EXPLORING THE FUTURE OF SECURITY IN THE CARIBBEAN:
A REGIONAL SECURITY PARTNERSHIP?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
MASTERS OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategy

by

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2007

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The transnational threats of narco trafficking, arms smuggling, terrorism and organized crime, among others, coupled with a lack of resources pose a threat not only to the Caribbean Basin but to the continental United States as well. As the region seeks to effectively address its security needs, a collective approach to security offers a possible solution for enhancing the security of the region. This thesis examines the historical political attitudes and initiatives towards the security issues of the region, reviews three regional security arrangements to identify lessons learned, and assesses the feasibility, suitability, and acceptability of a Regional Security Partnership (RSP) between the United States and the nations of the Caribbean as an appropriate security model for the region. It concludes that the governments of the Caribbean and the United States have demonstrated sufficient commitment at the operational level to security in the Caribbean Basin, and are poised to take this cooperative approach to the strategic level.
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ABSTRACT

EXPLORING THE FUTURE OF REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE CARIBBEAN: A REGIONAL SECURITY PARTNERSHIP? by Major Jaimie Ogilvie, (88 pages.)

The transnational threats of narco trafficking, arms smuggling, terrorism and organized crime, among others, coupled with a lack of resources have overwhelmed the ability of individual nation states in the Caribbean to adequately ensure their security. These threats pose a threat not only to the Caribbean Basin but to the continental United States as well. As the region seeks to effectively address its security needs in the context of the interconnectedness and interdependence among states, a collective approach to security offers a possible solution for enhancing the security of the region.

This thesis examines the historical political attitudes and initiatives towards the security issues of the region, reviews three regional security arrangements to identify best practices, pitfalls, challenges and other relevant issues, and assesses the feasibility, suitability, and acceptability of a Regional Security Partnership (RSP) between the United States and the nations of the Caribbean as an appropriate security model for the region.

It concludes that the governments of the Caribbean and the United States have demonstrated sufficient commitment at the operational level to security in the Caribbean Basin, and are poised to take this cooperative approach to the strategic level in the form of a formal regional security arrangement. It proposes a possible decision making structure and process, and discusses the importance of developing and nurturing the relationships within the RSP, as well as the relationships with countries and regions outside of the partnership.

The intimately connected existences of the nations of the Caribbean and the United States, and the far reaching impact and consequences of the now matured transnational threats on both the US and the Caribbean, requires an integrated collective approach to maintaining a positive security environment in the Caribbean Basin.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The fruits of this endeavor would not have been realized without the valuable contributions of the faculty of CGSC, my Thesis Committee Chair and advisors; Dr Ed Robarge, Lt Col Thomas Harrison, and Mr. Greg Beck, and Dr Robert Baumann, Dr Constance Lowe, Mrs. Helen Davis and Mrs. Elizabeth Brown of the Graduate Degree Programs office, along with the research librarians in the Combined Arms Research Library. My father, Lt Col (Ret’d) Nestor Ogilvie served as an invaluable sounding board and editor throughout the process. The extremely discriminating discussions in Staff Group 19E/3E during the strategy block of instruction, and the wide ranging experiences and contributions of the members of that staff group also helped to formulate some of the thoughts that went into this project. On the home front, I am indebted to, and must acknowledge the sacrifice and invaluable support of, my wife Joanna, and children Ileana, Jordan, Isabel, David-Benjamin, and Peter-John in allowing me the time to complete this study. The moral support of our neighbors and friends provided a perfect counterfoil to the rigors of the research. There are many others who added to the substance of this project; most notably my Caribbean counterparts on the course Lt Col Colin Mitchell, Lt Col Enoch Gaskin and Maj David Jones. Finally and most importantly, none of this would have been possible without the grace of my Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. To God be the Glory!
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
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<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECS</td>
<td>Organization of Eastern Caribbean States</td>
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<td>RSP</td>
<td>Regional Security Partnership</td>
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<td>Regional Security System</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
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ILLUSTRATIONS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

We agree that no single nation has the ability to deal effectively with the threats to the security of the region, and that co-ordination, co-operation, and combined operations are necessary.


Introduction

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (1947) --more commonly known as the Rio Treaty was brought into being on 2 September 1947 “in order to assure peace, through adequate means, to provide for effective reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks against any American [hemispheric] State, and in order to deal with threats of aggression against any of them.”¹ This treaty embodied the principle of individual and collective defense as outlined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Since the original signing of that treaty, the number of independent sovereign nations in the Americas has multiplied significantly, as have the threats.

The nations of the Caribbean have always grappled with adequately addressing the security issues facing the region; whether it be border disputes, narcotics and arms trafficking, the spread of communism, or the effects of natural disasters. Certainly, the security forces of English speaking Caribbean countries have largely been a legacy of their political independence from Great Britain and for the most part have not undertaken any significant review of the current and future threats confronting the region, or their roles in ensuring security in the region. Zealously independent to the point of isolation, these countries have come together under diverse circumstances to tackle regional crises
such as security issues in Haiti, Trinidad, and Grenada; and disaster relief in the
Caribbean and Central America. However the maturation of non-traditional threats such
as arms and narcotics trafficking, and the very real and persisting border disputes
between Venezuela and Guyana, and Belize and Guatemala among others, continue to
expose the inadequacy of current security arrangements in the region, and threaten the
stability of the region.

In fact, when the militaries of these nations have acted in concert, it has always
been nested in a larger context or framework of operations; mostly underwritten by the
United States (disaster relief being the exception). These US-led operations for the most
part however, have been perceived as very unilateral in terms of the methods by which
the goals and objectives of these operations have been decided and implemented. The
principle of “he who pays the piper calls the tune!” is the perception of most, as it relates
to the way in which decisions have been taken in the region. Such a unilateral approach
(real or imagined) has often offended the sensitivities of the sovereign states in the
region, who have demanded a greater say in how things should be done. The highly
controversial “Maritime Counter Narcotics Co-operation Agreement” of 1996
(commonly referred to as the “Shiprider Agreement”) illustrated just how much is at
stake for both the US and the countries of the Caribbean, and how much more can be
achieved through a multilateral approach.2

Purpose

The attainment of a secure and stable environment in the Caribbean is in the
interests of all the nations in the region. For the nations of the Caribbean, a secure
environment fosters economic development and growth, which in turn spurs investment;
particularly foreign direct investment (FDI). With many of the regional economies moving from an agricultural to a service based model, security becomes critical. Tourism, one of the largest contributors to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the region, is particularly vulnerable to an unstable environment and a lack of security. A devaluing of the tourism product through an insecure environment would spell doom to a significant number of countries. Similarly, the threat posed to the United States homeland security on its “third border” by the effects of narcotics, arms and human trafficking, and the potential movement by terrorists through the relatively porous borders of the Caribbean, right on the doorstep of the US, makes the security of the region of paramount importance to the US. This is one of the fundamental premises for the establishment of the Third Border Initiative in 2004 (US Department of State, 2004).

Consequently, the aim of this project is to examine the feasibility of a formal Regional Security Partnership (RSP) between the United States and the nations of the Caribbean, with a view to improving the security architecture of the Caribbean region. The small populations, the individual sovereignty of nations, a lack of resources, and the magnitude of threats and challenges facing the region, all of which have a direct bearing on the security of the US, have all patently emphasized the inability of Caribbean states (individually and collectively) to adequately address these challenges. This places the security of both the United States and the Caribbean region at risk. By critically examining this option of a Regional Security Partnership, it is anticipated that this study will provide meaningful input to the ongoing efforts of improving security in the Caribbean region. Thus the primary research question to be considered is: Will a Regional Security Partnership between the United States and the nations of the Caribbean
present a suitable framework for addressing the security needs of the Caribbean Basin and the United States?

Of necessity, there are several secondary questions which must be addressed, in order to arrive at an answer to the primary research question. Firstly, we have to consider how do we define the term “security” and by extension “regional security,” and what are the components and sub-sets of these terms? An answer to this question will help to define the parameters of the research and ultimately focus the applicability of the model to the region. Secondly, what is a Regional Security Partnership (that is, what are the concepts/principles/components of this security arrangement)? Does such an arrangement exist elsewhere, and if so, how effective has it been? Examining these areas will assist in benchmarking this model of cooperative security, distilling best practices and charting a possible “way ahead” for the Caribbean. Thirdly, what is the threat assessment for the region from both a US and Caribbean perspective and are there any points of convergence in these perspectives? The primary goal of this question is to lay the foundation for a cooperative approach to security in the region by both the United States and the nations of the Caribbean, by establishing shared perspectives, commitments and outcomes. Finally, the question of what capabilities do the US and the Caribbean nations bring to the table to mitigate these threats must be answered, and whether or not they have been employed previously – successfully or unsuccessfully. In the context of a Regional Security Partnership being the coordination of already existing agreements, instruments and mechanisms to more comprehensively address the security issues of a region and building upon these agreements, the answer to these questions will assist in
collating existing arrangements and identifying any additional requirements for improving security within the Caribbean Basin.

Scope and Methodology

In order to lay the foundation for any future framework for security and in this instance – a Regional Security Partnership -- this paper will examine the threat environment to regional countries and the US. It will then review existing strategies and identify new approaches which may then be synthesized under an overarching framework to adequately provide for the security of the region and the stakeholders. The lack of political homogeneity among Caribbean states coupled with the persisting colonial legacies of the British, French, Spanish, and Dutch, as well as US interests within the region, have for many years presented a significant challenge in arriving at any consensus. In recent times, consensus and cooperation on security issues have improved significantly, as the growing transnational threats have made regional security and cooperation imperative. The Security Assistance Treaty of 2006 is concrete evidence of this cooperation. It is acknowledged that transnational threats are not constrained by national boundaries and thus, any attempt to specifically delineate a geographic region for the purposes of analyzing the effects of these transnational threats and the possible solutions to these threats, will soon find it necessary to consider the role and impact of littoral states and regions. For the purpose of this paper however, the term “Caribbean Community”--(CARICOM) shall be used as a framework or model of regional integration with shared objectives, upon which the concept of a Regional Security Partnership may be developed. It shall further be interpreted to mean all the nation states, territories and dependencies of the Caribbean as shown in Table 1, while being cognizant
of the extent and involvement of Central and South American states and regions with the transnational threats of arms and narcotics trafficking and organized crime facing the Caribbean region.
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<th>Non-Member</th>
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</table>
Taking into consideration the limitations of individual nations in adequately addressing the external security threats as stated earlier, and also taking into account the inherent inadequacy of any combined Caribbean military force to adequately mitigate any major conventional threat to the region, let alone the more pervasive and widespread transnational threats, the option to be explored in this paper will focus on the concept of Regional Security Partnerships as a model of collective security arrangements. This will be achieved through a series of reviews of collective security arrangements in various regions of the world. The analysis of these cases is expected to provide critical information regarding the suitability and possible implementation of such a model for the Caribbean region.

The study will not consider a RSP with Canada, France, the United Kingdom or the Kingdom of the Netherlands, given the limited involvement of these nations in regional security issues in the region (in comparison to US involvement), and the persisting legacy of the Monroe Doctrine (the declaration by the US that it would not tolerate the interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states of the Americas by their former colonial masters). Additionally, these nations tend to regard the US as the primary power broker in the region and the logical leader of any regional security arrangement. However, it is envisioned that existing security initiatives with these countries will be incorporated into the RSP. The police forces of the region (including their paramilitary components) will not be included in the assessment of resources capable of contributing to the RSP, as they are primarily focused on the internal security of their respective countries, even though it is acknowledged that a favorable domestic security environment will allow for greater focus on external/regional security issues.
Organization of Study

The remainder of this chapter will detail the progression of the paper, clearly state assumptions fundamental to the objectives of the study and define some of the key terms to be used throughout. It will also provide a brief historical overview of the region and security cooperation within the region. It will examine the threat environment of the region from both the Caribbean and US perspectives, as well as the capabilities and gaps within the region. Chapter Two will focus on a review of the literature identified with issues of regional and collective security, the threats to the security of the Caribbean, and US security interests in the region. Chapter Three will review selected regional security arrangements, Chapter Four will be concerned with the analysis and the findings, and the final chapter will make recommendations for the future of security in the region and the way ahead.

Assumptions

There are several assumptions upon which this paper is based. The first is that CARICOM and the region in general will continue to pursue regional security as it seeks to address the transnational threats now dominating the region.\(^6\) Secondly, the paper assumes that the US will continue to be a committed stakeholder in the security of the region, regardless of the political color of any current or future administration, given US security initiatives for the region under both the Clinton and Bush (current) administrations, and the existing and potential threats to US homeland security as described in this chapter.\(^7\) Thirdly, although having an active interest and role in some of the threats to the Caribbean region, Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico (littoral states to the Caribbean and regional middle powers) will not be active stakeholders in any
collective security agreement in the Caribbean, due either to their own domestic situations or competing interests with the United States (Bishop, 2002). Even though Colombia and Mexico are actively seeking to eliminate the drug trade, and are working with the US towards this end, they are too preoccupied with their own internal situations to project any meaningful inputs into a regional security arrangement. In the current operating environment, it is unlikely that the US and Venezuela will be involved in any joint/cooperative security arrangement. Fourthly, this paper recognizes the OAS as a hemispheric organization concerned with facilitating a positive economic, social, cultural and secure environment of its member states, but which does not preclude the formation and development of sub-hemispheric (regional) organizations and agreements for promoting its broader objectives. Finally, this paper assumes that economic development and a secure environment complement each other, thus providing a common rationale for security cooperation (Attina, 2005).

