POWER BY THE NUMBERS:
CONGRESSIONAL LINE ITEM BUDGETING

by

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June 1994

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DTIC Document Number: 94-27208
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)  
2. REPORT DATE  
June 1994  
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED  
Master’s Thesis  
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
Power By The Numbers: Congressional Line Item Budgeting  
5. FUNDING NUMBERS  
6. AUTHOR(S)  
Stephen B. Dowell, Jeffrey H. Bell  
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey CA 93943-5000  
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER  
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER  
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE  
A  
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
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This thesis uses documents provided by the DOD Comptroller to conduct two studies. The first is a multi year (FY 1989-1994) analysis of the procurement account, to examine how the end of the Cold-War affected micromanagement. The second study examines all defense budget categories for one year (FY 1994) to compare micromanagement between accounts. This thesis argues that the percentage of budget line items for procurement altered by congressional appropriators remained nearly constant (20 to 23 percent) from FY 1989-1994. Congress subtracted from more line items that it added to, however line item subtractions were smaller on average than additions. A cross service analysis revealed no particular service or procurement programs as the prime target of Congressional micromanagement.  
The single year cross sectional analysis revealed that activity in DoD procurement is indicative of legislative change in operations and research accounts, but not in construction and housing.  
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
Congress, Line Item Budgeting, Micromanagement, Appropriations, Procurement, Department of Defense.  
15. NUMBER OF PAGES 79  
16. PRICE CODE  
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT  
Unclassified  
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE  
Unclassified  
19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT  
Unclassified  
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT  
UL  
NSN 7540-01-280-3500  
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Power by the Numbers: Congressional Line Item Management

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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 1994

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Congressional micromanagement of the defense budget is a crucial element of the struggle between the legislative and executive branches to shape military spending. By altering presidential funding requests, Congress can impose its own preferences on the defense budget, and thereby help guide the restructuring of U.S. armed forces. Congressional micromanagement has drawn enormous criticism from academics and Department of Defense officials. Yet, for all its criticism, surprisingly little empirical research has been conducted on the number and magnitude of program funding changes appropriated by Congress.

This thesis uses budgeting documents provided by the Comptroller of the Department of Defense to conduct two related studies. The first is a multi-year (Fiscal Years 1989-1994) trend analysis of one account, procurement, which examines how the end of the Cold War has affected micromanagement by congressional appropriators. The second study examines all defense budget categories for one representative year (FY1994) to compare the amount of micromanagement in procurement with that of other accounts. Taken together, these studies answer four questions crucial to the issue of micromanagement: (1) what percentage of procurement funding requests are altered in congressional appropriations, and how has that percentage changed with the collapse of the Soviet threat; (2) how big are the cuts -- and additions -- made by the appropriators to the president's request; (3) whether the House or the Senate is more dominant in
shaping the final appropriations bill; and (4) which of the armed services and elements of the defense budget are subjected to the greatest micromanagement?

This thesis argues that despite the end of the Cold War, the percentage of budget line items for procurement (i.e. weapons production) altered by congressional appropriators remained nearly constant from FY 1989-1994. In the six year analyzed, the percentage of procurement line items changed by congressional appropriators was between 20 to 23 percent. Measured in dollars, Congress never changed more than 27 percent of the total spending in the president's finding request. Congress subtracted from more line items that it added to, however line item subtractions were smaller on average (42 million dollars) than additions (63 million dollars). This thesis also found that Senate changes to individual line items were more likely to be retained in the final appropriations bill than were House changes. However, when averaged, line item changes proposed by the House were closer to the final conference average than those proposed in the Senate. A cross service analysis of defense appropriations line item budgeting revealed no particular service as the prime target of Congressional micromanagement, nor were any specific procurement programs within the services targeted above other programs. Finally, the single year cross sectional analysis revealed that the activity in the DoD procurement account is indicative of legislative change in the operations and research accounts, but not in construction and housing.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Congressional micromanagement of the defense budget is a crucial element of the struggle between the legislative and executive branches to shape military spending. By altering presidential funding requests, Congress can impose its own preferences on the defense budget and, thereby, help guide the restructuring of U.S. armed forces. Congressional micromanagement has drawn enormous criticism from academics and defense department officials. Yet, for all its criticism, surprisingly little empirical research has been conducted on the number and magnitude of program funding changes appropriated by Congress.

This thesis uses budgeting documents provided by the Comptroller of the Department of Defense to conduct two related studies. The first is a multi year (FYs 1989-1994) trend analysis of one account, procurement, which examines how the end of the Cold-War has affected micromanagement by congressional appropriators. The second study examines all defense budget categories for one representative year (FY 1994) to compare the amount of micromanagement in procurement with that of other accounts. Taken together, these studies answer four questions crucial to the issue of micromanagement: (1) what percentage of procurement funding requests are altered in congressional appropriations, and how has that percentage changed with the collapse of the Soviet threat; (2) how big are the cuts - and additions - made by the appropriators to the president's request; (3) which chamber, the House or the Senate, is more dominant in shaping the final appropriations bill; and (4) which of the armed services or program elements within the defense budget are subjected to the greatest micromanagement?
This thesis argues that despite the end of the Cold War, the percentage of budget line items for procurement (i.e. weapons production) altered by congressional appropriators remained nearly constant from FY 1989 to FY 1994. In the six year analyzed, the percentage of procurement line-items changed by congressional appropriators was between 20 to 23 percent. Measured in dollars, Congress never changed more than 27 percent of the total spending in the president's funding request. Congress subtracted from more line items that it added to, however line item subtractions were smaller on average (42 million dollars) than additions (63 million dollars). This thesis also found that Senate changes to individual line items were more likely to be retained in the final appropriations bill than were House changes. However, when averaged, line item changes proposed by the House were closer to the final conference average than those proposed in the Senate.

A cross service analysis of defense appropriations line item budgeting revealed no particular service as the prime target of Congressional micromanagement, nor were any specific procurement programs within the services targeted above other programs. Finally, the single year cross sectional analysis revealed that the activity in the DoD procurement account is indicative of legislative change in the operations and research accounts, but not in construction and housing.

