish brigade sent liaison officers to adjacent regiments, and the 25th Division sent an advisory group to the brigade. Additionally, the assistant division commander often accompanied the brigade, and his presence contributed to improved understanding between the two units. The TAFC commander and his G-3 attended commanders' conferences whenever possible and dispatched English-speaking
liaison officers to each echelon up to division headquarters. In a letter on the topic of working with UN forces, Captain Richard Harwell notes a disadvantage to the use of liaison officers: "a Turkish junior officer's interpretation of orders was only commensurate with his language capacity and familiarity with U.S. tactical concepts."(25)

Communications with the French battalion were complicated by the structure of the French UN Command (N.B. several allied force contributions were encumbered by the presence of national command elements to which the combat unit was subordinated while operationally commanded by an American force). Although a French liaison officer was attached to the 23rd U.S. Infantry Regiment, "all orders and official contacts had to be conducted through the French liaison officer at regiment and by personal visits to the French UN staff." The insistence on such a chain of communications retarded the battalion's reaction to commands from the regiment (see Fox, p. 88).

By contrast, the Colombian battalion had relatively few problems in understanding orders from the regiment to which they were attached. They had sent an advance party to the UN Replacement Center to translate American
regulations, manuals, and directives, and they found assistance in this task from Puerto Ricans in the 65th U.S. Regiment. (26)

Other UN units had relatively little difficulty understanding the American command. All the officers and most of the NCOs in the Dutch battalion spoke English well, though the commander of the regiment to which the battalion was attached made a special effort to ensure complete understanding. Similarly, most Belgian and Ethiopian officers spoke English, but again American commanders made extra efforts to ensure that orders to the Belgians were explicit.

This evidence shows that language difficulties between allied forces can be overcome by attaching bilingual liaison teams to at least one of the units. Let us look at the extent of the attachments and at the problems the U.S. command encountered in adopting this solution to difficulties in communication. The Greek battalion received two Greek-speaking U.S. officers and was attached to the Seventh Cavalry Regiment at least partly because one of the American battalion commanders spoke Greek. The regiment reported that one of the officers handled administrative and logistical matters and remained with the battalion executive officer.
the operational side, the regiment reported that the U.S. liaison officer and the Greek commander became inseparable. An additional Greek-speaking U.S. officer was assigned to the regimental operations section to facilitate communication with the battalion. Further support was provided by Greek-speaking U.S. enlisted personnel attached to the Greek motor pool and to the mess and communications sections. In response to a questionnaire, the regimental commander noted that the language barrier was a serious obstacle and that the battalion did not remain in continuous communications with the regiment. The command pointed out that the Greeks' reluctance in this area resulted in a lack of fire support at a critical time.

The Dutch and French battalions received U.S. liaison officers for artillery, armor, and mortar support and for access to the Tactical Air Control Party. They, in turn, sent liaison officers to their respective regiments. The Belgian and Philippine battalions supplied liaison officers to the Third U.S. Infantry Division, a dispatch we would assume was in addition to liaison with the supported regiments.

The Ethiopian battalion sent two English-speaking officers to the 32nd U.S. Infantry Regiment, one to work
with the intelligence staff and one to work in operations. Liaison was also established with the division. In after-action comments, the commander of the Ethiopian Expeditionary Force asserts: "We had no difficulty of language worth to be mentioned in dealing with American units."(27) As it was (and is) extremely unlikely to find Americans capable of speaking and understanding Amharic, the battalion took care to have at least one English-speaking Ethiopian officer accompany a patrol, regardless of its size, if the need for fire support was anticipated.

While liaison with the Colombian battalion posed no problem in finding U.S. officers and enlisted personnel who spoke Spanish, the liaison teams were taken from within the personnel ceiling of the parent command. As the liaison element consisted of one officer for the battalion, one enlisted man (EM) per staff section, two EM per rifle company, and one EM for the heavy weapons company, the loss of personnel was significant. As smooth as operations in this battalion seem to have been, command and control were indirect. As the adjutant of the 21st U.S. Infantry Regiment reported, "During tactical operations orders are issued directly to the U.S. liaison officer, who in turn gives them to the unit commander. This considerably reduces the effect and impact of the orders."(28)
Most of the units we have considered here have been allied battalions in support of U.S. regiments. In the case of the Turkish Armed Forces Command, we have a unit large enough to receive attachments of U.S. units. The Turks did in fact receive U.S. units placed under operational control of, or in direct support to, the brigade. In this event, the Turkish command furnished the U.S. commander with an English-speaking liaison officer. Since such a unit might have to call the brigade for fire support, the interpreter would transmit the call.

It should be apparent that the use of effective liaison teams was essential to the command and control of multinational units in Korea and that such teams were employed extensively. A request from the Thai battalion for permanent attachment of U.S. advisors on the maintenance of vehicles and weapons seems to have led to a review of the liaison system. Since billets were not provided for advisors, considerable paperwork began to flow between headquarters, ending with a study by G-3, Eighth U.S. Army, Korea, that recommended additional billets be provided by the Department of the Army. The result of the interchange was that UN battalions were to be authorized one field-grade and one company-grade officer and a driver with a jeep and trailer. UN
brigades were to be authorized one colonel as senior advisor, three field-grade and two company-grade officers, and six drivers with jeeps and trailers. Not all these positions were filled, as the Belgian, Canadian, and Colombian commands never received their full complement of advisors.

Communications provided a considerable challenge to the UN command. With the exception of the Commonwealth Division, UN units used U.S. signal equipment. But equipment was not abundant. When the Turkish and British brigades were attached to a division, under the guideline that higher-level units provide communications to subordinates the division signal company found it had to stretch its existing resources to cover an extra brigade without augmentation by additional personnel or equipment.