Definition of Terms

In order to properly define the parameters of this exploration, it will be useful to set some basic definitions in order. While there have been many definitions of security proffered by numerous security experts, this paper will settle with that put forward by Dr Ivelaw Griffith in his contribution to the “Conference on Security and Development”, Washington, DC, in September 2002:

Security is the protection and preservation of a people’s freedom from external military attack and coercion, from internal subversion, and from the erosion of cherished political, economic, and social values

The Organization of American States (2007) comments further on the modern concept of security and the more prevalent threats to security.
The concept of security, once framed largely in conventional military terms, today must expand its frame of reference and take into account a range of evolving threats—international terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, illegal arms dealing, trafficking in persons, institutional corruption, and organized crime. In some countries, poverty, disease and environmental degradation increase vulnerability and help undermine human security.

The concept of a Regional Security Partnership is yet another model among security organizations and frameworks. The main proponent of this model, Fulvio Attina (2005), International Relations and Jean Monnet Chair at the University of Catania defines it as:

The security arrangement of an international region that originates from intergovernmental consensus to cooperate on dealing with security threats and the enhancement of stability and peace in the region by making use of different types of agreements, instruments and mechanisms. (Attina, 2005, 4)

Transnational issues and threats have gradually risen to the top of the security agenda in the Caribbean region and as such require clarity in their definition. Smith (2000, 78) succinctly defines transnational security issues as “Non-military threats that cross borders and either threaten the political and social integrity of a nation or the health of that nation’s inhabitants.” Other definitions pertinent to the study may be found in the Glossary of Terms at Annex A.

Background

Threats to the Region

The weak economies and organs of state common in the Caribbean have fostered the conditions for the development of parallel (informal) economies and the breakdown of the rule of law. Fuelled by illicit funds from, and reinforced by the deleterious effects of, a cornucopia of illegal activities such as arms and drug trafficking, organized crime, corruption and money laundering, these conditions have placed the Caribbean at great risk (Griffith, 2003). The corruption of public institutions and officials, economic
privation and the inadequately policed/monitored coastlines and airspace, have made narco trafficking perhaps the most pervasive of the transnational threats facing the region (Scheman, 2003), while facilitating the possibility of free movement of terrorists, arms, ammunition, dirty bombs and explosives, through these porous borders. The geographical position of the region, in the direct path of tropical storms spawned off the west coast of Africa en route to Central and North America, has made the region vulnerable to the effects of these naturally occurring phenomena and their attendant disastrous consequences (flood, water, coastal erosion, loss of life, landslides, and wind damage to infrastructure, industry, tourism, and agriculture). Additionally, the region is not immune to the effects of volcanoes (given the recent activity in Montserrat and St Lucia), earthquakes and tsunamis.

Most of these threats do not only affect the Caribbean, but also have a direct impact on the United States; the largest and perhaps most influential actor in the security of the region. General Bantz Craddock, Commander US Southern Command (2005), in his Posture Statement to Congress noted that:

The stability and prosperity of the SOUTHCOM AOR are threatened by transnational terrorism, narco-terrorism, illicit trafficking, forgery and money laundering, kidnapping, urban gangs, radical movements, natural disasters, and mass migration.

This similarity of assessments by regional states and the US is further confirmed by Scheman (2003), who identifies the illicit drug trade as one of the most dangerous threats to the US, especially in light of the largely porous coastlines of the Caribbean nations and territories. Boudreau (2000) and Martinez (2001) attest that the illegal drug trade, organized crime, international terrorism and arms smuggling, are among the primary concerns of the US for the security of the region. Craddock (2005) further
emphasized that the mission and vision of SOUTHCOM was to “…promote security cooperation to achieve US strategic objectives…” by being focused on inter alia “…achieving regional partnerships with nations to promote …collective regional security.” The following section will thus address the historical security cooperation initiatives within the region in order to lay the foundation for an analysis of future security cooperation.

Historical Overview of the Caribbean and Security Cooperation within the Region

The map of the Caribbean (Fig 1) and the list of countries at Table 1, together amply depict the geographical distribution and the colonial legacies and influences present in the region. Covering an area approximately the size of Europe and with a combined population of approximately thirty four million people, this politically, culturally and economically diverse region has sought to overcome the various challenges associated with developing nations. With some of the countries attaining independence from their colonial masters in the latter half of the Twentieth Century, and a significant number still under “colonial” influences (either as dependencies or territories), the physical and social infrastructure, economies, and security institutions have not kept pace with developments around them. Subjected to resource exploitation by their colonial masters, the negative effects of US foreign and economic policies such as the “Monroe Doctrine,” “Gunboat/ Dollar Diplomacy,” and the “Roosevelt Corollary,” and the negative effects on the fragile agrarian sectors of these countries by tropical storms and the World Trade Organization policies and rulings, the region has had its fair share of setbacks.
Recognizing the importance of collective security to their national well-being, the states of the region have historically sought to participate in and form security partnerships with other states. The Rio Treaty of 1947, and the formation of the OAS in 1948, with similar objectives in mind, broadened the collective of participating nations in the effort to promote hemispheric security, as they specifically sought to “defend common interests and . . . confront shared problems such as poverty, terrorism, illegal drugs and corruption” (OAS). Several Caribbean nations were involved in these early initiatives. The formation of the short lived West India Regiment in 1958 on the eve of
political independence of a number of colonies signaled the recognition of a need for a cooperative approach to safeguard the interests of the region. The establishment of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in 1973, while primarily economic in nature, also made an implicit provision for security through the “...coordination of foreign policy.” The establishment of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) in 1981 through the Treaty of Basseterre to, inter alia, “…promote unity and solidarity among the Member States and to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence,” emphasized the desire to solidify the existing security arrangements in that part of the sub-region. The ideologically motivated coup d’etat in Grenada in 1979 and a similar attempt at regime change in Dominica in 1981, spurred the formation of the Regional Security System (RSS); an organ of the OECS geared specifically towards addressing security challenges in the region. Subsequent collective military groupings with broader participation were involved in restoring democracy and security in Grenada in 1983, Trinidad and Tobago in 1990, and Haiti in 1994. The 2006 Treaty on Security Assistance among Caribbean Member States and its subsequent Protocol (2006) establishing the CARICOM Operations, Planning and Coordination Staff (COPACS) continued the history of security cooperation in the region. Some of the specific objectives of this treaty were recently exercised in the pursuit of regional cooperation aimed at guaranteeing security during the hosting of the International Cricket Council’s Cricket World Cup 2007 (ICC CWC 2007) in the region -- the 3rd largest sporting event in the world second only to the Soccer World Cup and the Olympics.

The United States has also been part of several bilateral and multi-lateral arrangements with Caribbean nations in pursuit of security, and has authored and
continues to sponsor a number of conferences, field training exercises, and command post exercises as part of its broader strategy of peacetime engagement and empowerment. The implementation of the Shiprider Agreement with nations of the region has made the prosecution of the narco-trafficking trade more efficient and effective. This agreement has been supported by the provision of surveillance and detection equipment along critical transshipment routes and at transshipment points (air and sea ports). The agreement in principle to establish a Caribbean Information Sharing Network (CISN) in 1994 has not had the operational synergy envisioned then, but remains a mechanism which may be revitalized in the thrust of regional security cooperation. Other security related arrangements with extra-regional actors such as Canada and the United Kingdom are common throughout the region. There is a general networking of intelligence between the US, UK, Canada, and Caribbean nations as it relates to the drug trade, and the provision of economic support for programs geared towards eliminating the drug trade.

Capabilities

Perhaps with the exception of Trinidad and Tobago, the nations of the Caribbean are significantly under-resourced and require substantial external assistance as they pursue their national and regional security agendas. In most of those countries with a standing military, expenditure on defense related items averaged below one percent of GDP. Consequently, of all the elements of national, and by extension, regional power, the most effective tool in the arsenal of the Caribbean nations resides in the diplomatic dimension. Given their status as small, developing, island states, the countries of the region for the most part have chosen to rely on collective diplomatic pressures, and the international community and bodies, such as the UN and the OAS, to assist in resolving
any regional issue outside of its capability in order to reduce the vulnerability of the region. In the informational sphere, the Caribbean relies on the international media and international organizations to carry its messages and appeal to the global community in favor of its interests and objectives, such as in the border disputes of the region.

As shown in Table 2 with the exception of Cuba and the Dominican Republic, none of the states of the region possess any significant military capability. They are for the most part light infantry, dismounted forces with very limited organic wheeled transport. The weapons inventories are dominated by small arms, with only Guyana (one battery of 105mm guns with serious maintenance deficiencies) and Belize (eight Karl Gustav 84 mm antitank weapons), possessing very limited artillery and hand-held antiarmor capabilities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Standing Military Strength</th>
<th>Maritime Platforms</th>
<th>Aerial Platforms</th>
<th>Military Exp as a % of GDP</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Small coastal patrol vessels</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Member of OECS/RSS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Small coastal patrol vessels</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>Small coastal patrol vessels</td>
<td>Light observation and utility aircraft</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>RSS aircraft are “managed” by Barbados. Member of RSS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>Small coastal patrol vessels</td>
<td>Light observation and utility aircraft</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>600 strong reserve battalion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>47500</td>
<td>3 warships</td>
<td>25 combat aircraft</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>23350</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadeloupe</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Rotating French Garrison.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Small coastal patrol vessels</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>Small coastal patrol vessels</td>
<td>Light observation and utility aircraft</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martinique</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Rotating French Garrison.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>US National Guard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Member of OECS/RSS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Lucia</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Member of OECS/RSS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>Small coastal patrol vessels</td>
<td>Light observation and utility aircraft</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Small coastal patrol vessels</td>
<td>Light observation and utility aircraft</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: This table was developed using information from a variety of sources, including *The CIA World Factbook, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments*, interviews with officers of Caribbean militaries, and the author’s personal knowledge of Caribbean militaries.

The Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua and Barbuda, Trinidad, Barbados and the RSS all have small coastal and offshore patrol vessels whose primary tasks are search and rescue, and narcotics interdiction. In some instances, these maritime assets are supported by a variety of aerial platforms—capable only of observation. These forces have received support from the US through the United States Southern Command (US SOUTHCOM) in
training, provision of equipment and in the execution of joint operations; primarily drug interdiction operations. On a region wide scale, Grenada (1983-1985) and Haiti (1994–1996) have emphasized the value of US support during times of crises in the region.16

Economically, the region has gradually moved from individual economies to a single economic space--the Caribbean Single Market (CSM), and an integrated regional market--the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME). Notwithstanding these regional arrangements, the external pressures and reliance on more developed markets makes the region susceptible to economic shocks outside of the region.

Regionally, a core of Caribbean nations has sought to develop and implement instruments and mechanisms designed to improve the collective approach to the economic stability and security of the region. Most recently at the Twenty-Seventh Meeting of The Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) held between the 3-6 July 2006 at Bird Rock, St. Kitts And Nevis, a raft of treaties, declarations, protocols, agreements and memoranda were signed. These included: the Declaration by the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community on the Participation of their Countries in the CARICOM Single Market; the Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice Relating to Security of Tenure of Members of the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission; the Agreement Establishing the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security; the Memorandum of Understanding for the Sharing of Intelligence among Member States of the Caribbean Community; the Treaty on Security Assistance among CARICOM Member States; and the Memorandum of Intent Between the Government of the United
States of America and Member States of the Caribbean Community on Co-operation Regarding the Development of an Advance Passenger Information System.

The Treaty on Security Assistance among Caribbean Member States signed into being on 06 Jul 06, and the subsequent Protocol to the treaty establishing the CARICOM Operations, Planning and Coordinating Staff (COPACS), is a significant development in the collective approach to the security of the region. These arrangements have indicated the gravity of the threat to the region, such that they have overcome the barriers to regional military cooperation identified by Bishop (2002), and have formalized a regional security mechanism at the operational level. This initiative is aimed at advancing the security agenda of security cooperation within the region in a pro-active manner, and may be interpreted as yet another step in the maturation of regional governments towards collective security.

Challenges to Security in the Caribbean

With limited economic resources and decreasing external aid, these countries have struggled to provide and maintain strong state institutions, and have consequently suffered from the fallout of these deficiencies. US AID financial support for the region fell from $226 million in 1985 to $22 million in 1995 (Scheman, 2003). SOUTHCOM itself “…has suffered from a significant decline in Security Assistance dollars across all categories. From 1990 to 1999 security assistance to Latin America has declined 97%” (Martinez, 2001, 9). The small and poorly equipped Caribbean military and constabulary forces are struggling to address the traditional threats to security (including internal security), let alone the more insidious and pervasive effects posed by the transnational threats of arms and narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and international organized
crime. The ungoverned spaces and porous borders of the countries of the region also places the region at risk to the infiltration of terrorist groups (consider the resources required/allocated to secure the 2900 kilometer long eastern seaboard of the US and compare with the combined 16466 kilometers of coastline of the countries of the Caribbean). Smith (2000, 10) accurately states that “The diffused nature and protracted emergence of transnational security issues make them particularly dangerous, and will increasingly demand more attention and resources from the armed forces” – a capability not present in the Caribbean.

In fact, the internal instabilities have consumed so much of the attention and resources of the security apparatus of these countries (both the constabularies and the militaries), that the transnational threats were able to take root and mature within the region. The draw on these security institutions by domestic circumstances, and their inability to expand their influence in the region (in the case of the militaries) to address security issues, is further compounded by budgetary constraints, no integral force projection capability, less than desired intelligence sharing, and a lack of equipment (including maritime and aerial platforms, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities).

