Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) Status for Russia and U.S.-Russian Economic Ties

William H. Cooper
Specialist in International Trade and Finance

June 13, 2012
Summary

U.S.-Russian trade is governed by Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, which conditions Russia’s normal trade relations (NTR) status, including the “freedom-of-emigration” requirements of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. On December 16, 2011, the 153 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) invited Russia to join the organization, after Russia completed an 18-year accession process. The WTO requires each member to accord newly acceding members “immediate and unconditional” most-favored-nation (MFN) status which is called NTR in U.S. law. Russia is expected to formally join the WTO sometime in the summer after its parliament has approved the accession package which is expected to occur sometime in early July. In order to comply with the WTO rule, the United States would have to change Russia’s status from conditional NTR to unconditional or permanent NTR (PNTR).

The change in Russia’s trade status will require legislation to lift the restrictions of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 as they apply to Russia and authorize the President to grant Russia PNTR. On June 12, 2012, Senator Max Baucus, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, introduced legislation to remove the application of Title IV to trade with Russia. Therefore, Members of the 112th Congress confront the issue of whether to authorize PNTR for Russia. Some Members of Congress want to link congressional consideration of PNTR for Russia with S. 1039 and H.R. 4405—the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012.
PNTR Status for Russia and U.S.-Russian Economic Ties

Contents

What are NTR Status and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment? ............................................................ 1
Russia’s NTR Status ........................................................................................................................ 2
U.S.-Russian Economic Ties ........................................................................................................... 2
Issues in U.S.-Russian Trade ........................................................................................................ 3
Russia’s Accession to the WTO .................................................................................................... 4
Implications and Legislation ......................................................................................................... 5

Tables

Table 1. U.S. Trade with Russia, 2001-2011 ................................................................................... 3

Contacts

Author Contact Information ............................................................................................................ 6
Granting Russia permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status requires a change in law because Russia is prohibited from receiving unconditional and permanent NTR under Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974. The change would likely occur in the form of legislation to eliminate the application of Title IV to trade with Russia. Title IV includes the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment. Extension of PNTR has implications for Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO requires its members to extend immediate and unconditional nondiscriminatory treatment to the goods and services of all other members. As a result, the United States invoked “non-application” of WTO rules to its trade relationship with Russia. This report examines this legislative issue in the context of Russian accession to the WTO and U.S.-Russian economic ties.

What are NTR Status and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment?

“Normal trade relations” (NTR), or “most-favored-nation” (MFN), trade status is used to denote nondiscriminatory treatment of a trading partner compared to that of other countries.1 Only two countries—Cuba and North Korea—do not have NTR status in trade with the United States. In practice, duties on the imports from a country which has been granted NTR status are set at lower rates than those from countries that do not receive such treatment. Thus, imports from a non-NTR country can be at a large price disadvantage compared with imports from NTR-status countries.

Section 401 of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 requires the President to continue to deny NTR status to any country that was not receiving such treatment at the time of the law’s enactment on January 3, 1975. In effect this meant all communist countries, except Poland and Yugoslavia. Section 402 of Title IV, the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment, denies the countries eligibility for NTR status as well as access to U.S. government credit facilities, such as the Export-Import Bank, as long as the country denies its citizens the right of freedom-of-emigration. These restrictions can be removed if the President determines that the country is in full compliance with the freedom-of-emigration conditions set out under the Jackson-Vanik amendment. For a country to maintain that status, the President must reconfirm his determination of full compliance in a semiannual report (by June 30 and December 31) to Congress. His determination can be overturned by the enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval concerning the December 31st report.

The Jackson-Vanik amendment also permits the President to waive the freedom of emigration requirements, if he determines that such a waiver would promote the objectives of the amendment, that is, encourage freedom of emigration. This waiver authority is subject to an annual renewal by the President and to congressional disapproval via a joint resolution. Before a country can receive NTR treatment under either the presidential determination of full compliance or the presidential waiver, it and the United States must have concluded and enacted a bilateral agreement that provides for, among other things, reciprocal extension of NTR or MFN treatment.