Additionally, there is very little cohesion between the various defense oversight committees other than the fact that appropriators do tend to stay within the limits set by the authorization bill. Appropriators are also much more active overall and tend to cut from budget requests more frequently than authorizers.
I. INTRODUCTION

Congressional micromanagement of the defense budget is a crucial element of the struggle between the legislative and executive branches to shape military spending. By altering the specific program funding requests made by the president, Congress can impose its own detailed preferences on the defense budget and, thereby, help guide the restructuring of U.S. armed forces for the post-Cold War era. This congressional micromanagement has drawn enormous criticism from academics and defense department officials, who attack it as an inappropriate legislative power grab that disrupts and distorts the military's budgeting process. Yet for all this criticism, surprisingly little empirical research has been conducted on the actual number and magnitude of program funding changes made by Congress. This lack of research is particularly true of the funding ultimately appropriated (and not merely authorized) for defense. Moreover, while many academics argue that congressional micromanagement is driven by the desire to create weapons production jobs for constituents, no study has focused on micromanagement of the procurement (i.e., weapons production) account by comparing the amount of micromanagement in that account with other defense budget categories. Nor have previous studies examined variations in the amount of micromanagement directed at the appropriations for the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.
This thesis uses budgeting documents provided by the Comptroller of the Department of Defense to conduct two related studies. The first is a multi-year (FY's 1989-1994) trend analysis of one account, procurement, which examines how the end of the Cold War has affected micromanagement by congressional appropriators. The second study examines all defense budget categories for one representative year (FY 1994) to compare the amount of micromanagement in procurement with that of other accounts. Taken together, these studies answer four questions crucial to the issue of micromanagement: (1) what percentage of procurement funding requests are altered in congressional appropriations and how has that percentage changed with the collapse of the Soviet threat; (2) how big are the cuts - and additions - made by appropriators to the president's request; (3) which chamber, the House or the Senate, is more dominant in shaping the final appropriations bill, and (4) which of the armed services or program elements within the defense budget are subjected to the greatest micromanagement?

This thesis argues that despite the end of the Cold War, the percentage of budget line-items for procurement altered by congressional appropriators has remained nearly constant from FY 1989 to FY 1994. In the six years analyzed, the percentage of procurement line-items changed by congressional appropriators showed little variation, ranging from between 20 to 23 percent over that period. If the change relationships between procurement and two other accounts, operations and research, observed during the cross-sectional analysis of the FY 1994 are indicative of standard patterns, then very few of the budget changes made by legislators over the last six years are atypical. Measured in dollars, Congress never changed more than 27 percent of the total spending
in the president's procurement request. The highs were achieved in FY 1990 and 1991 when congressional dissatisfaction with the president's request was especially intense. Of the line-item changes made, appropriators cut program requests more often than they increased funding. However, line-item subtractions were smaller in size ($42 million on average) than were additions ($63 million on average). This study also finds that in four of the six years sampled, individual Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee line-item changes were more likely to be retained in the final bill than were House Appropriations changes. However, the House more often was closer to the procurement account's net dollar value average (in both additions and subtractions). Taken together these findings indicate that the final conference accepts, at face value, more Senate marks but on the whole strives to stay closer to House marks. Additionally, a cross-cut analysis of annual defense appropriations line-item budgeting reveals that no particular service or program element was the target of the Congressional micromanagement. Nor was any particular service or program singled out during FY 1994's cross-sectional study. Congress changes roughly 21% of the line-items submitted each year in the president's procurement budget request, procurement equates to about 33% of the whole DoD budget. The net fiscal effects of the changes are small, only about $1.8 billion dollars decrease in a $280 billion dollar budget in 1994.
II. THE ISSUE OF MICROMANAGEMENT

When critics attack Congress for micromanaging defense, that charge usually includes a multitude of sins: requiring the Department of Defense to submit numerous (and nonsensical) reports, demanding too much testimony from DoD witnesses at legislative hearings, or a variety of other congressional dictates. However, the element of micromanagement that is most significant for defense budgeting is the congressional penchant for altering "line-items" in the president's budget request; that is, for making specific changes to the funding proposals of individual programs listed in the request. The growth of this form of micromanagement emerged in part due to the larger, post-Vietnam and post-Watergate effort by Congress to play a greater role in military policymaking. However, micromanagement also reflected the competition for budgetary influence between the authorizing committees and the appropriations committees (especially the House and Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittees). In 1960 the Armed Services Committees began to apply the technique of annual authorizations to the procurement part of the defense budget and then continued to expand its application to other titles within the budget. (Kolodziej 1966, Stephens 1971, Art 1985a). Robert J. Art argues that intercommittee rivalry (between the Armed Services and Defense Appropriations Subcommittees) and control over the Pentagon were the two political imperatives that drove the Armed Services Committee into ever more detailed reviews of the annual budget and away from what had been their pattern from 1945–1960, namely, a rather general look at the nation's defense policies through annual posture hearings. (Art, 1985a, 229)
Concurrent with Art's article, an extensive study of defense decision making procedures by the Senate Armed Services Committee (including three days of testimony on the Senate Floor by Senators Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) and Sam Nunn (D-GA)) heightened attention to the problem of micromanagement. Several articles later appeared castigating the failure of Congress to provide reasoned oversight and recommending extensive structural changes. (Crackel 1985, Higgs 1988, Art 1989, Owens 1991) A 1990 Defense Department White Paper epitomized the compiling of statistical facts attacking Congressional intrusion into defense policy planning. The common theme of these studies is that 'good oversight' requires constant vigilance of legislative goals and action primarily through strategic dialogue, and that congressional micromanagement of program spending is disruptive to coherent budgeting.

However, while normative criticism of micromanagement abounds, far less empirical work has been done to measure the actual amount of micromanagement. Only two studies and a handful of short articles in the *Armed Forces Journal International* actually carry out a detailed empirical study of Congressional micromanagement. The first study was an unpublished report by Robert Bledsoe that documented the combined number of line-item changes by the Armed Services and Defense Appropriations Subcommittees for fiscal years 1976-1983. The findings of the study indicate that Congress changed over 10,000 line-items within the defense budget during the eight years considered. (Art, 1985a, 234) The basis of what constitutes a line-item is crucial for evaluating the efficacy of Bledsoe's work, but his study remains unpublished and is not available. Line-item
definition is particularly true of changes to the construction portion of the budget request. This portion of the budget is composed of many small program sub-elements that must be individually reviewed, authorized, and appropriated in order for the defense comptroller to allocate funding. However both the construction budget and changes to it are insignificant in comparison to the bulk of the president’s request. While commenting about the expansion in the scope of annual authorizations during the same period as Bledsoe’s study, Barry Blechman noted that the one exception was military construction.

(In the defense construction account)...”the armed services committees insisted on the right to authorize most individual construction projects. Construction, however, constituted only a tiny portion of defense spending and did not entail first-order decisions on defense policy and military strategy.” (Blechman, 1990, 30)

The increasing scope of Congressional authorizations and appropriations and its effect on the increase in the number of line-item changes to the defense request is another problem often overlooked by Congressional critics. Every empirically oriented Congressional micromanagement study comments on the dramatic increase in the annual number of line-items changed (Art 1985 and 1990, Blechman 1990, OSD 1990, Owens 1990, Lindsay 1991, Wildavsky 1992) No study links any measure of the increase to the broader issue that Congress had dramatically increased the scope of its budgetary review during those same years. Aaron Wildavsky, commenting on the descentus of defense, wrote that

In 1969 Congress made 180 changes to the defense authorizations bill and 650 revisions to the appropriations bill. These numbers increased to 222 and 1032, respectively, in 1975 and skyrocketed by 1985 to 1145 authorization adjustments and 2156 appropriations adjustments. (Wildavsky, 1992, 404)
A portion of the increases in line-item micromanagement are certainly due to more detailed scrutiny of the budget request, but a portion of the increase is also due to the inclusion of all types of weapons in 1970, Operations and Maintenance Programs in 1982, and all Procurement Programs in 1983. The breadth of Programs under Congressional scrutiny is a different issue than the detail of micromanagement.