Despite the various commitments and initiatives to improve regional security, the expected results have been undermined by a lack of resources and to a lesser extent by national insularities. While the latter has diminished over time, it is still too early to make an assessment of the effects of the 2006 Security Assistance Treaty and its subsequent Protocol, although the joint efforts at providing security for the Cricket World Cup are positive indicators of the improved nature of regional security cooperation. When there
has been success, it invariably has come about with assistance from states external to the region. The border skirmishes and territorial disputes involving Belize and Guatemala, Guyana and Venezuela, and more recently Guyana and Suriname, have all been beyond the military (and in some instances political) capabilities of the region. The successful deployments to Grenada and Haiti were due to the involvement of larger military forces (US and US led coalitions, and the UN). Notwithstanding the recent commitment to a cooperative approach to the security of the region as embodied in the establishment of COPACS, it is evident that the security of the region will require a more comprehensive approach and significant external involvement to counteract the transnational threats which have matured over the last decade and a half.

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1 The signatories to this treaty are the US, Argentina, Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

2 In attempting to counter the primary threat of drug trafficking, both to the US and the Caribbean region, the original demand by the US for Caribbean nations to allow US vessels to unilaterally enter their territorial space in pursuit of drug vessels was met with stiff opposition on the grounds of violation of sovereignty. This political stalemate delayed more aggressive counter-drug activities in the region, thereby allowing more drugs to transit the region. Faced with a lose/lose situation, both the US and the Caribbean nations agreed to more bi-lateral terms on this issue, resulting in a greater cooperative approach in the war on drugs.

3 The objectives of this treaty are to mitigate the effects of natural disasters, facilitate the mobilization and deployment of regional resources in response to national and regional crises, combat and eliminate threats to national and regional security, and the preservation of the territorial integrity of contracting states.

4 CARICOM was established under the Treaty of Chaguramas on 04 Jul 73 and espoused as one of its objectives “the co-ordination of foreign policies of Member states.” See Article 4 (b), “Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community” 1973.

5 Major Neil Lewis in “Combined Operations: A Commonwealth Caribbean Perspective,” asserts that based upon the potential threat of border conflicts between
Belize and Guatemala, and Guyana and Venezuela, any composite military force made up solely of CARICOM troops would, by itself, be unable to influence any of those conflicts in favor of the member states so affected.

6 The charters of the OAS and CARICOM, and the more recent “Treaty on Security Assistance among CARICOM Member States” of 2006 and its subsequent protocol establishing the CARICOM Operations, Planning and Coordinating Staff (COPACS), clearly identify the preservation of security in the region as a priority acknowledged by regional leaders.

7 Both the “Partnership for Prosperity and Security in the Caribbean” (1997) under the Clinton Administration and the “Third Border Initiative” (2001) of the Bush Administration, underscore the importance and the commitment of the US to security in the Caribbean.

8 Such organizations already in existence include the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Andean Community, the Central American Common Market (CACM), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Conferencia de las Fuerzas Armadas Centroamericanas (CFAC), the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), and the Regional Security System (RSS).

9 Haiti is a prime example of the end result of a weak economy and a breakdown of the rule of law.

10 The Regiment was disbanded three years later in 1961, as the independence movement took hold in the region and newly minted sovereign states sought to establish institutions and organs indicative of their independence.

11 The member states of the OECS are Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, and St Vincent & the Grenadines. Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands are associate members.

12 The RSS was deployed to Grenada during the US-led intervention in 1983 as well as to assist in quelling a prison riot in St Kitts and Nevis in October 1994 and manning the prison for a five month period in the aftermath of the riots. It has also been active in providing security in member states in the aftermath of hurricanes. Barbados, while not a member of the OECS is a Treaty member of the RSS.

13 These groupings were composed primarily of the militaries of the English-speaking Caribbean inclusive of Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, St Kitts and Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago.

14 The militaries of CARICOM member states activated the COPACS cell in Sep 06 to plan and supervise the execution of military involvement in the overall security plan for the CWC. A joint military force consisting of troops from Jamaica, Antigua &
Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, St Kitts & Nevis, and Trinidad & Tobago were instrumental in contributing to security in host countries during the tournament.

15 Ex Tradewinds, Peace keeping Operations (North) – PKO (N), Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarian –(FAHUM), and the Caribbean Nations Security Conference – (CANSEC) are some of the regional security initiatives sponsored by the US (through US SOUTHCOM).

16 The Caribbean forces were almost completely dependent on the US for transportation and logistic support in these operations and would not have been able to participate in these operations without the support.

17 This figure was obtained by cumulatively adding coastlines for independent nations/territories/dependencies shown in Table A as provided in “Country Profiles” in the CIA World Fact Book. Available from https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/profileguide.html

18 A Surinamese gunboat forcibly evicted an oil rig from Guyanese waters in 2000. The matter is now before the UN International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) as CARICOM (of which both countries are member states) was unable to broker a settlement to the dispute.

19 Although the charters of the OAS and CARICOM make explicit statements about the responsibilities of the organizations and their member states in the resolution of disputes between members, political expediency has often taken priority at the expense of facilitating a resolution brokered by these organizations and their members.
Psychologist Abraham Maslow posited that safety [read security] is one of the most basic needs of man, and a cursory examination of history will reveal just how much emphasis man has placed on efforts to attain a safe and secure environment. Much of the history of international relations is concerned with the study of the preservation of the peace and the development of models/theories of security. These theories of security abound, and have evolved as the international arena has changed. Realists, idealists and constructivists have all advanced their own theories of security, resulting in an extensive and expansive collection of literature on security and security models; from the simple traditional definitions of security, to the intricacies of security complexes and the securitization of referent objects by securitizing actors.¹

The extent to which writings on security and security-related issues proliferate is an indication of the importance of the issue to mankind. Such writings are to be found in academic journals, books, commentaries, the print media, and theses from military service colleges. Foreign policy documents and national security strategies also serve to provide meaningful insight into the thoughts and direction of governments in addressing security in the near and medium term. Together, these sources form an excellent platform from which to launch a study on a relevant and pressing topic.

In the last decade, much has been written about security in the Caribbean and the threats to that security. Very often though, it has been incorporated as a sub-set of hemispheric security issues which focuses on the role of the US in preserving security in the region. There have been several writings proposing how to improve security in the
Caribbean; largely through the empowerment of regional states by the US. However, there is precious little on proposing a feasible and functional regional security framework involving the US, and the smaller nation states of the Caribbean.

Ivelaw Griffith in *The Caribbean Security Scenario at the Dawn of the 21st Century: Continuity, Change, Challenge* (2003), and *Security, Sovereignty, and Public Order in the Caribbean* (2003), has sought to identify the significant threats facing the region and the challenges of the small nation states of the Caribbean in addressing these threats. Griffith identifies narco-trafficking, money laundering, gun smuggling, corruption of public officials and organized crime as being the now dominant non-traditional threats facing the Caribbean. He posits that the transnational character of most of these threats is too overwhelming for individual nations to address meaningfully. These threats are not confined to the small and resource challenged Caribbean nations however; they also affect the US, Central America and South America. Additionally he indicates that the failure of any one state, or the collective efforts of the states within the region, to deal with any or all of these threats will have a ripple effect throughout the region.

Colonel Michael Martinez (US Army) in his US Army War College strategy research project entitled *Strategy for Collective Security in the Western Hemisphere* (2001), contends that in the environment of the downsizing of the American military (at the time), collective security in the hemisphere may best be achieved through one unified command for all the Americas – north and south. This will allow other regional bodies to take more responsibility for the security of the region, while not jeopardizing the downsizing of the US military. He categorically states that the ability of the US to help
resolve crises in the region should not be contingent on unilateral military involvement, but should be more multilateral in nature. He identifies the primary threats to the region as being transnational in nature and including drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, illegal immigration, and terrorism. These threats demand regional interdependence to support the concept of multilateralism and collective security. The empowerment of other regional players, he continues, will be achieved through a strategy of “peacetime engagement operations that permit interoperability and access to the region” (p. 5). A failure to empower and equip other regional players will result in the US continually having to intervene to resolve conflicts and crises in the region. Ultimately he proposes regional collective security alliances under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Eastern Caribbean oriented Regional Security System (RSS) in a structure similar to NATO, in which the US would be “relegated to more of an ‘equal partner’ status with other members of the OAS and RSS.” Martinez indicates that a formal defense arrangement will achieve the result of making more US resources available for other theatres, but with a reduced risk of failure by the other regional partners, were they to undertake operations without US assistance. Additionally, it will allow the US to remain intimately involved in the region and thus in a position to continue to influence the security agenda in the region.

Commander George B. Boudreau III, writing while at the Naval War College in May 2000, in Security in the Americas: A Move to Multilateralism in a Unilateral World, also promotes multilateralism as the single most important strategy of the US in the region, which he contends will eventually result in a reduction of deployed US forces and help the military deal with reduced theater-wide military budgets. While Boudreau and
Martinez share the same threat assessment for the region, Boudreau also includes the existing cross-border rivalries within the region as being equally as damaging to the stability and security of the region as the transnational threats. He further identifies the regional power balance environment (actual or perceived) as a challenge to military cooperation. The strong arm of the US in crisis resolution in the region and the diversely trained and equipped militaries of the region, are challenges that will have to be overcome if the region is to have an effective regional security arrangement.

Lieutenant Colonel Colvin Bishop examines Challenges to Creating Formal Military Relationships in the English-Speaking Caribbean in his Master of Military Arts and Science thesis while at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, 2002. He begins by examining the international security system and then the Caribbean Basin as a subset of that system. He notes that while the militaries of the Caribbean have come together on numerous occasions in times of crises, initiatives at formalizing these relationships have not met with the expected success. In his analysis he concludes that international, regional and sub-regional challenges preclude the establishment of a regional military force. One of these challenges is the lack of capacity by the states of the Caribbean – individually and collectively. Additionally, extra regional powers such as the US, Canada and the UK are prepared to invest more heavily in law enforcement and police actions than they are to invest in the militaries of the region. The Unified Command Plan of the US has taken Cuba, the most significant “threat” to the US, from the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) area of operations and placed it with the US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) thereby lessening the focus on a region already grappling for recognition. Bishop also asserts that the shift in viewing security as
much more than just a military issue to one that includes political, social and economic factors, has distracted attention and resources away from a military solution to crises in the Caribbean. A lack of political consensus on the threats to the security of the region by political leaders within the region makes the argument for a formal military relationship between these states unlikely to prevail. To overcome these challenges, he suggests that developing relationships at the operational level, will allow for countries to retain political control over their forces but facilitate the networking and development of operational systems which will bring the militaries of the region closer together.

While Griffith, Martinez and Boudreau pay more attention to the now dominant and fully matured transnational threats, Major Neil Lewis in *Combined Operations: A Commonwealth Caribbean Perspective*, 1988, describes in detail the ramifications of an outbreak of border disputes in the Caribbean Basin, and in particular, between Belize and Guatemala. Like Martinez, he explains why due to a lack of resources, a small demographic base, and a far superior conventional military opponent, the Caribbean cannot go it alone successfully. This, he posits, makes it inevitable for the region to enter into alliances with larger forces if they desire to have a greater measure of guarantee for the security of the region. The effectiveness of such alliances, he argues, are contingent upon either full political integration, or the establishment of a structure that gives the political elites sufficient flexibility to exercise independence while ensuring security. He concludes by advocating a regional defense system supervised by regional Prime Ministers and run by a permanent civilian secretariat and a military General staff.

Robert Pastor, Professor of International Relations and Vice President of International Affairs at the American University, in his contribution to *U.S. and Russian
Policymaking With Respect to the Use of Force (Azrael & Payin, 1996), entitled “The Caribbean Basin,” indicates that American interest in the region has been motivated largely by the onset of crises, but is dominated by large periods of disinterest as the default position. He posits that as individual nations, Caribbean states are too small and present no credible threats to the US and only come up on the radar screen when American interests become the focus of attention due to crisis or instability. These conditions he posits are the direct result of a lack of a framework for securing the peace of the region, which may be secured by “forging a new collective defense of democracy.”

The Joint Statement by the United States of America, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Dominican Republic on the Third Border Initiative released by the US Department of State on 13 Jan 04, underlines the benefits of cooperation between the US and the Caribbean. Paramount in this statement is the recognition that the diversity of threats, with terrorism being most prominent, necessitates a common approach to ensure the security of the region, and that interdependence and cooperation will be critical to combating these transnational threats. The small size, geography and lack of resources of the Caribbean nations make them particularly vulnerable to these transnational threats. The statement also identifies economic integration, education, health, natural disasters, the environment, and the tourism industry as areas to be focused on in this initiative, that will contribute to the development of a “… stable, secure and prosperous Caribbean region capable of embracing the new hemispheric and global realities” (p. 2).

Ronald L. Scheman in Greater America: A New Partnership for the Americas in the Twenty-First Century, 2003 suggests that one of America’s greatest threats is instability at her doorstep. Those transnational threats identified by the previously
identified writers, Scheman agrees, will wreak havoc in the continental United States if allowed to go unchecked. While he agrees that the US is most suited to address these threats, he argues that it has to be in partnership with the other nations in the region; a prospect that will require a significant adjustment of US foreign policy and culture. This however is not as significant an obstacle as it may seem due to the tight economic connections between the US and the Caribbean/Latin America, and the impact on American culture and government by the ever increasing migrant populations from these regions. The future economic and physical security of the US, he states, is inextricably linked to that of the Caribbean and Latin America.