---

1 MFN has been used in international agreements and at one time was used in U.S. law to denote the fundamental trade principle of nondiscriminatory treatment. However, “MFN” was replaced in U.S. law, on July 22, 1998, by the term “normal trade relations.” (P.L. 105-206). MFN is still used in international trade agreements. The terms are used interchangeably in this report.
The agreement and a presidential proclamation extending NTR status cannot go into effect until a congressional joint resolution approving the agreement is enacted.

**Russia’s NTR Status**

In 1990, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a bilateral trade agreement as required under Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974. The agreement was subsequently applied to U.S.-Russian trade relations, and the United States signed similar but legally separate agreements with the other former non-Baltic Soviet states. The United States extended NTR treatment to Russia under the presidential waiver authority beginning in June 1992. Since September 1994, Russia has received NTR status under the *full compliance* provision. Presidential extensions of NTR status to Russia have met with virtually no congressional opposition.

Russian leaders have continually pressed the United States to “graduate” Russia from Jackson-Vanik coverage entirely. They see the amendment as a Cold War relic that does not reflect Russia’s new stature as a fledgling democracy and market economy. Moreover, Russian leaders argue that Russia has implemented freedom-of-emigration policies since the fall of the communist government, making the Jackson-Vanik conditions inappropriate and unnecessary.

While Russia remains subject to the Jackson-Vanik amendment, some of the other former Soviet republics have been granted permanent and unconditional NTR. For example, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia received PNTR in 2000, and Armenia received PNTR in January 2005. Perhaps what has irked Russian leaders greatly is that the United States granted permanent and unconditional NTR status to Ukraine in 2006.

As with these other countries, extending PNTR to Russia would likely involve legislation that would remove the application of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 as it applies to Russia. It would authorize the President to grant PNTR by proclamation.

**U.S.-Russian Economic Ties**

During the Cold War, U.S.-Soviet economic ties were very limited. They were constrained by national security and foreign policy restrictions, including the Jackson-Vanik amendment restrictions. They were also limited by Soviet economic policies of central planning that prohibited foreign investment and tightly controlled foreign trade.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, successive Russian leaders have been dismantling the central economic planning system. This has included the liberalization of foreign trade and investment. U.S.-Russian economic relations have expanded, but the flow of trade and investment remains very low, as reflected in Table 1, which contains data on U.S. merchandise trade with Russia since 2000.
Table 1. U.S. Trade with Russia, 2001-2011

(Billions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balances</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
<td>-8.9</td>
<td>-11.3</td>
<td>-15.1</td>
<td>-11.9</td>
<td>-17.4</td>
<td>-12.8</td>
<td>-19.7</td>
<td>-26.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The table indicates that U.S.-Russian trade, at least U.S. imports, has grown appreciably. The surge in the value of imports is largely attributable to the rise in the world prices of oil and other natural resources—which comprise most of U.S. imports from Russia—and not to an increase in the volume of imports. U.S. exports span a range of products including meat, machinery parts, and aircraft parts. U.S. imports increased more than 244%, from $7.8 billion to $26.8 billion from 2000 to 2008, and U.S. exports rose 343%, from $2.1 billion to $9.3 billion. However, U.S. exports and imports with Russia declined substantially in 2009, as a result of the global financial crisis and economic downturn, but increased in 2010 and 2011 as both countries have shown signs of recovery. Russia accounted for 1.6% of U.S. imports and 0.6% of U.S. exports in 2011, and the United States accounted for 3.3% of Russian exports and 5.3% of Russian imports.2 Russia was the 31st-largest export market and 14th-largest source of imports for the United States in 2011.

