Four Decades and Five Manuals
U.S. Army Strategic Leadership Doctrine, 1983-2011

A Monograph
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14. **ABSTRACT**

This monograph focuses on the articles, reports, opinions, studies, and research papers surrounding leadership doctrine from 1983-2011. Understanding each doctrine, reviewing the intellectual debate within the Army and across other leadership disciplines, examining the changes in the documents, and exploring future, proposed strategic leadership doctrine provides analysis. Beginning with the tactical, direct leadership attributes in 1983, the omission of operational and strategic leadership identified a gap in leadership at all levels. FM 22-103 established the first doctrine for command and leadership above the direct, tactical level. Coupled with the 1993 AR 600-100, leadership policies recognized direct, senior and executive leadership levels. The consolidation of leadership doctrine in 1999 placed the three levels of leadership together; however, with different definitions of the levels. FM 22-100, used direct, organizational and strategic, while the 1993 regulation used direct, senior and strategic. By 2007, the newly published documents agreed. Strategic leadership’s importance to Army leaders continued to evolve and remained a much discussed and researched topic. National military and government leaders addressed the need to improve strategic leaders’ ability to prepare for future conflicts while presenting how strategic leadership fits into leadership doctrine. Strategic leaders must understand the strategy of the organization, where the organization fits in the complex environment, and what the organization must do to be successful. The inclusion of strategic leadership references in doctrine improves the understanding necessary for a successful organization. The leadership traditions of the U.S. Army continue to codify the strategic leadership attributes necessary for success, accessible to all leaders, from the newest to the most senior.

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Abstract


This monograph analyzes the history of United States Army leadership doctrine from 1983 through 2011 to identify the evolution of strategic leadership theory and practice in Army doctrine. Using leadership doctrine, the focus is on the analysis of the articles, reports, opinions, studies, and research papers surrounding each doctrinal publication. This research uses an analytical approach across the timeline of leadership doctrine by understanding each approved doctrine, reviewing the intellectual debate within the Army institution and across other leadership disciplines, examining the doctrinal changes in the published documents, and exploring the future of proposed strategic leadership doctrine.

Beginning with the renewed emphasis on tactical, direct leadership attributes published in 1983, the omission of operational and strategic leadership in the doctrine identified a gap in addressing leadership at all levels within the Army. Following executive level leadership discourse in the 1980s, the publication of FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels in 1987 established the first doctrinal framework for command and leadership above the direct, tactical level for the Army. Coupled with the 1993 AR 600-100, Army Leadership, Army leadership policies became a better codified part of training and leader development, specifically in recognition of different levels of leadership including: direct, senior and executive.

The consolidation and reorganization of Army leadership doctrine in 1999 placed the three levels of leadership together in one doctrinal reference; however, differences still existed between definitions of the levels. FM 22-100, Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do used direct, organizational and strategic, while the 1993 regulation used direct, senior and strategic. By 2007, the newly published documents finally agreed, providing clarity of purpose and better understanding for all Army leaders as they progressed through the different leadership levels.

Strategic leadership thought and its importance to Army leaders continued to evolve and remained a much discussed, researched, and published topic into the twenty-first century. National military and government leaders addressed the need to improve strategic leaders’ ability to understand and prepare for future conflicts while presenting the ways strategic leadership fits into overall leadership doctrine. The planned forthcoming updates to the 2006 Army Leadership: Competent, Confident and Agile manual continues those linkages for strategic leaders.

The monograph concludes that strategic leaders must understand the strategy of the organization, where the organization fits in the complex environment, and what the organization must do to be successful. Through inclusion of strategic leadership references in consolidated Army doctrine, the academic theories and methods surrounding strategic leadership became more widely spread across the force, further improving the understanding necessary for a successful organization. The leadership traditions of the United States Army, better known for the direct leadership examples executed in every conflict, continues to have a codified description of the strategic leadership attributes necessary for continued success, accessible to all leaders, from the newest to the most senior.
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Why Strategic Leadership?

Not long after Operation Desert Storm, a newly commissioned second lieutenant reported to his assigned field grade officer to begin his Officer Basic Course block of instruction on delivering a U.S. Army briefing. His small group leader had told him to come prepared with a topic but that the officer receiving the brief would make the final decision. After quick introductions, the lieutenant proposed a brief on leadership, to which the lieutenant colonel asked, “Why?” Coming prepared, the lieutenant offered that there were many different ideas on leadership, and having read many perspectives and taking academic and practical classes on the topic, he felt that he could provide a unique perspective. Countering the lieutenant’s proposal by stating that he already knew about leadership, had his own opinions on the topic, did not need a newly commissioned officer to explain it to him, and that he wanted something different, the instructor assigned a “Tanking in the Desert” brief based on Army doctrine and lessons learned from Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.¹

The second lieutenant had thought that his understanding of leadership was broad and detailed enough to offer a unique perspective on a topic that was a centerpiece of Army doctrine. However, based on his training to be a junior leader of Soldiers, he had only studied a small aspect of the Army leadership doctrine. His understanding of the “process of influencing human behavior so as to accomplish the goals prescribed by the organizational appointed leader” was limited to tactical formations easily controlled by one or two leaders.² By only experiencing the leadership process where the leader was personally visible, the followers a small enough number to personally control, the situational context simple, the process easily seen and understood, and

¹ Author’s personal experience while attending the Armor Officer Basic Course in early 1993 at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The primary reference used in the graded brief was FM 90-3, Desert Operations. (Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, 1977).

the outcomes usually clear and finite, this junior officer’s leadership experience was as described for tactical leaders in Army doctrine of the late 1980s. By not addressing how senior leaders operate at the upper levels of the Army and why strategic leadership may be different than direct leadership, the pre-commissioning leadership training provided only a part of the overall leadership doctrine, just right for a new second lieutenant, but not enough to be interesting for a more senior officer.

Until the late 1980s, Army leadership doctrine did not include strategic leadership. Leadership doctrine through the 1970s focused on direct, tactical leadership without providing any guidance on how Army strategic leaders should lead differently. Strategic leadership theory discussion, both within and outside of the uniformed services, affected those ideas and concepts accepted into the doctrine. Since strategic planning had often been separate from shorter term operational or tactical planning, strategic leaders had to formulate and evaluate their own appropriate organizational responses and methods when faced with complex problems.

Understanding emerging ideas and the emphasis on older ideas places a framework on the doctrine. Questions answered must include those ideas incorporated in doctrine and those that were not, as well as why doctrine writers made these decisions. Across different Army leadership publications, through the obvious changes in Army manuals, regulations, and pamphlets over the past four decades, and including the multiple academic voices calling out for improvements, the amount of strategic leadership literature is overwhelming. The writers had to understand the theories, ideas, and work of those before them, and take into consideration the ongoing changes in

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4 Ibid., 10.

the Army as they collected, digested, interpreted, and incorporated new material into Army leadership doctrine.

As the twentieth century closed, the Army found itself engaged in multiple conflicts externally as well as facing questions from within its own ranks. Across the world, emerging nations, spreading ideologies, and superpower status dominated the strategic context for the Army. The forty-plus year Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union ended with the U.S. military engaged in other conflicts worldwide. The United States removed a Latin American dictator from Panama, fought a desert war to liberate Kuwait from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invasion, fought in the African streets against Somali warlords, and led North American Treaty Organization (NATO) military forces in the former Yugoslavia. While these external conflicts changed ideas, mindsets, and concepts on the use of the military in the post-Cold War world, the Army continued to discuss leadership doctrine within the evolving framework. Tactical and direct leadership remained mostly intact, but doctrine writers seemed to struggle to adapt leadership theories and concepts regarding the importance, method, style, and purpose of strategic and indirect leadership.