Moreover, knowledge of the basis and dispersion of line-item changes is crucial because much of the empirical work that has been done is methodologically flawed. Typical in this regard is the initial *Armed Forces Journal International* study done by Deborah Kyle. She argued that Congress changed over 60% of the line-items accounted for in the 1984 defense budget request. Specifically, Kyle wrote that,

> the Senate Appropriations Committee changed 63% of the 1,129 line-items it reviewed and the House Appropriations Committee changed a whopping 68%...although proportionally similar, Committee changes were redundant only half of the time. In most cases one Committee changed one line-item, while the other adjusted a different one, thereby reworking nearly every line-item in the budget. (Kyle, 1984, 24)

However, Kyle’s study was methodologically flawed. Kyle used only the Department of Defense final line-item summary on Congressional action (more commonly called the Financial Accounting Document or “FAD”) in determining the base number of line-items within the president’s budget request. This document exclusively addresses the specific program element funding requests that were subject to change by Congress. The FAD includes only those items that Congress has considered for change, not the total number of line-items in the president’s defense budget request. That request includes thousands of line-items that are sufficiently non-controversial to Congress that they are excluded.
from the FAD. In order to identify the total number of line-items in the president's request, a different set of documents must be used. The DoD Comptroller provides three documents to Congress that identify all of the line-items in their respective budget categories: Procurement Programs (the "P-1"); Research, Testing, Development, and Evaluation Programs (the "R-1"); Construction and Housing Programs (the "C-1"). There is no such document for Operations and Maintenance Programs. Kyle's failure to use the proper sources for determining the total number of line-items in the president's request led her to overestimate the percentage of line-items changed by Congress. A later Armed Forces Journal International studies accounted for all line-items in the budget request when calculating the percent changed in the FAD. Although this study indicated a higher number of line-item changes were made, its percent changed determinations were much lower. Specifically, 1,579 appropriations line-item changes in FY 1988 amounted to only 32% of the requested line-items and 805 appropriations changes in FY 1989 adjusted an even lower 21% of the next year's request. (Dean, 1989, 14) The last good empirical study of line-item changes was completed by James Lindsay in 1990. This was a very limited accounting of changes to line-items of nuclear weapons related expenses within the Procurement and Research Programs. Though the study was limited it was a sound accounting of changes viewed as a percent of total line-items and dollar values taken from the P-1 and R-1.

A second problem with much of the empirical literature on micromanagement is that it emphasizes authorizations, as opposed to appropriations. While the authorizations process is an integral part of defense budgeting, the final process through which funds are
appropriated for specific programs ultimately determines the actual spending levels for individual line-items. This is due to the fact that the House and Senate Appropriations Committees (and particularly their Defense Appropriations Subcommittees) possess the authority to actually "write the checks" that fund DoD programs. The appropriation of funding customarily occurs after the authorization process. In theory, the appropriators are supposed to be guided by the funding levels established by the authorization committees (i.e., the House and Senate Armed Services Committees). In practice, however, the appropriators do not always adopt the funding levels in the authorization committee conference reports, and numerous line-items within the DoD budgets are funded either higher or lower than the level designated in the Defense Authorizations Bill. In effect, the appropriations committees create their own separate versions of the Defense Bill, giving those committees the final power to shape the DoD budget.

A third empirical problem lies in determining which portions of the DoD budget to study. Some budget categories suffer from anomalies that make them poor points of reference for measuring micromanagement as a whole. For example, Military Construction Programs are considered separately from other budget requests even to the point of being authorized and appropriated under a different bill than all other defense accounts. The findings of this study also indicate that Construction and Housing programs are adjusted differently than are the remainder of the military budget requests. Another anomalous category is funding for the Reserve and National Guard. The services have been gradually reducing these two components' operations, procurement, and construction budgets. There are no reserve or guard procurement funding requests in the FY 1994 or 1995 DoD
budget submission. Congress generally reacts by adding line-items and increasing funding in its authorization and appropriations bills. This reaction would suggest an extensive legislative interest in the reserve and guard quite above Congress' actual concerns.

Moreover, given the many thousands of total line-items in the total DoD budget, practical considerations dictated that this study's multi-year analysis of micromanagement focus on one budget category. We selected defense procurement for a number of reasons. While there are many different budget accounts within the DoD budget (Operations and Maintenance, Research and Development, etc.), Owens and others have argued that Procurement seems especially likely to be micromanaged by Congressional conduct that is driven by the desire to create jobs for constituents. (Owens, 1991, 142-3) Weapons production offers a particularly tempting target for such "pork"-oriented behavior.

This thesis attempts to present a more thorough measure of congressional micromanagement than currently exists. The statistical analysis is presented in four parts. The first analyzes legislative appropriations of the defense budget request to evaluate how many line-items out of the total were changed and by how much. The second part of the analysis considers each annual budget against its service components to identify any service specific anomalies in the appropriations process. The third part of the analysis compares House and Senate actions to determine the influence each chamber has to effect its mark on the final bill. Finally, the fourth part of this study is a cross sectional analysis of an entire defense budget to determine the applicability of the findings to other budgetary accounts.
III. METHODOLOGY

Part of the difficulty in examining micromanagement lies in understanding how line-items are created in the president's request. The line-items within the president's request are the result of a complex defense budgeting process that requires years of programmed planning. The defense department budgeting system is a highly intricate multi-staged mechanism that begins with each service's budget submission and generates a complex defense budget; an enigmatic document composed of over fifteen hundred program elements, five thousand line-items, and over one hundred different accounting systems. The budget is formed through a routinized sequence of decisions taken within a hierarchy of constraints, standard operating procedures, and simple decision making rules. (Mintz, 1988, 22) The individual service budget submissions are organized by program categories (such as strategic forces, general purpose forces, airlift and the like), which are collated, reconstructed, and divided into line-items by the defense comptroller. These divisions designate the object of the expenditure and the effecting service. Budgetary excesses are then reconciled to a specific ceiling.