U.S. exports to and imports from Russia are heavily concentrated in a few commodity categories. The top five 2-digit Harmonized System (HS) categories of imports accounted for about 70% of total U.S. imports from Russia and consisted of precious stones and metals, inorganic chemicals, mineral fuels, aluminum, iron and steel, and fish and other seafood. About 60% of U.S. exports to Russia consisted of products in three 2-digit HS categories: aircraft, machinery (mostly parts for oil and gas production equipment), and meat (beef, pork, and poultry).3

Issues in U.S.-Russian Trade

Russia’s treatment of imports of U.S. meats—poultry, pork, and beef—is one of the most sensitive issues in U.S.-Russian trade relations. Russia’s agricultural sector, particularly meat production, has not been very competitive, and domestic producers have not been able to fulfill Russia’s expanding demand for meat, especially as the rise of Russian incomes has led to a rise in demand for meat in the Russian diet. U.S. producers, especially of poultry, have been able to take advantage and have become major sources of meat to the Russian market. At the same time, Russia has become an important market for U.S. exports of meat. For example, in 2009, Russia was the largest market for U.S. poultry meat exports.4

On January 1, 2010, the Russian government implemented new regulations on imports of poultry, claiming that the chlorine wash that U.S. poultry producers use in the preparation of chickens violates Russian standards and is unsafe. These regulations effectively halted U.S. exports of

2 World Trade Atlas. Global Trade Information Services, Inc.
3 World Trade Atlas.
poultry to Russia. The United States claimed that the wash is effective and safe and that Russian restrictions are not scientifically based. U.S. and Russian officials conducted discussions to resolve the issue. At their June 24, 2010, press conference that closed a bilateral summit meeting, President Obama and President Medvedev announced that the dispute over poultry trade had been resolved and that U.S. shipments of poultry to Russia would resume. However, the full resumption of shipments was delayed over Russian demands to inspect U.S. poultry processing plants before they can certified for shipping to Russia. On September 30, 2010, the two countries reportedly reached a compromise on this issue whereby Russian inspectors would examine and certify U.S. plants on an expedited basis.5 However, as a result of the Russian restrictions, U.S. exports of poultry to Russia plummeted almost 70% by the end 2011 compared to 2009.6

The lack of adequate intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in Russia has tainted the business climate in Russia for U.S. investors for some time. The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) consistently identifies Russia in its Special 301 Report as a “priority watch list” country, as it did in its latest (April 30, 2011) report. The USTR report acknowledges improvements in IPR protection and cites steps taken to fulfill its commitments to improve IPR protection made as part of the 2006 bilateral agreement that was reached as part of Russia’s WTO accession process. It also finds that Russia has problems with weak enforcement of IPR in some areas, including internet piracy.7

Russian economic policies and regulations have been a source of concerns. The United States and the U.S. business community have asserted that structural problems and inefficient government regulations and policies have been a major cause of the low levels of trade and investment with the United States. U.S. exporters have also cited problems with Russian customs regulations that are complicated and time-consuming.

Russia’s Accession to the WTO

PNTR for Russia is closely tied to Russia’s efforts to join the WTO. The WTO requires its members to extend immediate and unconditional nondiscriminatory treatment to the goods and services of all other members. To fulfill that commitment, the United States would have to extend PNTR to Russia.

Russia first applied to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT—now the World Trade Organization (WTO)) in 1993.8 Russia completed negotiations with a WTO Working Party (WP), which includes representatives from about 60 WTO members, including the United States and the European Union (EU). WP members raised concerns about Russia’s IPR enforcement policies and practices, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations that may be blocking imports of agricultural products unnecessarily, and Russia’s demand to keep its large subsidies for its agricultural sector. The United States also raised issues regarding the role of state-owned

6 Derived from U.S. Department of Commerce data.
8 For more information on Russia’s WTO accession, see CRS Report R42085, Russia’s Accession to the WTO and Its Implications for the United States, by William H. Cooper.
enterprises (SOEs) in the Russian economy and Russian impediments to imports of U.S. products containing encryption technology.