Stanley Sloan in *NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defense* (1995) argues that the principle, and consequently, the effectiveness of collective security as conceptualized, ended with the Cold War. He further asserted that such institutions and organizations were in danger of becoming irrelevant unless they reformed themselves; more so in light of the broader construct in which the term security has now been defined since the depolarization of the international political system in the 1990’s. Sloan argues that NATO has found itself moving away from collective defense activities to collective responsibilities involving a wide range of security related activities. This shift is largely associated with a US desire to involve the Europeans more in sharing the burden of NATO missions. However, in the absence of a unifying threat (the Soviet Union), member states are increasingly differing in their perspectives for the future role of NATO, although they all agree that NATO is a counter balance/insurance policy to Russian interests and objectives in the region.
Mark Lagon in *The Illusions Of Collective Security*, (1995), indicates that the concepts of collective security, unspecified collective defense and specified collective defense, are likely to have varying levels of success, with the former being the least effective and the latter most effective (see the Glossary of Terms at Annex A for a complete definition of these terms). The formation of the UN, the Brussels Treaty Organization and NATO in that order, demonstrates this argument. However, he continues that with the Warsaw Pact and The Soviet Union no longer in existence, NATO no longer has a *raison d'etre*. This, coupled with the “Partnership for Peace” initiative involving the now independent eastern European states, has shifted the focus from defense against external threats to the pacification of threats from within the newly expanded area. The broadening of the definition of security to include economic, social, environmental and other considerations, he argues, has diluted the energy and attention required to protect the territorial integrity of states from external attack. He concludes that when there is a common commitment to the peace, there will be stability – whether or not there is a collective security agreement. As such, collective security, he suggests, is a “state of affairs, not a mechanism that brings it about.”

Fulvio Attina, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Catania, Italy in *Regional Security Partnership: the Concept, Model, Practice, and a Preliminary Comparative Scheme*, 2005, examines what he describes as a new construct in international politics; building cooperative security systems at the regional level. He describes the components of such a system and examines five cases of regional security partnerships at various stages of development. There are four main components to this model. Firstly, there are the pre-conditions; an awareness of the
interdependence of the countries of the region and the local effects of global problems, and a “relaxed or no power” competition in regional politics (including the reluctance to use violence in international conflicts). Secondly, governments of the region must reach a consensus on building security cooperation, improving international and domestic stability and promoting peace and economic growth in an environment devoid of opposing military alliances; all as a necessary condition of this partnership. A third component of this model is a variety of structures and means, including written fundamental agreements, operative agreements, multilateral offices and international organizations, and internal and international conflict management measures and mechanisms. The players in this partnership must also be open to the involvement of extra-regional powers in the partnership in a constructive and moderate role, in preserving security in the region. The fourth component addresses the consequences of being involved in such a partnership. These include the reduction of the gaps between security cultures and doctrines of the region, and the eventual de-nationalization of security and defense policy.

The essence of any such partnership he explains is a shared interest by the participants in the security of the region and the pulling together of existing security agreements, instruments and mechanisms into a comprehensive framework that will maximize the effect of these various instruments and organizations in contributing to the security of the region. One of the reasons for the emergence of this “new model,” he asserts, is the declining prominence of military alliances and the ascendancy of composite security frameworks (or security complexes) at the regional level. The de-polarization of the international system has impacted the cooperative behavior of states, which now
prefer to engage in large cooperative networks in order to increase their state security, through the pooling of economic, military, cultural, technical and informational resources.

Several articles and commentaries exist about the various collective security arrangements currently in existence. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), have been described and analyzed for their relevance and effectiveness. One of the consistent positive effects of these arrangements is the sharing of the security burden between states, thereby reducing the economic cost of security to individual nations while maintaining security. The challenges are in maintaining these arrangements as players, foreign policy, and threats change and evolve. These organizations and agreements will form the basis for the review of collective security arrangements in Chapter 3.

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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

Introduction

A review of history on either side of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 will reveal man’s proclivity for alliances in the pursuit of security. Alliances were sought to strengthen a position or to deny the enemy a potential ally. Even dominant powers paid close attention to the value and utility of alliances; whether they used them or not. Today, the global village of the Twenty-First Century is characterized by interconnectedness and interdependence, evidenced by numerous multi-lateral and regional security arrangements. A review of some of these arrangements will be useful in examining the utility of a regional security partnership for the Caribbean Basin. In conducting these reviews it is anticipated that best practices, pitfalls, challenges and other issues affecting regional security arrangements will come to the fore. This will then assist in conceptualizing and evaluating the feasibility, acceptability and suitability of a Regional Security Partnership for the Caribbean.

In order to maximize the benefit to be gained from the review of the three regional security arrangements, this chapter will first review the theoretical construct of the Regional Security Partnership (RSP) model as put forward by Fulvio Attina. This review will consist of an outline of the basic components which constitute the framework of the RSP, and will build on the introductory comments already provided in Chapter 2.

The three regional security arrangements that will be examined are The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the security model used by the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS). The selection of these cases is not meant to be the basis of a comparative analysis to determine which model is more effective, as they represent different functions which correspond to regionally specific but diverse variables. This would undermine the integrity of any attempt at such a comparison. Rather, these three cases have been selected for their stage of development as a regional security model, with NATO being the most mature and ECOWAS the least developed. These cases provide a continuum along which the development, functioning, and dynamics of regional security models may be studied. Ultimately, the knowledge gleaned from a review of these cases should assist in informing the utility, applicability and likely development of a regional security partnership for the Caribbean Basin.

In reviewing the selected cases, an overview of the background to the formation of these regional security arrangements will be undertaken. The stakeholders, threat environment, and the structure and development of the security agenda within the respective regions will be discussed. The challenges and successes of these arrangements will be reviewed, and finally, the enduring relevance of these organizations/groupings will be covered.

Regional Security Partnership (RSP)

Attina (2005, p 4) identifies the defining characteristic of the RSP as its ability to “catch the features of a large number of current security cooperation processes”. In order to achieve this it utilizes a variety of instruments, agreements, and mechanisms which address security related issues in both the domestic and international environment. At the very foundation of the partnership is a requirement for governments to recognize the reciprocal interdependence between the countries of the region, and which are not
polarized by what he describes as “great power competition”. With this mutually recognized tenet acknowledged, Attina (2005, p 5) emphasizes the need for the governments of the region to commit to promote and facilitate security co-management through the principles of cooperative security (information sharing, collaboration, pooling of resources and dialogue) and comprehensive security (addressing domestic and international security issues, the utilization of diverse resources, and employing all aspects of national power – diplomatic, economic, cultural, military and technical).

Attina (2005, p 6) summarizes the main features of the RSP as indicated in Table 3 below. Two of the more salient points made by Attina are firstly, that there is a distinct possibility that a RSP may develop into a security community, and secondly, that “external actors can contribute to shaping and sustain the rules of regional security cooperation” (Attina, 2005, p 16). In reviewing existing regional security arrangements, Attina found that it is not uncommon for the need for security partnerships to be driven by economic necessity. In fact, both ASEAN and ECOWAS began as economic associations (in much the same way CARICOM is the principal regional economic body in the Caribbean) from which the regional security arrangements were developed. NATO, as outlined in the following section, began as a regional security partnership that created the conditions from which regional economic institutions were able to develop.
Table 3. Main Features of the Regional Security Partnership Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-conditions</th>
<th>Awareness of the countries of the region for interdependence and the local effects of global problems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relaxed or no power competition in the international politics of the region and restrained use of violence in international conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditions</td>
<td>Consensus of the governments of the region on building security cooperation by reducing violence in international relations, improving international and domestic stability, and promoting peace and economic growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No opposite military alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures and Means</td>
<td>Written fundamental agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operative agreements, multilateral offices and international organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A set of international and internal measures and mechanisms of conflict management and prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Involvement of extra-regional powers (very probable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>Reduction of the gap between the security doctrines and cultures of the countries of the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase of security and defense policy de-nationalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of a security community (possible)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: This table was developed using material taken directly from Regional Security Partnership: The Concept, Model, Practice, and a Preliminary Comparative Scheme by Fulvio Attina, 2005.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed on 04 April, 1949 as a system of collective defense against an attack on any of its members by an external party. This arrangement followed closely on the heels of the Brussels Treaty (1948), as the perceived threat of the Soviet Union to the newly established balance of power in Europe grew. While expanding the regional security membership of Western Europe, NATO did not mandate all member states to respond with military force to an attack on another member (as did the Brussels Treaty). Rather it gave states the option to respond
militarily in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense as outlined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The inclusion of West Germany as a member of NATO in May 1955 resulted in the immediate formation of the Warsaw Pact between the Soviet Union and its satellite states as a response to this move. This was the formal genesis of the Cold War which was to dominate international politics for the next four decades.\(^5\)

As time progressed, the membership of NATO grew to twenty six-states;\(^6\) even after the Cold War ended. It is noteworthy that NATO’s first military action in Europe did not occur until after the end of the Cold War, in Feb 1994, when NATO aircraft shot down four Bosnian Serb fighter aircraft for violating the UN mandated no-fly zone. August 2003 saw NATO undertaking its first mission, outside of Europe, when it assumed control of operations in Southern Afghanistan through the use of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

The dominant threat facing NATO throughout most of its existence had been the prospect of the former Soviet Union invading Western Europe and threatening the democracies of that region. Post-1989, the threat has shifted to the instability posed by European states in decline or those newly born/re-birthed, and their attendant security challenges (civil war, ethnic cleansing, refugee flows, poor border control/illegal migration, and arms, narcotics and human trafficking). Given the dynamics of the current operating environment, NATO has also had to focus on security issues outside of its original borders and is a significant player in several extra-regional security arrangements including ASEAN, the Mediterranean Dialogue and Eastern Europe.

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, launched in 1994, incorporated into the security framework of Europe those countries that were willing to enter into bilateral
arrangements with NATO for security purposes. NATO has also extended formal relations to countries of the Mediterranean (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Jordan Morocco and Tunisia – The Mediterranean Dialogue), Russia, Philippines, El Salvador, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand, in an effort to address various security issues relating to NATO’s interests.

Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (establishing NATO) is the fundamental operating principle of NATO. This article espouses the concept of collective defense as it allows NATO members to respond, in whatever way deemed appropriate, to any attack on any member state (and by extension all member states). Responses by member states may range from committing military forces, to the provision of logistic, diplomatic and/or financial support. The September 11, 2001 attack on the United States was the first time that this article was invoked and a response taken based upon this principle of collective defense.

Decision making in NATO is based on the principle of unanimity; there is no decision making by majority decision through voting. These decisions are typically made by the Permanent Representatives of each of the 26 member countries (known as the North Atlantic Council –NAC) who meet weekly to discuss security issues. These meetings are chaired by the Secretary General of NATO. From time to time, Heads of State and/or Foreign/Defense Ministers of member states will meet to discuss and shape major policies of the organization. The NATO Military Committee (NMC) is made up of senior military officials of all member states and is tasked with providing direction and advice on military policy and strategy to the NAC. The Allied Command Operations (ACO) is responsible for the day to day military operations of NATO worldwide, while
the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is responsible for the transformation and training of NATO forces.

NATO has been challenged in maintaining its unity, especially when between 1959 and 1993, the French withdrew first some and then all of its forces from under NATO’s command, in protest of American domination of the Alliance and an ignoring of French security interests by the organization.\(^8\) While France did not leave the Alliance, it demanded the removal of all non-French NATO troops from France in 1966. Most of these troops were relocated to Belgium and Germany. France re-engaged as an active participant in NATO operations in 1993.

In the current dispensation, going to war “by committee,” has created tensions within the organization (Kendall, 2005).\(^9\) The factors of decision making based on unanimity, the expanded membership of NATO, and the sovereignty of nations, have presented NATO with new challenges: a reduction in the likelihood of unanimity and schisms over conflicting interests. As NATO has sought to reinvent itself, it “now sells itself as a broad security alliance, a force for stability in Europe, as well as a tool box of highly trained forces, ready for new challenges” (Kendall, 2005).

NATO provided a successful deterrent to the ambitions of the Soviet Union and provided that measure of security for Western Europe during the Cold War. However with the end of the Cold War, the threat became more diffused in the form of the non-traditional transnational threats, permeating the new borders and spaces in and around Europe. Originally established to counter the threat from outside, NATO has struggled to respond effectively to the threats from within and to those threats where the principal actors are other than sovereign states.
Pierre (1999), in reviewing NATO on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary, raises a number of issues. The end of the Cold War has seen crisis management and peace support operations as the core of NATO’s military operations. These non-Article 5 missions have brought into focus the relevance of NATO as per the original mandate of collective self defense outlined at its inception. The question of defense of common territory versus common interests has raised the question as to whether or not NATO should expand its role globally (a position advocated heavily by the US). The enlargement of the European Union and the role of the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also bring into question the future of NATO as the primary security organization within Europe (Pierre, 1999).

In spite of the challenges facing NATO today, they have always remained in agreement on the broader issues of security for Europe; national interests notwithstanding. This puts the organization in a position to re-invent itself as it faces the challenges and threats of the new century. NATO can be expected to become even more active in extra-regional security arrangements, as the interconnectedness and the interdependence of the global system continue to influence the security agenda in all regions of the world.

**Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)**

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) came into existence in 1967 to promote peace and stability in the region and to prevent the spread of communism being overtly pushed by China into the region. Economic integration became high on the agenda in the post-Cold War era which saw intra regional trade
moving from 12% in 1967 to 21% in 1997 (Yah, 2004). In its evolution, ASEAN is now described as a security community being defined by Karl Deutsch (1953, p 5) as:

A group of people, which has become “integrated”… within a territory… of institutions and practices strong and widespread enough to assure . . . dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population.

ASEAN has opted for this model of regional security over other options such as “a defence pact, military alliance or a joint foreign policy” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004).

The fundamental principles guiding the behaviour and conduct of ASEAN states include; non-alignment, fostering of peace-oriented attitudes, conflict resolution through non-violent means, renunciation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, avoidance of an arms race in Southeast Asia, and the renunciation of the threat or use of force as indicated in their charter.

