




Sport Event Risk Management NCS4 Workshop Demonstration



Emergency Management in Higher Education Meeting
Department of Education
December 9-10, 2009
San Antonio, TX
Dr. Lou Marciani, Dr. Walter Cooper, and Darren Mitchell
Edited by Joslyn Zale





WARNING:
This is a
simulated
incident.

THE HATTIESBURG POST

Vol. 24 No. 53

The News Source for Metro Mississippi!

\$1.00

October 15, 2005

MULTIPLE BOMB BLASTS DEVASTATE STADIUM.

THOUSANDS OF CAPACITY CROWD DEAD OR INJURED

■ **INSIDE**

Security cuts raise concern of terrorist threats. (A-8)

Overworked maintenance personnel leaves broken fences. (A-14)

New ways to save money on the next sporting event (B-1)

Public assistance for those who loose "Bread Winning" family members. (C-2)

Where's your money going?




■ Early Reports indicate a terrorist attack has claimed the lives of over 2000 and injured thousands more innocent spectators at yesterday's football game at the M.M. Roberts Stadium in Hattiesburg, MS. A series of explosions rocked the east end of the upper deck causing it to collapse on the people below. Police say the stampede of terror probably tripled the amount of fatalities and injuries caused by the explosion itself. (Story Continued on A-2)



24/7: PROACTIVE SECURITY

To what degree is our security management system READY?





Sharing and Milling Activity



Course Goal

To develop multi-agency collaboration capabilities among intact university teams responsible for security management operations at sport events.

>60% Multi-Agency Collaboration

>30% Sports Event Security Assessment Process

>10% New Knowledge



Module Time Allocation

Module	Module Title			Time Allocation
Module 1	Introduction and Administration			1.0 hrs.
Module 2	The Threat is Real			1.0 hrs.
Module 3	Sport Event Incident Management			1.5 hrs.
Module 4	Incident Management Teamwork			2.0 hrs.
Module 5	Sport Security Planning			1.5 hrs.
Module 6	Sport Venue Risk Assessment			1.0 hrs.
Module 7	Sport Event Security Measures			1.5 hrs.
Module 8	Staff Training for Sport Event Security			.75 hrs.
Module 9	Exercises for Sport Event Incidents			.75 hrs.
Module 10	Capstone			2.0 hrs.
Module 11	Post-Assessment and Evaluation			1.0 hrs.
	Total			14.0 hours



MODULE 2

The Threat is Real



TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE

Participants will understand the global threat environment and be able to identify all-hazard event threats.



INTRODUCTION

The U. S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified venues of mass gatherings, including sport stadiums and arenas, as potential targets.



ALL-HAZARDS PREPAREDNESS

DHS emphasizes an all-hazards approach relative to disaster preparedness and response.

This includes any natural or human-made hazard.



TERRORISM

The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives.



We must be prepared to:

MITIGATE

PREVENT

PREPARE

RESPOND

RECOVER



LEGAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT

“The consequence of another terrorist incident would far outweigh the cost of investing in back-up systems, alternative operating locations, and additional protective measures.”

Michael Chertoff, Former Secretary of Homeland Security



Module 3

Special Event Incident Management



Terminal Learning Objective

The participant will be able to identify, describe and better understand the concepts of a coordinated response structure, the Incident Command System (ICS), the Unified Command System (UCS) and the location, organization, and staffing of a Command Post (CP) and Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in support of a university sport event.



National Incident Management System (NIMS)

The [National Incident Management System \(NIMS\)](#) provides a systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and agencies at all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to work seamlessly to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, in order to reduce the loss of life and property and harm to the environment.

(From FEMA's website: <http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/AboutNIMS.shtm>)




INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM (ICS)

A consistent system of response to incidents, inherent within NIMS, which promotes multi-agency collaboration among all responding units.




INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM (ICS)





RESPONSE PLANS RESOURCES





MODULE 4

Incident Management Teamwork



Terminal Learning Objective

- **Define effective information sharing processes**
- **Develop multi-agency collaboration capabilities**



INTRODUCTION


Effective multi-agency collaboration is only achieved through the development and practice of:

- **High level TRUST**
- **Communicating directly and clearly**
- **Leading “correctly”**
- **Positive climates**
- **WIN/WIN Teamwork**



Communication Climate

POSITIVE



NEGATIVE



Message Feedback Loop:


Sender  Receiver



Feedback Loop



Grid Model for Team Management





Teamwork Maturity Characteristics

- Undiscussibles are discussable
- Members give up the need to fix or control
- Interpersonal differences are appreciated
- Commitment to co-exist is established
- No sides taken
- Comfortable in making decisions
- Full range of emotions acceptable
- Total decentralization of authority
- Establishment of a “Win-Win” climate
- Acknowledges fear of the unknown
- A spirit of peace exists



True Community

“A group of individuals who have learned how to communicate honestly with each other, whose relationships go deeper than their masks of composure, and who have developed some significant commitment to rejoice together, mourn together, to delight in each other and make other’s conditions their own.”