It is important to note that the number of defense budget line-items that exist at any one time is constantly fluctuating. The standard document that contains all procurement line-items available in print is called the P-1, and it is the closest snapshot representation of procurement line-items published for each fiscal year in existence at any time. The
benchmark count of line-items used in this study came from the P-1s for each respective year. The Defense Comptroller’s Program and Financial Department tracks all line-items considered by the Congressional Authorizations and Defense Appropriations Subcommittees. They publish a record of this line-item activity in a document called the Financial Accounting Documents (FAD). FADs track line-items that are singled out for potential change during either the authorizations or appropriations process. The FAD is a comprehensive compilation of all Congressional action and so was used as the basis for this study’s accounting of changes made by Congress. Line-items listed in the FAD are drawn from all parts of the defense budget. However only line-items from the procurement accounts (excluding accounts designated for Reserve forces) were used in the multi-year analysis conducted in this study.

Figure 1 is a representative page from a FAD. The format is standardized. First listed (reading from left to right) are the line-item number and noun name. The next column specifies the amended presidential budget request. The following columns list the House and Senate Defense Appropriations Committees floor action. The dollar values in these columns represent the additions, subtractions, or agreement to the funding requested in the presidential budget. The header in these columns also specifies the House or Senate report number. The next column contains the resolution resulting from the Senate and House Appropriations Committees Conference. During this meeting the two chambers of Congress settle any differences in funding to determine the defense appropriations bill’s final mark. The amount of spending agreed upon in conference will be the amount signed
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appropriation Title and Item</th>
<th>Request</th>
<th>Authorization</th>
<th>House 106-145</th>
<th>House 107-145</th>
<th>Senate 107-145</th>
<th>Final Act</th>
<th>P&amp;I 107-145</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>All other programs</strong></td>
<td>938,680</td>
<td>916,353</td>
<td>702,271</td>
<td>70,271</td>
<td>12,353</td>
<td>22,271</td>
<td>416,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total - Other Procurement, Army</strong></td>
<td>4,100,100</td>
<td>3,008,111</td>
<td>2,272,720</td>
<td>192,272</td>
<td>694,084</td>
<td>2,006,219</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Aircraft Procurement, Navy**
- **201** GB/GD/HMS (SURFWARFARE) SHORES
- **207** AV-8B (VSTOL) MARINES (NVY)
- **208** P-14A/B/REDHAWK (FIGHTER) TOSCAT
- **209** P-14A/B/REDHAWK (FIGHTER) TOSCAT
- **210** P-14A/B/REDHAWK (FIGHTER) TOSCAT ADV PROC (CV)
- **211** P-14A/B/REDHAWK (FIGHTER) TOSCAT ADV PROC (CV)
- **212** F/A-18 (FIGHTER) ADVANCED ADVANCED ADV PROC (CV)
- **213** CIV/N-S36 (HELICOPTER) SUPER STALLION
- **214** CIV/N-S36 (HELICOPTER) SUPER STALLION
- **215** CIV/N-S36 (HELICOPTER) SUPER STALLION
- **216** V-22 OSHAW ADV PROC (CV)
- **219** SH-60B (NVY HELICOPTER) ADVANCED ADV PROC (CV)
- **221** SH-60B (NVY HELICOPTER) ADVANCED ADV PROC (CV)
- **224** (EARLY WARNING) ADVANCED ADVANCED (NVY) AF (CV)
- **225** (EARLY WARNING) ADVANCED ADVANCED (NVY) AF (CV)
- **226** P-3C PRIOR YEAR SAVINGS
- **227** AIRCRAFT SELF PROTECTION JAMMER
- **228** S-4515 GUARDIAN
- **230** A-6 SERIES
- **233** A-6 SERIES
- **234** A-6 SERIES
- **235** A-6 SERIES
- **237** CARGO TRANSPORT A/C SERIES
- **238** POWER PLANT CHANGES
- **239** CARGO TRANSPORT A/C SERIES
- **240** CARGO TRANSPORT A/C SERIES
- **241** SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS
- **243** SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS
- **244** SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS
- **245** UNOCCUPIED EQUIPMENT
- **246** UNOCCUPIED EQUIPMENT
- **247** UNOCCUPIED EQUIPMENT
- **248** UNOCCUPIED EQUIPMENT
- **249** INSTALLING AIDS OF EQUIPMENT
- **250** INSTALLING AIDS OF EQUIPMENT

**Total** 2,084,180 2,084,180 601,500 542,720 542,720 2,084,180
into law. The final column listed on a FAD page lists the amount of spending enacted into law for each line-item considered.

The defense department comptroller produces the FAD because it is concerned about the effects of Congressional changes. Legislative micromanagement does adversely affect the Pentagon's planning and programming process. Many of the projects listed as line-items can take years to complete. Reducing such a project's budget for the current year results in a reassessment of the out-year budget needs. The revised costs must not only account for the lost money but also for increases due to inflation and for production inefficiencies introduced by stretching out the program. These fiscal setbacks will, in turn, ripple out to affect the funds available for other programs in the out-years. In this way the original line-item change can permeate out into future budgets and affect many more projects than the single line-item first modified by Congress. Capitol Hill is aware of the affect of its micromanagement and of its responsibilities for oversight. The FAD documents legislative decisions to review program elements but does not provide Congressional rational for those decisions. According to a senior staff member of the Senate Appropriations interviewed for this study, specific line-items can be singled out for any number of reasons: due to historical interest, because of some specific like or dislike, or because a member intends to add or subtract from a range of programs associated with a line-item. Any line-item considered by the defense authorization or appropriations committees shows up on the FAD (whether it is ultimately changed or not).

Parts of the Defense Budget not listed in the FAD are the classified intelligence procurement budgets for each of the respective services. While there are classified
line-items within the DoD Procurement budget (listed either by their code name or simply by the label “classified program”) there is no “single-source” document modeled along the lines of the FAD tracking funding of intelligence line-items through the appropriations process. While it is obvious that such a document would not be available for unclassified research, extensive inquiry indicates that such a document simply does not exist at all. According to a senior Defense Department budget official, the intelligence community has been more concerned with the intelligence information traveling through the hardware on hand and much less concerned with defending the purchase of the hardware itself.

In essence, the intelligence community has been more results oriented than hardware oriented. This attitude translates into a mission oriented approach to defending intelligence procurement programs when testifying to Congress, and has resulted in a lack of line-item tracking over time. While this process of budgeting appears to have been successful to date, it has resulted in little tangible information available for analysis, and until only recently (as result of the shrinking DoD budget) little enthusiasm for tracking line-items over time. Since there is no comprehensive list of intelligence procurement line-items available for analysis, intelligence procurement budgets for the services will not be addressed within the limits of this study. However, in light of the continuous decline in defense procurement (and in the Defense Budget as a whole) it would appear wise for the intelligence community to take aboard the concept of line-item management and tracking, if for no other purpose than to have an additional tool for analysis.

