OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD: A BRIDGING STRATEGY TO STOP THE CYCLE OF INDECISION

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<th>28 MAR 2008</th>
<th>2. REPORT TYPE</th>
<th>Civilian Research Project</th>
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<td>3. DATES COVERED</td>
<td>00-00-2007 to 00-00-2008</td>
<td>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</td>
<td>Operationalization of the Army National Guard: A Bridging Strategy to Stop the Cycle of Indecision</td>
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<td>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</td>
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<td>5e. TASK NUMBER</td>
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<td>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</td>
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<td>6. AUTHOR(S)</td>
<td>Erich Randall</td>
<td>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</td>
<td>U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA, 17013-5220</td>
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<td>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</td>
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<td>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</td>
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<td>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)</td>
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<td>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</td>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</td>
<td>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</td>
<td></td>
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<td>14. ABSTRACT</td>
<td>see attached</td>
<td>15. SUBJECT TERMS</td>
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<td>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</td>
<td></td>
<td>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</td>
<td>Same as Report (SAR)</td>
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<td>a. REPORT</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
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<td>c. THIS PAGE</td>
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Operationalization of the Army National Guard: A Bridging Strategy to Stop the Cycle of Indecision

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The views of the academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

Since September 11, 2001, the Army National Guard (ARNG) has brought over 400,000 soldiers to active duty to support operational requirements relating to the Global War on Terror. These demands have initiated the ARNG’s transformation from a traditional strategic reserve to an operational reserve. This process has brought to light several significant concerns, each of which may be resolved by the Army over time and budget cycles. Unfortunately, time is not a luxury that the Army has regarding the problems associated with mobilizing ARNG units. Additional concerns exist that need to be resolved sooner than the more overarching ones associated with the transition to an operational reserve. Therefore, a bridging strategy is proposed, one that will mitigate each of the six immediate concerns described within this paper.
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Disclaimer

This CRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the U.S. Army War College Fellowship Program.

The views expressed in this student civilian research project are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Guard Bureau, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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ABSTRACT

Since September 11, 2001, the Army National Guard (ARNG) has brought over 400,000 soldiers to active duty to support operational requirements relating to the Global War on Terror. These demands have initiated the ARNG’s transformation from a traditional strategic reserve to an operational reserve. This process has brought to light several significant concerns, each of which may be resolved by the Army over time and budget cycles. Unfortunately, time is not a luxury that the Army has regarding the problems associated with mobilizing ARNG units. Additional concerns exist that need to be resolved sooner than the more overarching ones associated with the transition to an operational reserve. Therefore, a bridging strategy is proposed, one that will mitigate each of the six immediate concerns described within this paper.
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“Always Ready, Always There.”

~ Credo of the National Guard

INTRODUCTION

The Army National Guard (ARNG), since 1636 and the calling of the first unit formations of the Massachusetts Bay Colony militia, has participated in every conflict that the United States of America has been involved in. The ARNG has also supported countless domestic emergencies that have befallen America – from hurricanes, to tornados, to floods, to fires, to ice and snow storms, to terrorist attacks.

The National Guard (NG) is unique to the US Armed Forces in that it has this dual mission – both Federal and State under the provisions of Titles 10 and 32, United States Code (USC), respectively. No matter what the crisis, the citizen-soldiers of the National Guard have responded.

This response is critical to the Army because the ARNG is no longer considered a strategic reserve but part of the Army’s operational force. In short, this means that the Army is now utilizing and employing the ARNG as part of its fighting force. The ARNG is no longer called to duty strictly as a last resort. Further, this change reflected in updated war plans and force flow models. This distinction is significant and will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper, however, to illustrate the operational importance of the ARNG, one need only look to numbers of soldiers serving on active duty. Over 40,000 ARNG soldiers have served on active duty supporting these Federal and State missions in 2007.¹ Since September 11, 2001, the ARNG has mobilized 401,840² soldiers for
duty in the Global War on Terror. There is little doubt that this force of slightly over 350,000 men and women has been taxed – however, there is even less doubt that these ARNG soldiers have answered their nation’s call with honor and faced the enemies of America with the same steely-eyed intensity of their active Army counterparts.

In 2005-2006, concern arose among policy makers as well as politicians, questioning the ARNG’s ability to withstand further mobilizations. In order to help forestall what was rapidly approaching an over reliance on the Army Guard, and indeed, all of the US military’s reserve components (RC), Secretary of Defense (SecDef) changed the mobilization policy of the US Reserve Forces in his memorandum, *Utilization of the Total Force.*

This memorandum made six changes to DoD policy. These six key policy modifications included:

1) Establishing the length of involuntary mobilization at a maximum of 12 months.
2) Mobilizing ground forces on a unit basis rather than as individual replacements.
3) Establishing a planning objective or goal to achieve a ratio of one-year mobilization followed by five years of “dwell time” (time not mobilized) for RC forces, but specifically states that units may need to be remobilized sooner due to current global demands. The planning objective for the AC was set at 1:2 (deployment: home station).
4) Establishing a new program to compensate or incentivize both active and reserve members who are required to mobilize or deploy early or often, or who are extended beyond established rotation policy goals.

5) Directing commands to review hardship waiver programs to ensure they are properly taking into account exceptional circumstances facing military families or deployed service members.

6) Minimizing the use of stop loss as a force management tool.

The SECDEF memorandum was a significant turning point in formalizing this “operationalization” the reserve forces. For the Guard, the impacts of this policy are immense. One of the effects of the implementation of the policy memorandum was that not only that the ARNG (indeed, all reserve components) would have a limited mobilization of 12-months, but also their “mobilization clocks” would be reset to zero. In essence, all of the reserve forces were immediately eligible for mobilization within the next five years.

The memorandum, *Utilization of the Total Force*, was a turning point for the Army as it continues to operationalize its reserve components. Over a year has gone by and, thus, the time has come to stop and reflect upon this significant shift in policy. There is little doubt that the policy solved some very significant problems. Solutions are usually good – but in solving a problem, others are typically created. Such is the case with the 12-month mobilization policy. For example, this policy has a significant and adverse impact upon normal force flow rotations for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) because the approximately 9-month ARNG unit rotations BOG do not synchronize with Active Component (AC) 12 to 15-month unit rotations\(^5\) causing more ARNG BCTs being
required to deploy than their AC counterparts. This problem referred to as “incompatible BOG time.”