The ASEAN Security Community (ASC) Plan of Action is mutually-reinforcing with bilateral cooperation between ASEAN Member Countries while recognising the sovereign rights of the Member Countries to pursue their individual foreign policies and defence arrangements. [Thus] In addressing future security challenges, ASEAN Member Countries share the responsibility for strengthening peace, stability and security of the region free from foreign military interference in any form or manifestation. (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004)

The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II adopted by ASEAN leaders at their Ninth Summit in October 2003, categorically stipulates the establishment of the ASEAN Community on three pillars; “an ASEAN Security Community (ASC), an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and an ASEAN Socio-Economic Community (ASCC)” (ASEAN Secretariat, April 2006. p 1.). With all three pillars being integrated and mutually reinforcing, their development and implementation has been pursued concurrently as stated by the ASEAN Secretariat (2004):

Recognising the strong interconnections among political, economic and social realities, the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) acknowledges the principle of
comprehensive security, and commits to address the broad political, economic, social and cultural aspects of building an ASEAN Community. It is also acknowledged that political and social stability, economic prosperity, narrowed development gap, poverty alleviation and reduction of social disparity would constitute strong foundation for a sustained ASC given its subscription to the principle of comprehensive security.

As a region, there is a milieu of threats that ASEAN has to contend with. Broadly defined these include “poverty, transnational health threats/infectious diseases, environmental degradation and natural disasters, and transnational crime” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2006, p 1). These transnational crimes are further broken down into “terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, money laundering, and other crimes such as arms smuggling, sea piracy, international economic crime and cyber crime” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2006, p 1). It is against these threats that ASEAN will have to focus its individual and collective efforts.

During the Cold War, Asia was divided into two groupings: the US leaning peripheral Asian states and Pacific states,11 and communist supporting states (Nanto, 2006).12 Post-Cold War, the transnational threats of “terrorism, illegal narcotics and weapons proliferation” (Nanto 2006, 2) along with an outdated Cold War security construct required a shift in the approach to regional security. ASEAN has found itself at the center of the reorganization of the security structure of East Asia as depicted in Fig. 2.
The East Asia security framework as depicted in Fig. 2 has been significantly influenced and facilitated by ASEAN, as the central figure in security in the region. These arrangements are a cogent example of the complexity and interdependence of political, security and economic issues among nations in the region.

There are a number of mechanisms, organizations and agreements within ASEAN which help it to achieve its objective of promoting peace and stability in the region. These include the Joint Declaration in the Fight Against International Terrorism,

ASEAN countries are however at a crossroads as regards their relationships with China and the USA. Due to the complementary linkage between economics and security, these countries benefit from trade with China but have to be wary of security concerns and cooption to China’s perspective; much as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has been led into supporting China’s interests (Nanto 2006).13 ASEAN has been able to act as the leading proponent in East Asia as it relates to political and security cooperation, as it is not seen as a threatening or polarizing force, as China or Japan would be seen (Nanto, 2006). Its main objective is to facilitate greater political and security cooperation and promote peace and harmony within the region.

While there is no dominating power within the ASEAN sub-region itself, it has engaged itself with regional powers (China) as well as extra-regional powers (India and the US), in order to maintain the balance of power within the region and to promote its
security interests. Whereas Indonesia previously enjoyed the position of “leader” of the ASEAN group, today Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand all have as much influence on the direction and initiatives of ASEAN as does Indonesia. This commonality of interests, the equal stake held by member states, and the critical engagement of external powers, acts as a measure of surety that the balance of power in ASEAN will be maintained.

The multiplicity of regional security agreements and the multi-layered structure of the regional security architecture amply demonstrate ASEANs commitment to combating regional security threats while maintaining a global perspective, through national, bilateral, and multilateral arrangements (ASEAN Secretariat, 2006). The success of the ASC is “based on shared norms and rules of good conduct in inter-state relations; effective conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms; and post-conflict peace building activities” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004). The engagement of stakeholders (both regional and extra regional) in partnership to mitigate the threats facing the region, are evidence of the practical approach to security adopted by ASEAN and should continue to facilitate the security of the region.

**West Africa**

The bilateral economic agreement between Nigeria and Togo in 1972 demonstrated that Anglophone and Francophone states in the region -- one big and “rich” and the other small and “poor” -- could work together to achieve mutual objectives (Adeniji, 1997). This act of cooperation was a precursor to improved regional cooperation in West Africa in the context of the different colonial experiences of states in the region and the persisting legacies of those experiences. Subsequently, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded in 1975 in order to achieve
economic integration among the sixteen member states (both Francophone and Anglophone).\textsuperscript{15} Regional security issues, while important, were to remain the remit of the continental body (the Organization of African Unity (OAU)) and the United Nations.

The Center for Democracy and Development (CDD) sponsored conference on “Collective Regional Security in West Africa” conducted in 1999, saw conference participants agreeing that “the artificial nature of the African state was a major factor in the perpetual instability of the nation-state” (CDD, 1999, p. 2); and by extent the sub-region. The presence of culturally homogenous groups of people residing in a contiguous geographical region stretching across two or more states, has perpetuated conflict in the sub-region, as the region has had to deal with the legacy of unnatural borders left by colonial and great power influences. This basic fault line which cut across geographical, social, and political spheres, when considered alongside the “glocal” (global events/activities with a local impact) effects of small arms proliferators, narco-drug dealers, the plunderers of African mineral wealth,\textsuperscript{16} and the “conflation of regime security with national security,” puts into perspective the security dilemma facing West African states (CDD, 1999, p. 2). Bah (2005) argues that the historical, cultural and social ties of the region, along with the interconnected nature of conflict and conflict resolution within the region, makes West Africa a “regional security complex.”\textsuperscript{17}

Throughout the Cold War era, West Africa featured significantly in US foreign policy. The formation of the Anglophone dominated ECOWAS in 1975, and the strictly Francophone membership of the \textit{Accord de Non Aggression et d’Assistance en matiere de Defense} (ANAD) formed in 1977, presented significant challenges to a unified security agenda within the region.\textsuperscript{18} The deterioration of internal security in Liberia in 1989 (once
considered a “US favorite”) and in the wider Mano River region of West Africa,\textsuperscript{19} coupled with the lack of interest by the US in the situation, resulted in ECOWAS establishing the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1989 in a rather ad hoc fashion; once again highlighting the Anglophone/Francophone friction in the region.\textsuperscript{20} The original ECOWAS treaty was revised in 1993 to include Article 58 which provided for regional security as an objective of ECOWAS. Notwithstanding the friction, this non-permanent multilateral armed force represented a formal agreement for the militaries of member states to work together in the pursuit of peace support operations.

The 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression and the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defense (MAD) were not geared towards such specific actions.\textsuperscript{21} The formation of ECOMOG and its intervention in Liberia in the hope of ending the civil war in that country has continued, as well as its deployment into two other West African countries; Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. Consequently, ECOWAS has now been pushed to make ECOMOG a permanent feature of West African security arrangements. In October 1998 the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of States and Governments endorsed the establishment of a collective security regime known as the “Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security,” as it sought a sustainable solution for the security agenda in the region (Appiah-Mensah, 2001).\textsuperscript{22} According to Appiah-Mensah the regime will function as follows:

The security system is to have as its highest decision-making body a Mediation and Security Council. The council may convene "as often as necessary" in the performance of its five primary functions: authorizing political as well as military interventions; determining mandates and terms of reference for such interventions; reviewing such determinations periodically; appointing such authorities as the special representative of the executive secretary and the force commander, upon the executive secretary's recommendation; and informing the

This new mechanism not only acknowledges the regional impact created by the conflict that originated in Liberia and which threatens human security in the region, but also challenges the principle of sovereignty; a domain very jealously guarded by states (Bah, 2005).

According to Dr Abbas Bundu, former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, any peace support, peacekeeping, or peace enforcement operation undertaken by ECOMOG must be seen as being conducted “within a regional framework in which the UN delegates regional action” (CDD, 1999, p 5). UN sanctioning of action would be accompanied by financial support which would help to relieve the enormous financial burden that ECOWAS countries would otherwise have to bear.23

ECOMOG is but a part of the security architecture in West Africa. Other aspects of the security framework include: the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace-keeping Security; A Regional Observation and Monitoring Centre – established to provide early warning of unrest and instability;24 a Mediation and Security Council; the Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) – 1998; and the Protocol on Conflict Resolution; and Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001). The US sponsored Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), the Renforcement des Capacites Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP), and the British Military Assistance Training Team (BMATT), are arrangements with states external to the region which also add to the security infrastructure of the region and which ultimately help to enhance the ability of states in the region to achieve their objective of improved regional security.
To date, the various security mechanisms have had limited successes in providing security and stability for the region. While there has been a curtailment in the proliferation of small arms and an increased unity of effort in addressing regional security issues, the epicenter of instability in the region – the Mano River conflict – continues to destabilize the region. The socio-political demographics of the region and a lack of resources by the West African states have proven to be the main drivers behind this ongoing conflict. Underlying these conditions is still a latent distrust between the Anglophone and Francophone states; particularly where Nigeria (as the regional power) and its interests are concerned.

However, it would be unfair to judge the security arrangements of the region from as far back as 1975/1977 as it was only in 2001 that ANAD joined forces with ECOMOG. This represents the unified operationalizing of all fifteen member states of the region in pursuit of the regional security agenda. This new unity of purpose will take time to develop the synergies required to effectively combat the issues challenging the region. With the redrawing of national borders along culturally and ethnically homogenous lines an unlikely prospect, West Africa is likely to experience continued unrest in the foreseeable future. However, as the regional relationships develop and as more resources are identified and applied to the issues in the interests of all stakeholders, then the processes and institutions for addressing conflicts and instability in the region should have an increased effect on the security environment and keep a lid on the simmering cauldron of instability in the region.
Conclusion

Even as the concept of the global village dominates the 21st century, states still remain the primary actors in the international arena. However, due to the elements of interconnectedness and interdependence which define globalization, states have bonded together in regional groupings to address issues vital to their development; and in some cases their survival. Economic and security issues appear to form a central theme in these regional partnerships and support the concept of complementarity between the two.

NATO, ASEAN and West Africa represent three regional groupings at various stages of development and integration as far as regional security issues are concerned. While they may all differ to some degree in the extent of the threats facing their region and development, there is a common thread in all three: they all have had to engage other states and regions outside of their own grouping to address the security issues within their own region effectively. This is a central component of a RSP.

Having reviewed the three regional security arrangements in this chapter against the background of the RSP model, it remains to ascertain the lessons to be learnt from them, if any, and to determine what is applicable for the development of a security partnership in the Caribbean. While being conscious that benchmarking may predispose conclusions which are not appropriate for a particular region given the unique characteristics of each region and sub-region, there are however concepts and considerations which may inform the development of a security partnership in the Caribbean. Consequently, the best practices, pitfalls, challenges and other issues gleaned from the review of the selected security arrangements will be the object of the following
chapter, as regional security partnership model for the Caribbean Basin is evaluated based on the criteria of feasibility, suitability, and acceptability.

1. The Treaty of Westphalia is commonly acknowledged as the birth of the modern day nation state, replacing the feudal system which had previously dominated Europe and in which royal/noble families were the principal actors in the international system.

2. Fulvio Attina at the time of his proposal was the Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Catania, Italy.

3. The five member states of this treaty were Belgium, France, Netherlands, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom.

4. Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and the United States were joined to the five Brussels Treaty states to balance the power of the Soviet Union.

5. The WARSAW Pact was officially known as the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and came into existence on 14 May 1955.

6. The current member states of NATO are; Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

7. The Partnership for Peace countries are Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

8. NATO refused to broaden its geographically mandated Area of Operations to include Algeria where the French were fighting an insurgency.

9. Kendall suggests that the US became very wary of the effectiveness of the NATO decision making process during the Kosovo operation and thus had no hesitation in moving against Afghanistan post-9/11 with a very ad hoc coalition and without a formal NATO decision.

10. The ASEAN member states which has increased in membership from 6 to 10 since its formation in 1967 are Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, and Burma/Myanmar.

11. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and Thailand.

The SCO consists of China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.

Adeniji suggests that whereas Britain backed off of maintaining that influence over her colonial possessions post independence, France very tenuously sought to preserve the colonial relationship as a symbol of her world power status by mandating as a condition of independence, a “Cooperation Agreement” by all African Francophone countries with France.

Member states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The withdrawal of Mauritania in 2002 has reduced the membership to fifteen states.

Many Private Military Companies (PMCs) who operate in West Africa, largely in the employ of the ruling regime or those who would seek regime change, are often paid in rights to access and exploit the valuable natural resources (mineral, timber) of the region.

Barry Buzan (1991, p. 190) defines a security complex as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.”

Member states of ANAD are Burkina Faso, Togo, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. All are members of ECOWAS with the exception of Mauritania, which withdrew in 2002.

The Mano River region covers Liberia, Ivory Coast, Guinea and Sierra Leone. The conflict which began in Liberia has moved around the countries of this sub-region which have fed off of each other and perpetuated the instability in the region.

ECOMOG was initially made up of the English speaking countries of ECOWAS. The Franco-phone equivalent in ECOWAS, ANAD, was very suspicious of Nigeria’s domination of ECOMOG and their intentions in the region, but later joined forces with ECOMOG in 2001 resulting in one unified sub-regional security mechanism.

ECOWAS, Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defense, 1981. The MAD Protocol specified the establishment of three institutions; The Authority, The Defense Council, and The Defense Commission. To date none of these have been established, making the protocol appear to be nothing more than a concept subject to negotiated action by interested member states.

The 1999 Protocol establishing this mechanism ultimately actualizes the concepts espoused by the MAD protocol of 1981 which failed to move that concept beyond the actual paper upon which it was written.