Each line-item listed in the FADs for 1989–1994, and used in this study, was manually entered into a database for analysis. While this process was time consuming, it afforded
A detailed analysis by sophisticated computer statistical software packages (specifically Starview by Macintosh and SPSS). Table I lists the coding format used in the data entry for this study. Figure 2 shows an example of how the data from the FAD looked when entered into the analysis database. The data first was broken down by service component (Army, Navy, Air Force) then by program account (Operations, Procurement, Research) and finally by program element (aircraft, weapons, ships). The data was entered by line-item within each program in the order it appeared in the FAD.

**TABLE I CODING FORMAT FOR DATA ENTRY**

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<th>PROCUREMENT</th>
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<td></td>
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A. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTI-YEAR DATA

The first stage of analysis considered successive annual procurement requests against appropriations changes as a whole. This examination measured the percent of procurement line-item changes for each year. This was done by counting the number of changes documented in each year's FAD and dividing by the total procurement line-items documented in the corresponding year's P-1. The next level of analysis split the annual appropriations changes down into the number of additions and subtractions. These changes were evaluated for percentage variations and for their net dollar value changes. Finally the monetary data from the preceding analysis was merged to reflect the total dollar amount (by summing the absolute value of additions and subtractions) and the net amount (by summing the raw value of additions and subtractions). This process was conducted successively against the whole budget, against the service and program components, and finally against program element breakdowns. The resulting values reflected the total change for each year under study.

The next stage of analysis involved statistical evaluation of the tabulated budget accounts to determine mean levels of activity by legislative committee. This required a careful review of coding to exempt line-item changes that were not modified by the committee being evaluated (i.e. excluding line-item whose change value was zero).

The primary purpose of the statistical analysis was to determine whether changes made by Congress show a standard normal distribution pattern. This portion of the study focused on two distinct levels of analysis; first on the correlation of House, Senate, and
Conference activity and second on an analysis of variance (ANOVA) between legislative treatments of program elements.

Correlation analysis studies the joint behavior of two statistical populations to see whether they are related. The strength of their relationship is measured by a correlation coefficient \( r \) which varies from -1 to 1. Correlation analysis does not depend on which of the two populations under study is treated as the dependent variable nor on the units in which the populations are measured. Correlation is a general measure of the linear relationship among the variable where the highest orders of relationship are achieved when the correlation coefficient is 1 (positive slope) or -1 (negative slope). Statistical rules of thumb provide that the correlation is weak when the coefficient is less than 0.5, strong when the coefficient is greater than 0.85, and moderate otherwise. The square of the coefficient roughly describes the percentage of the sample that could be accounted for by a linear model.

Analysis of variance is a more rigorous study of sample populations that tests for differences in true averages associated with different treatments of a controlling factor. In this study the budget request is the base statistical population and the legislative action is the factor under study. ANOVA tests against the assumption that the base and treatment populations are all normally distributed with the same variance. ANOVA derives a test statistic \( F \) that gauges agreement between the sample population and a theoretical standard (a chi-squared distribution). A large difference between the test population's \( F \)-test and the theoretical \( F \)-test indicates a weak relationship between the factor under study and the base population. This difference is normally shown as a \( p \) value. This is a
test of significance common to all statistical analyses. The p value conveys information about the strength of the test that allows evaluation at any level of testing. The p value varies between 1 and 0 where a value closer to 1 indicates test significance and closer to 0 indicates insignificance. Most computer driven statistical analysis packages automatically calculate and display p values. A conclusion about significance can then be drawn directly from the output data without reference to tables of critical values (as would be required to evaluate the F-test).

Correlation measurements were taken to investigate the strength of the relationship between the House, Senate, and Conference action for each year. ANOVA measurements were taken by percentages and funding levels to determine pattern of relationships within the program and service components.

B. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SINGLE YEAR CROSS SECTIONAL DATA

The initial analysis of Congressional appropriations action searched for trends within multi-year budgeting of the defense procurement accounts. The follow on empirical survey analyzed all budgetary accounts within a single year to find out if Congressional action amending the procurement account typifies action within other defense accounts. This portion of the study focused on the 1994 defense budget request and included both the House and Senate Armed Service Committees' and Defense Appropriations Subcommittees' action on all accounts represented in the FAD. Although the FAD treats each program account similarly there are differences in the original budget submission
between those accounts. The first and most obvious difference is that the Armed Services Committees do not authorize specific sums of money for personnel but rather authorize a specific end strength. The end strength can be converted to a dollar figure given certain assumptions about cost per man and rank distributions. These calculations are not included in the FAD. Appropriations for personnel are provided by single line budgets differentiated only by service. These anomalies differentiate the personnel accounts from other accounts and make them unsuitable for line-item analysis through statistical methods. The Operations and Maintenance account (O&M) is also anomalous in that there is no O-1 and only a limited elemental division of line-items in the president’s budget request. Legislative committees overcome this by breaking the operations accounts apart in their own legislative review. This requires a slightly different treatment of the O&M account to allow for a measured appraisal of this process. The base line-item count for O&M is taken as the number of line-items in the final bill (as delineated in the FAD). The Procurement (P-1), Research (R-1), and Construction (C-1) accounts do have itemized budget requests and these were used to determine the base number of line-items within each account. The Construction account can be broken down even further. First into Construction and Housing since both accounts are treated separately in the C-1. This was done. Second as specific projects within each element line, by law the Office of the Comptroller must receive specific authorization and appropriation for each project to allocate funding. This study remained at the level of elemental detail to remain consistent with the review afforded other budgetary accounts.
The statistical methodology utilized two-way contingency tables that compared change
code frequency coded as a nominal variable against action within budget categories by different
legislative committees. The purpose for employing a contingency table methodology was
to investigate whether the proportions between the different budgetary categories are the
same as for the whole statistical population. The hypothesis is that the sample population
is categorically homogeneous. The first step in conducting the test is to tabulate the
observed population values so that they can be compared to the expected population. The
expected number of observations is the product of the sample population and category
proportion. If the hypothesis of homogeneity is true and all samples are large (n > 5), the
differences between the sample population and the expected population should be small.
The test results provided observed and expected counts, a chi-squared test value, and its
associated level of significance (p).

The statistical results for the multi-year and single year analyses are presented
graphically through the charts provided in the results chapter. The multi-year analysis
yielded charts of percent change in total line-items by program and service and composite
dollar changes by addition, subtraction, average, and net differentiated by program and
service. These same graphs were prepared for the single year analysis as well as charts
showing committee differences and levels of association. These later chart displays
program category along the x-axis and associated counts along the y-axis. The observed
counts are shown as the blocks originating from the x-axis, the expected counts are the
heavy lines drawn over the blocks. The difference between the two shows the breadth of
dissociation between a statistically homogeneous sample and observed measurements.
IV. THE RESULTS

The results of this empirical analysis are introduced in three parts. The first part presents a summary of appropriations committee changes to defense procurement budget requests from 1989–1994. The next part explores those changes for statistical variations within their service and program element components. The final part presents a cross sectional analysis of authorization and appropriations changes to the fiscal year budget for 1994. The funding levels referred to and listed in the following tables and graphs do not include accounts designated for the Reserve forces.