Bomb Threat (VBIED) Scenario

Activity



Bomb Threat Scenario

- Van has crashed through checkpoints
- Van is now located close to stadium
- Driver has been apprehended
- Explosives discovered in van
- Timing mechanism is attached
- Explosives could detonate within minutes



- **Who is in Charge?**
- **What is our plan?**
- **How will we initiate, communicate, and organize command?**
- **Where will we be?**



MODULE 5

Special Event Security Planning



Terminal Learning Objective


**Participants will be able to
develop, update, and
implement needed special
event security management
plans**



INTRODUCTION

Planning, the critical first 15% of any system, determines the effectiveness of the other 85% (implementing).

1st 15% Quality Management Principle





Alice in Wonderland

The Cheshire Cat, looking down from the tree asked Alice,

“Where do you want to go to from here?”

Alice replied,

“I don’t much care.”

The Cheshire cat answered,

"Then it doesn't much matter which way you walk."



Leadership Planning Team (LPT)

- **Personnel responsible for coordinating special event security management**
- **Campus police chief or security director**
- **Emergency Management**
- **Fire/Hazmat representative**
- **Emergency medical/health services representative**




Emergency Response Team Members

- **Law Enforcement**
- **Fire Service**
- **Hazardous Materials**
- **Emergency Medical Services**
- **Emergency Management**
- **Public Works**
- **Health Care**
- **Public Safety Communications**
- **Governmental Administrators**
- **Public Information/Media**
- **Others?**



Continuous Quality Improvement Cycle

P.D.S.A Continuous Improvement Cycle





What Plans Are Needed?



MODULE 6

Special Venue Risk Assessment



TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE

Participants will understand risk management concepts and the risk assessment process for special event venues.



RISK MANAGEMENT

- **Risk** is the possibility of loss resulting from a threat, security incident, or natural disaster.
- **Risk Management** is a systematic and analytical process to consider the likelihood that a threat will endanger an asset, individual, or function.



RISK ASSESSMENT

- **Threat** is a product of intention and capability of an adversary
- **Vulnerability** is an exploitable security weakness or deficiency



DHS RISK ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

- **Identify the infrastructure**
- **Identify critical/key assets**
- **Collect asset data**
- **Conduct threat analysis and assessment**
- **Conduct vulnerability analysis and assessment**
- **Conduct risk assessment and determine priorities**
- **Make recommendations concerning countermeasures**



Special Event Venue Vulnerabilities

Examples:

- Inadequate searching of venue prior to event
- Inadequate lockdown procedures
- Concessions not properly secured
- Storage of dangerous chemicals inside venue
- Lack of accountability for vendors
- Lack of effective perimeter control
- Command center location and operations
- Ineffective credentialing



24/7: Threat Assessment

How might individuals planning an attack “check us out” ahead of time and how should we be prepared?



Module 7

Special Event Security Measures



TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE

Participants will be able to identify, understand, and determine the best available protective measures for special event venues on collegiate campuses.



Protective Measures are Designed to Protect and Mitigate Against Facility Threats

- **Time**
- **Finances**
- **Equipment**
- **Personnel**
- **Policies and Procedures**



Measures to Reduce Risk

- **Physical security measures**
- **Training and managing security staff**
- **Development of policies and procedures**



Essential Policies and Procedures

- **ADA**
- **Alcohol**
- **Communication Security Staff**
- **Credentialing**
- **Employee Code of Conduct**
- **Evacuation**
- **Fan Conduct**
- **Individual Search and Seizure**
- **Media and Communications**



Essential Policies and Procedures

continued

- **Missing Child/Person**
- **Parking**
- **Prohibited Items**
- **Search Policy**
- **Staff Evaluation**
- **Tailgate**
- **Protecting critical systems**
- **Ticket-taking**
- **Waste Management/Vehicle Receiving**



MODULE 8

Staff Training for Special Event Security Management



Terminal Learning Objective

Participants will be able to develop and implement a staff training process relative to Special Event Security Management.