In order to understand not just the changes made but also the process involved, there are four areas of analytical study necessary across the timeline of Army leadership doctrine. First, an understanding of the existing doctrine current at each doctrinal and regulatory publication establishes benchmarks for this study. Second, exploring the published intellectual debate within the Army as well as across other leadership disciplines and fields of study provides the necessary background to evolving leadership theory and academic discourse. Third, critically examining the evolutionary changes of leadership doctrine between 1983 and 2011 will show how the doctrine reacted to the ongoing discussions. Finally, a look at the current leadership doctrine demonstrates the evolved changes to the doctrine and, by examining the ongoing discussion, future improvements may emerge for today’s strategic leaders.
The impetus for this analysis on the importance and history of strategic leadership doctrine began with an initial research observation in 1989 that there existed a doctrinal disparity in the levels of leadership. Using the late 1980s leadership doctrine and regulations, Field Manual 22-103 *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, Army Regulation 600-100 *Army Leadership*, and Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-80 *Executive Leadership* as examples, earlier research determined that there were three levels of leadership and the Army doctrine at the time did not adequately address those differences. Over two decades later, it is possible to assess whether the recommendations to update doctrine were valid, and if the Army made the identified changes. A brief review of the current Army leadership doctrine shows three levels of leadership, but not how or when the Army made the change in terminology and definitions. Only through a careful study of the doctrine and definitions over time are these changes evident.

Army leadership doctrine writers had influence from within the force as well as from outside the institution. Through an understanding of those writers and influences, their framework becomes clearer. Any published leadership ideas not included in doctrine is important because of the decision to omit. By investigating the accepted viewpoints countered with those not published, the doctrinal methodology may become clear. After taking all historical dialog and situations into account, and using the current doctrine as a starting place for the proposed future for Army leadership doctrine, the astute observer can not only better understand the process but potentially can anticipate upcoming changes. This anticipation requires understanding of the historical background, the ongoing leadership theory discussions, again inside and outside the uniformed services, and the framework used by those rewriting doctrine for future Army leaders.

As identified, through the 1980s and into the 1990s, Army leadership doctrine and regulations did not mesh, resulting in different definitions and understanding of what the Army

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and the nation expected of a leader. Without clarity on two versus three levels of leadership, the regulations and doctrine created a situation where confusion could increase when trying to apply leadership across organizations. Through a snapshot of each doctrinal manual and Army regulation, the changes are clear; however, what is not clear is how the changes evolved and how they became incorporated into updates to the publications. This research project will explore that process including the discussions within the Army about definitions and terms as well as looking at leadership theory discussions outside of the Army and how that influenced doctrine and regulations. Using the publications as benchmarks, including the supersession of manuals, this research will fill in the gaps between publications, showing the academic rigor, research, and influence inherent in changing Army doctrine and regulations. Included in this research will be a critical examination of the steps of change over the past four decades, focusing on the Army’s strategic leaders and the discourse involved. After showing the way the doctrine changed, an examination of the current doctrine, as well as a brief glimpse into the planned future doctrine, will also demonstrate how both improve today’s strategic leaders in the Army. Without understanding the history of the changes, the future is much less clear.
Be, Know, Do Military Leadership Established, 1983

Our Army is made up of people, doctrine, organizations, weapons, and equipment. It is leadership, however, that brings all these together and makes them work...Good leaders develop through a never-ending process of self-study, education, training and experience...[This manual] provides a guide for developing yourself, your subordinates, and your unit.

—FM 22-100, Military Leadership, October 1983

Prior to the more complex ideas brought forth at the end of the twentieth century, most Army leadership study focused at the tactical and operational level rather than at officers responsible for strategic level leadership. A compilation of leadership articles in American cavalry and armor journals between 1888 and 1985 shows a focus on direct, tactical leadership skills rather than on higher levels of leadership. A sampling of thirty-eight articles, most relating how a leader should affect those under his direct command and influence, demonstrated the tactical mentality prevalent to leadership study through the 1980s. In 1971, Edgar Puryear first postulated that World War II brought forth the best leaders for the United States, but these leaders were a combination of self-determination and proper experiences prior to assuming responsibility for the complex leadership challenges offered by high command. By studying four Army leaders, George Patton Jr., Dwight Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur and George C. Marshall from their cadet days through their service as four and five star generals, he presented a pattern for successful military leadership from direct through strategic leadership. This historical lack of strategic leadership doctrine continued through the 1980s Army doctrine.

Historical context is necessary to understand the changes and progression of Army leadership doctrine from that published in the 1980s. Knowing what was ongoing within the Army as well as the conflicts and problems faced by those in uniform and their civilian leadership


places the timeline of doctrinal changes into a framework dependent on both. The Army of the 1980s faced the Soviet empire worldwide and specifically across the Iron Curtain in Europe. Still less than ten years from leaving Vietnam and operating with a fully volunteer force, the Army of the early 1980s, in the words of General Dennis Reimer, Army Chief of Staff in 1999, was “an army in crisis.” Leaders dealt with “too much obsolete, broken equipment; too many poorly educated, unmotivated and undisciplined Soldiers; unrealistic training; and undermanned units,” all while still charged with fighting and winning our nation’s wars.

From the 1986 capstone manual, FM 100-1 The Army, Army ethics and individual values emerged as part of leadership. Published the same year, FM 100-5 Operations, articulated the importance of skilled leaders within the force to achieve victory across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Continuing the discussion on leadership, Operations addressed the importance strategic perspective; understanding of unified, specified, and combined joint command structures; and the intricacies allied military and civilian leaders brought to the strategic environment for senior leaders. The 1988 training capstone doctrine, FM 25-100 Training the Force, continued this strategic leadership discussion, describing senior leaders’ missions in terms of developing and communicating clear visions with centralized planning and decentralized execution.

The 1983 leadership capstone manual, FM 22-100 Military Leadership, described how leadership was the key component that brought all of the Army’s components – people, doctrine, organizations, weapons and equipment – together to make the Army work. Focusing on leaders at the working level – companies, troops, batteries, squadrons and battalions – this manual used a “Be, Know, Do” framework to demonstrate how Army leaders could improve. The three key

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10 Ibid.
11 Purvis Jr., 21-23.
focus areas, learning what a leader must be, know, and do; how to coach, teach, and mentor subordinates; and how to develop cohesive, disciplined, well-trained units to win on the battlefield, did not address any leadership attributes above the tactical level. In describing a concept of leadership, eleven principles of leadership (Figure 1), first developed in 1948 and published as leadership doctrine in 1951, provided the tactical leader excellent guidelines to be, know, and do. Through examples on how to apply these principles, the tactical leader could better understand and use them while leading.

The successful leader would know who they are (beliefs and character), what they know (tactics and procedures), and what they do (provide direction and motivate) to influence their Solders to accomplish the mission. Through a clear understanding of the four major factors (Figure 2) of leadership – the follower, the leader, communications, and the situation – the successful tactical leader would realize how these factors affects the actions they must take and when to take them. Throughout the discussion of these factors and their interaction, the leadership manual used direct leadership examples focused on the tactical leader, without any

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**U.S. Army Traditional Principles of Leadership**

1. Know yourself and seek self improvement
2. Be technically and tactically proficient
3. Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions,
4. Make sound and timely decisions
5. Set the example
6. Know your soldiers and look out for their well-being
7. Keep your subordinates informed
8. Develop a sense of responsibility in your subordinate
9. Ensure the task is understood, supervised and accomplished
10. Build the team
11. Employ your unit in accordance with its capabilities

Figure 1. Historical Principles of Leadership Inherent in U.S. Army Doctrine. Source: Adapted from FM 22-100, Military Leadership (1983), 41-44.