**Purpose**

Though this incompatible BOG time is important, it is only one of many issues that are problematic since the Army has moved to make its reserve components (RC) more operational than strategic. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to develop courses of action (COA) and recommend a solution that will help mitigate the problems associated with not only the SECDEF memo, but with the entire shift from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve. Methodologically, this paper will focus on Iraq. By making significant inroads into solving the problems facing the ARNG with respect to Iraq, which has the ARNG’s largest troop commitment, the pressures can be eased in other theaters as well. To this end, this paper suggests five potential courses of action and recommends one: that the ARNG should be given a sector to manage in Iraq similar to those sectors commanded by the United States Marine Corps (USMC) and Coalition partners.

**THE NECESSITY OF AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE**

Within the past several years it has become increasingly obvious to the Department of Defense (DoD) leadership that the Reserve Components (RC) were being utilized as a much more operational force than as the traditional strategic reserve. This trend truly began as the Cold War ended. The ARNG and other RC organizations were being called upon to conduct operations in the Balkans and other areas where the Active Component services needed augmentation with this new onslaught of peacekeeping missions. These forces were brought into active service by
use of section (§) 12304 of the United States Code (U.S.C.), the Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC). This slow shift to a more operational reserve was most evident in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.  

The events of September 11, 2001, and subsequent Operations ENDURING and IRAQI FREEDOM pressed the Army to further increase the number of RC soldiers it mobilized. The President, needing much larger numbers than could be accessed by PRC alone, called up these reservists under Partial Mobilization authority (§12302 of Title 10, U.S.C.). By invoking the partial mobilization authority, rather than the full mobilization authority allowed in 10 U.S.C. §12301, the President was limiting military options regarding the number of forces available and the time for them to remain available.

Some analysts may argue that the administration should have implemented (or should still) a full mobilization. However, it is understood that doing so, significant political capital is expended because Congress must declare this authority. The President may not have wished to pay that political price in 2003 when attempting to justify the invasion of Iraq – and the 2008-2009 political environment, arguably, does not lend itself to favorably increasing the troop availability. Therefore, the partial mobilization decision has had lasting ramifications upon current strategy and policy issues including the *Utilization of the Total Force* memorandum.

**THE MOBILIZATION DILEMA**

As the Global War on Terror continues, it becomes clearer that this is a long, protracted war. The very nature of terrorists and Islamofacists is that they are seeking long-term change – indeed Caliphate – something that cannot happen in the six short
years since America was attacked by these very fundamentalists. Thus, the policies and military strategies in place now should be geared toward fighting that long war.

One of the principle drawbacks of the Partial Mob authority is that it, in practice, limits RC deployments to only one. A 2004 Government Accounting Office study discussed DoD’s intention to change longstanding implementation of PM policy from being mobilized for 24 months cumulative to 24 months consecutive. Rather than make this significant policy change, the SecDef limited the duration of reserve mobilizations.

Before the SecDef memorandum, a typical RC deployment for OIF and OIF was 12-month of Boots on the Ground (BOG) time – time that soldiers actually spent in the theater of war. This 12 months, when combined with 3-5 months of post-mobilization training and an additional 3-4 weeks of demobilization added up to the reservist being activated for about 16-18 months. This leaves only six months of time left on the soldier’s 24-month cumulative “mobilization clock” – not enough time to be of value to the theater commander. Additional deployments and mobilizations are possible when a reservist volunteers. Though it could be argued that many such reserve soldiers would happily volunteer, many formal and informal protections that guard the soldier are only in effect when he or she is when involuntarily mobilized.

This problem of volunteerism is compounded in the ARNG. Though 350,000 strong, the Army Guard is a unit-centric organization. National Guard leaders across the country prefer to mobilize an entire unit, not individual soldiers, a policy affirmed in the SecDef memo. This allows for, among other benefits, some level of predictability for the soldiers, families, and employers. Therefore, to utilize a Guard soldier for that last 4-6
months of the 24 allowed, units would need to be brought on for this short timeframe. Unit deployments for only six months are certainly not practical or advisable because the post mobilization training window for units, such as BCTs, is 60-90 days. Were an ARNG BCT to be mobilized for this six month timeframe, conduct training for ~90 days after mobilization, and deploy, that unit would only see ~90 days in theater, not including transportation time. This reality was one of the most significant driving factors for the development of the new mobilization policy because it allows for two 12-month mobilizations instead of one approximately 18-month mobilization.

**Time – The Enemy of Mobilization**

In order to meet the 12-month mobilization requirements, significant amounts of training, equipment, and resources must be moved to the left of the mobilization date. This situation is one that is currently being addressed, in earnest, by the Army Staff, the National Guard Bureau\textsuperscript{13} (NGB), the First U.S. Army,\textsuperscript{14} and RC unit commanders across the United States. Certain decisions must be made early, up to two years in advance of a deployment; these include: mission, location, timelines, units they are backfilling, equipment requirements, training requirements, and manning requirements. Making such decisions will allow commanders to know their mission, their location, their requirements, and other basic, yet critical information. Armed with this information and with enough time to develop plans, any AC or RC unit can successfully accomplish whatever mission is given to them.

These decisions are difficult to make 24 months out, however, because of the fluidity of the Global War on Terror and the bureaucratic systems that have historically manned, equipped, and trained the ARNG as part of the strategic reserve. These
systems have caused the time requirement to ready an ARNG unit to be much longer than that of an AC unit, sometimes as much as 180 days of training after mobilization. This potential lengthy training time, combined with the overall lack of equipment that the ARNG faces, makes gaining time before mobilization to conduct the traditionally post-mob training tasks extremely challenging. Equipping these units must be done well in advance. However, in many instances, new equipment is directed from the assembly line to a unit slated for deployment, yet before the equipment arrives the ARNG must send it somewhere else to a higher priority, often an AC unit, that just “cropped up.” When this happens, it is sometimes the case that neither unit gets adequate time and opportunity to train individually on their equipment – let alone to conduct collective training.