A. RESULTS OF THE MULTI-YEAR ANALYSIS

The statistical analysis begins with a basic breakdown of procurement line-item changes relative to the total number of line-items listed in the P-I for each fiscal year. The base number of annual line-item changes are listed in Figure 3. The number of changes varied between a low of 233 in FY 1989 to a high of 287 in FY 1993. Change percentages were calculated by dividing base numbers of changes into the total number of line-items listed in the P-I for each respective year and are presented in Table II. The percentage of line-items changed each year by the appropriations subcommittees varied between 15 and 23 percent.
Figure 3. Line-Item Changes vs Number of Line Items (Procurement)
The next level of analysis describes line-item changes as a function of cuts or additions. Figure 4 shows this breakdown. In each year more line-items were subtracted from than were added to. FY 1991 represented the widest disparity between changes adding (60 items) and changes cutting (226 items). Exploring further, the percentages additions and subtractions were determined and plotted with the total change percentages in Figure 5. As expected, the largest percentage of line-items cut occurred in FY 1991 when 16.6% of procurement line-items were cut in funding by the appropriators. This action coincides with the largest dollar amount of cuts (roughly $16.5 billion). The largest percentage of line-items added occurred the following year when 8.8% of procurement line-items were increased in funding. However, the largest increase in the dollar additions to procurement line-items was in 1990 ($11.85 billion), and not 1992 ($5.68 billion). The pattern indicates that prior to 1991 there were a smaller number of large funding changes and since then the pattern has changed to a pattern of enacting a larger number of smaller dollar amount increases. The year with the largest percentage of procurement line-item changes was 1993 (22.9%). However, it is important to note that despite the apparent increase in the percentages of line-item changes, the actual number of line-items changed did not differ significantly over the last three years of the study.
Figure 4. Appropriators Line-item Changes to DoD Procurement
Figure 5. Line-Item Changes as a Percent of Total DoD Procurement
Rather the total number of line-items listed in the P-I has decreased from the numbers submitted at the beginning of the decade. The recent increase in the percent of line-item changes does not appear indicative of any closer scrutiny by the appropriations subcommittees, but rather simply reflects a decreasing procurement program.

The next level of analysis measured the number and percentage of line-item changes as a function of the dollar amount of change in the defense procurement budget (in billions). This analysis combined the dollar amount of both additions and subtractions enacted by the appropriations committees (absolute value of additions and subtractions were combined as positive numbers, to measure the total dollar amount of change). Figure 6 shows the dollar amount of change plotted against the total defense procurement budget. This chart indicates that the procurement budget has been on a steady decline (from $78 billion in 1989 to $44 billion in 1994) and since 1991 a commensurate decline in the total dollar amount of change.

The next step in the analysis was to identify the specific dollar changes enacted by the appropriators. Figure 7 breaks down and displays the specific changes as additions and subtractions. The only year that Congress added more to procurement programs than it cut was FY 1990 (the same year as the Persian Gulf War). It is noteworthy that despite a net increase of $4.4 billion in FY 1990, the final appropriation was still $1 billion less than it had been in 1989. There are two important points that can be drawn from the general analysis of the annual budget. The first is that despite the rancorous and rhetorical protests of many congressional critics, Congress changes relatively few of the line-items proposed in the procurement section presidential budget request (on average about 20%
Figure 7. Appropriations Procurement Line-item Changes (in Billions)
over the last six years) and the dollar value of those changes is small when compared to the total procurement budget.

The second point is that although Congress generally appears to defer budgeting to the defense department it can and will change the budget if it is dissatisfied with the Pentagon's strategic and structural policy rationale. FY 1991 is unusual in just about every aspect measured in this study. The budget that year largely continued past policies even though historic events had reshaped the international balance of powers (and the American economy dipped into recession). The defense department's stance provoked sharp criticism on Capitol Hill that quickly moved beyond rhetoric. Paul Stockton observed that

After attacking the testimony of Cheney and other defense officials in a series of defense policy hearings, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees began in the spring of 1990 to draft their own version of the defense budget. Differences soon emerged between the two committee "marks," with Nunn pushing for smaller cuts than did Congressman Les Aspin, chair of the House Armed Services Committee. Nevertheless, the defense authorization bills that emerged from the two committees reflected a different sense of program spending priorities (and lower overall spending levels) than those proposed by the president. (Stockton, 1993, 240)

The next part of the analysis focuses on the individual committee, service, and program element components of the appropriations changes to the presidential budget request. The first phase of the analysis studied the interactions of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee (HDAS) and the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee (SDAS). Figure 8 shows the average line-item activity conducted by the HDAS, SDAS, and by their final conference mark up. The mean for each committee was calculated by dividing the total number of change proposals (specific to each committee) by total dollar amount.
Figure 8. Average Dollar Value of Line-Item Change by Appropriators (Procurement)
of the proposed changes (also specific to each committee) The figure shows the comparative magnitude of the average annual recommendation of each committee (per line-item) and the average change that results from the final conference mark up. The figure indicates that more often the HDAS is closer to the average conference mark.

While the measurement of the average change proposed by each appropriations committee is descriptive, additional statistical tools can be used to build a stronger basis of comparison. Correlation testing provides a more rigorous comparison between the actions of the two committees. Table III presents the computed correlation coefficients resulting from a comparison of the line-item dollar value changes within the appropriations committees and final conference. As described earlier, the higher the value of the coefficient, the closer the level of association between sample populations. The table indicates that the SDAS more often brings its change through the final conference (although as noted earlier, on average the HDAS is closer indicating that large changes proposed by the SDAS are not as readily accepted). The table also indicates an overall steady decline in the association between committee action and final conference mark. The inference is that committee decisions on line-item changes matter less than they used to. The level of association in FY 1994 was particularly weak.

**TABLE III  ANNUAL COMMITTEE TO CONFERENCE CHANGE CORRELATION**

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The next level of analysis examined the results of appropriations committee line-item changes against individual service components. The raw number of annual line-item additions and subtractions for each service were plotted and are presented in Figure 9. The figure indicates that all services (excepting the Marine Corps) withstood a particularly large increase in the number of line-item cuts in 1991. Marine Corps procurement activity, which is relatively small in comparison to the other three services, tracks evenly over all the years studied. The specific dollar changes to service accounts are provided in Figure 10. Only the relatively good treatment of the Navy in FY 1990 (through additions) and mild treatment of the Army in FY 1991 (through limited cutting) stand out from the apparently even treatment of the services. Figures 11 through 18 provide separate service plots of percent and specific dollar changes for further clarity. Finally, the net dollar change in appropriations is provided by Figure 19. This figure shows that in general appropriators add to Army and Marine budgets while subtracting from Navy and Air Force budgets. However the net effect for all services is at most modest, not exceeding $3 billion in budgets averaging $20-$30 billion annually.