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13 Ibid., 41-44.
14 Ibid., 44-48.
consideration for leaders at higher levels in the Army. The attributes of a leader listed also only focused on the tactical level with the three overall types of leadership action skills – providing direction, implementing, and motivating – using direct leaders examples in their explanations and illustrations throughout the manual.\textsuperscript{15}

In 1987, the Army developed additional references, acknowledging the need to clarify the differences in leadership models for junior and senior leaders. Army Regulation 600-100 \textit{Army Leadership}, while not addressing different levels of leadership, described the various dimensions within leadership requiring different skills, knowledge, and techniques based on the level the individual leader served. The individual or small group level utilized the direct approach, while higher organizations depended on indirect methods of leadership. Senior leaders still had to maintain their ability to execute face-to-face leadership as well. As leaders progressed in the

\textsuperscript{15} FM 22-100, (1983), 52-53. Chapter 7 covered Provides Direction, Chapter 8 covered Implementing, and Chapter 9 covered Motivating.
Army, the leadership skills necessary became more complex in order to meet the increased organizational responsibility inherent with senior leadership positions. At the strategic level of leadership, conceptual methods and integrative abilities would become more important.16

The 1987 FM 22-103 *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels* addressed the need to understand the organizational leadership climate across the Army and use that climate to improve senior strategic leadership. Utilizing several studies conducted in the early and mid 1980s, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels* addressed three possible issues with senior leaders in the Army. Either senior leaders did not care about creating combat focused command climates, were unable to perform at the executive level required as senior leaders, or did not have the necessary skills to maintain an organizational climate focused on excellence.17

This supplementary publication to the 1983 FM 22-100 assisted in personal senior leader development, provided a resource for senior leaders, and established a common benchmark for large-unit leaders. By defining leadership as the “art of direct and indirect influence and the skill of creating the conditions for sustained organizational success to achieve the desired result” acknowledgement of two different levels of leadership emerged.18 While making an argument for different forms of leadership and different challenges faced by senior leaders, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels* did not differentiate between senior leaders and senior commanders.19 This shortfall placed the manual’s ideas in a confusing light as it explained senior leader concepts and attributes but lost clarity in the difference between a leader and a commander. Commanders had legal authority for their orders and were specific individual positions, while everyone was a


19 Ulmer, 13.
leader. All commanders were leaders, but not all leaders were commanders. The senior commander demonstrated the essential leadership attributes necessary for a successful senior leader by providing a clear vision for the future; a purpose, direction, and motivation to the organization.²⁰

*Leadership and Command at Senior Levels* graphic representation (Figure 3) of a senior leader’s vision in action included organization, challenge, ethics, skills and processes as the spokes radiating out from the vision, supporting the actions of the senior leader.²¹ It also articulated the need for the senior leader to motivate both individuals and organizations subordinate to them by training to standard, providing a proper ethical climate, fostering a sense

![Figure 3. Senior Leadership Keys to Success Inherent in U.S. Army Doctrine. Source: FM 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels* (1987), 16.](image)

²¹ Ibid., 16.
of unity, and establishing an effective command climate. The senior leader’s clear vision, and motivation, of both subordinate individuals and organizations, were the essential ingredients for a functioning organization, and were a foundation for the necessary requirements for a successful senior leader.

Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-80 Executive Leadership, published the same year as FM 22-103, focused at the three and four-star level, providing a systems perspective based on senior leader experiences as the foundation for the leader development process. The executive level leader had to progress through two subordinate leadership levels, direct and indirect, prior to working in this complex leadership environment. These levels of leadership lost their distinctness within Executive Leadership, as the necessary skills outlined for successful leadership overlapped. Arguably, the more academically focused publication, Executive Leadership provided a mature tone for senior leaders to grasp more complex leader behavior to better predict their organization’s outcomes. Written primarily by the Army Research Institute, this pamphlet added significantly to the necessary and relevant dialog concerning senior leadership including addressing leader “frame of reference” and the “cascading translation process.” This understanding of the cause and effect relationships within a complex organization and the distortion of directives as passed down into an organization gave Army leadership a good start on examining and understanding executive leadership.

While neither FM 22-100 nor AR 600-100 addressed the strategic leadership level, both FM 22-103 and DA Pam 600-80 provided a foundation for senior leaders to think about the

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24 Purvis Jr., 28.
26 Ulmer, 15-17.
differences in direct and indirect leadership, while focusing their energies on the important items requiring their attention and not spending time on subordinate leadership issues. Finally, FM 22-103 and DA Pam 600-80 provided a list of “how-to’s” for senior leaders, setting forth practical examples of execution rather than focusing only on the ideal.27

The 1980s Army leadership doctrine spread across several field manuals and regulations, and these publications differed in their descriptions of levels and definitions. FM 22-103 listed direct leadership at the tactical level and indirect leadership above that. AR 600-100 discussed two levels of leadership, direct, and indirect. DA Pam 600-80 used the terms direct, indirect, and executive in explaining leadership levels. The first two equated to tactical and operational leadership and the third, strategic. FM 22-101, Leadership Counseling and FM 22-102, Soldier Team Development were two additional leadership manuals published in the 1980s and while important in overall Army leader development, do not address strategic leadership, so will not be further discussed in this analysis.

Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989 and more directly, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq in 1990-91 gave the U.S. military and the world an idea of the kinds of military application that might be forthcoming. With this framework, Mark Little analyzed Leadership and Command at Senior Levels in 1993 by reviewing the doctrine and summarizing the key leadership concepts and requirements using a case study of the 1944-45 Burma Campaign. Through a comparison of the late 1980s Army senior leadership doctrine in FM 22-103 against the 1944-45 Burma Campaign, this research identified concepts that future senior leadership doctrine should include for operational level commanders. These concepts included the operational campaign plan linked to strategic and tactical efforts while focusing on the strategic endstate; the operational commander conveying the commander’s intent, especially

27 Ulmer, 14.
in a coalition; the will of the operational commander; and how men and their morale can defeat even the best campaign plan.\textsuperscript{28}

Throughout the 1980s, many Soldiers and academics published articles and reports on Army leadership doctrine as well as on strategy and the importance of strategists and strategic leadership, some of which affected changes in doctrine. In 1985, Mitchell Zais explored the need for different leadership at different levels, rather than accepting the notion that a good tactical, direct leader, would automatically excel at the operational, strategic indirect leadership level.\textsuperscript{29} In 1984, Robert Killebrew articulated that the Army did not have enough strategists and outlined a way to both educate and place these personnel into the force.\textsuperscript{30} Five years later, John Galvin ascertained that more strategists were necessary in the Army and he explained where those strategists should serve once trained.\textsuperscript{31} This focus on strategists and their ability to be successful based on specific leadership qualities not clearly outlined in the existing doctrine demonstrated the fear, at least among some, that the Army was not properly resourcing or preparing strategic leaders for the future. The enemy of the U.S. in the mid-80s was clearly the Soviet Union with other, minor conflicts and incidents requiring minimum forces to handle, so accurately forecasting the needs of the Army following the drastic world changes at the end of the decade, was problematic.

Other articles addressed the education system, both overall for leaders and specifically for strategic leaders. In 1985, Robert Fitton provided a status report of existing leadership doctrine, focusing on the training aspect of ensuring Army leaders both received and provided

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{28} Little, 37-40.
\end{quote}
adequate leadership training.\textsuperscript{32} The same year, James O’Rourke’s work examined the delicate balance between education and training in preparing officers for military service.\textsuperscript{33} In 1987, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe, reinforced the education of senior officers, specifically within the war college experience, expounding on future requirements.\textsuperscript{34} This renewed interest in strategic leader education came in conjunction with the 1987 publication of FM 22-103, and attempted to capture the differences in strategic leadership and leadership at the direct, tactical level. Retired Lieutenant General Walter Ulmer reviewed \textit{Leadership and Command at Senior Levels}, and \textit{Executive Leadership}, concluding much had improved but there was potential for greater strides in Army leadership doctrine.\textsuperscript{35}

Within the military and political context of the early and mid 1980s, explaining strategic theory was necessary. Some aspects made it into the late 1980s doctrine, but these still did not encapsulate the emerging differences in leadership definitions. Leadership doctrine focused on tactical and operational leadership because the audience was larger, while strategic leadership remained separate. The strategic level leadership research done in 1989 concluded that there were three levels of leadership – tactical, operational, and strategic – and that the existing doctrine did not adequately address strategic leadership. This research asserted that the Army must standardize terms and levels and provide the doctrine, education and training for strategic leadership.\textsuperscript{36} The updated doctrine published in 1990 would make some changes but would not correct the discrepancy or adequately address strategic leadership. That would come later.