INTRODUCTION

A key component in protecting critical infrastructures such as university infrastructure is effective training of the staff.



Three Levels of Training

- **Leadership (Multi-Agency)**
- **Supervisory**
- **All Event Staff**



Sport Event Risk Management





Event Staff

- **Security Force**
- **Parking Attendants**
- **Gate Security**
- **Ticket Takers**
- **Ushers**
- **Concession/Maintenance**
- **Field/Arena/Stage Staff**



Critical Topics

- **Incident Command System**
- **Specialized Equipment**
- **Security Plan**
- **Legal Issues**
- **Crowd Control**
- **Terrorist Activities**



Timelines for Training Delivery

- **Pre-event**
- **Event operations**
- **Post-event**



MODULE 9

Exercises for Special Event Incidents



Terminal Learning Objective

Participants will understand various exercise options and how to conduct an exercise involving key partners and evaluate performance in order to address gaps and ensure continuous improvement.



INTRODUCTION

The homeland security exercise and evaluation program (HSEEP) is a capabilities and performance based exercise program.



Types of Exercises

- Seminar
- Workshop
- Tabletop (TTX)
- Game
- Drill
- Functional (FE)
- Command Post (CPX)
- Full Scale (FSE)



Improvement Planning

- **Recommendations organized by capability**
- **Corrective actions associated with recommendations & capability element**
- **Corrective actions must be measurable**
- **Corrective actions have start & end dates**
- **Corrective actions assigned to an organization and a point of contact (POC)**



MODULE 10

Capstone Exercise



Terminal Learning Objective

Participants will participate in a TTX and thereby gain valuable insights relative to effective special event security management.



Key Issues to Consider During a Scenario

- **Prevention/Deterrence/Protection**
- **Emergency Assessment/Diagnosis**
- **Emergency Management Response**
- **Incident/Hazard Mitigation**
- **Public Protection**
- **Victim Care**
- **Investigation/Apprehension**
- **Recovery/Remediation**



Regent University

- Southeastern United States
- Approximately 25,000 students
- Town of approximately 75,000 residents
- Venue surrounded by university buildings
- Four-lane highway on eastern boundary
- Parking concentrated around venue
- Sold out – 50,000 spectators
- 5,000 tailgaters without tickets




FBI/DHS Fusion Center Bulletin

- IEDs in backpacks found at California game
- In pre-game sweep backpacks (IEDs) found in bushes and near trash can
- Be alert to possible similar activities
- Linked to True Revolution Brigade (TRB)
- TRB mentions blowing up a stadium full of people



Sport Event Risk Management



Evacuation Radius



INJECT # 1

- Friday morning—fifteen days prior to game
(3:30 p.m. kickoff)
- FBI call: TRB investigation resulted in the an arrest
with ties to Regent
- Suspect was enrolled at Regent for one semester
- 23 year old white male, med. build, very short brown
hair
- Federal warrant for weapons violations
- Traffic violations in California
- Residence search revealed significant information
on college football



COMMAND GROUP TASK 1



INJECT # 2 (Slide 1/4)

- Game is 5 days away
- FBI evidence ID suspect in custody as Jeremy Potts
- Transferred from Regent to State College in California
- TRB linked to failed attack in California
- Local media has not picked up TRB ties to Regent



INJECT # 2 (Slide 2/4)

- 11:30 a.m.: FBI contacts campus police chief
- FBI raid in California yields evidence linking between TRB and attacks against football games
- Regent appears on target list along with six others
- FBI request meeting with Regent's President



INJECT # 2 (Slide 3/4)

- 2:30 p. m.: Regent's President has a conference call with athletic director and campus police chief
- President emphasizes the economic importance and tradition of Regent v. Fairview game
- President: "I will not allow this institution to give in to the terrorists! This is why I pay you folks. This event will continue as scheduled and if you don't feel you can do so, then please submit your resignation by the end of the day."