The final component level analysis examined appropriations committee activity against a breakdown of program elements. The intent of this investigation is to find out if appropriators have an interest in any particular group of projects within the procurement account. ANOVA testing was used to explore differences in the means and variances in the Congressional treatment of program elements. The statistical results of the examination are provided in Table IV in the form of means tables differentiated by HDAS, SDAS, and CONFERENCE activity. The tables indicate that while some
Figure 9. Appropriations Procurement Line-Item Changes by Service
Figure 10. Net Dollar Amount of Procurement Line-Item Changes by Service
Figure 11. Army Appropriations Line-Item Changes (Procurement)
Figure 12. Dollar Value of Changes to Army Appropriations Request (Procurement)
Figure 13. Navy Appropriations Line-Item Changes (Procurement)
Figure 14. Dollar Value of Changes to Navy Appropriations Request (Procurement)
Figure 15. Air Force Appropriations Line-Item Changes (Procurement)
Figure 16. Dollar Value of Changes to Air Force Appropriations Request (Procurement)
Figure 17. Marines Appropriations Line-Item Changes (Procurement)
Figure 18. Dollar Value of Changes to Marines Appropriations Request (Procurement)
Figure 19. Net Dollar Effect of Procurement Line-Item Changes by Service
### TABLE IV  MEANS DIFFERENTIATION OF PROCUREMENT LINE-ITEM CHANGES

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#### CONFERENCE

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**SOURCE:** DoD Financial Accounting Documents for FYs 1989 to 1994

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procurement program areas are significantly affected in a particular single year, there are no specific program categories that are generally affected. The mean tables also indicate that there is no specific pattern of change within the final conference mark. These results support the hypothesis that there are no particular programs within the procurement account that are exceptionally interesting to appropriators. Although not shown, p values calculated in conjunction with the means tables all indicated an insignificant level of association.

B. RESULTS OF THE SINGLE YEAR ANALYSIS

The broad trends found in the defense appropriations account are indicative of how other accounts are treated and how the authorization committees act. The key findings in the study of the 1994 budget are that the interrelationship between committees is generally more significant than between chambers and that the total percent change to the budget request is indicative of specific change rates within the operations, procurement, and research accounts but not to changes within construction and housing accounts. The findings are suggestive that Congress generally micromanages the defense budget to fulfill its legitimate policy oversight responsibilities, even in areas where potentially significant direct public incentives could be a powerful lure for parochialism.

The initial assessment of Congressional micromanagement in the FY 1994 budget process paralleled the analyses of multi-year budgeteering. The treatment of the defense budget request was broken down by committee, service, and program components to find distinct operating patterns. Percent change and changes from expected were analyzed first.
The study then examined dollar value changes by average, addition or cut, and net assessments with respect to the component breakdowns. Tables V and VI provide the percent of line-items changed and changes from expected by program and service. Figures 20 and 21 provide this information graphically.

This data indicates that procurement programs are adjusted less than expected, research and personnel programs are adjusted about as much as expected, and that operations and construction programs are adjusted more than expected. No specific patterns of changes are measured through this examination but a pattern does seem to be indicated that will be investigated by more powerful statistical methods. Figures 22 through 27 provide the dollar value breakdown of legislative line-item changes and show no clear patterns in Congressional interest. Again more cogent means will be employed to verify the independence between committees and program or service components in the next phase of analysis.

Although the procurement account is changed the least among all accounts the relationship of the procurement account to the total number of line-item changes and to the operations and research accounts is strong. A simple linear regression holding total percent change by committee as the independent variable against percent change in other committees yielded strong measures of correlation to operations, procurement, and research. Table VII shows the calculated coefficients of determination ($R^2$), as noted before a test value above 0.9 indicates a strong (linear) relationship. The regression analysis was used instead of a correlation test because the unit measures of all the test variables are the same and because the regression analysis is more meaningful for small
## TABLE V VARIATIONS IN CONGRESSIONAL ACTION BY PROGRAM

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*Tables show percent of observed change from total by program and number of observed line-item changes shown over number of expected line-item changes by program.*

SOURCE: DoD Program Budgets (P-1,R-1,C-1) and Financial Accounting Documents for FY 1994.
TABLE VI  
VARIATIONS IN CONGRESSIONAL ACTION BY SERVICE

### HOUSE COMMITTEES

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Tables show percent of observed change from total by service and number of observed line-item changes shown over number of expected line-item changes by service.

SOURCE: DoD Program Budgets (P-1,R-1,C-1) and Financial Accounting Document for FY 1994.
PERCENT CHANGE IN LINE ITEMS
BY PROGRAM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SENATE

HOUSE/SENATE CONFERENCE

ASC  APPR

Figure 20. Percent of FY 94 Budget Request Line-Items Changed (by Program)
Figure 21. Percent of FY 94 Budget Request Line-Items Changed (by Service)
Figure 22. Net Dollar Effect of Changes to FY 94 Budget Request (by Program)
Figure 23. Total Changes by Additions to FY 94 Budget Request (by Program)
TOTAL DOLLAR CHANGE FROM CUTS
BY PROGRAM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SENATE

HOUSE/SENATE CONFERENCE

Figure 24. Total Changes by Recessions to FY 94 Budget Request (by Program)
Figure 25. Net Dollar Effect of Changes to FY 94 Budget Request (by Service)
TOTAL DOLLAR CHANGE FROM ADDITIONS
BY SERVICE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

TOTAL DOLLAR CHANGE BY ADDITIONS (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

ARMY  NAVY  AIR FORCE  MARINES  DoD

SENATE

TOTAL DOLLAR CHANGE BY ADDITIONS (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

ARMY  NAVY  AIR FORCE  MARINES  DoD

HOUSE/SENATE CONFERENCE

TOTAL DOLLAR CHANGE BY ADDITIONS (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

ARMY  NAVY  AIR FORCE  MARINES  DoD

ASC  APPR

Figure 26. Total Changes by Additions to FY 94 Budget Request (by Service)
Figure 27. Total Changes by Recessions to FY 94 Budget Request (by Service)
test samples. A similar test along service lines indicated that there is also a strong relationship between the various committee treatments of changes to service budgets but not to defense-wide requests. The actual spending patterns did not show strong patterns of association in either program or service shares as shown by Table VIII and IX.