\textsuperscript{33} James S. O’Rourke, “Military Leadership for the 1990’s and Beyond,” \textit{Military Review} (February 1985): 16-23


\textsuperscript{35} Ulmer, 10-17.

\textsuperscript{36} Purvis Jr., 1-4, 39-41.
Initial Changes to Military Leadership Doctrine, 1990

The Army’s leadership doctrine lays out principles that, when followed, provide the tools to execute our operational doctrine….The Army needs leaders who sustain their ability to look beyond peacetime concerns and can execute their wartime missions even after long periods of peace….This manual presents the requirements for leading and points for you to consider when assessing and developing yourself, your subordinates, and your unit.

—FM 22-100, Military Leadership, 31 July 1990

The early 1990s were a time of change across the United States and specifically within the military. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, open borders, free elections, and the Soviet Union failing, the decades of Cold War ended. Victory against Iraq in Kuwait, coupled with the loss of a direct superpower adversary, found the United States alone as a world superpower and left the military trying to identify itself with a clear task and purpose.

The military found itself entangled in ambiguous, inconclusive operations that blurred political and military lines of responsibility. Operations Desert Strike and Desert Fox through the 1990s continued the U.S. involvement in Iraq through aerial enforcement of no-fly zones and punishment for non-compliance with international weapons inspectors. The U.S. military tested its doctrine, including leadership, across the spectrum of conflict and intervention. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia under both the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and as the lead for the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) starting in 1992 ended shortly after Task Force Ranger’s loss of two helicopters and eighteen Soldiers killed in Mogadishu in October 1993.

Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994 provided the U.S. with another opportunity to use the military as coercive diplomacy and gave the Army the opportunity to continue to refine and update doctrine for similar operations. In 1995, Operation Joint Endeavour and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led Implementation Force (IFOR) provided another chance for the U.S. to validate, refine, and update doctrine. Considering the sensitive nature of working within NATO, this operation introduced another mindset for the Army, one of global police officer. The 1999 fighting in Kosovo again expanded the U.S. military role to force peace.
After the Army published FM 22-103 and DA Pamphlet 600-80 in 1987, studies continued about where strategic leadership fit into the doctrine, specifically what kind of leadership was necessary to fight and win the AirLand Battle doctrine refined in the 1980s. In 1987, the Army’s Center for Army Leadership (CAL) hosted a leadership study in an attempt to codify strategic leadership within the military profession. Command climates and how senior leaders either improved or destroyed units through their application of the precepts outlined in senior, executive doctrine were timely and necessary due to the senior Army leadership’s increasing emphasis on strategic leader development. The Army needed senior leaders who recognized the command climate that was successful, and understood how to improve those successful climates to further develop and nurture their subordinate leaders, and conduct tactics effectively. Potentially, Army leadership doctrine was postured for a major breakthrough.

Near the end of his four-year term, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Carl Vuono, addressed the professionalism of the Army as it entered the 1990s. Using the events signifying the end of the Cold War, he claimed that events were drastically altering the world leading to the Army reshaping itself into a smaller, but still capable, force that would continue to defend and advance interests for the United States worldwide. He described six enduring imperatives that would guide the force into the twenty-first century (Figure 4). Leadership crossed all six imperatives, with specific emphasis on developing leaders of unmatched ability. Leaders would ensure the force was of quality through powerful war-fighting doctrine able to win in the future, putting units through tough realistic training while continuing to modernize.

General Vuono continued his emphasis on leader development through the three pillars of the leader development program – schools, operational experiences, and self-development – with

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37 This was the 250th identifiable U.S. Army study on leadership since the end of World War II. Ulmer, 17.

38 Ibid.
leaders taking responsibility for their development as part of their commitment to the profession.\textsuperscript{39} This article focused on the overall requirements of the professional leader, but did not separate the different levels of leadership. Without direct leaders to implement these imperatives and the executive leaders to maintain a vision, these imperatives lose their effectiveness, but General Vuono did not specify the different ways the different levels of leadership would meet these demands.

Continuing General Vuono’s focus on professional leaders in the 1990s Army, an instructor at CAL, Ray Palmer, argued for a more streamlined development process for Army leaders that would result in a “comprehensive program and a supportive environment throughout the Army.”\textsuperscript{40} In 1989, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) instructed all resident leader courses to use the Leadership Assessment and Development Program (LADP). Palmer explained the goal of LADP and how the Army could better implement it across the force using

\begin{figure}[h]
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\begin{itemize}
\item 1. An uncompromising commitment to a quality force
\item 2. A powerful war-fighting doctrine that will win both now and in the future
\item 3. A mix of forces including heavy, light, and special operations forces in our Active and Reserve Components
\item 4. Tough, realistic, training
\item 5. Continuous modernization
\item 6. Development of leaders of unmatched ability
\end{itemize}


the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) Command’s Leadership Assessment Program (LAP) as a model (Figure 5). Using the logic that if a leader performed well in an assessment opportunity for a reality-based position, then that leader would do well in that position. Palmer outlined the five steps in the leadership assessment process: observe the performance, record the actions, classify the actions into the leadership competencies, rate the performance, and provide immediate feedback. He further explained how this would apply across the Army and acknowledged the differences between assessing a second lieutenant and a more senior leader. 41

Figure 5. Change in Assessments between Leadership Levels over Time. Source: Adapted from Palmer, “Developing Army Leaders,” 40,42.

41 Palmer, 36-39.
Because the two modes of leadership, direct and indirect, cut across all organizational levels, he showed how the LADP would have to shift as the leader progressed into higher organizational levels. At the direct mode, superior (boss) assessments, associate (peer) assessments, and self-assessments were the three aspects leaders would use in their development. As leaders progressed through operational assignments from the junior level to the senior level, the instituted directed assessments would decrease while the self-directed assessments would increase accounting for the increased maturity, skills, knowledge, and self-awareness more prevalent at the senior level. Palmer accounted for the disparity in leadership levels in his description of the LADP and how the Army could use the program in developing leaders. Based on the existing doctrine, his terms reflected the confusion on the levels of leadership and the absence of strategic leadership development programs. He addressed improvements in senior level development, but the disagreement between the levels of leadership descriptions in the publications hindered the overall assessment methodology.

In July of 1990, five manuals contained the Army’s leadership doctrine with each focusing on a specific leadership need while supporting the overall doctrine and contributing to the ability to fight or deter aggression. The 1990 FM 22-100 provided some updates to Army leadership doctrine but still did not address strategic leadership. Leadership and Command at Senior Levels and Executive Leadership remained the two references addressing anything above direct, tactical leadership in detail, but as with the earlier versions, neither reference agreed on the levels or the modes of leadership (Figure 6). Army leaders had to satisfy four leadership requirements: lead in peace to be prepared for war, develop individual leaders, develop leadership

42 Palmer discussed a possible fourth aspect, subordinate assessment, but TRADOC had not implemented it at the writing of his article.
43 Palmer, 40-42.
44 FM 22-100, Military Leadership. (Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, 1990), ix.
Teams, and decentralize. This version of *Military Leadership* focused on leaders of junior Soldiers at battalion and squadron level and below by providing an overview of Army leadership doctrine and how to prescribe the leadership necessary in peace and war. The company grade officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers this manual focused on were to demonstrate tactical and technical competence, teach subordinates, be good listeners, treat Soldiers with dignity and respect, stress basics, set the example, and set and enforce standards. By leading, training, motivating, and inspiring their Soldiers, these junior leaders would be ready to deter, and if necessary, win war.

Clarifications in this manual focused at the tactical leader level only. Key Army leadership elements articulated in this doctrine identified certain leadership factors, principles, and competencies mastered by effective historical leaders and then explained how these formed

45 FM 22-100 (1990), vi-vii.
46 Ibid., i-ii.
the framework at all levels for developing self, subordinates, and units. While acknowledging that leaders led in different ways at the different organizational levels, this manual focused only on the junior level techniques, while stating that in larger organizations, the scope of missions would broaden and leadership would be more complex. Senior level leaders and commanders would provide vision, influence indirectly through layers of large units, build organizations, and create conditions that enabled junior leaders to accomplish their assigned tasks and missions.