Prime Minister Putin’s June 9, 2009 announcement that Russia would be abandoning its application to join the WTO as a single entity and would instead pursue it with Belarus and Kazakhstan as a customs union seemed to set back the accession process. However, after meeting resistance from WTO officials, Russia and the other two countries decided to pursue accession separately. On June 24, 2010, during their meeting in Washington, DC, President Obama and President Medvedev pledged to resolve the remaining issues regarding Russia’s accession to the WTO by September 30. The United States also pledged to provide technical assistance to Russia to speed up the process of Russia’s accession taking into account its customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan. On October 1, 2010, the USTR announced that “the United States and Russia have reached agreement on the substance of a number of Russian commitments.” He noted that Russia had enacted amendments to laws related to the protection of IPR and that the United States “looks to the effective implementation of these laws.”

Russia completed its bilateral negotiations and negotiations with the Working Party. On November 10, 2011, the members of the Working Party approved the accession package and sent it on for consideration by the Ministerial Conference. The Ministerial Conference approved the package and, on December 16, 2011, formally invited Russia to join the WTO. Russia’s parliament, the State Duma, must approve the accession package by July 23, 2012, 30 days after which Russia will be a WTO Member. On June 7, 2012, the Russian government submitted the accession package to the Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament. The Duma is expected act on it on July 4, followed by action by the Federal Council, the upper house.

Implications and Legislation

PNTR is a major issue in Russia’s accession to the WTO. Because Title IV still applies to Russia, the United States invoked nonapplication of WTO rules, procedures, and agreements in its trade with Russia. As a result many of the commitments that Russia will have made in joining the WTO might not necessarily apply to the United States, if Title IV remains in effect on Russia when Russia formally joins the WTO. (Under the 1992 U.S.-Russia bilateral trade agreement, Russia would be obligated to apply non-discriminatory tariff treatment to imports from the United States.)

Russian leaders consider the absence of PNTR status an affront and the Jackson-Vanik amendment to be a relic of the Cold War that should no longer apply to U.S.-Russia trade relations, especially since such still ostensibly communist countries as China and Vietnam are afforded PNTR status by the United States.

On June 12, 2012, Senator Max Baucus, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, introduced bipartisan-cosponsored legislation (not yet numbered) to remove the applicability of Title IV from Russia. PNTR status has already generated debate not only on the pros and cons of PNTR status for Russia per se, but also on U.S. economic policy towards Russia and Russia’s economic policies and practices. For example, some Members of Congress have asserted that a number of

---

9 Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR Kirk Welcomes Bilateral Resolution of Key WTO Issues with Russia press statement, October 1, 2010.
issues in U.S.-Russia trade relations need to be addressed as Congress considers PNTR legislation for Russia. These issues include: Russia’s use of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures to restrict unnecessarily imports of U.S-produced meat; weak enforcement of intellectual property rights; and government corruption.\textsuperscript{10}

Human rights and foreign policy issues are also being raised. For example, a number of Members are linking congressional consideration of PNTR with Russia to consideration of legislation, S. 1039 and H.R. 4405—the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012. The legislation would require the State Department to identify publicly individuals responsible for the detention and death of Sergei Magnitsky and other individuals known to have committed human rights violations seeking to expose fraud by Russian government officials. It would require the Secretary of the State to deny visas for these individuals to enter the United States and for the Secretary of the Treasury to freeze the financial assets in and financial transactions with the United States. Sergei Magnitsky was a Russian lawyer who died in detention after trying to expose corruption with the Russian government.\textsuperscript{11}

\section*{Author Contact Information}

William H. Cooper  
Specialist in International Trade and Finance  
wcooper@crs.loc.gov, 7-7749

\textsuperscript{10} See for example, the June 12, 2012 letter from Senate Finance Committee Ranking Member Sen. Orrin Hatch and seven other Republican Members to Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{11} For more information on this and other issues in U.S.-Russia relations, see CRS Report RL33407, \textit{Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests}, coordinated by Jim Nichol.