Getting each of the man, train, and equip functions into pre-mob timelines does not occur instantly. It takes time - a commodity that is very scarce for an operational warfighting organization. Thus, there is still a significant amount of training being conducted post-mobilization. Guard planners are estimating that it will take ARNG BCTs two to three months to be validated on warfighting tasks before deployment. This leaves the ARNG only nine months BOG time for the Theater Commander to utilize these formations. In some cases there will be more, and in others less. The key is to move what was traditionally post-mob training to pre-mobilization – by doing this, it can be estimated that the nine or even as much as ten month BOG timeline will remain fairly consistent.
**Boots on the Ground Imbalance**

This 9-10 months BOG is significantly different from what the active Army is doing. In April 2007, the SecDef approved the Army’s request that all AC Army units to remain in theater for 15-month deployments. This policy change, when combined with the 12-month mob policy, exacerbated the incompatible boots on the ground (BOG) time problem. The difference in BOG timelines causes significant and varied issues for deployment planners, force providers, trainers, equippers, and, most importantly, for the units themselves.

For every AC BCT mobilized, 1.5 ARNG BCTs must be mobilized to cover the same 15-month timeline. This number will shrink to a 1:1.25 ratio if the Army moves to 12-month deployment, but both reflect the need for more ARNG units than their AC counterparts due to the differing BOG timelines.

Additionally, planners need to clearly distinguish between AC and RC units and implement different models for strategic lift, training, equipment needs, and force flow projections. This can be confusing and errors may occur by not making such adjustments. This should not be as much of a challenge for large formations such as BCTs, but when one implements this across 10-15 BCTs, plus many more combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS) units, the possibility of such confusion and human error becomes a problem that should not be ignored.

**The Cycle of Indecision**

The confusion that either can begin with or be exacerbated by the incompatible BOG problem can cause decision makers to not make decisions. This indecision, in turn, may develop into very significant problems. At-risk decisions include those very
basic questions: mission, timelines, equipment, and location. When the problems occur, and decisions on these basic issues are not made (or the original decisions are changed) the BOG time decreases because of the ripple-effect of the slow or inaccurate decision process. When BOG time decreases, more units are needed to cover the same theater requirements. This changes already established decisions because the units called are now needed sooner. The problem continues to perpetuate and becomes the “Cycle of Indecision.” A slow or bad decision on the basic issues of mission, timeline, equipment, and location causes another, which causes another, and so on.

This phenomenon can be exemplified by reviewing the mobilization planning timelines for the ARNG BCTs scheduled for deployment to OIF or OEF in 2008. Though this timeline is detailed, the factors that play an important role are the relative lateness in which the units were provided their critical mission information. In this planning timeline. One BCT was alerted in mid-October 2007 for a mobilization scheduled to occur in August-September of 2008. This allowed the unit only 10-11 months with which to receive their mission, conduct alert procedures, get mobilization orders published, obtain their Mission Essential Equipment List, conduct Strategic Readiness Processing events, conduct New Equipment Training and Fielding, Individual/Leader/Staff training, obtain Joint Assessment, and many more necessary tasks.

The concern is that by not making key decisions on which unit will take which mission (or by the decision being changed at any point after the unit is alerted) until the last minute, this the unit selected must have an extended post-mob training period, shorter BOG time, which results in a higher demand for forces.
This cycle of indecision is the heart of the problem that faces mobilizing ARNG formations. Indecision freezes action and prior planning. The problems that flow are in manning, training, and equipping in time to get Guard units in theater. The “unknowns” in this scenario must become “knowns,” or as a minimum, be mitigated by addressing the problems that spin from the BOG imbalance.

Global Force Management (GFM) and the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN). Prior to 2003, the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) list was the methodology war planners used to schedule and move forces and a TPFDD list was provided as an annex to all Combatant Command plans. This methodology was phased out in 2003 for OIF and was replaced with the Request for Forces/Capabilities (RFF) procedure due to the need to build force packages in a more expeditionary manner. The RFF process, used when an emergent need for conventional forces arises, begins with the combatant command submitting an RFF to the SecDef through the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Upon approval and validation of the need, the Joint Staff (JS) develops a draft deployment order, which is sent to U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), the Joint Force Provider (JFP) for assignment/apportionment of forces to full the request. The JFP relies heavily upon input from its Service components to develop sourcing solutions to fill the request.  

The GFM process also manages rotational forces. In these instances, units, typically BCTs or larger, are assigned to a schedule known as the Rotational Force Allocation Plan. This plan “gives the primary joint force provider, combatant commands, and Services strategic-level planning guidance for rotational allocation of forces for two fiscal years.”
The U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), as the Service Component for JFCOM and the Army’s force provider, has developed their own system to manage force flow. When a request is sent to the FORSCOM, either an RFF or a rotational requirement, the Army Forces Generation Model (ARFORGEN) is applied to the process. The purpose of ARFORGEN is to generate a pool of manned, trained, and equipped Army forces ready for immediate mobilization and/or worldwide deployment.\textsuperscript{20}

Through proper use of ARFORGEN, the Army will be able to generate forces by knowing when and where to target limited manning, training, and equipping resources. To know the resources that must be directed to what units, either AC or RC, move through three stages of readiness: the Reset/Train, the Ready, and the Available pools are created. Units move through the pools over time and remain in the “Ready” pool for up to one year or until deployed. After the year has expired or the unit has returned from deployment, they will move into the Reset/Train pool and begin again.

Within each of these pools, ARFORGEN focuses units on a particular mission set and bins them into one of three Expeditionary Force packages: Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF), Ready Expeditionary Force (REF), or Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF). DEF units who are missioned for known operational requirements, REFs are available for short notice missions, and CEFs are designated to hold more of a strategic reserve role – being available for contingency operations if needed.\textsuperscript{21}

The speed with which a unit moves through ARFORGEN is different for AC and RC units. The goal for AC units is one deployment in every three years and for RC units the goal is one deployment in every five years.\textsuperscript{22} These goals, however, are not
currently being met. AC forces are at approximately a 1.25:1 (deployment:dwell) ratio and RC forces are at an approximate 3:1 ratio.²³

With respect to ARNG units, the force generation process is similar to the Army’s. The ARNG, like the Army, is seeking to fully implement ARFORGEN and is making progress for BCT and support brigades. Although the ARNG works within the Army system, they must also work with the States and Territories to determine which units will be assigned which mission.

The process, as currently being done (not as it will be when ARFORGEN is fully implemented) begins with FORSCOM, at their annual sourcing conference, identifies a mission that they would like to source with an ARNG unit. The National Guard Bureau then coordinates the mission with the Joint Force Headquarters of states/territories with units available and ready to perform the mission. Once a State/Territory ARNG agrees to take on the mission and the Adjutant General of that State/Territory approves it, the unit information is sent from NGB to FORSCOM to fulfill the request.