There were four requirements for military leadership: to lead in peace to be prepared for war, to develop individual leaders, to develop leadership teams, and to decentralize. The four major factors of leadership remained the led, the leader, the situation, and communications (Figure 7). Also from the 1983 leadership doctrine, the principles of leadership would provide the

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47 FM 22-100 (1990), viii.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., xii.

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Figure 7. Leadership Factors Inherent in U.S. Army Doctrine. Source: FM 22-100, *Military Leadership* (1990), 4.
cornerstone for action.\textsuperscript{50} Face-to-face leadership, executed at the junior officer level, was direct leadership, while indirect leadership involved subordinate levels between leaders and the led. Indirect leaders had to develop vision and build organizations, allowing junior officers to practice direct leadership in completing their missions. Further defining a leader, this manual listed the following attributes: integrity, sense of values, courage, candor, and commitment. The doctrine did not differentiate between direct and indirect leadership when defining these attributes.\textsuperscript{51}

Leadership competencies, the framework for leader development first developed in 1976 after studying leaders from corporal to general officer, identified nine functions necessary for leaders to operate effective organizations (Figure 8). Claiming that all leaders exercised these competencies, the application only differed a little, based on the leader’s relative position within

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{leadership_competencies.png}
\caption{Leadership Competencies Inherent in U.S. Army Doctrine. \textit{Source:} FM 22-100, \textit{Military Leadership} (1990), 66.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{50} FM 22-100 (1990), 3-5.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 4-12.
the organization, or their level of leadership.\textsuperscript{52} Acknowledging that leaders led differently based on their organizational level, the two modes of leadership remained in the doctrine – direct and indirect. This reference again stressed that all leaders used both methods, but that the “proportion of influence shifts from predominantly the direct mode at junior levels to predominantly the indirect mode at senior levels.”\textsuperscript{53}

By mixing the two leadership modes, the successful leader would excel at different levels within an organization, but, outside of the 1987 versions of FM 22-103 and DA Pamphlet 600-80, there was no discussion or articulation of the indirect mode for this manual’s audience. Senior leaders had to read both manuals to understand their role as strategic leaders in the Army while junior leaders had no visibility on what exactly their senior leadership was responsible for or should provide them to accomplish their tasks and missions. It would be almost a full decade for the doctrine to consolidate in one manual and reflect the three levels of leadership: direct, organizational, and strategic.

\textsuperscript{52} FM 22-100 (1990), 66-68.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., viii-ix.
Consolidation of Army Strategic Leadership Doctrine, 1999

As the capstone leadership manual for the Army, [this manual] establishes the Army’s leadership doctrine, the fundamental principles by which Army leaders act to accomplish the mission and take care of their people. ...[This manual] offers a framework for how to lead and provides points for Army leaders to consider when assessing and developing themselves, their people, and their organization.

—FM 22-100, Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do, 31 August 1999

As the twentieth century ended, there were several significant updates to Army leadership doctrine. Based on external research in the separate studies of leadership and strategy theories, and in the study of strategy and leadership as mutually inclusive disciplines, the Army’s next publication incorporated drastic differences. The strategy field of study had only appeared as a self-conscious discipline in the mid 1960s. Thirty years later, concepts of leadership and strategy still tended to be interchangeable terms, but the study of leadership within the field of strategy began to emerge in the mid 1990s across multiple studies of leadership, not just within the military. With the 1993 update to the Army Leadership regulation and the 1999 version of FM 22-100 Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do, the Army perspectives on strategy within the study of leadership appeared to change and the doctrine started to differentiate between the levels of leadership.54

In 1994, John Agoglia explored leader development and training by reviewing the current doctrine including the 1991 Military Leadership, the 1985 Leadership Counseling, the 1987 Soldier Team Development, the working draft of Leadership at Organizational and Strategic Levels, and the 1988 FM 25-100 Training the Force for their usefulness in effective action. Starting with FM 100-5 Operations, this research, which did not explore the differences of doctrinal leadership information, stated that the references did not clearly articulate the guidelines in a coherent manner allowing the leader to implement it in a successful manner. Rather, he

concluded that the Army must link training management with doctrinal leadership frameworks within the hierarchy of leader, team, and unit development, and he presented two constructs to make that link.  

Brian Levy’s 1996 article linked the strategy process with the perspective of indirect and strategic leadership and the approaches necessary to study it. According to Kimberly Boal and Robert Hooijberg, the last twenty years of the twentieth century saw studies and analysis on leadership go through rejuvenation, specifically in the study of leadership as an aspect missing in management. There was a metamorphosis away from the study of direct leadership to a greater study of strategic and indirect leadership. Their 2001 work outlined these changes by reviewing the various issues within strategic leadership and explained how the new and emergent theories integrated within strategic leadership. Both reports suggested that throughout the 1990s, strategy as a field of leadership study evolved across multiple disciplines including within the U.S. military. This evolving field of study of strategic leadership showed that the military strategic leader needed to focus more specifically on different skills and abilities, which seemed to affect the 1999 doctrine in the consolidated FM 22-100 *Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do*. These studies also hinted at even that update not being enough.

*Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do* was a framework for all Army leaders, including active and reserve component military officers and non-commissioned officers and civilians. This edition covered the three levels of leadership, direct, organizational and strategic (Figure 9), the first time an Army leadership manual did so. According to the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, this addition of all three levels of leadership was not to downplay direct leadership’s

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56 Leavy, 435.

importance but was because organizational and strategic leaders needed additional skills to perform in the increasingly complex roles and responsibilities encountered at the higher levels of leadership. This updated leadership doctrine consolidated the various leadership publications by combining leadership Field Manuals, Department of the Army Pamphlets and Department of the Army Forms into a single manual. This placed into one reference the varying levels and aspects of leadership theory and application. Entering the twenty-first century, the Army had only two leadership doctrine and regulation references: AR 600-100 Army Leadership, and FM 22-100 Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do.

Army Leadership recognized three interrelated levels of leadership requirements: direct, senior, and strategic. Acknowledging variations in scope and character, the regulation articulated how each level required differing mixes of leadership skills. Doctrine defined the direct level as

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58 FM 22-100, Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do. (Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, August 1999), forward.

59 The 1999 publication of FM 22-100 Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do consolidated and superseded the 1990 FM 22-100 Military Leadership; the 1985 FM 22-101 Leadership Counseling; the 1987 FM 22-102 Soldier Team Development; the 1987 FM 22-103 Leadership and Command at Senior Levels; the 1987 DA Pam 600-80 Executive Leadership; and the 1985 DA Form 4856 Developmental Counseling Form. FM 22-100, (August 1999), i.
front-line, first level leadership, including leaders from squad through battalion level tactical units. The norms were face-to-face, interpersonal leadership skills, knowledge, and attitudes that influenced human behavior. Direct leaders had to have technical and tactical competence to build cohesive teams while still empowering subordinates. Effective direct leaders focused on individual Soldiers through problem solving, interpersonal skills, performance counseling, and plans developed to accomplish policies and missions assigned. Utilizing a time-based framework, this regulation focused direct leaders on short range planning from three months to one year.\textsuperscript{60}

At the second, senior, level of leadership, in more complex organizations, such as brigade through corps tactical units, these leaders tailored resources to organizations and programs while establishing command climates. Technical and tactical competence, as well as interpersonal skills remained necessary, specifically on synchronizing systems and organizations. Sophisticated problem solving, shaping, and directing complex organizational structures and systems revolved around ensuring healthy command climates thrived. The senior leaders’ time window focused on mid-range planning from between one to five years.\textsuperscript{61}