INJECT # 2 (Slide 4/4)

- 3:15 p. m.: Regent's athletic department's sport information office receives a call from local NBC affiliate
- Caller self identifies as a reporter and asks to interview the athletic director about chances the big game will be cancelled



COMMAND GROUP TASK 2



INJECT # 3 (Slide 1/2)

- 9:00 a. m.: six and one-half hours until kickoff
- Stadium was “locked down” twelve hours ago
- All personnel evacuated, entrances locked or secured, and building & perimeter swept for suspicious devices
- Parking areas cleared
- Remaining vehicles towed
- Local police established traffic control
- Stadium employees are arriving via shuttle and through employee entrances



INJECT # 3 (Slide 2/2)

- Stadium command center is staffed and monitoring radio traffic
- Student volunteers are working stadium ticket office
- Ticket office receives a threatening phone call
- Student at ticket offices calls 911: someone called and said there was a bomb inside the stadium



COMMAND GROUP TASK 3



INJECT # 4 (Slide 1/3)

- 1:00 p. m.: Stadium gates will open in 30 minutes
- Football teams and league officials have arrived and are inside
- Media truck and camera crews are conducting “live shots” from inside the media compound on the south side of the stadium
- Parking lots are reaching capacity as traffic continues to stream in from the highway



INJECT # 4 (Slide 2/3)

- Backpacks and large bags are prohibited in stadium
- Extra law enforcement has been positioned around the venue
- Private security officers have been posted at all entrances
- Several thousand fans wander around parking lot stadium perimeter
- Roaming patrols of uniformed law enforcement, plain-clothes officers, and uniformed private security move in and around the stadium



INJECT # 4 (Slide 3/3)

- 1:12 p. m.: Private security officer reports an abandoned backpack in a large planter near the NW corner of the stadium.
- Planter is approximately 25 yards from a stadium entrance gate.
- Backpack is described as a “standard book bag.”



COMMAND GROUP TASK 4



INJECT # 5 (Slide 1/2)

- 1:40 p. m.: All stadium gates, except gate at NW corner, are open
- A few spectators have entered the stadium, but most of the building remains empty
- Parking lot and all pedestrian areas around the stadium are busy
- Marching band is performing a short concert just south of the stadium
- Traffic in highway east of stadium is a virtual standstill



INJECT # 5 (Slide 2/2)

- Plain clothes officer deployed outside of the stadium's SE entrance are observing a suspicious person wearing a dark blue backpack.
- Suspect, a white female who is walking alone, is moving toward the stadium



COMMAND GROUP TASK 5



INJECT # 6 (Slide 1/2)

- 3:00 p.m.: Kickoff in 30 minutes
- Report to Command Post of smoke on main concourse
- Roaming security office radios report of a strong smell of smoke coming from a dumpster near one of the concession stands on the east side of the stadium
- Dumpster located behind a locked fenced enclosure
- Officer sees no flames, thinks smoke is from dumpster
- Security officer cannot get into the enclosure
- Security officer requests assistance



INJECT # 6 (Slide 2/2)

- Minutes later, Command Post receives a cell phone call from an usher working inside the stadium's north end zone

“Hello, is this the Command Post? I need EMTs to respond to the men’s restroom near section 115. There is a fan who appears to be having a heart attack. He is lying on the floor in the bathroom and is unresponsive. My name is Walter Ryan, and I am an usher near section 115 in the north end zone. The gentleman is a white male, approximately 50 years old with a heavy build and gray hair.”



COMMAND GROUP TASK 6



INJECT # 7 (Slide 1/4)

- 3:25 p.m.: Kickoff in 5 minutes
- Long lines extend from each gate into parking areas
- Tailgating spectators now moving into stadium
- Longest line at SW corner of stadium
- Stadium nearly full as capacity crowd files in for game
- Traffic on highway has begun to ease, but still a lot of congestion



INJECT #7 (Slide 2/4)

- Man wearing a backpack is standing in line to enter stadium at the SW entrance gate
- Officer asks the man to step out of the line.
- Air National Guard planes fly low over the stadium as part of the pre-game activities
- Man with backpack darts away from the officer toward the NW corner of stadium
- Man described as a “20-something, white male, very short black hair, dark blue backpack”
- After a few minutes—loud explosion heard outside west side of stadium, panic erupts, people flee



INJECT # 7 (Slide 3/4)

- Source of explosion unknown, west side of stadium, near chemistry building
- People wounded report seeing more seriously injured casualties lying near explosion
- Stadium command center and 911 lines choked with calls
- Conflicting reports
- Police officer, west side of stadium, continues to call for medical support
- Police officer reports three fatalities and five people with serious, life threatening injuries



INJECT # 7 (Slide 4/4)

- Inside the stadium the public is restless
- Almost everyone is standing up looking at the smoke rising from the stadium's west side
- Several individuals are moving quickly up and out of the seating area
- Sirens can be heard approaching the stadium



COMMAND GROUP TASK 7



Capstone Debrief



INTRODUCTION

The SESA system is an on-going cycle of improvement.



Sports Event Security Aware System