When the process goes smoothly, it is effective. However, it all happens much too late for ARNG units to be able to be fully prepared, trained, and ready. For instance, units that are to be deployed in FY09 were not sourced and alerted until after the FORSCOM sourcing conference in early FY08. This means that ARNG unit commanders were not notified two or more years in advance of a mission. The sourcing conference methodology makes this a “batch process” and a “continuous process” would be much more effective in getting the decisions made sooner. The sourcing conference works well for the AC, however, because they are deploying units at a much faster rate than the ARNG. Notification a year out for an AC unit is, essentially, as early
as they need since earlier notification would take place while the unit was in theater on a current rotation and not focused on the next. This imbalance, too, exacerbates the cycle of indecision.

Because units are not identified early, which is attributed to the fluid nature of the battlefield – the rationale that FORSCOM provides for not sourcing units until their annual sourcing conference – the ARNG continues to suffer significant lags in post-mobilization training time as well as decreased readiness overall.

Earlier notification and alert of units ensures that commanders, and all of the supporting mechanisms associated with getting that unit ready, can begin with enough time to properly man, train, and equip their units. When ARFORGEN goals are met, it will help – but this is years away due to the high demand for forces. The problems cannot wait for long-term solutions as they are happening now.24

A Solution is Needed

The situation has many facets, but must be resolved. There is a long-term solution being worked toward, and it is a good one. The Army’s solution to this problem is long-term: reducing the requirements for committed forces, increasing the overall size of the Army (both Active and Reserve), fully implementing ARFORGEN, increasing funding the Army and its components, and the commitment to and programming of funds necessary to convert the ARNG and USAR from a strategic reserve to an operational force.25 When each of these elements of the Army’s plan takes place, much should be resolved.

The Army’s solution, however, is not immediate. It will take several years to fully implement – if it is implemented at all. Thus, a short-term “bridging solution” to help
manage the most critical issues that the ARNG, and indeed, the Army, is facing must be
developed and implemented.

**DESCRIBING THE PROBLEMS AS CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION**

There are a myriad of concerns, all of which are interdependent and overlapping. The SecDef Memorandum and the imbalance in BOG both feed the cycle of indecision. Thus, it can be stated that in order to solve or significantly mitigate each of the problems, the key is to stop the cycle of indecision. Injecting stability and predictability into an unstable and unpredictable process can help to achieve this objective.

By analyzing the cycle of indecision as impacted by the SecDef memorandum and the imbalance in BOG, six critical problems become evident. By solving or mitigating each of these problems, a solution should be successful. Therefore, the six problems are described in terms of evaluation criteria for the proposed possible solutions. It will become evident that each of the six criteria can be addressed with stability and predictability to mobilization, training, manning, and equipping functions and processes.

These criteria are:

1. Any solution will have to enable DoD to continue to meet today’s operational requirements.
2. Any solution will have to stay within the broad guidelines set in the SecDef memorandum.
3. Any solution will have to be acceptable to DoD and Army senior leadership.
4. Any solution will have to enable early identification and alert of units.
5. Any solution will have to enable ARNG to know what resources are needed for the mission and know what of these resources are not already in theater.
6. Any solution will have to enable ARNG units to complete post-mob training within three months or less.

By addressing these six criteria in a single solution, the bridging strategy can be incorporated which will allow time for the Army’s slow, bureaucratic systems time to catch up and fully operationalize its reserves.

**Criterion #1: Any solution will have to enable DoD to continue to meet today’s operational requirements.**

This criterion is one that places the mission first. The US Army has significant and far-reaching requirements worldwide. The ARNG, as part of the Army, must be remain accessible. Meeting the many operational requirements may seem obvious, but its importance cannot be understated.

Therefore, any course of action that can be seen as limiting the DoD from its ability to meet current and potential missions will not be selected. These include operational requirements both domestic and abroad, both natural and man-made.

**Criterion #2: Any solution will have to stay within the broad guidelines set in the SecDef memorandum.**

The SecDef memorandum established significant boundaries that the services have with regard to mobilizing reserve forces. This criterion states that the solution must be compliant with the memorandum by staying inside of these boundaries. Two such boundaries must not be crossed:

1. Limiting total mobilization to a maximum of 12 months.
2. Emphasize unit mobilizations versus individual mobilizations.
To successfully pass this criterion, each of these sub-criteria must also be passed. Any course of action that seeks to increase the mobilization timeline beyond the 12 months established by the SecDef memorandum will not be accepted. Any COA that recommends moving to a policy of more individual replacement will not be selected.

**Criterion #3. Any solution will have to be acceptable to DoD and Army senior leadership.**

As discussed already, no leader in either DoD or the Army will accept a solution that goes beyond partial mobilization because to do so would be politically infeasible. There are other issues that would make a possible solution either more or less attractive to a given DoD or Army leader, depending upon that individual’s perspective and constituency. The most successful solution, therefore, will be one that the entire DoD and Army leadership can support.

**Criterion #4: Any solution will have to enable early identification and alert of units.**

This criterion is very important. A good solution to this problem will ensure that units are identified and alerted at least two years in advance of mobilization. Two years is a goal that is discussed by the Army leaders. The alert is a key trigger to begin funding to be dedicated to the deploying unit. DA G3 staffers recognize these units and their readiness is tracked and reported to the VCSA weekly. In other words, these units gain visibility in the process and they are treated as is any other Army deployer, regardless of component.
Criterion #5: Any solution will have to enable ARNG to know what resources are needed for the mission and know what of these resources are not already in theater.

Any solution must also address two associated concerns; both primarily associated with equipment resources, but also can be easily correlated to training and personnel resources. These two concerns are 1) the necessity to increase accuracy in forecasting needed resources and 2) improving visibility and management of theater provided equipment (TPE).

1) Increased accuracy in forecasting necessary resources. Unit commanders need to know the types of equipment and ammunition, as well as the numbers of soldiers that they will need to accomplish their wartime mission. The sooner that they gain visibility on the mission, the sooner they assess the personnel needed, the equipment required, and the types of training necessary to be fully ready to conduct their assigned mission in combat.

Clearly, in the case of equipment readiness, there is a significant need to get equipment to deploying units as early in the process as possible. The ARNG is seeking to get the majority of the significant equipment needed by a unit 24+ months before mobilization. This is a difficult thing to do, however, because there is a finite amount of equipment available. Equipment comes to a unit from only a few sources: new equipment, rebuilt/refurbished equipment, transferred or cross-leveled equipment from another unit, or equipment that is in theater already which is known as theater provided equipment (TPE).