Acknowledging the strategic level of leadership for the first time, this regulation limited strategic leadership to the highest levels of the Army such as field armies through the national level. Strategic leaders succeeded through establishment of structures, allocation of resources, and articulation of strategic visions. Technical competence on force structure, unified, joint, combined, and interagency operational understanding, and management of complex systems were the strategic leader’s imperatives. Interpersonal skills remained crucial, specifically on consensus building and influencing peers and other policy makers while maintaining their healthy command climate. The strategic leaders’ time window ranged from five to twenty years.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{60} Army Regulation 600-100 \textit{Army Leadership}, (Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, 1993), 1.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
Instilling the Army ethic across the force remained important, but differed for each level of leadership. *Army Leadership* divided the directions regarding leaders’ responsibilities and articulated the different requirements for each level leader regarding their subordinates. Strategic leaders were responsible for the total Army culture; senior leaders used sound ethics to maintain their command climate and develop, motivate, and coach subordinate leaders; and direct leaders would demonstrate the Army ethic most effectively through personal example and individual, personal impact.63

With the 1993 update to the regulation, the doctrine continued in research and production until the 1999 consolidation. This consolidation removed possible confusion and searching inherent in having doctrine, regulations, and guidance spread across multiple mediums rather than in a comprehensive document. The three other leadership manuals superseded encompassed important material, but with them being separate and distinct, greater care was required to ensure they remained complementary and not contradictory. Separate references made it less likely for direct leaders to learn any aspects of the indirect leadership skills involved in organizational or strategic levels of leadership until they reached those levels and actively sought out the publications. Following the update to the levels of leadership outlined in *Army Leadership* in 1993, the 1999 FM 22-100 included three levels of leadership for the first time: direct, organizational and strategic. Understanding what each of these were and how the manual defined them helps understand the changes made in strategic leadership study and how that correlates with the different levels described in the regulation. It would be almost ten years before the Army updated the regulation to match the manual and doctrine.

The primary audience for *Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do* remained direct leaders serving in battalion and below formations, but by incorporating organizational and strategic leadership, this manual also provided leadership doctrine applicable at all leadership levels. This

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63 AR 600-100 (1993), 2.
inclusion would “introduce direct leaders to the concerns faced by leaders and staffs operating at
the organizational levels.” The skills and actions within strategic, organizational, and direct
leadership overlapped and the perspective could change based on the span of control,
headquarters level, extent of influence, size of the unit or organization, type of operations,
number of people assigned, and the planning horizon. This publication specifically removed
military rank from the discussion between the different levels since some ranks could serve across
multiple levels, even within the same position. This doctrine also kept the focus on direct
leadership, no matter what level of leadership, because almost all Army leader positions had
aspects of direct leadership, specifically with those individuals directly subordinate. The
responsibilities of a duty position, together with the factors listed above, determined which level
an individual leader operated.

Direct leadership remained the face-to-face, first-line leadership with the preponderance
of the manual written for these leaders. Organizational leaders influenced more people, usually
had staffs to help lead and manage, and required skills different in degree, but not in kind, from
those necessary for direct leaders. These military organizational leaders’ span of control was from
between a brigade and a corps, which was equivalent to the senior leadership level defined in the
regulation. The definitions and descriptions of strategic leaders in the doctrine very closely
mirrored that in the regulation.

Over the first thirty years of study in the strategy field, the concept of leadership
remained peripheral while studies in the 1990s suggested that leadership had become central to
the strategy field, however with some challenges. With leadership, “one of the great conundrums
of social science,” and the subject of over 5000 separate studies, this concept remained not only

64 FM 22-100 (August 1999), x.
65 Ibid., 1-11.
66 Ibid., 1-11-1-12.
important but a necessary field of study requiring dedicated research and clear understanding. Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do tried to further codify what the Army considered strategic leadership and how practitioners within the institution should approach the execution of science and art.

As described in this doctrine, strategic leadership required significantly different techniques in the skill and scope from organizational and direct leadership. Based on the expected audience and sphere of influence, Army strategic leaders had to be astute in areas outside their profession in order to be successful. Interpersonal skills, conceptual skills, and technical skills, properly acted on through influencing, operating, and improving would lead the strategic leader into better preparation for whatever the next conflict or crisis faced the U.S. and specifically, the military. Strategic leadership had not changed from “setting the fundamental conditions and providing assets to secure policy objectives,” merely the clearer articulation and compilation of those skills and attributes within Army doctrine. These different strategic leadership techniques were now in line with historical direct leadership, providing the Army one leadership manual, but further changes were forthcoming.

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67 Leavy, 435.
68 FM 22-100 (August 1999), 7-1-7-28.
69 Purvis Jr., 20.
Reorganization and Agreement of Leadership Doctrine, 2006

As the keystone leadership manual for the United States Army, [this manual] establishes leadership doctrine, the fundamental principles by which Army leaders act to accomplish their mission and care for their people….Army leaders recognize that organizations built on mutual trust and confidence, successfully accomplish peacetime and wartime missions….All Soldiers and Army civilians, at one time or another, must act as leaders and followers….It is important to understand that leaders do not just lead subordinates-they also lead other leaders.

—FM 6-22, Army Leadership: Competent, Confident and Agile, 12 October 2006

Two years after the significant consolidation of Army leadership doctrine into the 1999 version of FM 22-100, and barely into the twenty-first century, terrorists attacked the United States. Spurred by the perception of a new order, the Army conducted multiple studies on existing operations and doctrine in the post-September 11, 2001 environment. Army leadership, specifically strategic leadership, received significant reviews with input from several research groups in conjunction with, and separate from, internal studies by CAL at Fort Leavenworth.

Researching under what conditions, when, how, and on what criteria strategic leadership mattered, the Institute for Leadership Research at Texas Tech University published a report early in 2001 advocating further progress in strategic leadership research. This study concluded that effective strategic leadership followed the essence of strategic leadership – absorptive capacity, adaptive capacity, and managerial wisdom – and incorporated new and emerging theories of leadership. By focusing on the behavioral complexity, cognitive complexity, and social intelligence of strategic leaders, this research proposed to better quantify the necessary traits to be a successful strategic leader.70 Activities associated with strategic leadership included strategic decision-making, creating and communicating a vision, developing competencies and capabilities, developing organizational structures, managing constituencies, nurturing the next generation of leaders, sustaining the organizational culture, and infusing the ethical values into the organizational system. This report defined absorptive capacity as the ability to learn, adaptive

capacity as the ability to change, and managerial wisdom as combining properties of discernment and timing.\textsuperscript{71}

The purpose, method, and effectiveness of leadership doctrine, specifically strategic leadership, continued to develop. In 2001, Carnes Lord concluded that leadership was a forgotten dimension of strategy.\textsuperscript{72} A year later, Mark McGuire discussed developing strategic leaders through senior leader education programs, specifically within the rapidly changing pace and demands on the U.S. Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{73} Late in 2003, Michael Guillot defined strategic leadership, the components, and nature of the strategic environment, and articulated another opinion on how to develop strategic leaders.\textsuperscript{74} Only a few months later, Michael Flowers wrote on how to improve strategic leaders through the Army Strategic Leadership Course, but that the course needed expansion for a larger audience.\textsuperscript{75} In 2006, Scott Nestler reviewed the 2003 Strategic Leadership Competencies publication and compared the six meta-competencies identified with the Army Chief of Staff’s leader development programs.\textsuperscript{76} These authors and their research often addressed the changing world in the new century but also offered insight and analysis on the existing leadership theories, the shortfalls, and ways to improve strategic leadership in the Army.

Internal Army studies paralleled academic and professional dialog. Following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff tasked the U.S. Army War College to identify the required strategic leader skills necessary in the future environment.

\textsuperscript{71} Boal, “Strategic Leadership Research,” 516-518.


\textsuperscript{73} Mark McGuire, “Senior Officers and Strategic Leader Development,” JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn 2001): 91-96.