Nigeria currently is the main contributor to underwriting the costs of ECOMOG operations in West Africa; often at the expense of other important domestic projects and
also has the effect of arousing the suspicions of other regional partners as to Nigeria’s motives.

24 There are four centers located throughout the region in Banjul (The Gambia), Cotonou (Benin), Monrovia (Liberia) and Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso).
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

*Today, most dangers originate from areas of the world without collective security arrangements*

Thomas Barnett (2004)

**Introduction**

An assessment of the appropriateness of the Regional Security Partnership (RSP) model for the Caribbean region in the context of regionally specific variables, and the broader lessons learned from the review of the selected regional security arrangements in Chapter 3 will be the focus of this chapter. The first two criteria listed in Table 3 (pre-conditions and conditions) in the previous chapter will form the basis for examining the feasibility of the RSP for the Caribbean region. Thereafter, the suitability and the acceptability of the model will be examined. Finally, the lessons learned from the review of the regional security arrangements in Chapter 3 will be considered in order to inform any subsequent recommendations.

**Evaluation Criteria**

**Feasibility**

In assessing the feasibility of the RSP model, the primary method will be the application of Attina’s benchmark of pre-conditions and conditions to the political environment of the region. As outlined in Table 3, Attina identifies the components that must be in place for a RSP to work effectively.
The Security Assistance Treaty (2006) signed by member states of CARICOM has indicated that Caribbean governments have recognized the national and regional effects of narcotics and arms trafficking in the region, and the interdependence so crucial to countering these threats. As listed in the treaty, among the primary objectives of the agreement are the “expeditious, efficient mobilization and deployment of regional resources in order to manage and defuse national and regional security, however arising”, and “combating and elimination of threats to national and regional security, however arising” (CARICOM, Treaty on Security Assistance Among Caribbean Member States, 2006, p 4). Likewise, the Third Border Initiative (2001) signed by the US and the CARICOM Heads of State, confirms the mutual perspective of a collective approach to security in the Caribbean by both the Governments of the Caribbean and the US Government.

The objective of the Third Border Initiative is to focus U.S.-Caribbean engagement through targeted programs that comprise both new and ongoing activities designed to enhance cooperation in the diplomatic, security, economic, environmental, health and education arenas without prejudice to additional areas of collaboration that may be agreed upon in the future. The Third Border Initiative provides the opportunity to focus funding and assistance on those areas where we see the greatest increased need.

Governments of the United States of America, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Dominican Republic, 2004.

Within the Caribbean region, Cuba represents the only political opposition to the US government, while maintaining healthy diplomatic relationships with other Caribbean governments. Venezuela, under a Chavez led administration, has also voiced significant opposition to the policies and positions of the US government, but has economic and diplomatic ties with the governments of the Caribbean and the US. While the relationships between these two countries and the governments of the Caribbean and the
US will require due consideration, they do not present significant obstacles to the establishment of a RSP between the US and the regional governments. The economic benefits to be derived from an improved security environment will trump ideological differences. The continued diplomatic efforts at the regional and international levels to address border disputes between Guatemala and Belize, Venezuela and Guyana, and Guyana and Suriname, indicate the restrained use of violence to settle contentious issues within the region; one of the pre-conditions established by Attina.

At the strategic level, the cornerstone of any such partnership will be the buy in required from the political leadership of the prospective member countries. Without this, as Attina indicates in his list of conditions, the partnership will not work. The unity and consensus among Caribbean countries since the political independence of many of these nations in the decade of the 1960’s has developed significantly; mostly in the economic and political spheres as it relates to the relationship of the region with the rest of the world. The main point of friction concerning regional unity has always been in the area of the maintenance of independence and sovereignty. The CARICOM summit on regional security in 2003 and the subsequent Security Assistance Treaty (SAT) of 2006 signaled a quantum change in the approach to sensitive issues affecting sovereignty. The maturity displayed by CARICOM leaders in acknowledging that regional security transcends national sovereignty, is one of the benchmarks that Attina identifies as an indicator that the region is on its way to becoming a security community (Attina, 2005, p 6), and satisfies one of Attina’s pre-conditions.

This regional maturity however satisfies only one half of the equation of the proposed partnership between the Caribbean and the US. Will the US buy into such a
formal arrangement? While the answer to this question can never be guaranteed, the indicators are encouraging. Twice in the last decade, the US has entered into formal arrangements with the nations of the Caribbean. The “Partnership for Prosperity and Security in the Caribbean” (1997) under the Clinton Administration included a significant security oriented initiative. The “Third Border Initiative” (2001) of the Bush Administration, further developed on the security framework established in 1997. Both agreements underscore the importance of, and the commitment to, security in the Caribbean region by the US.

At the operational level, the cooperation between US agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Coast Guard, and Caribbean authorities also points to the shared interests and the mutually beneficial relationships between the US and the states of the Caribbean. On the military side of the equation, the executive agent for the US military in the region, United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), has been employing a strategy of peacetime engagement within the Caribbean region through a variety of exercises, conferences and training initiatives, all geared at increasing the capacity of these nations to add to the security of the region.

Table 4 provides a summary of the analysis of the pre-conditions and conditions as they relate to a RSP involving the Caribbean and the US.
Table 4. Using Attina’s Criteria to Assess the Feasibility of a Regional Security Partnership Model for the Caribbean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-conditions:</th>
<th>Narcotics and arms trafficking in the region have led to increased levels of domestic crime and violence, corruption, and the penetration of national borders by destabilizing elements. The effects of these problems have been acknowledged and the need for a collective approach to address these problems agreed upon.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Awareness of the countries of the region for interdependence and the local effects of global problems.</td>
<td>No power competition in the international politics of the region despite strong anti-US rhetoric by President Chavez of Venezuela. Border disputes between Guyana and Venezuela, Belize and Guatemala, and Suriname and Guyana have been characterized by the restrained use of violence in these international conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Relaxed or no power competition in the international politics of the region and restrained use of violence in international conflicts.</td>
<td>No power competition in the international politics of the region despite strong anti-US rhetoric by President Chavez of Venezuela. Border disputes between Guyana and Venezuela, Belize and Guatemala, and Suriname and Guyana have been characterized by the restrained use of violence in these international conflicts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions:</th>
<th>Consensus on building security cooperation within the region is to be found in agreements, treaties and initiatives such as the Partnership for Prosperity and Security in the Caribbean (1997), The Third Border Initiative (2001), and the Security Assistance Treaty (2006).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Consensus of the governments of the region on building security cooperation by reducing violence in international relations, improving international and domestic stability, and promoting peace and economic growth.</td>
<td>No opposite military alliances exist in the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No opposite military alliances.</td>
<td>No opposite military alliances exist in the region.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* This table was developed using material taken directly from *Regional Security Partnership: The Concept, Model, Practice, and a Preliminary Comparative Scheme* by Fulvio Attina, 2005, and comparing it with existing data from the current political environment of Caribbean-US relations.

In assessing the feasibility of a RSP between the US and Caribbean states, perhaps the final issue will surround the relationship between this regional security bloc and other multinational institutions and organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN). Articles 52 – 54 of the UN Charter
speak favorably to the establishment and role of regional security organizations in pursuit of the greater peace. The charter of the OAS also bases its support for regional security organizations under the framework of the previously mentioned articles in the UN charter. Thus, with the aim of the partnership being to improve the security of the region (hemispheric and international security being something central to the existence of both the OAS and the UN), it is likely to meet with a favorable reception from both these organizations.

Suitability

Determining the suitability of a RSP for the region will perhaps be best assessed by an examination of whether or not the implementation of the RSP will result in the attainment of the desired outcomes. The primary reason for engaging in a regional security partnership is to maximize the resources and collective power of a group of states, in order to counter threats which no one state can effectively do. The transnational threats of narcotics, arms, and human trafficking, and organized crime have matured in the Caribbean due to an inability of individual nations to address these threats. While countries within the region have bilateral security arrangements with each other as well as external powers such as the US, UK, Canada, France, and other countries, there are many seams which remain vulnerable and of which the traffickers and crime syndicates have taken full advantage.

A review of the efforts at countering narcotics trafficking through the region will demonstrate the impact of a cooperative approach to regional security. The decade of the 1980’s heralded the growth of the transshipment drug trade in the region. Back then, not much effort was placed in countering the flow of illicit drugs through the region by
Caribbean governments, as there was no perceived threat to domestic security by these transshipment countries. The Caribbean nations largely ignored the threat while the US was more focused on the overland route through Mexico which at that time accounted for some 90% of the cocaine flowing into the US, leaving only token resources in the waters of the Caribbean to combat the nascent trade.

The largely porous and poorly monitored coastlines of these Caribbean states demonstrate the vulnerability of the region to the highly organized drug syndicates of Latin America. Haiti, with its political instability and poor law enforcement capabilities accounts for an estimated 50% of the cocaine transiting the region.² The involvement of an external power with the resources and the incentive to fill the existing gaps would significantly add to the security of the region.

As the drug trade matured in the 1990’s,³ it began to spill over into the Caribbean territories and establish its own domestic markets there, which in turn fueled increases in violence, corruption, addiction and organized crime. Seizures in 2000 were estimated at approximately ten percent of the estimated throughput (US Coast Guard, 2001).⁴ Faced with this menace, Caribbean countries tried desperately to stem the tide but with little effect.

At the same time, the US, also suffering from increased drug inflows from the region, sought to increase their counter narcotics activities in the region through the DEA and the Coast Guard. One of the primary initiatives in this regard was the establishment of formal bilateral agreements between the US and Caribbean countries under the “Maritime Counter Narcotics Cooperation Agreement”. While this initiative was initially rejected by some states as it was perceived to violate their sovereignty, it had the general
effect of increasing the seizures of cocaine transiting through the region; although the estimated volume of cocaine passing through the region had also increased.\(^5\) Now with most Caribbean states involved in the initiative (albeit on revised terms which addressed the equity and input of Caribbean governments into the decision making and execution processes), drug interdiction operations have been more frequent and successful.

Admiral James Loy of the US Coast Guard in his statement to a congressional sub-committee in 2001 attributes this success to the bilateral arrangements with Caribbean and Latin American nations. It is logical therefore that a regionally coordinated approach to countering the drug trade (as well as other transnational threats), through the “maturation of the interagency cooperation process, improved sharing of information and intelligence [and] enhanced cooperation of the international community” (US Coast Guard, 2001, p 3) should provide greater levels of effectiveness with far fewer seams to be exploited.

Being directly affected by these same threats of narcotics and arms trafficking and organized crime, the incentive to the US to secure the “third border” is compelling. Additionally, in executing the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and with Homeland Security a priority for the US government, it would be in the interests of the US to contribute to the border security of the small and inadequately resourced nations of the Caribbean, in order to reduce the risk and the vulnerability posed by the inadequately monitored borders of the region.

Attina clearly advocates for the involvement of external powers in regional security partnerships, not only for the balance that they may bring to the group, but also for the resources they have to offer. The employment of US resources in improving the
security of the Caribbean against transnational threats will also satisfy its own interests. In this case, the interests of the US may be considered as being inextricably linked to the security of the Caribbean region, due to the impact of the threats on the US and the contiguous nature of the geography of the region. The challenge in this partnership would be in ensuring the principle of equality based on membership and not resources provided; one member one vote.

The recently concluded International Cricket Council’s Cricket World Cup 2007 (ICC CWC 2007) which took place throughout the length and breadth of the Caribbean is an example of the effectiveness of a collective and cooperative approach to regional security. The increased involvement of the US and other external powers such as the UK and Canada significantly contributed to the positive security environment in the region. Use of the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), the training of resource and security personnel, the provision of specialized equipment for security operations, and the sharing of operational intelligence by these international partners with Caribbean authorities, all contributed significantly to the positive security environment throughout the region for the duration of the tournament.

Finally, the establishment of a RSP between the US and Caribbean states would not exclude the security initiatives of other external partners. Rather, such a partnership would be enhanced by these additional security programs, making the gaps even smaller and the security of the region more effective and more robust. The involvement of the UK, Canada and to a lesser extent, France and the Netherlands, in security initiatives in the region has several advantages. It helps to strengthen the security architecture of the
region, shares the burden of providing security, and provides a countervailing influence against internal power plays which could upset the balance of the partnership.

Acceptability

The final criterion to be used in this assessment addresses the acceptability of the proposed partnership to the varied stakeholders. This includes domestic constituents, the littoral states and sub-hemispheric middle powers, and extra regional powers. The issue of the cost of such a partnership will also be reviewed briefly in this section.

The involvement of the US in decision making affecting Caribbean regional and domestic policy has always been viewed by Caribbean populations with some skepticism, and in some cases outright opposition. The general perception has been one of the US promoting its own interests over those of the region. Thus, the question is “how will Caribbean people feel about the US becoming an equal partner in decision making affecting national and regional policies?” While there still exists significant portions of these populations which maintain the opinion that Caribbean interests will be always be suborned to US interests, there has been a shift in this view by a critical portion of these populations; their elected representatives.

More and more, governments of the region over the last two decades have engaged the US in very clear terms on their right to sovereign decision making. While this has not always met with the desired response, there has been a greater understanding by the US of Caribbean policy positions. The Maritime Counter Narcotics Cooperation Agreement of the late 1990’s, the Third Border Initiative and the more recent CARICOM Treaty on Security Assistance, and the participation of the US in the security plans for the ICC CWC 2007, all indicate the positive shift in US-Caribbean relationships by the US
and Caribbean governments. These initiatives have demonstrated the willingness and
ability to operate on equal terms and the practical benefits to be gained from such a
relationship are of benefit to all.