What this means is that except for some new equipment coming off the lines, the current state of equipment procurement amounts to a “zero-sum game.” On the ground, this means that a unit will not get the needed resources because a sooner-deploying
unit requires it earlier. This situation, though inconvenient, is not apt to change. Therefore, the best way to mitigate this issue is derived when the understanding of the requirements are known well in advance.

Therefore, the COA that can most successfully provide early forecasting of the resources needed by a unit will score higher on this sub-criterion.

2) Improved management and visibility of theater provided equipment (TPE).

Related to the forecasting sub-criterion, is one that does a better job of managing and providing overall visibility of TPE. Before discussing the specifics of this sub-criterion, however, a brief background of TPE is needed to explain why management and visibility must be improved.

In late 2003, Army units (including active, Guard, and Reserve) were directed to leave much of the equipment that they had into the theater of war (either Iraq or Afghanistan) for use by their replacement units. Since this decision, thousands of pieces of equipment, everything from vehicles, to computers, to mobile kitchens, to weapons, to night vision, to communication systems, as well as many other systems, have been left in theater to be used by follow-on forces. The impetus behind this decision was that scarce equipment should be in the hands of a unit and being utilized to its fullest extent. Further, the strategic lift capacity and financial cost associated with the transport equipment back and forth from the Continental United States (CONUS) to Iraq or Afghanistan as units rotated in and out was staggering. Thus, the Army was directed to leave such equipment in theater.28

Though the intentions of this directive were admirable, the TPE program quickly began to have accountability problems. Units were not doing a very good job of handing
over equipment to their succeeding units, hand receipts for equipment were not being kept, and after time the situation deteriorated significantly. Things became so bad, in fact, that the Army G-4 to issue an order to conduct an immediate accounting of every piece of equipment in the Army inventory\textsuperscript{29}. This effort helped, to an extent, though there still remains significant confusion in theater about what is actually there for a unit to fall in on. Not knowing what TPE is available makes it much more difficult for ARNG units to sort out what they have on hand versus what they still need to conduct their combat mission.

Time, again, causes additional constraints. Because the ARNG is cross-leveling so much equipment – in order to get as much materiel to units in time to train and deploy within the 12-month mobilization timelines – unit commanders and force flow planners must know what unit is replacing another and what TPE the departing unit has on hand. This allows for calculations of what, if any, CONUS based equipment must be shipped to theater. Of course, the logistics of shipping equipment into Kuwait takes longer than the 3-month post-mob training timeline, so, ideally, units will need to know estimated available TPE at the time of alert (Mobilization Day minus 24 months). Of course, the TPE will change with new procurement, requirement changes, and battlefield losses, but the Guard units should be able to follow and track the TPE throughout their alerted timelines, thereby ensuring minimal last-minute cross-leveling.

Thus, it can be stated that any COA that allows for a greater visibility and management of TPE will be considered a better option than those COAs that do not.
Criterion #6: *Any solution will have to enable ARNG to complete post-mob training within three months or less.*

Traditionally, a BCT needed approximately 5-6 months of post mobilization training, conducted at a First Army mobilization station, to complete validation and certification on all of the tasks necessary for deployment into a theater of war. Now that post-mob training time is 60-90 days. In order to meet the shorter post-mob training timelines, many of the tasks must be moved into the years preceding mobilization. This requires several things to come together and be available for deploying units. The equipment must be available in time to train on, the personnel must be in place and have conducted all necessary individual and collective training, and the mission and equipment lists must be known in advance.

It is clear that this problem incorporates many of the previous concerns. The solution that successfully mitigates this will, by its very nature, mitigate other problems as well. It is, however, important to specify this as a separate problem because possible solutions exist that can, indeed, ease other problems and neglect the 3-month timeline.

**REJECTED COURSES OF ACTION**

Five courses of action were evaluated to reach the recommended solution. Four of these were rejected and are briefly discussed:

**COA 1: Reduce AC to 9-month Rotations**

COA 1 states that the Army should reduce the length of Active Component rotations from 15 months to nine months.

This course of action, on the surface, would solve the problems created by the imbalance in BOG time because there would be no imbalance. All Army forces would be in theater for ~9 months. This COA is one, in fact, that the Army is working to achieve,
however, the number of forces available and the significant requirement make this COA fail the first criterion, the ability to meet the operational requirements of the DoD. Further, this COA does not address the immediate needs of the Army with regard to solving the problems created by the Cycle of Indecision. It has potential in the future as the US draws down troop levels, but it is not an immediate solution and was, therefore, rejected.

**COA 2: Increase RC and Reduce AC to 12-months BOG.**

COA 2 states that the ARNG and USAR should have their BOG time increased back to 12 months from its current ~9 months and that the AC should have its BOG time reduced from the current 15 months to 12 months.

This course of action puts the policies that were effective before the 19 January 2007 memorandum back in place. Because of this, COA #2 fails to meet the second criterion, ensuring that the SecDef memo is adhered to. Further, this COA it would fail the third criterion of being acceptable to DoD and Army leadership because it violates one of the basic tenants of the SecDef policy. It is for these reasons that this COA is also rejected.

**COA 3: Full Mobilization**

COA 4 states that the President should declare full mobilization of the reserve components.

Declaring full mobilization would, in effect, allow the President to have unlimited access to all reserve components. By implementing such a mobilization, there would be no further timelines and ARNG units could conduct as much post-mobilization training as necessary until they were properly manned, trained, and equipped for deployment.
This course of action, though effective, fails both Criteria #2 and #3. This COA violates the one-year mobilization tenant of the SecDef memo and it discounts the resetting of the mobilization clock tenant of the SecDef memo. Key leaders in the DoD or the Army would not accept it because, as stated earlier in the paper, the idea of a full-mobilization is not politically feasible.

**COA 4: Give ARNG Specific Unit Mission Sets (SECFOR, etc)**

Of the failed courses of action, COA 4 was very close to surviving. Therefore, additional attention will be given to it to fully explain why it was rejected in the end.

COA 4 would provide ARNG units with a specific type of mission set, a mission that would be conducted for all forces in theater by ARNG units only. For example, all ARNG BCTs would be given the Security Force (SECFOR), also known as Combat Patrol Force (CPF) mission. This COA would relieve the AC and USAR (as well as other services) of providing forces to conduct these missions because the ARNG would take on the entire task.