\textsuperscript{76} Scott T. Nestler, “Developing Strategic Leaders for the Army,” Army 56, Issue 9 (September 2006), 13-16.
Between 2001 and 2003, The War College conducted research into the strategic leader skill sets required in the post-September 11, 2001 environment. After examining existing strategic leadership literature, existing lists of Army strategic leader competencies (from the 1999 version of FM 22-100), and the future environment expected, the authors of Strategic Leadership Competencies derived six metacompetencies: identity, mentality agility, cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, world-class warrior, and professional astuteness for the future Army. These metacompetencies all fell within the three pillars of leader development – institutional, operational, and self-development – and remained part of the overall development of strategic leaders.\footnote{77 Leonard Wong, and Stephen Gerras and William Kidd and Robert Pricone and Richard Swengros. Strategic Leadership Competencies, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College (September 2003), 1-11.}

In 2004, the faculty of the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management at the Army War College published a second edition primer on strategic leadership that updated the first edition published in 1998. This publication was useful for those whose background was primarily in tactical and operational field environments and became the primary Army document that described and defined strategic leadership in easily understood terms. While the primer claimed that strategic leadership had not changed drastically, the authors attempted to update it with recent literature and examples to maintain its relevancy into the future.\footnote{78 Strategic Leadership Primer, 2nd Edition. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004), ii.} In coordination with this primer, Leonard Wong published another article in 2003 that reviewed military leadership literature, stratifying it into the system, organizational, and direct levels of leadership. This review also examined the critical tasks and individual capabilities each level required while emphasizing the changes ongoing in the changing nature of war and the world environment.\footnote{79 Leonard Wong and Paul Bliese and Dennis McGurk, “Military Leadership: A Context Specific Review,” Leadership Quarterly 14, Issue 6 (December 2003): 657-692.}
Others outside the military, political, and business arenas also researched and published articles on strategic leadership within their own professional expertise. These attempts by multi-discipline professionals to codify concepts in discourse across academic leadership publications reflected not only the importance of strategic leadership concepts but also the broad appeal and need for better understanding. Explaining the importance of strategic leadership and the difference between strategic and tactical leadership within complex endeavors, articles such as John Buckman’s fire engineering study showed the ideas permeating across disciplines. He defined successful strategic leaders as first having a clear understanding of where they want the organization to go, a vision; developing the means to get to the ends envisioned, a mission; and finally setting specific goals to measure their progress. He claimed that even the best strategic leadership would only take the organization as far as the effective tactical leadership inherent within the organization.80

FM 6-22 *Army Leadership: Competent, Confident and Agile*, published in 2006, continued the recent policy of a single leadership manual for the Army. AR 600-100 *Army Leadership*, published a year later, updated the levels of leadership to match the manual and for the first time in Army leadership doctrinal history, the three levels of leadership described in all Army references complemented rather than conflicted.81 Again addressed to all leaders in the Army, FM 6-22 defined leadership, leadership roles and requirements, and how to develop leaders in the Army, as well as outlining the leadership levels and how to succeed at all three.82

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81 Army Regulation 600-100, *Army Leadership*, (Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, 2007), 4. With the difference in the levels of leadership terms and definitions between the 1993 AR 600-100 and the 1999 FM 22-100, the 2007 version of AR 600-100 updated the levels of leadership to direct, organizational and strategic with discussion on the differences and leader progression requirements.
FM 6-22 directly supported the Army capstone doctrine as well as expanding and addressing the topics necessary to be a competent, skilled Army leader, including at the strategic level.83

Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile maintained a similar overall structure, but removed the single focus on direct leaders. The three levels of Army leadership remained direct, organizational and strategic, but the relationship of the three removed the previous overlap of the levels and more clearly separated them with differing focuses and purposes (Figure 10). The definitions remained mostly the same, but by separating them rather than showing overlap, the ideas behind the doctrine took a different shape. Additionally, this manual further clarified previous doctrinal descriptions on the levels of leadership, specifically on

Figure 10. Three Levels of Army Leadership and their Relationships. Source: FM 6-22 Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile, (October 2006), 3-6.

83 The renumbering of field manuals was part of an overall evolution of Army doctrine including the two capstone manuals, FM 1, The Army, published in 2005 and FM 3-0, Operations, published in 2001.
how strategic leaders within the Army should operate. Using the roughly 600 authorized military and civilian positions classified as senior strategic leaders, this manual very carefully outlined specific duties and responsibilities of these strategic leaders. Included concepts such as leader teams – both legitimate (formal) and influential (informal) – provided additional clarity to the importance of the Army as a collection of teams within the construct of roles, relationships, and levels of leaders across the force.\textsuperscript{84}

Similar to the 1999 doctrinal manual, FM 6-22 included competency based leadership from the direct through organizational to the strategic level. This structure provided the direct leader the opportunity to see the leading, developing, and achieving affect they provided while also considering the same competencies at those higher levels of leadership. Leaders had to continuously build and refine their values, attributes, and professional knowledge across the levels of leadership. As they moved from direct leadership positions through organizational to strategic positions, these competencies became more nuanced and complex.\textsuperscript{85} For the operational and strategic leader, they should already have known and understood the direct level of leadership, both because they experienced it as a more junior member of the Army and because their own leading, developing, and achieving foundation rested on the direct leadership base (Figure 11).

Strategic leadership focused on the specific leader attributes to succeed at that level. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, deemed it critical that all Army leaders be “agile, multiskilled pentathletes who have strong moral character, broad knowledge, and keen intellect.”\textsuperscript{86} As the Army’s ultimate multiskilled pentathletes, strategic leaders, as professional experts, must have surveyed the complex national and international security environment outside

\textsuperscript{84} FM 6-22 (October 2006), 3-1-3-12.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 7-1.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., Foreword.
the Army to achieve full understanding of their place within the network of organizations for long
term success through constant internal assessments.

Leaders at the highest levels of the Army must have developed their successors,
spearheading force changes, and optimizing complex systems with minimal risk. Strategic leaders
would lead others through vision, motivation and inspiration. They extended influence through
negotiating within and beyond national boundaries while building strategic consensus. They
would lead by example through inspiring institutional change, dealing with ambiguity, and
displaying confidence in adverse conditions. Strategic leaders communicated across multiple
audiences and venues using various methods, means, and media. 87

Strategic leaders made institutional investments with long-term focuses. They positioned
the institution for the future by creating a positive environment. They maintained a strategic

87 FM 6-22 (October 2006), 12-1-12-2.
orientation, and expanded their cultural knowledge and self-awareness through a well-developed frame of reference. Strategic leaders developed subordinate leaders through counseling, mentoring, and coaching while building teams and processes, constantly assessing the needs of the organization.

Strategic leaders succeeded by providing direction, guidance, and clear vision within a strategic planning framework that allocated the right resources while leveraging technology and external assets in a multicultural context. Strategic leaders accomplished their missions consistently and ethically. These attributes and competencies, refined and further articulated in the current Army doctrine for strategic leaders, also remained a discussion topic for intellectual discourse on where else strategic leadership should lead the Army. Further research, reports, and updates would continue this interest in strategic leadership doctrine.

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88 FM 6-22 (October 2006), 12-2-12-16.
Strategic Leadership’s Ongoing Discourse, 2011

Today bookstores are overflowing with titles on leadership of every conceivable sort…. The U.S. Army has led the way in leadership education. In the last few years in particular, there has been a great deal of interest in the Army’s approach to leadership and leadership education.
—Mark Grandstaff and Georgia Sorenson, Strategic Leadership: The General’s Art, 2008

In 2010, the Center for Army Leadership at Fort Leavenworth was updating the Army’s leadership field manual with the Commanding General’s, TRADOC, guidance based on direction from the U.S. Army Chief of Staff. The author’s draft went out for staffing and review in late 2010, with publication currently scheduled for October 2011. Based on other evolving doctrine, this update should reinforce existing capstone documents and explain leadership concepts in more situationally relevant terms for contemporary and future operations. Focusing on achieving operational adaptability through leaders’ abilities to integrate Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) partners to better develop situations and adjust to changing situations, this update follows ongoing capstone doctrinal updates in the Army.