The Dominican Republic, Mexico, Columbia, Cuba and Venezuela are the
“middle” states or sub-hemispheric regional powers who are either littoral to the region
or are in the Caribbean Basin. The Dominican Republic, Mexico and Columbia all have
healthy bilateral relationships with the US and Caribbean governments, and their
governments will see the benefit of having the US as a major player in the security of the
region, given that they are all affected by the drug trafficking trade (either as a source or
transshipment country). Mexico, Columbia and Venezuela, also known as the Group of
Three, have entered into a formal economic agreement with CARICOM and stand to
benefit from an improved security environment in the region. Cuba and Venezuela
represent a small anti-US sentiment in the region; both of whom however have healthy
diplomatic and economic relationships with Caribbean countries. While the anti-US
rhetoric may be strong and even vitriolic at times, they do not present a credible obstacle
to the establishment of a partnership between the US and the Caribbean countries.

Canada, the UK and France are the traditional extra regional powers who have
historically held a stake in the region’s security and who continue to play a limited role in
the security of the region today. Brazil, India and China have begun to show more of an
interest in the security of the region, but more from an economic perspective. These
extra-regional powers should not have any major issues with the formation of such a
security partnership, as they too stand to benefit economically from the improved security
and stability of the region.
One of the major consequences of the establishment of the RSP between the US and the Caribbean states will be the cost-benefit relationship to be derived from such an arrangement. While there will be a requirement for an increased outflow in dollar terms on security related initiatives, the anticipated economic windfalls from an improvement in the security climate of the region are likely to include a reduction in the costs of production, improved tourism revenues, and increased inflows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The implementation of a RSP would also anticipate a sharing in the overall cost of security to individual nations; especially the Caribbean nations due to the sharing of responsibilities and the provision of resources and assets. Whereas the considerably poorer nations of the Caribbean will have been hard pressed to provide the level of technology and physical assets to resource the security needs of the region, often at the expense of other essential developmental sectors (such as education and healthcare), the commitment of the US to security in the region should help in sharing the burden of some of these inescapable cost centers. This will allow domestic budgets to facilitate a greater spread of finite resources across other critical developmental sectors.

Having examined the feasibility, suitability and acceptability of a RSP between the US and the Caribbean, and understanding that such a partnership will take time to mature to full effect (with the development of organizations, institutions, mechanisms and procedures), it is prudent to extract the lessons learned from the review of the existing security partnerships examined in Chapter 3, in order to properly frame any meaningful recommendation.
Lessons Learned

Best Practices

For any organization, and particularly a regional security organization, to function at an optimal level, there must be an established principle of operation; a common foundation that all participants ascribe to. In the case of NATO it is Article 5 of the NATO charter. Significantly, this article is not in conflict with the UN (another multinational organization to which all NATO members belong) but rather draws upon the charter of that organization to support its own mandate (see Article 51 of the UN Charter as it relates to individual and collective self-defense). ASEAN has similar fundamental operational principles as do other regional security organizations.

The review of the collective security arrangements in Chapter 3 confirms Attina’s view that maintaining the balance of power within the organization through the establishment of relationships with external great powers is essential. The relationships that ASEAN has with Russia, China, India, Japan, the European Union, and the USA, helps to keep the region on an even keel, and precludes the association from becoming bent out of shape through unfavorable bilateral arrangements or internal squabbling.

Although it may not be possible to identify every threat that exists to the region, there are some threats that will have driven the need for the organization to be formed. These threats must be clearly defined and their origins and confluences (if any) identified. Additionally, there must be periodic reviews on the effectiveness of the strategies employed to counter these threats, the stage of development or recession of the threats, and the identification of any new threats. The identification of new threats is critical to the continuing effective functioning of the organization and its relevance.
Responses to threats should not be unnecessarily constrained or limited to single options. Rather there must be a network of options which all contribute to defeating, countering, or mitigating either the threat, or the effects of these threats. As much as there are multiple options being employed, these options within themselves must have varying levels of intensity that can be ratcheted up or down as required. The diversity of instruments and tools will operate most effectively when they are integrated with the structure of the organization.

The structure of the organization itself is also important. While there should be a predominance of “flatness” to ensure maximum participation and consultation between members, of necessity there will be some vertical structure involved. The relationship between the decision making North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the planning and advisory NATO Military Committee (NMC) is an example of the vertical structure in a regional organization. In the final analysis, whatever structure is developed and employed it must facilitate and enhance the effectiveness of the instruments and mechanisms of the organization.

While the issue of security is paramount in national and international affairs, it cannot be rationalized in and of itself; that is, maintaining security for security’s sake. There must be a greater justification for security. In the three examples examined in the previous chapter, the leading catalyst for security is linked with a need to attain and maintain a positive economic environment. In fact, ASEAN and ECOWAS were founded as economic organizations, but which quickly recognized the need for security as a prerequisite for a permissive economic environment. In Europe, after a stable and secure environment had been substantially achieved by NATO, the European Economic
Community (EEC) was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, evolving over the years to its present day successor the European Union (EU).

Challenges

In any organization there will be challenges that will have to be faced. Based on the review of NATO, ASEAN and West Africa as discussed in Chapter 3, there are several challenges with which a regional security organization will have to contend.

The political diversity present within the organization and maintaining regional cohesiveness are two inextricably linked challenges that will always be at the forefront. Each member state has individual interests to pursue and domestic constituencies to satisfy. These two elements guarantee a constant state of discussion, negotiation and compromise if the unity, and ultimately the effectiveness of the organization is to be realized.

While seeking to satisfy the various stakeholders within the arrangement, the issue of dealing with parallel institutions and organizations will also require considerable resources and time. Given the inter-connectedness of the international security environment, as seen in all three cases reviewed, it is prudent for any regional security grouping to consider the effect of its actions on the wider community, and make a determination as to whether or not those actions will have a negative or positive impact.

One of the more delicate challenges facing a regional security grouping are the relationships it establishes with those organizations and powers who are not included in the organization; especially those on the “border” who may think that they ought to have been included. The situation becomes even more tenuous if these peripheral states/organizations have enough resources and ability to influence the security
environment within the region from which they have been formally excluded. Careful consideration will have to be given to the effect of decisions and actions taken by the grouping in pursuit of their own security, so as not to unnecessarily antagonize other surrounding states/blocs, who in turn could respond in a manner which causes the security within that region to deteriorate.

The term security as discussed in Chapter 1 has become a very broad term and encompasses what some may describe as not being “classical” security issues. The effect of this is the ever widening security agenda with which states have had to contend. NATO has had to expand not only its membership, but its consideration of security in other regions of the world and the impact they are likely to have on its own security. The Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), are examples of other groupings with which NATO has had to engage, as it seeks to address its own security needs.

Given the commonality of interests normally ascribed to by the members of any security arrangement at the outset of that arrangement, one of the more serious challenges regional security organizations may have to face is the emergence of a threat/(s) from within. These may be spawned from the direct or indirect actions or inactions of a member state, which may lead to conditions prejudicial to the security of the region. These threats have the potential of dividing the organization and reducing its effectiveness. Addressing and mitigating these conditions as early as possible will have a positive effect on the security of the region, but will require foresight, time, thorough discussion of the issues, and recognition by the “offending” member and a commitment to correct the situation.
The decision making process and the authority for decision making are matters that have to be clearly outlined from the outset and accepted by all members of the security arrangement. Not only do they have to be clearly delineated and accepted by all, but they have to be reviewed periodically for relevancy and effectiveness. All three security arrangements discussed earlier, at some point in time have had challenges associated with decision making, whether it be acceptance of the process (West Africa), the effectiveness of the process/method (unanimity over consensus – NATO), whether or not the decision was in the best interest of a member (France in 1966), or one member seeking to drive the decision making for the organization (Indonesia in ASEAN and Nigeria in ECOWAS). All debates and concerns over the decision making process must be satisfactorily concluded before the partnership is launched, in order to prevent these issues from impacting negatively on the functioning of the organization.

Pitfalls

Having reviewed the three selected regional security organizations in Chapter 3, there are pitfalls, some obvious and some not so obvious, which should be recognized from the outset and avoided as a matter of course.

Establishing the role and functioning of the organization from the outset and continuing to operate in that mode without undertaking regular reviews of the effectiveness of the status quo, may lead to the organization losing its relevance and effectiveness. The lack of a review is more likely to happen if there is concert within the organization and there is no apparent need to “fix what is not broken”.

Similarly, there may be a tendency to utilize one or a few mechanisms or instruments to address any security issue that may arise. The probability of this occurring
is much higher when there are fewer resources, instruments and mechanisms at the disposal of the organization. Multi-functional instruments and mechanisms may indeed address a variety of issues, but may not address a particular issue comprehensively. The residual portion of the issue may then, through ignorance of its existence, be allowed to morph into something more threatening to the security of the region. All issues must be diligently examined and solutions tailored to properly address it/them, in order to eliminate the threat and reduce the likelihood of a continuation of the problem.

The domination of the organization (de facto or de jure) by one member due to historical antecedents, greater resources, or its primacy in a particular issue, may destabilize and even splinter the organization if this is not actively guarded against. Member states must be acutely aware of the possibility for this situation to arise and to take steps to prevent this; even at the cost of delaying the implementation of a solution to address a problem. Care must be taken to not let haste and immediacy preclude the consideration and implementation of an equally effective solution more acceptable to all members, which may take a longer time to implement but which would not result in an unreasonable deference to one state. When there is transparency and equality throughout the organization, the best interests of the organization as a whole tend to be served, as opposed to when distrust and imbalance exist.

Polarization within the arrangement can sound the death knell for any regional security grouping. The colonial antecedents in West Africa created an almost fatal division between the Anglophone and Francophone members of ECOWAS. It took twenty-six years for this anomaly to be addressed in West Africa, and the ineffectiveness of ECOWAS in addressing security within the region during that period may be traced
back to this state of affairs. The multiplicity of external relationships engaged in by 
ASEAN, as a grouping, provides the counter to the creation of such a condition. Even 
though member states have the freedom to pursue bilateral relationships, the broader 
interests and issues of the region to be addressed with diverse external powers must also 
be geared towards negating the possibility of this arising.

Finally, it is quite feasible for crises to dominate the immediate attentions of the 
grouping at the expense of other security concerns. The dilemma of channeling all 
energies and resources to the resolution of a crisis while attempting to continue an 
ongoing program aimed at eliminating other threats can place the security of the region at 
risk. Organizational systems and structures must ensure that crisis management does not 
obfuscate the wider vision and workings of the arrangement.

Other Issues

In the global environment, security has no discrete boundaries due to the 
interconnectedness and interdependence which characterizes the international arena. 
Regional security arrangements are not immune to this fact as has been shown in the 
linkages and relationships in Chapter 3. Some regional security arrangements come into 
existence to address the security needs of a common geographical region, while others 
have their genesis in shared interests which may be external to the region. The debate of 
common territory versus common interests is one which arises frequently enough for it to 
merit serious consideration within any regional security grouping.

Two other issues which must be recognized and considered from the outset are 
the identification of low visibility threats and measures to address them, and the 
withdrawal of members from the arrangement; especially members that contribute
significantly to the functioning and effectiveness of the grouping. Contingencies and redundancies must be built into the structure and systems of the organization to adequately address these issues.

Conclusion

The pre-conditions and conditions as defined by Attina as being necessary for the formation of a RSP, are present in the political stratosphere of US/Caribbean relationships. Although domestic constituents, particularly in the Caribbean, may espouse differing views on this issue, the political decision makers have signaled a buy in to this type of partnership through formal agreements such as the Partnership for Prosperity and Security in the Caribbean, the Third Border Initiative and the Security Assistance Treaty. The premise that security facilitates economic growth and development makes such a partnership acceptable to regional middle powers and extra regional powers, all of whom have economic linkages with the region and stand to benefit from a more secure region. The sharing of the cost of security among participants also makes a RSP an attractive option to prospective participants. The local impact of global threats and the interconnected and interdependent nature of the world today, almost demand a collective approach to security.

As the recommendation for how this partnership should look is developed, it will take into account the best practices, pitfalls, challenges and other issues common to other already established collective security agreements in existence around the world. As the partnership develops, it is anticipated that the structures, means, mechanisms, processes and procedures will be built and developed and the benefits of such a relationship commensurate with a security community will be realized.
1 In a 2005 OAS sponsored conference on human trafficking in the Caribbean, Surinamese Ambassador to the OAS Henry Illes suggested that “no single country, in fact not even a region like ours, can eliminate this problem by acting alone”. He further added that the region has no choice then but to strongly join forces across national and regional borders.

2 In 1998/99, 53 out of the 108 metric tonnes (MT) estimated to flow through the region was thought to have transited the highly permissive environment in Haiti.

3 John C Varrone of the US Customs Service in his statement to the Congressional Sub-Committee on Criminal Justice Oversight in May 2000 indicated that according to statistics from the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement, 43% of cocaine destined for the US transits through the Caribbean.

4 Haiti and the Bahamas were the principal transshipment countries; largely due to almost non-existent law enforcement and border management in the first instance, and an inability to adequately monitor thousands of islands and cays in the widely dispersed archipelago in the second.

5 Although seizures in 1998, 1999, and 2000 were at successive record levels (Varrone, 2000), so too were the estimated amounts transiting the region.

6 Policy positions on relationships with Cuba, US interventions in Haiti (particularly the removal of President Aristide from Haiti in 2004), and supporting the nomination of Venezuela over the US backed Guatemala for a seat on the UN Security Council, have all been against the trend to concur with US policy positions and initiatives.