The use of various signal nets is of some interest. The Dutch, whose officers and NCOs spoke English, had no difficulty in communicating. They used English on the regimental net and Dutch within the battalion net. The French requested radio operators for their end of the regimental net. Since these operators did not speak French, they passed messages to interpreter-translators who, in turn, forwarded them to the addressees. The
Belgian and Greek battalions were furnished U.S. radio operators, and the Colombian battalion received bilingual switchboard and radio operators from the 21st U.S. Infantry Regiment. The Philippino battalion provided its own English-speaking switchboard operators.

Communications and fire-support arrangements were not at all standard. In some cases, communications were rather cumbersome. In the case of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army, which had a shortage of English-speaking personnel, close air support was called in through ROK forward observers to a ROK fire direction center, where the Tactical Air Control Party had a representative. A ROK artillery officer would translate the call for close air support and then forward it to the American Tactical Air Control Party.

Problems in intercultural communications, in overcoming a language barrier, and providing logistic support differ by command level. (29) Brigadier General Thomas L. Harrold, deputy commander of the First U.S. Corps, asserted that the language barrier is not a serious problem to overcome. (30) On the other hand, at the regimental level, Colonel W.A. Harris noted that "The language barrier is a serious obstacle and plans to overcome it must be made immediately." (31) Colonel W.C.
Bullock, commander of the Second Division Artillery, writes: "Language barriers were never completely overcome." (32)

Our study comes to an end with this presentation of unmet language needs in Korea. To be sure, the world did not begin to speak English in 1953; on the contrary, our problems continue. But documentation is sparse. In chapter two, we noted the existence of several studies of language needs. These studies need not be repeated here. To our knowledge, a thorough examination of our experience in using Vietnamese has not been undertaken. Congressional testimony by Admiral Inman and by General Larkin, also mentioned in chapter two, documents a continuing need for language skills to meet our intelligence requirements.

We hasten to emphasize that the need for language competence is not limited to intelligence. Command and control are impossible without communication. The practice in Korea of subordinating an allied battalion to a U.S. regiment may have been superseded by current doctrine, which seeks to avoid placing a national unit below brigade level under command of another nation's forces -- though even here there are exceptions -- but
the language problems remain. One need only review the
after-action reports of recent multinational exercises
to discover the continuing need for extensive liaison.
CRESTED EAGLE 80, for example, revealed that

(1) a substantial number of liaison parties for
each major staff function are needed but are unavailable;
(2) a U.S. division is incapable of providing
sufficient language-proficient personnel for liaison;
(3) lengthy delays in planning and operations
result from the need for translation;
(4) face-to-face communication, taken for granted
when a language is shared, is difficult between
commanders of allied units.

The after-action report asked U.S. Army, Europe, and
NATO's Central Army Group to investigate the liaison
problem and asked the Department of the Army to consider
requiring language proficiency as a qualification for
promotion to field-grade rank.
Notes to Chapter 3


8. On the training and use of American units with the British and French, see Historical Division, Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1948), vol. 3.


11. Military Intelligence Division, General Staff, Provisional Combat Intelligence Manual (Washington, DC: War Department, 1918), originally classified
CONFIDENTIAL declassified 1949, pp. 8-9. We would add that interrogation was begun at the regimental level but was primarily a function of the corps intelligence section, according to Regulations for the Intelligence Section of the General Staff (Paris: Headquarters, A.E.F., 1917), originally classified SECRET, declassified 1949, pp. 22-23.

12. "General Staff College, Langres, 1918, G-Z," bound, mimeographed notes, lecture no. 7, second course, p. 2. Nonmilitary readers please note that "order of battle" refers to the organization, rank, structure, uniforms, and identification of personnel of an armed force, either friendly or hostile. Although not mentioned in the lecture notes, there was also an intelligence section at the battalion level.


19. Saul K. Padover, memo for Secretary Ickes, 8 January 1943, cited by Coles and Weinberg, p. 26. Padover, a historian, was an assistant to Ickes from
1938 to 1943. Elsewhere in his memo, he laments the militarization of social scientists, administrators, "scientific" managers, lawyers, and others. Padover's fear that the military was monopolizing the pool of skilled labor was to take an ironic twist, as he accepted a commission as a lieutenant colonel.

20. Franklin D. Roosevelt, memo to the Secretary of War, 29 October 1942, cited in Coles and Weinberg, p. 22.

21. Provost Marshal General's Office, "History of Military Government Training" (Washington, DC: OCMH, 1946), TS 4-4/DA, p. 1. Hereafter cited as PMGO. This TS and the previous one are quite similar; they duplicate passages verbatim but are not identical. The researcher should also note that some of these TSS differ between hard copy and microfilm copy.


24. Major William J. Fox, Inter-Allied Co-operation during Combat Operations, History of the Korean War, v. 3 (Washington, DC: OCMH, n. d.). On microfilm (reel A141), the TS is considered v. 1. Originally SECRET, the volume was declassified in 1975.

25. Captain Richard L. Harwell, U.S. signal advisor to the TAFC, letter to Signal Officer, 25th Infantry Division, subject: Problems encountered in working with UN forces, 28 October 1951, cited by Fox, who received the information indirectly from Colonel Richard W. Whitney, chief of staff of the division. This letter and subsequent ones cited are all to be found in the annex to Fox's narrative. As these letters
are numbered by hand in the TS, as well as numbered in the original, we have opted here to cite letters directly with their original pagination.


27. Colonel Kebbede Guebre, commanding officer, Ethiopian Expeditionary Forces in Korea, letter to General Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army, Korea, dated 1 January 1952, p. 3.


29. Logistic support was not a "national responsibility" during the Korean War. Extensive support was provided UN units by the United States.


32. Colonel W. C. Bullock, op. cit.