As written in the author’s draft, this updated manual will not change the Army leadership levels published in 2006, or the overall links between direct, organizational, and strategic leadership across the Army to include commissioned officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and Army civilian leaders. This manual will focus on ways for leaders to develop themselves and their subordinates to address complex, ill-structured problems. Concepts that will currently endure in the new manual include leaders of character and competency, foundations for leadership, leader roles, levels of leadership, and the leadership requirements model. The American professional military ethic will remain a focus area and the manual will describe an effective balance between education, training, and experience while placing more emphasis on negotiations and the leadership competency of Extends Influence Beyond the Chain of Command. The planned changes to strategic leadership includes more information on the
challenges specific to strategic leaders and how to overcome those challenges, specifically in developing the institution, its organizations, and people.  

Research and published articles continued to explore the changes within the strategic leadership domain and specifically the changes necessary for Army strategic leaders during the ever-changing national and international environment including the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Three studies, written in 2008 and 2010, explored strategic leader development, practicing strategic leadership, and overall Army leadership in the twenty-first century. One author was concerned that evolving warfare, as a complex environment and adaptive system, was forcing strategic leader development to go beyond the existing Officer Education System (OES) and Officer Evaluation Report (OER). This would force the Army to distinguish critical abilities, measure individual self-study, and operational experiences in finding, creating, and developing strategic thinkers and leaders.  

Another argued that leadership was becoming a multifaceted and symbiotic function, therefore, collaboration and cooperation by, with, and through people would force Army leaders to modify leadership philosophies across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) construct. Using a problem-management rather than a problem-solving methodology, another researcher examined existing leadership theories, doctrine, and practices to determine the “appropriateness of institutional preparation and development (education and training) of future Joint leaders.” Each of these attempted to understand existing Army leadership doctrine and the necessary future for doctrine.

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89 Thomas P. Guthrie, “Program Directive (PD) for Field Manual (FM) 6-22, Army Leadership” memorandum (Department of the Army, Center for Army Leadership, 1 September 2010).

90 James M. Hardaway, “Strategic Leader Development for a 21st Century Army” (monograph, Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Command and General Staff College, 2008), iv.


92 David A. Danikowski, “Practicing Strategic Leadership Without a License” (monograph, Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Command and General Staff College, 2010), ii.
Kimberly Boal used the complex adaptive system construct, as related to organizations, in 2007 to argue that strategic leaders played a crucial role in leading organizations away from chaos.\(^\text{93}\) Within the Norwegian military, Louise Bastviken consolidated proceedings from a 2007 seminar on leadership by articulating the importance of leadership in a multi-national environment. This review also covered indirect leadership aspects in stressful environments and strategic leading in the information age including management and leadership differences.\(^\text{94}\) Don Snider’s 2008 examination of civil-military relations’ influence on strategic leaders’ behavior claimed that recent strategic leaders did not understand their profession’s ethic and that this missing aspect needed restoration.\(^\text{95}\) Mary Crossen’s paper proposed a transcendent leadership framework for strategic leaders in the existing dynamic contexts.\(^\text{96}\)

In addition to studies and research projects, national leaders in the U.S. military and government also attempted to present a better way ahead in strategic leadership doctrine. Based on remarks made at the United States Military Academy in April 2008, Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, imparted his reflection on leadership. Beginning with the successful strategic leadership by Generals Dwight Eisenhower and George Marshall, Secretary Gates presented three axioms from their tutor and mentor, General Fox Conner, on leadership in a democratic society: never fight unless you have to, never fight alone, and never fight for long. Secretary Gates argued that these seemingly simple principles, coupled with candor, credibility, and professional dissent,


would provide success on the asymmetrical battlefield. In 2009, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, wrote that the scope of opinion on strategic leadership was so diverse, strategic leaders must be open to different points of view, from within and outside their organizations. He claimed that strategic leaders’ problems involved ambiguity, complexity, were multidimensional, and transitioned with little to no warning between various aspects across many areas of thought. In order to be successful, General Meyers claimed strategic leaders must build teams across agencies, military branches, political appointees, and across allied nations. Without these teams of teams, the strategic leader could not integrate the people within the team.

Barak Salmoni’s recent research addressed how the military should develop strategic leaders for conflicts not yet known or understood. By using the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as a model, he and his co-authors interviewed conventional and special operations officers (O6 or higher) who commanded at that level in the current fights. First defining characteristics of strategic leadership through key experiences including education, JIIM, commands, and senior staff positions, the authors queried about cautions and concerns, as well as institutional changes necessary. They concluded that the ongoing military environment had the opportunity for strategic leadership development.

Strategic leadership is a multinational and multidiscipline school of thought whose study and research has accelerated along with the changing environment. With the U.S. military engaged in two long wars – Afghanistan since 2001 and Iraq since 2003 – multiple attempts to understand, explain and predict the next, logical leap in doctrine continue. Strategic leadership is

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part of this understanding. This analysis continues the study, seen throughout this author’s research, to understand strategic leadership, how to identify potential future strategic leaders and prepare them for the uncertainty of future conflicts. By examining the ongoing strategic leadership discussions, and looking at the proposed upcoming doctrinal changes to FM 6-22 in late 2011, it is clear that strategic leadership has a place in Army doctrine and will continue to influence the identification, development, and improvement of all leaders in the U.S. Army.
Strategic Leadership's Importance Tomorrow

The second lieutenant’s understanding of Army leadership in the early 1990s was indicative of the leadership doctrine at the time. His training through that point in his career rightly focused on tactical, direct leadership using existing doctrine. The base leadership manual only briefly mentioned senior level leadership, and there was a separate manual for executive leadership. However, the regulations and manuals did not even agree in terminology or definitions. Be, Know, Do was the Army’s emphasis for all leaders, acknowledging that senior leaders would utilize different techniques and aspects of the direct leadership they had learned earlier in their Army careers. The separate doctrine further widened the gap between what junior leaders needed to learn, what senior leaders needed to be able to do and overall understanding across the Army.

Army leadership doctrine, first codified after World War II, focused exclusively on tactical leadership and influencing subordinates directly but did not included strategic leadership concepts until 1987. During the 1980s, research, articles, and discourse questioned the wisdom of neglecting the higher levels of leadership in doctrine. Strategic leadership was a new term for an older way of thinking that had its origins in the strategic leadership requirements of World War II, but had never achieved widely read status in doctrine until the Army leadership doctrine consolidation in 1999.

Tracing the articles, opinions, research, and reports across the span of the last four published U.S. Army leadership doctrine manuals over four decades shows the understanding, acceptance, and embracing done within the Army doctrine community, specifically at Fort Leavenworth in the Combined Arms Center, Command and General Staff College, and the Center for Army Leadership. This evolution in understanding and inclusion of strategic leadership thought and methodology followed the overall discourse on the theories under development outside the Army and within ideas published by military leaders and scholars. This embracing of academic ideas of strategic leadership theory and concepts shows that almost each version of
Army leadership doctrine since 1983 included more on strategic leadership, further improving this aspect of the Army’s leadership traditions. As strategic leadership discourse continues and CAL drafts the future Army leadership manual, the history of the changes, coupled with the ongoing academic and leadership schools of thought, can point towards potential future improvements in strategic leadership doctrine.

The second lieutenant commissioned in 1993 has experienced three of the last four Army leadership doctrinal manuals, felt the influence of the 1983 version through his early career leaders, and now looks forward to the next improvement in leadership doctrine. Progressing from tactical operations at the direct leadership level to influencing hundreds in multiple organizations, and assisting those strategic leaders address highly complex problems, today’s lieutenant colonel is a product of the Army’s doctrine. He benefited from the 1990 emphasis of Be, Know, Do, received exposure to higher levels of leadership with the 1999 consolidated doctrine, and studied the 2006 competency focused doctrine as a field grade officer. His experience mirrors the evolution of strategic leadership doctrine in the Army. Strategic leadership doctrine entered the Army as an afterthought, gained momentum through repeated studies, research, discourse, and implementation over time, and has become a dominant topic in Army doctrine. Inclusion of clear descriptions and explanations of operational and strategic leadership in the doctrinal centerpiece will help today’s junior leaders more easily understand Army leadership earlier in their careers, potentially improving future strategic leaders.
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