This course of action solves many of the problems and passes many of the criteria. It stays within the guidelines of the SecDef memorandum; it allows for the early identification and alert of units; it enables the ARNG to know better forecast and manage resources, and it enables the Army and ARNG to complete post-mobilization training within three months or less.

The two criteria that the COA does not pass, however, relate to meeting the DoD operational requirements and being acceptable to DoD and Army senior leadership.

With regard to not meeting DoD operational requirements the concern is that the ARNG will need to disassemble and reassemble many functional combat
combat support units in order to fully embrace this mission. Essentially, the Guard combat BCTs, of which there are 28, will need to be reclassified to multiple SECFOR companies with appropriate headquarters structure. These companies are not organic to the Army’s unit structure and must be taken from other types of units. Equipment, personnel, and training must be provided and these SECFOR companies have a large amount of vehicles, weapons, communications, and night-vision systems in their mission essential equipment lists.

When combat brigades are broken apart to form these other companies, a significant amount of the Army’s ground forces are lost in terms of training, equipping and actual “ready” forces. Criterion #1 indicates that future conflicts must be considered as well as the current operations and by breaking apart as significant number of ARNG units to form other units, the DoD would be giving up significant future capability from its Operational ARNG. This COA fails the first criterion because of these reasons.

Criterion #3 states that DoD and Army (including ARNG) leadership must be able to support a given COA. It must be stated clearly that the ARNG has never backed away from a mission it was asked to perform and would fully (and probably very successfully) execute a SECFOR-only mission were the organization directed to do so. If he DoD, Army, NGB and ARNG leadership saw more value than harm in accepting a single mission in order to solve these other problems (and, in turn, make life better for all of the Army’s soldiers as a result), they would be fully supportive. However, in the decision making process, this COA would meet with some significant resistance by many DoD, Army, and National Guard leaders.
The primary reason for the resistance would be the same reason the COA failed Criteria #1: doing this would degrade the Army’s combat capability. However, another reason exists. The Army and the ARNG have long been at odds over the relevance of Guard forces. In recent years significant and, in fact, unprecedented progress has been made by the Army to not only repair the relationships between itself and its component, but to embrace the ARNG and take active steps to ensure the Guard’s success. Significantly higher amounts of resources have been programmed to the ARNG since 2002, including funds, equipment, training seats, decision-making authority and more.

It is getting to the point that both the Army and the ARNG are close to letting go of the old fears and baggage that plagued their relationship for decades. The concern by DoD, Army, and Guard leaders may be that these excellent gains could be reduced were the ARNG asked to break its combat structure, even temporarily, to invest itself in SECFOR units.

This COA was rejected for these reasons.

Summary

Of these failed COAs, none are necessarily bad; in fact, all have merit at one level or another. The concern is that none of these COAs solves or mitigates all of the problems created by the imbalance in BOG time and the cycle of uncertainty. One COA, however, does resolve or mitigate each problem.
RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION:

COA 5: THE “GUARD SECTOR” SOLUTION

This COA states that the ARNG should be given a sector in Iraq. This sector, similar to the al Anbar sector that the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) commands, should be commanded by an ARNG division with assigned ARNG BCTs and CS/CSS units necessary to provide security, reconstruction, civil-military operations, combat requirements, logistics, and indeed all of the requirements for the entire area. The ARNG Division Commander would report to the Multinational Corps – Iraq Commander as would any of the two-star (or three-star in the case of the USMC) headquarters currently do. With this COA, the ARNG would manage force flow, TPE, and all of the other enablers necessary to sustain operations in its sector over time.

This COA is the only one that fully meets each of the criteria. The following discussion will address each individually.

Meeting Operational Requirements.

Selecting this COA enables the Army as a whole to continue to meet today’s DoD operational requirement. The COA assumes that the sector selected by the ARNG is of the size and troop requirement that is sustainable by the ARNG over time. When deciding the correct size for the force, the ARNG and Army must consider the myriad of other operational missions the ARNG is engaged in and plan for these as well. This includes a contingent remaining to protect and defend the Homeland; the ARNG’s top priority.

Over the course of Fiscal Year 2008 (FY08), the ARNG has and will deploy several BCTs into Iraq. This is in addition to their already robust presence in Bosnia,
Kosovo, Guantanamo Bay, the Sinai, and Afghanistan. Planners have determined that the ARNG, using the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) will have five or six BCTs available in any given year and ready for deployment. This would then be the maximum number of BCTs that the ARNG could commit to current operations.

Considering the other requirements that the ARNG has it may be that three BCTs is the “right” number. In addition to the combat formations, planners must include a Division Headquarters, and the associated CS/CSS units necessary to support the sector.

The requirement for a strategic reserve is neither reduced nor eliminated by the operational reserve necessity. Therefore, an important consideration in determining the size of the ARNG sector is to keep in mind that additional troop surges or to support contingencies as necessary. Though not an easy task considering the large current operational requirement, such surges can be compensated for using this COA.

**Meeting SecDef Memorandum Guidelines.**

The “Guard Sector” COA does not violate any of the constraints laid out in the SecDef memorandum. First, it allows for a 12-month maximum mobilization and the ARNG would be in full control of this with respect to troops in the ARNG sector. Second, the COA encourages unit mobilizations by employing all types of Guard units, including Division Headquarters and CS/CSS formations.

**Ensuring Senior Leader Acceptability.**

This course of action will be acceptable to DoD, Army, NGB, ARNG, and State National Guard leaders. It will not be completely agreed to by all, but when considered fully, it becomes evident that the positives of implementing such a strategy will have positive, long-term benefits to the entire Army, not only to the ARNG.
The key to success in this criterion is to display how this COA will benefit the total Army – as well as benefit the entirety of the OIF/OEF AORs. The primary arguments against giving the ARNG as sector will be issues of trust and issues of integration of forces.

**Issues of trust.** Although the ARNG has been decisively engaged in the GWOT since its inception, there will linger a kernel of doubt in the minds of the Army leadership (as well as the Administration) if these “weekend warriors” are truly up to the task of taking on full management and ownership of an Iraqi sector. Few will argue that the ARNG has demonstrated its ability to handle these situations in recent years and by pointing out the empirical evidence of successes in having operational command of (to name a few): Operation JUMP START, Task Force Phoenix, KFOR, Guantanamo Bay, MFO Sinai, and the relief efforts of Hurricane Katrina. These missions require the ability to provide full command and control and are all highly complex, but pale in comparison to that of a full sector in Iraq.