When considering change patterns it is clear from the contingency tables that procurement is adjusted less often than other accounts. Similarly it is explicit that operations and construction accounts are adjusted more frequently than other accounts. The significant difference between the operations account and others is that it is not presented in a programmed format when the budget goes to Congress, rather it is submitted as a collection of broad categories with virtually no elemental breakdown. Congress generates line-items when it breaks the account down into a more practical format. There is no prevailing pattern among the committees of adding or cutting the operations budget through those changes (FY 1994 Authorizations reduced the O&M
### TABLE VIII CORRELATION ASSOCIATION OF LINE-ITEM CHANGES

**ASSOCIATION OF COMMITTEE CHANGES TO FINAL CONFERENCE CHANGE**

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### TABLE IX REGRESSION ASSOCIATION OF DOLLAR VALUE CHANGE

**PROGRAM DIFFERENTIATION**

**ASSOCIATION OF COMMITTEE CHANGES TO FINAL CONFERENCE CHANGE**

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**SERVICE DIFFERENTIATION**

**ASSOCIATION OF COMMITTEE CHANGES TO FINAL CONFERENCE CHANGE**

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budget, FY 1994 Appropriations increased it). The military construction budget potentially has the greatest parochial gain because the changes there immediately and directly affect constituent interests. In fact there appears to be a great deal of activity above expected in the construction accounts. However, this year is anomalous within that account because the services submitted budgets not accounting for BRAC closures and so required Congress to act to rescind funds for projects requested at bases that are soon to be closed. This explains some of the additional line-items and negative adjustments to this account in FY 94 (though the bulk of the recessions came from cutting support for overseas bases). The area of base closure is one where Congress has shown that it knows its own liabilities and can act above parochial interests. Christopher Derring summarized the process whereby the House and Senate...

successfully joined forces to create base-closing legislation (in 1988)...(the independent commission appointed by the secretary of defense) recommended the closure of 86 bases and partial closure of five others. The recommendation was endorsed by the defense secretary and by all but four members of the House committee. A resolution to reject the package, that is, to keep the bases open, was then defeated on the House floor. While the 1988 law provided for only a single round of base closings, the 1991 defense authorization bill provided for a slightly revised commission process of three more rounds of cuts in 1991, 1993, and 1995. The base-closing procedure is essentially a means for the committees and for Congress to make a decision in the public's interest that would not otherwise be forthcoming. Members affected by the cuts are able to engage in the necessary symbolic opposition but the packages are of sufficient size to sustain protest votes against them. Although the initiative has returned to the Pentagon, since the defense secretary promulgates the initial list, the commission shields members by its endorsement, allows for member input, and the all-or-nothing procedure prevents serial consideration of each of the proposed closings. (Derring, 1993, 179-180)

This is a clear instance where, although the services provided Congress the opportunity to easily legislate parochial interests, both the House and Senate chose to observe the higher goal of fiscal responsibility. The statutory nature of the construction account
requires that each project (program element and sub-element) must be specifically authorized and appropriated to execute funding. Therefore each project must specifically be rescinded to stop funding, in an aggregated context the process would be counted against Congress as micromanagement of defense department budgeting.

Among the four important defense budgeting committees, it is clear that each committee acts independently of one another. A correlation of committee action based on line-item dollar value changes over the whole budget indicated only a weak correlation between the Authorization committees and a separate weak correlation between the Appropriations committees and conference mark up. The specific correlation coefficients are shown in Table VIII. A correlation study was used in lieu of regression analysis because of the large sample size and significant difference in the magnitude of dollar value changes throughout the budget (unit valuation is irrelevant to correlation studies). There is also only a weak correlation between the Authorization bill and Appropriations bill. The Appropriation's Defense Subcommittees generally do look at line-items changed by the Armed Services Committees and stay within authorized limits of those line-items.

In FY 94, appropriations exceeded authorizations in 16% of all line-items, this included both exceeding dollar changes to authorization changes and increasing funding to line-items not considered by the Armed Services Committee's Final Bill. The Appropriations Subcommittee evaluates and changes a significant number of additional line-items not even considered during authorization's mark ups.
V. CONCLUSION

The objective of this thesis was to describe the patterns of Congressional Committee line-item changes on the defense budget. The study conducted included empirical analyses of appropriations committee changes to procurement budget requests from FY 1989-1994 and a cross sectional analysis of authorization and appropriations changes to the FY 1994 budget. The principle findings within the examination of annual procurement appropriations indicate that legislative line-item micromanagement is both enduring and consistent. Congress regularly changes from 20% to 23% of the line-items submitted each year in the president's budget request. When measured in billions of dollars the change has not exceeded 27% of the total, even when there was a high degree of legislative dissatisfaction with the budget proposal. An evaluation of the net financial effect on the Congressional changes would conclude that the impact is slight in comparison with overall procurement spending; the net dollar change in funding for all the years studied is shown in Figure 28. Reductions of $1.71 billion in FY 1992, $1.96 billion in FY 1993, and $1.8 billion dollars in 1994 are relatively small when compared to procurement budgets of $62 billion, $54.8 billion and $44.3 billion dollars for each of those respective years. Of course, for particular programs, such funding changes can have a decisive impact.
Figure 28. Net Dollar Effect of Annual Changes to DoD Budget Request (Procurement)
The examination of specific components suggested that there are no favorite sons among the program elements within the procurement account (or any other account) and that the services receive roughly equal treatment. Although the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee stays closer to the average conference mark up the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee brings its mark through more often.

The findings of the cross sectional analysis support the findings that Congress is impartial in its treatment of budget programs or services. In general, the percent total number of line-item changes is proportionally related to the percent change in the budget's operations, procurement, and research accounts. Construction and housing accounts are treated separately, physically and statistically. Within all of these accounts, Congress anticipates a certain level of detail in the budget request. The procurement and research accounts are suitably partitioned and very few line-items are added to either of these sections, the operations account is not so Congress partitions that section itself. When it does so the new line-items it inserts are usually cuts. Congresses treatment of the reserve and guard is similar. Since the end of the Cold war, the defense department has generally sought to reduce reserve and guard funding. Congress, probably reacting along both policy and parochial lines, has been protecting reserve and guard budgets. When it restores funding to these two programs, it reduces funding elsewhere. The resulting micromanagement is counter-productive to the specific program cut in balance but essentially inconsequential to the makeup of the total defense budget.

Within Congress, there is very little cohesion between the various defense oversight committees other than the fact that appropriators do tend to stay within the limits set by
the authorization bill. Legislators agree statistically more often by chamber (HASC to HDAS & SASC to SDAS) than by committee but only marginally so. The levels of association along specific dollar value changes are very weak. Only as a percent of total line-item changes along program and service sections is there any consistent pattern between the various defense oversight committees. Overall, within that pattern, appropriators are much more active and tend to cut from budget requests more frequently than authorizers.
REFERENCES


Lindsay, James M. "Congressional Oversight of the Department of Defense: Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom." Armed Forces and Society, 17 (Fall 1990): 7-33.


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