7 The cost-benefit relationship between improved security and economic advancement in the Caribbean region was one of the key conclusions arrived at in the 2002 UK-Caribbean Ministerial Forum held in Guyana.
CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATIONS

Our security is related directly to the security of the newly developing world. And our role must be precisely this: to help provide security to those developing nations which genuinely need and request our help and which demonstrably are willing and able to help themselves.


Findings

This thesis has examined the scope and nature of the threats facing the Caribbean region. It has found that the transnational threats of arms and narcotics trafficking, organized crime, and the vulnerability of the Caribbean states to terrorist activities are beyond the capabilities of the Caribbean nations to adequately counter them. Not only are these threats prejudicial to the sovereignty and security of the Caribbean states and the region on a whole, but they also place the United States at risk from increased narcotics flows, the establishment of organized crime syndicates right on its border, and make it vulnerable to terrorists who may infiltrate through a weak region to launch attacks on the homeland.

The Caribbean states have recognized their vulnerability and inadequacy as it relates to these threats, and have made a collective approach to countering these threats a priority as stated in the Treaty on Security Assistance among CARICOM Member States (2006). The Partnership for Prosperity and Security in the Caribbean (1997) and the Third Border Initiative (2001), both formal agreements between the United States and CARICOM, have acknowledged the threats and the vulnerability to all signatories by these threats, and a commitment to work jointly to counter these threats. However, these
agreements leave solutions up to the initiative of individual states and bilateral agreements, without mandating a baseline for action, and no organization or body charged with coordinating the countering of these threats and overseeing the security of the region.

The review of the operations of NATO, the East Asian security model, and the West African security model, has shown that a formal collective approach to regional security issues are far more effective than individual or bilateral arrangements. While these collective agreements take time to mature and increase in effectiveness, they have the ultimate consequence of reducing the threats to the region, reducing the gaps and seams between individual states which may then be exploited by these threats, as well as sharing the cost burden of providing security for the region. Ultimately these arrangements may lead to the development of a security community. Finally, the studies show that an enhanced security environment facilitates economic development and growth; something which all governments aspire to.

**Recommendations**

The maturation of the regional threats and their negative impact on both the Caribbean states and the United States, require that a more formal collective security agreement be entered into by these governments. Given the close relationships which already exist at the operational level between US and Caribbean governmental agencies in countering the threats to the region, the next logical step is to engage in a formal strategic agreement to provide a positive security framework in the region. The Regional Security Partnership (RSP) model as described by Fulvio Attina is an option that is
suitable, feasible, and acceptable, and ought to be considered seriously by US and Caribbean governments for implementation.

**Caribbean Regional Security Partnership**

Having already determined in Chapter 4 that the pre-conditions and conditions for the establishment of a RSP between the US and a majority of Caribbean states have been satisfied, this recommendation will address three critical components of the RSP; the decision making structure, the decision making process, and the regional and extra-regional relationships. As indicated in Chapter 1, the term CARICOM is meant to be interpreted broadly in the context of a CARICOM/US RSP and is used only as a reasonable starting point given the critical mass of Caribbean states which it represents. More practically however, it is envisaged that at the very least, the United States and its territories in the Caribbean (Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands) and all members of CARICOM will be signatories to this partnership. The Dominican Republic by virtue of its close relationships with the US and CARICOM, as well as its strategic geographical location in the Caribbean should be invited to become a member of the RSP. All associate members of CARICOM should also be invited to become members. The Caribbean territories not originally included in the RSP; the French and Dutch Antilles, should be invited to participate in order to strengthen the internal dynamics of the partnership and add more external balancing potential through relationships with France and Holland. Cuba once it is fully reconciled with the international community is expected to play a critical role in the partnership.
Decision Making Structure

Figure 3 depicts the proposed decision making structure within the RSP. The Heads of State/Council of Ministers (HOS/COM) would be the supreme decision making body of the RSP. It is proposed that this body meet annually, or as required, to ratify or make decisions. It is envisioned that the Ministers/Secretaries with responsibility for foreign policy will make up the membership of this body. Every two years, or in exceptional circumstances, the Heads of State should meet at a Regional Security Summit to discuss the security issues of the region. The Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) should be persons with ambassadorial status and who are authorized to make decisions regarding the routine operations of the RSP, but who would report to their principals on the HOS/COM. The Security Advisory Committee (SAC) would consist of the security technocrats and conceivably come from the Departments/Ministries of Defense/Security, or their equivalent, of the various states. This composition will require inter-departmental/inter-ministerial coordination at the national level so that internal differences are worked out before the SAC meets to discuss issues. The SAC should be permanent staff members resident at the RSP Secretariat office to be housed in a mutually agreeable location.
Figure 3. Proposed Decision Making Structure of the CARICOM/US RSP

Decision Making Process

Figure 4 depicts the decision making process within the CARICOM/US RSP. The SAC is that body that should be charged with the responsibility of identifying the problem(s) that needs to be addressed and the overall impact on the security of the region and individual member states. The SAC then develops options for addressing the problem, highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of each option (including cost, the impact on RSP member states and other states within and on the borders of the partnership geographic area), the implementation process, and a recommendation as to which option should be implemented. These options and recommendations are then
passed up for the PRC to review and make a selection. If the PRC is not satisfied with one or more of the options presented, it will have the SAC refine the affected portion and re-submit to the PRC.

![Diagram of Proposed Decision Making Process of the CARICOM/US RSP.](image)

Figure 4. Proposed Decision Making Process of the CARICOM/US RSP.

Once an option has been accepted by the PRC, it is sent to the HOS/COM for ratification. Ratification should be determined by a vote; one per member in order to preserve the unity of the partnership. This will require much diplomatic consultation and negotiation. Ratification may only be prevented by a member state voting against the proposed solution. Abstention from a vote ought not to derail the ratification or implementation of the proposed solution. Once ratified, the SAC coordinates the
implementation. If at any time during the process the next higher body is not satisfied with a proposed option/recommendation, it should be sent back down the chain with the necessary guidance for it to be re-worked. It is anticipated that the PRC will conduct any necessary extra-regional dialogue on the impact of the issue and proposed options.

Relationships

Developing, nurturing and respecting relationships -- within the RSP and with countries/regions external to the RSP -- will be critical to the functioning and effectiveness of the RSP. Figure 5 depicts the political relationships between the CARICOM/US RSP and with sub-hemispheric middle powers and international organizations and institutions. Within the RSP, the pre-existing sub-regional organizations such as the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Regional Security System (RSS) should be incorporated into the partnership. The Dominican Republic by virtue of its strong economic and diplomatic relationships and security related initiatives with both the US and Caribbean governments, as well as its strategic geographical location will be an important member of the RSP. Member states will have to be bound together by a fundamental declaration which explicitly states the purpose of the RSP and the commitment of states to threats to the region or to individual states (or groups of states). This undergirding principle will embody the principle of collective security and is expected to improve the security of the region.
Mexico, Columbia, and Venezuela (known as the Group of Three in trade relationships with CARICOM) have formal trade agreements and diplomatic relationships with CARICOM and the US. The US also has specific security arrangements with Columbia and Mexico as it relates to countering the drug trade emanating in and transiting those countries en route to the US, as it does with individual Caribbean states. The RSP will need to have close and active coordination with these countries, especially as it relates to countering the drug trade, given the interconnectedness between these countries and the region. Despite the current anti-US
rhetoric from Venezuela, that country has not acted in a way that would indicate that it is willing to act in a way that is prejudicial to its own security or the security of the region. These three sub-hemispheric middle powers all border the geographic area proposed to be covered by the RSP, and any action by the RSP ought to consider carefully the interests of these countries and the impacts of RSP actions on these countries.

Cuba under the Fidel Castro regime is unlikely to be involved in any formal agreement with the US. Literally an island on its own, Cuba, which has been suspended by both the OAS and the UN, only represents a physical transshipment point for drugs between South America and North America, and can be isolated and appropriate strategies employed to mitigate the “Cuba factor”. Additionally, the healthy relationship between Cuba and CARICOM bodes well for the countering and mitigation of any threat to the region, and should preclude any obstructionist or negative tendencies by Cuba towards the functioning and effectiveness of the RSP.

Those countries which have been the traditional security partners of the Caribbean states (outside of the US), the United Kingdom, France, and Canada, still have a vital role to play in contributing to the security of the region. The RSP model does not exclude these countries, but rather encourages their involvement in regional security through bilateral arrangements with RSP members. The coordination of initiatives with these states for maximum effect will add to the robustness and options available to the RSP. The considerable intelligence capabilities of these states, and information sharing between them and the RSP should also be a focus of the RSP in developing these relationships. In particular, France — perhaps the least active of the three in terms of security initiatives -- should be encouraged to have its Caribbean territories actively
involved in the RSP, even if only for liaison and coordination. The continued engagement and involvement of these traditional partners in the security of the region should be actively pursued and nurtured.

China, India, and Brazil are representative of states which traditionally have not been involved in contributing to the security of the region, although they do have strong economic relationships with states in the region. Of late China, and to a lesser extent India and Brazil, have been providing security assistance to Caribbean states in the form of equipment, financing, and the training of police and military personnel (similar to the traditional partners). These contributions, like those of the traditional partners, have the effect of positively contributing to the regional security environment and the capabilities of regional states. Other bilateral security agreements between RSP members and other states should be synchronized and employed in furtherance of the primary objective of improving the security of the region. All these relationships and engagements are valuable and should continue.

The United Nations and the Organization of American States as the global and hemispheric umbrella organizations for whom security is a priority, are organizations whose objectives will be aided by the formation and development of this RSP. The active support of both organizations should be enlisted to further bolster the workings and efficacy of the RSP as it seeks to preserve the security and stability of the region.

Conclusion

The complexities of globalization have emphasized the increasingly intricate relationships between states and regions in the levels of interdependence and interconnectedness displayed in diverse sectors. Security in the Caribbean Basin is not by any
means exempt from this trend. In fact, the threats to states do not operate in a vacuum, but rather cut across national and even regional geographic boundaries, affecting multiple constituencies. More and more, success against these threats has to be defined by a cooperative and collective approach, where strategic regional security arrangements are becoming the method of choice as states seek to nullify the threats facing them.

Caribbean states have evolved from tackling these threats on their own, to pursuing bilateral security arrangements within a broader cooperative approach at the operational level in addressing the security needs of individual states and the region. However, a more comprehensive and strategic approach is required to effectively counter the transnational threats of narcotics and arms trafficking, organized crime and the vulnerability to penetration by terrorist networks. The Regional Security Partnership (RSP) as a form of a collective security agreement has the benefit of building on the premise of a mutual acknowledgement of threats by the stake holders, and the collective approach needed to counter them. Ultimately, this will develop over time into a robust and effective mechanism capable of dealing with these threats.

This study has demonstrated that the preconditions and conditions necessary for the formation of a regional security partnership between the US and Caribbean states exist, and that the benefits to be gained from such an approach should not be forfeited. For this model of regional security to work, some essential components will have to be implemented. These include a clearly defined decision making structure and process, and the developing and nurturing of relationships both within the RSP and outside the RSP. The RSP will require the formal commitment of participants and the adherence to a fundamental binding principle for action by all member states. It will require that a
constant assessment of the RSP be conducted to ensure its relevancy and effectiveness, and that multiple mechanisms and tools are developed to combat the threats facing the region.

The strong economic and cultural linkages between the US and Caribbean states, the impact of the transnational threats on both the US (through the Caribbean) and the Caribbean region, and the geographical proximity between the Caribbean Basin and the US, make the formation of this RSP plausible and very likely to improve the security of the Caribbean Basin and the United States. As the influence of states over their sovereign territories decreases relative to the impact of non-state actors, such an approach should help in the pursuit of security, stability and growth.

1 This term refers to Foreign Ministers and Secretaries of State or the equivalent person with the responsibility for the foreign policy of the state.

2 It is anticipated that the SAC will have staff members who are organized into working groups to facilitate the development of these options.

3 Traditional security initiatives include training and development courses for members of the regions security forces, the provision of equipment, and the conduct of joint security related exercises and operations within the Caribbean region.
GLOSSARY

Collective Security. “Reflects a security arrangement whereby a clearly delineated group of nations agrees that if one nation in their membership encroaches upon the sovereignty of another, the rest of the members will take collective action against the aggressive member. It is . . . an arrangement to protect the status quo within a given group” (Lagon 1995).

Collective Defense. A formal arrangement among participant states that undertakes to commit support in defense of a member state if it is attacked by another state outside the grouping.)

Regional Security Partnership. “Is the security arrangement of an international region that originates from inter-governmental consensus to cooperate on dealing with security threats and the enhancement of stability and peace in the region by making use of different types of agreements, instruments and mechanisms” (Attina 2005).

Security. “Security is the protection and preservation of a people’s freedom from external military attack and coercion, from internal subversion, and from the erosion of cherished political, economic, and social values” (Griffith, 2002).

Security Community. “A group of contiguous countries bound together by a high level of transaction and communication flows and the perception of being a community; factors essential to establishing institutions for peaceful conflict resolution” (Attina 2005).

Specified Collective Defense. “Represents preparations made against outside threats which have already been identified” (Lagon 1995).

Transnational Security Issues. “Non-military threats that cross borders and either threaten the political and social integrity of a nation or the health of that nation’s inhabitants” (Smith 2000, 78).

Unspecified Collective Defense. “Collective defense is a formula whereby group members are concerned with threats from without. But subscribers to a collective defense arrangement, established to deal with outside threats, need not know or declare at the time of entering into the arrangement who [or what] the outside threat might be. Collective defense of this kind is concerned with creating a pledge for united action against one or more unspecified external aggressors; it is limited to outside aggressors, but unlimited as far as they are concerned” (Lagon, 1995).
REFERENCE LIST

Books


Periodicals


**Government Documents**


Other Sources


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

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