Because of the complex nature of the task, and meaning no disrespect to the ARNG, there will be DoD and Army leaders who will simply not concur of giving operational command to an entire sector of the OIF theater to ARNG personnel. What these well-intentioned individuals must remind themselves of is the reality of the current situation we are facing as an Army. The move toward an operational reserve and the challenges of the GWOT has forced DoD to take many managed risks. Allowing the ARNG to take control of an Iraqi sector would be another in this long list – and solving the larger problem is well worth taking. As stated earlier, bold, dynamic, and risk-taking action is required.
Issues of integration of forces. This problem states that by giving the ARNG an Iraqi sector, the Army will be dividing itself. The long-time goal for the Army has been better integration of its forces – not division of them. This solution, on the surface, is not very “Total Force.” However, when the situation is looked at holistically, particularly in terms of the criteria laid out in this paper, it becomes clear that this separation of the ARNG and the AC is worth violating a desire for further AC/RC integration. In addition, unlike the what has been true in the past so frequently, the reason for the separation is not perceived concerns about different levels of performance, abilities, or capabilities – it is largely driven by the mandated differences with each of the problems described in this paper and seeking a way to deal with these difficult realities.

Early identification and Alert of Units.

If this course of action is implemented, the ARNG will know specifically what their OIF requirements are at any given time. This knowledge will allow the ARNG to consistently and continuously identify and alert ARNG units 24 months in advance without waiting for the FORSCOM sourcing conference. The ARNG will be able to better match both BCTs and support units to the requirements – this gives unit commanders much more time to train for their specific missions, thereby increasing the effectiveness and overall readiness of the deploying units.

Providing Focus to Limited Resources.

Increased accuracy in forecasting necessary resources. If the ARNG is given a sector, and thereby can establish early identification of units two or more years before the mobilization and deployment - they will know what resources are needed by each of these units to properly conduct their mission. Having this knowledge will allow the
Guard to know the requirements in personnel, training, and equipping and will be able to wisely expend limited resources to more effectively spend and direct these funds. This is proven in the ARNGs other missions, such as MFO Sinai and K-FOR. The ARNG is able to identify units well in advance and they know the mission requirements. These balance in a very efficient resourcing operation for the Guard. Such can be said if the recommended COA is implemented.

The obvious counter to this argument is that even if the ARNG were given this sector immediately, it would take them up to two years to finally reach the full, “two-year out” notification. However, this argument will be accurate for any plan that the Army implements and, in truth, is an excellent reason to make the decision quickly and implement the ARNG sector immediately.

*Improved management and visibility of theater provided equipment (TPE).*

Understanding the equipping nightmare known as TPE is never going to be easy. There is equipment in the Middle East that may never be accounted for. That being said, the USMC and the coalition forces should have a much easier time of tackling this problem than the US Army primarily due to the smaller size of their sectors. Smaller size equates to less equipment, which further equates to better accountability. By knowing what equipment is provided by theater, the units operating within that “known TPE” battlespace are then able to forecast requirements with a greater degree of accuracy.

This knowledge is particularly important for ARNG and forces that must ship equipment before mobilization in order for it to arrive in theater on time. Further, knowing what is needed allows the NGB to ensure that the States where the deploying units are headquartered have adequate amounts of equipment for homeland
security/homeland defense (HLD/HLS) missions. This is a politically sensitive issue and one that the Army takes very seriously. By giving the ARNG a sector, TPE would be a relatively known commodity and the Governors would be able to have better responses to disasters that afflict their states.

Ensure Post-Mobilization Training is at or Below 90 Days

The final problem is critical. In order to meet the 12-month mobilization guideline outlined in the SecDef memorandum, ARNG units of every type must be able to obtain at least nine months BOG with goals of even longer times. This means that they need to have three or fewer months of post-mob training. The only way to do this is for unit commanders to know their missions well in advance; two years or longer is recommended. With this knowledge, commanders can prepare their training calendars appropriately to be confident that they will not need any additional time over this three-month timeline. This COA allows, after a short amount of time, commanders this needed information – and, more importantly, the missions should not change as often happens now. The cycle of indecision presses the need for the sourcing of different units at times and the perpetuation of the cycle continues this problem. The ARNG, when managing its own sector, will be responsible to ensure that this does not happen. They, more than any other organization, have an understanding of and a stake in their own soldiers. When the cycle of indecision is broken, these incidences of mission change should occur only when they are and operational necessity – not a function of mismanagement.
Stopping the Cycle of Indecision

If this solution were implemented, the Cycle of Indecision would be halted. No longer would the ARNG need to wait for the FORSCOM sourcing conference to determine what missions were going to be made available for ARNG units for OIF. The ARNG would be able to implement an ARFORGEN timeline very effectively as the OIF mission would become part of their “known” mission set and would thereby be much less turbulent.

Planners could identify the necessary BCTs and supporting units needed for each of these known missions years in advance. This would allow commanders to fully prepare their units for successfully reaching each manning, equipping, and training readiness goal before mobilization. The stabilization and predictability afforded by selecting this course of action would be invaluable to the ARNG, the Army, and the DoD as a whole.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this paper was to develop courses of action (COA) and recommend a solution that will help mitigate the problems associated with not only the SECDEF memorandum, but with the problems associated with incompatible BOG time and the cycle of indecision and this purpose was achieved. Several problems were described and were used as criteria to evaluate five courses of action. Of these COAs, only “creating an ARNG sector in Iraq” solved or mitigated each of the criteria. Therefore, this COA is recommended.

Often, when bureaucracies are faced with opportunities and needs to make transformational change, they are stalled into inaction. The DoD, the Army, and the
ARNG simply cannot allow fear and concern over implementation details of this strategy to not allow its adoption. The price of retaining the status quo is too high.

The difficult truth is that the readiness problems facing the Army National Guard demand an immediate fix. The Army cannot continue to wait for cold-war era bureaucratic systems to improve personnel, equipment, and training situations in the Guard. It is time for the Army – that is “The” Army – to take bold, decisive, and, yes, risk-taking action to bridge the ARNG readiness problems until the long-term plans for the operational reserve can be fully initiated. Giving the ARNG full operational control of a sector in Iraq will do just that.
ENDNOTES:

1 LTG H Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and LTG Clyde A. Vaughn, Director of the Army National Guard, 2009 National Guard Posture Statement, pg. 10.

2 Ibid. p. 10.


5 There has been significant speculation that in Secretary Gates may request that the Army reduce its troop rotation time from 15 months to 12 months. Even if this occurs, the problem of incompatible BOG time remains due to the 25% disparity in BOG timelines. Unless the AC and RC units are on equal terms with regard to BOG time, the concerns associated with this problem will manifest.


7 Ibid. p. vii.

8 PRC authority authorizes the President to involuntarily mobilize up to 200,000 members of the reserve components for no more than 365 days. The partial mobilization authority authorizes the President to involuntarily mobilize up to one million reservists for not more than 24 cumulative months.

9 Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Partial Mobilization (World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks) and Redelegation of Authority Under Title 10, United States Code, §123, §123a, §527, §12006, §12302, §12305, §12011, and §12012, September 19, 2001.

10 Full mobilization authorizes the President to involuntarily mobilize any and all members of the Reserve Components for the duration of the war or emergency. This authority required a declaration by Congress in order for it to take effect.

11 As described in a US Central Command (USCENTCOM) press release dated October 23, 2006, “Al Qaeda and some Islamic extremist groups have stated that their ultimate goal is to restore a caliphate encompassing all former and current Muslim lands. The totalitarian state would impose a strict interpretation of Islamic law, curbing freedom of speech and religion, and women’s and minority rights. Though maps vary, the plan would extend the caliphate into the middle of Africa, South Asia, and part of Europe and Southeast Asia. After the historic caliphate is established, some plans show long-term efforts for it to encompass the entire globe.
Information in this section was obtained from US Government Accountability Office. GAO Report #GAO-04-1031. Military Personnel. DOD Needs to Address Long-term Reserve Force Availability and Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues. September 2004 page 19. The report states in the executive summary “DOD’s implementation of a key mobilization authority to involuntarily call up reserve component members and personnel policies greatly affects the numbers of reserve members available to fill requirements. Involuntary mobilizations are currently limited to a cumulative total of 24 months under DOD’s implementation of the partial mobilization authority. Faced with some critical shortages, DOD changed a number of its personnel policies to increase force availability. However, these changes addressed immediate needs and did not take place within a strategic framework that linked human capital goals with DOD’s organizational goals to fight the Global War on Terrorism. DOD was also considering a change in its implementation of the partial mobilization authority that would have expanded its pool of available personnel. This policy revision would have authorized mobilizations of up to 24 consecutive months without limiting the number of times personnel could be mobilized, and thus provide an essentially unlimited flow of forces. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it would retain its current cumulative approach, but DOD did not elaborate in its comments on how it expected to address its increased personnel requirements.”

The NGB is the DoD Joint Activity over both the ARNG and Air National Guard (ANG) Directorates in Washington DC, as well as to the 54 Joint Force Headquarters in each State, three Territories, and the District of Columbia.

The First U.S. Army’s (1A) mission statement states that the organization “supports Reserve Component (RC) pre-mobilization training, performs 180-Day Training Readiness Assessments and conducts post-mobilization operations in CONUS (plus Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands) in accordance with the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process in order to provide trained and ready forces to the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) for the full spectrum of operations.” Information taken from First Army Web site at http://www.first.army.mil/mission_statement.htm.

Information taken from the National Guard, 2009 Posture Statement, pg 12. Although the current estimates of equipment on hand vary due to differences in counting methodologies, the ARNG currently estimates 61% of its equipment on hand for non-deployed units – though this varies from state to state and from unit to unit. Much of this equipment is older and not deployable, such as M35 2 ½ ton trucks, yet count as available for deployment. When unacceptable and/or non-deployable items are subtracted, the equipment on hand falls to an even lower level.

On April 11, 2007, at a Pentagon News Conference, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates announced that all active component soldiers in the U.S. Central Command area of operations will serve 15-month tours in the region. This extension added three months to their existing 12-month tours and did not change the tour lengths of the Army’s reserve components or of the USMC. It is expected that the Army will revert to 12-month rotations in the Summer of 2008.

Information derived from FOUO/UNCLASSIFIED slides provided by ARNG Directorate of the National Guard Bureau.


Ibid., page 46.


Ibid.
On March 10, 2008, GEN George Casey, Chief of the Army Staff, sent a memorandum to LTG H Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, stating that the goal of the Army is to achieve full-spectrum readiness mobilization and full deployment readiness on mobilization. GEN Casey asked LTG Blum for recommendations on systemic policy changes needed to ensure these goals are achieved (FOUO).

GEN Campbell (Commanding General, Forces Command), LTG Honoré (Commanding General, First Army), LTG Stultz (Chief, Army Reserve/CG US Army Reserve Command), LTG Vaughn (Director, Army National Guard), LTG Rochelle (Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G-1), and Mr. Smiley: Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Reserve Affairs, (ASA M&RA) discussed the criticality and way ahead on moving the ARNG and USAR to an Operational Reserve during the AUSA Conference on October 10, 2007.

Although many potential criteria exist, the author has discussed these specific criteria with experts in key organizations working on the very problems described, including subject matter experts on the CJCS staff, DA G3, NGB, ARNG G3, ARNG G4, ARNG G5, ARNG G8, NORTHCOM, CENTCOM, 1A, and NG JFHQ personnel from two States, including one Adjutant General. Further, the author has significant personal experience with attempting to work on these issues and formulated the list. Through these personal contacts, it is concluded that, though not sanctioned by any governmental organization, the list could be considered as representative of the views of many of the leaders of organizations in charge of solving this problem and that these criteria are among the most significant issues facing the Army as it transforms from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational force.

GEN Campbell (Commanding General, Forces Command), LTG Honoré (Commanding General, First Army), LTG Stultz (Chief, Army Reserve/CG US Army Reserve Command), LTG Vaughn (Director, Army National Guard), LTG Rochelle (Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G-1), and Mr. Smiley: Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Reserve Affairs, (ASA M&RA) discussed the importance of alerting units a minimum of two years out during the AUSA Conference on October 10, 2007.


In 2007, the Army G4, LTG Ann Dunwoody implemented “Operation TOTAL RECALL.” This was a massive logistics effort for units in each of the Army’s components to physically account for each piece of equipment that was assigned to their MTOE – and insures that the equipment was entered into the Equipment On Hand database of record, PBUSE.